

# Urban economies and urban inequalities

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# Three takes

- **Geographic / radical political economy** (Harvey, Massey): rich, theory-driven accounts of modes of spatial capitalism
  - Phases of essentially chaotic accumulation, spatial inequalities
- **Urban economists** (Roback, Glaeser): incorporates Neoclassical + Keynesian elements
  - Allows for uneven development and within-place inequalities
  - Long-run, a particular form of convergence: spatial equilibrium
- **Economic geographers** (Jacobs, Storper): econ + institutions, political economy, non-market processes
  - From econ-adjacent to evolutionary frameworks

# What I'll talk about

## Part 1: Why are spatial disparities persistent?

- Build a picture using concepts and tools from urban economics
- Uneven development; big nominal disparities between places
- BUT long term convergence to 'spatial equilibrium'

## Part 2: challenges to convergence

- Will convergence happen at all?
- Recent work on job polarisation; housing market failure; lack of mobility

## Part 3: policy responses


# Part 1: urban economics and spatial disparities

# Agglomeration

- **Starting point: cities help firms and workers more productive.** 'Agglomeration economies' make this happen
- Duranton and Puga (2020) divide these into three types
  - **Sharing** – benefits of shared infrastructure, e.g. public transport
  - **Matching** – deep labour markets help workers and firms find the best job / people at any point
  - **Learning** – generating new ideas, learning from others
- **Production side:** cities help people connect and maintain economic links; observe, learn from each other
- **Consumption side:** urban scale supports a rich set of products, services, experiences

# Clusters

- **Key idea: colocation, interaction and collaboration by firms in cities** fosters innovation, growth (Marshall 1918)
- In the jargon, ‘industrial production districts’ or ‘milieux’ in cities
  - **Clusters may involve firms in the same industry** (Marshall)
  - **... or involve knowledge spillovers across industry** (Jacobs, 1969)



# The urban wage premium

- Doubling city size ~ 5-10% increase in ave productivity
- Key idea: there is an 'urban wage premium' for workers in cities, compared to similar people outside cities
  - Why? Higher productivity ~> higher wages for urban workers
  - Bigger city ~> bigger wage premium
  - More skilled / experienced / higher ability ~> bigger wage premium
  - The wage premium stays with you after you leave a city  
Glaeser and Maré 2001, Baum-Snow and Pavan 2012, D'Costa and Overman 2014, De La Roca and Puga 2016
- This helps explain spatial inequality *between cities* (bigger vs. smaller places) and *within cities* (how experienced you are)

# Push-pull forces


- **Key idea = push-pull dynamic in urban systems**
- **Agglomeration can be self-reinforcing**, pulling people in
- This means that some cities will grow faster than others – and also helps explain economic inequality between places
- **But at the same time, these growing cities also have ‘diseconomies’**, which push people out
- For example: **congestion, pollution, higher rents, higher cost of living**



# Spatial equilibrium

- **So urban systems and cities have a push-pull dynamic**
- Attraction/repulsion forces between places in an urban system
- Urban economists argue that these forces can organise into **‘spatial equilibrium’** (Glaeser 2011, Roback 1982)
  - **Firms and workers can ‘sort’ into ‘optimal’ locations**, given their skills, needs and preferences
  - Popular cities have **higher wages *and* living costs**; unpopular places have lower wages and costs
  - **These wage / cost differences flatten out**, so that ‘real incomes’ are ~ equal across locations


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**Firm and worker sorting leads to uneven development**

GDP and employment are highly concentrated in a few urban cores


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More complex activities, and more skilled workers cluster into these places

Balland et al (2020)

# Higher wages ... higher living costs



London is very productive => its urban wage premium is higher  
But London's also very expensive to live in. Real incomes are lower


**So: is the UK ~at~ spatial equilibrium? Not exactly ...**

# Part 2: challenges to convergence

# Challenges to spatial equilibrium

- **Recent work in urban economics challenges the idea that urban systems converge, in real terms, in the long run**
- **The urban wage premium stops working**, at least for some
  - This drives up income disparities both *between* and *within* places
- **Housing supply fails**, esp in the most popular locations
  - Rising cost of living eats into urban wage premium ...
  - ... and pushes workers out of big cities / prevents others moving in
- **Limits to worker / household mobility**
  - Either from money constraints, social ties or both

# Urban-biased growth




Eckert et al (2022).

Data from US Census Bureau Longitudinal Database. Commuting Zones popdensity measured by 1980 deciles

# Big city, big firm-biased growth

FIGURE 8: URBAN-BIASED GROWTH AND LARGE FIRMS



Eckert et al (2022).


Data from US Census Bureau Longitudinal Database. Commuting Zones popdensity measured by 1980 deciles. Large firms have >1,000 employees

# Challenge 1: unequal cities

- **In theory, everyone earns more in bigger cities** – your urban wage premium should cushion against higher costs
- **Is this still true in practice?** Eckert et al suggest no
- Autor (2019) looks at real wages (income less cost of living) by skill group in US cities, between 1970 and 2015
  - Rising urban wage premium for graduates
  - Flattening urban wage premium for non-graduates
  - Especially for those aged under 40, i.e. Millennials and Gen Z



# Unequal cities



Autor (2019)


Rising wage premium for college graduates (blue)

Flattening wage premium for non-graduates (red)

# What explains these shifts?

- **Autor is clear that the main driver of change is ‘job polarisation’** – that is, growth in high-wage and low-wage work, and shrinking of mid-wage work
- What drives this? Autor is clear that **technological change (computerisation, automation) is one of the main forces**, at least in the US
- Also others: trade shocks, weakened unions ...
- **These macro shifts have an urban footprint, and generate winners and losers in cities**

# Geography of job polarisation



US cities have seen growth in lowest-paid and highest-paid jobs  
Biggest changes in the biggest cities

# ‘New work’

**Table 1: Examples of New Job Titles by New Work Category and Decade**

	Frontier work	Last Mile Work	Wealth Work
1980	Supervisor, Word Processing Controller, Remotely-Piloted Vehicle	Check Writer Tamale-Machine Feeder	Hypnotherapist Gift Wrapper
1990	Circuit Layout Designer Robotic Machine Operator	Vending-Machine Attendant Film Touch-Up Inspector	Dance Therapist Singing Messenger
2000	Artificial Intelligence Specialist Echocardiographer	Chat Room Host/Monitor Bicycle Messenger	Counselor, Marriage-Family Employee Wellness Crdnr
2010	Technician, Wind Turbine Intelligence Analyst	Underground Utility Cable Locator Technician, Prepress	Exercise physiologist Sommelier


Table reports examples of new job titles added to the 1977 and 1991 Dictionary of Occupational Titles, and the 2000 and 2010 Census Classified Indices of Occupations.

Autor and Salomons look how new types of job have appeared over time

Three groups of job, organised by tasks

Differ by a) qualifications b) salary c) gender

# 'New work' in cities



Higher-skilled and better-paid types of 'new work' cluster in bigger cities

Clustering has got stronger over time

# Challenge 2: urban housing markets



Source: Land Registry 2022, Price Paid Data, 2022 data; Scottish neighbourhood statistics 2022, Mean , 2022 data.

Note: Northern Ireland data not available so the figure for Great Britain is shown. ONS 2022, Earnings and employment from Pay As You Earn Real Time Information, seasonally adjusted, 2022 data. CPI inflation adjusted (2019=100). Earnings data is for employees only.


# Causes of the crises

- **Key idea = two competing explanations for the urban housing crisis, supply side and demand side**
- **Supply side** – we're not building enough housing, especially affordable housing. The planning system is too restrictive, especially in the most popular places. Build more and prices will come down
- **Demand side** – no, the problem is who's buying. Housing has become financialised. We're building for investors and speculators, especially from outside the UK. This is why cities are full of luxury flats. Restrict that, and prices will fall.



# The supply side

Figure 1: Real Land & House Price Indices (1975 = 100)



UK house and land prices since the 1950s, big jump from the 1980s  
 Why? Planning system doesn't release enough land, so prices go up




# The supply side

- **Key idea = UK planning system is based on development control. This restricts supply in popular places**
  - Existing homeowners want to restrict supply, so their homes get more valuable (Cheshire et al 2014)
  - Hilber and Vermeulen (2016): house prices in England would be 35% lower – if all planning restrictions ended
  - Hilber and Mense (2021): problem worst in ‘superstar cities’: supply constraints plus richer workers sorting in

# The demand side

- **Key idea = we've turned housing into an investment class**
- Ryan-Collins (2018) in summary:
  - Banks lend you money to buy homes
  - Finite supply of land, limited supply of houses
  - Limited supply of mortgage credit ~ this limits demand, and thus prices
  - BUT liberalising finance hugely increases *demand for housing*
  - Housing becomes an asset, including for international investors
  - And: more borrowing ~> higher demand ~> higher prices
- **Lots of truth in this, especially in London**
- **But – why is housing so attractive an investment in the first place?** In part because it's in short supply ...

# Challenge 3: falling mobility



# Why is immobility high?

- Bosquet and Overman (2019) look at UK mobility patterns. They find that:
  - Nearly 44% of people only ever work in the place they were born
  - Immobility is higher for people with low qualifications, or none
  - Lack of mobility is also related to your parents' social class
- **Large minority of people *never* move**
- **Lack of income** – linked to lower qualifications – partly explains this. But others **may not want to move**
- UE generally doesn't talk about **attachments to places and communities; 'bonding social capital'**

# Part 3: summing up

# Summary

- Economic activity is uneven – between countries, cities and neighbourhoods
- This is partly the result of big ‘macro’ forces, such as technological change and job polarisation
- Cities help people and firms get more productive ...
- ... but urban economies also produce disparities between and within cities.

# Summary (2)

- Urban economists have argued that urban systems should move towards ‘spatial equilibrium’, with people sorting to the right places
- This smooths out some of the inequalities we worry about
- More recent work shows three challenges to this picture:
- **Challenge 1:** the urban wage premium is disappearing, for the lowest-paid workers
- **Challenge 2:** housing in many big cities is unaffordable, and building rates (in some countries) are very low
- **Challenge 3:** many people can’t or don’t want to move, in the way theory says they ‘should’

# Policy responses

- **“Mainstream”** – make markets work better
  - Fix co-ordination failures between actors in a market
  - Fix market failures (spectrum from regulation direct provision)
- **“Mainstream ++”** – shape market direction
  - Missions approach: set social goal and organise market and non-market actors to achieve it
- **“Critical / radical”** – reshape market power
  - Includes competition policy and anti-trust at the mainstream end ...
  - .... through to nationalisation / collective ownership



# Policy responses: disparities

- **Key idea = policies for people vs. policies for places**  
(Cheshire et al 2014)
- In practice, you need a mixture of both
- **Less radical:** skills training, active labour market policy
- **More radical:** Living Wages, UBI
- **Less radical:** business support, workspace, tax breaks
- **More radical:** sustained area-based investment in e.g. R&D, infrastructure and skills; devolve powers to do it
  - UK2070 Commission: to close economic gaps between towns and cities in the UK, need to spend £1tn over 20 years!

# Policy responses: housing

- **Supply side responses ...**
- **Change the planning system** – move UK to masterplanning systems as in Netherlands, Germany
- **Build up and out in cities** – higher density, more tall buildings, more building on the Green Belt
- **Demand-side responses ...**
- **Tighter mortgage finance regs** – make it harder to own
- **Restrictions on investors** – dampen financialisation, penalise Buy To Let
- **Build more affordable homes!**

# Policy responses: immobility

- **What's driving this?** Partly things we've covered today: flattening urban wage premia; unaffordable housing in cities
- But also, economists' assumption that people 'sort' across space is not that realistic
- In 'left behind' places, rather than encouraging mobility, it is smarter to **improve public services and quality of life**
- This is what Coyle (2017) calls 'universal basic services'

**Thanks!**

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# Appendix 1: measuring disparities

# Measurement issues


- **Two main issues when measuring area disparities**
- **Metrics** – need to avoid distortions caused by urban processes, especially commuting across areas
  - GVA / resident will overstate area productivity in places where many people work, but don't live
  - Really big issue for global cities like London
- **Scales** – need to avoid results being driven by the units we choose for the analysis
  - The 'Modifiable Areal Unit Problem' (MAUP)
  - Using regions give you different results than using neighbourhoods



# Example 1: metrics

Figure 2: Regional variations in GDP per inhabitant, in purchasing power standard (PPS), by NUTS 2 regions, 2014

Source: Eurostat (2016) *Statistics Explained: GDP at regional level*<sup>16</sup>




The UK is a massive outlier, and this is driven by London

The study uses **GVA/resident**, so the result is partly driven by commuting

# Example 2: metrics

Figure 1. Regional inequality in productivity and employment, Western Europe




Stansbury et al (2023)

Source: ARDECO. Note: Regions defined at NUTS 1 level. We do not include Germany data pre-reunification.

This analysis uses **GVA/worker, a workplace measure**  
The UK still has area disparities, but is no longer such an outlier  
NB units are bigger here (NUTS1 > NUTS2)

# Example 3: scales




London is very productive, but also very expensive to live in. Regional productivity gaps are much bigger than real wage differences

But ... what about differences *within* regions?

# Example 4: scales

Percentage of local areas (MSOAs) in each rank decile for the regions of England and Wales

- Lowest income decile
- Middle income deciles
- Highest income deciles



ONS (2023)

Using regions as units hides a lot of important variation!  
Controlling for housing costs doesn't make disparities go away