

Faculty of Economics and Social Sciences  
of the University of Tuebingen

Master thesis

# **Cognitive Biases in Large Language Models: An empirical analysis of state-of-the-art models**

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# Abstract

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# List of Abbreviations

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# 1 Introduction

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## 2 Theoretical background

### 2.1 Past studies on human behavioral effects

Humans are constantly exposed to decision making. Decisions can vary between very simple and complex ones. In studying the decision processes of humans, researchers started seeing the human species as a rational species that makes decisions based on logic and reasoning (Juárez Ramos, 2018). However, gaps in these theories such as missing information access were identified quickly. This led to the development of the bounded rationality theory by Herbert Simon <sup>simon1955behavioral</sup>. The theory suggests that humans are not always rational and that they make decisions based on the information available to them. This theory was further developed by Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, who introduced the concept of cognitive biases <sup>kahneman1974judgment</sup>. Cognitive biases are systematic errors in thinking that affect the decisions and judgments that people make. It has been estimated that 70% of all decisions by humans are affected by cognitive biases (Juárez Ramos, 2018).

”Relationship between Cognitive Biases in Decision-Making” (Yeung et al., 2023)

”Effect Of Select Cognitive Biases On Financial And General Decision Making” (Gupta, 2018)

”The Impact of Cognitive Biases on Professionals’ Decision-Making: A Review of Four Occupational Areas” (Berthet, 2022)

### 2.2 Leveraging large language models to simulate human behavior

A) Recent developments in large language model

B) The exposure of human behavioral patterns in the models

How could models pick up biases? A) Data (texts of humans e.g.), B) Training and Learning (RLHF)

”Challenging the appearance of machine intelligence: Cognitive bias in LLMs and Best Practices for Adoption” (Talboy and Fuller, 2023)



Does exactly what we want to do

”Questioning the Survey Responses of Large Language Models” (Dominguez-Olmedo et al., 2023)

”Human-like intuitive behavior and reasoning biases emerged in large language models but disappeared in ChatGPT” (Hagendorff et al., 2023)

”Cognitive bias in large language models: Cautious optimism meets anti-Panglossian meliorism” (Thorstad, 2023)

## **2.3 Meta analysis techniques**

## 3 Methodology

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### 3.1 Experiments

#### 3.1.1 Studies

Some are choice experiments, some expect a number and then compare the answers between different questioning types.

#### 3.1.2 Scenarios

- Normal (replication of original study)
- Random values
- Explicitly prompt to behave humanlike

Also describe how the normal prompt is structured.

### 3.2 Bias selections

Former research revolving around cognitive biases has shown that there are numerous biases influencing human behavior. Thus, we have to sample a concise yet ideally comprehensive sample of biases to get more generalizable analysis results. To narrow down the range of biases, we focus on biases affecting economic decision-making processes. In particular, we recreate and perhaps slightly modify experiments to make sure they contain an economic decision-making component.

**Anchoring bias** The bias known as anchoring is often used to explain why people tend to anchor their estimates around a given value. The central tendency bias is particularly relevant in economic decision-making as it can lead to suboptimal decisions. We recreate the experiment from Tversky and Kahneman, 1974 where participants are first asked whether the portion of African countries in the United Nations is higher or lower than a certain number and afterwards estimate the exact percentage.

**Category size bias** Decision-making is often influenced by the way alternatives are presented. The category size bias in particular focuses on whether alternatives are presented in a categorized manner and how the resulting categories are distributed (Isaac

and Brough, 2014). For example, an investor’s expectation about the performance of a particular stock could be influenced by the number of other stocks in the portfolio that belong to the same industry. Similarly, Tversky and Koehler, 1994 showed that participants judged the probability of dying of unnatural cases different when the other causes were presented as one category (natural causes) or individually. To test for the category size bias, we use an experiment from Isaac and Brough, 2014 where participants should estimate the probability of randomly selecting a ball from a lottery, itself containing balls with three different colors and varying category sizes.

**Central tendency bias** Humans generally tend towards the mean of a scale when asked to estimate a value.

**Endowment effect** The human tendency to value objects of their endowment higher than if they did not own them is known as the endowment effect. Further, they demand more when giving up the item compared to acquiring it. This effect is often explained as a byproduct of loss aversion (Kahneman et al., 1990). The effect is independent of whether sellers actually earn money or exchange similarly valued goods (Knetsch, 1989), though recent research such as Weaver and Frederick, 2012 suggest that other effects (e.g. fear of financial disadvantage) could be causes. The classic example to illustrate the endowment effect is comparing the willingness to pay for a mug versus the willingness to accept compensation for a mug. The results show that participants owning the mug valued it at more than double the value than the other participants (Kahneman et al., 1990).

**Framing effect** The way in which equivalent information is presented to a human can have a significant impact on their decision-making process and is known as framing. The effect is strongly influenced by the loss aversion of humans as well as heavily relying on the emotional state (Tversky and Kahneman, 1981). To detach the framing effect a bit from the experiment on loss aversion, we target to simulate two scenarios that both have losses but are framed differently. We recreate the experiment by Tversky and Kahneman, 1981 where participants are asked to buy another concert ticket after having lost either the original ticket or the same amount of money (different framing of lost monetary value).

**Gambler’s fallacy** This bias refers to the human tendency to believe that the prob-

ability of a certain event occurring is influenced by the frequency of past events, despite each event being independent (Bar-Hillel and Wagenaar, 1991; Kovic and Kristiansen, 2019). Known as an "insensitivity to sample size", humans also often tailor their decisions to a small sample size which, in their mind, represents the distribution of the larger sample. With regard to gambler's fallacy, humans quickly adapt their judgement based on the law of large numbers even though the law of small numbers is present (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974). The shifts in probability perceptions are thus major causes for biased (economic) decision-making. While there has been research on the mechanisms influencing the fallacy (for example the presentation of information (Barron and Leider, 2010)) as well as possible side effects and fallacies (Kovic and Kristiansen, 2019), we focus on assessing whether the models are prone to the fallacy with solely head coin flips or balanced coin flips (similar to the Monte Carlo fallacy).

**Illusory correlation** This bias hinges on the idea of gambler's fallacy that is that humans tend to see associations between independent, random events.

### **Incentivization**

**Loss aversion** Loss aversion describes the human habit to prefer avoiding losses over acquiring gains of the same value (Liu, 2023). Within their research on prospect theory (decision-making biases under risk and uncertainty), Tversky and Kahneman, 1992 estimated that losses are twice as impactful as gains. Closely related to the framing effect, the presentation of the same base information in more risk-averse and risk-seeking scenarios can have significant impact on human decision-making (Druckman, 2001). This bias is particularly relevant in the context of economic decision-making and has been applied to various fields such as retail sale strategies (discount for additional spending), financial investments (sell winners, hold losers) and more (Liu, 2023). We recreate the experiment from R. H. Thaler, 2015 which phrases two scenarios as a financial loss and a gain to test for loss aversion. Or rather disposition effect as loss aversion is not a bias but a theory???

### **Overjustification bias**

**Sunk cost fallacy** This effect refers to the human phenomenon to preferring an option due to a prior investment into it (sunk costs) even though a better alternative would be available (Arkes and Blumer, 1985). Due to this, even temporally distant investment

decisions can have a substantial impact on the decision-making process. The sunk cost fallacy has also been linked as a side effect to some other cognitive biases, most notably loss aversion or commitment bias (Jarmolowicz et al., 2016). We choose to examine the experiment introduced by Arkes and Blumer, 1985 where participants are asked to decide between two ski trip scenarios with different sunk costs.

**Take-the-best heuristic** ? Heuristics not biases (Take-the-last, minimalist)

**Transaction utility theory** Transaction utility describes non-monetary gains that are not directly related to the transaction itself. A simple example is the joy from buying a product itself but the joy of saving 20 percent is the transactional utility in the purchase. R. Thaler, 1983 defined the concept as the difference between the actual price and one's reference price. The experiment we recreate is expected to show that in two scenarios where participants have an option to buy two products (one with low and one with large pricing) at a store 20 minutes away for the same absolute discount, the transaction utility is higher for the cheaper product.

**Ultimate game** ?

### 3.3 Model selections

The development and publication of new models and model architectures is ongoing and rapid.

Ollama for models, larger models ran on cluster, llamaindex, structured prediction

### 3.4 Response analysis

Somewhere describe what the expected output of the models should look like and what I do if it is different.

#### 3.4.1 Replicability analysis

Original studies and compare results. Perhaps a "bias detected" number. If always 100 experiment runs, bias detected is the percentage of runs where the model acted biased. (Between 0 and 1, perhaps normalize)

### **3.4.2 Average treatment effects**

Average treatment effects of treated on randomized values as well as explicitly prompting humanlike behavior. The control group is the normal prompt.

### **3.4.3 Model metadata analysis**

Are there any trends between newer/larger models?

### **3.4.4 Model parameter analysis**

Temperature?

## 4 Results

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### 4.1 Replicability analysis

Xxx

### 4.2 Treatment effects caused by randomized values

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### 4.3 Treatment effects caused by humanlike behavior

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### 4.4 Model metadata analysis

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### 4.5 Model parameter analysis

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## 5 Discussion and outlook

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## Formal declaration

I hereby declare that I have written this thesis independently, did not use any sources or resources other than those cited and that the thesis has not been submitted as a whole or in any significant part as part of any other examination process. All information taken from other works - either verbatim or paraphrased - has been clearly indicated. The copy submitted in electronic form is identical in content to the bound copies submitted.

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