Racism, Class Position, and the Policing of the Surplus Population

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Abstract:

This project investigates the relationship between class, race, and the likelihood of being killed by law enforcement in the United States. While acknowledging the role of racial discrimination, it emphasizes how other factors such as class position and gentrification are predictors of police lethal use of force. The study argues that class position, within capitalist political economy, is a better overall predictor than race. In addition, it highlights the need for political science to research policing issues and focuses on the influence of class contradictions, local politics, and economic forces. The research uses crowdsourced lethal use of force data and census tract income and gentrification levels to examine these dynamics. The author expects that class position and gentrification will explain many of the racial disparities.

Racism, Class Position, and the Policing of the Surplus Population

On August 8, 2015, US senator and Democratic presidential candidate Bernie Sanders spoke at "Social Security Works," an event commemorating the 80th and 50th anniversary of the enactment of Social Security and Medicare, respectively (Wilson and Smilowitz 2015). But before Senator Sanders could speak, several Black Lives Matter activists interrupted because they felt that Sanders was inadequately responding to issues of racial justice, particularly as it pertains to the killings of black Americans by law enforcement. One of the activists, Marissa Johnson, in an MSNBC interview elaborated that the aim of the interruption was to "put pressure on people who claim that they care about black lives" (Hall 2015). Specifically regarding Sanders, she averred, "if you look at Bernie Sanders's platform, you look at what he said on racial equality, he's basically a class reductionist. He's never really had a strong analysis that there is racism and white supremacy that is separate than [sic] the economic things that everyone experiences. So, we want to continue to push him on that" (Hall 2015). The issue for Johnson and the other activists who stormed the stage that day was that while Sanders had a fairly expansive economic justice platform, those policies were an inadequate response to issues of racism and white supremacy. Hence, from this perspective, his politics were class reductionist.

Earlier that year, in an interview with CNN's Wolf Blitzer, Senator Sanders was asked about his thoughts on the unrest in Baltimore following the murder of Freddie Gray by law enforcement. Sanders emphasized that "too many mostly black suspects have been treated terribly and, in some cases, murdered," and that "police officers have got to be held accountable for their actions," but also that economic factors were related to the killing of Freddie Gray:

> [I]n the neighborhood where this gentleman [Freddie Gray] lives [sic], as I understand it, the unemployment rate is over 50 percent, over 50 percent. What we have got to do as a

nation is understand that we have got to create millions of jobs to put people back to work to make sure that kids are in schools and not in jails. So, short term, we've got to make sure that police officers have cameras. We've got to make sure that we have real police reform so that suspects are treated with respect. Long term, we've got to make sure that our young people are working, they're in school, they're not hanging out on street corners. (Sanders 2015)

That is, for Sanders, the issue of people being killed by law enforcement is inextricably tied with unemployment and economic inequality: Those residents in Freddie Gray's neighborhood had little economic opportunity, which meant that they would frequently "hang out on street corners" and come into contact with police, often with deadly consequences. This was in contradistinction to claims of activists like Marissa Johnson, who saw the issue primarily as a function of racism and white supremacy.

This project aims, at least in part, to take on this question. Of course, the issue of racial discrimination and economic inequality are never mutually exclusive, and this project does not suggest such a view. However, these two very different orientations to the question of police violence are worth fleshing out further. As I will contend, while African Americans are indeed disproportionately targeted and killed by law enforcement, the phenomenon is also much broader and affects many others besides African Americans. As researchers attempting to better understand the phenomenon, it is imperative that we not only understand the racial disparity frame of reference, but also other possible causal mechanisms.

Some Background: Why this Research Matters

From a disciplinary perspective, Political Science has not adequately researched issues of policing and incarceration (a related phenomenon) in general. In their 2017 article, "Police Are

Our Government: Politics, Political Science, and the Policing of Race–Class Subjugated Communities," in the *Annual Review of Political Science*, Joe Soss and Velsa Weaver highlighted how the discipline in general has failed to "heed the call" for greater research into the issues concerning policing (2017, 568). Consequently, the discipline "continues to offer a distorted portrait of democracy and government in America and a deeply incomplete view of how politics and power operate in RCS [race and class subjugated] communities" (2017, 568). Significantly, the authors call upon the discipline to more closely examine the state's second face: " the activities of governing institutions and officials that exercise social control and encompass various modes of coercion, containment, repression, surveillance, regulation, predation, discipline, and violence" (2017, 567). It is in this spirit that this paper proceeds, as an undertaking aimed at better understanding these dynamics.

The issue of lethal uses of police force is remarkably high in the United States relative to other countries in the Global North, making it all the more urgent of as issue. While this project is not chiefly focused on comparative aspects, it nonetheless helps drive home the point regarding how serious of an issue this is. Espiner and Hancock (2022) observed that "America is in a league of its own with nearly 31 police shootings per 10 million people," making the United States's rate nearly four times that of New Zealand, and over 100 times that of England and Wales. Other countries that Espiner and Hancock (2022) investigated include Canada (9.2 per ten million) and Norway (3.6 per ten million). This underscores the urgency and need to further investigate causal forces contributing to the high incidence in the United States.

Research Question:

Is class position the best predictor of the likelihood of being killed by law enforcement even when taking into account other variables such as race?

Scholarly Audience

My research question is important for scholars like Cedric Johnson, Adolph Reed, and their colleagues who also study racism and class in American politics. It would complement the historical methods that they have used to illuminate political dynamics behind the phenomenon of police killings. Having a clear sense of the class indicators of those who are killed by law enforcement would help clarify whether the phenomenon is felt broadly across the working class, as Johnson and Reed have suggested. It also could help them better understand the class cleavages within the black population, which has been a central focus of their work. Others, such as Soss and Weaver (2017), have emphasized how the Political Science discipline has not adequately researched and theorized how the institution of policing affects citizens' political rights and how mass incarceration and police violence undermine democracy. This research could make a meaningful contribution to expanding the emphasis on this pressing issue within the discipline that should be of great interest to those such as Soss and Weaver who have called for greater focus on the issue.

Literature Review

The literature in political science on the question of police killing has focused on the question of racial disparity. For example, a controversial article published in The National Academy of Sciences (PNAS) in 2019 asserted that the authors found "no evidence of anti-Black or anti-Hispanic disparities across shootings, and White officers are not more likely to shoot minority civilians than non-White officers" (D. J. Johnson et al. 2019, 15877). This caused quite an uproar across the social sciences. Political Scientists Dean Knox and Jonathan Mummolo were among some of the more vocal critics. They voiced an issue with methods that the authors used, and published a short response (Knox and Mummolo 2020). Another lengthier article

published later by Knox, Lowe, and Mummolo (2020) elucidated the authors' claims more comprehensively. Their primary claim is that racial disparities exist and could even be underestimated because of the lack of data concerning when officers choose not to investigate; that is, there is no way of tracking how many whites they choose not to stop.

However, Adolph Reed Jr (2016), professor emeritus of political science at the University of Pennsylvania has emphasized the limitations of race politics in combatting the issue. He critiqued the antiracist orientation to the question both on normative grounds, in that, "antiracist politics is in fact the left wing of neoliberalism in that its sole metric of social justice is opposition to disparity in the distribution of goods and bads in the society, an ideal that naturalizes the outcomes of capitalist market forces so long as they are equitable along racial (and other identitarian) lines," and on empirical grounds: "when we step away from focus on racial disproportions, the glaring fact is that whites are roughly half or nearly half of all those killed annually by police. And the demand that we focus on the racial disparity is simultaneously a demand that we disattend from other possibly causal disparities" (2016).

For example, Reed (2016) found that no blacks were killed in some of the states that experienced the highest rates of police killings. Moreover, Reed (2016) references that Zaid Jilani (2015) found that 95% of police killings occurred in neighborhoods with median incomes under $100,000, and "the average neighborhood family income where a killing occurred was $57,764." He contends that policing as an institution manages the social consequences produced by "the regime of market-driven public policy and increasing direction of the state's functions at every level toward supporting accelerating regressive transfer." Reed concludes by noting that "the focus on racial disparity accepts the premise of neoliberal social justice that the problem of inequality is not its magnitude or intensity in general but whether or not it is distributed in a

racially equitable way." Cedric Johnson has made a similar observation in stressing that the rhetoric of Black Lives Matter and cognate notions like the new Jim Crow, popularized by Michelle Alexander's (2010) book, "posit[] universal black injury where, in fact, police brutality and the carceral state are experienced more broadly across the working class" (2016, 317) (C. Johnson 2016, 317).

Historical Perspective

Political Scientist Cedric Johnson looks at the question by examining policing historically, tracing back the emergence of today's policing not to slave patrols or the perpetuation of the Jim Crow order but in the "discrete social contradictions of 'postindustrial capitalism'" (2019, 171). He argues that policing since its modern inception, has always been about "disciplining the poor and protecting emergent property regimes" (2019, 172). In particular, he argues that the postwar transformation of US cities into middle-class suburbs with a high standard of living and the broader transformation of society into one of consumers produced a fundamental contradiction in that insofar as it produced middle class suburbs, it also produced an "industrial reserve of unemployed, mostly black and brown urban dwellers" (2019, 171). In this context,

> policing took a dual form: an emulatory strategy of promoting civic virtues of deference and middle-class aspiration, and a punitive strategy of defending the propertied and virtuous middle class from the outsiders, those segregated in inner-city ghettos and struggling to survive. (C. Johnson 2019, 176)

The Reagan and Bush years saw an intensification of what Johnson described as "class war at the urban level." This included a rollback of the welfare state and a concomitant expansion of the carceral state and its more aggressive policing practices in urban minority

communities (C. Johnson 2019, 177; C. G. Johnson 2023). With the rise of gentrification, the urban landscape shifted once again with the physical distance created by the suburban, post-war transformation disappearing as the middle class began to reenter cities. Real estate speculation brought "urban pioneers, house flippers, large real estate developers, and tourists" into direct confrontation with the "old ethnic neighborhoods, the unemployed, the itinerant poor, sexual minorities, and countercultural spaces" (C. Johnson 2019, 177). According to Johnson, these class contradictions are managed through "manifold technologies of policing, surveillance, and social accreditation that permit ease of movement across urban space for those of means, while regulating and constricting the poor" (2019, 178). Johnson further elaborates that this new urban landscape is,

> defined by helipads and Uber Black, artisanal grocers, boutique fitness clubs, private roads, dog parks, and relentless condo tower construction for the investor class and renascent bon vivant, and "bum-proof" benches, ankle monitors, stress policing, the demolition of public housing, water shutoffs, ubiquitous closed-circuit cameras, and check-cashing centers for the working-class enclaves. (C. Johnson 2019, 178)

For Johnson, then, modern policing has a racist dynamic, but it is not about bias or other psychologistic notions like prejudice but is rooted in maintaining the capitalist social order.

Quantitative Analysis

Quantitative work backs Johnson's claims. Feldman et al.'s (2019) study looked at the association between rates of police-related deaths and indices of neighborhood residential segregation using several different measures that included income, race/ethnicity, or both. They used the American Community Survey's 5-year estimates to obtain census tract data, and the Index of Concentration at the Extremes (ICE) to operationalize segregation. ICE allows

researchers to "simultaneously measure[] the relative concentrations of privileged and deprived residents in an area" (Feldman et al. 2019, 459). While ICE had previously been used to operationalize privileged and deprived status in terms of income alone, it has since been broadened to include other considerations such as racial/ethnic privilege and deprivation. In this case, Feldman et al. used 5 common ICE measures, defining privilege and deprivation in terms of: (1) high- versus low-income neighborhoods, (2) non-Hispanic white versus non-Hispanic black persons, (3) non-Hispanic white versus people of color (PoC), (4) high-income non-Hispanic White versus low-income Black households, and (5) high-income non-Hispanic White versus low-income PoC households. Each ICE score ranged from -1 to 1, with -1 indicating 100% of the population belonging to the most deprived group and 1 signifying that 100% of the population belonged to the most privileged group (Feldman et al. 2019, 549). In addition to the census tract measures, they included characteristics of the individuals killed in the tracts in their analyses.

Feldman et al. found that, for the years in the study (2015-16), "census tract concentrations of economic privilege were associated with lower rates of police-related deaths," and "greater concentrations of deprivation were associated with higher rates" (2019, 461). At the same time, ICE measures for racialized economic polarization did not show a meaningful difference "compared with ICE measures of census tract income or census tract race/ethnicity alone (2019, 461). The most privileged quintile of census tracts experienced police-related killings at roughly half the rate of the second most privileged quintile, regardless of whether privilege was measured solely in terms of income, by income and race/ethnicity, or by poverty (2019, 461). Individual-level analysis in combination with tract characteristics provided an additional layer of analysis. For example, when privilege and deprivation were defined solely by

census tract racial/ethnic concentration, only non-Hispanic whites experienced a lower risk of being killed by law enforcement in tracts with the highest concentration of white residents, while non-Hispanic blacks experienced a higher risk of being killed by law enforcement in census tracts with higher concentrations of non-Hispanic whites (Feldman et al. 2019, 461).

While Feldman provides an important first step at a quantitative analysis that helps back Johnson's argument, there is still more to be fleshed out with respect to how class is an important variable with regard to who is killed by law enforcement. Additional research could look more closely at how race and class interact and how much the probability of a deadly police encounter changes when the proportion of people of color or income is held constant in a census tract. In addition, understudied variables like unemployment rate could be brought into the analysis to help understand if areas of high unemployment experience greater numbers of police killings. Additional considerations such as whether an area is at risk for gentrification, could be added to the analysis to help us better understand how factors directly related to real estate affect the likelihood of being killed by police.

The Argument

Class position is going to be a better predictor of whether one is likely to be killed by police. As the allusions thus far have suggested, the phenomenon is simply too broadly affecting many different racial and ethnic populations across many different geographies, even those not typically associated with the phenomenon for it to be completely subsumed under racial discrimination. This is not to say that racial discrimination does not contribute to the high incidence of police killings in the United States. Many studies have found high levels of racial and implicit bias in departments, especially in areas with large African American populations and disproportionately smaller numbers of African American police officers (Ba et al. 2021). Some

studies have even found that black police officers are less likely to use force and that diversifying the ranks of police departments could serve as an important bulwark against police brutality and unnecessary uses of force (Ba et al. 2021). Again, this paper does not seek to challenge those findings or suggest that discrimination or bias play no role. On the whole, it seeks to advance the perspective that class position is going to be a better predictor overall.

I argue that class position is best understood in the context of capitalist political economy, as a social relation that produces the invidious outcomes seen in income and wealth inequality, unemployment rates, but is not reducible to them. Though a deeper explication of such dynamics is beyond the scope of this prospectus, it should be made clear that class contradictions sharpen and are managed by law enforcement, especially at the municipal and county level where most police departments operate. It is in that context where class indicators will become the most salient predictors.

Though many forces driving hyper-policing and lethal uses of force consistently appear across the Unites States, policing is a hyper-local institution in the US, making local politics and economic forces particularly important for understanding the phenomenon. As Senator Sanders noted in the opening vignette of this prospectus, lethal uses of force by law enforcement cannot be divorced from the broader economic dynamics and economic inequality. This most economically marginal subpopulation is likely to have low income and little resources, inadequate access to a job that pays enough for a dignified standard and be forced to participate in the informal economy. Some of the high-profile cases over the years illustrate this point clearly. Freddie Gray, who was killed in Baltimore had been involved in petty drug sales; Alton Sterling was selling used and pirated CDs in front of a gas station; Eric Garner had been selling "loosies," which are cigarettes sold individually; and George Floyd allegedly tried to use a

counterfeit twenty dollar bill to purchase cigarettes (C. G. Johnson 2023; Bogel-Burroughs and Wright 2021).

Furthermore, another salient political-economic feature is gentrification. As Johnson notes, gentrification forces have an inextricable link to the issue of hyper-policing and lethal uses of force. Police are organized institutionally at the local level and respond most directly to those local political-economic dynamics. Real estate investors and interests drive the assault on working and poor people's living standards not only through rent-intensifying speculation, but also through the concomitant policing that occurs as part of laying the groundwork for developers.

Operationalization

Key concepts for this project are race, class, and gentrification. The **dependent variable** for this project is the per capita rate of fatal police uses of force in a particular census tract. For purposes of this project, fatal police uses of force will include those incidents in which the *highest force used* is coded as tasered, gunshot, stabbed, asphyxiated/restrained, beaten/bludgeoned with instrument, chemical agent/pepper spray, asphyxiation/restrained, or less than lethal force. *Highest force used* categories excluded are: vehicle, fell from a height, drowned, medical emergency, other, burned/smoke inhalation, drug overdose, and undetermined. The reasoning is that those categories included best reflect direct use of force by an officer during and interaction, whereas the excluded *highest force used* categories include incidents where no direct physical intervention was employed, and the officer merely happened to be present during a medical emergency or a drug overdose. The most frequently observed of the excluded categories, vehicle, could include incidents where officers never physically restrained the suspect, and the suspect had simply fled recklessly.[1] **Independent variables** include: the

race of the victim and the racial composition of the census tract, the median household income of the census tract, and the stage of gentrification or its absence within the tract.

Data sources and availability of data

Three sources will be used in the project. The Fatal Encounters data set is the primary source of incidents of someone dying in the course of police activity. Journalist D. Brian Burghart started the effort in 2012 after finding that there was no comprehensive database of people killed during interactions with the police. Data have been collected using paid researchers who aggregate data from other large data sets such as the *Los Angeles Times*' "Homicide Report," public records requests, and crowdsourced data (Burghart n.d.). Crowd-sourced data is subsequently checked against published media reports or public records to verify accuracy. Every incident includes a link to a public record or media report substantiating the veracity of the details of the death (Burghart n.d.). Because of the limitations of the FBI's Uniform Crime Report (i.e., participation by law enforcement agencies is voluntary, and the number of officer-involved death is severely underreported), Fatal Encounters is one of the main sources that academics researching police uses of deadly force use (Feldman et al. 2017a; 2017b; 2019)

The US Census American Community Survey is the primary source for median household income for each census tract. Since each incident in the Fatal Encounters data set includes a latitude and longitude, it can be matched with a census tract in the American Community Survey. Census tracts are "small, relatively permanent statistical subdivisions of a county or statistically equivalent entity" that "generally have a population size between 1,200 and 8,000 people, with an optimum size of 4,000 people" (Bureau n.d.). Because of their small size, these geographic units offer the most granular view of the characteristics of a neighborhood. This makes them generally superior to other geographic subdivisions such as zip codes because

those larger units often overlap with both poorer and more affluent areas.

The *Urban Displacement Project* (UDP) is the source of gentrification data. The UDP conducts "data-driven, applied research," including census tract-level identification of gentrification or lack thereof (UDP [2019] 2023). The UDP has constructed typologies based on income and Zillow home values, and changes in income or Zillow home values between 2000 and 2018 (Table 1). For the purposes of this project, several of these typologies will be merged. Tracts will be classified as those experiencing gentrification, and those that are not. They will be further split into low, moderate, or high income for non-gentrifying tracts, and early gentrification, advanced gentrification, and gentrified for those tracts that have been subject to gentrification (Table 2).

Methodology and Causal Hypotheses

The hypothesis is that class is a better predictor of whether a tract will experience a deadly use of police force than the racial composition of the tract. Specifically, those tracts with lower income and/or experiencing gentrification should experience higher rates of lethal uses of police force than higher income tracts that have not experienced any gentrification, regardless of racial composition of the tract. This can be tested by using bivariate tests to hold one variable constant and see whether the results are consistent with this hypothesis. After conducting these bivariate analyses, a larger multivariate regression can be run to account for all variables at once and to see which have the most effect.

Tracts will be categorized as majority-black, majority-white, or majority-Hispanic/Latino. Majority shall mean greater than 50 percent of the tract is of one of the three aforementioned racial groups. Other races and ethnicities will not be included in this typology, though they will be included in the denominators in calculating proportions to determine if any one group

constitutes a majority. The race of the victim is specified in most of the entries in the data set of lethal uses of police force. This will be used later as a robustness check against other variables, such as the racial composition of the tract.

All tracts will be binned according to the income classifications in Table 2: low income, moderate income, and high income. With all tracts that meet the above racial majority criteria aggregated into majority-black, majority-white, or majority-Latino, income will be held constant to see if per-capita rates of police uses of lethal force vary between majority-black, majority-white, and majority-Latino regions. The same can be done with income. For example, between all majority-black tracts, do we see a different rate in police uses of lethal force in lower income tracts compared to moderate or high-income tracts? This would be an effective way to test the counterargument; that is, that race is the most important factor contributing to a higher incidence of police violence. If that counterargument is correct, the per capita rate of police uses of lethal force should remain consistent across all income categories. However, if the lower income tracts experience higher per capita rates, then that would lend credence to this paper's claim that class is the more important causal variable (Table 3).

Lastly, gentrification can be introduced as a causal variable (Table 2). The same bivariate scheme can be employed to assess the causal effects of gentrification. That is, between all tracts experiencing the same level of gentrification, how, if at all, do the rates of police uses of lethal force vary between majority-white, majority-black, and majority-Latino tracts? And how do rates vary within each aggregate of tracts with a majority of one race? If race is the most important factor, then one should not expect to see a significant difference in, for example, the rate between majority-white tracts experiencing no gentrification, and the tracts experiencing early or ongoing gentrification. If significant differences are observed, then that would support the claim that class

is the most important causal variable (Table 3).

I expect to find that class and gentrification indicators largely predict a greater incidence of lethal uses of force. However, because discrimination also is causal force that does to some extent operate independently from economic factors, I expect some racial disparity to still remain even after controlling for income and gentrification. In the final analysis, considering both how discrimination plays a role and how class and political economy have causal effects will enhance our understanding of the phenomenon and could inform discussion both among academics and those outside the academic community who want to think critically about the issue and how to combat it.

Criticisms and limitations

Possible criticisms and limitations of this approach are that it can only examine census tract level data and not individual level data. Preferably, data about individuals killed by police would be collected for this analysis, but that is not possible since income or other class indicators about individuals are not maintained and readily available, and it is unlikely that governmental institutions, such as the Internal Revenue Service would release such data. If there were a way for elected officials to lobby for deidentified information about individuals to be released by the IRS or another authority, that would provide a rich analysis that could reveal dynamics that this paper cannot. At the same time, class is always a difficult concept to operationalize, and one possible criticism is that income is an inadequate proxy for class in that it fails to capture power relations effectively. That notwithstanding, income is still a useful variable class outcomes because it does effectively capture whether one is deprived of an extremely important resource, money.

Endnotes

[1] It is important to point out that the excluded cases are not undeserving of scrutiny. It is quite possible that officers acted inappropriately in cases in which no direct force was applied. However, for purposes of this project, it is best to exclude these categories since it is unclear whether the officers' behavior or presence influenced the fatal outcome in any way.

Tables and Figures

MODIFIED TYPES	CRITERIA
LOW-INCOME/SUSCEPTIBLE TO DISPLACEMENT	• Low or mixed low-income tract in 2018
ONGOING DISPLACEMENT OF LOW-INCOME HOUSEHOLDS	• Low or mixed low-income tract in 2018 • Absolute loss of low-income households, 2000-2018
AT RISK OF GENTRIFICATION	• Low-income or mixed low-income tract in 2018 • Housing affordable to low or mixed low-income households in 2018 • Didn't gentrify 1990-2000 OR 2000-2018 • Marginal change in housing costs OR Zillow home or rental value increases in the 90th percentile between 2012-2018 • Local and nearby increases in rent were greater than the regional median between 2012-2018 OR the 2018 rent gap is greater than the regional median rent gap
EARLY/ONGOING GENTRIFICATION	• Low-income or mixed low-income tract in 2018 • Housing affordable to moderate or mixed moderate-income households in 2018 • Increase or rapid increase in housing costs OR above regional median change in Zillow home or rental values between 2012-2018 • Gentrified in 1990-2000 or 2000-2018
ADVANCED GENTRIFICATION	• Moderate, mixed moderate, mixed high, or high-income tract in 2018 • Housing affordable to middle, high, mixed moderate, and mixed high-income households in 2018 • Marginal change, increase, or rapid increase in housing costs • Gentrified in 1990-2000 or 2000-2018
STABLE MODERATE/MIXED INCOME	• Moderate, mixed moderate, mixed high, or high-income tract in 2018
AT RISK OF BECOMING EXCLUSIVE	• Moderate, mixed moderate, mixed high, or high-income tract in 2018 • Housing affordable to middle, high, mixed moderate, and mixed high-income households in 2018 • Marginal change or increase in housing costs
BECOMING EXCLUSIVE	• Moderate, mixed moderate, mixed high, or high-income tract in 2018 • Housing affordable to middle, high, mixed moderate, and mixed high-income households in 2018 • Rapid increase in housing costs • Absolute loss of low-income households, 2000-2018 • Declining low-income in-migration rate, 2012-2018 • Median income higher in 2018 than in 2000
STABLE/ADVANCED EXCLUSIVE	• High-income tract in 2000 and 2018 • Affordable to high or mixed high-income households in 2018 • Marginal change, increase, or rapid increase in housing costs

Table 1. Source: Urban Displacement Project.

	Combined Typology Used	UDP Typology
No Gentrification	Low Income	Low-Income/Susceptible to Displacement
		At Risk of Gentrification
	Moderate Income	Stable Moderate/Mixed Income
		At Risk of Becoming Exclusive
	High Income	Stable/Advanced Exclusive
Gentrification Occurring	Early Gentrification	Ongoing Displacement of Low-Income Households
		Early/Ongoing Gentrification
	Advanced Gentrification	Advanced Gentrification
	Gentrified	Becoming Exclusive

Table 2: Urban Displacement Project typologies combined for purposes of this paper.

H$_1$: Holding income constant, lethal uses of police force remain roughly the same across racial/ethnic groups.	**H$_3$:** Within each racial/ethnic group, police uses of lethal force increase as gentrification processes begin and taper off once gentrified.
H$_2$: Within each majority racial/ethnic group tract, police uses of lethal force will be greater in lower income tracts.	**H$_4$:** Across all tracts at the same gentrification stage, police uses of lethal force should be about the same regardless of majority-race status.

Table 3: Hypotheses

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