

# Firm reactions to extreme weather and implications for climate change policy

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## Abstract

Climate change and extreme weather events are a global problem, but especially affect poor countries, including firms in these countries. We know that weather shocks affect these firms through both a demand and supply channel. Depending on which channel dominates, short-run firm adjustments to the shocks differ, and understanding these adjustments can help in designing better policy to reduce the impact of climate change on poor countries. I combine firm-level World Bank data with high-resolution weather data to show that weather shocks are primarily supply shocks, affecting non-agricultural firms across sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia by reducing their productivity. I further show that firms react to these shocks by scaling back their expenditures on productive capability, hiring less machinery, less space and fewer non-production workers. These adjustments further reduce firm productivity. I develop a simple international trade model featuring hired productive capability that rationalizes my reduced form findings. Combining the model with machine learning estimates of the impact of climate change, I highlight the importance of productivity adjustments for policy design: Productivity responses make trade cost reductions 1.7 times more effective at countering welfare losses from climate change.

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Climate change and extreme weather events are a global problem but especially affect poor countries, including firms in these countries (Costinot, Donaldson, & Smith, 2016; Nath, 2020; Santangelo, 2019; Somanathan, Somanathan, Sudarshan, & Tewari, 2021; Zhang, Dêschenes, Meng, & Zhang, 2018). Extreme weather affects firms both through a demand channel, by reducing local demand, and through a supply channel, by directly decreasing firm productivity (Adhvaryu, Kala, & Nyshadham, 2019; Nath, 2020; Santangelo, 2019; Somanathan et al., 2021; Zhang et al., 2018). We do not know, however, which channel is relatively more important. Depending on weather being a net supply or demand shock, firm adjustments to the shock differ. Understanding these adjustments could, in turn, improve policy to help poor countries reduce the impact of climate change.

In this paper, I show that the supply channel dominates, that firms adjust to these supply shocks by endogenously changing their productivity and that these adjustments are quantitatively important for policy design. I combine World Bank data on firms across Africa and South Asia with global weather data sets and projections of future weather. I use well-identified reduced form regressions to show that weather shocks act as net supply shocks and to explore how firms adjust to these shocks. I then develop and estimate a model of international trade that captures these key reduced form relationships. Finally, I combine the model with machine learning estimates of the effect of climate change to highlight the importance of firm productivity adjustments for policy design.

My argument proceeds in five steps. First, I use World Bank Enterprise Surveys data combined with high-resolution weather data to show that, across sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia, negative weather shocks have a larger relative impact on exporters' total sales than on purely domestically active firms' total sales. I regress log sales on a temperature index combining mean temperature, temperature variance the number of days with temperatures exceeding 32°C (89.6°F), using location fixed effects to isolate random year-to-year weather variation. An 80<sup>th</sup> percentile weather shock decreases non-exporters' sales by 3.9 percent, but exporters' sales by 6.9 percent. That exporters are more affected by extreme weather implies that weather is, on net, a supply shock for these firms, rather than a local demand shock. The reasoning, as I explain in more detail below, is that demand shocks should affect exporters' sales less, because local demand shocks leave foreign demand unaffected, and exporters can access that foreign demand. Supply shocks, on the other hand, should lead exporters to reduce their quantity sold especially strongly, as long as international demand is more elastic than local demand.

Second, I further show that even exporters' domestic sales decrease more due to negative weather

shocks. This suggests that firm performance in one market affects firm performance in other markets. This link is due to spending on productive capability. Productive capability comprises rented or hired equipment, facilities or non-production personnel. For example, it includes rented machinery, rented office space or a sales team. It improves overall firm performance across all markets the firm is active in, by increasing labor productivity (through providing workers with sufficient equipment or space) or by making it easier to sell the firm’s output — productive capability lowers the cost of providing the firm’s products across all markets it serves. I find this effect in the data: In response to an 80<sup>th</sup> percentile weather shock, domestic producers reduce their expenditure on productive capability by 2.9 percent, while exporters reduce their expenditure by 6.7 percent. I also show that the differential impact on exporters is not easily explained by common correlates of exporting, such as firm size, sector, or complexity of their production process.

Third, based on these reduced form results and adapting the basic framework of Hyun and Kim (2022), I develop an international trade model that features one simple addition to Melitz (2003) — allowing firms to hire productive capability. The model immediately generates the patterns I observe in the data: In reaction to a negative productivity shock, firms scale back productive capability expenditures, reducing their productivity and therefore their sales across all markets they are active in. The effect is larger for exporters, because exporters may no longer want to incur the cost of trading with some of their export destinations. When they exit those markets, they see a discontinuous fall in total sales and productive capability, which then leads to a discontinuous fall in sales to the domestic market. Adding productive capability makes the model computationally more challenging, since firms’ decisions to enter various markets are no longer independent: If a firm enters a new market, the additional demand it can now reach makes it worthwhile to hire additional productive capability, which in turn can make it profitable to enter additional markets. The usual approach to this kind of problem is to find bounds on the set of active markets and check all possible combinations of markets between the bounds (Antràs, Fort, & Tintelnot, 2017; Jia, 2008). I show that in my setting, I can find tighter and computationally more efficient bounds on the set of active markets. I also develop a novel and efficient algorithm for finding the optimal set of markets when the lower and upper bound do not coincide. Instead of searching over all possible combinations of markets between the bounds, which for some firms is a very high dimensional combinatorial problem, I invert the problem. I find bounds on the optimal productive capability the firm hires and do a grid search across productive capability between those bounds. Finally, while the model remains computationally more burdensome than a standard Melitz (2003) model, I show that it

can be readily estimated using novel small open economy methods (Bartelme, Lan, & Levchenko, 2023; Demidova, Naito, & Rodríguez-Clare, 2022). I use Zambia as a small open economy, and am able to estimate large parts of the model using reduced form approaches, which reduces the complexity of the estimation considerably without sacrificing key insights from the model. I find that the estimated model matches targeted and non-targeted moments well.

Fourth, I then turn to estimating the causal effect of climate change, based on an array of high-resolution weather projections covering a range of climate change scenarios. I use the generalized random forest (GRF) algorithm (Athey, Tibshirani, & Wager, 2019) to estimate the average firm's change in sales under different climate scenarios. GRFs are especially well suited to this high dimensional, inherently out of sample exercise. The estimation uses a wide range of temperature and precipitation measures, including averages, variances and day counts for temperature and precipitation; an important feature of GRFs is that they perform well even with such a large selection of right hand side variables. I incorporate adaptation to climate change into the estimation by also including long-term means and variances of all weather measures. Under a severe climate change scenario, I estimate that the average firm faces an almost eleven percent decrease in sales by the late 2080s. Even under a mild scenario, I find that the average firm's sales would drop by over six percent.

Finally, I combine these projections with the model to calibrate a counterfactual baseline scenario under climate change, matching the estimated impact on the average firm to a shift of the productivity distribution. I conduct trade policy experiments based on this scenario, comparing my model's results to those of a basic Melitz (2003) model. I show that trade policy is markedly more effective when I take productive capability reactions into account: Over a fifth of the total output increases from trade cost reductions are due to firms' productivity responses, and almost half of the welfare impact is due to these same productivity responses. This effect is strongest for firms in countries with smaller domestic markets, where purely domestic producers do not find large productive capability expenditures worthwhile, but access to large foreign markets warrants considerable increases in productive capability. My findings are especially relevant as richer countries consider onshoring and consciously shortening their supply chains (Goldberg & Reed, 2023). I highlight that such policies can have especially negative consequences for poor countries and should be well-targeted to avoid collateral damage.

I contribute to the literature on the impact of climate change on poor countries, especially its impact on firms and trade (e.g. Conte, 2022; Costinot et al., 2016; Nath, 2020; Santangelo, 2019;

Somanathan et al., 2021; Zhang et al., 2018). I add two important stylized facts to this literature, namely that weather is, on net, a supply rather than a demand shock, and that non-agricultural firms in poor countries react to weather shocks by adjusting their productive capability. I show that this means trade policy can increase firm productivity, because improved access to foreign markets makes it worthwhile for firms to invest in additional productive capability. Since climate change decreases firm productivity, trade policy can directly counteract its effects. Existing studies have conceptualized weather shocks as either demand (Santangelo, 2019) or supply shocks (Nath, 2020; Somanathan et al., 2021; Zhang et al., 2018) for firms, but have not tried to assess which of the two dominates. Knowing that weather is, on net, a supply issue is helpful because firm reactions to either kind of shock can differ. Additionally knowing that firms react by adjusting their productive capability, and thus endogenously changing their productivity, helps model firm responses to climate change. I provide a tractable way of doing this which, in turn, can inform policy design around leveraging firm responses to climate change. For example, this suggests that reducing trade cost raises firm productivity and thus directly counteracts some of the negative effects of climate change.

I further contribute to the broader literature on estimating the effects of weather shocks and climate change (e.g. Auffhammer, Hsiang, Schlenker, & Sobel, 2013; Burke & Emerick, 2016; Burke, Hsiang, & Miguel, 2015; Burke & Tanutama, 2019; Carleton & Hsiang, 2016; Carleton et al., 2022; Dell, Jones, & Olken, 2012; Deschênes & Greenstone, 2007, 2011; Lin, Schmid, & Weisbach, 2019; Nath, 2020; Ortiz-Bobea, 2021; Somanathan et al., 2021; Zhang et al., 2018), highlighting a novel approach to estimation using GRFs (Athey et al., 2019). These are especially well-suited to the problem, since they can easily handle high-dimensional weather data and are optimized for out of sample performance (future climate change is necessarily out of sample). Not having to pick specific weather measures to keep estimation feasible or tractable reduces the risk of results depending on the inclusion of a specific weather variable. The GRF relates current outcomes to current weather data and estimates the causal effect of moving to a new set of weather realizations, for example drawn from a future climate. Results can then easily be summarized as the average change in outcomes under the new climate.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 1 describes the data I use. Section 2 presents motivating evidence, showing that weather acts as a net supply shocks, highlighting the importance of productivity adjustments in response, and ruling out alternative explanations and informing my modeling choices. Section 3 lays out an international trade model informed by my reduced form results, which can generate the pattern I see in the data using a parsimonious mechanism: firms

are able to hire productive capability, such as machinery, office space, or a sales team. Section 4 estimates the causal impact of climate change on firms, taking seriously the challenges involved in this, including the high dimensionality of weather data, the inherently out of sample nature of the problem and firm adaptation to climate change. Section 5 combines the climate change results with the model, presenting counterfactual simulations that show how productivity adjustments increase the effectiveness of, for example, trade policy at counteracting some of the negative effects of climate change. Section 6 summarizes my main findings and concludes.

# 1 Data

## 1.1 Firm data: World Bank Enterprise Surveys

For data on firm outcomes and characteristics I use the World Bank Enterprise Surveys (ES).<sup>1</sup> The ES data include formal companies with at least five employees in the manufacturing and service sectors. Interviews cover specific fiscal years; I obtained meta data from the World Bank that allow me to fill in fiscal year dates where they are missing in the data. I use the harmonized data set provided by the World Bank, comprised of surveys between 2006 and 2020, and combine this with location data provided to me by the ES unit in the World Bank. For firms that lack location data, I further use information on the city, state and country the firm is located in to geocode the firm's location, using three different web services accessible via `Python` (OpenStreetMap, GeoNames and Google Maps).

Table 1 shows basic summary statistics for firms across sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia; Figure 1 shows the locations of all firms across sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia. I focus on these two regions for two reasons. First, they contain the countries on Earth with the highest fraction of people living in absolute poverty and the largest number of people living in absolute poverty. As climate change stands to be especially damaging to these regions (Costinot et al., 2016), mitigation policy needs to take into account how their economies work. Second, my main argument is most relevant to countries with relatively small domestic markets compared to world markets — relatively poor countries. The ES data for sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia cover many of the poorest countries on Earth.

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<sup>1</sup> More information on the ES data and how to access them is available at <https://www.enterprisesurveys.org/>

## 1.2 Weather data: CHIRPS and Berkeley Earth

I use precipitation data from the Climate Hazards Group InfraRed Precipitation with Stations (CHIRPS) data set (Funk et al., 2015).<sup>2</sup> CHIRPS is a global, daily, high resolution (0.05° grid) precipitation data set going back to 1981. I combine these with daily maximum temperature data from the Berkeley Earth (BKE) data set (Rohde et al., 2013).<sup>3</sup> These data are at a lower resolution (1° grid) but cover recent years, which is important since my most recent data points come from 2020. Figure 2 shows daily maximum temperature on April 24, 1991, to illustrate the resolution of the temperature data.

Since the World Bank provides firms locations that are slightly randomly offset from the actual firm location, it happens in some cases that firm locations are over the water, where CHIRPS and BKE do not cover them. For these firms, I interpolate their data using weather data from the closest firm that does not have this problem.

## 1.3 Climate projections: NEX-GDDP-CMIP6

I obtain projections for future weather (weather drawn from a changed climate) from the NEX-GDDP-CMIP6 data set (Thrasher, Wang, Michaelis, Melton, Lee, & Nemani, 2022; Thrasher, Wang, Michaelis, & Nemani, 2021). These are results of climate model runs that are part of Coupled Model Intercomparison Project Phase 6 (CMIP6), downscaled to a higher resolution and bias corrected by the NASA Center for Climate Simulation. The data contain daily projections for temperature and precipitation, though I do not need them to accurately project temperature on any given day; I just need them to produce reasonable projections of expected weather patterns in future years.

I use projections for three different climate change scenarios; these scenarios are called Shared Socioeconomic Pathways (SSPs). Each SSP describes a different path for future climate change based on different assumptions about greenhouse gas emissions, population and international cooperation. The three different scenarios I consider, which are the most commonly used SSPs, are SSP1/2.6, which is a very optimistic scenario featuring climate change mitigation and sustainable development, SSP2/4.5, which is a middle of the road scenario featuring some mitigation, and SSP5/8.5, which features the most rapid climatic change.<sup>4</sup> Studying results for different SSPs allows me to incorporate deep uncertainty about the broad parameters governing the future path of climate change. Beyond

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<sup>2</sup> More information on CHIRPS is available at <https://www.chc.ucsb.edu/data/chirps>

<sup>3</sup> More information on BKE is available at <https://berkeleyearth.org/data/>

<sup>4</sup> See O'Neill et al. (2017) and Riahi et al. (2017) for more detail on the SSPs.

this deep uncertainty, the NEX-GDDP-CMIP6 data contain results for 35 different climate models for each SSP, reflecting uncertainty about modeling climate even for a given set of broad parameters. I combine all of these data when projecting the causal impact of climate change in Section 4. My results therefore incorporate modeling uncertainty about future weather as well. See Appendix C for more detail on data processing.

Figure 4 shows the trajectory of yearly average daily maximum temperature in the actual data and across SSPs (taking the average across all models within SSP). Starting in 2040, the differences between the three scenarios become apparent, with temperature rising fastest in SSP5/8.5, and plateauing (in fact slightly decreasing towards the end of the century) in SSP1/2.6.

## 2 Motivating reduced-form evidence

This section presents simple reduced form results that make four points. First, firms across sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia are impacted by weather, with hotter years depressing sales. Second, this effect is especially strong for exporters, who see a larger relative decrease in total sales due to negative weather shocks. One implication of this is that weather shocks are, on net, supply shocks — their effect on firms’ marginal cost outweighs their effect on local demand, as I explain below. Third, exporters’ *domestic* sales also decline more as a result of negative weather shocks, suggesting a link between their international and domestic activities. Fourth, this is not easily explained by common correlates of being an exporter, but is consistent with firms cutting back hired productive capability, such as machinery, office space, or a sales team, in response to productivity shocks.

The functional forms I use in this section are simple, and are not meant to capture the full effects of weather, or the effects of climate change, on firm outcomes. I propose a solution to that challenge in Section 4. Instead, this section provides the key motivation for my modeling choices in Section 3.

### 2.1 Identification

When regressing firm outcomes on weather, the key challenge to identification is that more or less productive firms could be more likely to be located in hotter or colder places (e.g. Burke & Emerick, 2016). To overcome this, location fixed effects can be used to isolate random year-to-year variation in weather variables. I do not have panel data on firms, so I instead group firms into clusters based on geographic proximity and average weather variables within each cluster-year combination. This



ensures that, conditional on cluster fixed effects, there is no correlation between unobserved firm characteristics and weather shocks.

I group firms into clusters using an algorithm called Density-Based Spatial Clustering of Applications with Noise (DBSCAN), which I implement using the `Python` package `scikit-learn` (Pedregosa et al., 2011). This algorithm takes a distance parameter to determine core groups of firms that are located close to each other, and in a second step adds periphery firms to a cluster if they are close enough to a set of core firms. The core trade-off here is that large clusters introduce measurement error due to the cluster averaging of weather variables (the cluster-average shock is different from the shock at the firm’s exact location), but small clusters include fewer firms and leave some firms out of any cluster altogether (dropping them from the analysis).

An additional econometric challenge is correlation of errors across space, an issue raised for the historical persistence literature in Kelly (2020). Fortunately, I use variation over time rather than just cross-sectional variation across space; by choosing an appropriate clustering distance, I can ensure that errors are correlated within, but not across clusters. As a result, clustered errors are sufficient for correct inference, which helps with inference for the more complicated estimation of the effects of climate change in Section 4. My preferred clustering distance is 10.0 km, since the fraction of firms included in any cluster plateaus at this distance and it is still relatively small. Therefore, the measurement error induced by clustering at this distance should likewise be small. I also fail to reject the null that errors at this clustering distance are uncorrelated across clusters. See Appendix Table 13 for a formal test of error correlation at various distances, as well as the fraction of firms included in the clusters.

With firms grouped into clusters, I estimate regressions of the form

$$y_{jt} = \beta_1 x_{jt} + \gamma_{n(j)} + \delta_t + \varepsilon_{jt}$$

where  $y_{jt}$  is an outcome for firm  $j$  in cluster  $n$  at time  $t$  and  $x_{jt}$  is a measure of weather over the preceding year. I include location fixed effects  $\gamma_{n(j)}$  for identification, as explained above, and year fixed effects  $\delta_t$  purely to gain precision in my estimates. To explore heterogeneity, I interact weather with firm characteristics  $\mathbf{z}_{jt}$ ,

$$y_{jt} = \beta_1 x_{jt} + \mathbf{z}_{jt}' \boldsymbol{\beta}_2 + x_{jt} \mathbf{z}_{jt}' \boldsymbol{\beta}_3 + \gamma_{n(j)} + \delta_t + \varepsilon_{jt}$$

To provide motivating evidence, I use a weather measure that is parsimonious, easy to understand

and captures weather dynamics over the entire year: an index of three commonly used temperature variables. The index combines average temperature over the year, variance of temperature over the year and the number of days with temperatures exceeding 32°C (89.6°F). These three measures provide different lenses on how hot a year is, and each have their own strengths and weaknesses. Combining them into a single index provides a parsimonious combined measures of temperature. To make the index components comparable, I calculate location-specific  $z$ -scores for each of the three components  $x_{jt}$  as

$$\tilde{x}_{jt} = \frac{x_{jt} - \bar{x}_{jt}}{\sqrt{\hat{V}}(x_{jt})}$$

where  $\bar{x}_{jt}$  is the average of the variable at firm  $j$ 's location over the last 20 years and  $\sqrt{\hat{V}}(x_{jt})$  is the corresponding standard deviation.<sup>5</sup> The index is then just the average of the three  $z$ -scores.

To make the effect size more interpretable, I scale the index by its standard deviation across locations after partialling out cluster fixed effects. (I use the standard deviation after removing fixed effects since that is the identifying variation the regressions use.) A one unit increase in the re-scaled index now corresponds to a one standard deviation weather shock. Figure 3 shows a histogram of the resulting standardized index after partialling out fixed effects; the figure also indicates the 20<sup>th</sup> and 80<sup>th</sup> percentiles of the variable. A one standard deviation weather shock in either direction is quite large; most shocks are smaller in absolute magnitude than this. To give a sense of scale, I will convert the one standard deviation effect sizes into 80<sup>th</sup> percentile weather shocks, or 0.318 standard deviations, in the following discussion.

Since I do not care about the impact of temperature compared to some other weather variable, I do not control for precipitation, for example. The idea is not to isolate the effect of this specific variable. Rather, I am interested in the effect of weather over the year on firm outcomes, and a higher temperature index serves as an indicator of generally unfavorable weather conditions.

## 2.2 Results

Table 2 shows the effect of weather on firms' log sales. An 80<sup>th</sup> percentile weather shock leads to a 7.2 percent decline in sales. This is a substantial effect, but note again that I use a very simple functional form here which does not distinguish between small weather variations and truly extreme

<sup>5</sup> Another advantage of the location-specific de-meaning is that, since my estimations include cluster fixed effects, I now effectively use deviations of location-specific shocks from a linear growth trend to identify the effects of weather shocks on firms, rather than relying purely on the randomness of weather shocks.

events — the idea is to highlight that weather affects firms, rather than to exactly quantify its effect, which I turn to in Section 4.

Breaking the weather effect up by exporter status, Table 3 shows that purely domestic firms see a 3.9 percent decline in sales in response to an 80<sup>th</sup> percentile weather shock, while currently exporting firms see a 6.9 percent decrease, with the difference significant at the one percent level. Appendix A.3 shows that this exporter interaction is not sensitive to using alternative ways of measuring exporter status (for example, using past exporter status instead of current exporter status). The estimate of the base effect for domestic producers is somewhat noisy, but as Section 4 shows, using estimation methods that can fully capture the complexity of weather data, I do estimate a significant overall effect of weather on firm performance.<sup>6</sup>

That exporters see a larger negative effect may seem surprising, given that weather shocks affect local demand (Santangelo, 2019) and that exporters have access to a foreign source of demand that is insulated from the local shock. The differential impact on exporters makes sense, however, because weather shocks also affect firms’ marginal cost (Nath, 2020; Somanathan et al., 2021; Zhang et al., 2018). In a basic open economy framework where international demand is more elastic than domestic demand, exporters will respond to a negative productivity shock by reducing their international sales more than their domestic sales. My results therefore imply that, for sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia, the supply effect of weather shocks outweighs their demand effect.

This basic open economy model cannot explain one additional result, however. Table 4 shows that exporters’ national sales also see a larger decline in response to negative weather shocks. Purely domestically active firms see a 5.4 percent decline in domestic sales in response to an 80<sup>th</sup> percentile weather shock, but exporters see a 7.7 percent decrease. This suggests a link between exporters’ international and national sales, which I will formalize in Section 3 by allowing firms to hire productive capability.

To preview the underlying idea, exporters reach a larger total market size than purely domestic producers. This incentivizes them to spend additional money on hired productive capability, in the form of (for example) machinery, office space, or a sales team, which lowers their marginal cost. In turn, when a negative supply shock decreases their productivity, they may no longer be able to profitably serve some foreign markets, because the profit they would make there is smaller than the fixed cost of accessing the market (e.g. keeping a up-to-date export license). In response,

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<sup>6</sup> To highlight that year fixed effects are present purely to increase precision, and do not affect point estimates much, Appendix Table 14 shows an estimation without year fixed effects. Results for the effect on non-exporters are much less precise. The difference in the effect for exporters remains highly significant and similar in magnitude, however.

they scale back their expenses on rented productive capability, which increases their marginal cost, raises their prices and leads to lower sales even in the markets they can still profitably service. This leads to a larger relative decrease in domestic sales in response to weather shocks compared to non-exporters, explaining the pattern in Table 4. I show formally that the model I build generates these comparative statics in Section 3.

To provide direct support of the hypothesis that expenditures on fixed productive capability are important in this context, Table 5 shows the effect of weather shocks on fixed costs by exporter status. Fixed costs combine cost of communications, sales, transportation, and rent for buildings, equipment and land. I see a 2.9 percent decrease in fixed costs for domestically active firms in response to an 80<sup>th</sup> percentile weather shock, but a 6.7 percent decrease for exporters.<sup>7</sup> I only have detailed cost breakdowns for a sub-sample of firms, which is why this analysis uses fewer observations than the preceding results, but this nevertheless provides direct evidence of productive capability adjustments when faced with negative weather events. Exporters scale back fixed expenditures considerably more than non-exporters in response to negative weather shocks. This is because exporters may no longer be able to profitably serve some markets, making some of their productive capability redundant. When they cut back on this productive capability, their overall productivity decreases. This is also evident in the second column of Table 5, which shows that sales per employee see a larger relative decline for exporters compared to non-exporters (a 2.6 vs. 1.1 percent decline in response to an 80<sup>th</sup> percentile weather shock).

## 2.3 Underlying mechanism

My results show an effect of weather on output, which I interpret as evidence of a net productivity reduction. There is a large literature showing that weather shocks decrease productivity. For example, Adhvaryu et al. (2019) find direct evidence for lower worker productivity on assembly lines during hot days, exacerbated by heat-generating lighting, Somanathan et al. (2021) find lower worker productivity in Indian manufacturing firms on hot days, and Zhang et al. (2018) find reduced total factor productivity in Chinese manufacturing during hotter years. In their wide-ranging literature summary, Carleton and Hsiang (2016) note negative impacts of temperature on labor supply, which are also found to be important in Somanathan et al. (2021) and Santangelo (2019). If

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<sup>7</sup> It is possible that weather shocks lead firms to reduce the valuation of their productive capability, rather than its physical quantity. Appendix Table 19 shows, however, that weather has no effect on firms' valuation of their stock of machinery, where I should see that same effect at play if it mattered. This suggests the productive capability effect I find is due to a reduction in its quantity, rather than just due to a change in valuation.

workers supply less labor at each wage level, for example because they need to work on their own subsistence farms, that has an effect similar to lower worker productivity — to produce a given quantity, the firm needs to incur higher labor cost. These arguments may pertain more to employees in lower skilled jobs, but as Carleton and Hsiang (2016) note, previous research also finds that extreme temperatures reduce cognitive performance, e.g. lowering math test scores. With imperfect climate control, even workers in an office setting would face lower productivity due to extreme heat. Through this cognitive performance channel, temperature can reduce worker productivity even for firms in the service sector, for example. Ultimately, working in extreme heat makes it hard for anyone to perform their best, is at best unpleasant and at worst outright dangerous.

Table 6 shows evidence that these channels are present in my data. For example, though the estimate is somewhat noisy, I see firms’ total operating hours increasing by 4.3 percent in response to a 80<sup>th</sup> percentile weather shock. Since firms’ sales are falling, this suggests lower output per hour, as e.g. found by Adhvaryu et al. (2019). I further find that hotter years lead to more power outages, with an 80<sup>th</sup> percentile weather shock increasing the likelihood of an outage by 1.7 percentage points (again, the estimate is somewhat noisy). Outages directly decrease firm productivity by making it impossible to operate machinery or computers.

## 2.4 Alternative explanations

Of course, exporters are different from other firms in many ways; Table 7 shows a comparison of exporting and non-exporting firms’ characteristics. It could be that these differences simply make them more susceptible to weather shocks. To address this concern, I run an extensive battery of robustness checks that regress log total sales on the temperature index interacted with exporter status and additionally interacted with other firm characteristics, plus base effects for those characteristics. If it were true that another firm characteristic is the ‘true’ reason for the effects I find, I would expect that once I include that characteristic in the regression, the interaction between exporter status and weather shocks loses significance and/or sees a drastically smaller point estimate. I find that neither happens for any of the three alternative hypotheses I describe in the rest of this section. Appendix Table 20 summarizes these robustness checks.

First, exporters tend to be large firms, which could be more reliant on short-term hired labor that can get drawn into agriculture when negative weather shocks hit (Santangelo, 2019); accordingly, I check whether the initial number of employees or the number of employees three years ago can explain the exporter effect. Second, since exporters are more likely to be in large-scale manufacturing,

where temperature control can be a problem (Adhvaryu et al., 2019), I control for two- and four-digit ISIC sectors, fully interacted with weather shocks. This also addresses concerns around an effect through input prices — if it were true that exporters simply use a different import structure, I would expect firms in similar sectors to face the same issue. Third, exporters could potentially be using more complex production processes (Costinot, 2009), so I control for measures of complexity: whether a firm has an international quality certification, the firm’s ownership structure, and the manager’s years of experience. None of these alternative hypotheses alone can explain the different effects for exporters, and I find that weather has a differential impact on exporters even when including them all in the regression at once.<sup>8</sup>

I conclude from this that the effect I find is not due to an obvious correlate of being an exporter, but is instead about the production structure of exporting firms. As I show in Section 3, a simple extension of Melitz (2003) immediately yields the patterns I find. All that is required is that firms can acquire any kind of productive capability — including, but not limited to items such as machinery, office space, or a sales team — and the model generates the comparative statics I find. That firms can hire productive assets is not, in fact, an unrealistic assumption, and provides a parsimonious explanation of the patterns I see in the data, including the greater decrease in fixed cost seen in Table 5.

### 3 Model

I now develop a simple international trade model that can rationalize the core reduced form results I highlight in the previous section. That is, this model can explain why exporters see a larger effect of weather shocks on total sales and why this carries over to domestic sales as well. The core mechanism is firms’ ability to hire productive capability, such as machinery, office space, or a sales team.

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<sup>8</sup> A final concern would be differential measurement error for exporters and non-exporters. To rule out this possibility, I estimate the main regression using only data on firms coming directly from the firms’ books. Appendix Table 15 shows the results; point estimates become noisier but remain very similar to my main results.

### 3.1 Demand

There are  $N$  countries and a mass of goods  $\mathcal{G}_n$  is available in each country  $n$ . Consumers have CES preferences with elasticity of substitution  $\sigma$ , a budget of  $X_n$  and solve

$$\max_{\{q_n(j)\}} \left( \int_{\mathcal{G}_n} q_n(j)^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}} dj \right)^{\frac{\sigma}{\sigma-1}} \text{ s.t. } X_n = \int_{\mathcal{G}_n} q_n(j) p_n(j) dj \quad (1)$$

This yields quantity demanded as

$$q_n(j) = \underbrace{X_n \mathcal{P}_n^{\sigma-1}}_{\equiv \alpha_n} p_n(j)^{-\sigma} = \alpha_n p_n(j)^{-\sigma} \quad (2)$$

where

$$\mathcal{P}_n = \left( \int_{\mathcal{G}_n} p_n(j)^{1-\sigma} dj \right)^{\frac{1}{1-\sigma}}$$

is the optimal price index and I introduce the shorthand  $\alpha_n$  to denote demand factors — from the perspective of firms selling in market  $n$ , a higher  $\alpha_n$  translates into higher sales in that market at any given price they charge there. The  $\alpha_n$  factors will be an important component of solving the model.

### 3.2 Supply

Firms are located in their home country  $i$  and export to other countries  $n$ . Each country has an infinite mass of potential entrants. Firm  $j$ , producing the proprietary variety  $j$ , is characterized by its core productivity  $a_j \sim F_i$ , where the distribution of productivities is country specific. I adapt the framework of Hyun and Kim (2022), which is an extension of Melitz (2003) allowing firms to choose a common quality level across all markets they are active in. Instead of linking decisions across markets via demand, I let firms purchase or hire productive capability  $c_j$ , such as machinery, office space, or a sales team. Additional productive capability makes it cheaper to provide goods in all markets and links choices, including entry decisions, across markets. The cost of acquiring  $c_j$  is  $f(c_j)$  and measured in units of labor. Firm  $j$ , active in a set of markets (countries)  $\mathcal{M}_j$ , has effective productivity  $a_j c_j^\delta$  and incurs variable cost

$$v(\{q_n(j)\}) = \sum_{n \in \mathcal{M}_j} d_{ni} q_n(j) \frac{w_i}{a_j c_j^\delta}$$

which includes an iceberg trade cost  $d_{ni}$  and the wage  $w_i$ . (Since Hyun and Kim (2022) focus on entry in various domestic markets within one country instead of international trade, their model does not feature an iceberg cost.) The firm's profit maximization problem is

$$\begin{aligned} & \max_{\{p_n(j), q_n(j)\}, c_j, \mathcal{M}_j} \left[ \sum_{n \in \mathcal{M}_j} p_n(j) q_n(j) - d_{ni} q_n(j) \frac{w_i}{a_j c_j^\delta} - f_{ni} w_i \right] - f(c_j) w_i - f_i w_i \\ & \stackrel{(2)}{\Leftrightarrow} \max_{\{p_n(j)\}, c_j, \mathcal{M}_j} \left[ \sum_{n \in \mathcal{M}_j} \alpha_n p_n(j)^{1-\sigma} - d_{ni} \alpha_n p_n(j)^{-\sigma} \frac{w_i}{a_j c_j^\delta} - f_{ni} w_i \right] - b \beta c_j^{\frac{1}{\beta}} w_i - f_i w_i \end{aligned} \quad (3)$$

where I follow Hyun and Kim (2022) and set  $f(c_j) = b \beta c_j^{\frac{1}{\beta}}$ . Unlike Hyun and Kim (2022) I explicitly consider market entry and exit, so I include a fixed cost  $f_{ni}$ , measured in units of labor, for operating in each market, as in Melitz (2003). I assume  $f_{ii} = 0$  and  $d_{ii} = 1$  for simplicity, because it makes the model computationally easier to solve and because the data I use cover only active firms. I further include a fixed start-up cost  $f_i$ , also measured in units of labor, which entrants have to pay to discover their productivity  $a_j$ , again as in Melitz (2003). For a given  $c_j$ , optimal prices  $p_n(j)$ , quantities  $q_n(j)$  and sales  $S_n(j)$  for firm  $j$  in market  $n$ , as well as profits across all markets  $\pi(j)$ , follow from first order conditions as

$$p_n(j) = \underbrace{\frac{\sigma}{\sigma-1}}_{\equiv \mu} d_{ni} \frac{w_i}{a_j c_j^\delta} \quad (4)$$

$$q_n(j) = \alpha_n \left( \mu d_{ni} \frac{w_i}{a_j c_j^\delta} \right)^{-\sigma} \quad (5)$$

$$S_n(j) = \alpha_n \left( \mu d_{ni} \frac{w_i}{a_j c_j^\delta} \right)^{1-\sigma} \quad (6)$$

$$\pi(j) = \frac{1}{\sigma} \left( \mu \frac{w_i}{a_j c_j^\delta} \right)^{1-\sigma} \left( \sum_{n \in \mathcal{M}_j} d_{ni}^{1-\sigma} \alpha_n \right) - \left( \sum_{n \in \mathcal{M}_j} f_{ni} \right) w_i - b \beta c_j^{\frac{1}{\beta}} w_i - f_i w_i$$

After solving for prices and quantities, the FOC for the optimal distribution network gives<sup>9</sup>

$$c_j = \left[ \frac{1}{b} \delta (\mu w_i)^{-\sigma} a_j^{\sigma-1} \left( \sum_{n \in \mathcal{M}_j} d_{ni}^{1-\sigma} \alpha_n \right) \right]^{\frac{\beta}{1-\beta(\sigma-1)\delta}} \quad (7)$$

Analogous to Hyun and Kim (2022), the parameter restrictions to ensure an interior solution are  $\sigma > 1$ , which is a standard CES assumption and ensures that goods are substitutes,  $\delta > 0$ , which

<sup>9</sup> Detailed derivations for this and all following results which are merely stated can be found in Appendix D.



ensures that additional productive capability decreases marginal cost, and  $\beta(\sigma - 1)\delta < 1$ , which ensures that the optimal  $c_j$  is finite, because the increase in fixed cost outpaces the decrease in marginal cost. As I discuss in Section 3.4, I find that these restrictions are fulfilled in the data.

I showed in Section 2 that exporters see a larger decline in total sales and domestic sales in response to higher temperatures. This implies that weather is, on net, a negative supply shock for firms, otherwise, I would expect exporters to see a smaller decline in sales in response to these weather shocks. Further, the larger impact on domestic sales can be rationalized if, when they are pushed out of certain markets as a result of the productivity shock, exporters scale back productive capability in response. Matching these reduced form results, exporters see a larger decline in domestic sales if they stop exporting to any markets as a result of a negative productivity shock  $a'_j < a_j$ . Let  $\mathcal{M}_j' \subseteq \mathcal{M}_j$  denote the set of markets the firm is active in after the shock. Using primes to denote post-shock quantities, the relative decline in Home sales is

$$\frac{S_i(j)'}{S_i(j)} \stackrel{(6)}{=} \left( \frac{a'_j c'_j}{a_j c_j} \right)^{\sigma-1} \stackrel{(7)}{=} \left[ \left( \frac{a'_j}{a_j} \right) \left( \frac{\sum_{n \in \mathcal{M}_j'} d_{ni}^{1-\sigma} \alpha_n}{\sum_{n \in \mathcal{M}_j} d_{ni}^{1-\sigma} \alpha_n} \right)^{\beta\delta} \right]^{\frac{\sigma-1}{1-\beta(\sigma-1)\delta}}$$

Note that the parameter restrictions ensure the overall exponent is positive. The first term in parentheses depends solely on the change in  $a_j$ . The second term in parentheses depends on the change in active markets  $\mathcal{M}_j$ ; it represents an indirect effect of the productivity shock which occurs if leads the firm to exit some markets it was active in. For domestic producers,  $\mathcal{M}_j' = \mathcal{M}_j$ , since they will not exit altogether given that  $f_{ii} = 0$ . For exporters, if  $\mathcal{M}_j' \subset \mathcal{M}_j$ , the second term in parentheses is smaller than one, exacerbating the effect of the shock and leading to a larger relative decline in sales. This model therefore generates the comparative statics I observe in the data. The standard Melitz (2003) model, in contrast, would only generate this comparative static for total sales — when an exporter leaves a market following a productivity shock, they see a discontinuous drop in sales, and thus a larger relative decline in *total* sales than a purely domestic producer would. For *Home* sales, however, both firms would see the exact same relative decline.

### 3.3 Equilibrium

**Definition 3.1** *For a given a CES elasticity  $\sigma$ , start-up costs  $f_n$ , entry costs  $f_{ni}$ , iceberg trade costs  $d_{ni}$ , cost parameters  $b$ ,  $\beta$  and  $\delta$ , and productivity distributions  $F_i(a_j)$ , an equilibrium for this model is a set of prices  $p_n(j)$ , quantities  $q_n(j)$ , productive capacities  $c_j$ , active markets  $\mathcal{M}_j$ , masses of entrants  $N_n$  and active firms  $n_n$ , incomes  $X_n$  and wages  $w_n$  such that, for all firms  $j$  and all*

countries  $n$ ,

- *Consumers are maximizing utility (1)*
- *Firms are maximizing profits (3)*
- *Labor supply  $L_n$  equals labor demand in all countries*
- *Expected profits prior to entry are zero in all countries*
- *Income equals expenditure in all countries, i.e. trade is balanced*

### 3.3.1 Optimal choice of active markets

The first step in finding the equilibrium is determining  $\mathcal{M}_j$  for a given set of  $\alpha_n$ , which in principle is a high-dimensional combinatorial problem. Antràs et al. (2017) confront a similar problem when modeling input sourcing and use the algorithm developed by Jia (2008). This relies on finding an upper bound on  $\mathcal{M}_j$  by assuming the firm is active in all  $N$  markets and determining whether leaving an individual market  $n$  would increase firm profits. If so, as Jia (2008) shows,  $n$  cannot be part of the optimal set of markets. A similar procedure yields a lower bound, starting from the firm being active in no markets at all and checking where entry increases profits. To find the optimal  $\mathcal{M}_j$ , you then only have to calculate profits across all combinations of markets present in both the lower and upper bound.

In my setting, I can use a more computationally efficient algorithm for finding upper and lower bounds. To find an upper bound, for a set of parameter guesses, start by assuming the firm is active in all markets, and set that as the initial  $\mathcal{M}'_j$ . Then,

1. Calculate  $c_j$  if the firm were active in  $\mathcal{M}'_j$  and calculate variable profits in each market, that is, sales  $S_n(j)$  in each market minus the entry cost  $f_{ni}$  (ignoring the cost of acquiring  $c_j$ )
2. Drop all markets where the firm would be earning negative variable profits from  $\mathcal{M}'_j$ , and use those where it makes weakly positive profits as the new  $\mathcal{M}'_j$

Iterate until the firm makes weakly positive variable profits in all markets in  $\mathcal{M}'_j$ ; this gives the upper bound  $\mathcal{M}_j^{\text{ub}}$  (see Appendix D.3 for a proof).

To find a lower bound, for a set of parameter guesses, start by assuming the firm is active only at Home, and set that as the initial  $\mathcal{M}'_j$ . (Since I assume  $f_{ii} = 0$ , firms will always be active in the Home market.) Then,

1. Calculate  $c_j$  if the firm were active in  $\mathcal{M}'_j$  and calculate variable profits in each market, that is, sales  $S_n(j)$  in each market minus the entry cost  $f_{ni}$  (ignoring the cost of acquiring  $c_j$ )
2. Add all markets where the firm would be earning positive variable profits to  $\mathcal{M}'_j$ , and use these plus the markets in  $\mathcal{M}'_j$  as the new  $\mathcal{M}'_j$

Iterate until the firm cannot enter additional markets where it would make weakly positive variable profits when  $c_j$  is chosen optimally under  $\mathcal{M}'_j$ ; this gives the lower bound  $\mathcal{M}_j^{\text{lb}}$  (see Appendix D.2 for a proof).

In simulations, I find both bounds in many fewer steps than I can find the bounds from Jia (2008). This is largely because finding the bounds from Jia (2008) always requires as many steps as there are markets, whereas my bounding algorithms can often exclude or include multiple markets in one step. I also find that my bounds are usually tighter than those from Jia (2008). Both of these factors speed up computation considerably. The core feature of my model that enables me to use these more efficient bounds is that the link between entering or exiting different markets ultimately comes down to an optimal firm decision on  $c_j$ .

Having found the bounds, I know the optimal set of active markets for all firms with  $\mathcal{M}_j^{\text{lb}} = \mathcal{M}_j^{\text{ub}}$ , which is the case for the majority of firms. For firms where the bounds do not coincide, I could check all possible combinations of markets in between the two bounds. Unfortunately, unlike Antràs et al. (2017), I find that the cardinality of that difference can be considerable: Though most firms only need to decide between a few markets, some have over 100 different markets ( $\approx 1.23 \times 10^{30}$  combinations) to choose from. Therefore, I cannot feasibly solve the optimal market problem by checking profit across all combinations of active markets.

Instead of searching over sets of active markets  $\mathcal{M}_j$  and determining the optimal profit for each set, I invert the problem. I search across  $c_j$  (productive capability) to find optimal profits across possible choices of productive capability. Determining  $\mathcal{M}_j$  for a given  $c_j$  is easy, since with a known productivity, market entry decisions just boil down to Melitz (2003): Firms enter markets in which they make a variable profit (taking entry costs into account). The lower and upper bounds for markets the firm could be active in,  $\mathcal{M}_j^{\text{lb}}$  and  $\mathcal{M}_j^{\text{ub}}$ , also yield lower and upper bounds on  $c_j$ , since as firms increase  $c_j$ , they only ever enter additional markets and do not exist markets they are already active in. (Leaving a market the firms is making positive variable profit in cannot increase its total profit for a given  $c_j$ .) The  $c_j$  the firm would optimally choose if it were active in  $\mathcal{M}_j^{\text{lb}}$  thus is a lower bound on the optimal  $c_j$  the firm chooses, and similarly the optimal  $c_j$  at  $\mathcal{M}_j^{\text{ub}}$  yields an

upper bound. I then simply conduct a grid search between those two bounds.

### 3.3.2 Remaining equilibrium objects

To determine  $\alpha_n$ , I turn to the free entry condition for country  $i$ . It states that expected profits before paying the fixed start-up cost  $f_i$  required to discover firm productivity should be zero. Let  $\underline{a}_i$  denote the least productive firm that finds it profitable to operate in country  $i$  (instead of shutting down after discovering  $a_j$ ), then the free entry condition is

$$f_i w_i = \int_{\underline{a}_i}^{\infty} \frac{1}{\sigma} \left( \mu \frac{w_i}{a_j c_j^\delta} \right)^{1-\sigma} \left( \sum_{n \in \mathcal{M}_j} d_{ni}^{1-\sigma} \alpha_n \right) - \left( \sum_{n \in \mathcal{M}_j} f_{ni} \right) w_i - b \beta c_j^{\frac{1}{\beta}} w_i \, dF_i(a_j) \quad (8)$$

The integral cannot be solved analytically because it depends on the sets of active markets  $\mathcal{M}_j$  (directly but also, non-linearly, through  $c_j$ ). These sets are a function of  $a_j$  and (being sets) do not have an easily computable antiderivative. This condition nevertheless pins down the equilibrium  $\alpha_n$  terms, given wages and sets of active markets, in a computationally attractive form: When numerically solving the model (using a sum to simulate the integral), this becomes a system of linear equations in  $\alpha_n$ .

The full employment condition for country  $i$  yields the mass of entrants

$$N_i = \frac{\mu^{\sigma-1} w_i^\sigma L_i}{\int_{\underline{a}_i}^{\infty} \left( a_j c_j^\delta \right)^{\sigma-1} \sum_{n \in \mathcal{M}_j} d_{ni}^{1-\sigma} \alpha_n \, dF_i(a_j)}$$

which can be used to find the mass of active firms  $n_i = [1 - F_i(\underline{a}_i)] N_i$ . To derive the gravity equation, I first calculate the price index for country  $n$  as

$$\mathcal{P}_n = \mu \left( \sum_{i=1}^N n_i (d_{ni} w_i)^{1-\sigma} \int_{\underline{a}_{ni}}^{\infty} \left( a_j c_j^\delta \right)^{\sigma-1} dF_i(a_j) \right)^{\frac{1}{1-\sigma}}$$

Plugging this into aggregate trade flows from  $i$  to  $n$  leads to the gravity equation

$$X_{ni} = \frac{n_i (d_{ni} w_i)^{1-\sigma} \int_{\underline{a}_{ni}}^{\infty} \left( a_j c_j^\delta \right)^{\sigma-1} dF_i(a_j)}{\sum_{k=1}^N n_k (d_{nk} w_k)^{1-\sigma} \int_{\underline{a}_{nk}}^{\infty} \left( a_j c_j^\delta \right)^{\sigma-1} dF_k(a_j)} X_n \quad (9)$$

where  $\underline{a}_{ni}$  is the least productive firm from  $i$  selling in  $n$ . This has the typical gravity structure, but the integrals of effective productivity across producers selling from  $i$  to  $n$  again cannot be solved analytically. The gravity equation nevertheless pins down wages, closing the model with world GDP

as the numeraire.

### 3.4 Estimation

#### 3.4.1 Reduced form

I follow the common practice of assuming that core productivities come from a Pareto distribution with shape parameter  $\theta$ , shifted by a country-specific scale parameter  $T_i^{\frac{1}{\theta}}$ , where  $T_i$  captures differences in technology across countries. I estimate both  $\theta$  and  $T_i$ . I simulate firm productivities using draws  $u_j$  from a uniform distribution on  $(0, 1]$ , since

$$u_j = T_i a_j^{-\theta}$$

is uniformly distributed and can be used to back out  $a_j$  given the dispersion parameter and technology shifters (Eaton, Kortum, & Kramarz, 2011).

Following Eaton et al. (2011), I estimate  $\sigma$  based on the ratio of firms' sales to their variable costs. Variable costs include the cost of labor, raw materials, fuel, water, electricity, goods for resale, and other costs of production. I first calculate the mark-up for each firm and then use the average across firms to calibrate  $\sigma$ , which yields  $\hat{\sigma} = 3.016$  with a standard error of 0.043. Table 8 shows estimates for all parameters of the structural model.

Next, I turn to the parameters governing firms' optimal productive capability,  $\beta$  and  $\delta$ . Log sales in firm  $j$ 's home market  $i$  can be written as

$$\log(S_i(j)) = I + \log(\alpha_i) + (\sigma - 1) \log(a_j) - (\sigma + \beta\delta - 1) \log(w_i) + (\sigma - 1) \beta\delta \log(\mathcal{S}(j)) \quad (10)$$

with  $I$  a constant. This shows that the elasticity of home market sales with respect to total sales identifies  $\beta\delta$  for a known  $\sigma$ . I make the simplifying assumption that  $\beta = \delta$  to ease the computational burden during the structural estimation described below.  $\beta$  and  $\delta$  both discipline firms' choices of productive capability  $c_j$ , and equilibrium wages and welfare depend only on the product of both parameters, though they have slightly different implications for price distributions. Normalizing the two is therefore without great loss of generality.

I can then directly estimate  $\delta$  and  $\beta$  by regressing log home market sales on log total sales, country-year fixed effects (to deal with  $\alpha_i$  and  $w_i$ ) and proxies for core productivity  $a_j$ . I proxy for core productivity using country-sector-year fixed effects (obviating the need for country-year

fixed effects), the manager’s years of experience, log initial number of employees, log number of employees three years ago, whether the firm uses an international quality certification, whether the firm experienced power outages, whether the firm competes against the informal sector, whether the firms introduced a new product or service during the last three years, whether the firm introduced a new process during the last three years, whether the firm had any R&D expenditures, whether the firm is part of a larger firm, whether the firm was formal when it was founded, whether the firm applied for an electricity connection over the last three years, whether the firm applied for a water connection over the last three years, the firm age, and legal status indicators. To allow for more flexibility in the estimation, I add all pairwise interactions as well as fourth-degree polynomials of all continuous variables.

I estimate (10) using only data on exporters, since purely domestically active firms mechanically yield an elasticity of one (their home sales and total sales are identical); see Appendix Table 21 for a summary of the results. Since the estimate for  $\beta\delta$  depends on  $\hat{\sigma}$ , I obtain its standard error via a pairs bootstrap, estimating  $\sigma$  and  $\beta\delta$  for 999 bootstrap samples. I find  $\widehat{\delta\beta} = 0.388$  with a standard error of 0.016, which results in  $\hat{\delta} = \hat{\beta} \approx 0.623$ . Regardless of the assumption that  $\beta = \delta$ , these parameter estimates satisfy the crucial restriction that  $\beta(\sigma - 1)\delta < 1$ , ensuring an internal solution for firms’ productive capability  $c_j$ .

Finally, I need to fix the productive capability cost shifter  $b$ . This is not separately identified from the technology shifters  $T_i$ , because making productive capability overall much cheaper has the same effect as shifting overall productivity. I assume that  $b = 1$  to resolve this set identification problem. The interpretation of this assumption is simply that workers can do production work and administrative work equally well.

### 3.4.2 Structural estimation

All remaining parameters — technology shifters  $T_i$ , the technology scale parameter  $\theta$ , start-up costs  $f_i$ , iceberg costs  $d_{ni}$  and entry costs  $f_{ni}$  — are estimated via the method of simulated moments (MSM). Estimating the model for the entire set of economies I have in my data is computationally infeasible, since finding a single equilibrium of the model for many countries and with a large number of simulated firms takes considerable time. Instead, I estimate the model for a small open economy Home ( $H$ ), building on the theoretical work by Demidova et al. (2022) and the estimation strategy in Bartelme et al. (2023). Specifically, I solve (8) only for the Home price index  $\alpha_H$ , taking all other countries’  $\alpha_n$  as given. I take the labor force size  $L_H$  from World Bank (2023).

I recover  $\alpha_n = X_n \mathcal{P}_n^{\sigma-1}$  for all other countries from the ITPD data on total expenditures  $X_n$  and a gravity estimation using data on all countries but Home, similar to Bartelme et al. (2023). I model all other countries' economies as following the model in Melitz (2003), which means their price indices are

$$\mathcal{P}_n = \frac{\sigma}{\sigma-1} \left( \frac{\theta_F}{\theta_F - \sigma + 1} \right)^{-\frac{1}{\theta_F}} \left( \frac{\sigma}{X_n} \right)^{\frac{\theta_F - \sigma + 1}{\theta_F(\sigma-1)}} \left( \sum_{i=1}^N T_i n_i (d_{ni} w_i)^{-\theta_F} (f_{ni} w_i)^{\frac{\theta_F - \sigma + 1}{1-\sigma}} \right)^{-\frac{1}{\theta_F}}$$

where  $\theta_F$  is the dispersion parameter for other economies' core productivity distributions, which I take from Melitz and Redding (2015) as  $\theta_F = 4.25$ .<sup>10</sup> Everything else in this expression is either data or a parameter I can estimate via the reduced form approaches above, while the final term in parentheses can be recovered from a gravity estimation. Specifically, the model in Melitz (2003) yields the gravity equation

$$X_{ni} = \frac{T_i n_i (d_{ni} w_i)^{-\theta_F} (f_{ni} w_i)^{\frac{\theta_F - \sigma + 1}{1-\sigma}}}{\sum_{l=1}^N T_l n_l (d_{nl} w_l)^{-\theta_F} (f_{nl} w_l)^{\frac{\theta_F - \sigma + 1}{1-\sigma}}} X_n \quad (11)$$

for trade flows from  $i$  to  $n$ , which allows me to recover  $\sum_{i=1}^N T_i n_i (d_{ni} w_i)^{-\theta_F} (f_{ni} w_i)^{\frac{\theta_F - \sigma + 1}{1-\sigma}}$  from the importer fixed effect of country  $n$  in a standard gravity estimation. I estimate this gravity equation using pseudo-Poisson maximum likelihood estimation (Santos Silva & Tenreyro, 2006), based on data for all countries except Home. Following Bartelme et al. (2023), I use distance and an indicator for contiguity to approximate the bilateral term

$$\tau_{ni} \equiv d_{ni}^{-\theta_F} f_{ni}^{\frac{\theta_F - \sigma + 1}{1-\sigma}} \quad (12)$$

To minimize measurement error in the trade data, I calculate average real flows across all years from 2000 to 2019 (the most recent year in the data). Appendix Table 22 shows estimation results for the gravity equation.

The results from this gravity estimation also allow me to ease estimation of  $d_{ni}$  and  $f_{ni}$ . The estimates for  $\tau_{ni}$  combine iceberg trade cost and entry cost. I parameterize iceberg cost  $d_{ni}$  as a function of the same variables I include in the gravity equation, distance and the contiguity

<sup>10</sup> The technology scale parameters  $\theta$  and  $\theta_F$  capture the dispersion of core productivities, one for Home, the other for all other countries. I take  $\theta_F$  from the literature since good estimates of this parameter exist, but allow  $\theta \neq \theta_F$  because those existing estimates are for the dispersion in firm productivity when  $a_j$  completely captures firm productivity. In my model, total firm productivity is  $a_j c_j^\delta$ , which has a different distribution than core productivity  $a_j$  by itself. I therefore allow for a different dispersion for core productivity.

indicator,

$$d_{ni} = 1 + \exp \{ \mathbf{X}_{ni} \gamma \}$$

where  $\mathbf{X}_{ni}$  also contains a constant term. For a guess of  $\gamma$ , I can then recover  $f_{ni}$  from (12). I maintain the assumptions that  $d_{ii} = 1$  and  $f_{ii} = 0$ . Parameterizing  $d_{ni}$  in this way is an exact analogue to estimating parameters via a gravity equation beforehand and feeding the results into the structural algorithm, as done for example in Antràs et al. (2017).

The parameters  $T_H$ ,  $f_H$  and  $\gamma$  are estimated via MSM. The targeted moments are Home's share of exporters, exports from Home to each other country,<sup>11</sup> the ratio of Home's trade with itself to its total exports and firms' average productive capability. In simulated data, these moments are exactly sufficient to identify all model parameters. To minimize measurement error in the trade data, I again use average real flows across all years from 2000 to 2019 (the most recent year in the data), as I did when estimating (11). In the firm data, productive capability combines the cost of communications, sales, transportation, and rent for buildings, equipment and land. In the model, it is simply the value of firms' productive capability,  $\beta c_j^{\frac{1}{\beta}} w_H$ .

While all parameters are identified by all moments, the share of exporters and ratio of Home's trade with itself to total exports are especially helpful for identifying  $f_H$  and  $T_H$ , the export flows are especially useful for identifying  $\gamma$  and the average fixed cost is needed to identify  $\theta$ . Table 8 also shows which variation in the data is especially important for identifying which parameters. I simulate the model using one million firms. I also estimate a version of Melitz (2003) in exactly the same way, targeting the same moments except the average fixed costs, which that model does not require. For this model, I simply use the dispersion parameter  $\theta_F = 4.25$  from Melitz and Redding (2015).

### 3.5 Estimation results

I estimate the model using Zambia as the small open economy, Home, because I have three rounds worth of Enterprise Surveys data (2007, 2013 and 2019) and because it could reasonably be described as a small open economy. It has a ratio of total exports to total domestic trade (trade with itself) of  $\approx 58$  percent, so trade makes up a large fraction of its economy, and it exhibits roughly balanced trade: Its trade imbalance (exports minus imports) as a fraction of its total trade (exports plus

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<sup>11</sup> In order not to overweight a few large export destinations, I take the log of exports and add the fraction of countries Home does not export to as an additional moment.



imports) is only six percent.

Table 8 shows the parameter estimates. I estimate a productivity dispersion parameter  $\theta = 3.590$ , which is somewhat lower than the estimate for the standard Melitz (2003) model I take from the Melitz and Redding (2015). Comparing total productivity distributions, however, Figure 9 shows that my model actually generates a higher dispersion for total productivity among Zambian firms than Melitz (2003) estimated on the same data. This figure shows the percentiles of  $\log a_j$  for the Melitz (2003) model and  $\log a_j c_j^\delta$  for my model. My model results may look like an extreme productivity distribution, but poor countries often exhibit a relatively large mass of very small firms (Hsieh & Olken, 2014), leading to a stronger productivity dispersion. For example, in the Enterprise Surveys data for Zambia, the ratio of the 95<sup>th</sup> to the 5<sup>th</sup> percentile (95/5 ratio) of real sales is  $\approx 681$ , which is even larger than my model’s estimate of the 95/5 ratio of  $\approx 365$ . For comparison, the Melitz (2003) model generates a 95/5 ratio of  $\approx 8$ . This highlights that my model’s implications for productivity dispersion are not implausible in the Zambian context.

Figure 7 shows a comparison of Zambian log exports and model results. The model matches the data well — the correlation coefficient is 0.63. In addition, figure 8 shows Zambian log imports, which are not a targeted moment in the MSM estimation, compared to the model simulation. The correlation here is even stronger, at 0.79. This is encouraging, since imports depend on the iceberg cost parameters from the MSM estimation and other countries’  $\alpha_n$ , which I estimate outside the model. That imports are well approximated suggests that the theoretical model captures key relationships in the data, that the estimates of that model reproduce those relationships for untargeted data moments, and that the MSM estimation and estimations outside the model combine well. Comparisons of the data and estimated values for the other three targeted moments are shown in Table 9. The model produces a share of exporters of 15 percent, which is identical to the share in the data, a ratio of own trade to total exports of 1.73, which is also identical to the data moment, and an average fixed cost of  $\approx$  USD 145,000, which matches the data moment as well.

## 4 Estimating the impact of climate change

### 4.1 Setup

For counterfactual simulations that take climate change into account, I require a realistic estimate of the impact of climate change on firms. Three key challenges arise in this context. First, weather is a very high-dimensional object, and I thus need to flexibly estimate how weather affects firm

outcomes. Second, projecting the causal impact of climate change is inherently an out of sample exercise and I need to estimate firms' responses to climate change in a way that takes this seriously. Third, firms adapt to climate change and my estimation needs to allow for this, or otherwise take it into account.

To formalize the problem, I observe firm outcomes  $\mathbf{y}$  and weather data from the current climate,  $\mathbf{X}^{\text{now}} \sim F_{\text{now}}$ ; those depend on each other as

$$\mathbf{y} = g(\mathbf{X}^{\text{now}}) + \varepsilon$$

Rather than trying to isolate the effect of a specific  $x_{ij}$  on  $\mathbb{E}[y_i|\mathbf{X}_i]$ , I am interested in the combined effect that moving to a new set of weather realizations  $\mathbf{X}^{\text{future}} \sim F_{\text{future}}$  has on the expected  $\mathbf{y}$ , but I do not see outcomes for these new weather realizations. Doing inference on the difference in expected outcomes thus requires an estimate of the new outcomes.

One solution is to pick a set of weather variables and estimate a relationship using regression, perhaps including splines or other flexible function forms. However, the choice of weather variables is not obvious. Instead, I use the generalized random forests (GRFs) developed by Athey et al. (2019). GRFs are designed to incorporate high-dimensional data and can be tuned to protect against overfitting and improve out of sample performance. GRFs are generally used to estimate heterogeneous treatment effects. However, I thank Stefan Wager and Erik Sverdrup for pointing out to me that they can also be used to estimate and do inference on unobserved means. Let  $D_i = 1$  for data with observed outcomes (the 'treatment' group) and  $D_i = 0$  for data without (the 'control' group). Keep  $y_i = y_i(1) = y_i$  for observed data and set  $y_i = y_i(0) = 0$  for unobserved outcomes. Then, the conditional average treatment effect for the control group is

$$\mathbb{E}[y_i(1) - y_i(0)|D_i = 0] = \mathbb{E}[y_i - 0|D_i = 0] = \mathbb{E}[y_i|D_i = 0]$$

which is the expected outcome among data points with unobserved outcomes. GRFs provide efficient cluster-robust confidence intervals for this expected outcome and can easily be estimated using the `grf` package in R (Tibshirani et al., 2023). They provide a solution to the first two challenges: they are able to incorporate high-dimensional weather data and flexibly relating them to firm outcomes, and they perform well out of sample, which is highly desirable when estimating the impacts of climate change.

The third challenge, incorporating adaptation, can be addressed by including long-term moments

of weather in the estimation. Adaptation means reacting differently to an identical weather shock depending on the climatic environment. For example, a firm that is used to an average yearly temperature of 28°C may be severely affected by a year that averages 30°C. If over time, the average temperature rises to 30°C, the same firm may adapt to the changed climatic environment, for example by installing climate control measures (Adhvaryu et al., 2019). It may then be less affected by a 30°C year.<sup>12</sup> To capture this, I include longer-term moments of contemporary weather variables in the estimation, akin to Carleton et al. (2022). Specifically, I include the mean and variance over the preceding 20 years.

## 4.2 Results

I use de-meaned log sales as my outcome of interest. By construction, this has an average of zero for data with observed outcomes. The estimated mean for each SSP can therefore be interpreted as the relative change in sales the average firm sees due to climate change. The weather measures I use include yearly averages, yearly averages of daily values raised to the second, third, fourth, fifth and sixth power (that is, the second to sixth non-centered moments of each variable), as used in Carleton et al. (2022), the corresponding centered moments, and counts for days in specific intervals and above certain thresholds. I also include long-term means and variances to capture adaptation, as described above. I partial out cluster fixed effects from all variables, including the outcome, before conducting the estimations. The GRF flexibly estimates the response of firm outcomes to all of these weather measures, including their interactions.

My main reference period for which I estimate the effects of climate change is 2086–2090. That is, for each SSP, I include projections from all 34 climate models and for each year in the 2086–2090 range and predict the causal effect on average sales. I choose this period because at that time, differences between the three SSPs are clearly visible in the data.<sup>13</sup> Table 10 shows the estimated change in sales under the three different SSPs as well as 90 percent confidence intervals. I consistently estimate negative effects, with larger magnitudes under more extreme climate change scenarios. The impacts range from a 6.6 percent decrease in sales for the average firm under SPP1/2.6 to an 8.3 percent decrease under SSP2/4.5 to a 10.8 percent decrease under SSP5/8.5. The latter two are significant at the ten percent level, while the change under SSP1/2.6 is not (though the confidence

<sup>12</sup> It is also conceivable that rising average temperatures could make firms more vulnerable to weather shocks, for example if they negatively affect local labor markets (Santangelo, 2019). My solution here can take either effect into account.

<sup>13</sup> Appendix A.7 shows results for additional periods.

interval only barely includes zero). I want to highlight here that the confidence intervals I present incorporate two sources of uncertainty. First, they of course reflect uncertainty in fitting the model (statistical uncertainty). Second, since I combine data for many different model projections of future weather under each scenario, the intervals are also affected by scientific uncertainty regarding the path of future weather.

## 5 Counterfactuals

I now combine the model estimates from Section 3 with the estimated impacts of climate change from Section 4 to show that trade policy is especially suited to help poor countries mitigate the effects of climate change. I first calibrate a counterfactual that changes the technology parameter  $T_H$  to match the estimated impact of climate change under SPP5/8.5 from Section 4. Specifically, I calibrate  $T_H$  so the average firm experiences a real sales decline of 0.108 log points.<sup>14</sup> That is, I find the shift in the distribution of core productivities  $a_j$  would lead to the estimated impact on firms' sales. I call this the *climate change baseline* counterfactual. To be able to compare my model results to conclusions I would draw if I ignored productive capability, I also estimate the model of Melitz (2003). I estimate this in exactly the same way as my model, using the same moments, and calibrate the climate change baseline counterfactual in the same way.

I then calculate the change in total output resulting from this shift in technology. Note that the impact on total output need not be identical to the 10.8 percent shift that the average individual firm experiences. As the first row Table 11 shows, I find that in my model, total output would decline by 6.6 percent, which is less of a decrease than the 10.8 percent impact on average firm sales. Using Melitz (2003) instead, I would have concluded that total output would decrease by 9.4 percent, which is closer to the average firm's decline but still a smaller decrease. I also assess welfare changes under the climate change baseline counterfactual, shown in the first row of Table 12. For my model, I find that welfare decreases by 8.7 percent, whereas for Melitz (2003), welfare decreases by 12.5 percent. This difference mirrors the sales results discussed above.

It is important to note that both models predict that larger firms see a smaller relative decline in real sales. This is highlighted in Figures 10 and 11, which show the change in real sales distributions under the climate change counterfactual, for my model and the Melitz (2003) model, respectively. Both figures show the change in the CDF of log sales across log sales; positive values indicate

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<sup>14</sup> To calculate real sales, I calculate prices, quantities and total sales in the estimated model as well as quantities sold in the counterfactual. I then evaluate counterfactual quantities at the actual prices to get real sales.

that the CDF is shifting to the left, and entirely positive values mean the new distribution first order stochastically dominates the old one. In both models, larger firms see a smaller relative reduction in sales.<sup>15</sup> The reason is that smaller firms are the least competitive, and their relative competitiveness decreases even further when the productivity distribution shifts left. In my model, however, this is exacerbated because larger firms can retain their productive capability, while smaller firms cannot afford to do so. Figure 12 shows the change in the distribution of productive capability  $c_j$ , highlighting that smaller firms lose productive capability compared to larger firms. This means larger firms stay relatively more competitive in my model.

That larger firms fare better in this counterfactual might seem at odds with the observation in Section 2 that exporters suffer more from negative weather shocks. The reduced form results and counterfactuals are consistent, however. The difference is that instead of thinking about idiosyncratic shocks, I am now considering moving to a new equilibrium in which larger firms become relatively more competitive. In general equilibrium, climate change is worse for smaller firms, both in my model and in Melitz (2003).

I then conduct policy experiments under the climate change baseline. I reduce trade costs and assess the change in average sales compared to current levels. The first policy change is a reduction in iceberg trade cost from Home to all other countries,  $d_{nH}$ , by 10 percent across the board. (This is an asymmetric reduction — I keep trade costs from all other countries to Home,  $d_{Hn}$ , fixed.) The results are presented in row two of Table 11. Compared to current sales, under my model, Zambia now experiences only a 2.9 percent drop in sales, a 3.7 percentage point improvement over the 6.6 percent baseline reduction, decreasing the negative impact of climate change by 56 percent ( $\approx 2.8/6.6$ ). When firms are unable to adjust their productive capability, under Melitz (2003), Zambia experiences a 5.3 percent drop in sales. This is still a 4.1 percentage point improvement over the baseline impact of climate change, but trade policy now only reverses 44 percent ( $\approx 4.1/9.4$ ) of the baseline impact of climate change.

For welfare, shown in row two of Table 12, my model predicts a 5.9 percent decline, which means trade policy reduces the impact of climate change by 2.8 percentage points, or 32 percent ( $\approx 2.8/8.7$ ). Ignoring productivity responses, Melitz (2003) would instead yield a 10.2 percent decline, a 2.3 percentage point or 18 percent ( $\approx 2.3/12.5$ ) improvement.

Thus, I find that over a fifth, or 21 percent ( $\approx (56 - 44)/56$ ), of the positive impact of trade

<sup>15</sup> The Melitz (2003) model has a small area with a negative shift, because in general equilibrium, wage changes allow some firms to access a market they were previously unable to profitably export to. This is purely a reallocation of sales within this group of firms and firms right below that cutoff, however.

policy is due to the endogenous response of productive capability. Overall, endogenous productivity responses make trade policy 1.3 times ( $\approx 56/44$ ) more effective at recouping sales declines from climate change. For welfare, I find that almost half of the impact of trade policy, or 44 percent ( $\approx (32 - 18)/32$ ), is due to productivity responses, making trade policy 1.7 times ( $\approx 32/18$ ) more effective. This highlights that trade policy is especially important for small open economies, such as Zambia, where access to foreign markets allows firms to invest in operations they could not support based solely on domestic market demand. Comparing the results for sales and welfare, the effect is considerable for businesses yet even larger for consumers.

The second policy change is a reduction in entry cost  $f_{nH}$  by 10 percent across the board. In my model, the effects are negligible, though the Melitz (2003) model predicts some improvements for total output and welfare, though these are much smaller than the predicted effects for variable trade cost reductions. The reason is that only relatively unproductive firms benefit from the entry cost reductions. In my model this is further exacerbated by that fact that variable trade cost allow large firms to expand productive capability.

## 6 Conclusion

I show that weather shocks are especially detrimental for exporting firms in poor countries, which implies that weather shocks are a net supply shock for these firms (rather than a demand shock). I further show that even exporters' domestic sales are more severely affected, which means firm operations across markets are linked. This is because of firms' expenditures on productive capability, such as machinery, office space, or a sales team. Productive capability lowers the cost of providing their products across all markets they serve. In response to a negative productivity shock, firms reduce productive capability, which in turn makes them less productive across all markets they are active in, reducing sales there as well. I support this by showing that exporters scale back fixed costs more than non-exporters in response to negative weather shocks. I rule out competing explanations based on well-known differences between exporters and purely domestic producers.

I then develop an international trade model featuring hired productive capability and show that it yields exactly this comparative static. I estimate it using a small open economy framework, which allows me to discipline this otherwise computationally complex model. I combine the model with causal forest estimates of the impact of climate change, taking the large dimensionality of weather as well as firm adaptation into account. Policy simulations under this climate change scenario show

that trade policy is considerably more effective at mitigating the impact of climate change when I take productive capability responses into account. I find that over a fifth of the effect of trade cost reductions on sales is due to firms' productivity responses, and almost half of the effect on welfare is due to these responses.

This is important as we consider what policies both rich and poor countries can adapt so poor countries can better mitigate the impact of climate change. The endogenous productivity response I highlight means trade policy is more effective than we might have assumed, is especially well-suited to counteracting the negative productivity effects of climate change, and should play a significant role as we work on coping with climate change. My results are especially important for poor countries, since the key mechanism is especially pronounced when the domestic market is small relative to foreign markets. My results also highlight that as rich countries consider onshoring and shortening supply chains (Goldberg & Reed, 2023), they should ensure those policies do not impose unnecessary collateral damage on poor countries. Ill-targeted, such policies could in fact greatly reduce poor countries' ability to deal with climate change.

Of course, none of this detracts from the fact that trade policy can also play a key role in preventing or reducing the severity of climate change (Farrokhi & Lashkaripour, 2021). More generally, there are good reasons to think that prevention is preferable to accepting climate change and resolving ourselves to dealing with it when it happens. Nevertheless, some amount of climate change is already occurring and will continue to occur over the near and medium term, and poor countries will be affected by it. Understanding what policies are especially suited for allowing them to deal with that reality is a crucial task for contemporary social science.

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# Tables

Table 1: Firm summary statistics

Variable	Count	Mean	P25	Median	P75
Sales (real 2009 USD)	37,100	44,451,183.54	27,648.78	104,665.36	500,123.04
Cost (real 2009 USD)	38,358	2,309,691.81	8,393.78	30,651.68	134,594.01
Labor cost (real 2009 USD)	36,664	221,888.62	4,747.38	14,736.47	56,391.69
Number of employees	46,347	40.21	6.00	10.00	23.00
Initial number of employees	39,455	24.36	4.00	6.00	12.00
Exporter	45,884	0.12	0.00	0.00	0.00
Manufacturing	46,694	0.32	0.00	0.00	1.00
Internat. quality cert.	45,302	0.13	0.00	0.00	0.00
Manager experience (years)	45,949	14.17	7.00	12.00	20.00
Yearly mean temperature (°C)	26,309	29.68	26.72	30.56	33.15
Yearly total precipitation (1,000 mm)	26,309	1.03	0.56	0.92	1.28

*Note:* The lower observation counts for weather variables stem from the fact that I can only match firm and weather data for firms that have non-missing location information.

Table 2: ATE of weather shocks

Variable	Log sales
Temperature index	−0.226* [0.094]
Year FE	Yes
Cluster FE	Yes
Clusters	582
Observations	18,101

*Note:* *Temperature index* is an index combining mean temperature, temperature variance and the number of days with temperatures exceeding 32°C (89.6°F). The index is an average of location-specific *z*-scores for each variable (using the 20-year mean and standard deviation of each variable). An 0.318 increase in the index is an 80<sup>th</sup> percentile weather shock. Standard errors clustered by firm cluster. Outcomes winsorized at the 95<sup>th</sup> percentile for each survey round. *p*-values in brackets.

Table 3: Effect of weather shocks by exporter status

Variable	Log sales
Temperature index	−0.122 [0.322]
Temperature index $\times$ Current exporter	−0.095*** [0.006]
Current exporter	1.590*** [0.000]
Year FE	Yes
Cluster FE	Yes
Clusters	363
Observations	16,844

*Note:* *Current exporters* are firms that export in the current fiscal year. *Temperature index* is an index combining mean temperature, temperature variance and the number of days with temperatures exceeding 32°C (89.6°F). The index is an average of location-specific  $z$ -scores for each variable (using the 20-year mean and standard deviation of reach variable). An 0.318 increase in the index is an 80<sup>th</sup> percentile weather shock. Standard errors clustered by firm cluster. Outcomes winsorized at the 95<sup>th</sup> percentile for each survey round.  $p$ -values in brackets.

Table 4: Effect of weather shocks on domestic sales

Variable	Log domestic sales
Temperature index	−0.170 [0.158]
Temperature index $\times$ Current exporter	−0.073** [0.012]
Current exporter	0.914*** [0.000]
Year FE	Yes
Cluster FE	Yes
Clusters	350
Observations	16,039

*Note:* *Temperature index* is an index combining mean temperature, temperature variance and the number of days with temperatures exceeding 32°C (89.6°F). The index is an average of location-specific  $z$ -scores for each variable (using the 20-year mean and standard deviation of reach variable). An 0.318 increase in the index is an 80<sup>th</sup> percentile weather shock. Standard errors clustered by firm cluster. Outcomes winsorized at the 95<sup>th</sup> percentile for each survey round.  $p$ -values in brackets.

Table 5: Effect of weather shocks on fixed costs

Variable	Log fixed cost	Log sales/employee
Temperature index	−0.091 [0.572]	−0.034 [0.742]
Temperature index × Current exporter	−0.120*** [0.000]	−0.049** [0.020]
Current exporter	1.247*** [0.000]	0.617*** [0.000]
Year FE	Yes	Yes
Cluster FE	Yes	Yes
Clusters	198	364
Observations	7,387	16,780

*Note:* *Temperature index* is an index combining mean temperature, temperature variance and the number of days with temperatures exceeding 32°C (89.6°F). The index is an average of location-specific z-scores for each variable (using the 20-year mean and standard deviation of each variable). An 0.318 increase in the index is an 80<sup>th</sup> percentile weather shock. Fixed costs combine cost of communications, sales, transportation, and rent for buildings, equipment and land. Standard errors clustered by firm cluster. Outcomes winsorized at the 95<sup>th</sup> percentile for each survey round. *p*-values in brackets.

Table 6: Indications of productivity impact

Variable	Log weekly hours	Outage
Temperature index	0.136 [0.117]	0.053 [0.148]
Year FE	Yes	Yes
Cluster FE	Yes	Yes
Clusters	518	590
Observations	11,751	22,055

*Note:* *Temperature index* is an index combining mean temperature, temperature variance and the number of days with temperatures exceeding 32°C (89.6°F). The index is an average of location-specific z-scores for each variable (using the 20-year mean and standard deviation of each variable). An 0.318 increase in the index is an 80<sup>th</sup> percentile weather shock. Each column shows results for a different outcome. *Log weekly hours* is the log of the firm's total operating hours per week. *Log female employment* is the log of the firm's number of female employees. *Outage* is an indicator for whether the firm experienced power outages. Outcomes winsorized at the 95<sup>th</sup> percentile, except indicators. *p*-values in brackets.

Table 7: Exporters compared to non-exporters

Variable	Mean non-exporter	Mean exporter	<i>p</i> -value
Sales (real 2009 USD)	870,913.66	2,646,253.68	0.000***
Cost (real 2009 USD)	267,630.22	1,093,091.57	0.000***
Labor cost (real 2009 USD)	74,375.21	232,004.51	0.000***
Number of employees	23.14	66.31	0.000***
Initial number of employees	11.68	23.97	0.000***
Manufacturing	0.29	0.49	0.000***
Internat. quality cert.	0.10	0.28	0.000***
Manager experience (years)	13.65	15.45	0.006***
Yearly mean temperature (°C)	29.61	29.69	0.593
Yearly total precipitation (1,000 mm)	0.98	0.98	0.561

Table 8: Parameter estimates for structural model

Parameter	Source/identifying variation	Estimate
<i>Panel A: Reduced form and data</i>		
$\sigma$	Sales, variable cost	3.016 (0.043)
$\beta\delta$	Sales regression (10)	0.384 (0.016)
<i>Panel B: Structural estimation</i>		
$\theta$	Average fixed cost	9.047
$T_H w_H$	Ratio of Foreign to Home sales	0.000
$f_H w_H$	Fraction of exporters	0.031
$\gamma_0$		-2.251
$\gamma_{\text{dist}}$	Export flows	0.893
$\gamma_{\text{contig}}$		-1.622

*Note:* Standard errors in parentheses where available. I present the minimum productivity  $T_H$  and start-up cost  $f_H$  times the estimated Home wage  $w_H$  to convert them into an easier to interpret unit, millions of USD, rather than presenting them in units of labor. The three components of  $\gamma$  are the intercept  $\gamma_0$ , the coefficient on log distance  $\gamma_{\text{dist}}$  and the coefficient on the contiguity indicator  $\gamma_{\text{contig}}$ .

Table 9: Moment comparisons for structural model

Moment	Data	Model
Fraction exporting	0.152	0.152
Ratio own trade/total exports	1.727	1.727
Mean fixed cost	0.145	0.145

*Note:* Mean fixed cost is in millions of USD. In the data, fixed costs combine cost of communications, sales, transportation, and rent for buildings, equipment and land. In the model, fixed costs are equal to the value of firms' productive capability. The other set of targeted moments, log exports and the fraction of firms with zero exports, is shown in Figure 7.

Table 10: Causal forest estimates for 2086–2090

Scenario	Change in log sales
SSP1/2.6	−0.066 (−0.131, 0.000)
SSP2/4.5	−0.083 (−0.160, −0.006)
SSP5/8.5	−0.108 (−0.188, −0.028)

*Note:* Standard errors clustered by firm cluster. 90 percent confidence intervals in parentheses.

Table 11: Counterfactual change in total output

Scenario	Full model	Melitz (2003)
Climate change baseline	−0.066	−0.094
Iceberg cost reduction	−0.029	−0.053
Entry cost reduction	−0.066	−0.084

*Note:* Each row presents the relative change in average real sales under a different counterfactual scenario compared to the baseline estimates for my model. *Climate change baseline* uses the technology parameter  $T_H$  to match the estimated impact of climate change on the Zambian economy. *Iceberg cost reduction* reduces variable trade costs from Zambia to all other markets by ten percent, while *entry cost reduction* reduces entry cost for Zambian firms to all other markets by ten percent. *Full model* shows estimated sales changes from my model, *Melitz (2003)* shows estimates based on the model by Melitz (2003).

Table 12: Counterfactual change in welfare


Scenario	Full model	Melitz (2003)
Climate change baseline	−0.087	−0.125
Iceberg cost reduction	−0.059	−0.102
Entry cost reduction	−0.087	−0.119

*Note:* Each row presents the relative change in welfare under a different counterfactual scenario compared to the baseline estimates for my model. *Climate change baseline* uses the technology parameter  $T_H$  to match the estimated impact of climate change on the Zambian economy. *Iceberg cost reduction* reduces variable trade costs from Zambia to all other markets by ten percent, while *entry cost reduction* reduces entry cost for Zambian firms to all other markets by ten percent. *Full model* shows estimated welfare changes from my model, *Melitz (2003)* shows estimates based on the model by Melitz (2003).




## Figures

Figure 1: Locations of firms and firm clusters across Africa and South Asia




*Note:* Each dot is either the location of a single firm or the location of a firm cluster. Clusters appear if several firms were recorded as having the same location in the Enterprise Surveys data or if I was able to determine the firms' location via geolocation methods based on the city firms are located in.

Figure 2: Maximum temperature on April 24, 1991




*Note:* The figure shows temperature from the Berkeley Earth dataset.

Figure 3: Histogram of temperature index after partialling out cluster FE




*Note:* The figure shows the temperature index after partialling out cluster fixed effects. This is the same identifying variation used in the regressions I estimate — the variation remaining in the standardized temperature index after cluster fixed effects are taken into account. Dashed lines indicate the 20<sup>th</sup> and 80<sup>th</sup> percentile. Observations without variation after partialling out FE not shown.

Figure 4: Yearly average daily maximum temperature across climate change scenarios




*Note:* The figure shows yearly averages of daily maximum temperatures. The climate change projections are adjusted for differences in baseline temperature means for each day of the year, as described in Appendix C.

Figure 5: Distribution of yearly average daily maximum temperature, 2005–2015, for actual data and climate change projections




*Note:* The figure shows the empirical CDF of the yearly average of daily maximum temperatures across firms. The climate change projections are adjusted for differences in baseline temperature means for each day of the year, as described in Appendix C.

Figure 6: Distribution of yearly average daily maximum temperature, 2005–2015 for actual data and 2085–2095 for climate change projections




*Note:* The figure shows the empirical CDF of the yearly average of daily maximum temperatures across firms. The climate change projections are adjusted for differences in baseline temperature means for each day of the year, as described in Appendix C.

Figure 7: Zambian log exports vs. model simulation




*Note:* Log exports are a targeted moment, together with the fraction of countries with zero exports.

Figure 8: Zambian log imports vs. model simulation




*Note:* Log imports are an untargeted moment.

Figure 9: Log total productivity distribution compared to Melitz (2003)



*Note:* The figure shows the first through 99<sup>th</sup> percentiles of log total productivity for my model and the model of Melitz (2003) estimated on the same data. For my model, total productivity is the product of core productivity  $a_j$  and productive capability  $c_j^o$ , whereas for Melitz (2003) it is simply  $a_j$ .


Figure 10: Change in real sales distribution under climate change baseline counterfactual, full model



*Note:* The figure shows the change in the CDF of log sales across log sales. Positive values indicate that the CDF is shifting to the left, and entirely positive values mean the new distribution first order stochastically dominates the old one.




Figure 11: Change in real sales distribution under climate change baseline counterfactual, Melitz (2003) model



*Note:* The figure shows the change in the CDF of log sales across log sales. Positive values indicate that the CDF is shifting to the left, and entirely positive values mean the new distribution first order stochastically dominates the old one.

Figure 12: Change in productive capability under climate change baseline counterfactual



*Note:* The figure shows the change in the CDF of log productive capacity  $c_j$  across log productive capacity. Positive values indicate that the CDF is shifting to the left, and entirely positive values mean the new distribution first order stochastically dominates the old one.

## Appendix A Additional tables

### A.1 Clustering distance choice

Table 13: Moran test for spatial correlation

Clustering distance	$p$ -value	Adjusted $p$ -value	Fraction included
0.25 km	0.116	1.000	0.110
0.5 km	0.686	1.000	0.215
1.0 km	0.535	1.000	0.325
2.5 km	0.147	1.000	0.399
5.0 km	0.582	1.000	0.406
10.0 km	0.130	1.000	0.414
15.0 km	0.161	1.000	0.416
20.0 km	0.422	1.000	0.417
25.0 km	0.440	1.000	0.423
50.0 km	0.678	1.000	0.430
100.0 km	0.605	1.000	0.432
200.0 km	0.757	1.000	0.440
500.0 km	0.500	1.000	0.509

*Note:* The Moran test is for the null that residuals from a regression of log sales on a temperature index are not correlated across clusters. The index combines mean temperature, temperature variance and the number of days with temperatures exceeding 32°C (89.6°F). The index is an average of location-specific  $z$ -scores for each variable (using the 20-year mean and standard deviation of reach variable). Standard errors clustered by firm cluster. *Adjusted  $p$ -values* are adjusted for multiple hypothesis testing using the Holm-Bonferroni correction.

## A.2 Alternative specifications for exporter effect

Table 14: Effect of weather shocks by exporter status, no year FE

Variable	Log sales
Temperature index	−0.005 [0.926]
Temperature index × Current exporter	−0.095*** [0.006]
Current exporter	1.615*** [0.000]
Cluster FE	Yes
Clusters	581
Observations	17,803

*Note:* *Current exporters* are firms that export in the current fiscal year. *Temperature index* is an index combining mean temperature, temperature variance and the number of days with temperatures exceeding 32°C (89.6°F). The index is an average of location-specific *z*-scores for each variable (using the 20-year mean and standard deviation of each variable). An 0.318 increase in the index is an 80<sup>th</sup> percentile weather shock. Standard errors clustered by firm cluster. Outcomes winsorized at the 95<sup>th</sup> percentile for each survey round. *p*-values in brackets.

Table 15: Effect of weather shocks by exporter status, most reliable numbers only

Variable	Log sales
Temperature index	−0.123 [0.301]
Temperature index × Current exporter	−0.070 [0.215]
Current exporter	1.454*** [0.000]
Year FE	Yes
Cluster FE	Yes
Clusters	236
Observations	5,638

*Note:* This estimation uses only data that came directly from firm records, as opposed to being estimates, for example. *Current exporters* are firms that export in the current fiscal year. *Temperature index* is an index combining mean temperature, temperature variance and the number of days with temperatures exceeding 32°C (89.6°F). The index is an average of location-specific *z*-scores for each variable (using the 20-year mean and standard deviation of each variable). An 0.318 increase in the index is an 80<sup>th</sup> percentile weather shock. Standard errors clustered by firm cluster. Outcomes winsorized at the 95<sup>th</sup> percentile for each survey round. *p*-values in brackets.

### A.3 Alternative indicators for exporter status

Table 16: Exporter effect using past exporter status

Variable	Log sales
Temperature index	0.121 [0.368]
Temperature index $\times$ Past exporter	-0.074** [0.040]
Past exporter	1.181*** [0.000]
Year FE	Yes
Cluster FE	Yes
Clusters	582
Observations	18,101

*Note:* *Past exporter* is an indicator for firms reporting a past year as their first year of exporting. *Temperature index* is an index combining mean temperature, temperature variance and the number of days with temperatures exceeding 32°C (89.6°F). The index is an average of location-specific *z*-scores for each variable (using the 20-year mean and standard deviation of reach variable). An 0.318 increase in the index is an 80<sup>th</sup> percentile weather shock. Standard errors clustered by firm cluster. Outcomes winsorized at the 95<sup>th</sup> percentile for each survey round. *p*-values in brackets.

Table 17: Exporter effect using ever exporter status

Variable	Log sales
Temperature index	0.146 [0.267]
Temperature index $\times$ Ever exporter	-0.080** [0.024]
Ever exporter	1.365*** [0.000]
Year FE	Yes
Cluster FE	Yes
Clusters	581
Observations	17,803

*Note:* *Ever exporter* is an indicator for firms which exported in the past and/or report international sales this year. *Temperature index* is an index combining mean temperature, temperature variance and the number of days with temperatures exceeding 32°C (89.6°F). The index is an average of location-specific *z*-scores for each variable (using the 20-year mean and standard deviation of reach variable). An 0.318 increase in the index is an 80<sup>th</sup> percentile weather shock. Standard errors clustered by firm cluster. Outcomes winsorized at the 95<sup>th</sup> percentile for each survey round. *p*-values in brackets.

Table 18: Effect on continuing, discontinuing, and first-time exporters

Variable	Log sales
Temperature index	−0.141 [0.200]
Temperature index × Continuing exporter	−0.098*** [0.005]
Temperature index × Discontinuing exporter	−1.464*** [0.002]
Temperature index × First-time exporter	0.091 [0.579]
Year FE	Yes
Exporter status FE	Yes
Cluster FE	Yes
Clusters	581
Observations	17,803

*Note:* *Continuing exporters* are firms that exported in the past and do so in the observed year. *Discontinuing past exporters* are firms that exported in the past and are not doing so in the observed year. *First-time exporters* did not export in the past, but are doing so now. *Temperature index* is an index combining mean temperature, temperature variance and the number of days with temperatures exceeding 32°C (89.6°F). The index is an average of location-specific z-scores for each variable (using the 20-year mean and standard deviation of reach variable). An 0.318 increase in the index is an 80<sup>th</sup> percentile weather shock. Standard errors clustered by firm cluster. Outcomes winsorized at the 95<sup>th</sup> percentile for each survey round. *p*-values in brackets.

## A.4 Additional regressions

Table 19: Effect of weather shocks on cost of repurchasing machinery

Variable	Log value of re-purchasing machinery
Temperature index	0.034 [0.902]
Temperature index $\times$ Current exporter	0.035 [0.474]
Current exporter	1.635*** [0.000]
Year FE	Yes
Cluster FE	Yes
Clusters	221
Observations	6,241

*Note:* *Temperature index* is an index combining mean temperature, temperature variance and the number of days with temperatures exceeding 32°C (89.6°F). The index is an average of location-specific z-scores for each variable (using the 20-year mean and standard deviation of each variable). An 0.318 increase in the index is an 80<sup>th</sup> percentile weather shock. Outcomes winsorized at the 95<sup>th</sup> percentile for each survey round. *p*-values in brackets.

Table 20: Checks for alternative explanations

Variable	Log sales	Log sales	Log sales	Log sales	Log sales	Log sales	Log sales	Log sales
Temperature index	-0.275** [0.024]	-0.031 [0.791]	-0.103 [0.289]	-0.067 [0.449]	-0.100 [0.336]	-0.047 [0.642]	-0.099 [0.379]	0.074 [0.247]
Temperature index $\times$ Current exporter	-0.089*** [0.007]	-0.064** [0.026]	-0.090** [0.015]	-0.103*** [0.000]	-0.078** [0.015]	-0.100*** [0.000]	-0.099*** [0.003]	-0.049*** [0.003]
Temperature index $\times$ Initial no. of employees > median	-0.018 [0.498]							-0.013 [0.473]
Initial no. of employees > median	1.212*** [0.000]							0.432*** [0.000]
Temperature index $\times$ No. of employees 3 yrs. ago > median		-0.038 [0.130]						-0.044* [0.085]
No. of employees 3 yrs. ago > median		1.780*** [0.000]						1.331*** [0.000]
Temperature index $\times$ International certification					-0.032 [0.554]			0.001 [0.979]
International certification					1.279*** [0.000]			0.637*** [0.000]
Temperature index $\times$ Manager's years of experience > median							-0.061*** [0.000]	-0.012 [0.469]
Manager's years of experience > median							0.553*** [0.000]	0.232*** [0.000]
ISIC2 FE			Yes					
ISIC2 FE $\times$ weather variables			Yes					Yes
ISIC4 FE				Yes				Yes
ISIC4 FE $\times$ weather variables				Yes				Yes
Legal status FE						Yes		Yes
Legal status FE $\times$ weather variables						Yes		Yes
Current exporter	1.257*** [0.000]	1.030*** [0.000]	1.488*** [0.000]	1.410*** [0.000]	1.337*** [0.000]	1.266*** [0.000]	1.555*** [0.000]	0.709*** [0.000]
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Cluster FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Clusters	579	577	579	578	581	581	581	568
Observations	16,007	16,401	16,275	16,058	17,368	17,731	17,606	13,287

*Note:* *ISIC2 FE* and *ISIC4 FE* are indicators for two-digit and four-digit ISIC sectors, respectively. *International certification* is an indicator for firms reporting that they have an international quality certification. *Legal status FE* are indicators for the legal status of the firm. The omitted status are sole proprietorships. *Temperature index* is an index combining mean temperature, temperature variance and the number of days with temperatures exceeding 32°C (89.6°F). The index is an average of location-specific z-scores for each variable (using the 20-year mean and standard deviation of each variable). An 0.318 increase in the index is an 80<sup>th</sup> percentile weather shock. Standard errors clustered by firm cluster. Outcomes winsorized at the 95<sup>th</sup> percentile for each survey round. *p*-values in brackets.



## A.5 Reduced form parameter estimation for structural model

Table 21: Sales regression

Variable	Trade flows
Log sales	0.816*** [0.000]
Manager's years of experience	0.037*** [0.000]
Log initial no. of employees	0.333*** [0.000]
Log no. of employees 3 yrs. ago	-0.668*** [0.000]
International certification	0.124*** [0.000]
Had power outage	0.060*** [0.000]
Competes against informal sector	-0.103*** [0.000]
Introduced new product	0.238*** [0.000]
Introduced new process	0.174*** [0.000]
Had RD expenditure	-0.131*** [0.000]
Part of larger firm	0.133*** [0.000]
Formal when founded	0.183*** [0.000]
Applied for grid connection	-0.085*** [0.000]
Applied for water connection	-0.103*** [0.000]
Firm age	0.021*** [0.000]
4 <sup>th</sup> degree polynomials	Yes
Pairwise interactions	Yes
Country-sector (ISIC4)-year FE	Yes
Observations	4,160

*Note: Fourth degree polynomials* are included for all continuous variables besides log sales. *Pairwise interactions* include only level variables, not variables raised to a power as part of the polynomials. Standard errors are robust. *p*-values in brackets.

Table 22: Gravity estimation

Variable	Trade flows
Log distance	−1.171 [0.000]
Contiguous	0.649 [0.000]
Importer FE	Yes
Exporter FE	Yes

*Note:* Standard errors are robust.  $p$ -values in brackets.

## A.6 Moment comparisons for Melitz (2003) estimation

Table 23: Moment comparisons for structural estimation of Melitz (2003)

Moment	Data	Model
Fraction exporting	0.152	0.152
Ratio own trade/total exports	1.819	1.819

*Note:* The other set of targeted moments, log exports and the fraction of firms with zero exports, is shown in Figure 13.

## A.7 Additional causal forest results

Table 24: Causal forest estimates for 2091–2095

Scenario	Change in log sales
SSP1/2.6	−0.048 (−0.121, 0.026)
SSP2/4.5	−0.059 (−0.133, 0.015)
SSP5/8.5	−0.101 (−0.176, −0.026)

*Note:* Standard errors clustered by firm cluster. 90 percent confidence intervals in parentheses.

## A.8 Additional counterfactual results

Table 25: Unequal productivity shift counterfactual


Scenario	Full model	Melitz (2003)
<i>Panel A: Average change in firm sales</i>		
Climate change baseline	-0.108	-0.077
<i>Panel B: total output</i>		
Climate change baseline	-0.066	-0.071
Iceberg cost reduction	-0.029	-0.029
Entry cost reduction	-0.066	-0.060
<i>Panel C: Welfare</i>		
Climate change baseline	-0.087	-0.095
Iceberg cost reduction	-0.059	-0.071
Entry cost reduction	-0.087	-0.089

*Note:* This counterfactual calibrates my model to find the shift in core productivity  $a_j$  that matches the causal forest estimates. I then feed that same shift into the Melitz (2003) model. Since in my model, this shift in core productivity is exacerbated by a reduction in productive capability  $c_j$ , the total productivity reduction is larger in my model, leading to an unequal comparison. *Panel A* shows the average firm's change in sales going from the status quo to the climate change baseline counterfactual, highlighting that the average firm sees a smaller drop in sales in the Melitz (2003) model in this case. *Panel B* shows the change in total output. *Panel C* shows the change in welfare.

## Appendix B Additional figures


### B.1 Moment comparisons for Melitz (2003) estimation

Figure 13: Zambian log exports vs. model simulation from Melitz (2003) estimation



*Note:* Log exports are a targeted moment, together with the fraction of countries with zero exports.

Figure 14: Zambian log imports vs. model simulation from Melitz (2003) estimation



*Note:* Log imports are an untargeted moment.

## Appendix C Climate data processing

For firms that, due to their offset locations, ended up with interpolated data from CHIRPS or BKE, I also interpolate projection data in the same way to ensure that observed changes in weather are due to differences in weather over time at the same location, rather than weather data and projections coming from different locations. Since I combine weather data (CHIRPS and BKE) with the NEX-GDDP-CMIP6 projections, I need to take care to remove underlying differences in average weather at baseline, to isolate the effect of changes in weather patterns over time (Auffhammer et al., 2013). To this end, I also download historical runs of each model for the period from 1980–2014. This gives me an overlapping period of 34 years to assess existing biases across models and correct for them. For both temperature and precipitation, I calculate the average value for each day of the year (e.g. January 1) across this overlapping period and subtract the difference from projection data, as recommended by Auffhammer et al. (2013). For one of the climate models, TaiESM1, temperature jumps significantly between the historical run and climate change projection, making it impossible to adjust for bias and making me question the validity of the projection. I thus exclude the TaiESM1 projections for both temperature and precipitation from my analyses. No other model has this issue.



## Appendix D Proofs and derivations

### D.1 Optimal $c$

The FOC for the optimal distribution network gives

$$\begin{aligned}
0 &= \delta \frac{w_i}{a_j} c_j^{-\delta-1} \left( \sum_{n \in \mathcal{M}_j} d_{ni} \alpha_n p_n(j)^{-\sigma} \right) - b c_j^{\frac{1}{\beta}-1} w_i \\
\Leftrightarrow c_j^{\frac{1}{\beta}+\delta} &= \frac{1}{b} \delta \frac{1}{a_j} \left( \sum_{n \in \mathcal{M}_j} d_{ni} \alpha_n p_n(j)^{-\sigma} \right) \\
\stackrel{(4)}{\Leftrightarrow} c_j^{\frac{1}{\beta}+\delta} &= \frac{1}{b} \delta (\mu w_i)^{-\sigma} a_j^{\sigma-1} \left( \sum_{n \in \mathcal{M}_j} d_{ni}^{1-\sigma} \alpha_n \right) c_j^{\delta\sigma} \\
\Leftrightarrow c_j &= \left[ \frac{1}{b} \delta (\mu w_i)^{-\sigma} a_j^{\sigma-1} \left( \sum_{n \in \mathcal{M}_j} d_{ni}^{1-\sigma} \alpha_n \right) \right]^{\frac{\beta}{1-\beta(\sigma-1)\delta}}
\end{aligned} \tag{13}$$

### D.2 Proof that $\mathcal{M}_j^{\text{lb}}$ is a lower bound

I need to show that there is no set of markets  $\mathcal{M}_j^{\text{cand}}$  included in  $\mathcal{M}_j^{\text{lb}}$  such that exiting these markets would increase firm profits. I first show that there is no single market included in the lower bound that the firm could profitably exit, and then show that this also implies there is no set of markets included in the lower bound that the firm could profitably exit.

Suppose firm  $j$  is active in markets  $\mathcal{M}_j \supseteq \mathcal{M}_j^{\text{lb}}$  with  $c_j$  optimally chosen and considers whether exiting a market  $n \in \mathcal{M}_j^{\text{lb}}$  could increase its profit. Let  $\widetilde{\mathcal{M}}_j = \mathcal{M}_j \setminus \{n\}$  and let  $\tilde{c}_j$  be the corresponding optimal productive capability. Since  $c_j$  is increasing in  $|\mathcal{M}_j|$ , I know that  $\tilde{c}_j < c_j$ . I also know that at the iteration of the algorithm during which  $n$  was added to  $\mathcal{M}_j^{\text{lb}}$  the firm was active in a set of markets  $\mathcal{M}'_j$  not including  $n$  and would have made a variable profit in  $n$  at the optimal  $c'_j$ . Since the algorithm only ever adds markets at each iteration and  $\mathcal{M}_j \supseteq \mathcal{M}_j^{\text{lb}}$  I know that every market in  $\mathcal{M}'_j$  must also be in  $\widetilde{\mathcal{M}}_j = \mathcal{M}_j \setminus \{n\}$ . I therefore have  $\mathcal{M}'_j \subseteq \widetilde{\mathcal{M}}_j$  which implies  $c'_j \leq \tilde{c}_j$ . That is, the firm made a variable profit in  $n$  at some  $c'_j \leq \tilde{c}_j < c_j$ . Therefore, it will certainly make a variable profit in  $n$  at  $c_j$  or  $\tilde{c}_j$ , and variable losses incurred in  $n$  cannot be the reason to exit it (since there are none). Exiting  $n$  could still increase the firm's total profit because at  $\widetilde{\mathcal{M}}_j$ , the fact that  $\tilde{c}_j < c_j$  decreases its cost of acquiring productive capability. But there is nothing stopping the firm from choosing  $\tilde{c}_j$  at  $\mathcal{M}_j$  while still incurring a variable profit in  $n$ . Since at  $\mathcal{M}_j$ , the firm instead optimally chooses  $c_j$ , deviating to  $\tilde{c}_j$  cannot increase profits. Therefore, the firm would

never want to exit any market  $n \in \mathcal{M}_j^{\text{lb}}$ .

This argument extends to exiting a set of markets  $\mathcal{M}_j^{\text{cand}}$  that the algorithm included in  $\mathcal{M}_j^{\text{lb}}$ , because  $c_j$  depends only on the total effective demand of all markets in  $\mathcal{M}_j^{\text{cand}}$  (not on their indices, for example). The firm would make a profit in any market  $n \in \mathcal{M}^{\text{cand}}$ , so direct losses cannot be the reason to exit. For the firm's choice of  $c_j$ , exiting several markets at once is just like exiting one large market, because  $c_j$  depends only on the sum of  $\alpha_n$  across all markets the firm is active in. For the same reason as above, choosing a different  $c_j$  cannot increase profits.

### D.3 Proof that $\mathcal{M}_j^{\text{ub}}$ is an upper bound

I need to show that there is no set of markets  $\mathcal{M}_j^{\text{cand}}$  excluded from  $\mathcal{M}_j^{\text{ub}}$  such that entering these markets would increase firm profits. I first show that there is no single market excluded from the upper bound that the firm could profitably enter, and then show that this also implies there is no set of markets excluded from the upper bound that the firm could profitably enter.

Suppose firm  $j$  is active in markets  $\mathcal{M}_j \subseteq \mathcal{M}_j^{\text{ub}}$  with  $c_j$  optimally chosen and considers whether entering a market  $n \notin \mathcal{M}_j^{\text{ub}}$  could increase its profit. Let  $\widetilde{\mathcal{M}}_j = \mathcal{M}_j \cup \{n\}$  and let  $\tilde{c}_j$  be the corresponding optimal productive capability. Since  $c_j$  is increasing in  $|\mathcal{M}_j|$ , I know that  $\tilde{c}_j > c_j$ . I also know that at the iteration of the algorithm during which  $n$  was dropped from  $\mathcal{M}_j^{\text{ub}}$  the firm was active in a set of markets  $\mathcal{M}'_j$  including  $n$  and did not make a variable profit in  $n$  at the optimal  $c'_j$ . Since the algorithm only ever drops markets at each iteration and  $\mathcal{M}_j \subseteq \mathcal{M}_j^{\text{ub}}$ , I know that every market in  $\widetilde{\mathcal{M}}_j = \mathcal{M}_j \cup \{n\}$  must also be in  $\mathcal{M}'_j$ . I therefore have  $\mathcal{M}'_j \supseteq \widetilde{\mathcal{M}}_j$  which implies  $c'_j \geq \tilde{c}_j$ . That is, the firm made a variable loss in  $n$  at some  $c'_j \geq \tilde{c}_j > c_j$ . Therefore, it will certainly make a variable loss in  $n$  at  $c_j$  or  $\tilde{c}_j$  and variable profits made in  $n$  cannot be the reason to enter it (since there are none). Entering  $n$  could still increase the firm's total profit because at  $\widetilde{\mathcal{M}}_j$ , the fact that  $\tilde{c}_j > c_j$  increases its profit in other markets. But there is nothing stopping the firm from choosing  $\tilde{c}_j$  at  $\mathcal{M}_j$  without incurring a variable loss in  $n$ . Since at  $\mathcal{M}_j$ , the firm instead optimally chooses  $c_j$ , deviating to  $\tilde{c}_j$  cannot increase total profits. Therefore, the firm would never want to enter any market  $n \notin \mathcal{M}_j^{\text{ub}}$ .

This argument extends to entering a set of markets  $\mathcal{M}_j^{\text{cand}}$  that the algorithm excluded from  $\mathcal{M}_j^{\text{ub}}$ , because  $c_j$  depends only on the total effective demand of all markets in  $\mathcal{M}_j^{\text{cand}}$  (not on their indices, for example). The firm would make a variable loss in any market  $n \in \mathcal{M}^{\text{cand}}$ , so variable profits cannot be the reason to enter. For the firm's choice of  $c_j$ , entering several markets at once is just like entering one large market, because  $c_j$  depends only on the sum of  $\alpha_n$  across all markets the

firm is active in. For the same reason as above, choosing a different  $c_j$  cannot increase profits.

#### D.4 Mass of entrants

Letting  $\Omega_i$  denote the set of entrants in  $i$ , so  $N_i = |\Omega_i|$ , country  $i$ 's full employment condition is that

$$\begin{aligned}
L_i &= \int_{\Omega_i} \mathbb{1}[a_j \geq \underline{a}_i] \left\{ \left[ \sum_{n \in \mathcal{M}_j} d_{ni} q_n(j) \frac{1}{a_j c_j^\delta} + f_{ni} \right] + b\beta c_j^{\frac{1}{\beta}} \right\} + f_i \, dj \\
&= N_i \left( \int_{\underline{a}_i}^\infty \left[ \sum_{n \in \mathcal{M}_j} d_{ni} q_n(j) \frac{1}{a_j c_j^\delta} + f_{ni} \right] + b\beta c_j^{\frac{1}{\beta}} \, dF_i(a_j) + f_i \right) \\
\Leftrightarrow w_i L_i &= N_i \left( \int_{\underline{a}_i}^\infty \left[ \sum_{n \in \mathcal{M}_j} d_{ni} q_n(j) \frac{w_i}{a_j c_j^\delta} + f_{ni} w_i \right] + b\beta c_j^{\frac{1}{\beta}} w_i \, dF_i(a_j) + f_i w_i \right) \\
&\stackrel{(5)}{=} N_i \left( \int_{\underline{a}_i}^\infty \left[ \sum_{n \in \mathcal{M}_j} \mu^{-\sigma} \left( d_{ni} \frac{w_i}{a_j c_j^\delta} \right)^{1-\sigma} \alpha_n + f_{ni} w_i \right] + b\beta c_j^{\frac{1}{\beta}} w_i \, dF_i(a_j) + f_i w_i \right) \\
&\stackrel{(8)}{=} N_i \int_{\underline{a}_i}^\infty \sum_{n \in \mathcal{M}_j} \left( \frac{1}{\mu} + \frac{1}{\sigma} \right) \left( \mu d_{ni} \frac{w_i}{a_j c_j^\delta} \right)^{1-\sigma} \alpha_n \, dF_i(a_j) \\
\Leftrightarrow N_i &= \frac{\mu^{\sigma-1} w_i^\sigma L_i}{\int_{\underline{a}_i}^\infty (a_j c_j^\delta)^{\sigma-1} \sum_{n \in \mathcal{M}_j} d_{ni}^{1-\sigma} \alpha_n \, dF_i(a_j)}
\end{aligned}$$

#### D.5 Price index

The price index of country  $n$  is

$$\mathcal{P}_n = \left( \int_{\mathcal{G}_n} p_n(j)^{1-\sigma} \, dj \right)^{\frac{1}{1-\sigma}}$$

Letting  $\mathcal{E}_{ni}$  denote the set of goods produced in  $i$  and exported to  $n$ ,

$$= \left( \sum_{i=1}^N \int_{\mathcal{E}_{ni}} p_n(j)^{1-\sigma} \, dj \right)^{\frac{1}{1-\sigma}}$$

Dealing with  $\mathcal{E}_{ni}$  directly is cumbersome, because it involves conditional probabilities. Instead, let  $\mathcal{O}_i$  denote the set of goods produced in  $i$ , regardless of where they're shipped to. Then,

$$= \left( \sum_{i=1}^N \int_{\mathcal{O}_i} \mathbb{1}[j \in \mathcal{E}_{ni}] p_n(j)^{1-\sigma} \, dj \right)^{\frac{1}{1-\sigma}}$$

which, using that  $j \in \mathcal{E}_{ni} \Leftrightarrow n \in \mathcal{M}_j$ , switching to integrating over the CDF of productivities and remembering that there is a mass  $n_i$  of firms active in country  $i$ ,

$$\begin{aligned} &= \left( \sum_{i=1}^N n_i \int_{\underline{a}_i}^{\infty} \mathbb{1}[n \in \mathcal{M}_j] p_n(j)^{1-\sigma} dF_i(a_j) \right)^{\frac{1}{1-\sigma}} \\ &\stackrel{(4)}{=} \left( \sum_{i=1}^N n_i \int_{\underline{a}_i}^{\infty} \mathbb{1}[n \in \mathcal{M}_j] \left( \mu d_{ni} \frac{w_i}{a_j c_j^\delta} \right)^{1-\sigma} dF_i(a_j) \right)^{\frac{1}{1-\sigma}} \end{aligned}$$

Since there will also be a cutoff  $\underline{a}_{ni}$  such that all firms in  $i$  with  $a_j \geq \underline{a}_{ni}$  will sell in  $n$ , and all other firms in  $i$  will not,

$$= \mu \left( \sum_{i=1}^N n_i (d_{ni} w_i)^{1-\sigma} \int_{\underline{a}_{ni}}^{\infty} (a_j c_j^\delta)^{\sigma-1} dF_i(a_j) \right)^{\frac{1}{1-\sigma}} \quad (14)$$

## D.6 Gravity equation

Sales from firms in  $i$  to  $n$  are

$$\begin{aligned} X_{ni} &= \int_{\mathcal{E}_{ni}} S_n(j) dj \\ &= n_i \int_{\underline{a}_{ni}}^{\infty} S_n(j) dF_i(a_j) \\ &\stackrel{(6)}{=} n_i \int_{\underline{a}_{ni}}^{\infty} \alpha_n \left( \mu d_{ni} \frac{w_i}{a_j c_j^\delta} \right)^{1-\sigma} dF_i(a_j) \\ &= n_i (\mu d_{ni} w_i)^{1-\sigma} \alpha_n \int_{\underline{a}_{ni}}^{\infty} (a_j c_j^\delta)^{\sigma-1} dF_i(a_j) \end{aligned}$$

which, by definition of  $\alpha_n$ ,

$$\begin{aligned} &= n_i (\mu d_{ni} w_i)^{1-\sigma} X_n \mathcal{P}_n^{\sigma-1} \int_{\underline{a}_{ni}}^{\infty} (a_j c_j^\delta)^{\sigma-1} dF_i(a_j) \\ &\stackrel{(14)}{=} \frac{n_i (d_{ni} w_i)^{1-\sigma} \int_{\underline{a}_{ni}}^{\infty} (a_j c_j^\delta)^{\sigma-1} dF_i(a_j)}{\sum_{k=1}^N n_k (d_{nk} w_k)^{1-\sigma} \int_{\underline{a}_{nk}}^{\infty} (a_j c_j^\delta)^{\sigma-1} dF_k(a_j)} X_n \end{aligned}$$

## D.7 Home sales as a log-linear function of total sales

From (13), the optimal  $c$  can be written as

$$c_j^{\frac{1}{\beta} + \delta} = \frac{1}{b} \delta (\mu w_i)^{-\sigma} a_j^{\sigma-1} \left( \sum_{n \in \mathcal{M}_j} d_{ni}^{1-\sigma} \alpha_n \right) c_j^{\delta \sigma}$$

$$\begin{aligned}
&\Leftrightarrow c_j^{\frac{1}{\beta}} = \frac{1}{b} \delta (\mu w_i)^{-\sigma} a_j^{\sigma-1} \left( \sum_{n \in \mathcal{M}_j} d_{ni}^{1-\sigma} \alpha_n \right) c_j^{\delta(\sigma-1)} \\
&\Leftrightarrow c_j = \left[ \frac{1}{b} \frac{\delta}{\mu w_i} \left( \mu \frac{w_i}{a_j c_j^\delta} \right)^{1-\sigma} \left( \sum_{n \in \mathcal{M}_j} d_{ni}^{1-\sigma} \alpha_n \right) \right]^\beta \\
&\stackrel{(6)}{=} \left[ \frac{1}{b} \frac{\delta}{\mu w_i} \underbrace{\left( \sum_{n \in \mathcal{M}_j} S_n(j) \right)}_{\equiv \mathcal{S}(j)} \right]^\beta
\end{aligned} \tag{15}$$

Plugging (15) into sales to the Home market (6) and remembering that  $d_{ii} = 1$  by assumption,

$$\begin{aligned}
S_i(j) &= \alpha_i \left( \mu \frac{w_i}{a_j} \left[ \frac{1}{b} \frac{\delta}{\mu w_i} \mathcal{S}(j) \right]^{-\beta\delta} \right)^{1-\sigma} \\
&\Leftrightarrow \log(S_i(j)) = \log(\alpha_i) + (\sigma-1) \left[ \log\left(\frac{1}{\mu} \frac{a_j}{w_i}\right) + \beta\delta \log\left(\frac{1}{b} \frac{\delta}{\mu w_i} \mathcal{S}(j)\right) \right] \\
&\Leftrightarrow \log(S_i(j)) = I + \log(\alpha_i) + (\sigma-1) \log(a_j) - (\sigma + \beta\delta - 1) \log(w_i) + (\sigma-1) \beta\delta \log(\mathcal{S}(j))
\end{aligned}$$

with

$$I \equiv (\sigma-1) \left[ \log\left(\frac{1}{\mu}\right) + \beta\delta \log\left(\frac{1}{b} \frac{\delta}{\mu}\right) \right]$$