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South African Hospitals Commission

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Other experiments referred to were those of Mr. H. Crouch upon the action of chloroform. Stress was laid on the fact that the really serious symptom in threaon the lact that the really serious symptom in threatened death by chloroform was cardiac failure, not respiratory failure. The great fall in blood pressure caused by the inhalation of chloroform was shown by plethysmographic records to be due chiefly to cardiac enfeeblement. A further point, which may prove of great value, was that amplications are considered to act to compare the control of nitrite appeared to act in some respects as an antidote to the cardiac action of chloroform. In an animal to which amyl nitrite had been previously administered, chloroform no longer gave the great fall in blood pressure.

## SOUTH AFRICAN HOSPITALS COMMISSION.

AT the first meeting of the Commission, held on July 24th, after the opening statement by the Chairman, Lord Justice Romer, which was published in the British Medical Journal of July 28th, the first evidence taken was that of the Director-General of the Army Medical Service, who gave particulars of the working of his department, and the arrangements made in time of peace for future wars. He said that every demand made for South Africa up to date had been met. There had been ample supplies of doctors, nurses, beds, and medical appliances; but he could not say whether the doctors and appliances sent out had been properly distributed. He had not in his official capacity received any complaints of any special hospital. Next came the Assistant-Director of the Army Medical Service, who stated that the medical service was in respect of transport at the mercy of the Army Service Corps, or rather of the General. After some further evidence from departmental officials, Lieutenant-Colonel G. Sterling Ryerson, of the Canadian Army Medical Staff, expressed the firm conviction that the best that was possible in the circumstances was done for the sick and wounded.

At the second sitting, on July 25th, the Rev. W. H. Orford, who was attached to a hospital in Bloemfontein, said there was no overcrowding. The nursing was all done by orderlies, who worked splendidly. He had never heard any complaint from the men, either at the hospital where he was for two months or at two others in which he was. With regard to vermin he said that if a new brick building was put up even upon new ground in South Africa it was immediately infested. Sir Howard Vincent, M.P., who visited several hospitals, said the arrangements were beyond all praise. He heard no complaints even from the men of his own regiment, who would have spoken freely to him. Mr. Watson Cheyne also spoke well of the medical arrangements. He was inclined to think the epidemic was not typhoid, or at least that a great deal of camp fever had been mixed up with typhoid. No neglect of the sick or wounded came under his notice. An immense amount of the energies of the medical staff was wasted in administrative and clerical work. Next came a trooper of the C.I.V. who had himself been in hospital, and who said that as far as he knew there was no want of attention either at Bloem-fontein or at Wynberg. A full report of the evidence is given

below.

Surgeon-General J. J. Jameson, Director-General of the Army Medical Service, said that with regard to the constitution of the department in reference to preparing for the care of sick and wounded, there was a personnel of officers and men for two army corps and a cavalry brigade. In case of war being threatened the Adjutant-General communicated with witness, stating where the war was to be and the strength likely to be engaged. He was then desired to submit a proposal, which would afterwards be discussed by the Army Board, as to the medical requirements, including the percentage of beds required. In unhealthy climates the estimate ranged from 10 per cent. to 25 per cent. of the total strength. Then he prepared a memorandum showing the probable diseases likely to be encountered, the kind of supplies and provisions to be obtained, and everything connected with the sanitary part of the campaign. He also furnished all the medical officers engaged with a memorandum showing them what diseases they would have to contend with and how to obviate them, and the necessary sanitary precautions. The memorandum which had been prepared for the present war dealt with temperature, rainfall, winds, precautions required on account of climate, and the following prevailing diseases: Enteric fever, dysentery, diarrheea, malarial fevers, parasitic diseases, ophthalmia, and pneumonia. Immediately the war broke out it was found that the medical personnel for two army corps and a cavalry brigade were exhausted. The number of medical officers in South Africa on September 18t, 1890, was 32. During September 19 serve sent out, in October 138, in November 102, in December 38, in January, 1900, 44, in February 48, in March 50, in April 10, in May 8, and in June 10, making a total of 508. This month 20 more were being sent out. The figures did not include the medical

officers of colonial contingents. Every demand for South Africa up'to date had been met. There had been ample supplies for the sick and wounded, of doctors, nurses, beds, and medical appliances. He could not say whether the doctors and appliances sent out were rightly distributed in South Africa. He then read the following note on the state of the sick and wounded at Bloemfortein on April 27th: "Mr. Eurotet-Courts derived in South Africa. He then read the following note on the state of the sick and wounded at Bloemfortein on April 27th: "Mr. Eurotet-Courts derived in South Africa. He then read the following note on the state of the sick and wounded at Bloemfortein on April 27th: "Mr. Eurotet-Courts derived in the state of the sick and wounded at Bloemfortein on April 27th: "Mr. Eurotet-Courts derived in the state of the sick and wounded and the state of the sick and wounded the state of the sick and wounded the state of the sta

requested; and it was found necessary to import them, which in his opinion was a mistake.

Sir Ralph Knox, Permanent Under-Secretary for War, said the Army Medical Department had no executive authority, but according to what was required in the field, had togo to one of the four high military officers of the War Office—either the Adjutant-General, the Quartermaster General, the Inspector General of Fortifications, or the Director General of Ordnance; and while, spesking generally, all its applications were granted, they were usually referred to the Army Board. The preparations of all the responsible departments were based on the assumption that for a war of attack or of defence it was necessary to send out two army corps and a cavalry division giving an aggregate of about 90,000 men. At the same time, their preparations were framed in respect of a third army corps at home, but they were on a more moderate scale. Replying to a question respecting the delay in getting the base hospitals ready, the witness said that as a matter of fact the Government had not in July, or even in August, made up its mind as to what would have to be done. As to suggestions or complaints of delay, or insufficiency of hospital equipment and transport not hospital purposes, the fact was that the Army Medical Department desired that all medical matters in the field should be under their direct control, and in a large measure that was so in the present campaign. Of course the difficulties of transport had to be taken into account, and the main transport had to be maintained, even though the medical transport suf-

fered in consequence. So far as he was aware, the War Office had not received any complaints respecting the management of the hospitals beyond those contained in Mr. Burdett-Contité's letters.

Lieutenant-Colonel C. Sterling Ryerson, Canadian Army Medical Staff Control of the Contr

there he received the only complaint made, and that was Commandant Pretorius. He also visited No. 2 Hospital close by on the same day, and again on March 5th when he was quite alone. He said there were two men of his own regiment in the hospital, and he conversed with them, and they would no doubt have spoken to him if they had had complaints to make. On February 14th he had an opportunity of going round the whole of Sir kedvers Buller's army, and seeing the provision made for taking away the wounded from the fighting line. Everything was done that could possibly be done, and it was remarkable to see with what skill the medical department took up their dressing stations. There was, however, always a tendency on the part of bearers to linger a little when they got tired. As to the red cross on the waggons he did not think it was sufficient indication, as it was difficult to see it at a long range. The Boers painted their ambulance trains white. He was at Chieveley the best part of a week, and he went amongst the officers and men, and it would be impossible on anything he heard to found any substantial complaint. Then he visited Sir William Gatacre's column at Sterkstroom. There typl:oid was very prevalent, and there were three or four wards of bad enteric cases. He did not ascertain that there was any real cause of complaint that could be avoided. He arrived at Paardeberg on February 27th. He was able to see the hospitals there, and also the arrangements for carrying the wounded from Paardeberg to Modder River, and he was bound to say that it was to be regretted that the number of ambulances in the bearer company were reduced in order to obtain extra mobility. The complement of the bearer company was ten ambulances, and these were reduced by the exigencies of the moment to two. That was a very bad time, because a convoy had just been captured by the Boers, and there was great pressure. He visited the general hospital at Kimberley, and it was as good as any hospital in London. After leaving Kimberley, and it was

ggain visited the hospitals in Capetown, and he heard no complaints from any of the men in his own regiment or the members of the C.I.V., who all perfectly well knew that he went out to see if he could do anything to improve their condition. Taking all the exigencies of the case into consideration he could not speak too highly as to the general strangement. Cheyne said that he had visited several military hospitals in fouth Africa. There was no real trouble about the sick and wounded. Of course there was overcrowding in the field hospitals, and they were short of equipment. The sick were attended to, and were beling sent back to the base hospital. Being out in the open did not affect the patients a bit, for it was a beautiful time of the year. They ran rather short of dressings, but the medical comforts were all right. The only hardship was the long distance the men had to be sent back in ox waggons. They could not expect a large proportion of army medical men to be good surgeons any more than among civilian surgeons. As to the ordered officers were very good. The witness went on to say that at Drietfontein they had proof that the ambulances were insufficient in numbers. Ambulances had been left behind partly in consequence of the exigencies of the advance and partly in the hope that they would not be required. He was at Bloemfontein till April 25th or 21st. During the greater part of that time the enteric epidemic was at its worst, but he believed there were more cases in May. Within rive days of reaching Bloemfontein could skeenson had, we weeks, and when he returned there had been 400. There was a point which he thought the medical members of the Commission might consider, and that was how far this epidemic was one of typhoid fever. The great majority of cases recovered in ten days or a fortnight, and there were other characteristics which made him think it was not typhoid. As soon as Bloemfontein was left there were hardly any cases, but at Kroomstadit broke out again. The great bulk of the exist of the mou