Adversarial Attacks on GPT-4 via Simple Random Search

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1 Summary

In a recent announcement,[1] OpenAI made the predicted probabilities of their models available via API.[2] In this short paper, we use them to implement an adversarial attack on the latest GPT-4 Turbo (*gpt-4-1106-preview*) model based on *simple random search*. We append a short adversarial string to a harmful request that is by default rejected by the model with high probability due to safety or ethical concerns. This is sufficient to "jailbreak" the model and make it answer the harmful request. We show examples of corresponding conversations without and with adversarial suffixes in Figure 1 and Figure 2. Interestingly, iterative optimization via simple random search *is* highly effective as illustrated in Figure 3: we can iteratively increase the probability of a desired starting token from $\approx$ 1% to above 50%. Finally, we discuss implications and potential defenses against such attacks. Our code notebook is available at https://github.com/max-andr/adversarial-random-search-gpt4.



Figure 1: Request #1 without and with adversarial suffix. OpenAI playground links for these conversations are available at https://platform.openai.com/playground/p/gEEPak6gtzI4HiMnoKhksBc6?mode=chat and https://platform.openai.com/playground/p/0IU3UOP70KoviepEIjXGBvUU?mode=chat.

2 Methodology

Algorithm We use a simple random search algorithm (Rastrigin, 1963) customized for the given task of jailbreaking a language model. The algorithm proceeds as follows:

- We append a *suffix* of certain length to an original request.

[1] https://twitter.com/OpenAIDevs/status/1735730662362189872
[2] https://platform.openai.com/docs/api-reference/chat/create#chat-create-logprobs



Figure 2: Request #2 without and with adversarial suffix. OpenAI playground links for these conversations are available at https://platform.openai.com/playground/p/gTciUFzOZiQaYl65G16frCxT?mode=chat and https://platform.openai.com/playground/p/szF1Vs2IwW5Hr9xUFM1DL8fb?mode=chat.

- On every iteration of the algorithm, we try to change a single character in the suffix at a random position.
- We accept the change only if it increases the log-probability of the token `Sure` at the first position of the response.

We use adversarial suffixes of 10 characters (initialized with underscores _____) and we perform 1 000 iterations of random search. The usage of suffixes (e.g., instead of prefixes) and the idea of maximizing the log-probability of the token `Sure` is inspired by the recent white-box attack of Zou et al. (2023). The general usage of random search is based on the success of random search for generating score-based black-box adversarial examples for vision models (Andriushchenko et al., 2020).

Results We illustrate the effectiveness of the attack on two harmful requests in Figure 1 and Figure 2 for which we performed the generation a few times with the sampling temperature 1 and selected the most convincing response. We observed that the model answers the requests with high probability only when adversarial suffixes are appended. Moreover, the optimization progress shown in Figure 3 suggests that the adversarial suffix is sequentially refined over iterations via relatively small increments. This allows to optimize the probability of token `Sure` from $\approx 1\%$ to above 50%.

Note: basic prompting is essential Random search *alone* does not always suffice to jailbreak the GPT-4 Turbo model. A basic prompting is required to first get the probability of the target token (in our case `Sure`) to appear in the top-5, and then make sure that the probability is high enough (e.g., as a rule of



Figure 3: Optimization progress of the simple random search attack over iterations.

thumb, around 1%).

3 Discussion

Iterative search is possible on the latest GPT-4 Turbo It is not obvious that such a simple iterative search should necessarily succeed on a frontier LLM like the latest GPT-4 Turbo. Moreover, it is rather surprising that such a small number of characters (10) and iterations $(1\,000)$ is sufficient to generate a successful adversarial suffix *from scratch*. In particular, it implies that the cost for the attacker is low, i.e., less than a dollar per adversarial suffix.

Potential defenses The fact that the API returns only top-5 log-probabilities is not a major obstacle since it is usually easy to make a desired token (such as `Sure`) appear in the top-5 by simple prompting. A potentially more significant obstacle is *non-determinstic log-probabilities* since then random search does not necessarily have a correct signal to refine the adversarial string. As illustrated in Figure 4, repeating the same query multiple times leads to different log-probabilities, even when fixing the *seed* parameter in the API. Interestingly, the variance is much higher for GPT-4 Turbo compared to GPT-3.5 Turbo. Based on the shape of the curves, the noise seems to be non-Gaussian and sometimes two API calls can return exactly the same log-probability vectors. Thus, most likely, this randomness comes a combination of potential caching and hardware (e.g., from non-deterministic GPU computations). This randomness makes random search harder to apply, thus a simple defense is to simply add more noise to the returned log-probabilities (which, however, would lead to a robustness-utility trade-off that might not be desirable). Additionally, one can try to simply detect repeated queries which are very similar to each other and refuse to answer them as suggested in earlier works like Chen et al. (2020).



Figure 4: The histogram of log-probabilities for the first position in the response using the same query repeated 250 times. The *seed* parameter in the API is fixed so it is unable to prevent the randomness in the returned log-probabilities.

Implications We believe that the described algorithm can be used to iteratively optimize *not only* for jailbreaks, but also for many other types of requests that frontier LLMs tend to prohibit. Although it is unlikely that much of actual harm can be done in this way with the *current* LLMs, the possibility of such iterative optimization is definitely not a desirable behavior which warrants investigations regarding possible defenses. Finally, the adversarial vulnerability of frontier LLMs is very interesting from the conceptual point of view: it is clear that scaling data and compute alone is not sufficient to prevent these attacks, and it is likely that one would need to incorporate a worst-case adversarial training objective for fine-tuning or even pre-training of frontier LLMs.

Acknowledgements

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References

[1] Maksym Andriushchenko, Francesco Croce, Nicolas Flammarion, and Matthias Hein. "Square attack: a query-efficient black-box adversarial attack via random search". *ECCV*. 2020.

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[4] Andy Zou, Zifan Wang, J Zico Kolter, and Matt Fredrikson. "Universal and transferable adversarial attacks on aligned language models". *arXiv preprint arXiv:2307.15043* (2023).