Lecture 24


Secure?

- Insecure: password is transmitted openly and frequently
- Solution: no password transmitted by involving ticket-granting server (TGS)

^{1.} C —>AS: $ID_C ||P_C||ID_V$ 2. AS —> C : Ticket = $E(K_V, [ID_C ||AD_C ||ID_V])$ 3. C —> V: $ID_C || Ticket$

A More Secure Authentication Dialogue

- Once per user logon session
 - (1) C \rightarrow AS: $ID_{c} | ID_{tgs}$
 - (2) AS —> C: E(K_C, Ticket_{tgs})
- Once per type of service:
 - (3) C \rightarrow TGS: $ID_c | |ID_v| | Ticket_{tgs}$
 - (4) TGS —> C: Ticket_v
- Once per service session:
 - (5) C —> V: $ID_r | I \text{ Ticket}_{v}$, $Ticket_{tgs} = E(K_{tgs}, [ID_C || AD_C || ID_{tgs} || TS_1 || Lifetime_1])$ $Ticket_v = E(K_v, [ID_C || AD_C || ID_v || TS_2 || Lifetime_2])$



- 1. C —> AS: $ID_c ||P_c||ID_v$
- 2. AS -> C : Ticket = $E(K_{V}, [ID_{C} | AD_{C} | ID_{V}])$
- 3. C —> V: ID_C || Ticket

Advantage

- No password transmitted in plaintext
- Ticket is reusable. Timestamp is added to prevent reuse of ticket by an attacker

Secure?

no user authentication

- Ticket hijacking
 - Malicious user may steal the service ticket of another user on the same workstation and try to use it
 - Network address verification does not help
 - Servers must verify that the user who is presenting the ticket is the same user to whom the ticket was issued
- No server authentication
 - Attacker may misconfigure the network so that he receives message addressed to a finished by the order of the network of the legitimate server – man in the middle attack
 - Capture private information from users and/or deny service
 - Servers must prove their identity to users
- Solution: section key

- - (1) C —> AS: ID_C | | ID_{tgs}
 - (2) AS -> C: E(K_C, Ticket_{tgs})
- Once per type of service:
 - (3) C —>TGS: ID_C ||ID_v|| Ticket_{tgs}
 - (4) TGS -> C: Ticket_v
- Once per service session:
 - (5) C -> V: ID_C || Ticket_v