## Chapter 1:

Three basic components of computer security:

*Confidentiality*: The concealment of information or resources.

*Integrity*: The trustworthiness of data or resources, preventing unauthorized changes.

*Availability:* The ability to use information or resources (reliability).

Threat Model:

Classifications: Deception (fake news), Disruption (prevent operation), Usurpation (unauthorized control), Disclosure.

Characterizations: Alteration, Spoofing, Repudiation, Denial of Receipt, Delay, Denial of Service.

Policy and Mechanism:

*Security Policy*: A statement of what is, and what is not allowed.

*Security Mechanism*: A method, tool or procedure for enforcing a security policy.

Assumptions and Trust:

*Trust*: Your belief the system is trustworthy.

*Assurance*: Level at which the security mechanism implements the policy.

Let P be the set of all possible states, Q be the set of secure states, R be the set of states restricted by the security system.

A security mechanism is *secure* if R in Q, *precise* if R = Q, and *broad* if there are some states r not in Q.

*Specification*: A statement of the desired functioning of the system.

A system is said to *satisfy* a specification if the specification correctly states how the system will function.

*Design*: Translates the specifications into components that will implement them.

*Implementation*: Creates a system that satisfies the design.

A program is *correct* if its implementation performs as specified.

## Chapter 2: ACM


Protection State:

*State*: The collection of the current values in memory locations.

*Access Control Matrix Model*: A tool that can describe the current protection state. Which Describes the rights of subjects over all entities in the matrix.

Consider the set of protection states P. Some subset Q of P consists of exactly those states in which is the system is authorized to reside.

When a command changes the state of the system a *state transition* occurs.



Protection State Transitions: Let the intial state of the system be X\_0 = (S\_0, O\_0, A\_0) the set of state transitions is represented as a set of operations t,t2... successive states are represented as X\_1, X\_2,… where the notation X\_i (sideways T) \_(t\_i + 1) means that sate transition (t\_i + 1) moves the system from state X\_i to state X\_i + 1.

Harrison, Ruzzo, Ullman (HRU):

Primitive Commands:

1. Precondition: s not in S.
   1. Command: **create subject** s.
2. Precondition: o not in O.
   1. Command: **create object** o.
3. Precondition: s in S, o in O, r in R.
   1. Command: **enter** r **into** a[s,o].
4. Precondition: s in S, o in O, r in R.
   1. Command: **delete** r froma[s,o].
5. Precondition: s in S.
   1. Command: **destroy subject** s.
6. Precondition: o in O.
   1. Command: **destroy object** s.

Example:

**command** create\_file(p, f)

create **object** f;

**enter** *own***into** A[p,f];

**enter** *r***into** A[p,f];

**end**

**command** grant\_read\_file(p, f, q)

**if** *r* **in** A[p,f] **and** *g* **in** A[p,f]

**Then**

**enter** *r***into** A[p,f];

**end**

Note commands cannot have or or negation like not in operators otherwise they would be two commands.

*Copy Right*: Often called the grant right allows the processor to grant rights to another.

*Own Right*: Enables the possessors to add or delete privileges.

Principle of Attenuation of Privilege: A subject may not increase its rights, nor grant rights that it does not possess to another subject.

## Chapter 3:

## Chapter 4:

## Chapter 5:

## Chapter 6: