

EDITED BY
TUKUFU ZUBERI AND EDUARDO BONILLA-SILVA

WHITE LOGIC, WHITE METHODS

RACISM AND METHODOLOGY

Telling the Real Tale of the Hunt

Toward a Race Conscious Sociology
of Racial Stratification

Tukufu Zuberi and Eduardo Bonilla-Silva

Until lions tell the tale, the story of the hunt will always glorify the hunter.

—African Proverb

To the real question, how does it feel to be a problem? I answer seldom a word.

—W. E. B. Du Bois, *The Souls of Black Folk* (1903, 44)

Sociological hunters still parade the game they collect (data and arguments about people of color) with their objective rifles (White methods) and it is very likely they will continue doing so in the near future. However, in this volume the prey had a chance to tell the tale of the hunt. And the "prey" ("prey" from the perspective of the hunters) showed the weaknesses of the hunters as well as the many calibration problems of their rifles.¹ In this conclusion we attempt to bring it all together and we proceed as follows. First, we outline the contours of an alternative epistemology to the White logic. Second, we suggest the need to deracialize the analysis of race matters by conducting research not on the infamous "race effect," but on how racial stratification produces disparate outcomes among racialized groups. Our specific intent in this chapter is to spark new thinking on methods so as to turn the sociological tables on the sociology that made us, people of color, into a problem. Lastly, we speculate aloud on the kind of politics² we believe will be necessary for the epistemology and methodologies we advocate to become dominant in the wild (social scientific) kingdom.

TOWARD AN EPISTEMOLOGY OF RACIAL EMANCIPATION

Lo otro no existe: tal es la fe racional, la incurable creencia de la razón humana. Identidad = realidad, como si, a fin de cuentas, todo hubiera de ser, absolutamente *uno y lo mismo*. Pero lo *otro* no se deja eliminar; subsiste, persiste; es el hueso duro de roer en que la razón se deja los dientes.

(*The other does not exist:* such is rational faith, the incurable belief of human reason. Identity = reality; as if, all in all, everything had been absolutely *one and the same*. But the *other* does not allow itself to be eliminated; it subsists, persists; it is the hard bone in which reason loses its teeth.)

—Antonio Machado, *Juan de Mairena* (1963)

The authors in this volume, along with a number of other scholars (see, for example, the excellent collections by Stanfield and Dennis 1993; and Stanfield 1993, Twine and Warren 2000, and Bulmer and Solomos 2004; see also the many books by critical race theory scholars in the field of education on epistemology and methodology) are engaging in discussions that help us understand that race need not determine the structures that organize the distribution of life chances and well-being. This important line of scholarship in the social sciences demands we change our view of race and how we use it in our research. This new view embraces diversity, multiplicity, and heterogeneity (Zuberi 2001a; Collins 2007).

Unfortunately (or, maybe, predictably), because the social sciences were part of what Foucault (1973) labeled "the sciences of Man," the knowledge they produced was implicated in the "matrix of domination" (the race, class, gender, and sexual order of things) (Collins 2007), and fundamentally geared toward "social control" (Ross 1990).³ Hence, from the beginning, sociology—as all the social sciences—produced knowledge about "Others" (workers, people of color, gays and lesbians, etc.) as "deviants" from the "norm" (defined as White, heterosexual, bourgeois, and male). Furthermore, social statistics were created as researchers sought to formally define these "deviant" others of color (Zuberi 2001a). Difference was not regarded in the social sciences as a salutary sign of human heterogeneity, but as clear proof of the inferiority of the "deviants" from the natural "order of things" (Foucault 1973; Zuberi 2001a, 2006). From a statistical point of view this meant that normalcy could be defined by the use of a so-called bell curve (Zuberi 2001a).

Based on this "(White) gaze" (Foucault 1979), sociology explained racial inequality mostly as the outcome of the "deficiencies" of people of color whether they be construed as natural (i.e., biological) or cultural. In fact, African Americans and other people of color have been historically central to disciplines such as sociology for this reason exclusively: they have served, alongside women and workers, as the "abnormal," "deviants," and "prob-

EMANCIPATION
encia de la razón humana, todo hubiera dejado eliminar; sube dejando los dientes.
e belief of human
been absolutely one
inated; it subsists,
Mairena (1963)
er scholars (see, for
his 1993; and Stan-
olomos 2004; see
the field of edu-
n discussions that
structures that orga-
important line of
view of race and
iversity, multiplic-
ial sciences were
"the knowledge
tion" (the race,
and fundamen-
from the begin-
owledge about
) as "deviants"
ois, and male).
ght to formally
rence was not
heterogeneity,
e natural "or-
statistical point
of a so-called
plained racial
ople of color
ural. In fact,
cally central,
have served,
d "prob-

lem people" (Du Bois 1934; Zuberi 2006); they have served as the "object of study" as well as subjects for practicing social engineering and "reforms" of all sorts (Bhabha 1994). Whereas anthropology found most of its "savages" abroad (Said 1979; but see Baker 1998), sociology "found" them within (Zuberi 2006). Indeed, "The Art of Savage Discovery" has a long history in the social sciences (Ryan 1972).

But sociology and the social sciences have always had their discontents.⁴ Women such as Ida B. Wells and Jane Addams, men of color such as W. E. B. Du Bois, and a few White men such as W. I. Thomas (see Bonilla-Silva, Baiocchi, and Horton forthcoming), challenged White supremacist standards early on and offered more nuanced interpretations of inequality (racial and otherwise) in society (Zuberi 2006). And almost all the sociological dissidents of yesteryears as well as those of today (Essed and Goldberg 2002) have been connected to larger causes and movements.⁵ Their specific confrontations in sociology derived from the intellectual foundations of the social movements they were part of, such as the antilynching campaigns (Ida B. Wells), the suffragist and feminist movement (Ida B. Wells and Jane Addams), Pan-Africanism (Du Bois), and many other movements in the early part of the twentieth century.⁶

The critique of what has been known as "the sociology of race relations" has thus been intrinsically connected to the politics of resistance and decolonization projects. Whereas mainstream sociology has advocated, since the work of Robert Park, "assimilation" as the solution to America's (and the world's) racial "problems,"⁷ critical minority sociologists have insisted on fundamental changes to the social order as the only way to eliminate "the color line" (Du Bois 1903; Crenshaw 1988); whereas sociology and the social sciences have offered at best a slow, piecemeal, evolutionary process of racial change, analysts of color have insisted on the need for radical or revolutionary change.⁸ African and African Diaspora scholars such as W. E. B. Du Bois (1934) and Oliver Cox (1948), for instance, long held that only by understanding decolonization and deracialization could one understand the development of capitalism and modern society. Rather than "civilization" (the language of sociology in the early years), "modernity" (the language of sociology from the 1940s to the 1960s), or "development" (the language of sociology since the 1960s), people of color enduring colonial, neocolonial, or internal colonial domination have historically demanded freedom, equality, and respect as the way out of the bubbling racial cauldron.

Therefore, we position our efforts as part of the long (and still woefully incomplete) march for racial redemption and propose that what is needed to uproot the White logic that has organized the sociology of race relations is an *epistemology of liberation* (Moya 1997; Feagin and Vera 2001; De Sousa Santos 2006). We advocate for a new epistemology expressive of

Moving
autono
idea of
we argu
note e
domin
postm
Cartes
male,
eman
is, it i
An
not r
syste
ativi
colo
nall
the
"As
rac
tio
ad
pro
W
"I
ti
o
se
i
v
T

the movement to abolish White supremacy and liberate us all—White and non-White—from the racial prison we have inhabited for 500 years. Such epistemology is a corrective to the Tarzanic logic⁹ that has inspired (sometimes vocally, but most often, silently) sociological inquiry into racial matters that made Whites into heroes and Blacks into primitives, villains, and criminals (Young 1990). Below we provide the outline of such an epistemology fully aware that the precise content of any epistemology of social change will ultimately be shaped by the politics, values, and emotions of the movement it embodies—in this case, the movement to end White supremacy once and for all and, hopefully, achieve in the process “social emancipation.”¹⁰

In the introductory chapter to this volume we defined “White logic” as “the epistemological arm of White supremacy.” Rather than leading to a science of objectivity, White logic has fostered an ethnocentric orientation. Most researchers have embraced the assumptions of White supremacy. In fact, many researchers of color (Dinesh D’Souza and John McWhorter come to mind) are in agreement with White supremacy at the epistemic level; however, scholars of color are potentially much closer to being objective or unbiased in research on racial stratification. This point has been well argued by Iris M. Young, Paula Moya, and more recently, by Charles W. Mills. According to Mills, expressing a view to which we subscribe wholeheartedly, “hegemonic groups characteristically have experiences that foster illusory perceptions about society’s functioning, whereas subordinate groups characteristically have experiences that (at least potentially) give rise to more adequate conceptualizations” (1998, 28). Therefore, our claim for the need of an epistemology of racial liberation is not just a claim for just another “perspective.” We are not arguing that there is an “ontological symmetry between whiteness and blackness” (Headley 2004, 87). Instead, we contend that viewing racial stratification from the position of people of color (Bonilla-Silva 2001) is a privileged perspective.

At the same time, we reject the ontological and fixed existence of racial identity. Racial identity embodies the basis and nature of modern racism and White supremacy. Sociology from this point of view sees the persons of color when they are in conflict with the existence of the racism that sustains White supremacy (see Zuberi 2006; and several of the chapters in this volume on this point). While we see the confrontation with White supremacy as important, we do not see it as a totalizing experience. Overcoming White supremacy is possible for all people within its realms of domination; however, it would be foolish to act as if we did not live in a society in which the implications of race are all too real.

Second, although modernity constructed the notion of *the subject* as “a self-present origin outside of and opposed to objects of knowledge—

autonomous, neutral, abstract, and purified of particularity . . . an abstract idea of formal reason, disembodied and transcendent" (Young 1990, 125), we argue that all subjects are part of the social process and, therefore, denote epistemologically their place in the power structure—some express domination, while others express resistance to domination. In this light, as postmodern, feminist, and critical commentators have argued, the modern Cartesian subject is not truly universal, but an idealized White, bourgeois, male, atomistic, heterosexual construct.¹¹ Hence, an epistemology of racial emancipation makes explicit its foundational nexus to people of color, that is, it is both *race conscious* and *race-affirming*.

And to anticipate two easy criticisms, first, being "race conscious" does not mean we essentialize race.¹² To be race conscious is to be aware of the system of racial stratification, and to recognize the acts of survival and creativity of those marginalized by the racial hierarchy. Like other scholars of color (Ladson-Billings 2000), we recognize that racial "Others" are internally fractured along class, gender, and sexual-orientation lines as well as by the multiplicity of histories that comprise the people we call "Latinos," "Asian Americans," "American Indians," and even "Blacks." For us, having a race-conscious standpoint means that we openly acknowledge the positionality of our episteme; we do not hide the fact that the epistemology we advocate reflects the "racialized identity" and the common history of oppression shared by people of color (Ladson-Billings 2000; Collins 1998). We knowingly take the risk of using race as a category because we know that "race' in a racist society bears profound consequences for daily life, identity, and social movements" (Fine et al. 2003, 176). Furthermore, because of its emancipationist goal, this epistemic alternative *must* be race conscious so as to validate the standing, views, and even aesthetic of people of color in the "ecology of knowledges" (De Sousa Santos 2006).¹³ Second, to those who will accuse us of advocating divisive "identity politics" we respond with: We reject the view of those who wish to erase difference without first erasing the structure that produces differences in life chances (i.e., inequality and exclusion) and in identities. We advocate a move from race as soon as the conditions of racial stratification no longer exist.

Instead of the so-called universal programs and universal politics (by which authors often mean using class as the category around which to build a coalition) advocated by liberals and many progressives alike (Greenberg and Skocpol 1999), we believe it is imperative for this episteme to be openly race conscious. Such a standpoint is better suited for producing realistic knowledge about racial matters, for ultimately helping to develop *real* communication across racial boundaries, and for producing the knowledge and practices that will ultimately help abolish race as a category of exclusion (Gooding-Williams 2001).¹⁴ In this we stand strong, like Frantz Fanon,

Sojourner Truth, W. E. B. Du Bois, Ida B. Wells, and so many others; we stand strong and proud of who we are and tell sociologists and other social scientists exactly what Fanon said in his *Black Skin, White Masks*:

I am not a potentiality of something. I am wholly what I am. I do not have to look for the universal. No probability has any place in me. My Negro consciousness does not hold itself out as a lack. It is. It is its own follower. (1967, 135)

Third, the epistemology of racial liberation is unabashedly "political" in the sense that it is deeply reflective of and rooted in the liberation movements of the past, present, and future. "Knowledge," as Scranton has argued, "including the formalized 'domain assumptions' and boundaries of academic disciplines is neither value-free nor neutral . . . but is derived and reproduced in, historically and contemporaneously, in the structural relations of inequality and oppression that characterize established social orders" (Scranton 2004, 179). Hence the challenge for a critical epistemology like the one we are endorsing here "is to provide knowledge which engages the prevailing social structures . . . oppressive structures [such as] those based on class, gender, and race" (Harvey 1990, 2). Accordingly, the epistemology of racial emancipation is fundamentally geared toward the production of knowledge that is socially and politically relevant (Essed and Nimako 2006) and, hence, derides the current state of affairs in sociology and the social sciences where too many scholars do "small-scale research backed by large-scale grants" (Duberman 1999, 193).

Once again, to avoid easy criticisms, by "political" we do not mean doing politicized, one-sided, sloppy research. We mean that, like feminist and Marxist scholarship, research based on the epistemology of racial emancipation examines the practices of White supremacy and their effects and, more significantly, works toward the elimination of both.

Lastly, the epistemology of racial emancipation is global, multicultural, and in conversation and solidarity with all social movements of emancipation. It is *global* because the world system has been racialized for at least 500 years (Winant 2001; Balibar and Wallerstein 1988) and, therefore, the house race built must be demolished everywhere. It is *multicultural* because it aspires to learn from, understand, and validate the knowledge produced by the experiences of the many racialized groups in the world system suffering from the various incarnations of White supremacy. And it is in *solidarity* with the aspirations for social justice of oppressed people everywhere.

Although rooted on the racial problematic, the epistemology of racial liberation is not blind to other forms of oppression and works *with* and *for* the liberation of all oppressed people in the world. It works toward racial justice but is mindful that "racial justice is only a part of justice; one could have a society that is racially just, but unjust in other ways" (Mills 2003, 196).

People doing human eman prison built by erosexism, an learn from— in struggle. B self a priori ship, or clas racial liber [Schutte 19 notion of group diff of everyone Laclau an

The epi human have u ods, q We ha hend cantl Since ologciali

A stan is r rac im b a r

People doing research in this tradition work with others in the struggle for human emancipation; they work to demolish the monstrous and complex prison built by systems of racial and class domination, by patriarchy, by heterosexism, and by other forms of domination; and, finally, they hope to learn from—as well as to teach to—other subordinated groups and peoples in struggle. But the epistemology of racial emancipation does not empty itself *a priori* into universal projects based on human rights, world citizenship, or class, because such projects, and the categories upon which they are based, are still partial and have historically worked to subsume projects of racial liberation (e.g., the case of Cuba [Sawyer 2006] and South Africa [Schutte 1995]). The strategy we favor for coalition building is based on the notion of *radical democratic pluralism*, a stand that acknowledges and affirms group differences “as a means of ensuring the participation and inclusion of *everyone* in social and political institutions” (Young 1990, 168. See also Laclau and Mouffe 1985. Our emphasis).

TOWARD A METHODOLOGY FOR ACHIEVING RACIAL JUSTICE

The epistemology of racial emancipation has as its goal the elevation of the human by the elimination of White supremacy. As part of that process, we have urged in this volume for a relentless critique of the traditional methods, quantitative and qualitative alike, used to produce racial knowledge. We have urged analysts to search for alternative methodologies to comprehend how racial stratification produces racial inequality, and, more significantly, we have called for *deracializing* the analysis of racial stratification. Since this last point seems to contradict our call for a race conscious sociology of racial stratification, we will explain here what we mean by a deracialized analysis of race matters.

A deracialized perspective has great potential for helping us to understand society (also see Zuberi 2001a; 2006). If race is not biological, then it is not a good proxy for understanding biological processes (Marks 2002). If race is, as has been argued by the authors in this volume, a signifier for the impact of racial stratification, then we may well learn much by developing better measures of social and economic processes. Cultural differences among different populations do exist; however, race is not a satisfactory measure of these differences (Marks 1995, 2002).

We, the authors of this volume included, have argued that race is a social construct. Within this construct, the person of color does not exist outside of his or her otherness. Here we are not simply being critical in our view of racial research; we are also creatively suggesting a way forward (Zuberi 2006). Race is constructed for the purpose of maintaining a racial hierarchy.

Race does not exist as a neutral attribute of each individual. Race exists as a signifier of group and individual social status. Race is real in its social consequences. If race existed only on its condition of being believed, its life would have ceased long ago. Our desire is not to diminish the social significance of race, but to bring into view the reality of racial stratification, the reality of the experience of race, and the rationality of those who study racial dynamics and processes. We are not advancing the idea that race is the most important form of oppression. We agree with Stuart Hall who suggests a "non-reductive approach to questions concerning the interrelationship between class and race" (Hall 1986). By not reducing the problem to a single determining articulation of oppression—class or race—we avoid making circular and dogmatic arguments. To view the problem purely from a class perspective limits our ability to understand the dynamics of race. Likewise, by viewing the problem from a perspective that privileges race over class we enter into the pitfalls of racial reasoning. The solution to the problem of oversimplification may reside in a perspective that considers "intersectionality within the matrix of domination" (Collins 2000, 18, 274–76). This perspective suggests that examining how racism, sexism, classism, and other forms of domination are organized within the matrix of oppressive circumstances.

It is in the collective belief that humans are divided into races, built into the experience of everyday life, that the idea of race to which we are subordinate gains its place in the "real world." Creative critical thinkers have long been aware of the limits of racial reasoning (see Fanon 1963, 1967; Césaire 1972). In order to elevate our understanding of racial stratification we must reject the ontological and fixed existence of racial identity. From this perspective both whiteness and blackness are social problems produced by the European partitioning of humanity into races. In order to understand and to evaluate whom humans are—and specifically, for our purposes—we must look beyond our own personal or historical experience. And in order to change the place of race in the world, we must change not merely our own thinking but also the social conditions of everyday life that facilitate beliefs in race.

This volume has focused more sharply on the concepts of research methods by directing our attention onto the actions of researchers, and the power of the researcher, in conducting research. Deracialization of our research methods sets out to change the social world. Deracializing our methods will require that we disarrange the current social order. The social and economic realities of race must be changed by our actions. Deracializing our research methods is a process by which two forces—by definition opposed to each other—culminate in the rearticulation of what it means to be human. The first aspect of this process concerns how and why people are raced at, and between, birth and death. Secondly, mutual understanding or developing friendships across racial groupings cannot change racial reali-

ties; the erasure of humanity that race has brought to bear cannot be clearly understood except in the exact measure that we engage in social research to transform its social basis.

We propose an idea to produce in us a new state of consciousness in which we describe in detail the basic concepts we use in our research of racial stratification. Empirically (from ethnography to statistical analysis of census data) oriented persons have no reason to reject such reflections, for that would imply that their empiricism is, in reality, an apriorism with its sign reversed. And to commit this mistake is to violate the very foundation of the logic of scientific analysis. There is no reason for rejecting reflection.

Most research on race lacks a critical evaluation of racist structures that encourage pathological interpretations (Zuberi 2001a). These pathological interpretations have had a profound impact on our theories and methods. Our theories of society, not our empirical evidence, guide how we interpret racial stratification. Fancy methods come and go. We need a better understanding of how our methods relate to society. We are not suggesting that we discredit research findings because they lead to unwanted political conclusions. We are suggesting that we have a better understanding of the political and theoretical ideas that motivate different interpretations of social science results.

The Civil Rights, Black Power, and National Liberation movements are all forms of deracialization. Like the philosopher Charles W. Mills's (1998) idea of the "racial contract," our idea of deracialization is a critique of the nature of the "White logic" that has given rise to the misconception that we have labeled "White methods." In the tradition represented by literary critic Henry Louis Gates Jr.'s (1988) concept of signifying, deracialization marks the sense of difference from the sociology as practiced under White logic and applied in the form of White methods.

Unlike Fanon, whose classic analysis in *The Wretched of the Earth* focused on the moment or "onset" of decolonization, our new methods must allow us to focus on the process of the rise of these new social relations, the social, demographic, and political trends that follow the end of White supremacy (or the anticipation of its end), and the possibilities that are implied. Deracializing our research methods is fundamentally important if we are to turn back the tide and bring the human back into the picture.

Deracialization of our research methods is a social act, and it requires that the researcher participate in the modification of social reality. It privileges the human over the racialized individual. These new methods will need to be created by a new self-conscious action, and they will introduce a new language as part of a new social reality. The racialized and the racializer will both be humanized by the process.

Accordingly, the challenge we pose to the sociology of race relations is predominantly a political one. We preach to newcomers (and old-timers who can still listen) in sociology to refuse normativity in race research and urge them

to rely on alternative paradigms and methodologies. As does Headley (2004), we advocate for the "teleological suspension" of whiteness and White logic. Although we must continue exposing the multiple problems of research done from the White logic perspective and critiquing the racial knowledge produced through White methods, the new generation of analysts must prioritize their efforts and develop new projects, orientations, approaches, practices, and knowledge about racial stratification. To do this effectively we must all work hard to **decolonize our own sociological imagination** (Oliver 2004); to unlearn received truths about race, "race relations," and race research; to unlearn received truths even about ourselves and our own potential. The new generation of race scholars must do their work without much concern for "*el que dirán*" (what others will say). We must do a "For-Us" social science (Mendoza 2006) on racial affairs and let the representatives of whiteness continue finding, again and again, that race "is declining in significance." The race rebellions of the future will awaken them from their dream as the race rebellions of the sixties forced many of them to admit they actually knew very little about racial matters in America.¹⁵

We are extremely aware that in this age where social science data on race has become crucial (maybe even more important than data from the biological sciences) for the reproduction of racialization and racism (Dumm 1993), critical social scientists¹⁶ must do whatever they can to be active in the various social movements against White supremacy. Even if our engagement with these movements is only as supporters (but we plead to social scientists so that they become scholar activists in these movements), we should not evade our historic responsibility;¹⁷ we cannot continue business as usual and act as mere reporters of racial matters. Our ethical and political neutrality on these matters, given the *herrefolk* moral terrain of America and the world (Mills 1998), leaves our folks trapped in "*el laberinto de la soledad*" (the labyrinth of solitude).

Critical social scientists on race matters can provide data, arguments, counternarratives, and all sorts of intellectual ammunition against dominant representations about racial groups and racial inequality. And to provide better ammunition for the movements against White supremacy, the sociological and social scientific efforts in this field must be race conscious and engaged in a systematic analysis of racial stratification and its effects. A neutral, or even liberal, sociology will not do the trick, as neutrality on race matters usually means "support of the racial status quo" and liberal sociology fosters at best charitable views about people of color and reformist policies on behalf of the "problem people" (Du Bois 1903). If the social sciences are going to assist in the emancipation of people of color, their efforts, therefore, must be clearly on the side of the racially oppressed for "[i]f there is a hell for social scientists, it is precisely that they only manage to be objective if they are directly involved in a struggle, and that they have

no way of escaping
Our committed prac
supremacy in the s
dominant White,
(and some people
stratification affec
tale of the hunt re

1. Our metaph
poetic. As the aut
bodied experien
colonial corpore
categorizing, an
that racial other
a space for "the
2. Most soci
tific process. W
cial action, sci
robated by
such as Bern
houn's (ed.)

3. A word
ology, or an
We believe,
covery is an
ternatives
ogy/politi
view, whi
(a positio
way). He
what ext
ponents

4. So
ponent
within
This is
ciolog

5.
norm
ond
soc
19

no way of escaping, even through wishful thinking (Casanova 1981, 3). Our committed practice for people of color and for the elimination of White supremacy in the social sciences (the need for outing the institutionally dominant White, male, heterosexual *homus academicus* is still desperately urgent)¹⁸ and elsewhere will help lift the veil that has prevented Whites (and some people of color) from truly seeing and understanding how racial stratification affects the life chances of people of color. Only then will the tale of the hunt reflect what truly happened in the hunt.

NOTES

1. Our metaphoric choice here (the notion of "the hunt") is neither casual nor poetic. As the authors of a recent book state in their introduction, "The visceral, embodied experiences of domination and control—the immediate manifestation of colonial corporeality—were an integral part of governmental practices of codifying, categorizing, and racializing difference" (Rao and Pierce 2006, 5). Hence, we believe that racial others have been "hunted" for years in the social sciences and that this is a space for "the prey" to fight back.

2. Most social scientists deride anyone who claims politics are part of the scientific process. We contend that politics, with a small *p*, are part and parcel of all social action, scientific or otherwise. In the case of sociology, this social fact can be corroborated by even the most cursory reading of texts on the history of the discipline, such as Bernard and Bernard's *Origins of American Sociology* (1943) or Craig Calhoun's (ed.) recent *Sociology in America: A History* (2007).

3. A word of caution must be inserted here. We are not suggesting that all sociology, or any other disciplinary-based knowledge for that matter, is useless ideology. We believe, following some of Latour's ideas on science studies (1999), that all discovery is arrived at in a way that potentially combines ideology and science. The alternatives to this view are the *externalist* view, which holds that science is all ideology/politics (a position that cannot explain scientific advances) or the *internalist* view, which holds that science and scientists are somehow above the social process (a position that cannot explain how humans can work in a nonhuman or nonsocial way). Hence, sociologists may discover "social facts," but analysts must examine to what extent these "social facts" have the imprint of the social world and what components of that world they reflect.

4. Sociology, like all disciplines, has a center, a mainstream, or a normative component. But this also means that it has margins or a periphery. Thus, domination within the field of sociology (or, better, hegemony) has never been complete or total. This is why alternative views and analyses of racial matters have always existed in sociology and in the various disciplines.

5. Yet far too many members of subaltern communities have assimilated to the norms of sociology, as the alternative—imperiling their careers or working in "secondary" institutions—is unsavory. In yesteryears, for example, Black scholars in the social sciences before the birth of the African American Studies movement of the 1960s and 1970s (Aldridge and Young 2000) found "success" only by capitulating