Mike Trabert

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Mr Pittman Period 4

3/1/17

**Pre-Planning Template - 4.2.3 Simulation Project**

**Ideas:**

Our group chose the **Flocking simulation** in the NetLogo biology library as my basic template, and compared the simulation to Machiavelli's speech.

* We used the flocking simulation
* In the code we could have it show the different views of different people on a leader
* guidelines to be the perfect leader
* creates one turtle as the leader
* makes other turtles listen to leaders instructions
* leader is a different color or larger than followers
* After a while the followers break up, this shows that a good leader can't last forever

**Research & Rules:**

My article was “The Morals of the Prince by Niccolo Machiavelli” file:///C:/Users/Chris/Downloads/4.2.3PD%20Machiavellei-The-Morals-of-the-Prince.pdf

* Quotes to follow in the code was, “I’m afraid people will think rash of me for trying to do so again, especially since I intend to write something useful to an understanding reader,” (Machiavelli. pg 1. paragraph 4).
* Other quote we used to base the code off of was, “But it is a necessary part of this nature that you must conceal it carefully; you must be a great liar and hypocrite.” (Machiavelli. pg 5. paragraph 3).
* The last quote we chose was, “We call a man "stingy" who clings to his own. (Machiavelli. pg 1), this represents a leader taking his own path.

**Create Prompt:**

This is my 150 to 250 word response to the Create Task Prompt (see 4.2.3, #5)

In the code for the simulation flocking there are functions that make the turtles find the nearest turtle next to it. This is what generates the flocking simulation and makes the turtles follow each other in groups. Over time the groups will start to come together and create one big group. In the edited version of the code it will make one of the turtles a leader and over time most of the turtles will start to face in the direction of the leader. Once all the turtles face the leader, the color will change red and the size will increase. This represents a good leader being able to lie to gain power. Also in this altered code, not all the turtles will face the leader, this is shown in the speech when Machiavelli says that not every person will follow you. In conclusion, this code was created to show the basic standard of a good leader in Machiavelli's speech.

Machiavelli’s speech

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| *The first great political philosopher of*  *the Renaissance, Niccolo Machiavelli was*  *born in 1469 in Florence, Italy. He was a*  *politician whose fortunes mirrored those*  *of the republic that was founded in the*  *absence of the ruling Medicis and ended*  *upon their return to power in Florence.*  *The Prince, written in 1513 but not*  *published until 1531, is the work that*  *earned Machiavelli his lasting reputation*  *and is a seminal text of political*  *philosophy still widely regarded—and*  *read—today. It is a study of leadership and*  *an argument that leaders must do anything*  *necessary to hold on to power.*  *It is this message that turned*  *Machiavelli's name into an adjective. As*  *you read the following excerpt from The*  *Prince, observe the different qualities of*  *Machiavelli's ideal prince and compare it*  *to those qualities we refer to when we call*  *something or someone "Machiavellian."*  ON THE REASONS WHY MEN ARE  PRAISED OR BLAMED  —ESPECIALLY PRINCES  It remains now to be seen what style  and principles a prince ought to adopt in  dealing with his subjects and friends. I  know the subject has been treated  frequently before, and I'm afraid people  will think me rash for trying to do so  again, especially since I intend to differ in  this discussion from what others have said.  But since I intend to write something  useful to an understanding reader, it  seemed better to go after the real truth of  the matter than to repeat what people have  imagined. A great many men have  imagined states and princedoms such as  nobody ever saw or knew in the real  world, for there's such a difference  between the way we really live and the  way we ought to live that the man who  neglects the real to study the ideal will  learn how to accomplish his ruin, not his  salvation | . Any man who tries to be good  all the time is bound to come to ruin  among the great number who are not good.  Hence a prince who wants to keep his post  must learn how not to be good, and use  that knowledge, or refrain from using it, as  necessity requires.  Putting aside, then, all the imaginary  things that are said about princes, and  getting down to the truth, let me say that  whenever men are discussed (and  especially princes because they are  prominent), there are certain qualities that  bring them either praise or blame. Thus  some are considered generous, others  stingy (I use a Tuscan term, since "greedy"  in our speech means a man who wants to  take other people's goods. We call a man  "stingy" who clings to his own); some are  givers, others grabbers; some cruel, others  merciful; one man is treacherous, another  faithful; one is feeble and effeminate,  another fierce and spirited; one humane,  another proud; one lustful, another chaste;  one straightforward, another sly; one  harsh, another gentle; one serious, another  playful; one religious, another skeptical,  and so on. I know everyone will agree that  among these many qualities a prince  certainly ought to have all those that are  considered good. But since it is impossible  to have and exercise them all, because the  conditions of human life simply do not  allow it, a prince must be shrewd enough  to avoid the public disgrace of those vices  that would lose him his state. If he  possibly can, he should also guard against  vices that will not lose him his state; but if  he cannot prevent them, he should not be  too worried about indulging them. And  furthermore, he should not be too worried  about incurring blame for any vice without  which he would find it hard to save his  state. For if you look at matters carefully, |

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| you will see that something resembling  virtue, if you follow it, may be your ruin,  while something else resembling vice will  lead, if you follow it, to your security and  well-being.  ON LIBERALITY AND STINGINESS  Let me begin, then, with the first of  the qualities mentioned above, by saying  that a reputation for liberality is doubtless  very fine; but the generosity that earns you  that reputation can do you great harm. For  if you exercise your generosity in a really  virtuous way, as you should, nobody will  know of it, and you cannot escape the  odium of the opposite vice. Hence if you  wish to be widely known as a generous  man, you must seize every opportunity to  make a big display of your giving. A  prince of this character is bound to use up  his entire revenue in works of ostentation.  Thus, in the end, if he wants to keep a  name for generosity, he will have to load  his people with exorbitant taxes and  squeeze money out of them in every way  he can. This is the first step in making him  odious to his subjects; for when he is poor,  nobody will respect him. Then, when his  generosity has angered many and brought  rewards to a few, the slightest difficulty  will trouble him, and at the first approach  of danger, down he goes. If by chance he  foresees this, and tries to change his ways,  he will immediately be labeled a miser.  Since a prince cannot use this virtue of  liberality in such a way as to become  known for it unless he harms his own  security, he won't mind if he judges  prudently of things, being known as a  miser. In due course he will be thought the  more liberal man, when people see that his  parsimony enables him to live on his  income, to defend himself against his  enemies, and to undertake major projects  without burdening his people with taxes.  Thus he will be acting liberally toward all  those people from whom he takes nothing  (and there are an immense number of | Them), and in a stingy way toward those  people on whom he bestows nothing (and  they are very few). In our times, we have  seen great things being accomplished only  by men who have had the name of misers;  all the others have gone under. Pope Julius  II, though he used his reputation as a  generous man to gain the papacy,  sacrificed in order to be able to make war;  the present king of France has waged many  wars without levying a single extra tax on  his people simply because he could take  care of the extra expenses out of the  savings from his long parsimony. If the  present king of Spain had a reputation for  generosity, he would never have been able  to undertake so many campaigns, or win so  many of them.  Hence a prince who prefers not to rob  his subjects, who wants to be able to  defend himself, who wants to avoid  poverty and contempt, and who doesn't  want to become a plunderer, should not  mind in the least if people consider him a  miser; this is simply one of the vices that  enable him to reign. Someone may object  that Caesar used a reputation for  generosity to become emperor, and many  other people have also risen in the world,  because they were generous or were  supposed to be so. Well, I answer, either  you are a prince already, or you are in the  process of becoming one; in the first case,  this reputation for generosity is harmful to  you, in the second case it is very  necessary. Caesar was one of those who  wanted to become ruler in Rome; but after  he had reached his goal, if he had lived,  and had not cut down on his expenses, he  would have ruined the empire itself.  Someone may say: there have been plenty  of princes, very successful in warfare, who  have had a reputation for generosity. But I  answer; either the prince is spending his  own money and that of his subjects, or he  is spending someone else's. In the first  case, he ought to be sparing; in the second  case, he ought to spend money like water.  Any prince at the head of his army, which |

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| lives on loot, extortion, and plunder,  disposes of other people's property, and is  bound to be very generous; otherwise, his  soldiers would desert him. You can always  be a more generous giver when what you  give is not yours or your subjects'; Cyrus,  Caesar, and Alexander were generous in  this way. Spending what belongs to other  people does no harm to your reputation,  rather it enhances it; only spending your  own substance harms you. And there is  nothing that wears out faster than  generosity; even as you practice it, you  lose the means of practicing it, and you  become either poor and contemptible or (in  the course of escaping poverty) rapacious  and hateful. The thing above all against  which a prince must protect himself is  being contemptible and hateful; generosity  leads to both. Thus, it's much wiser to put  up with the reputation of being a miser,  which brings you shame without hate, than  to be forced—just because you want to  appear generous—into a reputation for  rapacity, which brings shame on you and  hate along with it.  ON CRUELTY AND CLEMENCY:  WHETHER IT IS BETTER TO BE  LOVED OR FEARED  Continuing now with our list of qualities,  let me say that every prince should prefer  to be considered merciful rather than cruel,  yet he should be careful not to mismanage  this clemency of his. People thought  Cesare Borgia was cruel, but that cruelty  of his reorganized the Romagna, united it,  and established it in peace and loyalty.  Anyone who views the matter realistically  will see that this prince was much more  merciful than the people of Florence who,  to avoid the reputation of cruelty, allowed  Pistoia to be destroyed. Thus, no prince  should mind being called cruel for what he  does to keep his subjects united and loyal. | he may make examples of a very few, but  he will be more merciful in reality than  those who, in their tenderheartedness,  allow disorders to occur, with their  attendant murders and lootings. Such  turbulence brings harm to an entire  community, while the executions ordered  by a prince affect only one individual at a  time. A new prince, above all others,  cannot possibly avoid a name for cruelty,  since new states are always in danger. And  Virgil, speaking through the mouth of  Dido says:  My cruel fate  And doubts attending an unsettled  State. Force me to guard my coast from  foreign foes. Yet a prince should be slow to believe  rumors and to commit himself to action on  the basis of them. He should not be afraid  of his own thoughts; he ought to proceed  cautiously, moderating his conduct with  prudence and humanity, allowing neither  over-confidence to make him careless, nor  over timidity to make him intolerable.  Here the question arises: is it better to  be loved than feared, or vice versa? I don't  doubt that every prince would like to be  both; but since it is hard to accommodate  these qualities, if you have to make a  choice, to be feared is much safer than to  be loved. For it is a good general rule  about men, that they are ungrateful, fickle,  liars and deceivers, fearful of danger and  greedy for gain. While you serve their  welfare, they are all yours, offering their  blood, their belongings, their lives, and  their children's lives, as we noted  above—so long as the danger is remote.  But when the danger is close at hand, they  turn against you. Then, any prince who has  relied on their words and has made no  other preparations will come to grief;  because friendships that are bought at a  price, and not with greatness and nobility  of soul, may be paid for but they are not  acquired, and they cannot be used in time  of need. People are less concerned with  offending a man who makes himself loved |

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| than one who makes himself feared; the  reason is that love is a link of obligation  which men, because they are rotten, will  break any they think doing so serves their  advantage; fear involves dread of  punishment, from which they can never  escape.  Still, a prince should make himself  feared in such a way that, even if he gets  no love, he gets no hate either; because it  is perfectly possible to be feared and not  hated, and this will be the result if only the  prince will keep his hands off the property  of his subjects or citizens, and off their  women. When he does have to shed blood,  he should be sure to have a strong  justification and manifest cause; but above  all, he should not confiscate people's  property, because men are quicker to  forget the death of a father than the loss of  a patrimony. Besides, pretexts for  confiscation are always plentiful, it never  fails that a prince who starts living by  plunder can find reasons to rob someone  else. Excuses for proceeding against  someone's life are much rarer and more  quickly exhausted.  But a prince at the head of his armies  and commanding a multitude of soldiers  should not care a bit if he is considered  cruel; without such a reputation, he could  never hold his army together and ready for  action. Among the marvelous deeds of  Hannibal, this was prime: that, having an  immense army, which included men of  many different races and nations, and  which he led to battle in distant countries,  he never allowed them to fight among  themselves or to rise against him, whether  his fortune was good or bad. The reason  for this could only be his inhuman cruelty,  which, along with his countless other  talents, made him an object of awe and  terror to his soldiers; and without the  cruelty, his other qualities would never  have sufficed. The historians who pass  snap judgments on these matters admire | his accomplishments and at the same time  condemn the cruelty which was their main  cause.  When I say, "His other qualities would  never have sufficed," we can see that this  is true from the example of Scipio, an  outstanding man not only among those of  his own time, but in all recorded history;  yet his armies revolted in Spain, for no  other reason than his excessive leniency in  allowing his soldiers more freedom than  military discipline permits. Fabius  Maximus rebuked him in the senate for  this failing, calling him the corrupter of the  Roman armies. When a lieutenant of  Scipio s plundered the Locrians, he took  no action in behalf of the people, and did  nothing to discipline that insolent  lieutenant; again, this was the result of  his easygoing nature. Indeed, when  someone in the senate wanted to excuse  him on this occasion, he said there are  many men who knew better how to avoid  error themselves than how to correct error  in others. Such a soft temper would in time  have tarnished the fame and glory of  Scipio, had he brought it to the office of  emperor; but as he lived under the control  of the senate, this harmful quality of his  not only remained hidden but was  considered creditable.  Returning to the question of being  feared or loved, I conclude that since men  love at their own inclination but can be  made to fear at the inclination of the  prince, a shrewd prince will lay his  foundations on what is under his own  control, not on what is controlled by  others. He should simply take pains not to  be hated, as I said.  How praiseworthy it is for a prince to  keep his word and live with integrity rather  than by craftiness, everyone understands;  yet we see from recent experience that  those princes have accomplished most who  paid little heed to keeping their promises,  but who knew how craftily to manipulate  the minds of men. In the end, they won out  over those who tried to act honestly.  You should consider then, that there  are two ways of fighting, one with laws |

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| and the other with force. The first is  properly a human method, the second  belongs to beasts. But as the first method  does not always suffice, you sometimes  have to turn to the second. Thus a prince  must know how to make good use of both  the beast and the man. Ancient writers  made subtle note of this fact when they  wrote that Achilles and many other princes  of antiquity were sent to be reared by  Chiron the centaur, who trained them in  his discipline. Having a teacher who is half  man and half beast can only mean that a  prince must know how to use both these  two natures, and that one without the other  has no lasting effect.  Since a prince must know how to use  the character of beasts, he should pick for  imitation the fox and the lion. As the lion  cannot protect himself from traps, and the  fox cannot defend himself from wolves,  you have to be a fox in order to be wary of  traps, and a lion to overawe the wolves.  Those who try to live by the lion alone are  badly mistaken. Thus a prudent prince  cannot and should not keep his word when  to do so would go against his interest, or  when the reasons that made him pledge it  no longer apply. Doubtless if all men were  good, this rule would be bad; but since  they are a sad lot, and keep no faith with  you, you in your turn are under no  obligation to keep it with them.  Besides, a prince will never lack for  legitimate excuses to explain away his  breaches of faith. Modern history will  furnish innumerable examples of this  behavior, showing how many treaties and  promises have been made null and void by  the faithlessness of princes, and how the  man succeeded best who knew best how to  play the fox. But it is a necessary part of  this nature that you must conceal it  carefully; you must be a great liar and  hypocrite. Men are so simple of mind and  so much dominated by their immediate  needs, that a deceitful man will always  find plenty who are ready to be deceived.  One of many recent examples calls for | mention. Alexander VI never did anything  else, never had another thought, except to  deceive men, and he always found fresh  material to work on. Never was there a  man more convincing in his assertions,  who sealed his promises with more solemn  oaths, and who observed them less. Yet his  deceptions were always successful,  because he knew exactly how to manage  this sort of business.  In actual fact, a prince may not have  all the admirable qualities we listed, but it  is very necessary that he should seem to  have them. Indeed, I will venture to say  that when you have them and exercise  them all the time, they are harmful to you;  when you just seem to have them, they are  useful. It is good to appear merciful,  truthful, humane, sincere, and religious; it  is good to be so in reality. But you must  keep your mind so disposed that, in case of  need, you can turn to the exact contrary.  This has to be understood: a prince, and  especially a new prince, cannot possibly  exercise all those virtues for which men  are called "good." To preserve the state, he  often has to do things against his word,  against charity, against humanity, against  religion. Thus he has to have a mind ready  to shift as the winds of fortune and the  varying circumstances of life may dictate.  And as I said above, he should not depart  from the good if he can hold to it, but he  should be ready to enter on evil if he has  to.  Hence a prince should take great care  never to drop a word that does not seem  imbued with the five good qualities noted  above; to anyone who sees or hears him,  he should appear all compassion, all honor,  all humanity all integrity, all religion.  Nothing is more necessary than to seem to  have this last virtue. Men in general judge  more by the sense of sight than by the  sense of touch, because everyone can see  but only a few can test by feeling.  Everyone sees what you seem to be, few  know what you really are; and those few  do not dare take a stand against the general |

opinion, supported by the majesty of the

government. In the actions of all men, and

especially of princes who are not subject to

a court of appeal, we must always look to

the end. Let a prince, therefore, win

victories and uphold his state; his methods

will always be considered worthy, and

everyone will praise them, because the

masses are always impressed by the

superficial appearance of things, and by

the outcome of an enterprise. And the

world consists of nothing but the masses;

the few who have no influence when the

many feel secure. A certain prince of our

own time, whom it's just as well not to

name, preaches nothing but peace and

mutual trust, yet he is the determined

enemy of both; and if on several different

occasions he had observed either, he

would have lost both his reputation and his

throne.