

The labor market integration of immigrant women in Europe. A review.

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1. Introduction

In labor market research, both in economics and sociology, the economic integration of male immigrants in their new place of residence has always held a prominent position. Immigrant women's labor market integration, on the other hand, has often been seen as "subservient" to the labor market activities of their male partners (Boyle et al., 2001, p. 201). Yet, even before the large family migration inflows following the conclusion of labor recruitment schemes in the 1970s, migration inflows into Europe were far from being entirely male. For example, in 1970, around one third of foreign employees in Germany were women (Mattes, 2010), and other countries across Europe also saw (mostly independent) female immigrants coming to fill demand in teaching, nursing and domestic work (Kofman et al., 2005). Thus, perceiving immigrant women exclusively as invisible dependents means not only neglecting them in research, but also inhibiting opportunities to adopt a gender-specific perspective on the labor market performance of immigrants (Kofman et al., 2005; Mushaben, 2009). Even after researchers started to include women in their analyses, gender was often just treated as one of many covariates in the estimated model. In the case when only women were investigated, researchers applied the models to them that initially had been derived for men, ignoring that the lives of immigrant women (including their labor market integration) were likely to differ substantially from those of their male counterparts (Kofman et al., 2005). Research has become much more intersectional in the past two decades, but the investigation of the particular labor market patterns of female immigrants remains a work in progress. Thus, the aim of this article is to provide a review of the existing research on female immigrant labor market outcomes in Europe, evaluating what is there and exposing what remains to be investigated.

Considering both gender and nativity, immigrant women often occupy the most disadvantaged spot on European labor markets. The lack of research on the determinants of these disadvantages is hardly understandable, especially when considering the European demography. In 2018 alone, 2.4 million immigrants arrived in the EU from a non-EU member country, with an additional 1.4 million EU citizens moving from one EU country to another (Eurostat, 2020b). Females account for 46 percent of the total. Clearly, investigating the labor market performance of immigrant women is not only of macroeconomic importance, especially in light of Europe's demographic change (Barslund et al., 2017; d'Albis et al., 2016; Fuchs & Kubis, 2016), but also addresses the fundamental question of ethnic *and* gender equality. Emancipative instruments might work very differently for immigrants, taking into account specific gender dynamics arising from the direct experience of immigration and integration as well as cultural differences (Kofman et al., 2005; Mushaben, 2009). Understanding the causes as well as mitigating the detrimental consequences of the labor market disadvantages of immigrant women could provide a substantial contribution to their quality of life, for instance by helping their family establish greater economic independence. The benefits are not just limited to the economic sphere. Women with more economic independence are also less likely to experience intimate partner violence (Eggers del Campo & Steinert, 2020).

This review has three objectives. The first objective is to contextualize female immigrant labor market integration in the European geo-political context and theoretical sociological context. The second objective is to present the existing findings on

immigrant women's labor market integration patterns, identifying broad trends in their experiences across Europe and connecting the theoretical determinants of their labor market success to actual empirical evidence. The final objective of our review is to evaluate the intersectionality of the disadvantages that immigrant women face—based on their nativity and gender—and the feasibility of a 'double disadvantage' explanation (see, for example, Boyd, 1984).¹ For these latter two objectives, we enhance our review of the existing literature by including descriptive analyses using the most current data. Overall, this approach should provide a good overview of the existing state of the research and identify pressing areas for new studies.

2. Theoretical and contextual setting

2.1. General framework and focus of this review

The comparability of migration-related research rests on a clear understanding of the used terms and their applicability to the presented results. In this review, we adopt the working definition of immigrants as individuals who are living in a country in which they were not born (irrespective of the citizenship they hold). These first generation immigrants differ in their nativity from the host population and in their immigration experience from the host population and from second generation immigrants born in the host country. Such a definition involves the assumptions that immigrants have been natives of a country other than the host country at some point and that this country is the country of birth—assumptions that can rarely be validated in most surveys.²

What is the yardstick we use to measure the integration of immigrants in the host society? In sociology, the term integration is a descriptive one, typically referring to the cohesion of a larger entity (Esser, 2001). However, much of the integration theory is built around nation states and the assumption that immigrants assimilate into a static host society. Although scholars like Hartmut Esser emphasize that assimilation only refers to a convergence and is not necessarily one-sided, the terms integration and assimilation often carry a normative character (Canan, 2015). This review is not the place to compare in detail the different theoretical notions of how immigrants and the host society interact. Still, labor market outcomes for immigrant women cannot be evaluated without a reference, especially when employing quantitative methods. Thus, following Esser's (2001, p. 22) notion that assimilation means that immigrants and natives 'participate to the same extent in the rights and resources of a society'—and acknowledging the difficulties associated with such 'methodological nationalism' (Wimmer & Schiller, 2002)—we adopt a concept of socio-economic integration understood as assimilation between immigrants and natives in terms of labor market outcomes. Most of the

¹ We explicitly adopt a perspective of intersectionality, although we predominantly focus on the dimensions of gender and nativity. While there are certainly always other stratifying factors in play that make individual life experiences (and labor market outcomes) quite unique (Crenshaw, 1990; Nash, 2008), the possibilities to approach these intersections via quantitative research are limited. Nonetheless, we pay attention to any stratifying dimensions in addition to gender and nativity considered in the reviewed literature.

² Additionally, focusing on nativity instead of ethnicity is useful in the European context because of the substantial immigration of co-ethnics. Examples include the repatriates after decolonization or ethnic Germans following the collapse of the Soviet Union.

quantitative studies in the social sciences either implicitly or explicitly consider the (structural) integration³ into the labor market to be successful when immigrants do not suffer any (additional) disadvantages compared to natives in terms of the examined indicators.

Based on these definitions of ‘immigrant’ and ‘integration’, the scope of this review extends to all quantitative studies of first generation female immigrant labor market integration in a European country, published in English between 2000 and early 2020. Although we look at female labor market integration after migration, this does not mean that we only consider female *labor* immigrants. Instead, we focus on the labor market outcomes of immigrant women irrespective of their individual migration paths or motives. This also includes refugees. The studies included in this review were found via extensive database and web searches, as well as citation searches within these initial articles.

2.2. A brief history of European immigration since 1950

There has been a long tradition of migration from, to and across the European continent, but compared to other countries such as the U.S., Canada or Australia, large-scale immigration and its political recognition is a relatively recent phenomenon for European countries, which started after the end of the Second World War (Dustmann & Frattini, 2011). Migration experiences have been quite heterogeneous across countries within this period owing to historical, political and economic differences, resulting in immigrant populations that differ considerably in their origins and composition. To contextualize our review, we provide a brief history of migration to and within Europe, distinguishing between three phases (1945 until mid-1970s, mid-1970s until mid-1990s, and mid-1990s until today) and three main regions (north-western Europe (NWE), southern Europe (SE), and central and eastern Europe (CEE)).⁴

1945 until mid-1970s

The Second World War spurred sizable refugee movements, mostly from eastern Europe to western Germany, either as a result of the war or the new geo-political landscape that emerged afterwards (Berlinghoff, 2018). Rebuilding Europe facilitated an

³ Esser (2001) distinguishes four dimensions of assimilation within the wider concept of social integration: cultural (e.g. language, norms), structural (e.g. education, labor market), social (e.g. native-immigrant friendships), and identificatory (feeling of belonging). Thus, labor market integration is mainly a structural matter, although all different kinds of integration reinforce each other. For example, having a job in a company where natives work certainly facilitates forming inter-ethnic friendships, but such friendships can also be an asset in finding a job. There are many different definitions of integration, but the importance of the socio-economic dimension and its interrelation to the legal, political, or cultural dimensions of integration is widely acknowledged (Penninx & Garcés-Mascareñas, 2016).

⁴ We define NWE as consisting of Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Iceland, Ireland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland and the UK. To account for the historical division by the Iron Curtain and its effects on migration flows, we use a narrow definition of SE and a rather broad definition of CEE. Greece, Malta, Italy, Portugal, and Spain count as SE. Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Belarus, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Poland, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Ukraine count as CEE. Without this historical context, a definition based on current geography would arrive at a different categorization for various countries, e.g. for Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania (as northern Europe) or North Macedonia and Albania (as southern Europe), as typically used, for example, by the UN (see, e.g., UNDESA, 2020).

economic boom in the 1950s in the highly industrialized nations of NWE, accompanied by the refusal of natives to do certain precarious jobs any longer. International labor migration was seen as key to meeting the domestic labor shortages in service, construction and manufacturing. Almost all countries devised bilateral foreign labor recruitment ('guest worker') schemes. Initially, recruitment was based on geographical proximity (e.g. from Spain to France), but excess demand meant also recruiting from the periphery or even outside of Europe. The main origin countries were Algeria, Greece, Italy, Morocco, Portugal, Spain, Tunisia, Turkey, and Yugoslavia, where most of the immigrant workers came from poor agricultural regions with high unemployment (Van Mol & de Valk, 2016). Although inflows were predominantly male, a considerable share of foreign workers was female, taking up jobs in the garment or electronics sector (Mattes, 2005). Former colonies were another source of foreign labor. Following their gradual independence after WWII, several million (mostly return) immigrants moved, for example, from Kenya, India, and Malaysia to the UK; from Northern Africa to France; from Congo to Belgium; or from Indonesia to the Netherlands (Bade, 2003, as cited in Van Mol & de Valk, 2016). All of these movements led to substantial increases in the foreign-born populations throughout NWE.

SE was in this phase characterized by large outflows to NWE. An estimated 7-10 million people emigrated between 1950 and 1970 from Portugal, Spain, Italy and Greece (Okólski, 2012), considerably out-weighting immigration from former colonies and, generally, North Africa. The bilateral agreements with NWE countries for dispatching 'guest workers' were also a welcome way of dealing with their own economic and demographic problems (Van Mol & de Valk, 2016).

Migration from or to the communist sphere of CEE was rare due to its isolation behind the Iron Curtain. Emigration in the direction of Western countries was prohibited and strictly controlled (except for Yugoslavia). Immigration was limited to some foreign labor or students coming from other socialist countries, for example Hungarian or Polish workers in the GDR (de Haas et al., 2020).

Mid-1970s until mid-1990s

The economic downturn in the early 70s, culminating in the first oil crisis in 1973, was followed by a restructuring of the NWE economies and decreased demand for manual labor. Beginning with Sweden in 1970, all countries closed their labor recruitment channels by 1974 (Van Mol & de Valk, 2016). Contrary to the political goals, this did not stop immigration but fundamentally transformed it, because many foreign workers decided to stay and to reunite with their families (Hansen, 2003). Immigration quickly became a hot political topic, but it took much longer before immigrant integration emerged as a political priority (for example, Sweden and the Netherlands began implementing policies in the 80s, Germany 20 years later). As unskilled labor immigration was no longer wanted in NWE,⁵ the only other way of legally entering most of the countries besides family migration was to claim asylum. The gradual fall of the Iron

⁵ These general developments in immigration policy already mirror the approach later on taken by the EU and its predecessors: Migration within NWE was much less restricted than immigration from the outside. In this phase, the difference was most significant for labor immigrants. For example, as early as 1958, the Treaty of Rome ensured free labor movement between Belgium, Germany, France, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands.

Curtain starting at the end of the 1980s sparked substantial migration movements from east to west, and the break-up of both the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia resulted in mass inflows of displaced persons and refugees to NWE. Asylum claims peaked at 695,000 in 1992 in European OECD countries, and remained well above 400,000 for the rest of the decade (Hansen, 2003). Initially, asylum regulations were rather lenient, however, the skyrocketing number of claims (especially in Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands and the UK) since 1990 were soon met with policies meant to curtail the rights to asylum (Van Mol & de Valk, 2016). These policies resulted in decreasing overall asylum claims, but also spill-overs into other European countries and an increase in undocumented immigration (Doomernik & Bruquetas-Callejo, 2016).

In SE, Portugal, Spain, Italy and Greece were gradually changing from net emigration to net immigration countries. The economic situation and increased restrictiveness of countries in NWE diverted migration flows to SE and also meant that fewer people emigrated to the north and more people returned to the south. Improved political stability following the end of the dictatorships in Portugal, Spain and Greece in the 1970s and rapid economic growth in the 80s and 90s also made SE countries attractive migration destinations (Van Mol & de Valk, 2016). Labor market shortages, particularly in construction, agriculture and care services, and a large informal sector⁶ resulted in a large increase in irregular migration, first coming from North Africa and the Middle East, later from CEE after the fall of the Iron Curtain (de Haas et al., 2020). Irregularity was facilitated by the mismatch between a continued demand for low-skilled immigrant labor and SE countries' obligation to adopt restrictive immigration policies as part of the European Economic Community (EEC, later the EU⁷) that were typically realized as annual quotas (Geddes & Scholten, 2016). This mismatch was addressed by several collective regularizations of undocumented immigrants, first implemented in Italy and Spain in 1985 (Finotelli & Arango, 2011). In general, although net immigration was positive in this period, the real upsurge in immigration numbers started after the mid-90s. In contrast to Italy, Spain and Greece, Portugal also remained a major sending country.

During the time the Iron Curtain was still intact, migration from and to CEE remained rare. To some extent, workers from Cuba, Vietnam or North Korea filled labor shortages in Hungary, Czechoslovakia, the GDR and major Soviet cities (de Haas et al., 2020). Before 1989, the largest migration flow to Western Europe was about 240,000 ethnic Germans from Poland and Romania who moved to West Germany (Doomernik & Bruquetas-Callejo, 2016). The situation drastically changed after the fall of the Berlin Wall, which was followed by sizable outflows to the West, particularly of ethnic Germans (Dustmann & Frattini, 2011). Still, refugees from the Yugoslav wars 1991-1993, especially from Bosnia, not only fled to the West, but also to Hungary, the Czech Republic and Poland.

Mid-1990s until 2020

Since the inception of the European Union with the Treaty of Maastricht in 1992, migration related policies have undergone a standardization across old member and new accession countries. The main areas of standardization have been the universal free

⁶ In the 1990s, the informal economy was estimated to contribute to about a fourth of the GDP in Spain and Italy (Geddes & Scholten, 2016).

⁷ Italy was a founding member, Greece joined in 1981, Portugal and Spain in 1986.

movement for all EU citizens on one side, and selective rules in terms of labor migration from non-EU countries on the other side; as well as general directives on asylum and family migration. For NWE countries, EU enlargement meant that certain low-skilled (but also professional) labor demands could be met by new EU citizens enjoying free labor mobility. Important examples are the migration flows of Poles to Germany and the UK.⁸ Moreover, for formerly irregular immigrants, EU accession of the country whose citizenship they held resulted in the regularization of their status. For non-EU citizens, one labor migration channel that received particular attention is the competition for global talent. Unifying national approaches, the EU implemented its Blue Card scheme in 2009 that serves as an EU-wide work and residence permit for non-European skilled immigrants (Boucher, 2019). In the same vein, attracting international students and facilitating their transition to the labor market also became an important goal (Van Mol & de Valk, 2016). Despite the general restrictiveness in (national) asylum regulations, refugee migration to NWE continued to play a major role in this period, for example following the Kosovo War in 1998/99, the war in Afghanistan beginning in 2001, Gulf War II in Iraq in 2003, and, most notably, following the Syrian civil war, when over 1 million refugees entered the EU in 2015 (de Haas et al., 2020). Because of the selective labor migration channels and asylum regulations in place, family migration remains the main channel of regular immigration from outside the EU to NWE, closely followed by labor and education (de Haas et al., 2020).

Immigrant inflows to SE countries picked up massively in the 2000s. The largest increase in foreign-born population shares between 2000 and 2009 were seen by Spain (from about 4 to about 14 percent) and Italy (from about 4 to about 10 percent) (OECD, 2020b). The flourishing economic situation, a lax implementation of immigration policy, and geographical proximity made SE an attractive destination for refugees fleeing from African and Middle Eastern conflicts; non-EU labor immigrants (particularly Latin Americans moving to Portugal and Spain, Albanians moving to Italy and Greece); workers from CEE EU accession countries (particularly Romanians in Italy and Spain); and family immigrants joining their relatives who entered the countries earlier (de Haas et al., 2020; Geddes & Scholten, 2016). The financial crisis in 2008 reversed some of these developments, but as soon as the economic recovery gained traction, migration flows largely returned to their previous levels (OECD, 2020b). It is noteworthy that immigration to Portugal is still largely related to its historical colonial ties, whereas immigration to Italy, Spain and Greece has increasingly diversified, including new migration trends such as the substantial number of British immigrants in Spain (estimated to be around 300,000 in 2018), reflecting pensioners and lifestyle immigrants (de Haas et al., 2020; King, 2002). In 2015, Italy and Greece were transit states for large numbers of refugees from the Middle East. Because of difficulties in the implementation of the Dublin regulations⁹ and varying interpretations of 'burden sharing' among EU

⁸ Moreover, the UK, similar to Ireland and Sweden, did not impose a waiting period before the new EU member state citizens could enjoy free labor mobility

⁹ The Dublin Regulation came first into effect in 1997 as part of the Common European Asylum System and defines the responsibilities of member states in processing asylum applications. Its main provision is that any country in which fingerprints are stored or an asylum claim is made first, is also the country to process the claim. The Dublin Regulation has been revised multiple times to acknowledge the fact that most of these responsibilities fall to the countries which border non-EU states, yet the burden sharing is still only loosely regulated in the most recent policy (European Commission, 2020).

member states, Italy and Greece resorted to rather strict border closings and the political rhetoric and public opinion shifted markedly against immigration (Geddes & Scholten, 2016).

In contrast to SE, most of the CEE nations have remained emigration countries until today, although much of the emigration is temporary or circular. Some CEE countries with thriving economies have become migration destinations, most notably Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic (with immigrants coming mostly from Russia, Ukraine and Slovakia) (de Haas et al., 2020). Moreover, between 2004 and 2013, 11 CEE countries joined the EU. The accession requirements included granting free movement to EU citizens as well as implementing the EU's restrictive policies on immigration from non-EU countries and general directives on asylum and family migration (Doomernik & Bruquetas-Callejo, 2016). Existing migration patterns between neighboring states were now disrupted by a 'hard' border between new EU-member states and non-members. However, countries like Poland quickly implemented measures that allowed such immigration to continue, establishing 'chained migration' patterns. For example, Ukrainian migrants moved to Poland, whereas Polish migrants moved to western Europe. Moreover, some countries also have special policies in place facilitating the return-migration of expatriates, e.g. Poland and Hungary (Geddes & Scholten, 2016). Larger immigration inflows came with the refugee movements from the Middle East in 2015, many travelling via eastern Europe to NWE states. Attempts to limit immigration were rare, but in some countries governments capitalized on immigration issues and employed restrictive admission regimes (most notably in Hungary under Victor Orban) (Geddes & Scholten, 2016). Still, predominantly concerned with emigration to (other) EU countries as new opportunities, the politicization of immigration as an issue of national concern remains generally low in CEE countries as compared to NWE or SE countries (de Haas et al., 2020).

In sum, migration flows to Europe have become much more diverse since the Second World War, reflecting changes in immigration policies as well as general global geo-political trends. The classic channels of labor migration, family reunification, and humanitarian migration remain important, but additional migration motives (such as education or retirement migration) appear increasingly relevant (King, 2002). In terms of immigration policy, the EU has had a large influence, but the nation states still hold considerable sovereignty over many issues. As of 2019, the share of the foreign-born population among NWE countries ranges between 7 percent in Finland and 48 percent in Luxembourg, most countries having shares of 10-20 percent (see Figure 1). The largest ethnic communities originate from, for example, India, Poland and Pakistan in the United Kingdom; Morocco, Algeria and Portugal in France; Turkey, Suriname and Morocco in the Netherlands; Poland, Turkey and Russia in Germany; and Syria, Finland and Iraq in Sweden (see Figure A2 in the online appendix). In all SE countries except Portugal, the share of the foreign-born population exceeds 10 percent, clearly reflecting the substantial inflows since the 1990s. The main origins are Albania, Germany and Georgia in Greece; Romania, Albania and Morocco in Italy; Angola, Brazil and France in Portugal; and Morocco, Romania and Ecuador in Spain. In CEE countries, immigrant numbers are typically lower in absolute and relative terms, foreign-born population shares range between 2 percent in Poland and 14 percent in Estonia. Most immigrants come from neighboring countries, the main origins are Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia and

Montenegro in Serbia; Ukraine, Slovakia and Vietnam in the Czech Republic; and Ukraine, Germany and Belarus in Poland.

This overall heterogeneity in immigrant nativities illustrates how the intersections of geographical, historical and political factors shape immigration. Countries with larger shares of non-European immigrants were either colonial powers, recruited labor from outside Europe, or were main refugee destinations. In terms of the gender composition of immigrant populations, it looks fairly balanced across European countries in 2019 (see Figure 1). However, it is important to acknowledge that stock statistics hide the gendered nature of specific migration flows. For example, whereas labor recruitment of NWE countries favored men, the larger proportion of the following family migration was, naturally, made up of women. Another example is the gendered demand for low-skilled immigrant labor in SE countries during the recession after 2008. Whereas (male) construction work was virtually non-existent in the wake of the crisis, the demand for (female) workers in care services was unbroken (de Haas et al., 2020). In general, the claim of a ‘feminization’ of migration over time has been called into question as women have always made up close to half of immigrant inflows since 1950 into OECD countries (de Haas et al., 2019). Thus, in the present review, the crucial question is not if immigrant women have become a relevant population, but how the gender-specific processes of migration and integration affect women’s labor market outcomes.




Figure 1. Immigrant population across Europe by gender and origin groups, 2019
[\[interactive version ^\]](#)

Note: The dashed vertical lines separate northern-western Europe (NWE) on the left, southern Europe (SE) in the center, and central and eastern Europe (CEE) on the right.

Source: [UNDESA](#)

2.3. The theory behind female immigrant disadvantage

Moving from the geo-political contextualization of immigration in Europe, in this section we present the relevant theoretical approaches to describing and investigating (female) immigrant labor market integration. The theoretical foundations of immigrant disadvantage on the labor market are based in human capital theory, which highlights the importance of human capital endowments like education and work experience in obtaining employment (Becker, 1993). For immigrants this is particularly important, because human capital is not perfectly transferable from one context to another. Assimilation theory thus states that immigrants remain disadvantaged on the labor market compared to natives even when their level of education and prior work experience are accounted for, and that their labor market outcomes converge towards those of natives as they spend more time in the host country and gain capital relevant to this new labor market (Chiswick, 1978; Friedberg, 2000). This not only relates to host-country educational degrees and job experience, but also proficiency in the language of the host country (Chiswick & Miller, 2002, 2003; Dustmann, 1994), the establishment of new social networks (Putnam, 2000, from Kanas et al., 2011), and other forms of softer socio-cultural capital (Reimers, 1985).

Assimilation theory itself has not been able to explain the full extent of immigrant disadvantages, and thus other approaches have been developed to extend this theoretical framework. Segmented assimilation theory, for instance, spells out that immigrants' integration trajectories are not just determined by labor market capital endowments, but that group-specific reception contexts in a destination country also play a decisive role (Portes & Zhou, 1993). These reception contexts are formed by government immigration and integration policies, the perceptions of the majority society, and the existing co-ethnic community. Institutional barriers inherent in the migration channel contribute to the disadvantage of some 'unwanted' groups compared to others, as do the ties that some immigrant communities have to low-skilled sectors and ethnic job markets. Discrimination by members of the majority population, both socially and on the labor market, also creates part of the reception context that influences immigrant labor market outcomes.

While these theories are some of the most widely used to explain immigrant labor market integration, they do not include considerations of gender in and of themselves. Moreover, researchers who approached this topic from a 'household specialization' perspective often presumed that the male occupied the traditional breadwinner role, and that females, especially those who are married with children, occupy a place outside of the labor force. Over time, though, researchers have acknowledged that female immigrants have heterogeneous labor market profiles, and that factors such as marital status and the presence/number of children in the household have a gender-specific impact. With this realization came increasing efforts to explain their labor market behavior in itself, not just as a caveat to males.

The findings from Chiswick (1978) on the wage assimilation of male immigrants in the US were extended by Long (1980) to female immigrants, but instead of the expected wage disadvantage (as found for men) he found an advantage for immigrant women compared to native women. The findings from this study came to be referred to as the 'family investment' hypothesis, which predicts that women are more active in the labor

market directly after immigration to allow their partners to invest in country-specific capital, and then retire from the labor market once their partner enters. This being said, little support for this hypothesis has been found in more recent studies (Basilio et al., 2009; Cobb-Clark & Connolly, 2001).

Another approach highlights the intersectionality of being a woman and of being an immigrant. Based on the observation that immigrant women in Canada were on average the most disadvantaged group on the labor market in terms of occupational status compared to native women, native men and their male compatriots, Boyd (1984) first concluded that...

...in addition to the status of being a migrant, migrant women experience additional difficulties in the labor force as women [...]. Overall, the position of migrant women in the labor force can be understood as reflecting the combined impact of sex and birthplace or the 'double negative' effect. (p. 1092f.)

The assertion of such a 'double disadvantage' (Raijman & Semyonov, 1997) or 'double jeopardy' (Greenman & Xie, 2008) rests on the assumption that, on average, both women and immigrants experience penalties on the labor market and that these penalties add to each other, leaving immigrant women in the least favorable position.

This double disadvantage approach clearly comes the closest to outlining the most important dimensions of disadvantage related to being a female immigrant throughout the process of labor market integration - their nativity and gender. The way these disadvantages translate into inferior labor market outcomes, however, is not instantaneous, but arises as these women move through different stages of the immigration and integration trajectory. In the following, we discuss how disadvantage along these two dimensions arises via (1) selective access to a country and its labor market, (2) decisions to participate in the labor market, and, once established, (3) success on the country's labor market. This distinction will also guide our literature review in Section 3.

Migration capabilities, legal entry and stay

One of the major understandings of migration research is that the complex processes of migration are shaped by the interplay of structural factors and individual agency. Individual decisions to migrate can have a multitude of reasons and can only be understood considering a person's identity, history, resources and embeddedness in larger social structures; the decisions and following migrations are situated within social entities, informational networks and ethnic communities spanning across international borders; and the available choices are shaped by the migration regimes in place in the country of origin and possible destinations (Kofman et al., 2005). We are not interested in providing a detailed account of existing migration theories here,¹⁰ but we want to highlight some important factors driving immigrant selection in terms of labor market relevant characteristics, nativity and gender.

The individual agency to migrate is shaped by individual aspirations and capabilities, where capabilities can be understood as the substantive mobility freedoms a person

¹⁰ See Chapter 3 in de Haas, Castles and Miller (2020) for an excellent overview.

enjoys (de Haas, 2014). This adaptation of Amartya Sen's capability approach (Sen, 1995) can usefully accommodate both individual as well as macro level factors determining individual freedoms and individual choices between available capability sets (that also include not moving at all). Individual factors affecting the human capability to migrate are, for example, available resources such as money, education, information, or health; and such factors are also likely to change individual aspirations. People who migrate are rarely the most deprived in a society (de Haas et al., 2020). Thus, in terms of labor market relevant individual characteristics, immigrants tend to be rather positively 'self-selected' relative to the origin population, but in some cases also relative to the destination population (a good example being the 'healthy immigrant effect' (Razum et al., 2000)).

While self-selection processes take place before migration, similar selection processes are inherent in the immigration policies of destination countries. Immigration regulations define whose entry and residence in a state or larger entity such as the EU is 'wanted' and whose entry and residence is 'unwanted' (Jesse, 2014; Mügge & van der Haar, 2016). This kind of discrimination is usually maintained with the argument of meeting economic, demographic and labor market needs (Hanewinkel & Oltmer, 2017). Such immigration regimes deliberately produce immigrant populations that are selective in terms of characteristics relevant to their labor market integration; and this selection process operates differently by nativity and gender (Morokvasic-Müller, 2014).¹¹

Regarding nativity, the most important distinction in EU migration policy is made between EU and non-EU citizens - so-called third country nationals (TCNs). Whereas EU citizens enjoy free movement within the union area (including the right to take up work in any country of the European Economic Area and Switzerland¹²), rigid external borders exist that seek to manage and control the migration of TCNs (Geddes & Scholten, 2016). Most of these immigrants fall into the category of the 'unwanted' and, thus, face strict immigration regulations.¹³ The 'wanted' are typically only those immigrants deemed economically valuable because they correspond to shortages in labor demand. Thus, the target of this positive policy discrimination is the incorporation of immigrants into the labor market. However, the job quality of the available vacancies is very heterogeneous, implying positive immigrant selection for high-skilled and negative immigrant selection for low-skilled positions. Examples of policies that facilitated low-skilled immigration into European countries include the labor recruitment schemes in NWE in the 1950s-70s; regularizations of undocumented workers in SE since the 1980s; or the decision of the UK, Ireland and Sweden to immediately open their labor markets to immigrants from the CEE accession countries in 2004. Policies focused on high-skilled immigration are student migration strategies, recruitment of particular professionals (such as nurses in the UK), and the EU Blue Card directive introduced in 2009.

¹¹ We focus on the selectivity of immigration policies in terms of factors determining labor market outcomes, but most of the considerations extend to a general selectivity in opportunities to legal entry and residence by gender and nativity (as well as class and religion). See, for example, (Kofman et al., 2005; Morokvasic-Müller, 2014; Schrover & Molony, 2013).

¹² As of 2020, Iceland, Liechtenstein, and Norway belong to the European Economic Area in addition to all EU member states.

¹³ However, not all TCNs are treated the same. Across the EU (and Europe), immigrants from high-income countries typically receive preferential treatment, for example in terms of visa regulations or immigration requirements (Joppke, 2017; Mau et al., 2015). Another reason for differential treatment by nativity are the historical (mostly colonial) ties of nations, although privileges in that respect became more and more restricted in the last decades (Geddes & Scholten, 2016; Hansen, 2003).

Although most immigration policies are essentially gender-neutral, they can produce specific gendered outcomes because of inherent gendered assumptions (Anthias & Pajnik, 2014; Kofman et al., 2005; Morokvasic-Müller, 2014). For example, to participate in the EU Blue Card scheme, immigrants must have at least a tertiary education and an income of 1.5 times the average gross salary in the country of destination (with much stricter and additional requirements such as language skills or on-the-job training in some countries) (Boucher, 2019). Women are much less likely to meet these requirements because of gender inequalities, particularly in terms of general income opportunities in the destination countries (Blau & Kahn, 2017), but in also in terms of the substantially lower educational levels of women in some origin countries (e.g. Turkey, Caner et al., 2016). This gender-asymmetry is also reflected in the number of permits issued. In Germany, the country issuing over 80 percent of total Blue Cards in the EU (Eurostat, 2020a), the share of female recipients is only 26 percent (BAMF, 2020). Another example of gendered labor migration is the annual quota system in southern Europe. In Spain, work and residence permits for TCNs are issued by region and sector, filling vacant and typically low-skilled positions in construction, agriculture and care services (de Haas et al., 2020). Because of demographic trends as well as increased employment rates among native women, the demand in care services is particularly large, so that the quota policy favored women in many years (Oso & Catarino, 2013).

The selectivity of immigration regimes along economic lines also extends to forms other than labor migration. Humanitarian and family TCN immigrants face particular restrictions because they are generally considered to be less economically valuable (Morokvasic-Müller, 2014). Technically, refugees have a right to asylum and unrestricted protection under the Geneva Conventions almost worldwide and under the Asylum Procedures Directive in the EU; however, there is considerable leeway in country officials' decisions as to whether and to what extent asylum is granted (Dustmann et al., 2017), where economic considerations also play a role. Much public debate regularly follows from governments revising their 'list of safe countries', resulting in dwindling chances of asylum being granted or prolonged for immigrants of this origin (Afghanistan being a particularly disputed example, Hanewinkel & Oltmer, 2020).

Similarly, since the EU directive 2003/86/EC, family migration (and reunification) is codified as a right of immigrants who have obtained their residence title, irrespective of their gender (Jesse, 2014). The gendered nature becomes apparent when the specific targeting of women by these policies is acknowledged, as well as their normative character in terms of family and gender relations (Morokvasic-Müller, 2014). One example are the 'civic integration from abroad' measures, pioneered by the Netherlands in 2006 and subsequently adopted in several European countries, obliging TCN candidates for family reunification to pass a test as a condition for granting them a visa (Geddes & Scholten, 2016; Joppke, 2017). Applicants are selected based on their skills, values, attitudes, political beliefs and moral sensibilities (Kostakopoulou, 2014, p. 38) and these applicants are predominantly women.¹⁴ For the Dutch case, women have been shown to be less likely to pass the exam than men (Oers, 2013).

¹⁴ This is not to say that civic integration measures cannot foster a successful integration (on that, there is mixed evidence, see e.g. (Goodman & Wright, 2015)), but their symbolic and instrumental value in terms of gender, nativity and culture is obvious (see also Joppke, 2017).

The above stated examples make clear that the governance of immigration and integration is a multilevel process, affected by laws, policies and practices at the EU level, the national level, as well as further subnational levels (Scholten & Penninx, 2016).¹⁵ The frameworks in place explicitly or implicitly discriminate by presumed economic viability, which often intertwines with the nativity and gender of immigrants. This selectivity means that most non-EU immigrants face restrictions, whereas EU and other Western citizens do not; and that some channels are more open for men (such as high-skilled migration) and others are more open for women (family migration, labor migration for care services). Still, there are limits to managing migration flows. Individual agency and the help of other facilitators (e.g. existing migration networks, ethnic communities, agents, NGOs, discretion of state officials, ...) frequently offer ways for immigrants to cross borders or to circumvent particular barriers (de Haas et al., 2020).

Labor market access

Immigration and integration policies are inextricably linked, so that disadvantages in immigrants' labor market access also tend to be stratified along the lines of gender and nativity, resembling the very same demarcation between the 'wanted' and the 'unwanted'. Restrictions apply only to those immigrants who do not enjoy free labor mobility or an equivalent agreement securing their employment (such as the EU Blue card directive). Consequently, restrictions are highly conditional on the migration channel and legal status, particularly disadvantaging non-EU/non-Western immigrants (Huddleston & Migration Policy Group, 2015).

Common practice in European countries was and is to restrict labor market access for immigrants whose legal status is not yet determined. As of 2020, restrictions are maintained for the full determination period in some cases (e.g. in Germany for asylum claimants from 'safe countries' (AIDA, 2020)); in other cases they expire after a waiting time (e.g. 9 months in Ireland (INIS, 2020)). However, even given a legal residence title, European countries issued work permits for immigrants very selectively, conditional on a variety of regulations (that have undergone considerable changes over time). Eligibility was based on, among other things, the migration channel, the duration of residence, the labor market situation, or the labor market segments/occupations. Consider the following examples. First, in terms of migration channel related restrictions, Germany granted no work permits for (predominantly female) family reunion immigrants from 1973-1979 (Kofman et al., 2005). For the next 25 years, before the new immigration law entered into force in 2005, family immigrants were subject to a waiting period of one year and subsequent 'labor market testing'; they received a work permit for a particular job only if no Germans or privileged immigrants (e.g. EU citizens) were available and no other 'negative effects' on the labor market were expected (Liebig, 2007, p. 24).¹⁶ Since 2005, family reunification immigrants receive the same labor market access as the principal immigrant upon arrival. Second, some countries such as France, Ireland, or

¹⁵ Note that EU migration policy has very few legally binding elements (almost none in terms of integration policy), particularly not for the countries that opted out of this part of the Treaty of Amsterdam (UK, Ireland, Denmark) (Geddes & Scholten, 2016).

¹⁶ There exist many other forms of labor market testing. For example, work permits might be issued only for a particular job or employer. More generally, the dispersion of immigrants (particularly asylum claimants) across the destination country also partly follows labor market considerations.

Slovakia prevent immigrants from accessing certain public sector jobs (Huddleston & Migration Policy Group, 2015). France is particularly restrictive, reserving about 20 percent of total jobs (as of 2010) for French nationals, in addition to public sector jobs also including private sector careers (e.g. pilots) and self-regulated professions (e.g. lawyers) (Simon & Steichen, 2014).

Clearly, although heterogeneous regulations exist across European countries, labor market access restrictions not only target exclusively (non-high-skilled) TCNs, they also operate in a gender-specific way because they are linked to specific migration channels and occupations. Labor market disadvantages directly arise from devaluations of human capital over waiting periods (Morrison & Lichter, 1988); in case of ‘testing’ the individual suitability of immigrants for the host country’s labor market, women might either lack the desired skills compared to men (Morokvasic-Müller, 2014) or they might suffer from (EU-)citizens given precedence, leaving work-permits only for the most precarious jobs (Phizacklea, 1987). Compared to the ‘wanted’, the economic opportunities of the ‘unwanted’ immigrants are further constrained by these policies. Taking up undocumented work is a likely consequence, however, such work might be characterized by high dependence and the lack of rights and social insurance (Kofman et al., 2005).

Taken together, immigration regimes operate in a selective fashion and, thus, shape the composition of the immigrant population in terms of gender and nativity, migration experiences and origins, as well as individual characteristics such as education or occupation. Similarly, these regimes define who has access to the (formal) labor market and who has not, thereby determining the immigrant labor force to a large extent. Policies in place are in principle gender-neutral, but they target women and men differently and, therefore, produce gendered outcomes (Morokvasic-Müller, 2014), which is not only true for labor market regulations, but also in terms of access to the educational system or the welfare state (Kofman et al., 2005). Intersecting inequalities in all of the considered dimensions as well as their complex interplay with the individual and family life course can impact the access to and, subsequently, also the success of immigrant women on the labor market.

Labor force participation

After acknowledging these initial selection processes, which result in a very specific group of immigrants, the subsequent integration considerations revolve around actual labor market outcomes in the destination country. Typically, the first measure of immigrant labor market integration is labor force participation (LFP), that is, the process of actively looking for and/or engaging in wage-earning employment. At first glance, immigrants are often observed to have lower LFP than natives directly after their arrival in the destination country, but converge towards native levels as time spent in the country increases (Cobb-Clark & Connolly, 2001; Reimers, 1985). As before, the dimensions of nativity and gender continue to exert a strong influence over the observed outcome.

Immigrants have different LFP intentions after migration, which link back to the selection processes they have undergone up to this point. On one hand, labor immigrants are positively selected with regards to their labor force participation rates, in the sense that the vast majority intend to work, and for TCNs, they often already have a job lined up prior to arrival (as a precondition to their work visa). However, the LFP intentions of

other types of immigrants can be more ambiguous from the beginning of their trajectory. For 'unwanted' groups of TCNs, who often do not qualify for labor migration channels, other migration channels like family reunification are the only way to receive the authorization to immigrate. Thus, TCN immigrants arriving as family immigrants, students, etc. may have intentions to participate in the labor force after arrival, and use these other channels to gain the initial access they would have otherwise been denied. Still, as we have seen, non-labor migration channels might entail labor market access restrictions.

Clearly, the selection effects of immigration policy have an important impact on the LFP of these groups after arrival, often resulting in a disadvantaged situation for certain groups of immigrants on the labor market based on their country of origin. Gender constitutes an additional dimension of disadvantage. When it comes to LFP, more often than not, males' participation is taken as a fact. In most cases this makes sense: data shows that male immigrants had high labor force participation rates before immigration, and that this continues after immigration (see Bürmann et al., 2018, for evidence from male refugees in Germany) regardless of the country of origin. Very few do not try to find a job at some point in their early integration trajectory. For women, on the other hand, entering the labor force is a much more deliberative process, and it often involves the following considerations: economic necessity, household labor requirements, social norms, and perceptions of labor market success (including discrimination).

Regarding the economic necessity of female labor force participation, this often relates to their living circumstances. For those who live in households with other sources of revenue (from a spouse or parents), it might not be a requirement for them to contribute monetarily. Even so, it is becoming increasingly difficult to support a household on a single salary, creating economic incentives for females to seek paid work and driving up the female LFP rates even in the majority populations: the average female LFP rate increased across all European countries in the last decades (OECD, 2020a). Thus, the culture of the male breadwinner seems to become less prevalent in Europe and other high-income countries, though females often continue to undertake household tasks (Altintas & Sullivan, 2016), even if they are working (see Sofer & Thibout, 2019, for evidence from France).

Along with economic incentives for female LFP comes the opportunity to delegate time away from household activities, which is especially difficult when there are children to take care of. Immigrants often delay family formation until after migration, which is evident from a high birth rate in the year following migration (Milewski, 2007). Thus, recent immigrants can have more strenuous household burdens than members of the majority population, which impacts their labor force participation. Nonetheless, many European countries encourage female LFP, and particularly mothers, via different types of activation policies such as expanded funding for childcare, but immigrant women remain difficult to engage. Some sources claim that they are less likely than natives to take advantage of public daycare schemes (Gambaro et al., 2017), though other studies find that employed immigrant women use public daycare just as much as employed native women (Rendall et al., 2010). In any case, immigrants are less likely to have extended family present to help with household tasks, which plausibly reduces their likelihood of allocating time away from the household.

Additionally, culture-specific gender values can factor into the decision to search for work. For women (and/or their spouses) who hold conservative ideas about the appropriateness of females in the labor market, the wage which would be earned from being active in the labor force often does not compensate for the perceived utility loss in household production, and therefore discourages their labor force participation (Bertrand et al., 2018). Typically, these conservative gender values are associated with immigrants from Middle Eastern/Muslim-majority origins. This being said, the correlation between Muslim religiosity and gender values has not received widespread empirical support in recent studies (Koenig et al., 2016), so this consideration needs to be treated with caution when examining the dimensions of nativity and gender.

The final aspect that female immigrants may take into account when deliberating whether to enter the labor force or not is their perception of being successful on the labor market. This involves, mainly, perceptions of discrimination based on sex and ethnicity/nativity, which could impede their ability to find a job. While perceptions are not necessarily accurate indicators of actual discrimination (Diehl & Liebau, 2017; Small & Pager, 2020), they likely influence the decision of whether participation in the labor force participation is individually worthwhile or not.

Thus, the decision for immigrant women to enter the labor force is multi-faceted and much more complex than for immigrant men (or native women). They encounter possible disadvantages not just because of their nativity, but also stemming from their gender.

Labor market success

Assuming that immigrants manage to access the host country's labor market and they make the decision to participate in the labor force, those who are active on the labor market continue to experience disadvantages stemming from nativity and gender (among other factors). As previously mentioned, studies of immigrant labor market integration usually follow an assimilation mentality, where the labor market outcomes of immigrants are compared to those of natives, and convergence is expected. Any detrimental performance of immigrants for a particular outcome then suggests a disadvantage driven by nativity. A similar logic applies to the gender dimension and the interplay of both.

Success on the labor market relates to several measurable outcomes. Once the decision has been made to participate in the labor force, the next step is successfully getting hired. Thus, the employment/unemployment rates of immigrants are an important topic of study, though self-employment is also an important option for many immigrants (OECD, 2017). Additional outcomes describe the conditions of employment, such as the contract type and number of hours worked, as well as characteristics of the work found, such as the sector of work, occupational status and the wage paid.

Besides the immigrant disadvantage mentioned earlier involving human capital and the differences between home and host country labor market contexts, there are gender considerations that particularly impact the labor market outcomes of female immigrants. For one, in the case of family immigration, the decision to immigrate is often based on the husband's job prospects in the destination country. In most situations, the male lead immigrant is the one who benefits from better job opportunities, though studies show that this holds for female lead immigrants as well (Krieger, 2019). Nonetheless, there

seems to be a gender imbalance in the selection into tied migration, which likely contributes to the gender gap in outcomes on the new labor market (if they choose to enter at all) (Krieger, 2019).

Another aspect that impacts the success of female immigrants on the labor market is their occupational segregation. Women in general, not just female immigrants, are typically found in service, care, and teaching occupations (Das & Kotikula, 2019). These occupations tend to require significant customer service and communication skills. When it comes to female immigrants, their proficiency in the host country language and familiarity with social norms can present a barrier to them finding jobs in their trained occupation (Rajman & Semyonov, 1997). Moreover, additional domestic tasks may direct them to the types of jobs that can give them the flexibility in working hours they need. Thus, these factors work together to dictate the quality and characteristics of the job found after immigration.

Finally, discrimination is an important consideration when examining the outcomes of female immigrants. Audit studies back up the existence of discrimination against ethnic and racial minorities on European labor markets (Quillian et al. 2020). Discrimination is one factor that relates to both a nativity and gender dimension. Not only do immigrants experience labor market discrimination, but females also - they may be less desirable to employers if they have a spouse or children at home (Correll, 2007), and they sometimes carry an ethno-religious marker of 'otherness' like the hijab for Muslim women (Weichselbaumer, 2020).

Studying indicators of female immigrants' success in the labor force is important for understanding the economic standing of immigrant families and their ability to remain autonomous from state aid, and for identifying barriers which may hold these groups back from reaching their full potential.

3. Literature review

In the following review, we organize the existing findings by the outcomes studied. We start by reviewing studies on female immigrants' labor force participation, and then move on to their labor market success conditional on participation. Since labor market success is such a broad topic with multiple indicators, the review of this portion of the literature will be broken into two subsections: The first subsection deals with immigrant women's employment status (including their (un-)employment rates, working hours/part-time work and contract type) and the second subsection with the quality of and returns to their employment once it is found (including occupational status, earnings/ wages).

When seeking to investigate possibly coinciding labor market disadvantages that immigrant women face because of their gender and nativity, both of these dimensions have to be explicitly considered. Yet, only a few of the reviewed studies do so; most compare either women and men among immigrants, or immigrants and natives among women. As each of these comparisons corresponds to a different type of disadvantage, we first group the findings by the comparison made. In a second step, we provide an integrated perspective that explicitly focuses on the intersectional nature of gender and nativity and how their interplay affects the labor market outcomes of immigrant women.

To situate the reviewed studies in the current European context, we provide additional descriptive statistics on gender and nativity gaps for the most common labor market indicators by country of destination for 2019 based on Eurostat data. In an [interactive online appendix](#), we present additional figures on how these gaps have developed over time.

3.1. Labor force participation




Figure 2. Nativity and gender gaps in labor force participation rates by country, 2019
[\[interactive version ^\]](#)

Note: Age 15-64. Immigrants include all immigrants for which there is data available, irrespective of origin. Markers represent the values obtained by subtracting the comparison group value from the value for immigrant women. The dashed vertical lines separate northern-western Europe (NWE) on the left, southern Europe (SE) in the center, and central and eastern Europe (CEE) on the right. Lighter shades of markers represent the Eurostat flag 'low reliability.'

Source: [Eurostat](#)

Nativity gap among women

According to 2019 Eurostat data, immigrant women show lower average LFP rates than native women in many of the European countries covered by the studies included in this review (see Figure 2). This disadvantage is observed for all of NWE except Ireland and Luxembourg, and has also been confirmed in other studies for the UK, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Germany, Austria, Denmark, and Sweden (Fleischmann & Höhne, 2013; Gorodzeisky & Semyonov, 2017; Knize Estrada, 2018; Koopmans, 2016; Neuman, 2018; Rubin et al., 2008). By contrast, in SE countries the average LFP rates of immigrant women in the Eurostat data consistently exceed those of native women (see also Amuedo-Dorantes & de la Rica, 2007; Bernardi et al., 2011; Fullin & Reyneri, 2011; Rendall et al., 2010; Rubin et al., 2008). We observe a similar pattern in some CEE countries, e.g. the Czech Republic, Poland, and Hungary, but the situation appears much more heterogeneous. The observed advantages in LFP need not indicate a disparity in

the type of immigrants moving to each region, but can also point to the fact that, in SE and CEE countries, the LFP rates of native women are usually lower compared to NWE countries. For example, nearly 80 percent of native women in the Netherlands participated in the labor force in 2019, but only about 60 percent did so in Greece or Hungary (see Figure A4 in the online appendix). Still, there are many CEE countries in which immigrant women show lower LFP rates compared to native women, e.g. in North Macedonia or Slovenia (see Figure 2).

Besides general differences in female LFP in the destination countries, nativity gaps also vary greatly by immigrants' country of origin. In NWE countries, as of 2019 the nativity gap is generally smaller for immigrant women from EU countries compared to those from outside the EU; but the picture is again much less consistent across SE and CEE countries (see Figure A4 in the online appendix). Looking at immigrants from specific origin countries, several patterns emerge. Women from Muslim majority countries show the lowest LFP rates across destination countries, e.g. Turkish women in Germany, or Moroccan women in Italy (Fleischmann & Höhne, 2013; Fullin & Reyneri, 2011). By contrast, immigrant women from eastern European countries rank among the highest in LFP, e.g. women from Bulgaria and Romania in Italy and Germany (Fleischmann & Höhne, 2013; Fullin & Reyneri, 2011).

These patterns suggest that female immigrant populations across Europe are quite heterogeneous in terms of the characteristics determining their LFP. Several relevant factors have been repeatedly identified in the literature that explain parts of the observed (positive or negative) nativity gaps in LFP among women. First, a large part of the gaps usually disappears after accounting for compositional differences in age, human capital and household factors between immigrant and native women. The most important human capital factor is education, and its distribution among immigrants is strongly shaped by the selective processes described in Section 2.3. Regarding the family context, the marital status and the presence of small children matter most, as marriage and birth rates among immigrant women often exceed those among native women (Adserà & Ferrer, 2015). In some cases, after accounting for compositional differences in these relevant factors between immigrant populations in destination countries, but also between origin groups within these populations, nativity gaps vanish completely. For instance, Rendall et al. (2010) show that the LFP nativity-advantage of immigrant women in SE countries disappears net of these factors for Greece, Spain, and (almost) for Portugal. Gorodzeisky and Semyonov (2017) find a LFP nativity-disadvantage for non-European immigrant women, and a nativity-advantage for European immigrant women in France both gaps narrow and become insignificant after adding socio-demographic controls.¹⁷

Whereas these examples show that human capital and household context are important factors, they are in many cases insufficient to fully explain the nativity gap in female LFP. As the varying LFP patterns across origin countries suggest, additional relevant factors are related to the cultural and social norms of immigrants and the corresponding perceptions of appropriate roles of women and men in the household and

¹⁷ In some cases, gaps also increase (or even change direction). For example, Khoudja and Fleischmann (2017) show for the Netherlands that immigrant women of Surinamese/Antillean origin exhibit slightly higher LFP rates as native women (+3 percent) in their sample. After controlling for age, education, health, language skills and children in the household, the predicted Surinamese/Antillean advantage is 19 percent (p. 525).

the labor market. As norms are difficult to measure, quantitative studies usually either rely on a direct measurement approach in which respondents evaluate particular statements;¹⁸ or they proxy norms based on other information. Using direct measures, Koopmans (2016) shows for Muslim immigrant women (from Turkey, Morocco, former Yugoslavia, and Pakistan) to NWE that traditional gender values are associated with significantly lower LFP rates. Khoudja and Fleischmann (2017) confirm this result for immigrant women from Turkey, Morocco and Surinam/Antilles to the Netherlands, highlighting that the gender role attitudes held by the women's male partners play a significant role, too. They also show that traditional women tend not to participate in the labor market if the labor market resources of their partners permit, whereas this is much less the case for egalitarian women. In the absence of direct measures, religiosity is often used as a proxy for traditional gender roles, based on the assumption that higher levels of religiosity are associated with lower levels of LFP, particularly for Muslim women (see, e.g., Knize Estrada, 2018, for Germany). However, Khoudja and Platt (2018) challenge this interpretation by considering both religiosity and gender role attitudes of immigrant women in the UK. Net of gender role attitudes, labor market entry rates of immigrant women in their sample even increase with religiosity (and exit rates decrease vice versa).

Assimilation into the host country is relevant for all the considered (as well as unobserved) determinants of LFP. With longer durations of stay, nativity gaps in female LFP typically narrow across European countries, as immigrant women acquire host country specific resources such as the language or adapt to the culture and social norms present (Amuedo-Dorantes & de la Rica, 2007; Fleischmann & Höhne, 2013; Koopmans, 2016; Neuman, 2018; Rendall et al., 2010). Still, in most studies modeling assimilation trajectories, immigrant women starting out at a disadvantage in LFP do not manage to catch up to native women over the considered periods (see, e.g., Neuman, 2018; Rendall et al., 2010).

Several studies aim to consider as many factors relevant to female LFP as possible (e.g., Khoudja & Platt, 2018), but even then some 'unexplained' gaps remain. In most of these cases, immigrant women show lower LFP rates (due to lower entry or higher exit rates) than native women although they do not differ in the wide range of considered explanatory factors. This remaining gap might be due to the fact that immigrant women experience lower returns to their characteristics on the labor market than natives, and the expected disadvantage in returns discourages them from participating in the labor market (Rendall et al., 2010). In such a perspective, factors relevant for labor market success also play a larger role, such as individual language skills (Koopmans, 2016) or employer discrimination (Quillian et al., 2019).

That being said, the possibly far-reaching effects that structural factors have on immigrant women's LFP seem to be quite underexplored. In a rare study, Cangiano (2014) shows that the migration channels under which immigrant women entered EU-15 countries are strong determinants of their LFP. Both female family migrants and refugees show substantially lower odds of being active on the labor market in comparison to female labor migrants and native women in general, conditional on age, human capital, household characteristics, language skills and duration of stay. This result is a clear

¹⁸ For example, one of the items used by Koopmans (2016) reads "When jobs are scarce, men should have more right to a job than women".

example of the selection effects involved in migration regimes and corresponding individual migration trajectories.

Gender gap among immigrants

The prior section examined the nativity gap in LFP between native and immigrant women. This section reviews the evidence on differences in LFP rates between women and men among immigrants, thereby highlighting the gender-specific component of immigrant women's labor market (dis-)advantages. Across Europe, women participate less in the labor market than men and immigrants pose no exception. As of 2019, average gender gaps in immigrant LFP range from about 5 pp in Lithuania to over 25 pp in Greece, but there is no clear geographical pattern; most gaps lie between 10 and 20 pp (see Figure A3 in the online appendix). In NWE, gender gaps in LFP are larger for immigrants from non-EU compared to EU countries, whereas such a difference is not consistently present in SE and CEE countries (see Figure A4 in the online appendix).

In most studies, immigrant women and men are considered separately (usually in comparison to natives), making it difficult to pin down the factors behind the observed gender inequalities. Nevertheless, judging from their differential impact on women's and men's LFP, family context and cultural norms seem to be among the most important drivers. For example, controlling for age, education and origin, Fullin and Reyneri (2011) estimate that in comparison to immigrant women living alone, the LFP rates of women living with a partner are significantly lower, particularly in the presence of children. By contrast, immigrant men living with a partner and children are significantly more likely to participate in the labor force than men living alone. Koopmans (2016) reports similar results for Muslim immigrants of Turkish, Moroccan, former Yugoslavian and Pakistani origin in six NWE countries, although there only seems to be a LFP 'marriage-bonus' for men and a 'children-penalty' for women.¹⁹ He also shows that the gendered-effects of the family context persist when including socio-cultural factors in the model. However, these socio-cultural factors themselves only affect immigrant women: Their LFP is estimated to significantly increase in host country language proficiency, host country media use, and, particularly, in holding liberal gender role attitudes (Koopmans, 2016).

To the best of our knowledge, as of 2020 there is only one study for the European context that compares the LFP rates of immigrant women and men in one model, explicitly testing the significance of their difference. Fleischmann and Höhne (2013) estimate gender gaps in LFP (net of age, education, marital status, children in the household, and duration of stay) across origin groups of immigrants in Germany in 2009. They find participation rates of women to be lower than those of men for all immigrant groups except ethnic Germans and Greeks, significantly so for immigrants from Poland, North Africa, Turkey, the Middle East, and a group of Western countries (in the order of decreasing gap magnitude). Clearly, nativity-specific factors not considered in their model seem to play a role here, such as differences in gender role attitudes or language skills.

¹⁹ The respective effects are highly conditional on the measurement of the family status (e.g. living with a partner vs. being married; presence vs. number of children, etc.). In the Koopmans (2016) paper, it seems that the marriage dummy already captures parts of the effect of children present in the household for men (children are measured as no. of children).

Coinciding nativity and gender gaps

When examining labor market outcomes by nativity (among women) or by gender (among immigrants), we do not know whether nativity gaps are also present among men and whether gender gaps are also present among natives. To test for coinciding gender and nativity gaps, native men are a necessary additional comparison group in an increasingly complex framework. Across Europe, LFP disadvantages of women compared to men are ubiquitous in the 2019 Eurostat data, but they differ considerably in magnitude between immigrants and natives as well as by country (see Figure A3 in the online appendix). Whereas gender gaps in LFP have a uniform direction, this is not true for the nativity gap. Whether immigrants show higher or lower LFP rates than natives varies by country and gender. For example, in France as of 2019 immigrant women are the least likely to participate in the labor market, which suggests both a nativity and a gender disadvantage (see Figure A3 in the online appendix). Yet, immigrant men actually show an advantage in LFP over native men.

As we have seen, comparing immigrant and native women as well as immigrant women and men, the raw, descriptive gaps usually narrow after accounting for human capital, family context, and socio-cultural factors. Thus, any model attempting to estimate a double disadvantage needs to consider such factors as much as possible, while comparing immigrant women, native women, immigrant men, and native men. In terms of LFP, the only available study employing such a design is again the one by Fleischmann and Höhne (2013) for Germany. They estimate nativity gaps for men and women as well as gender gaps for natives and immigrants of different origin countries. Their results have two main implications. First, significant interaction terms between a gender dummy and an origin variable suggest that nativity and gender gaps are not always additive. Thus, a possible double disadvantage cannot be inferred from estimating a general nativity and a general gender gap and adding them together, because the gender gap varies by nativity or, vice versa, the nativity gap by gender. For example, they estimate that native women and Turkish men have higher conditional LFP rates than native men; yet, Turkish women exhibit the lowest rates in comparison to all other groups. Second, conditional nativity and gender gaps vary in their direction by immigrant origin, so that immigrant women do not generally face a double disadvantage in terms of LFP in Germany. Based on the results presented by Fleischmann and Höhne (2013), it is not possible to directly assess if the gap in LFP between native men and immigrant women is significant; or if this gap is significantly greater than the estimated gender gap or nativity gap, respectively (only then the notion of a double disadvantage would be sensible). However, for some of their coefficients a tentative interpretation seems warranted, suggesting that ethnic German immigrant women enjoy a double advantage in LFP, whereas immigrant women from North Africa and the Middle East suffer from a double disadvantage. This result could be driven by a combination of the selectivity inherent in Germany's migration regime (ethnic Germans received preferential treatment) and the differences in gender-role attitudes between Germans and immigrant origin groups (ethnic Germans being rather egalitarian, immigrants from North Africa and the Middle East being rather traditional).

Summary

The reviewed literature clearly shows that labor market integration in Europe in terms of LFP is stratified by gender and nativity. Considerable heterogeneity across destination and origin countries mean that there is no uniform pattern characterising the LFP of immigrant women vis-a-vis native women, immigrant men, and native men, lending credit to the theory of segmented assimilation. Structural factors seem to be strong drivers of nativity gaps in LFP and explain why immigrant women often fare better than natives in SE and CEE but not NWE countries. Besides human capital factors, main determinants of LFP gaps are the family context and socio-cultural factors, all of which have gendered outcomes that are additionally stratified by nativity. In many of the reviewed studies, unexplained gaps in LFP remain after accounting for a range of explanatory factors, suggesting either unequal returns to observed or further differences in unobserved characteristics between women and men, immigrants and natives. Gender-role attitudes appear to be particularly relevant for female immigrant LFP that should ideally be included in any such estimation. Finally, whereas many studies examine either the gender gap among immigrants or the nativity gap among women, studies are scarce that combine both perspectives. A possible double disadvantage for immigrant women in terms of LFP has not been thoroughly investigated for the European context, especially not in a way that allows to assess the magnitude of inequalities by nativity vis-a-vis inequalities by gender.

3.2. Labor market success I – Employment status

The next studies look at the (un)employment rates of immigrant women and the conditions of their employment once it is found (i.e. the contract type and number of hours worked). As outlined in the theoretical section above, employment outcomes differ from labor force participation, in that successfully finding employment not only requires a woman to decide to look for employment, but it also requires an employer to select her for a position.

A conceptual challenge is that unemployment rates are usually defined as the share of the unemployed relative to the labor force, whereas employment rates denote the percentage of the employed relative to the full (working-age) population. Any differences in employment rates might, thus, represent differences in LFP as well as differences in unemployment rates. To avoid a conflation of these dimensions, we mainly focus on results on unemployment (or conditional employment) in this section. In cases where there is scarce evidence, we also report some results on employment rates charged with this caveat.




Figure 3. Nativity and gender gaps in unemployment rates by country, 2019

[\[interactive version ^\]](#)

Note: The unemployment rate represents a share of the population active on the labor market. Immigrants include all immigrants for which there is data available, irrespective of origin. Age 15-64. Markers represent the values obtained by subtracting the comparison group value from the value for immigrant women. The dashed vertical lines separate northern-western Europe (NWE) on the left, southern Europe (SE) in the center, and central and eastern Europe (CEE) on the right. Lighter shades of markers represent the Eurostat flag 'low reliability.'

Source: [Eurostat](#)




Figure 4. Nativity and gender gaps in part-time employment rates by country, 2019

[\[interactive version ^\]](#)

Note: Part-time employment largely based on respondents self-assessment. Immigrants include all immigrants for which there is data available, irrespective of origin. Age 15-64. Markers represent the values obtained by subtracting the comparison group value from the value for immigrant women. The dashed vertical lines separate northern-western Europe (NWE) on the left, southern Europe (SE) in the center, and central and eastern Europe (CEE) on the right.

center, and central and eastern Europe (CEE) on the right. Lighter shades of markers represent the Eurostat flag 'low reliability.'

Source: [Eurostat](#)




Figure 5. Nativity and gender gaps in temporary employment rates by country, 2019
[\[interactive version ^\]](#)

Note: Temporary employment indicates no permanent work contract. Immigrants include all immigrants for which there is data available, irrespective of origin. Age 15–64. Markers represent the values obtained by subtracting the comparison group value from the value for immigrant women. The dashed vertical lines separate northern-western Europe (NWE) on the left, southern Europe (SE) in the center, and central and eastern Europe (CEE) on the right. Lighter shades of markers represent the Eurostat flag 'low reliability.'

Source: [Eurostat](#)

Nativity gap among women

Similar to LFP rates, female immigrant unemployment rates are not uniform across European countries and, as of 2019, range between about 5 percent in Ireland, Germany, Croatia, and the Czech Republic, to over 15 percent in Spain, Italy and Sweden, and even 35 percent in Greece (see Figure A7 in the online appendix). Albeit that there is no clear geographical pattern in the unemployment rates of immigrant women, one striking commonality is the observable disadvantage of immigrant women compared to native women in almost all countries (except Croatia and Serbia, see Figure 3). This result has been reported in other studies as well for countries such as the UK, France, Belgium and Sweden (Gorodzeisky & Semyonov, 2017), Germany (Kogan, 2011), and Spain (Amuedo-Dorantes & de la Rica, 2007; Bernardi et al., 2011). Despite the general pattern, the magnitude of the nativity disadvantage in unemployment among women varies greatly across countries (see Figure 3). The disadvantage is less than 3 pp in Germany, Estonia, and the Czech Republic; between 5 and 8 pp in Finland, France, and Italy; and in Sweden and Greece we observe a disadvantage of 12 and 14 pp, respectively. Of course, when making cross-country comparisons, it is also important to keep the respective country-specific base levels of unemployment in mind. For example, whereas the

absolute nativity disadvantage in unemployment rates among women is much larger in Greece than the UK (about 14 pp vs. 2 pp), immigrant women are similarly disadvantaged in relative terms: Their unemployment rate is roughly 50 percent higher compared to native women.

Studies that present data disaggregated by an immigrant's geographical origin reveal that aggregate figures for immigrant women conceal considerable variation between the groups. In NWE, nativity disadvantages in unemployment are typically higher for women of non-EU origin compared to those of EU origin in the 2019 Eurostat data (see Figure A7 in the online appendix) and in earlier studies (Gorodzeisky & Semyonov, 2017; Keyser et al., 2012; Kogan, 2006; Rubin et al., 2008). In Germany, immigrant women from EU or OECD countries even exhibit the same unemployment rates as native women (Kogan, 2011). With a few exceptions, the situation is similar in SE and CEE in 2019 (see Figure 3), though it seems that in countries such as Spain, Portugal or the Czech Republic, immigrant women from non-EU countries fared better than those of EU origin around 2005, a pattern that reversed over time (Amuedo-Dorantes & de la Rica, 2007; Bernardi et al., 2011; Fullin & Reyneri, 2011; Rubin et al., 2008; see also Figure A8 in the online appendix). Moreover, when looking at particular origin countries, there seem to be many deviations to the aggregate picture that only distinguishes between EU and non-EU origin. For example, in Italy women from eastern Asia show the lowest unemployment rates of all women, in comparison to other non-EU immigrants, EU-immigrants, and natives (Fullin & Reyneri, 2011).

When immigrant women do successfully find employment, the conditions of this employment often differ from those of native women. In terms of their working hours, immigrant women in SE (except Malta) have higher rates of part-time employment compared to native women according to Eurostat data (see Figure 4). The same is true in some NWE countries such as Germany, Finland or France, but the opposite is found in the Netherlands, Switzerland and the UK (see also Bevelander & Groeneveld, 2006; Fleischmann & Höhne, 2013). In CEE, where part-time employment is less prevalent in general, immigrant women also seem more likely to work part-time than native women. As working part-time can be desirable for individuals in many situations, a better measure to reflect disadvantage would be involuntary part-time employment rates—information which is rarely available in large scale datasets. However, for 2005, Rubin et al. (2008) observe a quite consistent pattern across Europe, involuntary part-time employment being more common among non-EU immigrant women compared to native women, particularly in Austria, Denmark, Portugal, Spain, and Greece. In terms of contract type, there is evidence that immigrant women have a lower share of permanent contracts compared to native women in all of SE and many NWE and CEE countries (see Figure 5), though there is again considerable heterogeneity by country of origin. For example, in the Netherlands females from Surinam actually more often hold permanent contracts than native women (Bevelander & Groeneveld, 2006). Overall, the descriptive data of female immigrants' employment situation across Europe does not present a very cohesive picture.

Quantitative studies investigating the determinants of these heterogeneous outcomes typically start by considering differences in human capital factors. Among immigrant women in Germany, accounting for their level of education reduces some of the nativity disadvantage that immigrant groups face in terms of unemployment, but

significant differences remain for all groups besides older cohorts coming from Western countries (Kogan, 2011). For female immigrants in Spain, controlling for education reduces some of the biggest unemployment gaps that exist between native women and women from the African continent, though these gaps remain sizable (Bernardi et al., 2011). Algan et al. (2010) show that net of human capital differences, female immigrants from certain countries of origin still experience persistent disadvantages in employment compared to native women: Turkish women in France and Germany have consistently lower employment rates (33 and 16 pp lower respectively), as do women from Bangladesh and Pakistan in the UK (36 pp lower) yet, a large part of the remaining gap stems from differences in LFP.

Moving on, evidence suggests that the effects of household characteristics, like the presence of children, differ between immigrants and natives. In Belgium, compared to native women, immigrant women from different origins are less likely to work once they become mothers (eastern Europe: 12.9 percent, Turkey 10.6: percent, southern Europe: 10.0 percent, Morocco: 5.8 percent) (Kil et al., 2018). These results do not mean that immigrants generally more strongly conform to a household specialization in which the woman works less than her partner. For example, compared to native women in Norway, having an employed husband has a stronger positive effect on the probability that immigrant women from Pakistan and Somalia will also be employed, and a negative effect on the probability that women from Vietnam, Iran and Iraq will be employed (Brekke, 2013).

Considering the heterogeneous effects of household factors on labor market outcomes between immigrant and native women, it comes as no surprise that general and also origin specific nativity gaps still persist after accounting for these factors as well as differences in human capital. This seems particularly true for unemployment rates or (vice versa) employment rates conditional on LFP, which are fairly unaffected by household factors. Ballarino and Panichella (2018) estimate that the remaining nativity disadvantages in employment rates among women active on the labor market range from 6-8 pp in the UK, Italy, and Spain; over 11 pp in the Netherlands and Germany; up to 13 pp in France. Gorodzeisky & Semyonov (2017) report that European female immigrants have similar conditional odds of being unemployed compared to native women in the UK and France, but a nativity disadvantage remains for Belgium and Sweden. By contrast, female immigrants originating from non-European countries show significantly higher net odds of unemployment in all four countries. In Italy, women from China and the Philippines are observed to have higher probabilities of avoiding unemployment compared to native women after controlling for education and household characteristics, but all other origin groups remain disadvantaged (Fullin & Reyneri, 2011). In terms of their working hours, immigrant women in Germany exhibit on average higher rates of part-time employment compared to native women a pattern that reverses after accounting for household factors and education (Fleischmann & Höhne, 2013).

Extending the investigation of explanatory factors, additional studies include host country specific capital, which could impact immigrants' ability to find job opportunities and their employability in the eyes of employers. One study from Sweden found that particularly female refugees from countries with a large perceived cultural and linguistic distance from Sweden had, relative to other immigrant groups and native women, a low probability of being employed (Bevelander, 2005). Language proficiency and cultural

norms were also found to be important for Muslim women in other NWE countries (including Germany, the UK, the Netherlands, Belgium and Switzerland). Koopmans (2016) shows that first generation immigrant women experience a large disadvantage compared to native women in their unemployment rates conditional on human capital and household factors. Yet, after additionally controlling for socio-cultural variables (like language proficiency, social contacts and gender values), there is a much smaller and no longer significant difference between the groups. A similar result is obtained by a German study. Accounting for German language skills and contacts to natives in addition to human capital and household characteristics further reduces the predicted nativity gap in unemployment among women by about 2 pp for women from Turkey and the former Soviet Union (FSU) (Salikutluk et al., 2020). Only for FSU women does a small (and insignificant) disadvantage remain.

Unfortunately, many studies do not consider specific factors relating to an individual's host country specific capital (perhaps due to a lack of data), but they do consider an immigrant's length of residence in the host country (which can also hint at levels of this relevant capital). In many cases, there is evidence of female immigrant assimilation in the labor market, which is depicted by shrinking nativity disadvantages (or growing advantages) over time. Studies typically look at employment probabilities (vs. un- and non-employment) rather than unemployment rates. For example, Ballarino and Panichella (2018) observe the assimilation of immigrant women in terms of employment rates in France, Germany, the Netherlands, Italy and Spain (less so for the UK). Yet, whereas the average gap between their employment rates and those of native women (almost) closes after 10 years in Italy and Spain, it is still 22 pp in Germany, 24 pp in France, and 32 pp in the Netherlands. According to Kesler (2006), female immigrants in Sweden close the nativity gap in employment rates quicker than those in Germany and Great Britain, although in Norway, the gap never closes for women from the most disadvantaged group, female refugees (Bratsberg et al., 2017). In Spain as well, immigrant women initially experience disadvantage in employment likelihood compared to native women with similar characteristics (-25.9 pp for women from EU-15 countries, -12.9 pp for women from Africa), but these disadvantages decrease with years of residence (Amuedo-Dorantes & de la Rica, 2007). The largest decrease in the disadvantage happens during the first year. One available study on unemployment among women in Spain shows that particularly immigrant women from eastern Europe and Africa manage to reduce their unemployment risks over the first few years of stay (Bernardi et al., 2011). In terms of working hours, Basilio et al. (2009) find that immigrant wives in Germany work 230 hours less than native wives per year directly after their arrival, but after 10 years of residence, they succeed in closing the gap completely (or even in overtaking native wives).

Naturalization can be seen as one of the outcomes of the assimilation process, but naturalization in itself can also be a facilitator of labor market integration, for example when holding the host country's citizenship entails particular rights (such as not being subject to labor market testing) or provides a positive signal to employers. Using a causal design based on a change in eligibility criteria for German citizenship, Gathmann and Keller (2018) estimate that immigrant women who obtained the German citizenship have a 5.9 pp higher employment probability compared to immigrant women who did not (net of age and years of residence).

Since variation in female immigrants' outcomes is observed not just between immigrants from different origins, but also between different regions of Europe, the unique reception context that immigrants encounter in the host country likely plays an important role. Comparing three countries in NWE, Sweden, Germany and Great Britain, female immigrants were found more likely to be employed in Sweden compared to the other countries once family factors were taken into account (Kesler, 2006). This could be related to the extensive social support that is provided to wives and mothers in the Swedish labor market. For SE countries, on the other hand, the smaller nativity disadvantages could likely be related to the large low-skilled sector in these countries, which benefits particular groups of immigrant women in their search for employment (Kogan, 2006). Although not always clear-cut, Cangiano (2014) emphasizes the importance of national migration regimes by concluding that lower restrictions on labor migration go along with smaller nativity gaps in employment rates across EU-15 countries.

Cross-country differences may be related not just to the specific institutional context, but also different levels of discrimination which immigrants may face. Kogan (2006) finds that immigrant women across Europe encounter, on average, 148 percent higher odds of unemployment compared to native women, even after controlling for human capital and host country institutional characteristics (including the type of welfare regime, strictness of employment protection, and the size of low-skilled sector). Labor market discrimination has also been documented by audit studies in several NWE countries. In Germany, Turkish women wearing a headscarf in the photo on their CV are 15 percentage points less likely to receive a callback compared to 'native German' female applicants, while bare-headed Turkish applicants are about 6 percentage points less likely (Weichselbaumer, 2020). Moreover, an audit study in the Dutch labor market shows that the callback rate for females from non-EU countries (Turkey, Morocco, Suriname, Dutch Antilles) is 11 percent lower than the callback rate for native women (Andriessen et al., 2012). None of the audit studies included in our review focus on immigrant discrimination in SE or CEE countries, which makes it difficult to estimate the impact of discrimination on immigrant employment in that context.

Gender gap among immigrants

When it comes to the gender gap between male and female immigrants, there is considerably less research, and the findings again produce an incohesive picture. According to Eurostat data from 2019, the average unemployment rates of immigrant women across Europe are typically greater than those of immigrant men, but there is considerable heterogeneity by country of residence (see Figure 3). In countries such as Germany, Ireland, or Norway, immigrant women have a similar or lower risk of being unemployed as men, but they face a much greater risk in Greece and North Macedonia. Gender gaps in the relative success of avoiding unemployment seem largely comparable between immigrants of European vs. non-European origin across countries (see Figure A7 in the online appendix), though the figures presented in the literature vary by data source and time (see, e.g., Gorodzeisky & Semyonov, 2017; Keyser et al., 2012; Rubin et al., 2008). In terms of working hours, immigrant women consistently show higher rates of part-time employment than immigrant men in European countries, with gaps ranging between 2.8 pp in Hungary to 42.3 pp in Switzerland as of 2019 (see Figure 4). Temporary

employment is also more common among immigrant women than men in most of NWE, but the picture is less uniform in SE and CEE (see Figure 5).

As far as quantitative analyses go, Fleischmann & Dronkers (2010) find that, for immigrants that are active on the labor market in 13 European countries, there is generally no difference between the conditional unemployment rates of women and men, and groups of individual-level or macro-level factors do not have a differential impact. Similarly, investigating additional determinants, Höhne and Koopmans (2010) find that the hazard of finding a job improves in host-country specific social capital for both immigrant women and men in Germany, whereas strong Muslim religiosity has the opposite effect. For the German case there is also evidence of female advantage in employment probability for immigrants from Turkey (+7.5 pp) and the FSU (+3.9 pp) conditional on LFP and net of differences in human capital, host country specific capital, and household context (Salikutluk et al., 2020). The authors interpret these results as pointing towards positive selectivity of women from Turkey and issues of lower returns to education for FSU women, possibly due to difficulties in the recognition of qualifications.

Household factors rarely have a gender-specific effect on unemployment rates, but they play an important role for the working hours of women and men. Ala-Mantila & Fleischmann (2018) show for the Netherlands not only that female immigrants generally work fewer hours than their male counterparts, but immigrant mothers in particular work fewer hours, while immigrant fathers actually work more hours. Fleischmann & Höhne (2013) confirm these results for Germany based on an empirical model in which the effects of household factors are allowed to vary by gender. In addition to marital status, having (small) children in the household increases the probability to work part-time much more for women than men. As a result, they estimate conditional gender gaps in part-time employment among almost all of the different immigrant origin groups they investigate, with particularly strong gaps among ethnic German, Polish, and Western immigrants.

The gender gap in hiring discrimination has also been explored in several European countries. An audit study on the Dutch labor market shows that immigrant women from non-EU countries (Turkey, Morocco, Suriname, Dutch Antilles) experience a smaller nativity disadvantage compared to immigrant men (11 percent vs 20 percent) (Andriessen et al., 2012). In France, another audit study had similar findings. Edo et al. (2019) found that women with non-Frenchsounding names were less discriminated against (i.e. received more call-backs) than men with such names. In this case, including a signal of French language proficiency in the CV reduced the discrimination that non-French women faced, but did not have the same effect for non-French men.

Coinciding nativity and gender gaps

When it comes to looking at the coinciding nativity and gender disadvantages in employment and employment conditions, little evidence is available, which presents a largely heterogeneous picture across indicators. Descriptive evidence from the 2019 Eurostat data shows that, for most countries across Europe, the nativity gap in women's unemployment rates and prevalence of temporary job contracts is generally greater than the gender gap within the immigrant group (see Figures 3 and 5) – that is, female immigrants are most disadvantaged because of their status as immigrants, not as women

(see also Rubin et al., 2008). The opposite seems true for differences in part-time employment rates, which are for the most part driven by gender gaps (see Figure 4). Gender gaps in part-time employment among immigrants are larger than among natives in many cases because immigrant women exhibit nativity advantages compared to native women.

Moving beyond pure description, two studies for the German case estimate nativity and gender gaps accounting for relevant determinants. Salikutluk et al. (2020) show that the unconditional unemployment rates of first generation Turkish women in Germany indeed are higher than those of native women (13.5 pp), immigrant men (1.2 pp), and native men (12.4 pp). Women from the FSU also show a (much smaller) nativity disadvantage, but fare better than their male compatriots. Accounting for differences in human capital explains much of the observed gaps, and in fact, once education, labor force experience, German proficiency and social contacts are all accounted for in the analyses, both groups of immigrant women are estimated to have lower unemployment probabilities than native and compatriot men. Moreover, no nativity gap remains among women, so this difference stems entirely from a gender advantage.²⁰

Fleischmann & Höhne (2013) investigate part-time employment rates by nativity and gender in Germany. Without conditioning on other factors, they find immigrant women to be typically more likely to work part-time than native women, immigrant men, and native men. However, net of age, education, marital status, children in the household, and duration of stay, they estimate that the part-time employment probabilities of immigrant women of most origins are actually lower than that of native women. As native and immigrant men do not differ for the most part, this makes for smaller conditional gender gaps among immigrants in terms of part-time employment rates.

Thus, while descriptive data shows that immigrant women are often substantially disadvantaged compared to native men, once relevant factors are accounted for, the disadvantage is not so clear cut. The quality of the employment may be one relevant difference between native men and immigrant women, to be explored in the following sub-section, but a double disadvantage in terms of their success in finding work when they're motivated to do so is not supported in the literature.

Summary

Overall, the picture of female immigrant employment in Europe remains highly complex. Both advantages and disadvantages are observed in the descriptive data as well as estimation results, and often this depends on the groups being compared. Explanatory variables from the theory have been shown (in many cases) to explain large parts of the gaps. Unemployment is often conditional on education, language skills, and inter-ethnic contacts, whereas marital status, the presence of children in the household and cultural understanding are particularly relevant in determining working hours. Moreover, macro-level factors that describe the institutional context immigrants find themselves in are also important to take into account, especially when comparing different countries. In some cases, nativity and/or gender disadvantages still remain for female immigrants even after controlling for all these observable variables. This could be evidence of labor

²⁰ Though, this does not necessarily mean that a nativity gap is absent per se. In this specific case, immigrant men show higher conditional employment rates than native men (Salikutluk et al., 2020).

market discrimination, which is tough to quantify, and has not widely been explored in countries across Europe. In general, the heterogeneity in unconditional descriptive statistics is met with a considerable lack of conditional estimates, making it tough to draw conclusions about more than a handful of countries, especially at the intersection of both nativity and gender disadvantages.

3.3. Labor market success II – Employment quality




Figure 6. Nativity and gender gaps in overqualification rates by country, 2019

[\[interactive version ^\]](#)

Note: Overqualification measure based on respondent's self-assessment that qualifications and skills would allow more demanding tasks than current job. Immigrants include all immigrants for which there is data available, irrespective of origin. Age 15–64. Markers represent the values obtained by subtracting the comparison group value from the value for immigrant women. The dashed vertical lines separate northern-western Europe (NWE) on the left, southern Europe (SE) in the center, and central and eastern Europe (CEE) on the right. Lighter shades of markers represent the Eurostat flag 'low reliability.'

Source: [Eurostat](#)

In this final part, we turn to the literature which examines the quality of female immigrants' employment for those who have found it. This includes studies that focus on immigrant women's wages and their occupational status. Often these measures go hand in hand, since jobs with a lower occupational status also tend to pay less. In fact, in some studies of immigrant women's wages, occupational status is included as an explanatory variable. Evidence from Germany (Stypińska & Gordo, 2018), Sweden (Grand & Szulkin, 2002) and Spain (Nicodemo & Ramos, 2012) all show that occupational status factors into female immigrants' wage disadvantage. Nonetheless, studies also examine occupational status in its own right, either with regards to occupational segregation, or occupational mobility over time, all issues that impact the position of women on the labor market.

Nativity gap among women

Looking first at the nativity disadvantage among women across Europe, descriptive data again shows that the success of immigrant women on the labor market is largely heterogeneous by their country/region of origin. Some groups of immigrant women experience a disadvantage because of their immigrant status, and this varies between the regions of Europe where they reside. In many NWE countries, immigrant women from western Europe and other industrialized countries experience a lower nativity penalty in their wages (or none at all) compared to women from other regions. In Finland, for instance, immigrant women from OECD countries earn on average 81 percent of the annual earnings of native women, though immigrant women from non-OECD countries have average annual earnings less than 50 percent those of native women (Sarvimäki, 2011). For immigrant women in Denmark, data shows they earn on average lower hourly wages than native women, though immigrant women from other Nordic countries actually earn higher wages (Husted et al., 2000). In southern Europe, variation by country of origin has also been observed. The earnings of female immigrants in Spain who originate from Africa are especially low compared to native women, and compared to immigrant women from other origins (Amuedo-Dorantes & de la Rica, 2007).

Similar descriptive evidence has been found for occupational status. Pooled data for several NWE countries, including Belgium, Switzerland, Germany, Denmark, the UK, the Netherlands, Norway and Sweden, shows that female European immigrants are generally less disadvantaged in their occupational attainment compared to native women than non-European women (Gorodzeisky & Semyonov, 2017). Disaggregated analyses from the same study show that the UK is an exceptional case, as European immigrant women actually have higher chances than native women of holding a high status job. More evidence from Germany shows that female immigrants from Western countries do not differ in their average occupational status from native women, but females from most other countries do (Fleischmann & Höhne, 2013). Findings from Rubin et al. (2008) also show that in countries across Europe, immigrant women who originate from outside of Europe work more often in low-skilled occupations than native women. Their results emphasize considerable occupational segregation between immigrants and natives, with sales & services, elementary occupations and personal & protective services accounting for 40 percent of all immigrant women's employment.

The apparent nativity gaps in wages and occupational status could be indicative of several mechanisms. On the one hand, this could be caused if immigrant women have lower levels of human capital compared to native women. Along the same lines, another explanation would be that their human capital endowments from the country of origin are not recognized and/or difficult to evaluate in the host country, limiting their access to their trained professions. Finally, it might be that these women worked in certain occupations in their country of origin for which there is no demand in the host country, also resulting in occupational mismatch.

In terms of human capital, two main findings emerge from studies across Europe. First, controlling for the level of education does, in many cases, reduce the nativity gap among women in earnings/wages and occupational status, but substantial differences often remain (Bernardi et al., 2011; Hayfron, 2002; Husted et al., 2000; Kogan, 2011; Pichler, 2011; Sarvimäki, 2011). Second, remaining nativity gaps appear to trace back to unequal returns to qualifications. Female immigrants' education is significantly less

correlated with their occupational attainment than that of native women in European countries (Pichler, 2011). Studies show that particularly the returns to foreign education credentials of immigrant women are less compared to native women in terms of occupational status (for Germany, see Kogan, 2011) and in terms of earnings (for Norway, see Hayfron, 2002). It comes as no surprise that immigrant women experience higher levels of overqualification than native women throughout Europe, as descriptive Eurostat data from 2014 shows (see Figure 6). In all countries but the Czech Republic, Latvia and Slovakia, a higher share of immigrants than native women states that individual qualifications would allow for more demanding tasks than required in the current job. The largest nativity gaps are present in Austria, Sweden, Italy and Estonia, and range between 15-20 pp.

On top of an individual's human capital resources, household characteristics are again important determinants. Evidence from Norway shows that (net of education and age) marital status impacts female immigrants' earnings—married immigrant women in Norway earn about 8 percent less than their unmarried counterparts (Hayfron, 2002). Whereas it is possible that these married women feel less economic pressure if they have a partner who is also contributing to the household income, children in the household likely play a role as well. Salikutluk et al. (2020) present evidence for Germany that immigrant women of Turkish or FSU origin earn about 4 percent less per hour than native women. Yet, this gap narrows after controlling for human capital, marital status and the number of small children; for women of Turkish origin the gap vanishes completely. Moreover, Ballarino & Panichella (2018) show that across Europe, immigrant women whose husbands have a high status job also tend to have high status positions themselves, compared to women whose husbands have an unskilled job or are unemployed. This could be evidence of a network effect, that with high status jobs come high status connections that can be used when the partner is also seeking work, though this is not something explored by the study.

Most studies which control for both human capital and household characteristics find that the nativity gap reduces, but to differing degrees for each origin group. For immigrant women in Sweden, those from western Europe and North America on average do not differ from Swedes in their wages, while those of women from all other origins are significantly lower (Behtoui, 2008; Grand & Szulkin, 2002). This disadvantage is robust to controls for labor market resources and household characteristics. A similar picture is observed for non-Western immigrant women in other NWE countries, like France (Algan et al., 2010), Germany (Adsera & Chiswick, 2006; Algan et al., 2010) and the UK (Algan et al., 2010), while European women are sometimes predicted to earn more than comparable natives (Algan et al., 2010). In Denmark, the considerable nativity disadvantage in wages is completely explained by differences in qualifications for women from Turkey and India, which is not true for women from Pakistan and Africa (Nielsen et al., 2004).

Something similar is seen with occupational status. In France and Sweden, non-European and European immigrant women have significantly lower net odds of holding a high status job compared to native women, even after accounting for education and household characteristics (Gorodzeisky & Semyonov, 2017). In Belgium, this is only true for women of non-European origin, and in the UK no significant nativity gap is observed at all. However, in all countries, non-European immigrant women seem to fare

worse than European immigrant women, though this difference is rarely significant (Gorodzeisky & Semyonov, 2017). Fleischmann & Höhne (2013) find that for Germany, the nativity disadvantage applies to all groups of immigrant women in their occupational attainment, regardless of origin. Such patterns are found for Western and non-Western female immigrants in SE countries as well, in Spain (Amuedo-Dorantes & de la Rica, 2007) and Italy (Fullin & Reyneri, 2011). The effects of country-specific migration regimes on the labor market outcomes of immigrant women are particularly salient for the SE case, as the demand for low-skilled labor manifests in non-Western immigrant women being advantaged in terms of employment rates while being disadvantaged in terms of the wages or status of their employment. That being said, Pichler (2011) shows that the larger nativity gaps in occupational status among women in SE compared to other parts of Europe mostly stem from differences in welfare regimes (and associated demands in immigrant welfare workers), whereas differences in migration integration policy—such as access to nationality, anti-discrimination legislation, or immigrant labor market access—do not have much explanatory power.

So far the literature indicates that for some disadvantaged groups, the compositional differences in human capital and household characteristics do have some impact on the nativity gap, but cannot explain away the disadvantage in many cases. The final aspect many of these studies consider is the impact of time on these outcomes. Wages and occupational mobility could be expected to improve as host country specific capital increases, or even with something as simple as the accumulation of job tenure in a domestic firm. Thus, several studies have looked at both the assimilation of female immigrants' wages and their occupational mobility compared to native women. Adsera & Chiswick (2006) find that, for female immigrants in the EU-15 countries, their average earnings catch up to those of native women 18 years after immigration. For Germany specifically, Basilio et al. (2009) find some slight assimilation over the years, but immigrant women never attain the same wage as natives. In Finland and Sweden, different trends are seen for European and Western immigrants compared to women from other regions. Generally, women from Europe and other developed regions start with a smaller gap in earnings right after arrival and assimilate towards native women, while women from other regions have a much larger disadvantage from the beginning, and their pace of assimilation tends to be much slower (Grand & Szulkin, 2002; Sarvimäki, 2011). Evidence from Denmark emphasizes that the assimilation trajectories vary among non-EU women. Nielsen et al. (2004) predict that, with 10 years of working experience, immigrant women from Turkey would close the wage gap with native women, but for women from Africa and Pakistan, any gains made by assimilation are negated by a low remuneration of their qualifications.

Regarding occupational mobility, however, assimilation seems to be conditional on the labor market context. Ballarino & Panichella (2018) find that immigrant women in Italy tend to enter positions with a low occupational status and remain there. This same pattern is observed for immigrant women in Spain, while immigrant women in the UK and the Netherlands show evidence of starting in similarly low positions, but experiencing positive occupational mobility over time. These mobility trends may expose the strong demand for low-skilled labor that is especially characteristic of SE labor markets. Evidence from Spain also shows that mobility differs by region of origin. Over the first five years of residence, women from Africa do not experience a significant

increase in their likelihood to hold a higher ranked occupation vis-a-vis native women, whereas women from EU15, non-EU15 and Latin America do. Even so, though EU15 immigrant women exhibit a nativity advantage after this period, immigrant women of other origins remain disadvantaged in their occupational attainment (Amuedo-Dorantes & de la Rica, 2007). Thus, while assimilation may occur, it is also very context specific.

Gender gap among immigrants

Turning now to the gender disadvantage in labor market success among immigrants, we might expect to find some similar trends. Foreign education and work experience is a commonality for both immigrant women and men, so the disadvantage that comes with transferring these endowments to the new labor market context should impact those with similar qualifications equally. Nonetheless, compositional differences in the proportion of immigrant men versus women that possess this type of capital from the country of origin will still be important considerations—something that is also tied to social norms in their country of origin. Moreover, immigrant women may face gender discrimination on the labor market in the host country in their wage and occupational status, something that women generally face on European labor markets (see, e.g., Weichselbaumer & Winter-Ebmer, 2005).

Looking at the descriptive data, female immigrants are almost consistently observed to earn less than male immigrants. This is shown by Husted et al. (2000) in Denmark for the earnings of female immigrants from all regions. In Finland, France, Germany, and the UK as well, there is a gender gap in wages among immigrants regardless of origin (except for Turkish women in France and Bangladeshi women in the UK), which highlights that this is a general disadvantage that most immigrant women face, though to a varying extent (Algan et al., 2010; Salikutluk et al., 2020; Sarvimäki, 2011). The direction of gender gaps in occupational status, on the other hand, seem to differ by region of origin. Data from Germany shows that ethnic German women, along with women from Poland, the FSU, and Spain/Portugal, on average do not hold significantly lower status positions than men from the same origin (Fleischmann & Höhne, 2013). Female immigrants from most other origins do, however. Moreover, women from the Middle East are actually reported to hold on average higher-status positions compared to men from the same origin (Fleischmann & Höhne, 2013). As women from the Middle East also show lower average LFP rates in comparison to other immigrant women, it appears that only a selective and rather high-skilled group of women from this origin is employed in Germany, possibly being an effect of a selectively operating migration and labor access policy (see Section 2.3). Moreover, evidence of gender-specific occupational segregation again appears for labor markets in SE. Immigrant women in Spain are found to end up in lower service occupations after immigration, regardless their occupational status before migrating, while immigrant men tend to end up in lower industrial occupations (Fernández-Macías et al., 2015).

Again, the first step in investigating these gender gaps is accounting for human capital and household characteristics. Hayfron (2002) estimates for Norway that just about 10 percent of the gender earnings gap among immigrants can be explained by differences in human capital and marital status (along with region of residence, industry and origin). This study attributes one quarter of the remaining unexplained part to an overvaluation of men's endowments and three quarters to an undervaluation of women's

endowments. Based on a model accounting for differences in human capital and occupational characteristics, as well as selection into employment, Stypinska & Gordo (2018) report for Germany that immigrant women earn about 24 percent lower hourly wages than immigrant men, a disadvantage that persists over the lifecycle.

In terms of occupational status, studies conducted in different countries have produced different findings. In the Netherlands, accounting for human capital and household factors explains the gender differences in occupational status for immigrants from Turkey, Bulgaria, Poland and Spain (Ala-Mantila & Fleischmann, 2018). For immigrants in Germany, however, the gender disadvantage in occupational status persists for most origin groups (except for immigrants from the Balkans) once these factors are taken into account (Fleischmann & Höhne, 2013). This could be indicative that immigrant women tend to enter low-skilled occupations after immigration, regardless of their pre-migration status and qualification. In fact, the descriptive Eurostat data confirms that in 2014, in all countries except Finland and Sweden, immigrant women were more likely to be overqualified than their male compatriots (see Figure 6). Cangiano (2014) suggests two different explanations for this picture across EU-15 countries. First, immigrants entering as family migrants or refugees are often more likely to be overqualified than labor migrants, and women make up a larger part of family migrants. Second, female labor migrants show higher conditional overqualification rates than male labor migrants, particularly in SE. When it comes to SE countries, the demands for female domestic and care workers are important drivers of gender-specific occupational segregation, but other studies also emphasize other factors, including country/region of origin and children in the household (Vidal-Coso & Miret-Gamundi, 2014). Possibly, some lower status occupations also come with the flexibility in working conditions required for immigrant women who also have considerable responsibilities in the household, and thus attract more immigrant women than men. In Italy, the gender gap in occupational status varies by duration of stay. Female immigrants on average start out in a position with a higher occupational status than their male counterparts, but they experience little occupational mobility over time because of overarching gender discrimination in the Italian labor market (Avola & Piccitto, 2020). This being said, the occupational mobility of most immigrant men is not predicted to be substantial.

Coinciding nativity and gender gaps

As with the other indicators, there is scant literature comparing the wage and occupational status of immigrant women to that of native men. Nonetheless, the few studies that do make this explicit comparison provide a glimpse of the nature of the overall disadvantage that immigrant women face in their labor market success. As could be expected, descriptive data shows that immigrant women have much lower average earnings than native men - in Norway, for example, immigrant women were observed to earn 76.3 percent of what native men earned (Hayfron, 2002). Again, this disadvantage is selective and impacts some origin groups more than others. In Finland, immigrant women from OECD countries earn on average 61 percent of the annual earnings of native men, while immigrant women from non-OECD countries earn on average just 37 percent (Sarvimäki, 2011). Algan et al. (2010) compare the hourly wages between native men and immigrant women in France, Germany and the UK. They report the highest wages for north European immigrant women in France (114 percent), white immigrant women in

the UK (114 percent), and EU16 immigrant women in Germany (118 percent). The lowest relative wages, on the other hand, show immigrant women of African origin in France (71 percent), of Pakistani and Bangladeshi origin in the UK (70/71 percent), and of Greek or Turkish origin in Germany (69/72 percent). In Germany, it is also women from Turkey who seem particularly disadvantaged in their occupational status relative to native men, even more so than female immigrants from the FSU (Salikutluk et al., 2020).

When it comes to investigating the disadvantage, many studies consider both the nativity and the gender aspect and the nature of their interaction while controlling for important compositional differences between groups. For instance, the analysis by Hayfron (2002) of immigrant earnings in Norway indicates that immigrant women face a double disadvantage net of human capital and household factors, but the gender gap is between four and eight times as significant as the nativity gap (depending on the model used). Another study from Denmark suggests that only some groups of immigrant women do experience a double disadvantage in their wage: Husted et al. (2000) find that female immigrants from Pakistan are clearly disadvantaged based on their immigrant status and gender, while immigrant women from Nordic countries or India/Sri Lanka are only disadvantaged because of their gender. This result takes into account education, household characteristics and time since migration, though it does not account for levels of Danish proficiency, which are particularly important for immigrant labor market success. The heterogeneity in estimated nativity and gender gaps across immigrant origin groups as well as the empirical models used is also illustrated by two German studies. Stypinska & Gordo (2018) find no intersectionality in negative wage outcomes between the factors of gender and migration status for younger immigrants controlling for human capital and household factors. Immigrant women face wage disadvantages only because of their gender, to a similar extent as native women. However, Salikutluk et al. (2020) come to a different conclusion for immigrants of Turkish and FSU origin, incorporating additional controls for language skills and social interethnic contact (though not accounting for selection into employment). They find that Turkish immigrant women's predicted wages do not significantly differ from the wages of native and Turkish men, but significantly exceed the wages of native women—corresponding to a nativity advantage for immigrant women. By contrast, immigrant women from the FSU face a double disadvantage as their conditional wages are significantly lower compared to native women (-15 percent), FSU men (-25 percent), and native men (-23 percent) (Salikutluk et al., 2020).

Regarding occupational status, Salikutluk et al. (2020) find no gender gap among natives as well as Turkish and FSU immigrants, but immigrant women and men experience a strong nativity disadvantage. This nativity disadvantage can partly be explained by different levels of human capital, but only for Turkish and not FSU women. For immigrant women of both origins, the remaining gaps persist even when controlling for job characteristics, household factors and language proficiency. Fleischmann & Höhne (2013) confirm a strong nativity disadvantage in occupational status in Germany for both immigrant women and men regardless of their origin, though they also report a gender disadvantage for immigrant women of Polish, FSU, eastern EU, and Western origin.

Gender differences in wages or occupational status among immigrants that remain after accounting for relevant factors can point to discrimination. It is a well established

finding that women face additional obstacles on the labor market compared to men, but less is known if gender discrimination varies by nativity or vice versa. With regard to hiring discrimination, study results suggest that there is, if anything, less discrimination based on nativity against women (see Section 3.2), though this finding might not extend to wages or occupational status after employment is found.

Summary

The reviewed studies on employment quality do not point to a general or uniform nativity disadvantage for immigrant women in their wages and occupational status, but to a selective disadvantage for specific groups. Women from European countries and other Western nations tend to experience a smaller disadvantage (or none at all) compared to native women in their host country, and this disadvantage often comes down to compositional differences in human capital and additional resources (such as language proficiency and social networks). The nativity disadvantages for other groups of women, however, remain even after accounting for a broad range of relevant factors, and require further research to investigate other explanations. Particularly salient are the disadvantages in the returns to qualifications that immigrant women experience, much of whom being overqualified for their jobs throughout Europe. Moreover, the mobility in wages and occupational status that immigrant women experience over time varies widely across destination countries and origin groups, but in many cases disadvantages persist in comparison to immigrant men, as well as native women and men. A gender disadvantage is particularly present in terms of wages (less so for occupational status) in many host countries, and is often not just a matter of differences in human capital between immigrant men and women. Findings from the literature show that the gender disadvantage does not differ much between immigrant groups within a given country, but it does differ based on the country where the immigrant settles. Thus, institutional factors seem to be important, such as the difference in gender structures between the labor market in the country of origin and the host country. Moreover, the household pressures that specifically immigrant women may be subjected to after immigration may contribute to the disadvantage they experience compared to their male counterparts.

Finally, the current literature does not provide a cohesive picture of the overall coinciding disadvantage faced by immigrant women in their labor market success. Some findings point to a gender disadvantage that is far greater than the nativity disadvantage. Other studies produce contradicting evidence of the intersectionality of these two dimensions of disadvantage. Given the fact that only a small proportion of the literature looks at this comparison, it is no surprise that the picture remains muddled.

4. Discussion and outlook

We have presented the most important contextualization for female immigrants' labor market integration in Europe and have reviewed the existing quantitative studies published within the past two decades which focus on this dimension of their integration trajectory. Our review has been broken down into two sections—labor force participation and labor market success—and in each section we examine two dimensions of the

disadvantage that female immigrants face the nativity disadvantage and the gender disadvantage and the interrelation between the two.

As could be expected, the findings from the studies included in this review point to a very heterogeneous experience of immigrant women on the European labor market. A multitude of factors likely contribute to this variation, including the regional labor market specificities and different integration policies among the countries studied, different data sources and analysis periods, and different sample populations. Nonetheless, we have attempted to gather together the important findings on female labor market integration in one place to expose overarching trends and potential gaps in the existing research, or oversights in theoretical/methodological approaches.

One phenomenon which is quite evident for all labor market outcomes reviewed is the importance of human capital factors in explaining the disadvantages that immigrant women are observed to encounter. The large majority of studies support the theoretical assertion that the level of education and prior work experience represent important contributions to immigrant women's (lack of) disadvantages at all stages of their labor market integration, but especially in terms of unemployment, wages and occupational status. Household factors are important determinants of immigrant women's labor market outcomes too, although they appear to matter most in the decision to become active on the labor market and the average hours spent on paid work. Being married and the presence of children in the household significantly contribute to a gender gap in LFP among immigrants and natives, but the magnitude of this effect is also conditional on social norms and associated gender roles, which can differ between immigrants and natives. Another commonality of studies is the finding that the disadvantages immigrant women face are often largest shortly after immigration and narrow with longer duration of stay. These trends can usually be attributed to adaptation processes in terms of acquiring host country specific capital such as language skills or inter-ethnic contacts. However, although immigrant women experience upward mobility over time in many cases, significant nativity and gender gaps often remain.

The complexity of the issue often makes it difficult to pin down the reasons for immigrant women's disadvantages that remain after controlling for compositional differences in relevant determinants between women and men, immigrants and natives. In some studies, unexplained differences seem to stem from omitted variable bias, something that is most apparent in the case of host-country specific capital (or duration of stay as a proxy), but also in terms of the relationship between traditional gender-role attitudes and female LFP. However, omitted variable bias is rarely the only reason for persistent nativity and gender gaps in estimated labor market outcomes, and many studies suggest that immigrant women experience lower returns to the same characteristics compared to native women as well as immigrant and native men. Although there might be various reasons for such unequal returns, they invariably mean that immigrant women benefit comparatively less from their skills. Ethnic discrimination has been shown to disadvantage both immigrant women and men in hiring decisions, and there is much reason to believe that this discrimination extends to labor market outcomes as well. Moreover, immigrant women may face additional discrimination because of their gender.

Despite persisting nativity and gender gaps in conditional labor market outcomes in many cases, evidence regarding a possible double disadvantage of immigrant women is

scarce and inconclusive. The results of studies that allow to investigate the intersecting effects of both dimensions do not point to a general double disadvantage, but to multifaceted situations immigrant women find themselves in conditional on the labor market outcome in question, the destination country, and their country of origin. Thus, while the labor market outcomes of immigrant women are stratified by nativity and gender, the specific effects of the single dimensions as well as their interplay are by no means clear-cut and universal. One of the clearer results in that regard is immigrant women's conditional disadvantage in terms of wages in NWE, which most studies show to be mainly driven by a gender gap, though some groups also face a disadvantage for being immigrants, and others experience no disadvantage at all.

This being said, one of the most important conclusions from this review is the heterogeneous experience of immigrant women from different origins. Studying immigrant women as one aggregate group, or even in broad sub-groups, glazes over substantial differences. In some cases it appears that distinguishing between EU internal immigrants and non-EU immigrants makes sense, because of the lack of institutional barriers that EU citizens face within Europe. However, studies show that European women themselves have different experiences when moving from one country to another, their experiences shaped, among others, by specific labor market demands, differences in the human or cultural capital they bring with them, or the different communities they encounter after arrival. Even more variation appears between immigrant groups from outside of Europe. These groups tend to be much more selective and their characteristics are heavily influenced by the immigration policy of the country they immigrate to. Immigration opportunities for women differ widely across destinations, and the particular circumstances are reflected in the labor market outcomes of these women. One example is immigrant women showing high employment rates but low occupational status compared to native women in SE countries countries with a high demand for care workers. The opposite seems true for countries in which immigration policy is so restrictive that only high-skilled individuals are able to immigrate via labor migration channels (e.g., Germany). The few immigrant women who meet these requirements are naturally successful on the host country labor market. Yet, women entering via alternative channels such as family migration may also have ambitions to work, but do not undergo such rigorous selection processes. As a result, their labor market integration does not progress as quickly as labor migrants, and they are more likely to occupy a secondary role in the household. Thus, the theoretical assumptions about the selectivity processes (or lack thereof) involved in immigration have generally been supported. Still, we arrive at this conclusion in light of the historical and theoretical considerations we made at the beginning of this review. Studies that estimate to what extent the labor market outcomes of immigrant women are actually affected by the policies in place governing their access to a country and a country's labor market remain rare (see, however, Cangiano, 2014; Pichler, 2011).

Selection issues seem to be a general oversight in many quantitative approaches to studying the outcomes of female immigrants, particularly when this comes to measures of labor market success (conditional on being active in the labor force). Not only is immigration itself a very selective process, but the decision to participate in the labor market is another stage of selectivity, especially for women. Of the studies included in our review, only Husted et al. (2000), Kogan (2011), Stypinska & Gordo (2018) and Pichler

(2011) explicitly incorporated selection into labor force participation into their models. Selection effects do not stop there. The data on immigrant outcomes can be further biased because of remigration, or naturalization (if the data only distinguishes immigrants by nationality). While this kind of selection is an important consideration for female immigrant labor market outcomes acknowledged in the literature (see, e.g., Dustmann & Görlach, 2015), it is rarely accounted for in empirical studies.

Another oversight in the literature is the lack of studies which try to comprehensively understand the labor market disadvantage of immigrant women. Almost all studies of immigrant integration make use of a reference group in order to contextualize and evaluate the experiences of immigrant women, but by selecting only one comparison group, this pigeon-holes the analyses into one dimension: When immigrant women are compared to native women, it is only the nativity disadvantage among women which is investigated, and when immigrant women are compared to immigrant men, it is only the gender disadvantage among immigrants. While each of these approaches are valuable, it is only when both of these disadvantages are examined together that we learn about the overall disadvantage of immigrant women in the labor force. Our review has made clear that the intersectional nature of disadvantage renders any empirical investigation increasingly complex. However, as we have repeatedly noted, intersecting inequalities cannot be properly estimated by focusing on different dimensions of disadvantage in sequence rather than conjunction. The studies by Fleischmann & Höhne (2013), Hayfron (2002), Husted et al. (2000), Nielsen et al. (2004), Salikutluk et al. (2020), and Stypinska & Gordo (2018) make a strong case for using quantitative approaches that allow to disentangle coinciding disadvantages. All these studies show, in one way or another, that nativity and gender gaps are not additive but interactive in many cases, and suggest that their specific relationship varies across destination countries, immigrant groups, and labor market outcomes. The limited number of studies and their exclusive focus on NWE mean that our preliminary and tentative conclusions are certainly subject to change as more and more studies adopt strategies suited to such endeavors, something we explicitly urge researchers to do.

As far as the scope of the existing literature is concerned, it is fairly comprehensive in addressing the multifaceted nature of female immigrants' labor market integration. While certain outcomes, like labor force participation, employment, and wage, may receive the most attention, studies exist for most other relevant (measurable) outcomes too. Nonetheless, in our search of the literature, we noticed that at least one important outcome is generally overlooked: self-employment. The OECD reports that, in 2016, 10 percent of individuals who were self-employed in the EU were immigrants (2017). In many EU countries, the percentage of immigrants who are self-employed is comparable to the percentage of the native population that is self-employed, although in countries like Poland, the UK, Slovakia, Czechia, Croatia, Malta and Lithuania, immigrants have a higher probability of self-employment than natives (OECD, 2017). Yet, in the majority of studies we have included, self-employment is not studied in and of itself. In some cases, self-employed individuals are grouped together into a general 'employed' dependent variable alongside individuals who were hired at a firm (Gathmann & Keller, 2018; Kanas et al., 2011), while in other cases they are explicitly excluded from the analysis (Nielsen et al., 2004). Our searches returned only one study of female immigrant entrepreneurs. Constant (2009) finds that, after controlling for relevant factors, the wages of

self-employed immigrant women in Germany are no less than those of self-employed native women. For immigrant women who do choose to follow this path, it appears to be a lucrative choice. However, the lack of additional research limits the conclusions that can be made about female immigrant disadvantage in this area.

Furthermore, our review shows that for some countries in Europe, very little is known about immigrant integration, and for others, only older studies relying on rather outdated data have examined this topic. This situation calls into question the comparability of results, and their relevance to today's immigrant populations in Europe. The only countries with studies using data from 2010 or later are Germany, France, Norway, the Netherlands, Belgium, the UK, Switzerland, Spain and Italy. No quantitative studies exist for countries in CEE (although some are no longer emigration but immigration countries, see Section 2.2), while other countries like Portugal, Greece, Austria and Switzerland do not feature prominently in the literature. Of course, these conclusions are only based on the studies we have included in this review, and it is quite possible that we have overlooked some relevant literature, or that a robust discussion exists on this topic in the native language of a given country. Overall, we can say that the 'internationally-accessible' literature is in need of research using more recent and more comprehensive data to construct a better picture of immigrants' labor market integration as we enter a new decade.

As a jumping-off point, we have supplemented the review above with descriptive analyses based on the most recently-available European data for many of the labor market outcomes considered. In comparison to this data, it is evident that much of the heterogeneity across destination countries and origin groups is empirically underexplored, and that the situation in many countries has changed since several of the reviewed studies were first published (see also the trend figures A5, A8, A11, A14 in the online appendix). Going forward, important contributions to the field would include in-depth studies of countries for which there is less available evidence that not only investigate a wide range of labor market outcomes and their determinants, but explicitly consider different immigrant origin groups. In addition, there is still a lot of knowledge to be gained in pursuing comparative research. Cross-country studies allow one to examine the effects of structural differences in migration regimes, labor markets, and welfare states on immigrant women's labor market outcomes. Moreover, since nativity and gender gaps are conditional on the characteristics of the native and immigrant populations in the respective destinations investigated, comparing these estimates across countries can help us to understand the effects that the specific migration histories of these countries have had on the current labor market outcomes of immigrant women residents. Trend studies within single countries can additionally highlight the effects of temporal conjunctures and policy changes on the labor market success of immigrant women. In many cases, the reviewed studies provided only a snapshot of the current situation for a particular time point, estimates being subject to cyclical or other kinds of variation (Dustmann et al., 2010). Finally, adopting a temporal perspective can also help in disentangling age, period and cohort effects when comparing labor market outcomes across immigrant groups (Altman, 2015). All of these approaches can enrich the picture of immigrants' experiences across Europe, point to similar trends/barriers in their integration processes, and can promote more cooperation between countries on policy improvements.

Finally, we cannot present the findings of this review without also acknowledging its limitations. Most importantly, our review has only considered the findings from quantitative research in this field. This certainly has its drawbacks, because quantitative approaches can only attempt to capture the multitude of processes at play in immigrant labor market integration, both measurable and unmeasurable. A particular shortcoming of quantitative approaches might also be that disadvantages are usually equated with unexplained gaps in outcomes, running risk to the conflation of equality of opportunity with equality of outcomes. This would be the case if nativity and gender gaps in labor market outcomes were not disadvantages but the result of individual motivations, preferences, and choices. Luthra et al. (2016) emphasize this point by showing that migration duration intentions and individual motivations are important determinants of both socio-economic as well as social and subjective integration of Polish migrants across western Europe. Similarly, the concept of transnationalism, understood as being in a constant in-between state with no fixed place to settle, precludes assimilation as goal as well as end (Lutz & Amelina, 2017). Qualitative research seems in many such cases to be particularly suited to illuminate the type of intersectional disadvantages that our review has attempted to present. Qualitative studies can also emphasize the considerable heterogeneity in employment trajectories and labor market disadvantages of immigrant women that are possibly uncovered by quantitative approaches such as shuttle migration (Morokvasic-Müller, 2014). Moreover, qualitative studies are better positioned to investigate relevant topics like undocumented employment, which is difficult to gather reliable data on. Thus, investigating the findings from this second body of literature could be one important step in broadening our understanding of the issues we have uncovered.

5. References

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