

MAXIMILIANO GARCÍA GONZÁLEZ

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EDUCATION

Ph.D., Economics, Boston University, Boston MA, May 2024 (expected)
Dissertation Title: *Essays on the Political Economy of Natural Resources*
Main advisor: Raymond Fisman
Dissertation Committee: Raymond Fisman, Martin Fiszbein, Kevin Lang, Dilip Mookherjee

M.S., Economics, University of Chile (*Summa Cum Laude*), Santiago de Chile, Chile, 2015

B.A., Business Economics (*Cum Laude*), Santiago de Chile, Chile, 2013

FIELDS OF INTEREST

Development, Environmental Economics, Political Economy, Applied Microeconomics.

WORKING PAPERS

“[Governing the \(Privatized\) Commons: Evidence from the introduction of Water Bords](#)”,
(with Jose Belmar), October 2023. Job Market Paper.

“[Does the provision of information on outcomes of local governments improve political accountability?](#)”, with Loreto Cox, Sylvia Eyzaguirre and Francisco Gallego. January 2023. R&R at the Journal of Development Economics.

“America’s Frontier Culture: A Particular(ist) Individualism” (with Sam Bazzi and Martin Fiszbein)

“Political Competition and the Causal Effects of Privatization on Public Goods”

WORK IN PROGRESS

“Governing adaptation: Water Governance and Climate Change”, (with Jose Manuel Belmar)

“Market Power in Water Markets”

PRESENTATIONS

RIDGE - Environmental Economics Workshop, Medellin, Colombia, 2023

Chilean Economic Society, CL, 2023

Global Priorities Institute OSW, Oxford, UK, 2023

Political Behavior of Development Conference at MIT (poster), Cambridge, MA, 2019

Chilean Economic Society, CL, 2015

FELLOWSHIPS AND AWARDS

Rosenstein-Rodan Prize for the Best Graduate Student Paper on Development Economics, Boston University, Fall 2023.

Abdala Fieldwork Research Grant, Institute for Economic Development, Boston University. 2021

GRS Student Fellowship, Boston University, 2018-2023
Becas Chile - Government scholarship for doctoral studies, CONICYT, Chile, 2018
COES Scholarship for graduate studies, COES, 2014
Academic Merit Scholarship, University of Chile, 2008

WORK EXPERIENCE

STC, World Bank, 2023
Research Assistant to Professor Jihye Jeon, Boston University, 2021-2022
Research Assistant to Professor Martin Fiszbein, Boston University, 2019-2021
Research Assistant to Professor Dina Pomeranz, J-PAL LAC, 2017-2018
Research Assistant to Professor Francisco Gallego, PUC-Chile, 2015-2017
Research Assistant to Professor Daniel Hojman and Nicolas Grau, University of Chile, 2014-2015
Intern, United Nations – Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, Santiago, 2012

TEACHING EXPERIENCE

Teaching Fellow for Macroeconomics, Applied Economics, Finance and Statistics, Department of Economics, Boston University, 2020-2023
Stata Instructor on J-PAL LAC executive course, PUC-Chile, 2016
Teaching Fellow for graduate Political Economy, PUC-Chile, 2015
Teaching Fellow for graduate Microeconomics and Econometrics I and II, University of Chile, 2014
Teaching Fellow for undergraduate Trade, Industrial Organization, Public Finance, Economic History, Microeconomics and Econometrics, 2010-2014
Instructor in course “Social Contemporary problems”, joint with Benito Baranda (Executive Director of America Solidaria), Santiago, 2010-2011

LANGUAGES

Fluent in English and Spanish, basic French.

COMPUTER SKILLS: Python, MATLAB, LaTeX, ArcGIS, QGIS, Google Earth Engine, Stata.

CITIZENSHIP: Chile

OTHERS: Organizer of Volunteer Works at Butelalbún (Mapuche community in Bio-Bio, Chile), 2007-2013. Sports director of RAMUCH (University of Chile Alpine Club), 2016-2017.

REFERENCES

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Governing the (Privatized) Commons: Evidence from the Introduction of Water Boards (Job Market Paper) *(with Jose Belmar)*

Climate change increasingly aggravates the tragedy of the commons in water resources. This paper studies the role of legally empowered users' organization when water is allocated through private property in a context of low state intervention. To achieve this goal, we assembled a novel dataset that integrates administrative records, geographic information, and satellite imagery. Using alternative empirical strategies, we show that the establishment of such organizations slows down the creation of new property rights and redistributes water from upstream locations to downstream locations, mostly because of improved enforcement of already existing property rights. This redistribution of water increases agricultural yield, allows the adoption of crops that require Summer irrigation, and increases exporting activity among farmers in downstream locations. A sufficient statistics approach suggests that these organizations reduce misallocation caused by the natural advantage of upstream users to over extract.

Punishing Mayors Who Fail the Test: How Do Voters Respond to Information About Educational Outcomes? *(with Loreto Cox and Francisco Gallego)*

This paper explores the electoral effects of providing information on the educational outcomes of municipal schools when the mayor is running for reelection. We designed and implemented an experiment in Chile whereby we sent 128,033 letters to voters in 400 randomly selected polling stations. The letters included information on past test scores for local public schools (levels and changes), and either average or maximum outcomes for comparable municipalities. We find that information on educational outcomes affects turnout, which translates almost one to one into votes for the incumbent mayor. Voters respond to educational results in levels and to letters that have average results as a benchmark. The results are concentrated in polling stations with bad educational outcomes, which reduce turnout and thus votes for the incumbent, especially if such outcomes come as news to voters. The results appear to be stronger in contexts where information is scarcer.

America's Frontier Culture: A Particular(ist) Individualism *(with Sam Bazzi and Martin Fiszbein)*

The United States is one of the most individualistic countries in the world. But unlike Western Europe's individualism, which was historically shaped in combination with moral universalism, America's "rugged individualism" is morally particularistic. We link the United States' distinctive cultural configuration to the country's history of frontier settlement: the frontier favored self-reliance; at the same time, cooperation had high-returns, but could only be sustained in the presence of strong, local group identities. We show that counties with longer frontier history are more localist: they disproportionately oppose federal taxation (much more than state taxes); they have stronger communal values relative to universalistic values; they display lower charitable giving for distant counties; and they show weaker social connectedness with people in distant counties.