


# SSL/TLS

- Transport-layer security protocol
  - Often used to secure reliable protocols (TCP)
  - Does not require pre-shared keys
  - Most common usage: https
    - E-commerce (\$200bn/2008), Banking, etc.




# Threat Model



# Threat Model

Q: How does an adversary run this attack?



# SSL/TLS

- Version 1.0 (pre-1995)
  - Non-public Netscape protocol
- Version 2.0 (1995)
  - Many flaws: export-weakened keys, rollback
- Version 3.0 (1996)
  - Some flaws (Wagner, Schneier)
- TLS Version 1.0 (1999)
  - Version 1.2 is current standard (as of 8/08)

# SSL/TLS

- **Extremely flexible protocol**
  - Lots of options
  - Backwards compatibility (TLS 1->SSL 3->SSL 2)



1. Negotiate peer capabilities
2. Exchange certificates
3. Session key establishment
4. Secure communications
5. Session expiration/rekeying



# SSL/TLS

- Negotiation:




I speak SSL 2.0, 3.0.  
I support ciphersuites X,Y.  
I don't require a client cert.

1. Negotiate peer capabilities

2. F

I speak SSL 3.0.  
I support ciphersuite X.  
I don't have a client cert.



# SSL/TLS

- Certificate Exchange



seed<sub>1</sub>

2. Exchange certificates

Here's my cert:  
{ pk, bofa.com,  
Not a CA, Expires 10/1/2008,  
signed by pk<sub>Verisign</sub> } &  
seed<sub>2</sub>



# SSL/TLS

- Session key establishment
  - Various options
  - Common approach: RSA based



$$C = \text{RSA-ENC}_{pk}(\text{seed}_3)$$

1. Negotiate peer capabilities
2. Exchange certificates
3. Session key establishment

$$\begin{aligned}\text{seed}_3 &= \text{RSA-DEC}(\text{sk}, C) \\ k_s &= H(\text{seed}_1 \parallel \text{seed}_2 \parallel \text{seed}_3)\end{aligned}$$


Secure communication  
4. Session expiration

$$k_s = H(\text{seed}_1 \parallel \text{seed}_2 \parallel \text{seed}_3)$$



# SSL/TLS

- Secure communication
  - In practice, we derive separate MAC & encryption keys



# SSL/TLS

- Key expiration/rekeying
  - Key has a defined lifetime
  - If session drops within that lifetime, we restart:
    - This shortcut saves PK operations



1. Negotiate peer capabilities
2. Exchange certificates
3. Session key establishment
4. Secure communications
5. Session expiration/rekeying



# Attacks on SSL2

- Many and varied...
- Major vulnerability:
  - Ciphersuite list not authenticated
  - Active attacker could modify the message to specify export-weakened ciphers

**Bank of America**



Bank of Opportunity™

I support ciphersuites  
X,Y, Ridiculous.



# SSL3

- All of the problems with SSL2 fixed!
- Well, not quite:
  - Ciphersuite rollback attack (weaker)
  - Key-exchange algorithm rollback
  - Version rollback
  - (Weak) traffic analysis
  - Also, uses some non-standard primitives

# SSL3 Handshake




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[http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Ssl\\_handshake\\_with\\_two\\_way\\_authentication\\_with\\_certificates.svg](http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Ssl_handshake_with_two_way_authentication_with_certificates.svg)

# Ciphersuite Rollback

- Most messages sent during client/server handshake are authenticated
  - Final MAC is sent at finish message
  - However, [change cipher spec] message is not included in the MAC
  - Tells the other party to start using encryption/authentication
  - Attacker can modify/drop this message!


# Ciphersuite Rollback



[change cipher spec to Auth]  
[finalize: MAC]




# Ciphersuite Rollback



# Ciphersuite Rollback

- Big caveat:
  - Only works when client asks for authentication without encryption



Server thinks encryption is disabled, but gets an encrypted MAC

# Key-Exchange Rollback

- SSL3 standard supports two ephemeral key exchange modes:
  - 1. Server publishes ephemeral RSA parameters (signed under its certified signing key)
  - 2. Server publishes ephemeral DH parameters
  - Client may be able to pick which to use
- Why ephemeral key exchange?
  - Advantages of Diffie-Hellman? RSA?

# Key Exchange - RSA



I'd like to use RSA-ephemeral

RSA Parameters ( $N, e$ ), signature



# Key Exchange - DH




I'd like to use Diffie-Hellman


---

DH Parameters ( $p$ ,  $g$ ,  $g^a$ ), signature

---



# Key Exchange Rollback




I'd like to use DH

I'd like to use RSA

DH Parameters ( $p, g, g^a$ )

RSA Encrypt:  $k^g \text{ mod } p$

Since  $p$  is a prime, we can compute inverses. Recover  $k$ .



Normal RSA parameters:  
( $N, e$ )

I assume  $p$  is the RSA modulus, and  $g$  is the RSA exponent. I ignore the extra value.

# Version Rollback

- Release of SSL3 didn't make SSL2 browsers go away
  - Servers still accepted SSL2 requests
  - Attacker could modify [client hello] message to specify SSL2
  - Server continues with SSL2 connection, attacker uses SSL2 attacks

# Version Rollback

- Version rollback is a big problem!
  - SSL, SSH, IPSEC...
  - Example: PPTP
    - Can disable encryption, force use of a weaker password authentication protocol
  - Example: L2TP
    - Better! But many implementations automatically downgrade to PPTP if L2TP connection fails

# Traffic Analysis: SSL3

- Example:
  - First HTTP request typically looks like:


```
GET / HTTP/1.1
Host: cnn.com
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; U; Intel
Mac OS X 10_5_6; en-us) AppleWebKit/525.27.1
(KHTML, like Gecko) Version/3.2.1 Safari/
525.27.1
```

- From ciphertext length, we may be able to work out URL information

# Traffic Analysis++

- **Digression: The case of encrypted VoIP**
  - Some VoIP protocols use VBR encoding, size of data packets depends on signal
  - Also include “silence suppression” (VAD)
  - Therefore, total traffic is highly correlated to the contents of the line.

Good news:  
Most VoIP implementations  
don't actually use VBR/  
supression




# **SSL: Current Events**

## **2/2009**


# Current Events

- Black Hat Federal 2009 (last week)
  - Moxie Marlinspike: SSLStrip
    - (now in the wild)
    - Does not break SSL
    - Instead: takes advantage of the way SSL is used




# HTTP->HTTPS

- Typical Banking Experience:
  - SSL URLs begin with https://
  - But users rarely type the prefix



User enters: americanexpress.com



[https://home.americanexpress.com/home/mt\\_personal\\_cm.shtml?](https://home.americanexpress.com/home/mt_personal_cm.shtml?)



Login page: https



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User ID

Remember Me [What's this?](#)

Password

Cards -- Check and Pay Bill

LOG IN



[Forgot ID or Password?](#)

IMPORTANT ANNOUNCEMENTS

- Delta and AXP Announce Extension of Co-Branded SkyMiles Credit Card



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# HTTP->HTTPS

- If you can intercept the user's connection:
  - Don't redirect, or:
  - Redirect to malicious site, unsecured (http)



User enters: americanexpress.com

GET http://amex.com

REDIRECT http://secure.amex.com

GET https://secure.amex.com

SSL secured web page


User login info



# HTTP->HTTPS

- If you can intercept the user's connection:
  - Homograph site: **paypal.com** (with a capital i), or:
  - Use clever IDN tricks e.g.,


**https://www.gmail.com/accounts/ServiceLogin!f.ijjk.cn**



# HTTP->HTTP->HTTPS

- It can be worse:
  - Some sites give an http page with a form that submits via https

User enters: americanexpress.com



GET http://americanexpress.com



Unsecured http web page

User login info



Wachovia – Personal Finance and Business Financial Services

<http://wachovia.com/>

**Login page: http**

 **WACHOVIA**

**LOGIN** 

User ID:

Remember my User ID

Password:   
(case sensitive)

Service: Choose a service...

**Login**

[Forgot User ID or Password?](#)

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Education Loan Customers: [Login](#)

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