		P1	
		A	B
P2	A	(2,0)	(-3,1)
	B	(4,2)	(-5,-4)

$$\left.\begin{array}{l} 2p - 3(1-p) = 4p - 5(1-p) \\ 0p + 2(1-p) = 1p - 4(1-p) \end{array}\right\} \Rightarrow x_n = 6x_{n+1}$$

Let $p = x_n$, $(1-p) = x_{n+1}$

$2p = 2(1-p)$

$\Rightarrow 2p = 2 - 2p \Rightarrow p = 1/2$

and $p = 6(1-p) \Rightarrow p = 6 - 6p \Rightarrow p = 6/7$

Utility for P2 $\Rightarrow 2(1 - 6/7) = 2/7$

→ Logistic Map: $x_{n+1} = 1/6\, x_n \pmod 1$



$x_n^* = 1/6\, x_n^* + 4/6$

$5/6\, x_n^* = 4/6$

$x_n^* = 4/5$

Therefore, when P2 actions $\times (1 + 5/6)$ $= 183.3\%$, $x_n^* = p = 4/5$ gives STABLE ATTRACTOR utility of 1.



where U = utility
T = attempts,
U converges to 2/7
as no. tends

Average utility of 200 different players per attempt.







Players settle for strategy equilibrium sooner if actions are raised to stable outcome level.



When multilayered,

$W_{ht}^{k} = W_{ht}^{k} + \Delta W_{ht}^{k}$

$\Delta W_{ht}^{k} = -C \dfrac{\partial E}{\partial W_{ht}^{k}}$

$f(s) = \dfrac{a}{1 + e^{-\beta s + \gamma}} + \lambda$

If $\Delta T \leq \epsilon$, $\Delta T = \int_a^b \phi^*(T,t)\phi(T,t)\,dT$

Flux $= j(x) = \frac{1}{2m}\left[(\hat{p}\phi)^*\phi + \phi^*(\hat{p}\phi)\right]$ and for $P(a \leq \Delta T \leq b)$,

$\phi = Ae^{ik\Delta T}$, with $\hat{p} = -ik\, d/dT$, $j(x) = \frac{\hbar}{m} A^* A$.

→ Neuron resonant amplitude output $T_r = \left|\frac{F}{A}\right|^2$