

CS396: Security, Privacy and Society

Homework #1

Instructions

Please carefully read the following guidelines on how to complete and submit your solutions.

1. The homework is **due on Friday, February 23rd, at 11:59pm**. Late submissions are accepted subject with a penalty of 15 points per 12 hours late (rounded down). Starting early always helps!
2. Solutions are accepted only via Canvas, where all relevant files should be submitted **as a single zip archive**. This should include your **typed answers as a .pdf file** and **the source code** of any programming possibly used in your solutions.
3. Unless otherwise specified, for any assignment involving programming you may use any **programming language** of your choice. If asked, you should be able to explain details in your source code (e.g., related to the design of your program and its implementation).
4. You are bound by the Stevens Honor System. You may use any sources related to course materials, but information from external sources **must be properly cited**. Your submission acknowledges that you have abided by this policy.

Problem 1: Shared or forgotten keys? (15%)

Long ago, Alice and Bob shared an n -bit secret key but now they are no longer sure they still possess the same key. To verify that the key k_a currently held by Alice is the same as the key k_b currently held by Bob, they need to communicate over an **insecure channel**.

- (1) Which **two basic security properties** should be considered in the design of a secure protocol for solving the above problem and why these properties become relevant in this setting?
- (2) Suppose that Alice and Bob use the following protocol to check if they share the same secret.

1. Alice generates a random n -bit value r .
2. Alice computes $x = k_a \oplus r$, and sends x to Bob. $enc(k)$ $x \oplus y$
3. Bob computes $y = k_b \oplus x$ and sends y to Alice. $dec(k)$ $x \oplus r \oplus k \oplus x$
4. Alice compares r and y . If $r = y$, she concludes that $k_a = k_b$ —that is, Alice and Bob share a secret key.

Does the above protocol satisfy the two security properties identified in question (1)?

$r = 0010$
 $k = 0110$
 \rightarrow

A.
 $r = 0101$

Problem 2: Perfect or imperfect ciphers?

(15%)

yes
no

(1) Assume that an attacker knows that a user's password is either $p_1 = \text{abcd}$ or $p_2 = \text{bedg}$. Say the user encrypts his password using the Vigenère cipher, and the attacker sees the resulting ciphertext c . Show how the attacker can determine the user's password, or explain why this is not possible, when the period t used by cipher is 1, 2, 3, or 4 respectively. The period is the length of the key before it repeats.

(2) Show that the mono-alphabetic substitution cipher is trivial to break when the attacker launches a chosen-plaintext attack. How much chosen plaintext is needed to recover the entire secret key? What is the shortest chosen single-message plaintext that you can find, which is a valid English message and would successfully recover the key? Finally, under which conditions, and why, is the mono-alphabetic substitution cipher perfectly secure (against a ciphertext-only attacker)?

Problem 3: Crypt-analyze this!

(35%)

I just discovered that two of my CAs, Alice and Bob, have been secretly communicating with each other in our common group chat that we use for course matters. I am pretty sure they make use of one-time pad encryption with the following parameters: The message space consists of English messages which are 33 characters long, where only letters (of either case), spaces and possibly punctuation marks are used. Please help me break their code!

(1) Below are eleven ciphertexts (in hex format) that they exchanged just minutes ago today... (Friday, Feb 3, 2023):

cribdragging...

web

$c_i = m_i \oplus k$

$c_1 \oplus c_2$

00 0d 1a 07 26 3a 37 6b 11 1c 3a 07 39 0b 15 46 06 02 1a 4c 00 3c 10 43 07 17 04 25 4c
03 09 10 00
0d 0d 19 53 06 74 33 2a 0b 59 3b 16 31 01 52 1f 0a 16 54 1c 1c 21 03 06 16 06 09 38 4c
00 04 15 1f
15 1f 0c 00 20 39 35 6b 0a 17 2c 53 24 0c 1f 03 45 13 15 08 59 3a 16 43 02 1d 17 2a 05
19 06 59 53
0d 09 10 53 38 31 70 3f 04 15 22 53 31 07 1d 13 11 43 00 04 1c 73 04 0d 06 05 00 33 1f
57 0f 16 04
1d 48 01 1c 3f 31 70 25 0a 59 3a 07 25 01 17 08 11 43 17 0d 17 73 17 06 14 16 45 35 04
1e 12 59 53
00 00 08 07 6f 23 3f 3e 09 1d 69 11 35 45 03 13 0c 17 11 4c 1c 3e 07 02 07 00 04 32 1f
1e 0f 1e 53
18 1d 0a 18 26 38 29 6b 2a 2d 19 53 39 16 52 16 00 11 12 09 1a 27 09 1a 55 01 00 22
1e 12 15 59 53
03 09 1a 1d 3b 74 24 23 00 0b 2c 53 31 45 11 07 11 00 1c 4c 16 21 45 10 1a 1f 00 35 04
1e 0f 1e 53
19 09 10 11 2a 74 29 2e 11 59 00 53 34 0c 16 08 11 43 04 0d 00 73 04 17 01 17 0b 35 05
18 0f 59 53
03 0d 49 00 27 3b 25 27 01 59 3b 16 31 09 1e 1f 45 0f 11 0d 0b 3d 45 02 17 1d 10 35 4c
1e 15 59 53
1a 09 01 53 2b 3b 3e 3f 45 0d 21 1a 3e 0e 52 11 00 43 1a 09 1c 37 45 17 1a 52 45 61 4c
57 41 59 53

Write down the 11 plaintext messages that were exchanged. You may write a program that will help you with your cryptanalysis. In designing your program, remember that most likely spaces will be among the most frequent characters in the plaintexts, and carefully observe what their role may be in the mapping from plaintexts to ciphertexts. **Some of the exercises from lab might help!** Explain what your cryptanalysis strategy is and what algorithm your program implements.

Essay 4: One more Crypto controversy...

(35%)

The so-called Dual_EC_DRBG pseudorandom generator (PRG) operates in the following simplified manner in order to incrementally generate blocks of pseudorandom bits r_1, r_2, \dots :

- The PRG is initiated by randomly selecting two (2-dim) points P, Q in a given elliptic curve over a given prime field size p , so that for any integer t the points P^t, Q^t are well-defined.
- Starting from an initial random seed s_0 in order to generate the k -th pseudorandom block r_k :
 - the PRG's internal secret state s_k is updated to the x -coordinate of point $P^{s_{k-1}}$; and
 - the PRG's k -th output r_k is the x -coordinate of point $Q^{s_{k-1}}$, appropriately truncated to a smaller bit-string.

Yet, if the points P, Q are known to be related in the form of $Q^e = P$, or if the output truncation rate is more than $1/2$, then this PRG is known to be insecure—that is, a brute-force type of attack is likely to reveal the PRG's internal state s_k . The rest is history...

Read about the Dual_EC_DRBG design, standardization, implementation, adoption and abandonment from its Wikipedia entry and Matt Green's blog entry, and answer the following questions.

- (1) Describe briefly the controversy related to Dual_EC_DRBG. To get full credit you must identify all main stakeholders (organizations or companies rather than individuals), their involvement in the events, and their possibly conflicted goals.
- (2) Describe a major ethical concern regarding the issue at hand. To get full credit, articulate the concern clearly as well as how it relates to this particular issue.
- (3) Describe some of the professional or societal codes of ethics that relate to the events. Include a description of why this code is adopted and what the impact may be if the code is not applied.