

Faculty of Economics and Social Sciences
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Master thesis

Cognitive Biases in Large Language Models: An empirical analysis of state-of-the-art models

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Abstract

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List of Abbreviations

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1 Introduction

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2 Theoretical background

2.1 Past studies on human behavioral effects

Humans are constantly exposed to decision making. Decisions can vary between very simple and complex ones. In studying the decision processes of humans, researchers started seeing the human species as a rational species that makes decisions based on logic and reasoning (Juárez Ramos, 2018). However, gaps in these theories such as missing information access were identified quickly. This led to the development of the bounded rationality theory by Herbert Simon ^{simon1955behavioral}. The theory suggests that humans are not always rational and that they make decisions based on the information available to them. This theory was further developed by Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, who introduced the concept of cognitive biases ^{kahneman1974judgment}. Cognitive biases are systematic errors in thinking that affect the decisions and judgments that people make. It has been estimated that 70% of all decisions by humans are affected by cognitive biases (Juárez Ramos, 2018).

”Relationship between Cognitive Biases in Decision-Making” (Yeung et al., 2023)

”Effect Of Select Cognitive Biases On Financial And General Decision Making” (Gupta, 2018)

”The Impact of Cognitive Biases on Professionals’ Decision-Making: A Review of Four Occupational Areas” (Berthet, 2022)

2.2 Leveraging large language models to simulate human behavior

A) Recent developments in large language model

B) The exposure of human behavioral patterns in the models

How could models pick up biases? A) Data (texts of humans e.g.), B) Training and Learning (RLHF)

”Challenging the appearance of machine intelligence: Cognitive bias in LLMs and Best Practices for Adoption” (Talboy and Fuller, 2023)

Does exactly what we want to do

”Questioning the Survey Responses of Large Language Models” (Dominguez-Olmedo et al., 2023)

”Human-like intuitive behavior and reasoning biases emerged in large language models but disappeared in ChatGPT” (Hagendorff et al., 2023)

”Cognitive bias in large language models: Cautious optimism meets anti-Panglossian meliorism” (Thorstad, 2023)

2.3 Meta analysis techniques

3 Methodology

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3.1 Experiments

3.1.1 Studies

Some are choice experiments, some expect a number and then compare the answers between different questioning types.

3.1.2 Scenarios

- Normal (replication of original study)
- Random values
- Explicitly prompt to behave humanlike

Also describe how the normal prompt is structured.

3.2 Bias selections

As described, previous research revolving around cognitive biases has shown that there are numerous biases influencing human behavior. Thus, we have to sample a concise yet ideally comprehensive sample of biases to explore more generalizable analysis results. To narrow down the range of biases, we focus on biases affecting (economic) decision-making processes. In particular, we aim to recreate and perhaps slightly modify existing experiments.

Anchoring bias The bias known as anchoring is often used to explain why people tend to rely heavily on an initial piece of information ("anchor") in their decision-making afterwards. We recreate the experiment from Tversky and Kahneman (1974) where participants are first asked whether the portion of African countries in the United Nations is higher or lower than a certain number and afterwards estimate the exact percentage. Their results showed that the initial percentage had a significant effect on the exact estimation afterwards.

Category size bias Decision-making is also influenced by the way alternatives are categorized and distributed, a phenomenon known as the category size bias (Isaac &

Brough, 2014). For example, an investor’s expectation about the performance of a particular stock could be influenced by the number of other stocks in the portfolio that belong to the same industry. Similarly, Tversky and Koehler (1994) showed that participants judged the probability of dying of unnatural cases differently when natural causes were presented as one category or broken down into individual categories. To test for the category size bias, we replicate an experiment from Isaac and Brough (2014) where participants estimate the probability of randomly selecting a ball from a lottery, itself containing balls with three different colors and varying category sizes. The output of the experiment showed that if the ball is drawn from a larger category, the probability is estimated higher even though the actual probability is equal.

Central tendency bias Humans generally tend towards the mean of a scale when asked to estimate a value.

Endowment effect The human tendency to value objects in their possession (endowment) higher than if they did not own them is known as the endowment effect. This effect is strongly linked to loss aversion, where people demand more to give up an item than they would be willing to pay to acquire it (Kahneman et al., 1990). Research has also shown that the effect is independent of whether sellers actually sell the product or exchange similarly valued goods (Knetsch, 1989). Kahneman et al. (1990) demonstrated the effect by asking participants for their willingness to pay for a mug versus their willingness to accept compensation for the mug. The results showed that participants owning the mug valued it at more than double the value than the other participants.

Framing effect Framing is a cognitive bias where humans react significantly differently to an equivalent choice depending on how it is presented. The effect is strongly influenced by the loss aversion of humans as well as them heavily relying on their emotional state (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981). To detach the experiment on framing effect as well as possible from the experiment on loss aversion, we target to simulate two scenarios that both have losses (not comparison between loss and gain framing). We recreate the experiment by Tversky and Kahneman (1981) where participants were asked to buy another concert ticket after having lost either the original ticket or the same amount of money (different framing of lost monetary value). The study showed that participants were more likely to buy the ticket when they lost the money as from the human perspective, the lost

money is decoupled from the ticket purchase.

Gambler’s fallacy The gambler’s fallacy is the mistaken belief that the probability of a certain event occurring is influenced by the frequency of prior events, despite each event being independent (Bar-Hillel & Wagenaar, 1991; Kovic & Kristiansen, 2019). Known as an ”insensitivity to sample size”, humans also often tailor their decisions to a small sample size which, in their mind, represents the distribution of the larger sample. For instance, humans might quickly adapt their judgement based on the law of large numbers even though they are faced with random events (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). The shifts in probability perceptions can thus be major causes for biased (economic) decision-making. While there has been research on the mechanisms influencing the fallacy (for example the presentation of information (Barron & Leider, 2010)) as well as possible side effects and fallacies (Kovic & Kristiansen, 2019), we focus on assessing whether the models are prone to the fallacy through an experiment involving coin flips (similar to the Monte Carlo fallacy).

Illusory correlation This bias hinges on the idea of gambler’s fallacy that is that humans tend to see associations between independent, random events.

Incentivization

Loss aversion Loss aversion describes the human tendency to prefer avoiding losses over acquiring gains of the same value (Liu, 2023). Within their research on prospect theory (decision-making biases under risk and uncertainty), Tversky and Kahneman (1992) estimated that losses are twice as impactful as gains. Closely related to the framing effect, the presentation of the same base information in more risk-averse and risk-seeking scenarios can have significant impact on human decision-making (Druckman, 2001). This bias is particularly relevant in the context of economic decision-making and has been applied to various fields such as retail sale strategies (discount for additional spending), financial investments (sell winners, hold losers) and more (Liu, 2023). We recreate the experiment from R. H. Thaler (2015) which phrases two scenarios as a financial loss and a gain to test for loss aversion. The results showed that participants were more likely to take risks in the gain scenario than in the loss scenario.

Overjustification bias

Sunk cost fallacy This effect refers to the human phenomenon to preferring an option due to a prior investment into it (sunk costs) even though a better alternative would be available (Arkes & Blumer, 1985). Due to this, even temporally distant investment decisions can have a substantial impact on the decision-making process. The sunk cost fallacy is also strongly intertwined with other cognitive biases, most notably loss aversion or commitment bias (Jarmolowicz et al., 2016). We choose to examine the experiment introduced by Arkes and Blumer (1985) where participants are asked to decide between two ski trip scenarios with different sunk costs. In their study, the participants were more likely to choose the more expensive trip (but being the less attractive trip) even though the costs were already sunk.

Take-the-best heuristic ? Heuristics not biases (Take-the-last, minimalist)

Transaction utility theory Transaction utility describes perceived psychological non-monetary gains of a deal that are beyond the actual economic value. R. Thaler (1983) defined the concept as the difference between the actual price and one's reference price. A simple example is the satisfaction from buying a product itself; the additional joy of saving 20 percent is the transactional utility in the purchase. To test this theory, we will recreate an experiment where participants have the option to buy two products either directly or at a store 20 minutes away, each for 20 percent discount. The difference in the scenarios is that one product is cheap (radio) and the other is expensive (television) (R. Thaler, 1983). The results showed that participants were more likely to buy the cheaper product directly without the discount even though the absolute savings were the same.

Ultimate game ?

The exact replications of the experiments are described in the appendix.

3.3 Model selections

The development and publication of new models and model architectures is ongoing and rapid.

Ollama for models, larger models ran on cluster, llamaindex, structured prediction

3.4 Response analysis

Somewhere describe what the expected output of the models should look like and what I do if it is different.

3.4.1 Replicability analysis

Original studies and compare results. Perhaps a "bias detected" number. If always 100 experiment runs, bias detected is the percentage of runs where the model acted biased. (Between 0 and 1, perhaps normalize)

3.4.2 Average treatment effects

Average treatment effects of treated on randomized values as well as explicitly prompting humanlike behavior. The control group is the normal prompt.

3.4.3 Model metadata analysis

Are there any trends between newer/larger models?

3.4.4 Model parameter analysis

Temperature?

4 Results

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4.1 Replicability analysis

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4.2 Treatment effects caused by randomized values

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4.3 Treatment effects caused by humanlike behavior

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4.4 Model metadata analysis

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4.5 Model parameter analysis

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5 Discussion and outlook

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Formal declaration

I hereby declare that I have written this thesis independently, did not use any sources or resources other than those cited and that the thesis has not been submitted as a whole or in any significant part as part of any other examination process. All information taken from other works - either verbatim or paraphrased - has been clearly indicated. The copy submitted in electronic form is identical in content to the bound copies submitted.

Munich, January 29, 2025

Max Mohr