

Network theory

Part V: errors, attacks and walks



Complexity in Social Systems
AA 2023/2024
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Recap last lecture

Barabasi-Albert model
Bianconi-Barabasi model
Link/Copying model


Models

Concepts

Origins of scale-free distributions
Growing networks
Assortativity and correlations
“Robustness”


Today!

Percolation!
Random Walks
Spectral properties



Robustness





Introduction



Percolation

- What is the expected size of the largest cluster?
- What is the average cluster size?


Add dot with proba p




Robustness

Inverse percolation


Remove a fraction f of nodes




$$f = 0.1$$



$$f = f_c$$



$$f = 0.8$$



$$0 < f < f_c :$$

There is a giant component.

$$P_\infty \sim |f - f_c|^\beta$$

$$f = f_c :$$

The giant component vanishes.

$$f > f_c :$$


The lattice breaks into many tiny components.

Small islands


Spanning cluster

Fully burned down


(a)



(b)



(c)



$$p = 0.55$$


$$p = 0.593$$

$$p = 0.62$$

Robustness

What it looks like on (random) networks?

Internet more robust than lattice




Iff giant component GC , each node in GC must be connected to at least two other nodes on average.
Hence, average degree k_i of node i attached to j in GC:

$$\langle k_i | i \leftrightarrow j \rangle = \sum_{k_i} k_i P(k_i | i \leftrightarrow j) = 2 .$$

$$P(k_i | i \leftrightarrow j) = \frac{P(k_i, i \leftrightarrow j)}{P(i \leftrightarrow j)} = \frac{P(i \leftrightarrow j | k_i) p(k_i)}{P(i \leftrightarrow j)} \quad \text{Bayes}$$

$$P(i \leftrightarrow j) = \frac{2L}{N(N-1)} = \frac{\langle k \rangle}{N-1} , \quad P(i \leftrightarrow j | k_i) = \frac{k_i}{N-1} , \quad \text{No deg corr}$$



$$\sum_{k_i} k_i P(k_i | i \leftrightarrow j) = \sum_{k_i} k_i \frac{P(i \leftrightarrow j | k_i) p(k_i)}{P(i \leftrightarrow j)} = \sum_{k_i} k_i \frac{k_i p(k_i)}{\langle k \rangle} = \frac{\sum_{k_i} k_i^2 p(k_i)}{\langle k \rangle}$$


Molloy-Reeds criterion (once again!)

$$\kappa = \frac{\langle k^2 \rangle}{\langle k \rangle} > 2 .$$

for Poisson $p_k \rightarrow \langle k^2 \rangle = \langle k \rangle^2 + \langle k \rangle \rightarrow \langle k \rangle > 1$

Robustness

Random removal: find critical f



$0 < f < f_c :$
There is a giant component.

$$P_\infty \sim |f-f_c|^\beta$$

$f = f_c :$
The giant component vanishes.

$f > f_c :$
The lattice breaks into many tiny components.

The problem becomes: does the damaged network still fulfil the Molloy-Reeds?

Initial network: $p(k), \langle k \rangle, \langle k^2 \rangle$

Final network?

Proba that node with degree k goes to k' with prob

$$k' < k$$

Resulting degree distribution

$$\binom{k}{k'} f^{k-k'} (1-f)^{k'}$$

$$p'(k') = \sum_k p(k) \binom{k}{k'} f^{k-k'} (1-f)^{k'}$$


Compute $\langle k \rangle$ and $\langle k^2 \rangle$ for Molloy Reeds

Robustness

Random removal: average degree

$$\begin{aligned}\langle k' \rangle_f &= \sum_{k'=0}^{\infty} k' p_{k'} \\ &= \sum_{k'=0}^{\infty} k' \sum_{k=k'}^{\infty} p_k \binom{k!}{k'!(k-k')!} f^{k-k'} (1-f)^{k'} \\ &= \sum_{k'=0}^{\infty} \sum_{k=k'}^{\infty} p_k \frac{k(k-1)!}{(k'-1)!(k-k')!} f^{k-k'} (1-f)^{k'-1} (1-f).\end{aligned}$$

$$\sum_{k'=0}^{\infty} \sum_{k=k'}^{\infty} = \sum_{k=0}^{\infty} \sum_{k'=0}^k.$$



$$\begin{aligned}\langle k' \rangle_f &= \sum_{k=0}^{\infty} k \sum_{k'=0}^k p_k \frac{k(k-1)!}{(k'-1)!(k-k')!} f^{k-k'} (1-f)^{k'-1} (1-f) \\ &= \sum_{k=0}^{\infty} (1-f) k p_k \sum_{k'=0}^k \frac{(k-1)!}{(k'-1)!(k-k')!} f^{k-k'} (1-f)^{k'-1} \\ &= \sum_{k=0}^{\infty} (1-f) k p_k \sum_{k'=0}^k \binom{k-1}{k'-1} f^{k-k'} (1-f)^{k'-1} \\ &= \sum_{k=0}^{\infty} (1-f) k p_k \\ &= (1-f) \langle k \rangle.\end{aligned}$$

Sum of binomial over all possibilities = 1

Robustness

Random removal: average degree

$$\langle k'^2 \rangle_f = \langle k'(k'-1) + k' \rangle_f$$

$$= \langle k'(k'-1) \rangle_f + \langle k' \rangle_f$$

$$= \sum_{k'=0}^{\infty} k'(k'-1)p_{k'} + \langle k' \rangle_f.$$

$$\langle k'(k'-1) \rangle_f = \sum_{k'=0}^{\infty} k'(k'-1)p_{k'}$$

$$= \sum_{k'=0}^{\infty} k'(k'-1) \sum_{k=k'}^{\infty} p_k \binom{k}{k'} f^{k-k'} (1-f)^{k'}$$

$$p'_{k'} = \sum_{k=k'}^{\infty} p_k \binom{k}{k'} f^{k-k'} (1-f)^{k'}.$$

Robustness

Random removal: average degree

$$\begin{aligned}
 \langle k'^2 \rangle_f &= \langle k'(k'-1) + k' \rangle_f \\
 &= \langle k'(k'-1) \rangle_f + \langle k' \rangle_f \\
 &= (1-f)^2 \langle k(k-1) \rangle + (1-f) \langle k \rangle \\
 &= (1-f)^2 (\langle k^2 \rangle - \langle k \rangle) + (1-f) \langle k \rangle \\
 &= (1-f)^2 \langle k^2 \rangle - (1-f)^2 \langle k \rangle + (1-f) \langle k \rangle \\
 &= (1-f)^2 \langle k^2 \rangle - (-f^2 + 2f - 1 + 1 - f) \langle k \rangle \\
 &= (1-f)^2 \langle k^2 \rangle + f(1-f) \langle k \rangle.
 \end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned}
 \langle k' \rangle_f &= (1-f) \langle k \rangle \\
 \langle k'^2 \rangle_f &= (1-f)^2 \langle k^2 \rangle + f(1-f) \langle k \rangle
 \end{aligned}$$

$$K = \frac{\langle k'^2 \rangle_f}{\langle k' \rangle_f} = 2.$$

So, for any P_k , with random removal

Only depends on 1st and
2nd moment of $p(k)$

$$f_c = 1 - \frac{1}{\frac{\langle k^2 \rangle}{\langle k \rangle} - 1}$$

$$f_c^{\text{ER}} = 1 - \frac{1}{\langle k \rangle}.$$

Denser
-> more robust

Robustness



Scale-free networks?

$$K = \frac{\langle k^2 \rangle}{\langle k \rangle} = \frac{(2-\gamma)}{(3-\gamma)} \frac{k_{\max}^{3-\gamma} - k_{\min}^{3-\gamma}}{k_{\max}^{2-\gamma} - k_{\min}^{2-\gamma}},$$

$$f_c = \begin{cases} 1 - \frac{1}{\frac{\gamma-2}{3-\gamma} k_{\min}^{\gamma-2} k_{\max}^{3-\gamma} - 1} & 2 < \gamma < 3 \\ & \rightarrow 1 \text{ if } N \rightarrow \infty \\ 1 - \frac{1}{\frac{\gamma-2}{\gamma-3} k_{\min}^{\gamma-2} - 1} & \gamma > 3 \end{cases}$$

$$\langle k^m \rangle = (\gamma-1) k_{\min}^{\gamma-1} \int_{k_{\min}}^{k_{\max}} k^{m-\gamma} dk = \frac{(\gamma-1)}{(m-\gamma+1)} k_{\min}^{\gamma-1} [k^{m-\gamma+1}]_{k_{\min}}^{k_{\max}}.$$

$$\langle k^m \rangle = \frac{(\gamma-1)}{(m-\gamma+1)} k_{\min}^{\gamma-1} [k_{\max}^{m-\gamma+1} - k_{\min}^{m-\gamma+1}].$$













Removing lots of small nodes in SF

Attacks

Many types of attacks...

- Degree
- Betweenness
- Link-based analogues
- Cascades...



Attacks

Critical threshold

Hub removal

$$f = \int_{k_{\max}}^{k'_{\max}} p_k dk = \frac{\gamma - 1}{\gamma - 1} \frac{k'^{-\gamma+1}_{\max} - k^{-\gamma+1}_{\max}}{k'^{-\gamma+1}_{\min} - k^{-\gamma+1}_{\max}}.$$

$$k_{\max} \gg k'_{\max} \gg k_{\min}$$

$$f = \left(\frac{k'^{\max}}{k_{\min}} \right)^{-\gamma+1}, \quad k'^{\max} = k_{\min} f^{\frac{1}{1-\gamma}}.$$



$$\tilde{f} = f^{\frac{2-\gamma}{1-\gamma}}.$$

-> 1 if gamma = 2

Link removal

$$\begin{aligned} \tilde{f} &= \frac{\int_{k'_{\max}}^{k_{\max}} kp_k dk}{\langle k \rangle} = \frac{1}{\langle k \rangle} c \int_{k'_{\max}}^{k_{\max}} k^{-\gamma+1} dk \\ &= \frac{1}{\langle k \rangle} \frac{1-\gamma}{2-\gamma} \frac{k'^{-\gamma+2}_{\max} - k^{-\gamma+2}_{\max}}{k'^{-\gamma+1}_{\min} - k^{-\gamma+1}_{\max}}. \end{aligned}$$

$$\langle k \rangle \approx \frac{\gamma-1}{\gamma-2} k_{\min}$$

$$\tilde{f} = \left(\frac{k'^{\max}}{k_{\min}} \right)^{-\gamma+2}.$$

Attacks

Critical threshold



$$p'_{k'} = \sum_{k=k_{\min}}^{k'_{\max}} \binom{k}{k'} \tilde{f}^{k-k'} (1-\tilde{f})^{k'} p_k.$$

$$\langle k^m \rangle = \frac{(\gamma-1)}{(m-\gamma+1)} k_{\min}^{\gamma-1} [k_{\max}^{m-\gamma+1} - k_{\min}^{m-\gamma+1}].$$


$$\kappa = \frac{2-\gamma}{3-\gamma} \frac{k'^{3-\gamma} - k_{\min}^{3-\gamma}}{k'^{2-\gamma} - k_{\min}^{2-\gamma}}.$$

$$\kappa = \frac{2-\gamma}{3-\gamma} \frac{k_{\min}^{3-\gamma} f^{(3-\gamma)/(1-\gamma)} - k_{\min}^{3-\gamma}}{k_{\min}^{2-\gamma} f^{(2-\gamma)/(1-\gamma)} - k_{\min}^{2-\gamma}} = \frac{2-\gamma}{3-\gamma} k_{\min} \frac{f^{(3-\gamma)/(1-\gamma)} - 1}{f^{(2-\gamma)/(1-\gamma)} - 1}.$$

$$f_c^{\frac{2-\gamma}{1-\gamma}} = 2 + \frac{2-\gamma}{3-\gamma} k_{\min} \left(f_c^{\frac{3-\gamma}{1-\gamma}} - 1 \right)$$



Errors and attacks

Real networks

| NETWORK | RANDOM FAILURES (REAL NETWORK) | RANDOM FAILURES (RANDOMIZED NETWORK) | ATTACK (REAL NETWORK) |
|----------------------------|-----------------------------------|---|--------------------------|
| Internet | 0.92 | 0.84 | 0.16 |
| WWW | 0.88 | 0.85 | 0.12 |
| Power Grid | 0.61 | 0.63 | 0.20 |
| Mobile-Phone Call | 0.78 | 0.68 | 0.20 |
| Email | 0.92 | 0.69 | 0.04 |
| Science Collaboration | 0.92 | 0.88 | 0.27 |
| Actor Network | 0.98 | 0.99 | 0.55 |
| Citation Network | 0.96 | 0.95 | 0.76 |
| E. Coli Metabolism | 0.96 | 0.90 | 0.49 |
| Yeast Protein Interactions | 0.88 | 0.66 | 0.06 |

Published: 27 July 2000

Error and attack tolerance of complex networks

Réka Albert, Hawoong Jeong & Albert-László Barabási 



Nature 406, 378–382 (2000) | [Cite this article](#)

43k Accesses | 5505 Citations | 75 Altmetric | [Metrics](#)



Cascades




Observations



| SOURCE | EXponent | CASCADE |
|----------------------------|----------|--------------|
| Power grid (North America) | 2.0 | Power |
| Power grid (Sweden) | 1.6 | Energy |
| Power grid (Norway) | 1.7 | Power |
| Power grid (New Zealand) | 1.6 | Energy |
| Power grid (China) | 1.8 | Energy |
| Twitter Cascades | 1.75 | Retweets |
| Earthquakes | 1.67 | Seismic Wave |

Avalanche exponent

$$p(s) \sim s^{-\alpha},$$



“Hard” Model







Figure 8.20
Failure Propagation Model

Cascades

Easier model



The branching model can be solved analytically, allowing us to determine the avalanche size distribution for an arbitrary p_k . If p_k is exponentially bounded, e.g. it has an exponential tail, the calculations predict $\alpha = 3/2$. If, however, p_k is scale-free, then the avalanche exponent depends on the power-law exponent γ , following (Figure 8.22) [32, 33]

$$\alpha = \begin{cases} 3/2, & \gamma \geq 3 \\ \gamma/(\gamma-1), & 2 < \gamma < 3 . \end{cases} \quad (8.15)$$




Figure 8.22
The Avalanche Exponent



The background features a faint, abstract network graph composed of numerous small, semi-transparent gray circles of varying sizes connected by thin gray lines. This pattern is visible in the top right and bottom left corners of the slide.

Pause

Walks in networks

- Simple process, well studied in finite dimensional lattices
- Simplest way to explore or search in a network
- Basic element of diffusion processes
- Basis of PageRank



Num walkers

$$W = \sum_i W_i$$

Number walkers
on node i

Markovian random walker

$$d_{ij} = \frac{r}{k_i}$$

Rate out of i to j

Total diffusion rate
Out of I

$$r = \sum_{j \sim i} d_{ij}$$

Hypothesis = statistical equivalence of nodes with the same degree

Degree-block
Variables

$$W_k = \frac{1}{N_k} \sum_{i|k_i=k} W_i$$

Diffusion
equation

$$\partial_t W_k(t) = -r W_k(t) + k \sum_{k'} p(k'|k) \frac{r}{k'} W_{k'}(t)$$

P: probability of having neighbour with degree k'

Walks in networks

$$\partial_t W_k(t) = -rW_k(t) + k \sum_{k'} p(k'|k) \frac{r}{k'} W_{k'}(t)$$

Uncorr. networks $p(k'|k) = \frac{k' p(k')}{\langle k \rangle}$

$$\partial_t W_k(t) = -rW_k(t) + \frac{k}{\langle k \rangle} r \sum_{k'} p(k') W_{k'}(t)$$

Stationary solution: $\partial_t W_k(t) = 0$
using $\sum_k p(k) W_k = W/N$

$$W_k = \frac{k}{\langle k \rangle} \frac{W}{N}$$

Finally, probability to find one walker in degree k :

$$p_k = \frac{W_k}{W} = \frac{k}{\langle k \rangle} \frac{1}{N} \propto k$$

Walks in (directed) networks

PageRank

Previous ranking: crawl around a starting page and return the ranking based on the #matches to word query, index, etc

The PageRank algorithm: major breakthrough based on idea that ranking depends on network topology

“Google” defines the importance of each document by a combination of the probability that a random walker surfing the web will visit that document, and some heuristics based in the text disposition, [cit. Barrat/Barth/Vesp]

Probability that a random walker will visit page i:

$$P_R(i) = \frac{q}{N} + (1 - q) \sum_j x_{ij} \frac{P_R(j)}{k_{out,j}}$$

q = **damping / teleportation**

x_{ij} : adjacency

Brin and Page, 1998

Degree-block variables

$$k = (k_{in}, k_{out})$$

$$P_R(k) = \frac{1}{N_k} \sum_{i \in k} P_R(i)$$

$$P_R(k) = \frac{q}{N} + \frac{(1 - q)}{N_k} \sum_{i \in k} \sum_{k'} \frac{1}{k'_{out}} \sum_{j \in k'} x_{ij} P_R(j)$$

Mean-field approx: $P_R(j) = P(k)$

$$P_R(k) = \frac{q}{N} + \frac{(1 - q)}{N_k} \sum_{k'} \frac{P_R(k')}{k'_{out}} \sum_{i \in k} \sum_{j \in k'} x_{ij} = \frac{q}{N} + \frac{(1 - q)}{N_k} \sum_{k'} \frac{P_R(k')}{k'_{out}} E_{k' \rightarrow k}$$

Walks in networks

PageRank

$$P_R(k) = \frac{q}{N} + \frac{(1 - q)}{N_k} \sum_{k'} \frac{P_R(k')}{k'_{out}} E_{k' \rightarrow k}$$


$$P_R(k) = \frac{q}{N} + (1 - q) \frac{k_{in}}{\langle k_{in} \rangle} \sum_{k'} P_R(k') P(k') = \frac{q}{N} + \frac{(1 - q)}{N} \frac{k_{in}}{\langle k_{in} \rangle}$$

$$\begin{aligned} E_{\mathbf{k}' \rightarrow \mathbf{k}} &= k_{in} P(\mathbf{k}) N \frac{E_{\mathbf{k}' \rightarrow \mathbf{k}}}{k_{in} P(\mathbf{k}) N} \\ &= k_{in} P(\mathbf{k}) N P_{in}(\mathbf{k}' | \mathbf{k}), \end{aligned}$$

Uncorr. networks

$$P_{in}(\mathbf{k}' | \mathbf{k}) = \frac{k'_{out} P(\mathbf{k}')}{\langle k_{in} \rangle}$$

Data from the Web



PageRank: also to quantify importance of scientific papers

Walks in networks

Laplacian

$$\Delta\phi(v) = \sum_{w \in \nu(v)} (\phi(w) - \phi(v)).$$


$$\mathbf{L} = \mathbf{D} - \mathbf{X}$$

$$D_{ij} = \delta_{ij} k_i$$

$$X_{ij} = \mathbf{adj}$$

$$L_{ii} = k_i$$

$$L_{ij} = -x_{ij}$$




$$L(S_4) = \begin{pmatrix} 3 & -1 & -1 & -1 \\ -1 & 1 & 0 & 0 \\ -1 & 0 & 1 & 0 \\ -1 & 0 & 0 & 1 \end{pmatrix}$$

Undirected graphs:

- on infinite square lattice == continuous Laplacian
- \mathbf{L} symmetric ==> spectrum is positive semidefinite $0 \leq \lambda_1 \leq \lambda_2 \leq \dots \leq \lambda_N$
- The multiplicity of 0 as an eigenvalue of L is equal to the number of connected components of the graph.
- The second smallest eigenvalue λ_1 is called the algebraic connectivity.
It is non-zero only if the graph is formed of a single connected component.

Walks in networks

Laplacian and return times

$$\partial_t p(i, t | i_0, 0) = - \sum_j L_{ij} p(j, t | i_0, 0) \quad p(i, 0 | i_0, 0) = \delta_{ii_0} \quad \sum_i L_{ij} = 0 \rightarrow \sum_i p(i, t | i_0, 0) = 1$$


Spectral density

$$\rho(\lambda) = \left\langle \frac{1}{N} \sum_{i=1}^N \delta(\lambda - \lambda_i) \right\rangle$$

Laplace transform

$$\tilde{p}_{ii_0}(s) = \int_0^\infty dt e^{-st} p(i, t | i_0, 0).$$

Integration by parts

$$\int_0^\infty dt e^{-st} \partial_t p(i, t | i_0, 0) = -p(i, 0 | i_0, 0) + s \tilde{p}_{ii_0}(s) = s \tilde{p}_{ii_0}(s) - \delta_{ii_0}$$

Finally, rewrite as

$$s \tilde{p}_{ii_0}(s) - \delta_{ii_0} = - \sum_j L_{ij} \tilde{p}_{ji_0}(s) \quad \sum_j (s \delta_{ij} + L_{ij}) \tilde{p}_{ji_0}(s) = \delta_{ii_0}.$$

Return time, definition

$$p_0(t) = \left\langle \frac{1}{N} \sum_{i_0} p(i_0, t | i_0, 0) \right\rangle.$$

Laplace transform

$$\tilde{p}_0(s) = \left\langle \frac{1}{N} \sum_{i_0} \tilde{p}_{i_0 i_0}(s) \right\rangle = \left\langle \frac{1}{N} \text{Tr} \tilde{\mathbf{p}}(s) \right\rangle,$$

$$\tilde{p}_0(s) = \left\langle \frac{1}{N} \sum_i \frac{1}{s + \lambda_i} \right\rangle.$$

Laplace inverse transform

$$p_0(t) = \int_{c-i\infty}^{c+i\infty} ds e^{ts} \left\langle \frac{1}{N} \sum_j \frac{1}{s + \lambda_j} \right\rangle = \left\langle \frac{1}{N} \sum_j e^{-\lambda_j t} \right\rangle,$$

Or equivalently

$$p_0(t) = \int_0^\infty d\lambda e^{-\lambda t} \rho(\lambda).$$

Searching in networks




Fig. 8.4. Schematic comparison of various searching strategies to find the target vertex t , starting from the source s . A, Broadcast search; B, Random walk; C, Degree-biased strategy. The broadcast search finds the shortest path, at the expense of high traffic.

Finds shortest path, generated traffic: traffic $\propto N$



Not shortest path, less traffic: $T \propto N^{0.79}$ $\gamma = 2.1$

What about this?

Peer-to-Peer networks,
Adamic et al. (2001)


Searching in small world networks

- Start from a D -dimensional hypercubic lattice:
- add a link node i , and connect to node j with at geographical distance r_{ij} with prob $\sim r^{-\alpha}$,
- Each node knows its own position and that of its neighbours.
- Greedy search process:
 - a message has to be sent to a certain target node t whose geographical position is known.
 - A node i receiving the message forwards it to the neighbor node j geographically closest to the target ($\min r_{jt}$)



Kleinberg (2000a)
if $\alpha = D$, the delivery time scales as $\log^2(N)$ with the size N of the network.

What is the dimension then of real networks? Are they navigable?
Barrat/Barth/Vesp Chapter 8



What did we talk about today?

- Formalism of robustness
- Errors vs attacks
- Cascades (qualitatively)

- Walks and random walkers
- Pagerank
- Introduction to Laplacian



What didn't we talk about today?

- Math-y Cascades ...
- How to engineer robustness?
- Deeper Laplacian spectral theory

- Calculations of the spectral densities
- Specific search results
- Dynamical systems in general

