Address Space Sparsity and Fine Granularity

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Abstract

To fully exploit the potential of large address spaces, e.g. 2^{64} -byte, the sparsity problem has to be solved in an efficient manner. Current address translation schemes either cause enormous space overhead (page table trees) or do not support address space structuring, object grouping and mixed page sizes (inverted page tables). Furthermore, an essential handicap of current virtual address spaces is their coarse granularity. It restricts the concept's relevance to low level OS technology. Without this constraint, mapping could be a vertically integrating paradigm, useful on all levels from hardware up to application programming.

Guarded page tables help solving both problems. They permit significant extensions of the current programming model without performance degradation: sparse occupation and coarse-grain (4K) pages can be handled by purely conventional hardware; fine-grain (down to 16-byte) pages without fine-grain aliasing become also possible using conventional cache and TLB technology combined with stochastically colored allocation. Unrestricted aliasing and unlimited user level mapping without performance degradation may become possible by hardware innovation.

1 Motivation

Upcoming 64-bit processors can lead to a quantum leap in the virtual address space paradigm. 2^{32} -sized spaces have proved to be a convenient and sufficiently powerful *local* tool for most problems. 2^{64} -sized spaces do not only permit to handle larger problems, but they offer new possibilities by means of *flat global* address spaces. This is a promising paradigm for distributed systems – especially for ob-

ject oriented and/or persistent ones – and perhaps also for supercomputers. There are strong reasons that "unlike the move from 16- to 32-bit addressing, a 64-bit address space will be revolutionary instead of evolutionary with respect to the way operating systems and applications can use virtual memory." (Koldinger, Chase, Eggers [8]). Experimental single address space operating systems are for example Opal [4, 3] and Mungi [6]; a similar design is described in [2] and [16]. The latter system especially relies on rich per page protection facilities.

One serious problem coming up in this context is sparsity. A 2^{64} -byte address space will ever be sparsely occupied. (Otherwise, a $2^{\approx 32}$ -space would do as well.) After all that we have learned from history and from Murphy, we should expect that systems and applications in real life will tend to unlimited sparsity. Imagine, for example, the complete usenet or other huge distributed databases mapped into each single address space. Sparsity is also essential for architectures relying on anonymity as protection mechanism [18].

The critical point in supporting sparsely occupied huge spaces is the efficiency of the mapping mechanism. Currently used address translation schemes either explode in space requirements or do not support structuring. We need a scheme which is tree-based, efficient (independent of the degree of sparsity) and as efficient as existing ones.

Conventional schemes meet only two of these requirements: page table trees (also called multilevel page tables) do not support sparsity, whereas inverted page tables support solely the 1-page abstraction and obstruct grouping of pages. In addition, the latter scheme restricts the OS architecture by high page sharing costs, and it does not permit mixed page sizes, what is essential for fine granularity.

Sparsity is strongly related to granularity: from the point of view of a 2^{64} -space, a $2^{12} = 4K$ page

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and a $2^4 = 16$ byte page do not look very different. Therefore, besides sparsity, we address granularity as well. Fine-grained address spaces potentially can have strong architectural impacts not only in obvious fields like object orientation, but also, for example, in code generation, data bases, distributed systems, supercomputers, file systems and multi media applications.

Whereas the sparsity problem can be solved solely by a better address translation mechanism without affecting other hardware components, fine granularity strongly interferes with the TLB and cache system.

2 Guarded Page Tables

The main problem with multilevel page tables is sparsity: we need huge amounts of page table entries for non-mapped pages. Look at the following example where the mapping of page 11101100 is shown. (For demonstration we use very small addresses and small page tables.) Additionally assume that no pages are mapped in the regions [11000000...11101011] and [11110000...1111111]. In figure 1 the corresponding nil pointers are marked by "•". The




Figure 1: Sparse Multilevel Page Tables.

second- and third-level page table are extremely sparse page tables: each one contains only one single non-nil entry. Consequently, there is only one valid path through these two tables: when the leftmost two bits are "11", the remaining address must have "10 11" as its next bits; all other addresses lead to page faults. As shown in figure 2, we can omit the two page tables and also skip the associated translation steps. Instead, whenever entry 3 of the top-level page table is reached, we have to




Figure 2: Guarded Page Tables.

check whether "10 11" is a prefix of the remaining address. If so, this prefix can be stripped off, and the translation process can directly continue at the level-4 page table.

Therefore, each entry is augmented by a bit string g of variable length, which is referred to as a guard. This is the key idea of guarded page tables.

The translation process works as follows: first, a page table entry is selected by the highest part of the virtual address upon each transformation step in the same way as in the conventional multi-level page table method. The selected entry however contains not only a pointer (and perhaps an access attribute) but also the guard g. If g is a prefix of the remaining virtual address, the translation process either continues with the remaining postfix or terminates with the postfix as page offset. As an example, figure 3 presents the transformation of 20 address bits by 3 page tables. Note that the length




Figure 3: Guarded Page Table Tree

of the guards may vary from entry to entry. Furthermore, page table sizes can be mixed; all powers

of 2 are admissible. The same holds for data pages, i.e., a mixture of 2-, 4-, ...1024-, ...entry page tables and pages can be used.

Guarded page tables contain conventional tables as a special case: if a guard has length zero, a translation step works exactly like in the conventional mechanism. However in all cases conventionally requiring a table with only one valid entry, a guard can be used instead. It can even replace a sequence of such "single-entry" page tables. This saves both memory capacity and transformation steps, i.e., guards act as a shortcut.

The guarded page table algorithms can be implemented purely by software. However, the "non regular" operations of guard checking and stripping can be substantially accelerated by dedicated hardware. Parallel execution can further speed up the algorithm: checking 4 adjacent page table entries in parallel doubles the walking speed of nearly minimal trees [9, 13].

The guarded page table mechanisms are described in more detail in [12].

3 Sparsity

Guarded page tables have the advantages of conventional page table trees (support of hierarchical operations, sharing of subtrees) and outperform inverted page tables in most cases (see [10]). They require only a maximum of 2 page table entries per mapped page, regardless of how the pages are allocated and how wide the virtual addresses are. Without restricting the operating system architecture, guarded page tables solve the sparsity problem of 64-bit systems: the page table overhead is less than 1% of user data for any chosen mapping of 4 K pages. In contrast, conventional page table trees require overheads between 6% (compact) and 400% (very sparse) for 100 pages.

If only the sparsity problem is addressed, a unique page size and conventionally coarse-grained

pages are sufficient. In this case, a guarded page table MMU can be integrated into a conventional processor without changing the TLB and cache architecture.

4 Fine Granularity

The worst case memory overhead depending on the object size for multi-level (MPT)², inverted (IPT) and guarded (GPT) page tables is shown in Figure 4. Note that in practice the overhead might be lower. Nevertheless, guarded page tables seem to support fine granularity better than the other mechanisms. A more detailed cost analysis of the worst case and some other models is contained in [11].




Figure 4: Worst Case Memory Overhead

Fine granularity does not only rely on the page table mechanism but also on the TLB and cache architecture. For example, it is difficult to handle small pages with todays favorite caches (virtually indexed + physically tagged). Therefore you may suspect performance degradation and/or higher hardware costs due to fine granularity.

Combined with stochastically colored allocation [10], more or less conventional caches (virtually indexed + physically tagged) and TLBs can fortunately be constructed which perform as well as conventional ones, in both the fine-granular and the coarse-granular case. Surprisingly, the combination permits larger caches than conventional technology, i.e., it will perhaps not only preserve system performance but increase it.

¹100% overhead means that 1 M of user data requires one additional megabyte for page table data and fragmentation. The x-axis denotes the minimal object size. If it is e.g. 256, 257-byte, objects are most expensive due to fragmentation. The page size is always chosen in such a way that the sum of page table data and fragmentation is minimal. Note that this usually leads to pages which are smaller than the minimal object size. MPT-entries are 4-bytes, page tables 4K; IPT entries are 16-bytes and a 50% occupied hash table is assumed; GPT entries are 8-bytes.

²The MPT overhead strongly depends on sparsity. Therefore two scenarios are shown: in '4G gaps', the objects are located at consecutive 4G-aligned addresses, in '64K gaps' at consecutive 64K-aligned ones.

5 Visions

Fine-grained aliasing makes higher demands on the cache system. It either increases cache latency or requires additional hardware, e.g. base address caches [5] or a virtually tagged cache supporting synonyms [14, 15]. Therefore, this section is highly speculative: imagine that unrestricted aliasing is sufficiently cheap. What can we do with this mechanism?

Experiments with user-level mapping are described in [1, 7]. Since, with guarded page tables, the obtainable granularity is in the magnitude of a program variable, we should even explore techniques to replace references by mapping, perhaps even parameter passing by mapping. For example, a compiler could assemble statically determinable sets of parameters and construct alias regions for them. Objects could be synthesized by mapping. Database queries could result in mapping the found objects instead of copying them. This could be extremely useful in distributed databases since it easily permits lazy evaluation of queries.

Extending the guarded page table mechanism permits user programs to manipulate mapping directly: efficient user controlled aliasing (for object synthesis, constructing alternate views or parameter passing) and call on reference become possible. The latter facility enables user programs to associate specific access semantics with address space regions (or pages), for example, 'delay upon read access' (variable value has not yet been computed), 'signal upon write access', 'remote object invocation', 'access by proxies' [17] or simply 'access protocol'.

The costs of unrestricted fine-grained aliasing are not yet clear, but the possibilities are amazing. Further work is required for exploration, including the construction of a really usable virtual machine, an appropriate kernel and experiments with code generators and applications.

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