Hume's Philosophy of the Self, by A. E. Pitson. London and New York: Routledge, 2002. Pp. xii + 196. H/b £55.00.

This is a fine addition to the growing interpretative and critical literature on Hume's philosophy of mind. Fastening on Hume's unexplained distinction between 'personal identity, as it regards our thought or imagination, and as it regards our passions or the concern we take in ourselves' (*Treatise* 1.4.6.5), Pitson explores Hume's views on both 'the mental aspect' and 'the agency aspect' of personal identity. An admirably close reader of the text, he is assiduous in the articulation, astute in the assessment, of many of Hume's arguments. While neglecting some matters I take to be of central importance, he provides a systematic, penetrating examination of an account of the self whose complexity and power he himself does much to make plain.

Pitson begins with Hume's rapid-fire rendering of the kinds and contents of impressions and ideas, and their interrelations, at *Treatise* 1.1. Though he ignores the central issues of abstraction, representation, and reification, he introduces a very profitable general line of interpretation. As he sees it, these opening pages intimate, and if read properly help us properly to grasp, the bundle theory of mind set out as part of the theory of personal identity at *Treatise* 1.4.6. Humean minds are systems, not merely bundles, of perceptions. Hume says so himself: 'the true idea of the human mind, is to consider it as a *system* of different perceptions or different existences, which are link'd together by the relation of cause and effect, and mutually produce, destroy, influence, and modify each other' (*Treatise* 1.4.6.19; Pitson's emphasis). The several kinds of perceptions are identifiable by their functional location in the mental economy and, with a nod towards Dennett, Pitson sketches a Humean flow chart revealing the complex pathways amongst functional locations, with bodily motions as input, bodily actions as output. To be sure, there's serious sanitizing here, and some dubious detail, but Pitson's functionalist reading proves remarkably helpful as his account of Hume on the mental (and later on the agency) aspect of the self proceeds.

Elucidating the seemingly intractable *Treatise* 1.4.5 ('Of the immateriality of the soul'), Pitson offers an historically situated account of Hume's arguments for the unintelligibility of the claim that a substance, whether immaterial or material, underlies a mind or system of perceptions. He convincingly takes Hume to deny that minds function in causal isolation from bodies, however. His Hume is a dualist interactionist, if, peculiarly, one committed to a remarkable 'twofold dualism' (p. 61): according to the first dualism, perceptions are numerically distinct from bodily states and events; according to the second, some perceptions (just as some sensible qualities) are spatial, while some perceptions (again, just as some sensible qualities) are not. In rendering Hume as a dualist interactionist, Pitson does not address much-canvassed questions about the prospects for integration of the mental and the physical in the causation of mental events. (He does, however, appear to find in Hume's doctrine of

causality a response to modern mysterian worries about the mind–body relation.) Briefly considering ways of modulating Hume's second dualist claim, he displays its ties to other fundamental doctrines of Hume's but does not seize the opportunity this provides for a serious examination of these deeply problematic doctrines.

What of personal identity 'as regards our thought or imagination'? Pitson distinguishes two questions. What makes a given perception a constituent in a given mind? Given the conception of a functional system introduced earlier, the fact that the perception is an element in a given system of perceptions, a given embodied system. What gives a mind a sense of its own identity over time? Associative processes involving reflective awareness of perceptions that stand in relations of resemblance and causality to one another. What—a third question—of the mind's sense of its unity at a time? Its perceptions at a time being co-temporary elements in a given embodied system of perceptions, its sense of itself as simple is a matter of a second-order perception of its perceptions at that time. Pitson is more sanguine than most about the prospects for a Humean theory of diachronic and synchronic mental identity (if supplemented by a Humean account of the agency aspect of personal identity), and he does effectively address many criticisms of Hume to be found in the literature. His introduction of 'a kind of complex perception which takes the successive perceptions of my mind as its object' (p. 34; see also pp. 42, 79) appears, however, to eliminate the associationism from Hume's account of diachronic identity. And the suggestion that the embodiment of systems of perceptions enables Hume to get around objections David Pears and others have raised, while it is intriguing, goes undeveloped.

There is, I think, no sharp way in which to demarcate the mental (strictly construed) from the agency aspects of the self. Neither Hume himself, nor Pitson, offers one. Granted a Humean distinction between the cognitive and the affective/conative aspects of the self, however, Pitson finds Hume's treatment of the latter to introduce identity-implicating issues largely unnoticed by previous commentators. His trim and selective treatment of Hume on the affective/conative aspects of the self is indeed insightful and suggestive: it gives substance to Hume's modestly elaborating claim that 'our identity with regard to the passions serves to corroborate that with regard to the imagination, by the making our distant perceptions influence each other, and by giving us a present concern for our past or future pains or pleasures' (*Treatise* 1.4.6.19).

For Pitson's Hume, the contents of backward-looking passions such as pride and humility represent the self as a psychophysical entity, as the source of both mental and bodily actions, as crucially possessing enduring features (traits of character, in particular) that constitute one the sort of person one is, that make possible one's being a moral agent, and that, though enduring, can change (the self remaining, nonetheless, the same).

According to Pitson, Hume has a thin and a thick conception of action. On the former, keyed to the functional role of volition in the generation of effects,

humans and non-human animals are equally agents (and are equally, Reid's objections notwithstanding, embodied systems of perceptions). On the thick conception, agency requires the capacity to adapt to varying circumstances, the ability to form plans or projects for the future, and—though this goes unexplained—a 'moral liberty' (p. 139) stronger than the liberty defined in the first *Enquiry*. It involves a capacity for identification with a projected future self, something made possible by the mechanism of sympathy (a mechanism that plays a role, as well, in the cultivation of traits, and so in effecting changes in one's character). With the unity that derives from character, the agent-self is a 'narrative … entity', one 'which does not merely undergo certain changes, but alters in a way which reflects the causal interdependence of different aspects of the self and their relation to its aims and intentions' (p. 93). Character, and so narrative existence, comport with Hume's rendering of minds as embodied systems: each introduces patterns or structures of perceptions not adumbrated in the bare-bones story of *Treatise* 1.4.6. Responsibility for actions is geared to the presence of such patterns and structures. (Though agents, non-human animals are not moral ones. Having a capacity neither for complex, including complex cooperative, reflection nor for adopting an impersonal vantage point, they have neither moral virtues and vices nor a moral sense.)

Hume says almost nothing on the matter of belief in other minds. Despite his focus on personal identity, he appears to say nothing at all about the acquisition of the very idea of mind, or of the very idea of one's own mind. Certainly the *Treatise* contains nothing on the mind that complements his brilliant account, at 1.4.2, of the very idea of a world of physical objects.

Pitson devises an account of the other minds belief on Hume's behalf. He has no trouble showing that, for Hume, neither causal nor analogical inference can provide the basis for such a belief. Along associationist lines purportedly akin to those at work in the case of belief in an external world, the idea of (and presumably belief in) another's mental state 'would arise through its association with the impression of a certain kind of behaviour with which that kind of state is associated in one's own case' (p. 154). If not the beginning of a very promising story, it's more than Hume himself provides.

Having sketched Hume's account of the very idea of a physical object, Pitson denies Hume has any need for a comparable account of the idea of mind. For Hume, he writes, the idea of mind 'appears to be something which is obtained from one's own case given the supposedly self-intimating character of our mental states' (p. 184, n. 15). It's a pity Pitson has not pressed Hume at this point. Had he done so—had he attempted to devise a Humean account on Hume's behalf—he might well have made good both his neglect of Hume on representation and reification and the limitations in his discussion of Hume's astonishing second dualism.

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Fairness, by Nicholas Rescher. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 2002. Pp. xiii + 134. H/b £29.50.

Is injustice a type of unfairness—or is unfairness a type of injustice? (Or is it more complex than that?) Cases like the parable of the labourers in the vineyard might encourage us to take the first view. If no one receives less than is due, then (arguably) there is no injustice; but if some *and only some* receive more than is due, then (arguably) there is unfairness. And if there can be unfairness without injustice, then perhaps unfairness goes wider than injustice. Alternatively, we might think justice the wider notion—that injustice can arise in a number of ways, and that unfairness is just one of those ways. In *Fairness*, Rescher takes this latter view, aiming 'to elucidate what is at issue in one important aspect of justice, namely fairness' (p. xi; see also pp. 14, 47, 49). His prime objective is to argue against those who 'seek to separate the concept of fairness from the province of ethics and moral philosophy' (p. vii), notably economists and decision theorists. To be properly understood, fairness must be linked to justice and not confused with other possible desiderata, such as benevolence or the avoidance of envy.

Rescher distinguishes (p. xi) between 'social justice'—which determines what legitimate claims individuals have—and 'distributive justice'—which determines how far any individual's legitimate claim should be met, given rival claims and limited resources. For the most part the book is concerned with 'distributive justice' and takes claims as given. There is, however, a brief discussion of how legitimate claims arise (pp. 3–8) in which Rescher emphasizes the importance of pragmatism and established practice as against 'abstract general principle'—an account that may please conservatives but leave others unpersuaded. Rescher suggests that whether 'socially established practices regarding claims are fair' is not a legitimate issue since 'claims determine fairness and not the other way around' (p. 6). Claims are determined by the arrangements to which 'people-in-general are willing to acquiesce … what the sedimented stabilization of social process attributes to them' (p. 4). Rescher does add that in order to have 'the colouration of justice' those involved must be rational and not 'overreadily acquiesce in arrangements that are contrary to their interests'. Nevertheless, one might wonder whether the establishment and restriction of claims by mere *acquiescence* can be reconciled with the acceptance of a clear distinction (on which Rescher later insists, pp. 46–7) between what is fair and what is the outcome of a negotiation in which power has been exercised.

Turning to 'distributive justice', Rescher makes two main claims: that in gen-