

APRIORI AND WORLD
EUROPEAN CONTRIBUTIONS TO HUSSERLIAN
PHENOMENOLOGY

MARTINUS NIJHOFF PHILOSOPHY
TEXTS

VOLUME 2

Vol. 1. *Totality and Infinity. An Essay on Exteriority* by Emmanuel Levinas,
translated by Alphonso Lingis. 1979, 307 pp. ISBN 90-247-2288-8

Vol. 3. *Otherwise than Being or beyond Essence* by Emmanuel Levinas, trans-
lated by Alphonso Lingis. 1981, XL + 200 pp. ISBN 90-247-2374-4

APRIORI AND WORLD

EUROPEAN CONTRIBUTIONS TO HUSSERLIAN PHENOMENOLOGY

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1981

MARTINUS NIJHOFF PUBLISHERS

THE HAGUE / BOSTON / LONDON

Distributors:

for the United States and Canada

Kluwer Boston, Inc.
190 Old Derby Street
Hingham, MA 02043
USA

for all other countries

Kluwer Academic Publishers Group
Distribution Center
P.O. Box 322
3300 All Dordrecht
The Netherlands

Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data



Main entry under title:

Apriori and world.

(Martinus Nijhoff philosophy texts; v. 2)

CONTENTS: Mohanty, J.N. Understanding Husserl's transcendental phenomenology.—Fink, E. The problem of the phenomenology of Edmund Husserl. Operative concepts in Husserl's phenomenology.—Funke, G. A transcendental-phenomenological investigation concerning universal idealism. [etc.]

1. Husserl, Edmund, 1859-1938—Addresses, essays, lectures. 2. Phenomenology—Addresses, essays, lectures. 3. Aprior—Addresses, essays, lectures. 4. Transcendentalism—Addresses, essays, lectures. I. McKenna, William. II. Harlan, Robert M. III. Winters, Laurence. IV. Series. B3279.H94A7 193 80-18656

ISBN-13: 978-94-009-8203-1 e-ISBN-13: 978-94-009-8201-7

DOI: 10.1007/978-94-009-8201-7

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Softcover reprint of the hardcover 1st edition 1981

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Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, P. O. Box 566, 2501 CN The Hague, The Netherlands,

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The editors gratefully acknowledge the following for permission to publish translations of the articles mentioned below.

Martinus Nijhoff, publisher of *Studien zur Phänomenologie*; the *Revue internationale de philosophie*; and Mrs. Eugen Fink for Eugen Fink's "Das Problem der Phänomenologie Edmund Husserls."

Verlag Karl Alber, publisher of *Nähe und Distanz*; and Mrs. Eugen Fink for Eugen Fink's "Operative Begriffe in Husserls Phänomenologie."

Casa Editrice Dott. Antonio Milani, publisher of *Il compito della fenomenologia*, for Gerhard Funke's "Transzental-phänomenologische Untersuchung über 'universalen Idealismus', 'Intentionalanalyse', und 'Habitusgenese'." We also thank Dr. Funke.

Ludwig Landgrebe for his "Das Problem der transzendentalen Wissenschaft vom lebensweltlichen *A Priori*" and his "Seinsregionen und regionale Ontologien in Husserls Phänomenologie." We also thank Springer-Verlag, publisher of *Studium generale*, for the latter article.

The Librairie Armand Colin, publisher of the *Revue de métaphysique et de morale*, and the editor of the *Revue* for Jean Wahl's "Notes sur quelques aspects empiristes de la pensée de Husserl," his "Notes sur la première partie de *Erfahrung und Urteil* de Husserl," and for Ludwig Landgrebe's "Lettre de M. Landgrebe sur un article de M. Wahl concernant *Erfahrung und Urteil* de Husserl."

Walter De Gruyter and Co., publisher of *Kant-Studien* for Thérèse Penzopoulou-Valalas' "Réflexions sur le fondement du rapport entre l'a priori et l'eidos dans la phénoménologie de Husserl." We also thank Ms. Penzopoulou-Valalas.

Presses Universitaires de France, publisher of *Cahiers internationaux de sociologie*, for René Toulemon's "La spécificité du social d'après Husserl."

We also thank the Faculty Travel and Research Committee of The Graduate Faculty, New School for Social Research, for a grant which helped defray some of our expenses.

Most of all, we wish to thank J.N. Mohanty for encouraging us to undertake this project, for working with us on it, and for his introduction to this volume.

ABBREVIATIONS

The following abbreviations were used in the notes to refer to Husserl's works. In the notes, the letters, E, F and G, followed by page numbers refer to the English, French and German editions respectively.

- APS* *Analysen zur passiven Synthesis*, *Husserliana XI*, ed. M. Fleischer. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1966.
- CM* *Cartesian Meditations*, trans. D. Cairns. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1960.
- Méditations cartésiennes*, trans. G. Peiffer and E. Levinas. Paris: J. Vrin, 1969.
- Cartesianische Meditationen und Pariser Vorträge*, *Husserliana I*, ed. S. Strasser. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1950.
- Crisis* *The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology*, trans. D. Carr. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1970.
- Die Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaften und die transzendentale Phänomenologie*, *Husserliana VI*, ed. W. Biemel. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1954.
- EJ* *Experience and Judgment*, trans. J.S. Churchill and K. Ameriks. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1973.
- Expérience et judgment*, trans. D. Souche. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1970.
- Erfahrung und Urteil*, ed. L. Landgrebe. Hamburg: Classen, 1964.
- EP I* *Erste Philosophie*, erster Teil, *Husserliana VII*, ed. R. Boehm. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1956. For the second part of this work, see: *Ibid.*, zweiter Teil, *Husserliana VIII*, ed. R. Boehm. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1959.

- FTL* *Formal and Transcendental Logic*, trans. D. Cairns. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1969.
- Logique formelle et logique transcendentale*, trans. S. Bachelard. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1965.
- Formale und transzendentale Logik, Husserliana XVII*, ed. P. Janssen. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1974.
- Ideas* *Ideas: General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology*, trans. W.R. Boyce Gibson. New York: Collier Books, 1962.
- Idées directrices pour une phénoménologie*, trans. P. Ricoeur. Paris: Gallimard, 1950.
- Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie*, erstes Buch, *Husserliana III*, ed. W. Biemel. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1950.
- Ideen II* Ibid., zweites Buch, *Husserliana IV*, ed. M. Biemel. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1952.
- Ideen III* Ibid., drittes Buch, *Husserliana V*, ed. M. Biemel. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1952.
- IP* *The Idea of Phenomenology*, trans. W.P. Alston and G. Naknianian. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1966.
- L' Idée de la phénoménologie*, trans. A. Lowit. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1970.
- Die Idee der Phänomenologie, Husserliana II*, ed. W. Biemel. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1950.
- LI* *Logical Investigations*, 2 vols., trans. J.N. Findlay. New York: Humanities Press, 1970.
- Recherches logiques*, trans. H. Élie. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1959.
- Logische Untersuchungen*. Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1968.
- PITC* *Phenomenology of Internal Time Consciousness*, trans. J.S. Churchill. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1964.
- Léçons pour une phénoménologie de la conscience intime du temps*, trans. H. Dussort. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1970.
- Zur Phänomenologie des inneren Zeitbewusstseins, Husserliana X*, ed. R. Boehm. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1966.

PL *The Paris Lectures*, trans. P. Koestenbaum. The Hague:
Martinus Nijhoff, 1967.

Cartesianische Meditationen und Pariser Vorträge (see CM).

PP *Phänomenologische Psychologie, Husserliana IX*, ed. W. Biemel.
The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1962.

UNDERSTANDING HUSSERL'S TRANSCENDENTAL PHENOMENOLOGY: AN INTRODUCTORY ESSAY

J.N. MOHANTY

I

“Essence,” “transcendental subjectivity,” and “lifeworld” are the three cornerstones of Husserlian thinking. They are also respectively the key concepts of what has been regarded as the three stages of the development of Husserl’s thoughts. The concept of the *a priori*, in a narrow sense, is coextensive with that of “essence”; in a broader sense, it appears to range over all three. And yet, curiously enough, the concepts of transcendental subjectivity and lifeworld seem to situate philosophical thinking beyond the *a priori – a posteriori* opposition. The tensions in Husserl’s thought derive as well from the complex relationship between these three key concepts,¹ as from the way they both appropriate and seek to go beyond traditional western thinking on these matters. The essays collected in this volume may be studied as bearing on these tensions.

II

But let us begin with the question of the principle of Husserl interpretation, a question that is but a singular instance coming under a general issue: how are we to understand and interpret the thoughts of a philosopher? It is to this question that Fink’s essays address themselves. The questions which Fink raises concern the relation between a philosophical text, the author’s understanding of it and the integrity of our interpretation of the thoughts of the philosopher as expressed (or concealed) in the text. Neither the documented text nor the author’s own understanding of the text is adequate guide to interpretation. Not the former, for the words of the text may conceal, rather than express, and may even express precisely by concealing, some fundamental movements of thought; also, because the *words* are dead matter unless the interpreter infuses them with life, or awakens the living thought in them by comprehending the total meaning-intention of the text. A purely textual exegesis may fail precisely in doing that. One may then turn to the

author's own understanding of the text, to what the author *says* he wanted to convey or express. That again is helpful, but is not certainly an unerring guide. For one thing, what the author *says* he means gives us again a text whose meaning needs to be ascertained, so that we understand the main text with the help of other texts. For another, the author's understanding of his text is *an* interpretation, and insofar as it is one it may need to compete amongst other rival interpretations, and unless one locates meaning in the transparency of the author's/speaker's inner life and so concedes a privileged and unerring access to the author, not alone to what he meant but also to what his text means, it need not always be the case that the author's own self-understanding is the measure of all subsequent interpretations. Not only is it *likely* that the author's pronouncement of what he meant by a text is removed from the text by time, so that what we have may be an attempt to recapture an intention that is lost in its original freshness; but it is necessarily the case – irrespective of the temporal sequence involved – that the author's self-understanding is determined by his perception of his historical situation (which may fall short of what that situation in fact is) and so may limit his grasp over the totality of problem-situation that motivated his thinking. In other words, the total horizon within which the specific problems which an author formulates are possible as problems may be, not merely unexpressed in the words of the text, but also concealed from the author's self-understanding.

These possibilities are certainly pertinent in the case of reading a single text, and may be less so in the case of the entire corpus of an author. In the latter case, the inadequacies of expression and the concealment-unconcealment structure are progressively overcome, if not totally eliminated. There is a historical development in the author's self-understanding which begins to throw light on some otherwise opaque and misunderstood texts even if it conceals others. Lights and shadows tend to conceal one another, and a clear view tends to emerge. The prospects are relatively more promising in the case of an author such as Husserl, who continues, in all his phenomenological texts, to pursue one goal of scientificity and progressively deepens and radicalises his self-understanding with regard to that goal and his own progress towards achieving it. But this does not altogether eliminate the skeptical considerations of the preceding paragraph.

Fink distinguishes between the *fundamental* question of a philosopher and the particular problems he tries to solve. How to determine this fundamental question? The method does not show the problem, it is rather the problem which determines the method. Nor does it help to turn to the theme, for the sense of "theme" in philosophy differs radically from what it is in the positive sciences. While in both, one would expect, the *theme* refers back to a background which is not thematised, so that the theme has a "problem-horizon," in philosophy – more than in the positive sciences – the theme is determined by the problem and not vice versa. The task of interpretation,

then, is to explicate this problem-horizon of a text, and from there to reach forward to the more thematic problems, methods and theses.

Fink is obviously referring to what Heidegger has called the *Ungedachte*: that which, while remaining unthought in a philosopher's texts, yet determines and makes possible what is thought in the manner in which it is thought. But how to explicate this *Ungedachte*? Fink's important contribution to the problem of interpretation lies in a distinction he draws between the thematic and the operative concepts of a philosophy. The thematic concepts, according to him, are those in which a philosophy aims intentionally to fix and preserve what is being thought. I think that the decisive components, in this formulation, are the ideas of "intentionally aiming" and "fixation." The philosopher must after all self-consciously want his thoughts to be understood in terms of a thematic concept. Furthermore, a thematic concept is "fixed," determined (definitionally or otherwise) and handed down to posterity by the philosopher as embodying the central thrust of his thinking. Such are, for example, Plato's "Ideas," Aristotle's "*ousia*," "*dynamis*" and "*energia*," Leibnitz's "monad," Kant's "transcendental," Hegel's "spirit" and Husserl's "transcendental subjectivity." But while philosophical thinking self-consciously determines such concepts and embodies in them its understanding of its results and its methods, at the same time, in that very process, it makes use of some other concepts without thematising them. These latter are called by Fink "operative" concepts. As a careful reading of Fink's essay on operative concepts in Husserl's philosophy will show, he says various things about what such concepts are and what they are not. They are called "intellectual schemata" which are used but not objectively fixed; "cognitive presentations," "conceptual fields" and, also, "conceptual medium" *through* which one thinks and sees; "the shadow of thought" cast by thinking, "that *with which and through* which the thematic light of comprehension had been formulated in the first place." The examples he gives us of such operative concepts are: the category of "domination," in Marx; the relation between the "transcendentals" *ens* and *verum*, in Kant; "phenomenon," "constitution," "performance," in Husserl.

In this introductory essay, I can only briefly reflect upon the nature of Fink's distinction. By "operative" concepts, Fink does not mean merely unproven assumptions and naive presuppositions. It is commonly held that most thinking, scientific or philosophical, proceeds on assumptions and presuppositions which it naively makes, of which it is often unaware, and which it is, within its own discourse, incapable of explicating or grounding. Fink obviously is not drawing attention to these, for his distinction applies specifically to philosophical thinking, whereas unproven assumptions and naive presuppositions may be regarded as vitiating all thinking. That thinking in the positive sciences is founded upon an already handed-down understanding of being and its division into regions, and therefore is in need of both regional

ontologies as well as a *critique* of the understanding of being which it *takes up as unquestionable*, have been well pointed out by Husserl and Heidegger – and in the essays by Fink and Landgrebe in the present volume. But in his emphasis on operative concepts, Fink is drawing attention to the *necessity* of a similar naivety even at the level of philosophical discourse. What then is the difference between this philosophical naivety and that naivety of the positive sciences? Can we say, in reply, that the thinking in the positive sciences, in fact the very concept of “positive science” is constituted by that naivety, whereas philosophical thinking while *not* constituted by the naivety of unreflectively using operative concepts, generates such concepts as it proceeds on its work? In that case, the naivety of philosophical thinking, insofar as it necessarily casts shadows, to use Fink’s language, is radically different from the naivety of the positive sciences. They are, *as naiveties*, different.

If, then, Fink’s operative concepts are not to be understood as unproven assumptions or naive presuppositions, what are they? It is common in our times to speak of conceptual frameworks which underlie thinking. There is a definitive sense of this locution in the context of the positive sciences, especially of the social sciences. As applied to philosophical thinking, the talk of conceptual frameworks is less definitive but nevertheless has some assignable sense and validity. One speaks of the physicalistic framework of much of contemporary analytic philosophy, or of the mentalistic framework of intentionalistic philosophies: these refer to ultimate presuppositions, theoretical commitments, perhaps valuational appraisals, which are not any further justifiable within the systems concerned. It seems to me that Fink is *not* speaking of conceptual frameworks in this sense.

As we try to determine positively what Fink means by operative concepts, he appears to have in mind several different, even if related, things: first, there is the Heideggerian *Ungedachte*, not thought within the system but making possible what is thought precisely as it is thought; the *horizon of sense* within which the problems and the themes first become posited for a system; the *mode of access* which a philosophical thinking uses to deal with its theme, by which is meant: not so much the method which may have been explicitly thematised if the thinking is critical, but what makes such method first possible in relation to the given theme; and fundamental concepts which are *necessary correlates* of concepts which have been thematised. An example of the first, of course, is the concept of Being as enduring presence, and so a certain relation between Being and time with regard to the dominant strand of western metaphysics; an example of the second is the understanding of Being as object, within which the Kantian problematic first becomes possible; of the third, the mode of reflection Kant employs in the critiques and the mode of knowledge which the critical philosophy itself gives, which, according to a standard Hegelian critique of Kant, was never and cannot, in principle, be thematised within the self-prescribed limits of Kantian epistemology; and,

finally, of the fourth, such conceptual phenomena as the necessary correlation between “rest” and “movement,” “one” and “being,” “identity” and “difference” in Platonic dialectics.

It does seem as though the fact that every philosophical system generates its own operative concepts must be closely connected with the finiteness and situatedness of the philosopher, with his lack of omniscience, with the perspectival and temporal character of all thinking. But even here we should be aware of misunderstanding Fink’s decisive concept. Perception is perspectival, both the percipient and the scientist are as much finite and situated as the reflecting philosopher, their thinking as much temporal, and they all as little omniscient. True, there always shall remain open and unsolved problems for every system; it may even be true that every philosophical thinking encounters, at some point, unsolvable problems (which Nicolai Hartmann called “the metaphysical”). But not all these are “operative” in Fink’s sense, although some of Fink’s formulations may appear not to want to distinguish between them. Only those unsolved problems and dark regions deserve to be called “operative” which are generated or subtended by the movement of one’s thought and the course of its thematisation. Thus, it seems as though Kant, in his First Critique, while thematising the question of the possibility of pure mathematics and mathematical physics, operated with a mode of reflective knowledge of the structure of human subjectivity which he could not then, in that very discourse, make his theme. But the case is very different when, in the *Parmenides*, Plato shows how the thought of being leads to that of unity, and vice versa: where one is dealing not with the tension between thematic and operative concepts, but with the reciprocal implication of two concepts, one of which is explicitly but the other implicitly thematised

Fink’s account also suggests, applied to Husserl’s phenomenology, as though the world and individual worldly objects constitute the universal and specific themes of natural attitude (he also calls the natural attitude “the basic *thematic* attitude of humanity”) while the attempt, through the epoché, to thematise this fact of the natural thematic attitude, lays bare the operative presuppositions of that attitude: for example, the acts of subjective experiencing through which a natural object comes to self-givenness. We do not want to raise the question of whether the world is the universal *theme* of natural attitude; but since our present effort is to precisely *understand* the distinction Fink has in mind, I would simply want to note the following: what are *operative* in the thematisation of the wordly objects *in* the natural attitude are the subjective experiencings themselves, but we do not thereby get operative *concepts* but, rather, operative *phenomena*. The subjective experiencings are not *conceptual* media through which the thematised objects become objects for us, but they nevertheless are operative in the process of those objects’ coming to appear for us. Shall we then distinguish between operative concepts and operative phenomena? Furthermore, these subjective

experiencings are operative already in the thematisation that takes place within the natural attitude. When this thematisation itself is thematised, through the epoché, by phenomenology, what new operative concepts and phenomena are thereby “generated”? Fink sees this problem and tells us that what were originally operative experiencings are transformed into operative concepts. But then we are faced with a curious situation, namely, that by the very same process as reflection brings the operative *experiencings* “out of the shadow,” it also forms the operative *concepts* which are but conceptual expressions of them.

I think the problem we are encountering concerns to what extent, if at all, a philosophy can lay bare its own operative concepts. Husserl’s philosophy, according to Fink, does attempt to do this to a considerable extent. There is no doubt that Husserl does thematise, and reflect at great length on, the concepts of phenomenon, constitution, reduction and transcendental subjectivity. What Fink insists is that they have not been, and cannot in principle be, fully clarified within Husserl’s philosophy, for no philosophy can be in complete possession of all its concepts. But, again, we need to ask: is not that true even of the thematised concepts themselves? Furthermore, what *other* operative concepts are “subtended” as phenomenology seeks to reflect, e.g., on the concept of constitution, itself an operative concept? These questions are raised only to show that Fink’s distinction is so decisive that we need to give much more thought to it than has been done since Fink published his essay. Perhaps *in the long run*, the distinction will give way, but as a preliminary and heuristic distinction its value cannot be exceeded by any other in the literature on hermeneutics.

A mode of philosophising which is content with its naivety, in fact reconciled to it, may be undisturbed by such considerations and proceed to assimilate its naivety to that of the positive sciences. But critical and radical philosophising such as phenomenology cannot but attempt to understand, appropriate and overcome all its naivety. As Fink notes, Hegelian “speculative proposition,” Heidegger’s “hermeneutic circle” and Husserl’s “phenomenological reduction” are attempts to deal with the tension between thematic and operative concepts.

III

Can we still regard phenomenology, considered as a radical, critical philosophy, as a *descriptive* science? Fink, Landgrebe and Funke all agree that phenomenology as transcendental philosophy cannot be merely descriptive. For Fink, eidetic description is pre-philosophical. The so-called eidetic ontologies are only misleadingly called ontologies; they are closer to the positive sciences. To consider intentionalities as data is, according to Fink,

to be guilty of a “sensationalism of intentionality.” Phenomenology has to proceed, not by noetic reflection on acts, but by noematic reflection on constituted senses; its goal is to uncover the operative intentionality as the constituting ground. But in this task, the very sense of “description” undergoes transformation inasmuch as here description cannot be understood as faithful depiction of what is *given as being present*. Operative intentionality, the sense-forming life, cannot be made an *object* for investigation in the same sense as mundane facts, essences and constituted meanings are. In effect, the idea of a descriptive phenomenology, as usually understood, has to be overcome as we overcome an untenable idea of a merely positing, objectivating consciousness, the idea of the merely given datum, and the idea of a thematising reflection. The being of operative intentionality is not the being of an object.

Funke, whose understanding of Husserlian phenomenology otherwise radically differs from Fink’s, would agree with the last statement but denies that we can at all speak of the *being* of the constituting subjectivity. If the transcendental subjectivity is a functioning subjectivity, then of it we cannot say, it is.² And transcendental phenomenology, as transcendental thinking, is not a science of what is immediately accessible; as critical, it is not and cannot be descriptive.³ For Funke, facticity is the field of metaphysics, not of critical, transcendental thinking.⁴ True philosophy cannot remain satisfied with merely describing the appearances as they have become evident. As science, philosophy has to look for the validation of such self-evidences by showing why, on a definite level of consciousness, something must appear to be evident. It then becomes investigation into the universal correlation between consciousness and being. Description provides the starting point for such enquiry. Only an uncritical philosophy can be pure positivism.

In his essay on regions of being and regional ontologies in Husserl’s phenomenology, included in this volume, Landgrebe takes up the decisive question about the place of eidetic ontologies in a truly transcendental philosophy. The regional ontologies, no doubt, provide foundations for the empirical sciences inasmuch as they determine what must belong to an object necessarily in order for it to become object of a given science. But at the same time the distinctions of regions of being reflect the prejudices and perspectives according to which things appear to us today so obviously. The distinctions of regions, then, provide us with the guiding principles (*Leitfaden*) for phenomenology to ask, “How can things become objects of consciousness in such a way that such demarcations of regions are at all possible?” Thus far Funke and Landgrebe would agree. But beyond this, there are vast differences between their understandings of phenomenology. For the present, we may note the decisive role which Landgrebe – exactly in opposition to Funke’s thesis – assigns to the concept of facticity in Husserlian thinking. If, according to Funke, critical philosophy is concerned with validation and not with facticity, Landgrebe, in an essay dating from 1939,⁵ insisted that the facticity

of *Dasein* as conceived by Heidegger should not be confused with the fact of being human (*Faktum des Menschseins*) in the Husserlian sense of a mundane fact. Even Husserlian transcendental subjectivity, as Landgrebe understands it, is not an *eidos*, a pure consciousness in general, but the concrete, historical process of intersubjective experience in which the world is being historically constituted.⁶ Transcendental subjectivity, so understood, may be regarded as much as consciousness as Life. Husserlian essences are thereby assigned a new role: they are not entities constituting a metaphysical domain, but they are rather the horizon of possibilities of comprehension through which the actual, factually constituted world can be made visible in its horizons and limits. The ultimate fact is transcendental subjectivity.⁷ In a later essay, Landgrebe contends that in understanding this founding domain as a field of absolute, historical *experience*, Husserl overcame not only the *a priori* – *a posteriori* distinction, but also the Cartesian tradition of rationalistic idealism.⁸

On closer examination, it seems that the opposition between Funke's rejection of all facticity from the transcendental domain and Landgrebe's characterisation of the transcendental as the ultimate *fact* may, in a large measure, be due to different ways in which they are using the terms "fact" and "facticity." Funke is right in insisting that since all ontological claims are constituted, the constituting consciousness in which all such claims are to be validated cannot itself be given an ontological status. Landgrebe is right in insisting not only that the Cartesian notion of consciousness is overcome by Husserl, but also that the Husserlian transcendental subjectivity is a field of experience in which meanings are constituted. If it is not an *eidos*, as Funke will agree, and if it is not a mundane fact, given in its positivity, as Landgrebe will concede, then we can salvage an understanding of Husserl that is common to them both, and that stands opposed to a dominant strand of the modern western metaphysical tradition.

In order to be able to appreciate the novelty of this Husserlian thought, let us briefly recall two important and perceptive criticisms of Husserl, both representing that tradition which Husserl may be said to have overcome. Hans Wagner has argued that Husserl wrongly replaces the *principles* of philosophy, which alone can provide ultimate grounding for knowledge, by a domain of experience, the subjective sphere. Such a sphere cannot provide the conditions of the possibility of validity of knowledge. Validity can only be accounted for by *principles*.⁹ Dieter Henrich agrees with Wagner that Husserl, in spite of his plans to do so, could not have given a critique of transcendental experience. According to Henrich, Husserl never came to reflect on the categories and their dialectical development, and remained stuck at the level of act-noema distinction which Hegelian reflection abolishes in favor of noemata alone. Husserl not only did not search for grounding principles, but moreover did not recognise the relational and dialectical nature of the ultimate principles of philosophy.¹⁰ It hardly needs to be recalled that the

critiques of Wagner and Henrich are from the standpoints of Neo-Kantianism and Hegelian logic, respectively. How are we to respond to them?

Funke has encountered such critics by pointing out that it is not admissible to ask about the being of the constitutive subjectivity inasmuch as “being” and “non-being” are idealities grounded in the meaning-constituting life. It is hasty to conclude that since Husserl speaks of a domain of *experience* as the constituting ground, such a domain must be mundane.¹¹ On the contrary, the logical-epistemological principles, as constituted idealities, are themselves to be regarded as mundane. Landgrebe also briefly meets the criticism: the idea of priority acquires a new understanding with Husserl.¹² But the really decisive response to Wagner ought to run as follows: Husserlian transcendental philosophy is not an enquiry into the conditions of the possibility of a given body of scientific knowledge regarded as *a priori* true of the world. Its fundamental question is not, how is scientific *truth* possible, but rather: how are meanings – including the meanings “science” and “truth” – possible? If the possibility of a body of truths is grounded in *principles* (such as the Kantian), the meanings are constituted in the originary life of consciousness.¹³ As regards Henrich’s point, the following may suffice for our present purpose: the idea of a science of noemata alone and of their self-development could be an alternative phenomenology, but such a science could not possibly lay claim to that radical presuppositionlessness which Husserl sought. For noemata are noemata of acts, and acts have their genesis in the total horizon of conscious life, so that to abstract from the noetic aspect, even if by dialectically overcoming the standpoint of consciousness in the manner of Hegel, is precisely to abstract from that domain in which noemata have their origin. To hypostatise them as self-moving and self-developing notions is to presuppose a movement of reflective thinking which itself is a form of noetic act.

IV

The movement of Husserl’s thought shows two motives: on the one hand, there is an unceasing search for the originary experience, in which all meanings are constituted; on the other, there is a fascination for the ideal of an apodictic grounding of knowledge in an eidetic science.¹⁴ Landgrebe has sought to show in several of his essays, including the two included in this volume, how Husserl was led to abandon the latter motive in favor of the former. What then are we to understand by the phenomenological program of *Zurück zu den Sachen Selbst*? For Fink, it is a call to re-establish an original closeness to being by overcoming the obscurity caused by tradition and history. “Original” means here the mode of access to being, which does not point back to any other (as memory points back to perception), it amounts to a seeing

which is also a self-givenness of being, an *experience* which is knowingly-being-with-the-existent. Funke's understanding of the “*Sache*” is not very far removed from this: it is the transcendental subjectivity as that which shows itself by itself, and by which all theses and position-takings are validated. It is surprising how utterly the early “realistic” phenomenologists failed to realise that Husserl's transcendental move was not tantamount to abandoning the original program of returning to the *Sachen selbst*.

What does the “return,” the going back, mean? For Fink, it is a “radical turning back,” which is not possible without the famed epoché. There are various questions about the epoché which these commentators raise here as well as elsewhere. First, what could motivate the reduction? In the *Ideas I*, Husserl's manner of introduction of the reduction suggests as though it is a matter of our freedom not to participate in the beliefs of the natural standpoint. As long as the *necessity* of this step is not further grounded, Landgrebe finds here a naivety that needs to be overcome. In the *Erste Philosophie II*, the radical philosopher's search for an absolute beginning is traced back to the fact of cognitive striving towards a totally grounded knowledge. But the question remains, how can this mundane fact about the governing telos of man's cognitive life motivate an epoché that is to comprehend the entire mundane order of discourse? In his important 1933 essay, Fink recognises this problem and insists that in the natural attitude reduction would of course appear “unmotivated,” while it is for the first time in the transcendence of the world that it is seen in its “transcendental motivation.”¹⁵ Fink can therefore say that the reduction presupposes itself and that the true theory of reduction cannot be stated at the beginning of the reduction. In his 1939 essay, included in this volume, Fink insists that phenomenology is not inspired by the traditional concept of philosophy or by a traditional idea of cognitive procedure. It is phenomenology alone which establishes the concept of a phenomenological philosophy in the sense of a striving after the original connection between being and knowledge. The reduction, therefore, is not a methodological step to isolate a new region, i.e., the region of pure consciousness, for pure consciousness is not a region at all. It certainly lays bare transcendental subjectivity, but transcendental subjectivity is not a region like the regions “material being,” “living being” or “psychic being.” In the 1933 essay, Fink had so much emphasised the divide between the mundane and the transcendental that he thought it impossible to correctly understand the sense of reduction as long as one takes the “I” that lives in the world-belief and the “I” that effects the epoché as one and the same, i.e., as long as they are identified *simpliciter*. The clue, for him, lies in recognising the most *peculiar* identity of the three “I's”: the I or man, the transcendental I, and the I which performs the epoché, i.e., the transcendental observer.¹⁶ However, in the essay on operative concepts, Fink perceives a much closer relation between the mundane and the transcendental, for now

reduction is understood as Husserl's way of dealing with and appropriating the tension between the thematic and operative concepts of his thinking, whereby transcendental subjectivity previously operative and lived through is sought to be brought out of the shadow into thematic light. This is not to say that Husserl succeeded in this enterprise. If Fink is correct, no philosopher could succeed in fully resolving that tension. In the present case, Fink insists on a resulting indeterminacy in Husserl's exposition of reduction. For example, Husserl could not quite separate the purely transcendental sense of the epoché from the natural. The understanding of epoché as neutralisation of a belief originates from the intra-worldly situation, and yet Husserl continued to speak of neutralising the total world-belief!

Landgrebe also rejects the conception of reduction as a merely preparatory methodological step. With his historically oriented approach, he grounds the necessity of reduction in our mode of existence together with our historical situation.¹⁷ Landgrebe therefore concedes that Heidegger's critique of the reduction as a renewal of epistemological Cartesianism was too hasty, for – as Landgrebe understands it – the bracket lets the world stay within the brackets, and at the same time reveals the ego not as a self-enclosed immanence but as intersubjectivity. In fact, as he insists later on, the transcendental subjectivity that is laid bare through the reduction should not properly be called subjectivity. It is rather the inseparable unity of world experiencing and its correlate, the experienced world, within which unity the distinction between subject and object, inner and outer, is after all possible.¹⁸

v

How are we to understand “constitution?” Again, Landgrebe and Fink have set the stage for much discussion in the literature on the concept of constitution. In his 1933 essay, Fink had distinguished between three stages in our understanding of one and the same intentional life: the psychic intention (mental act understood as an event in the natural world) is receptive, the transcendental act-intentionality is neither fully receptive nor creative and in that sense is indeterminate, while the transcendental constituting intentionality is creative and productive.¹⁹ In the essay on operative concepts, Fink appears to have somewhat modified his position: now he distinguishes between a naive sense of “constitution” and a transcendental sense. In the naive sense, constitution is putting together (*Zusammenstellung*); in the transcendental sense, it is performance (*Leistung*). Fink also distinguishes between two ways of understanding the concept of “performance”: it may be taken as a making or production (which he calls the rough meaning) or it may be understood in the sense in which one says “An orator performed beautifully” (which, Fink regards as the subtle meaning). Fink's main point is

that Husserl *finds* the concept of “constitution” in its ordinary use with regard to the mundane domain, and *gives* it a transcendental sense. The relation of the transcendental sense to the mundane is not adequately clarified. If Fink’s general thesis is correct, a complete clarification of such a concept is just not possible. It is one of those necessarily grey and shadowy areas which every philosophy generates; an operative concept which Husserl sought, without complete success, to thematise and illuminate. Husserl’s concept of constitution, then, is beyond the alternatives of *Erzeugen* and *Vernehmen*. What it is, is not clear and cannot be made clear.

Funke agrees with this. When we describe constitution in mundane language, he writes, that can only be analogical. Actually, constitution is a relation (?) between the pre-mundane and the mundane. It is “not a mundane, methodical construction, not a demiurge’s fabrication and not a mystical creation *ex nihilo*.²⁰ The mundane distinction between activity and passivity does not apply to the pre-mundane.

One of the conceptual difficulties in interpreting Husserl at this point concerns the passivity-activity distinction in his philosophy. Not only are both Fink and Funke aware that in some way this distinction, taken from mundane discourse, needs to be overcome in transcendental philosophy, even Jean Wahl in his essay on *Experience and Judgment*, included in the present volume, recognises that Husserl tends to relativise that distinction. Husserl, on Wahl’s reading of the text, knows of a passivity prior to act, but also of a passivity within an act; at the same time, Wahl thinks, Husserl assigns a role to activity within the passive *doxa*. On Wahl’s own view, of course – since he welcomes what he reads as Husserl’s progress towards empiricism – it is more in consonance with empiricism to regard activity as a higher stage of passivity, rather than – as I think, Leibnitz did – taking passivity as a low degree of activity. There is no doubt – and in this Wahl is certainly right – that the priority of passivity, of the ideas of “passive synthesis,” and “passive genesis” for example, emerges slowly and late in Husserl’s thought. What Wahl overlooks – and this is pointed out by Landgrebe in his letter to Wahl, translated for this volume – is that “receptivity” and “passivity” are not to be confused, so that whereas receptivity, for Husserl, is a lower level of spontaneity, passivity is not.

Landgrebe’s own contribution to our understanding of the problem of constitution lies in a distinction that he draws between methodological and idealistic, metaphysical interpretations. The idealistic interpretation proceeds on the understanding of consciousness as a region of absolute Being (in itself, an inauthentic mode of speech) and of constitution as a positing of the world within and by transcendental subjectivity. The methodological, or also called by him critical-transcendental understanding, takes the idea of correlation as fundamental and irreducible and then means by “constitution” the “bringing to appearance of entities.”²¹ This is not very far from Funke’s interpretation:

epoché, Funke writes, consists in the correlation between subjective performances and objective phenomena together with the fundamental historicity of rational-critical consciousness.²² (Note that the novelty of Funke's approach lies not so much in the emphasis on correlation or historicity, as on the rational-critical aspect.) And he writes in his contribution to the present volume that constitution is “the appearance of sense in its appearing, or the autonomous occurring of that which shows itself from itself.”

Given, then, these two understandings of constitution – the methodological and the idealistic, metaphysical – Landgrebe further contends that Husserl never resolved this tension to satisfaction; that while from the very beginning the idealistic tinge was there he also sought to overcome it. Taking up, as a concrete example, the question of the distinction between nature and spirit as regions of being, Landgrebe argues how, as Husserl moved from one conception of nature to another, he also moved from the methodological to the idealistic understanding of constitution. And, he raises the fundamental issue which every idealism has to face: if all nature (understood as the founding region) is constituted, can the “positing” act of consciousness account for sensation and the phenomenon of receptivity associated with sensation? We indeed do appear to reach a limit of constitution as we come to the problem of sensation. If the *hyle* is expelled from consciousness, the latter does not become Sartrean pure nothingness. On the contrary, corporeality and kinaesthesia are located within the structure of transcendental subjectivity, so that Landgrebe could attempt to explain sensation as a mode of being-in-the-world entirely on the basis of Husserlian concepts and without making explicit use of Heideggerian *Daseinsanalytik*.²³ It is in the light of this and of the distinction between “passivity” and “receptivity” that Wahl's reading of Husserl's *Experience and Judgment* needs to be appraised. It is important also to bear in mind – in view of the fact that Wahl ascribes to *Experience and Judgment* not only an empiricism but also a realism – that the *Experience and Judgment* begins with, and moves within, the horizon set free by phenomenological reduction.

VI

What happens to the concept of “*a priori*”? The concept of “*a priori*” does not coincide with that of essence. All essences are *a priori* insofar as they not only ground universal and necessary truths, but also are possible objects of non-sensible intuition. Let us first see how the Husserlian concept of essence is understood in these essays. When Fink distinguishes between two concepts of essence, pre-philosophical and philosophical, or when he asserts that the Husserlian essence, unlike the traditional concept of essence as the ground of

appearances, is the invariant *sense* – he is indicating but not explicitly articulating an important distinction which often gets blurred in the writings of Husserl himself as well as his commentators, namely, the distinction between essence and sense, the former being an *ontic* concept and the latter a truly phenomenological concept. In how strongly an ontological sense, then, are we to understand Husserl's essentialism? My own preference is to say something like this: Husserl did believe that there *are* essences as much as there are real individual things. What he tried to clarify is the *sense* of the being of essences (and the *sense* of being of individual things as also the sense of Being in general). Neither traditional realism nor conceptualism did justice to that problem.²⁴ This of course led to his thesis about eidetic intuition and about the analogy between empirical intuition and eidetic intuition. The analogy is not valid in all respects; no analogy is. It is important to see both in what respects the analogy holds good and in what respects it does not.²⁵ Once we see both sides of the picture, a likely ontological naivety with regard to essences gets corrected and balanced by a critical understanding of their function.

It is to the need for such an understanding that Landgrebe, Wahl, as well as Pentzopoulou-Valalas (in an essay specifically concerned with the *a priori* and the *eidos* in Husserl) draw our attention. Landgrebe has been long since emphasising that Husserlian essences should not be construed as constituting a region of metaphysical entities; they rather provide the horizon of possibilities of comprehension of subjectivity as transcendental.²⁶ For Landgrebe, regional distinctions of being (and so the essences of such regions) articulate historically accomplished interpretations and so provide the guiding principles for investigating back to the constituting performances of transcendental subjectivity. Likewise, the “free variation” which is supposed to lead to eidetic intuition of essences has, for Landgrebe, no other sense than articulating the possibilities of the constituting consciousness. To say that to comprehend and understand an individual one needs to grasp its essence means then no more than that only through pure possibilities (of variation) can the actual, factually constituted world be made intelligible in its horizons and limits.

Merleau-Ponty has written, in a well-known passage, that “the essence is here not the end, but a means,” that philosophy “requires the field of ideality in order to become acquainted with and to prevail over its facticity” and therefore phenomenology at the end puts essences back into existence.²⁷ This is true for all three, Landgrebe, Pentzopoulou-Valalas and Wahl, in different senses though, and no one of them agrees entirely with Merleau-Ponty's perception of the situation. For Landgrebe, Husserl maintains the primacy of the factual, the transcendental fact, which is none other than the transcendental field of experience (not to be construed as an *eidos*). For Pentzopoulou-Valalas, the Husserlian essence has a purely epistemological,

non-ontological sense; the material essence, for example, is the *possibly a posteriori*, the *a priori* of *a posteriori*, the possible perception, so that *a posteriori* continues to have a central position in Husserl's thinking. Jean Wahl (whom Merleau-Ponty accuses of wrongly ascribing to Husserl a separation of essences from existence²⁸) finds in the *Experience and Judgment* a considerable modification of the earlier doctrine of essences in the direction of empiricism and an "ante-predicative realism."

All this is true. But if Husserl's essentialism finds its complement in his empiricism, that is because Husserl's concept of "experience," as Landgrebe has seen more clearly than most commentators, makes the fact-essence distinction ultimately untenable, and also because transcendental thinking in the long run comes to terms with a last dimension of facticity in the historically unfolding life of consciousness. Nevertheless, the concept of *a priori*, released from the restrictions of the concept of eidos, remains sovereign. Even if transcendental subjectivity is not itself an eidos (although one can speak of an eidos "transcendental ego"), it nevertheless has *a priori* structures. The one *a priori* structure which comprehends all others is the so-called correlation *a priori* – the correlation between the *a priori* of consciousness and the *a priori* of being. This noetic-noematic correlation comprehends within itself all that is philosophically relevant from pre-phenomenological ontology.

A last feature of the Husserlian thought about the *a priori*, particularly when placed against the background of the tradition, may be found in two conceptions: one to be found in the earlier writings, especially in the *Ideas I*, and the other in the *Crisis* of the late period. The former is the idea of an individual's own essence, the latter is the idea of the *a priori* of history as a historical *a priori*. Both point to what Eley has recently called the crisis of the *a priori*:²⁹ the *a priori* does not any longer function as logical universality, but is taken to characterise the individual in its unique individuality. Landgrebe's second essay in this volume takes up the question of the historical *a priori* of the lifeworld. The lifeworld, as Landgrebe understands it, is the historical world. The *a priori* of the lifeworld must be the condition of the possibility of history as a science as well as of the prescientific experience of history. What makes it possible that our lifeworld is historical world? In trying to answer this question, Landgrebe wants to go back to the "primal evidences" in "the innermost self-experience of reflecting transcendental subjectivity," evidences belonging to the "living present" in which transcendental subjectivity as a flux is constituted. But if the *a priori* of history is to be found in the "living present," it can signify the invariant but not what is comprehended in its totality. The *de facto* reflecting subjectivity must always transcend itself; as free, "open reason," it cannot be, in all its possibilities, grasped in advance. In this sense, for Landgrebe, the *a priori* of history is also a historical *a priori*. One still may ask: why not say that the historical is an open

process with no invariant content, but always made possible by an invariant form, the formal structure of the inner time consciousness? If that is so, how are we to understand the claim that this invariant form itself is historical?

VII

In this review of the problems, issues and interpretative points of view, we are encountering, again and again, several oppositions: empiricism-rationalism, static constitution and genetic constitution, a-historicity and historicity of transcendental subjectivity. Gerhard Funke in many ways has struggled to work out an almost unique interpretation of phenomenology in which these oppositions have been allotted their rightful places. To understand Funke's reading of Husserl, we need to go beyond the essay translated for this volume and refer to his two earlier books to which references have already been made in this introduction.

Funke wants to correct the one-sided scheme of a thoroughgoing object-intentional structure of consciousness. Consciousness is not merely intentionally directed towards its object, but also appears to itself, is conscious of itself. The latter aspect, i.e., self-consciousness, is also an intentionality, but should not be construed as though it were a case of act-intentionality. In other words, the acts present themselves to themselves immediately as flowing, streaming without themselves being objectified and intended. This is what Sartre has called the translucency of pre-reflective consciousness. In their object-intentional aspect, the acts constitute objective senses, *noemata*, which are a-historical unities, and, in the long run, the world as nexus of such senses. But in their aspect as subjective appearings (Funke uses the word "Phansis" for this aspect), the conscious experiences generate habitualities. It is in such habitualities that the ego has its genesis. This is the concrete monadic ego. The concrete ego is thus constituted, its constitution being a sort of auto-genesis, radically different from the constitution of *noemata*. Thus the acts refer, on the one hand, to the *noemata* they constitute, and, on the other, to the ego which has its genesis in the habitualities founded on acts as subjective experiencings. Both the world (as a noematic structure) and the concrete monadic ego as the substrate of habitualities are transcendent to the acts regarded as subjective experiencings. The transcendental is then that which fully surpasses both transcendencies and makes them possible.³⁰

Of these two transcendencies, the *noemata* are a-historical, but the ego is a historically self-constituting unity. For Funke, it is not "man" or "culture" that is genuinely historical, but the ego. The stream of acts, or in Funke's language, of appearings (of the appearances), regarded as constituting, is transcendental subjectivity of the *flux*. Transcendental consciousness is

nothing but everyday consciousness with its I-world structure, with the difference that unlike everyday consciousness it does not naively posit I and world as existents. It is not clear though, from Funke's account, how for him transcendental ego is different from the concrete monadic ego. It is most likely that he regards the same concrete monadic ego as both empirical and transcendental. But then the concept of "transcendental" would not coincide with that of "constituting," for the ego is, on this theory, constituted even if its constitution is auto-constitution.

What, however, is most striking about Funke's understanding of phenomenology is the centrality he accords to the ideas of "reason" and "criticism." Earlier, I distinguished between a transcendental philosophy which, in the Kantian spirit, seeks to enquire into the conditions of validity or truth, and which also itself may, in the Platonic spirit, aim at arriving at a body of apodictic, founding truths, and a transcendental philosophy which limits itself to the more modest task of clarification of the constitution of *meanings*.³¹ Funke's conception of phenomenology has something in common with both. Unlike the Platonic enterprise, phenomenology, according to Funke, is not a metaphysics but a method. But unlike the sort of phenomenology which limits itself to the clarification of sense, Funke, in the true Kantian spirit, regards it as the task of a phenomenological philosophy to critically validate all truth claims. In the long run, all validation and all criticism have to appeal to consciousness. Consciousness is reason.³² Such an identification of consciousness with reason seems incompatible with the distinction which one cannot overlook between the naive, positing consciousness and critical, reflecting consciousness. I think what Funke means is that the latter alone is the rational consciousness. Critical phenomenology, then, cannot be merely descriptive. As a science, it has to look for the grounding structures (*Begründungszusammenhänge*). These ultimately grounding structures are the noetic-noematic correlation structures. The sort of grounding, namely, which we can expect phenomenology to provide, would answer the question of *why* on a definite level of consciousness, something must appear to be self-evident.³³

Although Funke wants phenomenology to critically validate all truth-claims, he does not admit any given truth claim to be final. A phenomenological philosophy cannot stop with any *position*. It shall overcome all positions by showing, critically, how those positions are correlates of specific positional acts. Thus phenomenology shall transcend all naive philosophising. It shall continue to be critical, and shall not end up in a metaphysics. One of Funke's valuable contributions lies in cautioning us against accepting any *given* as ultimate. This is especially worth heeding when it comes to the lifeworld. For many phenomenologists, Husserl rightly reached here, in his discovery of the lifeworld, the last source of all evidences, the ultimate fact, as it were. Funke warns us against the tendency to

dogmatise the positing of the lifeworld. It appears as if he is providing an insight which ought to counterbalance some of Landgrebe's seeming exaggerations. Interpreters who absolutise the lifeworld forget that phenomenological evidence is possible only within the correlation structure.³⁴ Critical thinking rules out the possibility of absolutising any particular mode of understanding or any particular world. If the lifeworldly reason lives only in the naivety of *convictions*, phenomenological reason seeks to go beyond all convictions.

Thus, transcendental subjectivity, as the critical reason, goes beyond all positions and is in this sense historical reason. This conclusion is not very far from Landgrebe's, in spite of Funke's use of the language of "consciousness" and rejection of all facticity including the facticity of the lifeworld.³⁵

VIII

If this introductory essay does not review in great detail Toulemont's study on Husserl's thoughts on the constitution of the social, that is not because its importance for understanding Husserl is lesser than that of the other essays in this volume. On the contrary, Toulemont's study, appearing long before the publication of the Husserlian volumes devoted to the problem of intersubjectivity,³⁶ provided one of the very few accesses to the rich contents of that Husserlian *Nachlass*. We learn from Toulemont that intersubjectivity, by itself, though necessary, is yet not sufficient for the constitution of sociality. Besides intersubjectivity, sociality requires communication, a common perceptual world, community of wills, willed ends and of plans of work, interpenetration of affective lives and socialisation of rational life. Whereas these concern the attentive consciousness restricted to the horizon of its temporal actuality, full constitution of the social requires union across time in the form of communicable "acquisitions" and traces. Husserl was led to the idea of community as "a person of a higher order." It is well known that a similar conception in Scheler had been severely criticised by Hartmann, and also that Schutz had been critical of Husserl's ideas in this regard. Toulemont rightly warns us against reading Husserl here as an organicist thinker. Husserl's attempt to maintain a parallelism between individual consciousness and collective consciousness does not stand up against critical scrutiny. Can it be said that the essence of the social, as contradistinguished from the individual, lies in this that whereas the individual is "present" to himself, the society is "appresented" to its members and cannot be grasped in direct experience? This is consistent with Husserl's egological stance in the *Cartesian Meditations* and his idea of "analogical transfer" of one's own consciousness to the other. Toulemont rejects both: more in accord with Scheler, he insists that the consciousness of the other is more direct than one's

own. The only plausible point of distinction between individual and society gives way, and one then needs to revise the very individualistic starting point of Husserl's thinking on the social. These are challenging thoughts, and it is to be hoped that they will provoke readers to what can only be a painstaking but immensely rewarding experience – viz. read the three volumes of intersubjectivity papers. We need not any longer depend solely on the fifth *Cartesian Meditation* to assess Husserl's thoughts on this problem. To what extent these newly accessible materials are going to influence our understanding of *transcendental phenomenology* is quite another question.

NOTES

1. For a discussion of this relationship, see my “‘Life-world’ and ‘A priori’ in Husserl’s Later Thought,” in Tymieniecka, ed., *Analecta Husserliana*, III (1974), 46–65, esp. 46–47 and 63–64.
2. G. Funke, *Zur transzendentalen Phänomenologie* (Bonn: Bouvier, 1957), p. 25.
3. G. Funke, *Phänomenologie—Metaphysik oder Methode?* (Bonn: Bouvier, 1966), p. 110.
4. *Ibid.*, p. 201.
5. L. Landgrebe, “Husserls Phänomenologie und die Motive zu ihrer Umbildung,” in L. Landgrebe, *Der Weg der Phänomenologie* (Gütersloh: Gerd Mohn, 1963).
6. L. Landgrebe, “Das Problem der Geschichtlichkeit des Lebens und die Phänomenologie Husserls,” in L. Landgrebe, *Phänomenologie und Geschichte* (Gütersloh: Gerd Mohn, 1968), esp. p. 30.
7. *Ibid.*, p. 32.
8. L. Landgrebe, “Das Problem der transzendentalen Wissenschaft vom Lebensweltlichen Apriori,” in *Phänomenologie und Geschichte*, esp. p. 166. (This volume, pp. 152–71; esp. p. 170).
9. H. Wagner, “Kritische Bemerkungen zu Husserls Nachlass,” *Philosophische Rundschau* (1953, 54):1–22, 93–123.
10. D. Henrich, “Über die Grundlagen von Husserls Kritik der philosophischen Tradition,” *Philosophische Rundschau* 6 (1958): 1–26.
11. *Zur transzendentalen Phänomenologie*, pp. 24, 40.
12. L. Landgrebe, “Husserls Abschied vom Cartesianismus,” in *Der Weg der Phänomenologie*, p. 174 ff.
13. I have recently emphasized this distinction in “Husserl’s Transcendental Phenomenology and Essentialism,” *Review of Metaphysics* 32 (1978).
14. Cp. my “Husserl’s Transcendental Phenomenology and Essentialism.”
15. E. Fink, “Die phänomenologische Philosophie Edmund Husserls in der gegenwärtigen Kritik,” *Kant-Studien* 38 (1933). Reprinted in *Studien zur Phänomenologie*, 1930–1939 (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1966).
16. *Studien zur Phänomenologie*, p. 122.
17. L. Landgrebe, “Phänomenologische Bewusstseinsanalyse und Metaphysik,” in *Der Weg der Phänomenologie*, esp. p. 87 ff.
18. *Der Weg der Phänomenologie*, p. 190.
19. *Studien zur Phänomenologie*, p. 143.
20. *Zur transzendentalen Phänomenologie*, p. 75.

21. See esp. Landgrebe's review of A. Gurwitsch's *Field of Consciousness*, in *Philosophische Rundschau* 8 (1960), esp. p. 307.
22. *Phänomenologie—Metaphysik oder Methode*, p. 131.
23. L. Landgrebe, "Prinzipien der Lehre vom Empfinden," in *Der Weg der Phänomenologie*.
24. Cp. E. Husserl, *Ideas*, sect. 21 and 22.
25. Cp. F. Kersten, "The Occasion and Novelty of Husserl's Phenomenology of Essence," in *Phenomenological Perspectives. Essays in Honor of Herbert Spiegelberg* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1975); and J. Konig, *Der Begriff der Intuition* (Halle: Max Niemeyer, 1926).
26. *Phänomenologie und Geschichte*, p. 32 ff.
27. M. Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, trans. C. Smith (New York: Humanities, 1962). Preface.
28. *Ibid.*, p. xv.
29. Eley, *Die Krisis des Apriori bei Edmund Husserl* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1962)
30. Cp. this volume, esp. p. 86.
31. Cp. my "Husserl's Transcendental Phenomenology and Essentialism."
32. *Zur transzendentalen Phänomenologie*, p. 31.
33. *Phänomenologie—Metaphysik oder Methode*, p. 117.
34. *Ibid.*, p. 101.
35. Cp. my "Consciousness and Life-World," *Social Research* (Spring 1975), pp. 147–66, for further comments on this issue.
36. E. Husserl, *Zur Phänomenologie der Intersubjektivität* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1973).

THE PROBLEM OF THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF EDMUND HUSSERL¹, *

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1. The Inquiry into the Problem of Phenomenology as a Conditioned Interpretation

In order to present the guiding, fundamental problem of a documented philosophy, it is appropriate that one turn only to the documents. The texts must provide the basis for interpretation, and thus the fundamental question must be elicited from them. However, just how this question is included in the texts cannot always be univocally ascertained.

The problem of a philosophy need not be identical with the particular questions with which its literature begins, with, therefore, the situation which belongs to a philosophy when it begins, or with the predominant, motivating questions which remain with a philosophy throughout its development. The problem need not even be properly formulated. It can have an effect prior to its reflective formulation *in all* of the particular questions, it can stand *behind* all of the individual motivations of thought as the driving motive.

If provisional, later reworked stages of a philosopher's development are involved in his own understanding of his thought, uncertainty regarding the fundamental problem of his philosophy remains even where the author formulates this problem.

Given that access to the fundamental question of phenomenology is uncertain, the indication of the problem of Edmund Husserl's phenomenology can only be an interpretation that concedes this risk from the start.

The questions concerning the sense-formations of mathematics and logic, the questions with which Husserl's phenomenological writings begin, are not the *genuine problem* of phenomenology. On the contrary, these questions, though they form a constant and predominant theme, first acquire their philosophical significance within the horizon of the fundamental problem. On the other hand, Husserl for the most part mainly understood his own project in terms of the particular questions of the respective texts. In addition,

*Translated by Robert M. Harlan from "Das Problem der Phänomenologie Edmund Husserls," in *Studien zur Phänomenologie* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1966), pp. 179–233; originally published in *Revue internationale de philosophie*, 2 (1939), pp. 236–70.

this understanding occasionally involved later, reworked stages in his development, or above all concerned the phenomenological method. Methods, however, do not stand on their own in the realm of philosophy: they are demanded by and wrested from problems. One cannot grasp the driving problem of a philosophy from its method. Rather, it is the other way around: the sense of the method is determined by the problem.

Therefore, when the texts contain the problem more between the lines than in them, as is the case in Husserl's phenomenology, the risk of an interpretation lies in one's seeking the essential, fundamental question which forms the *inner beginning* of a philosophy, and hence, which makes possible the question's textual documentation, from an understanding of the texts gained merely by following them. The concept of the "risk" of an interpretation is sharpened when what it means to "construct a philosophical problem" is expressly discussed.

The problem of a philosophy is the philosophy's fundamental question, a question that constantly radicalizes itself. In the active projection and inner development of this question, a new dimension of possible knowledge is formed, and through this question the establishment and grounding of a philosophy occurs. This means, however, that "problem" in the philosophical sense is not a simply namable and formulatable expecting-to-know [*Wissenausstand*] on the basis of a path to knowledge already taken by man.

"Expecting-to-know" here does not mean an objective not-being-present of determinate knowledge but, rather, the subjective modes of knowing that which is not yet known about the existent [*Seiendem*]. Expecting-to-know is the well-known phenomenon of knowing about knowledge that is lacking. On the basis of his pre-philosophical understanding of the world, on the ground of the commonly understood, public explication of the existent [*des Seienden*] man is not related cognitively simply to actually given things. In addition, he can always see that a thing is missing and search for the thing as well as see that knowledge about a thing is lacking and search for that knowledge. For man, the style of givenness of things is characterized by a relativity that already predelineates the direction for the augmentation of his knowledge about things. Human knowing has already embedded paths which enable progress in knowledge, progress in the sense of an always "more exact," "more complete" and "more systematic" determination of things. Progress in knowledge is always guided by the horizon of the known expecting-to-know. What is commonly called positive "science" is progress along the pre-given paths to knowledge which vastly exceeds everyday knowledge. Positive-scientific knowledge [*Erkenntnisse*] is a refinement of knowledge, at first of pre-scientific acquaintance [*Kenntnisse*]. The botanist determines plants which were known prior to all science within a progressing body of knowledge that was accomplished by the cognitive work of

generations of investigators. Within the domain of a *progressing* body of knowledge, knowledge that advances along paths, “problems” are expectings-to-know whose sense-structure is determined by the fixed identity of the *idea of knowledge* with regard both to the already known and the not yet known. To the identity [*Gleichheit*] with regard to the idea of knowledge corresponds an identity with regard to the *idea of the existent*. “Progress” in knowledge, as an augmentation of an already given body of knowledge with respect to extent, fullness and certainty, takes place on the ground of a *fixed idea of the existent*. The *existent qua existent* and the *nature of truth* are accepted as *known* and, as a result of this self-evident knownness, as *constant*. In this way, the determinate existent is determined, and ever more differentiated truths are sought. The constancy and fixity of the fundamental ideas of the existent and truth constitute the *basis* of human knowledge.

Philosophy is the shaking of the ground which bears human familiarity with the existent, the shaking of the basis which forms the presupposition for the progressive augmentation of knowledge, the unsettling of the foundations of knowledge and the *questioning* of the existent *qua* existent and the nature of truth. Therefore, problem in the philosophical sense is not an expecting-to-know on the basis of a path to knowledge but, rather, the *formation* of an expecting-to-know. It is the emergence of the necessity that we must seek knowingly where everything has apparently been found, where everything is known and questionless. In this context, problem means that what is obvious becomes questionable.

Problems in the philosophical sense, however, are not arbitrary doubts about what is constant, doubts that arise from *caprice*, from the search for doubts or from the mere mistrust of the human mind. Man’s arbitrariness gives way before philosophy. Rather, philosophy is an “experience” that man has of himself and the existent. The origin of philosophical problems is *wonder*.²

Astonishment descends upon man; it is essentially something that *befalls* him [*ein Widerfahrnis*]. What was obvious is no longer obvious. What was common becomes uncommon. However, what was obvious does not simply change into something with the *familiar* manner of the non-obvious, a simple turning of the obvious into its opposite. In astonishment, rather, the known becomes unknown in as yet unknown sense, the familiar becomes unfamiliar in an unfamiliar sense. The valid, the certain and the existent become invalid, uncertain and nothing in an alien and alienating way. The constant and unquestioned become, in just this constancy and unquestionableness, transitory and questionable. In wonder, the unsettling idea of a *genuine mode* of knowing the existent suddenly emerges from beneath the ordered, familiar world in which we are at home and about which we have fixed meanings concerning things, man and God, meanings which make certainty in life

possible. Therefore, a peculiar inversion occurs: what had previously been held to be the “existent” becomes a mere illusion. In astonishment, the “inverted world” of philosophy arises.

The essential structure of astonishment is indicated by the Greek work “*ekplēxis*.^a Astonishment is a forcing out: it forces man out of that fundamental way of life, one of laziness and metaphysical indolence, in which he has ceased to question the existent *qua* existent. Wonder dislodges man from the prejudice of everyday, publicly pre-given, traditional and worn out familiarity with the existent, drives him from the already authorized and expressly explicated interpretation of the sense of the world and into the creative poverty of not yet knowing what the existent is. Astonishment is essentially *dis-placing* in so far as it removes man from prejudice, familiarity and certainty. The “ekplektic,” *dis-placing* structure of astonishment refers to its proximity to the dispositions and experiences that bring man home in the depth of his essence. It refers to its proximity to dread, fear, horror and displacement as well as to that great self-movement of man which Nietzsche entitled “the great longing.”

Astonishment, however, is in no way merely a “disposition,” a feeling. Rather, it is the fundamental disposition of pure thought; it is *original theory*. A change and transformation of *knowing* takes place in wonder in that knowledge of the existent which is already at hand is devalued to mere opinion and the nature of knowing is altered. Any theory, any knowing relation between man and the existent is not original if what the existent as such and the nature of truth are already *decided*. It is not original if the original formation of the ideas of “existent” and “truth,” if the “*hypothèse*,^b the foundation of the possibility of knowledge of the existent has already occurred, whether through a lengthy effort belonging to the past of human spirit or through the inconspicuous obviousness of the “natural world-view.” Astonishment is original theory because man suffers the experience of a breakdown of his traditional knowledge, a breakdown of his pre-acquaintance with the world and things, and that as a result a *new confronting of the existent* and a *new projection of the senses of “being” and “truth” become necessary*. In turning towards the existent with astonishment, man is as it were primevally open to the world once again, he finds himself in the dawn of a new day of the world in which he himself and everything that is begins to appear in a new light. The whole of the existent dawns upon him anew.

Our speaking of a “new projection” and a “new dawning” does not mean, however, that it lies within the power and free choice of man to proclaim whatever he pleases to be “existent,” so that finally being and truth are presented as mere public conventions. The true freedom of human spirit is the self-determination to knowingly accept what is beyond all human power, an allowing itself to endure the might of the truly existent. This freedom is a

struggle over fundamental concepts such as “being,” “being-in-itself,” “appearance,” and the like, concepts with which man *attempts* to illuminate the concealedness of the existent. The transformation of the fundamental concepts which astonishment forces is not a transformation of the existent itself. Rather, it is a shift of the idea of the “existent” within human spirit. What the existent itself is beyond the human idea of it is the motivating uncertainty in which consists the *restlessness* of human spirit.

In astonishment, the existent is manifested in a new, original way that interrupts the fixity of the established explication of being and commences the “hunt for the existent.” As something that befalls man, astonishment is a visitation that descends upon him and in which he, by surrendering to it, also visits the ground of things.

If the origin of a philosophical problem lies essentially in astonishment, then its emergence from astonishment is not a passive occurrence. Rather, the problem becomes actual by man’s taking astonishment up voluntarily, by astonishment’s being sustained and developed by the awakening force of conceptual cognition. The extent of the creative *force of wonder* ultimately determines the rank and achievement of a philosophy and determines the possible greatness of man in the field of metaphysics. However, the projection of the problem, the essential, fundamental act of a philosophy, is not only the *formulation of the question* but the *development of the question which astonishes* as well. The “radicality” of a philosophy lies in the radicalization of its problem.

It is precisely with respect to the indicated sense-structure of philosophical problems that the attempt to understand a documented philosophy by beginning with its fundamental question is to be characterized as a *conditioned* interpretation. The interpretation’s being conditioned lies in the indelible questionableness of any reconstruction of an original projection of the problem. Moreover, the interpreter cannot be certain if he actually succeeds in entering into the question of a philosophy in the process of his inquiry. However, the decisive way in which his endeavor is conditioned is that it is impossible to *repeat* the constant, self-radicalizing movement of the problem’s development, the movement which is the elaboration of the fundamental question and which begins from the question. The interpreter abstracts as it were from the inner development of the problem, from the history of its radicalization. He is able only to indicate this development by a “construction” of its essential stages.

Our interpretation of the phenomenology of Edmund Husserl is guided by the following constructive sketch of the phenomenological problematic: A. The existent as phenomenon; B. The idea of an intentional analytic; C. The radical reflection; D. Science and life-world; E. The theory of the natural attitude; F. The theory of the phenomenological reduction; G. The theory of constitution; H. The fundamental problem.^c

A. THE EXISTENT AS PHENOMENON

2. “*To the Things Themselves*”

The interpretation of Husserl's phenomenology on the basis of the fundamental problem which motivates it must begin by attempting to characterize the way in which the wonder which forms the problem is formulated. Thus, it is of decisive importance that the essential universality of this formulation be shown and that a natural misunderstanding be prevented.

At first it may appear both clear and plausible that, similar to the way that an answer which comes to mind permits a motivated inference back to a preceding question, the so-called *theme* of a philosophy provides guidance for determining the problem which grounds it. Does not the “theme” designate the domain of the existent which constitutes the horizon of what is wondered about? Is phenomenology not a science of *subjectivity*? Is its thematic field not the subjective life and its fundamental characteristic, intentionality? Is its question, then, not one concerning the essence of the subject?

To be sure, these determinations are not totally false. However, they are false in that phenomenology, like the positive sciences, is assumed to be characterized by its theme. Theme in the context of the positive sciences and “theme” in the context of philosophy have completely different senses.

The formulation of a positive science, whether it is an empirical or *a priori* science, takes place in the selection of its theme. In fact, it takes place in such a way that a determinate *domain* of the existent which is already given and already known in its typicality is made the theme of a unitary, theoretical determination. Therefore, what essentially determines the unity of a science is the connected unity of the homogenous existent within this science's domain of objects, whether the science treats a genus of independent existents (such as animals, plants), a layer [*Schicht*] common to all genera of independent entities (*res extensa*) or the material and formal structures in the existent (essence, number, etc.). Positive science is necessarily “specific science” – that is, a limited and restricted science of a limited and restricted region of the existent: the existent *as number, as spatial shape, as materiality, as plant, as animal*, etc. The articulation of the existent into the regions of its whatness, however, is not an accomplishment of the positive sciences. Rather, the sciences find such an articulation already there and they conform to the given distribution of the diverse existent in their formulation. Positive science has its “*positum*,” its “*posited*,” in advance; namely, the existent as this and that. It arises from an attitude of man in which is not asked what the existent *qua* existent is; rather, the inquiry has already proceeded to the existent *as a determinate existent belonging to a region*.

Therefore, the position that a characterization of a positive science is provided by its *theme* is justified. The methods of a science may be arduous and

accessible only with difficulty. However, the region of its research, that with which it deals and that which it treats, is the most understandable and best known aspect of the science, no matter how much this pre-given knowledge of the thematic of a positive science may be deepened in the course of its research.

Because philosophy is *not a specific science*, every endeavor to acquire simple, understandable information regarding that with which it deals by direct references to its “theme” fails. If, in an attempt to understand a philosophy, the “theme” is taken to be simply an *already known* region of the existent, to be a limited field of specific, theoretical interest, then philosophy has already been abandoned and has covertly become a specific science. If one takes, for example, Husserl’s phenomenology to be a science of consciousness and understands the concept of “consciousness” in the commonly understood sense as one part of the psychic domain, then phenomenology is and remains psychology, a specific science, or perhaps only a psychological discipline, however much phenomenology may be differentiated from a naturalistic, external psychology.

If philosophy actually originates in wonder, then it never ascends merely to the small and limited peculiarity of this or that puzzling or noteworthy phenomenon, but, rather, ascends to the peculiarity of the existent as a whole. Worldly wisdom originates in universal wondering about the world. This does not mean that philosophy is a compilation of all of the specific sciences, an encyclopedia as it were of the positive sciences. Such a sum of the specific sciences would still be “specific-scientific” with respect to its mode of knowing; that is, it would still approach the existent *as the existent determined by its various regions*. Furthermore, this means that the sum of the specific sciences is a theoretical determination of the combined totality of the existent which is divided into partial domains by the specific positive sciences. However, both the distribution into domains and their combination take place on the basis of the existent *qua* existent, which as such remains presupposed without question. Domains and the totality of domains are essentially *structures within* the world.

The cosmological concept of “world,” which designates a problem of metaphysics, does not coincide with the physicalist concept of the universe as the totality of the world-domains of *res corporea*. “Universe” in the philosophical sense means the whole of the existent *qua* existent, the totality of all that “is” – a totality encompassing every domain, including the parts and the whole of each domain.

The *universality* of philosophical problems signifies universal wonder: the profound astonishment over the fact that this and that, the known and the unknown, the great and the small, the simple and the combined, the like, the unlike, the lifeless and the living, the innumerable multiplicity of things, the heavens, land and sea, time and space, figure, and so forth all “are.”

This total, all-encompassing wonder, however, does not refer to an expansion of what becomes questionable in the course of philosophical research, an incomprehensibility that subsequently broadens and ultimately reaches the “whole.” Universal wonder is that which *makes the formulation of a philosophy possible*.

This is what is not understood by those who attempt to work their way through to the problem by way of the philosophical “theme”—“theme” being taken at first in a *limited* sense. It is certainly the case that a central determination of a philosophy is given by its “theme.” However, a question arises as to whether what one calls the theme can be understood straightforwardly or if the “theme” must itself be interpreted. In philosophy is the sense of the problem to be derived from the “theme” or the sense of the “theme” from the problem? Is Kant’s *Critique of Pure Reason* an investigation of the human faculty of cognition, taken in its already known sense? Is it an investigation restricted to a determinate “domain”? Is it a theory of cognition, indifferent to whether it treats “facts” or “laws of sense”? Does it concern a *restriction, understood from the start*, to a determinate, pre-given field, the human intellect, or is Kant’s theory of knowledge one form of the question concerning the existent as a whole? Does Kant’s philosophy become a theory of cognition, a critique of pure reason, in the process of answering the question “how are synthetic *a priori* judgments possible”? And is this guiding question of Kant’s not a question concerning the existent as such, a wonder about how the existent can be “true” prior to its being encountered by experience, about how it can be unconcealedly open in its whatness? Does it not become understandable only on the basis of the horizon of the metaphysical problem of a necessary connection between being and being true, of a relation between the “transcendentals” *ens* and *verum*, why Kant’s transcendental philosophy is developed within the apparent confines of a critique of pure reason?

Because the “theme” of a philosophy must be understood on the basis of the problem standing behind it, and because the formulation of the problem rests precisely in the apparent narrowing of its universality, one’s taking the thematic sphere of a philosophy to be a thematic sphere restricted to an *already known* sense, while neglecting the problem-horizon of the “theme,” is a *misunderstanding* that cuts off from the philosophy to be interpreted only the characteristic invoked by the philosophy’s own “thematic” characterization.

In order to exhibit the universality of the formulation of the fundamental question of phenomenology and to prevent the misunderstanding just indicated, the following question must be asked: What kind of wonder, directed in some way to the whole of the existent, is it that grounds Husserl’s phenomenology in such a way that phenomenology develops into a science of subjectivity? Is Husserl’s “thematization of intentionality” taken up in the

process of raising a question concerning the whole of the world, and is it developed from this question? Is it the *problem of being* – therefore, metaphysics – which is developed in his thought in such a way that, as a result of this development, “consciousness” becomes thematic?

In fact this is the case. The science of consciousness does not arise for Husserl as something within the limits of psychology; for example, within the context of a classification of psychic phenomena. Husserl’s turning towards the sphere of subjectivity does not have a limited, anthropological sense, as if only the domain of the psychic had philosophical significance. No, Husserl questions the *existent* in such a way that the resolution of this question leads him to an *analytic of consciousness*.

It is the *fundamental thesis* of the interpretation undertaken here that the understanding of the sense of phenomenology as a philosophy is dependent upon the extent to which the problem of being is recognized as the horizon of the thematization of consciousness.

The *formulation of phenomenology* can be concisely and convincingly declared by the often evoked slogan “to the things themselves.” The literal sense of this slogan is by no means fortunate, for it can undergo either a harmless and unimportant or a most important interpretation. In any case, Husserl has set forth the problematic of phenomenology by this slogan.

Taken simply, this imperative expresses nothing more than the methodological maxim of the theoretical way of thinking in general; i.e., aim to achieve “scientific objectivity” and “intellectual honesty.” Therefore, it expresses that subjective principle of truthfulness, a principle that is certainly a prerequisite for any true striving to know. But is it enough for us merely to let the things themselves have their say? Are we so sure that when we make an effort, we are or can be *with the things themselves*? Is it not a naive presupposition, an unclarified, “obvious” assumption, to believe that what object and objectivity [*Sache und Sachlichkeit*] are so well known that we merely have to focus upon them? The immediately familiar concept of honesty, of the “objectivity” of theoretical thinking, presupposes the unquestioned validity of a determinate idea of the existent.

What is meant by the *phenomenological* sense of the slogan is a turning towards the “things” – i.e., to the *existent* – in which neither what the things are nor what constitutes the objectivity of knowledge or assertions about things *has already been decided*. What is meant is that turning towards which does not bring a fixed opinion with it but, rather, first decides what the existent is from the existent itself.

To be sure, it is impossible to search for, to find and to inquire into what the existent as such genuinely is without the *idea of the existent*. This idea, “innate” to human spirit, is the precondition for the problem of being. There is a difference, however, between continually presupposing a traditional explication of the idea of the existent, an explication which appears to be

unquestionably valid, and attempting to work this idea out conceptually by going to the existent.

The procedure by which we go to the existent, the existent being that towards which we are directed cognitively as the object of *philosophical wonder*, cannot be simply presupposed. In Husserl's phenomenology, rather, the movement of the question includes a *peculiar interrelation between a cognition that grasps the concrete fullness of the existent and an accompanying change in the concept of "existent" that results from the cognition*. For Husserl, then, what is to be expressed by the slogan "to the things themselves" is as far removed from the program of a "naive realism" as it is from that of a speculative determination of the concept of being.

If striving for the existent itself is to signify something more than a simple and dogmatic cognitive turning towards things already available, present and known with respect to their style of being, if in this striving not only is an aiming at strict scientific objectivity and valid and adequate methods and theories to be in effect but, in addition, - and above all else - *a search for the existent* is to take place, then such a radically meant slogan must in some way provisionally ground the experience that our human intimacy and unending intercourse with the existent in everyday experiencing, judging, acting and suffering as well as in scientific-theoretical thinking is determined through a *distance*, and is so determined without our otherwise knowing it.

But are we not always enclosed and encircled by the existent, surrounded by things, somewhere in space and time, together with fellow men, with animals and plants, with night and day? Are we not ourselves a part of nature, an existent in the midst of the all-encompassing whole? Do not nearness and distance as such first have sense on the ground of the constant and indelible being with the existent? It is precisely this "nearness" of the being-with, which first makes nearness and distance in the common sense possible, precisely this "nearness" of the being-in-the-midst-of that becomes questionable if the dictate "to the things themselves" (understood in the radical sense) is raised.

In "total wonder" the frightening knowledge of the fact that our being with the existent is mere supposition is *formed*. Nearness to being is shown to be an "illusion" and becomes distance from being. "To the things themselves" means, then, a cognitive movement from a distance from being to an essential and original nearness to the existent.

The sense of the phenomenological slogan first becomes clear when it is considered how Husserl attempts to determine the distance from being characteristic of human intimacy with the existent. Thus, the idea of an original nearness to being, the idea that motivates Husserl's philosophical passion, his *amor intellectualis*, is revealed by the metaphor of distance.

If ancient philosophy, in its struggle to bring cognizing man near to the existent, was a conscious reaction against sophistry and rhetoric, then

Husserl, though in a completely different and even opposite sense, above all else turns against the obstruction to original access to the existent resulting from the hegemony of an epistemological dogmatic and the uncritical use of language.

It is necessary to be freed for once from the tutelage and constant, though previously unnoticed, guidance by certain habits of thought, convictions, learned though never actually examined theories, opinions, pre-judgments and “epistemological” predeterminations that decree what “existent,” “object,” “knowing,” and so forth are without subjecting them to an original consideration. It is necessary to impartially *see, merely to see*, without being concerned about a so-called standpoint; i.e., to secure the possibility of seeing with one’s eyes as such for the first time. Likewise, it is necessary to for once lay aside the inconspicuous stamp that all things and that everything that is at all have received from time immemorial from the linguistic sphere. It is necessary to eliminate the generally familiar ways of speaking with the traditional concepts impressed upon us from the first and to conceptualize what is seen with our own eyes.

The originality of seeing and speaking belong together. However, the striving for originality is, for Husserl, essentially a movement away from the *mediation* of the existent and toward the establishment of *immediacy*.

Human behavior towards the existent is “mediate” to the extent that it is based upon unresolved, opaque *traditionality*. The reference to *traditionality* can be very superficial and philosophically unproductive if one only considers the obvious determinations of ways of life that are based upon tradition. In the essential and radical significance this concept has as set forth by Husserl, however, traditionality means the *essential trait* of man’s being with the existent: intimacy in which the mode of the original experiences of being is that of *obscURITY*.

In the pre-theoretical way of life, examples of intimacy with things are long-adopted uses for and utilizations of things; in general, ways of seeing, grasping and judging things that have been “broken in,” have become customary. We live in the midst of the existent in the prison of our customs and have forgotten how to break out. Scientific-theoretical intimacy, scientific-theoretical research and discovery, also has its methodological customs which the individual researcher takes over without examination, for he cannot examine all of the presuppositions of his science. Positive science, as a tradition of determining the existent that is centuries old, always remains in the dark shadows of primitive human customs, whether they are clear in themselves or not – the custom, for example, of presupposing the being of the world.

Man’s distance from being, which Husserl characterized as the *obscURITY of the tradition-instituting experience of being*, as the *loss of the originality and*

immediacy of the existent through unanalyzed “customs,” is to be eliminated by the turn “to the things themselves.” However, this means fundamentally that it is to be eliminated by philosophical thinking’s being *turned back*.

3. *The Beginning of Philosophy*

The idea of human thinking’s being radically *turned back* is the fundamental motive for the phenomenological conception of the idea of philosophy. The formulation of the problem of Husserl’s phenomenology is not a posing of a problem on the basis of an *accepted* notion of the essence of philosophy, a notion present perhaps as the formation of a tradition. In other words, Husserl does not raise the fundamental question of phenomenology within the framework of a determination of the nature of philosophy presupposed as valid. He does not pose the question *in accordance with* a guiding idea of so-called “philosophical questions.” The setting forth of the fundamental problem is nothing other than the *self-establishment of the phenomenological concept of philosophy*.

Perhaps it is the noteworthy fate of all of man’s essential attempts to philosophize that the beginning of philosophical cognition must be achieved by the projection of the possibility of a new knowledge, by its own posit, its own presupposition. Perhaps, moreover, the true idea of a *philosophia perennis*, a never-ending inquiry into the eternal essence of the existent and of reason, is not so much rejected in its own right as it is by the idea of raising philosophy to the rank of a “science” by removing this disturbing putting-itself-in-question.

According to the fundamental conviction of phenomenology, the beginning of philosophy is not the undertaking of a cognitive procedure, the sense of which is already known; such as, for example, the pre-theoretical intimacy with the things or the modes of knowing in either the positive sciences or the traditional methods of doctrines which are well known historically. The philosopher in Husserl’s sense is essentially a “beginner” because he begins above all else the *self-grounding of philosophy*.

It has become customary to interpret the foundation of Husserl’s phenomenological philosophy as a striving for a “philosophy as a strict science.” Given Husserl’s article with this title, this is not without justification. However, the inaccuracy of such interpretations is that the sense of *science* in the concept of “strict science” has not been sufficiently removed from the concealment which it had for Husserl himself at first, a concealment that was overcome at a relatively late date. They fail to get beneath what philosophy and positive science have in common in a negative way, which consists of their defense against an irrational “world-view” that serves merely emotive needs, and do not get to the positive difference between them. As a result, phenomenology is easily labeled as an attempt to vindicate the wisdom of the methodological ideal of positive science.

When an interpretation – as is the case here – is directed only to the *sense* of phenomenological philosophy and abstracts from Husserl's personal process of development, the self-grounding of phenomenology by its own *projection of an original knowledge* comes prominently into view. The concept of the science of philosophy is first determined on the basis of this “original knowledge.” Therefore, the sense of this “originality” of knowledge must be characterized.

The beginning of philosophy as the institution of philosophical knowledge occurs by a *conceptual reflection* upon that which lies in the problem-forming wonder.

We are inexpressibly astonished over the fact that we always speak about the existent, nature, things and all that these involve, that we so to speak continually discuss unclarified concepts with an illicit and never acknowledged familiarity. We are astonished that we know how to handle the existent by manipulating and using it. We are astonished that we believe to know what place, time, motion, mass, extension, number, figure, state, justice, substance and property, actuality, being and so forth are. We are astonished that these vague and rough opinions are those which we bring with us when we, through “learning,” enter into and progress in the positive sciences, always encumbered by the inexact and uncertain preconceptions with which we departed. We are astonished that we, in acting and suffering, in working and experiencing, dwell in the midst of the existent as an existent without ever seriously attempting to discover what this genuinely involves, because we drift along in the twilight of unclarity and are so to speak entangled by conventional, unchecked and unproven ways of accepting the existent. In Husserl's phenomenology, the inexpressible astonishment over man's distance from being and the obscurity of being, recognized to be the result of an embedded tradition, is conceptualized by the idea of a *primal state of man's access to being*. More precisely, it is conceived with the setting forth of the possibility of a reproduction of this primal state. It must be possible to inquire back and return to the *beginning knowledge* which has been obscured by the embedded tradition, to return to the immediate knowledge of the existent from which traditions are derived, though this knowledge is continually obscured. The primal beginning of knowledge must be able to be rescued from the night of obscurity. Truth, as “non-obscurity,” must lie within the power of human spirit. In the *inquiry back* to the beginning of knowledge as knowledge of the existent which shows itself immediately, the existent must not only unobstructively reveal itself but, in addition, must reveal itself in its “beginning.” That is, it must reveal itself as that which it is above all else, viz. existent. True cognition, original knowledge must be possible in the passage back to the beginning of knowledge from the beginnings of the existent. The phenomenological projection of a *scientific philosophy* occurs in this idea of a theoretical primal state, and the sense of the philosopher's being

a “beginner” is characterized by the idea. Since only the *direction* of the cognitive aim of phenomenology is to be indicated, the question of the extent to which phenomenology actually succeeds in inquiring back to the beginning of the existent and knowledge remains out of consideration here.

The *pathos* of phenomenology, its enthusiasm, results in the radicalism of the “beginner,” in the belief that human spirit freed from the burden of history has the ability to acquire an immediate relation to the existent. It results in the setting forth of a renaissance, a renewal of knowledge that is always possible: everything essential can be rediscovered again and again! Philosophizing returns man once again to the fundamental position of his existence, to truly knowing nearness to the existent.

The two-sided, though unitarily interwoven *examination of the existent* is to be conducted in the primal state of genuine nearness to and intimacy with being. First of all, that claiming to “exist,” that which is ungenuine and unclarified, that which we at first accept as “obvious” is to be examined. Then, however, the concept of “existent” used in the first examination, the horizon of sense included in our thinking this primitive concept, must be examined.

The examination of the fundamental concepts “existent” and “knowledge,” the metaphysical dialogue of human spirit with itself, is not merely a critique of man’s ordinary, everyday attitude towards the existent. It is also a peculiar critique of the positive sciences, though not in the sense of an unwarranted interference with the process of theoretical research or even a presuming to give *a priori* guidance to the physicist or biologist. Rather, it is a critique of the unthematized presuppositions and foundations that precede the formulation of the respective positive sciences. Therefore, philosophy is the *fundamental science* in a determinate sense. As a fundamental science, however, it is not a science among the sciences nor is it *prima scientia inter pares*. In its essential function, philosophy does not engage in a thorough critique of the foundations and presuppositions of the positive sciences in order to be the foundation of the positive sciences. Philosophy, as the process of making all knowledge, prescientific as well as positive-scientific knowledge, knowledge of things as well as knowledge of numbers and logical sense-formations, knowledge of the sense of human life, culture, the divine, etc. “original,” is a *living movement of man* that so long as the concept of theory is oriented by the derivative, so-called “only theoretical” procedure of the exact sciences, which is the opposite of “*praxis*,” does not have the character of being a “merely intellectual” way of existence. (It is, however, extremely questionable whether, for example, pure mathematics and pure logic are actually determined by a privation of significances related to living; beyond that, whether the emancipation of science from philosophy, that modern misfortune commencing with the break between scholasticism and natural research, concealed through the anonymous triumph of the latter and

recapitulated in the so-called "collapse of the Hegelian philosophy," has led to that privation.)

In the phenomenological conception of philosophy as a fundamental science that inquires back to the beginning of all knowledge of the existent, the aim is to re-root the specific sciences in philosophy, to obviate the "emancipation" and to proclaim the supremacy of philosophy. Philosophy is to ground the unity of human knowledge not as a subsequent combination in the form of a "methodology of the positive sciences" but, rather, as the prior probing of the connection between *being and knowledge*.

Because philosophy is not a specific science according to this guiding idea of phenomenology, the sense of the passage back to originality must be sharply contrasted with every interpretation of it in the manner of a specific science. The inquiry back to the beginning of knowledge is, thus, not the well known psychological question of the psychic origin of our representations, despite the fact that Husserl himself was partial to this opinion in his early period and perhaps failed to establish the difference determinately enough even in his later periods. The decisive factor is not that this psychological question is one that concerns a real genesis of human thinking – e.g., from childhood to maturity – that is ascertained empirically and not a flow of consciousness that is grasped eidetically. No, the essential difference lies elsewhere. In formulating his question, the psychologist has *his* knowledge and the existent which is valid in accordance with that knowledge "in advance." As a matter of course, he applies this knowledge as a *measure* for judging the "preliminary stages" that are subsequently considered to be stages of a development of knowledge. The psychologist does not thematize consciousness in order to bring out what the *existent* is originally. He naively accepts a separation of *being and knowing*, of world and "world-representation," of space and "spatial-representation," of time and "temporal-representation," etc. That is, he regards the existent to be determinate and his knowledge of it to fit the existent. His theme is the intrapsychic development, the "becoming" of this knowledge, knowledge taken as that which fits the existent.

The phenomenological inquiry back to the beginning of knowledge does not search for the origins of psychic development, the immanent genealogy of our representations, in knowledge that is present and accepted as valid. Rather, it searches for original knowledge of the existent; it searches for "original truth." The existent is *not* predetermined for phenomenology. It wants to bring into view knowledge *in its struggle with the existent*.

Still required is an explicit delimitation of phenomenology with respect to a determinate concept of *epistemology*. According to its idea, phenomenological philosophy is not epistemology if the latter is understood to be an investigation – one narrowly defined thematically – of the human faculty of cognition that is *detached from the problem of being*. It is not

“epistemology” if “faculty of cognition” is, with respect to its possibilities, naively presupposed to be something self-contained, something complete. It is not “epistemology” if what cognition is considered to be that present in both ordinary and positive-scientific cognizing. In other words, phenomenological philosophy is not epistemology if the theory of cognition is developed without first clarifying cognition’s essential totality of possibilities by initiating a cognitive search for the truly existent.

The phenomenological inquiry back to the beginning of knowledge is an attempt to grasp the human intellect *in its movement towards the existent*. To be sure, one can also designate such an intention by the expression “epistemology.” Husserl himself repeatedly designated his theoretical intention in this way, often adapting his intention in a misleading way to the sense of epistemology excluded here. This has just as often led to a misjudging of the true sense of his concept of philosophy.

Husserl himself regretted the fact that a truly appropriate expression for the essence of philosophy was already possessed by a positive science, viz. *archaeology*.

4. The Presentation of the Existent Itself [Die Selbstgebung des Seienden]

The characterization of the formulation of the fundamental problem of phenomenology as the questioning of the whole of the existent by projecting the idea of a primal state of human cognition is still essentially formal, because it has not yet considered the *particular aspect* of the formulation in which the unique characteristic of Husserl’s phenomenology lies.

In order to set this unique characteristic in the correct light, to remove phenomenology’s appearance of being a positive science of consciousness, an appearance that falsifies its sense, and to accentuate its fundamental philosophical intention, the enveloping sense-horizon of the problem of being and knowledge must be indicated. Because of its origin from this eternal – not pre-given temporal-historically – problem, the ever-present problematic of the fundamental concepts takes root in the “thematic” explication of consciousness. The science of consciousness is incessantly disquieted by the question of being and knowledge.

“Being” and “knowledge” become questionable, become dislodged by the awe of wonder. This means that knowledge of the existent can no longer be sought and investigated *on the basis* of an established acquaintance with the existent, that the nature of knowledge of the existent can no longer be looked for *on the basis* of an established acquaintance. *What is sought* is *genuine* knowledge of the *genuine* existent. The setting forth of the idea of an original access to the existent is not a *claim*, not an anticipatory decree of such an access but, rather, the establishment of a possibility of sense. If genuine knowledge of the existent is possible at all, then it can be grounded only by the genuine existent’s being revealed and being originally shown, by an *appearing*

of the genuine existent. The idea of the *existent's presenting itself* is the condition for the possibility of knowledge as such. To make the *existent as phenomenon* the original dimension of philosophical reflection does not mean to have the existent in advance in some way, but to determine the existent in the way that it shows itself. It does not mean to be acquainted with knowledge in advance, but to determine knowing in its being with the existent which shows itself. The *phenomenality* of the existent, thus, becomes the horizon of all determinations concerning a “being-in-itself” and the possibility of knowing related to being-in-itself. This concept of “phenomenality” is far from expressing the mere *semblance* of the existent, far from meaning that what merely claims to exist is not genuine. Phenomenality is the *true being of the existent* and phenomenology is the attempt to ground human knowledge by going back to the presentation of the existent itself. How the “relation” between being and being true [*Wahr-sein*] must be understood, thus, becomes a problem that begins from true being [*Wahrsein*]. The fundamental question of phenomenology, as questions concerning the existent which arise from the horizon of true being, is a metaphysical question if the concept of metaphysics is oriented by the four-fold, unitary question concerning the existent as existent, as one, as *true* and as *good*.

Husserl did not orient the concept of “metaphysics” in this way. For the most part he used the word in the common, contemptible sense.

The unfolding of the problem of being by beginning from true being is not a characteristic of philosophizing that belongs exclusively to phenomenology. The *uniqueness* of phenomenology lies in the particular way in which it explicates the *sense* of the original presentation of the existent itself. In ancient philosophy, the sense of “original” access which revealed the existent in its genuine being was interpreted as “*dianoia*.” “Reason” is that way of knowingly orienting oneself towards the existent in which the existent genuinely shows itself, in which the existent appears as what it is itself.

However, this setting forth of reason as original access to the existent was not a “dogmatic,” prior decision about the nature of knowledge. Rather, it was a problematic projection, a “*hypothésis*,” that was proven only by its ability to overcome the problem of being.

The “hypothesis” of Husserl’s phenomenology is the setting forth of intentionally understood, originary consciousness as the true access of being. The problem of being develops into an intentional analytic; phenomenology becomes a science of consciousness. This principle connection out of which subjectivity “becomes thematic” must also be understood as the impulse for intentional research even at the point—and perhaps at this point most of all—where Husserl appears, in an apparently positive-scientific manner, to lose his way in an exceedingly ramified analytic, as if he were in a labyrinth. Thus, the particular “phenomenological” sense which differentiates Husserl’s philosophy from other philosophical interpretations of being which begin

from true being is developed in the intentional-analytic theory of the “presentation” of something itself.

B. THE IDEA OF AN INTENTIONAL ANALYTIC

5. *The Problem of Evidence*

What is sought is the presentation of the existent itself. The situation of this search for an original concept of being and knowledge is determined by man’s living in the midst of what is at first accepted as “existing,” what is taken for “existent,” accepted and taken in the manifold and innumerable modes of practical and theoretical behavior. The customary, well-practised experience of and the well-learned, “scientific” acquaintance with the existent have lost their certainty in the wonder that awakens philosophical questioning. However, this unsettled knowledge did not disappear as a result of wonder. Rather, as that which is now questionable, it provides the *point of departure* for the search for original knowledge.

If what the existent *genuinely* is and what mode of knowing is genuine knowing of the genuine existent is not uncritically decreed or simply asserted dogmatically but, rather, is *asked*, then such a question runs as follows in Husserlian phenomenology: what are the “originary modes of consciousness” of the existent, what are the original evidences? Following Brentano’s terminology, Husserl called consciousness = of “intentionality.” Understood phenomenologically, then, evidence, as any intentional consciousness of the genuine existent, cannot mean merely the *grade of certainty* of a determinate cognition, irrespective of the interpretation of being that grounds it. Evidence is not a dignified cognition that is dogmatically established in advance but, rather, the problematic concept of the original knowledge which is *sought*. That is, “evidence” here is not the theme of a psychological or epistemological characterization, a theme that presupposes that evidence must only be investigated, not sought. Rather, evidence is the title for the *central* problem of Husserl’s phenomenology. In its intentional form, which will be determined more fully, the problem of evidence encompasses the whole of the phenomenological interpretation of being; at first as the inquiry into the existent *determined by a what-content*, then more radically into the existent *as such*.

In order to determine the formulation of the phenomenological problem of evidence, it is necessary to first bring out how Husserl is guided by a projection of “originality” which is itself “problematic” in his search for original knowledge. In this way, the *intentional* character of consciousness becomes significant in a decisive manner, because the senses of originary and non-originary consciousness are linked to one another by the projection. *Husserl acquires the direction for his inquiry into original knowledge by a reflective*

investigation of the intentional sense-moments of non-original knowledge of the existent given to begin with. Intentionality is not merely consciousness = of an object but is also – which is here of primary importance – consciousness = of “sensefully implicit” modes of consciousness. For example, memory is not only consciousness of determinate events as past, but is also consciousness of *past perception*. A *senseful reference back* to perception lies in the intentional sense of memory whether we note it or not. According to its intentional essence, memory originates from perception. As long as it is meant as a memory, even a presumed memory presents itself as a determinate sense-modification of perception. Memory is a derivative of perception and bears within itself, as a derivata mode of consciousness, the pointing back to the primal mode. Being known is an intentional modification of the actual learning. Dreams, as dreamed wakefulness, refer back sensefully to wakefulness; being imagined, as the imagining of something actual, to actuality; mediacy as such, to the immediate; “symbolic” thinking (e.g., “calculating” as an abbreviation for explicit, mathematical thinking) to explicit thinking, and so forth. However, the intentional references back are not always so obvious. Rather, they are for the most part latent, obscured as it were, so that an effort is required in order to uncover the referential structure of the various modes of consciousness.

The fundamental insight of an intentional explication of consciousness is that all conscious life is not only unified in the unity of a total flow of psychic processes, but that it also bears within itself *a unity of sense* that must guide every theoretical apprehension of consciousness. An explication that seeks understanding does not seek merely to ascertain the changing succession of intentions, memories, acts of thought, coming to mind and dispositions, the succession of dull and clear, articulate and vague experiencings, judgings, meanings, presentings and phantasizings, the succession of desirings, wishings, etc. in their *de facto* succession, without subsequently seeking to bring out the *rational order* which governs this apparent chaos of flowing psychic life. This order is nothing other than the totality of references of sense which extend from the primal-modal consciousnesses to their intentional modifications, first of all in the obvious form of non-originary consciousness’ being related back to originary consciousness. The following questions are not considered initially: the more fundamental problem of how the sense of the originary modes of consciousness themselves are founded, the cancellation of the equal status of the types of originary consciousness and the relativization of the concept of originarity. In an intentional explication of consciousness, however, it is important to bear in mind that in contrast to the faculty of cognition being compartmentalized according to fundamental faculties of the psyche which are not reducible to one another, the *sense-unity* of every cognizing is seen in its founding of sense, a founding that governs the cognizing in its totality.

If the thesis that Husserl's phenomenology becomes an intentional analytic in the process of considering the problem of being in that it searches for original knowledge of the existent is justified, then it is evident that the problem of being posed by phenomenology already shows an intentional structure. Determinate, intentional concepts are already employed in the projection of the problem. That the problem of being and knowledge is posed by means of an intentional, fundamental insight into the essence of cognition is indicated by the apprehension of the "mediacy," "traditionality" and "habituality" of our behavior towards the existent; i.e., by the apprehension of those concepts which express distance from being as "intentional modifications of primal modes of consciousness." In sum, intentionality becomes expressly thematic, becomes the domain of an "intentional analytic," in the process of considering the problem of being posed *intentionally*.

Husserl seeks originary knowledge by a reflection on the implications of sense of non-originary knowing, knowing in which we are turned towards the existent as something long known and familiar. However, this does not mean simply the easily effected passage back from, for example, memory to perception – i.e., to a perception that is already *set* within the total acceptance of a traditional knowledge, knowledge that is *rooted* in multifarious co-acceptances. The continuous chain of "perceptual acts," acts almost constantly given in the flow of conscious processes, is not that to which the implicit sense of memory genuinely refers back. If we inquire into their intentional sense, such *de facto*, concretely occurring perceptions are always more than *pure* perceptions. They are acts in which the existent is present, but in such a way that the existent is completely permeated and saturated by what has been inherited from previous perception and by knowledge that has been acquired individually or through education. What is perceived in such a perception has innumerable, already known characteristics and superimposed layers of sense, both of which cover the core of that which is actually perceived originally. We do not first begin to perceive, but have always already perceived. Actual perceiving is not originary consciousness, because sedimented acquisitions of knowledge which are traditional and taken over are involved in the perceiving. In the *de facto* succession of psychic processes, the pure, primal modes of knowing do not occur intact and detached from the complexes of interlaced primal and modified modes of consciousness. Accordingly, the primal modes of knowing cannot be *ascertained* simply by psychological reflection. A particular method of seeing which carefully and subtly establishes intentional distinctions is necessary in order to distinguish *purely*, under the guidance of intentional references back, the primal modes of knowing from the *de facto* forms of consciousness. *Intentional analysis* does not merely ascertain the occurring givens of consciousness. Rather it *primarily anticipates consciousness' inner order of sense*. This anticipation is the constructive moment of the intentional analysis of phenomenology. It first

makes possible a specific-scientific thematization of consciousness in the sense of a “phenomenological psychology” as well as the intentional analytic motivated by the philosophical problem of the relation of being and knowing.

The problem of evidence, the inquiry searching for the presentation of the existent itself, becomes for Husserl an inquiry into the originary modes of consciousness. By departing from non-originary knowledge, the peculiarity of its non-originality, its “reference back,” is conceptualized by penetrating into the implicit sense of non-originary knowledge. As a result, the search for originary knowledge has acquired a determinate, guiding idea. Obviously, “originary” knowledge is knowledge that *no longer refers back* in itself and no longer receives sense from pointings back that are modifications = of originary knowledge. Rather, originary knowledge is precisely the referent of every pointing back and is that which bestows sense upon each modification altered in the process of modification.

Originary consciousness – this is in fact Husserl’s idea – is *sense-bestowing* [*sinngebendes*] consciousness, that *beginning* consciousness which *bestows sense upon* a whole chain of modifications, obscurations and mediacies such that it is its sense that is “modified,” “obscured” and “mediated.” Originary and non-originary modes of consciousness do not stand next to one another, separate and unrelated, but form a unity of sense, a nexus of sense, an interrelated *system*. For example, “pure” perception is implicit in memory, expectation, phantasy, mere thinking, etc., analogous to the way the possible “actuality” is implicit in a possibility.

By means of the guiding clue of intentional “pointing back” and under the guiding idea of a sense-bestowing consciousness, Husserl arrives at the “*hypothésis*” of phenomenology in the determination of *originarity as intuition*. For him, seeing is original evidence. It is the mode of consciousness in which the existent shows itself in its “flesh and blood” existence, the mode in which the existent presents itself. The existent shows itself in seeing as both what it is and how it is. But is not such a beginning arbitrary? Is not the proclamation of seeing merely an authoritative decree of reason? Is there, then, a criterion for “seeing’s” actually being the genuine, unobstructed access to the existent itself? It is significant for the intentional-analytic style of Husserl’s thinking that the problem of evidence is set apart from all controversial questions concerning “criteria” and is transformed into a *problem of research*. Instead of speculating argumentively about the justification for seeing and setting forth empty, contrary possibilities constructed by thought, seeing is to be exercised, original evidence is to be produced. It is precisely in this way that seeing is to be determined to be the ultimate “criterion” for all mere possibilities constructed by thought. Seeing is legitimized only by its accomplishment: the showing of the existent itself. One cannot go back behind seeing, because seeing is the ultimate, primal mode of human cognition’s being with the existent, the mode that bestows sense upon

all other modified modes of consciousness. Seeing can be inexact or incomplete. However, it can be rectified only by seeing, by more exact, more complete seeing. Seeing can “deceive,” can be mis-taken. However, the possibility of deception does not confute the authority of seeing, for even deceptions can be shown to be deceptions only by better seeing.

Husserl most emphatically states his fundamental understanding of intuition as the original access of knowing to the existent in the following proposition. “No theory we can imagine can mislead us with regard to the principle of all principles: that every intuition that presents something originally is a source of legitimacy for knowledge, that everything presented to us originally (in its ‘flesh and blood’ actuality as it were) in intuition is to be taken simply as that which presents itself.”³ Is this intuitionism? No, if by intuitionism is understood a contention that *sensory* intuition is the only true cognitive access to the existent, a contention that is based upon the traditional division of the psyche.

For Husserl, intuition is not merely sensory intuition, sensory seeing. Rather, it is any type of consciousness in which its corresponding object is given in the mode of “itself-there,” such as the way sensuously given things are given in sensory intuition. More precisely, intuition is for Husserl the title for *that common to all types of the presentation of something itself*. It is, therefore, a concept by analogy in which the guiding sense is the intuition of sensory experience. There is, however, an intuition or, better, intuitiveness pertaining to arithmetic and geometric thinking, logical thinking, judicative thinking, the experience of another psyche (“empathy”), etc. Numbers and number relations “present themselves” in a different way than things. Pure corporality “presents itself” differently than animated corporality of plants and animals, and so forth. The fundamental types of existent prescribe the fundamental types of experiences in which they present themselves. The prior, prejudiced determination of what should be accepted as “the presentation of something itself,” e.g., by a dogmatic thesis of “sensationalism,” “naturalism” or “empiricism,” cuts one off from the possibility of originally grasping the existent of a type other than that which presents itself in the mode of access absolutized by the thesis.

Is it not “circular” when Husserl’s phenomenology, with the principal purpose of being open to everything existent, to the existent of every type, *extends* the concept of “intuition” to every type of primal-model consciousness? Is not originarity first explicated by intuition, then intuition by originarity?

The initial determination of the originarity which is sought as “intuition” in the narrow sense provides direction for the *analytic* explication of the *intentional* composition of this, *a type* of presentation of something itself. Thus, an understanding is effected which brings to light the whole context of this evidence along with the series of modifications which pertain to it

sensefully, the whole, latent referential structure. Certainly one cannot go back behind seeing. However, one can penetrate seeing analytically and explicate it according to the whole, concealed wealth of implicit intentional structures. In such an intentional analysis, the merely initial stage is to first verify seeing to be a presentation of something itself. Sense, limit, structure, relations of references of originary, sensible cognition, the system of coordination between object-structure and the structure of cognition, all come to light in the analysis. In a way analogous to this kind of analytic clarification, each claim that a type of cognition is “originary” must be examined. The extension of the concept of intuition is not an uncritical generalization. The sense-bestowing originarity of any professed evidence must be developed analytically. Therefore, one cannot claim, by appealing to the phenomenological thesis, that each type of existent has its original type of experience pertaining to it – perhaps some kind of uncontrollable, ‘mystical’ presentations of the existent – without conducting the analytic proof for this claim. Living in the certainty of a true or meant evidence is something completely different than justifying a mode of cognition as evidence. Justification here does not mean simply a demonstrating, a simple showing (even though this is also essential). It is also a presenting of the presentation-of-something-itself itself, an *intentional-analytic evidence of evidence*. “Originary consciousness” is here the *sought*, the problematic. Likewise, the existent is sought as well. In sum, the totality of the originary modes of consciousness is sought, since within this totality is to be shown what the existent is.

In Husserl’s phenomenology, the problem of evidence (understood as a philosophical problem) becomes an intentional investigation of correlates. This is not an investigation of a correlation given unproblematically but, rather, is primarily an inquiry into a correlation that must be investigated. Because the presentation of the existent itself or “evidence” is removed from naive certainty and becomes the aim of man’s theoretical seeking, a seeking in which man wants to renew the presentation from the ground up in all of his existential relations to the world, things, the ideal and God, an inquiry into the primordial *meeting of knowledge and being* commences. It is an inquiry into the light of an original encounter and agreement which, as the *idea* of truth, is the fundamental presupposition of sense for the possibility of knowledge as such. This encounter is attested to by knowledge that is meant, for its authority is derived from a meant connection with the “things themselves.”

The phenomenological concept of the “presentation of something itself” contains the idea of a primal relation, a primal correlation – namely, the true *synousia^d* of existent and knowledge which makes truth possible. Husserl used the term “experience,” similar to the way he used the concept of “intuition,” in order to express the originality of knowingly being-with-the-existent-itself. Here again, a narrow sense of the world – meaning *a type* of

cognizing – and a broader sense of the world – meaning a *characteristic way of carrying out cognition* that concerns all types of cognition – are to be distinguished.

As Husserl says, phenomenology is “radical empiricism” in so far as it is motivated by the vehement desire to set aside for a time all meanings, validities, traditions, convictions, acquaintances and customs and to acquire a relation to everything existent in which the existent is experienced originally. The structure of the “experiences” which are sought, experiences that present the existent itself, therefore, is fundamentally determined intentionally. That is, the correlation which is in question has an intentional sense. It is of preeminent significance for an integral understanding of the metaphysical problem which drives and moves Husserl’s philosophy to recognize that the intentional structure of the phenomenological problem of evidence cannot be derived from the formal essence of intentionality. The existent is not found in an intentional analytic because every consciousness, including originally-experiencing consciousness, is a *consciousness = of an object* and because a *meant as such* always lies in its being. A psychological (specific-scientific) investigation of intentionality finds meant existents in consciousness, existents given in various modes of consciousness (itself present, meditately present, present meditately by reiteration, etc.). Therefore, it is not the job of the psychologist to examine the concept of being valid for both him and the analyzed consciousness, the concept of being which determines the sense of “itself present,” “meditately present,” etc. He is ontologically disinterested. He investigates the given consciousness and the properties of consciousness connected with its intentionally meant existent. He remains within the thematic domain of the psychic when he analyzes the inner-psychic correlation between modes of consciousness and “objective” sense. The misunderstanding of the principal distinction between philosophy and specific science in the concept of phenomenology leads, then, to the almost inveterate error in the repeatedly formulated objection that Husserl’s phenomenology is uninterested in the “question of reality,” in the problem of being. It is objected that phenomenology thematized the existent merely as a subjective formation of meaning, as a moment of sense in the intentional life of consciousness.

The philosophical search for the existent – phenomenologically, the search for originary evidences – is the attempt to grasp consciousness in its meeting with the existent, in its experiencing ability, in its accomplishment of legitimizing being, in its *executive function*.

In order to understand the formulation of the phenomenological problem in its desire to attain a radical presuppositionlessness, it is necessary to disregard all preconceived theories concerning “immanence” and “transcendence” and the subjective and objective moments of the cognitive relation. By this, naturally, the knowledge gained from such epistemological distinctions is not doubted or even challenged. Rather, “no use is made of it”

as long as everything is still open in the struggle for an original “experience” of the existent. Therefore, the meeting of the existent and consciousness cannot be forced into the schema, one which is familiar to us, of a correlation between “object” and “subject,” of “object” and “act.” This schema is tacitly determined by the model of the so-called “transcendent perception of a thing,” as if the existent stood on one side, consciousness on the other. Is it the case, then, that the existent is only that experienced, perceived, remembered, judged, meant, desired, etc. within the fundamental attitude of consciousness, an attitude that is discovered first and that accords with consciousness’ way of life directed to nature, to the “external world”? Is it not the case that consciousness, the experiencing and the perceiving also “are”? Is knowing not a “relation to being”? If consciousness itself “exists” in the midst of the whole of the existent as an existent and is encompassed by the existent, then consciousness can certainly never simply have the encompassing-enveloping whole “over against it” and remain outside of the whole itself. On the other hand, consciousness, as consciousness = of, as intentionality, is knowing that objectifies [*vergegenständlichendes Wissen*]. The formulation of the fundamental problem of phenomenology is also characterized by that which it leaves undecided and unstated, viz. how the objectification of the existent in accordance with knowing must be understood as an *intra-ontic* occurrence.

In its provisional form as the inquiry into the originary evidence of the existent, Husserl’s inquiry into the presentation of something itself is accompanied by a concept of “object” that can lead to a radical misunderstanding. Namely, the interpretation of the concept of “existent” just rejected seems to be present in the concept of “object.” Husserl calls for an *extension of the concept of existent* that corresponds with the extension of the concept of “object,” “object” being understood as the correlate of an act that intends something, an act whose correlate has been identified sensuously. This extension is directed *against* a naive, pre-philosophical narrowness in which, thanks to his “naturalistic” prejudice, man for the most part holds that only what he can grasp with his hands exists; the sensuously real, the visible, audible things. As a result, numbers and ideal sense formations (e.g., logic) cannot be grasped in their *self-sufficient being as existents of a unique type* and become objects of psychologicistic misinterpretations. The extension is properly only the expression of a methodological precaution: any existent, however it is composed, is to be accepted initially as it shows itself without any prejudice. That is, it is to be grasped in its objective content. What can be legitimated in originary acts as something self-same and identical, with its own style, its own unique properties and determinations in a way particular to it, is, in spite of all prejudices, something *self-sufficient* and *independent*. In this sense, it is an “existent.”

The sense of this extended concept of existent which opposes naturalistic narrowness establishes it as a *provisional, auxiliary* concept that governs the

formulation of the phenomenological problem of evidence. However, this sense is still *prior* to the genuine, philosophical discussion of the ontological concepts in Husserl's phenomenology.

With this reservation, the *synousia* of the existent and knowledge is determinable as the sought *intentional system of correlation* between the originary modes of consciousness, understood in their executive function of legitimization ("accomplishment" [*Leistung*]), and the *fundamental types of objects*. However, since a running back through the referential relations of non-evident knowing, an awakening of that which is "implicated" latently, is set in action in the search for originary evidences, and since a consciousness accepted at first as "primal-modal" must be verified, a verification in which the consciousness must be shown to be the "sense-bestowing consciousness" in all of its sense-modifications – to take a simple case, perception bestows sense upon the whole reiteration of intentionalities in the case of a memory of a memory: M' (M (P)) – the *whole* consciousness, with its concealed, inner rational order of "primal modes" in their intentional modifications, becomes thematic in the process of considering the problem of evidence. The final objects which are discoverable in *evidences*, then, become *indices* for an intentional analytic of all of the ways of being related both knowingly and meaningfully (intuitively and non-intuitively) to the existent. The existent is set within the concrete system of conscious life and, hence, an atmosphere of life is acquired by the existent's *being-for-man*. Phenomenologically, evident knowing is not simply opposed to non-evident knowing. This opposition is not "fixed" by a rejection of non-originary knowing. Rather, non-originary knowing, in its modified relation to the existent, is to be clarified on the basis of originary knowing. As a result, the intentional-analytic problem of evidence also encompasses the "*evidence of the non-evident*."

In the indicated, provisional form of the intentional analytic, the presentation of the existent itself is sought *in so far as the existent is already the existent with a determinate whatness*. What is sought are evidences, the fundamental types of originary consciousness. The "extension" made by equating the existent with the self-sufficient object is precisely an indication of the fact that the question does not yet concern the *evidence of the existent qua existent* but, rather, the presentation of the existent itself which is articulated into regions.

The direction of the inquiry into the originary evidences, an inquiry conducted phenomenologically by *analytically demonstrating a cognition's primal-modal characteristic* and not by referring to its subjective certainty, is guided by a *preliminary method* in which the *domains of objects*, the regions of the existent articulated by genus and species according to the what-content of the existent, are the givens for the analytic examination of evidence. In other words, the problem of the presentation of the existent itself, the entities which stand under eidetic universalities, is guided by a prior, methodical

grasping of the eidetic universalities themselves. Husserl called this grasping of essences *ideation*. Ideation is in fact what is meant by the traditional title “*a priori*” knowledge, the cognitive accomplishment of the so-called *eidetic sciences*. However, it is Husserl’s understanding that the *methods* of eidetic cognition in the *de facto*, present eidetic sciences are, for a change, underdetermined and, further, that there has yet to come about a complete formation of all of the possible eidetic sciences, sciences which would be joined together in the unity of a system. In tackling the problem of the methodically clear establishment of the systematic totality of all eidetic knowledge, Husserl’s phenomenology sees a program of work, the carrying out of which is of the greatest importance for the fundamental question concerning the presentation of the existent itself – or, more exactly, for the exposition of this fundamental question. The considerable stress Husserl gives the required theory of essences (eidetics) has frequently misled readers to the opinion that phenomenology is actually nothing other than eidetic science. In contrast to this, it is necessary above all to recognize the *preliminary* role of eidetics, a role that serves the exposition of the problem. Eidetic science is not philosophy but *positive* science (for example, logic, mathematics). By means of a methodical investigation into its true eidetic universality, the vague, general acquaintance with its field of objects, which any empirical science already has in its formulation, enables the *a priori*, the *a priori* structure, to be clearly established and clearly defined. As a result, the science becomes conscious of the *a priori* structure within which empirical research can be carried on. The enormous importance of a preceding, *a priori* determination for an empiricism corresponding to and guided by it is shown by the example of modern natural science.

The *de facto*, formed eidetic disciplines of mathematics and logic, the two splendid, rational instruments of natural science, do not encompass the full *a priori* of nature, an *a priori* that must be developed systematically. A series of eidetic sciences has not yet been outlined as such. The existent is explained in accordance with the articulation into universal regions of whatness which is present in the existent. Therefore, a fundamental distinction stands out for Husserl in the determinations attributed to the existent in accordance with essence. This distinction is expressed by the distinction between “material” and “formal” eidetic sciences. Concisely stated, Husserl calls a determination of an existent that predicates a whatness in the sense of a genus and species “material” (for example, being a living being – being an animal). (The concepts of genus and species may not, however, be taken in the loose sense of mere concepts of type.) Eidetic concepts that abstract from all aspects referring to a determinate what-content and determine the existent in its empty structural form are “formal” (for example, as being something, as being a multitude, etc.). Husserl also designates the distinction between the material and formal *a priori* to be the distinction between “synthetic” and “analytic” *a*

priori (whereby this concept of “analytic” must be strictly differentiated from that of intentional-analytic). Again, Husserl also speaks of the distinction between “material” and “formal ontologies.”

Since Husserl calls the theory of the eidetic universalities of the existent “ontology” and, with respect to the multiplicity of regions, even speaks of “ontologies” in the plural, he entitles a group of positive sciences with a term which otherwise designates the *philosophical* problem of being. This has its unfortunate consequences. Either the restricted, particular sense that the term “ontology” has for Husserl is generally not recognized and, hence, phenomenology is interpreted without regard for what here has been termed “ontology” – therefore, phenomenology is misunderstood to be a universal theory of essence – or one sees the limited, prephilosophical sense of Husserl’s term but then fails to see the ontological problem in phenomenology as such – i.e., the problem inquiring into the concept of the genuine existent. It is difficult to see something if the name is lacking.

However, the theory of essence *can* also be a title for a theory that emerged from the philosophical determination of the existent. For Husserl, eidetics is not that *at first*. The concept of essence does not first have a sense developed ontologically (i.e., in accordance with the concept of being). Rather, it is determined by the *provisional* concept of the existent, by the *object in the broadest sense*, and determined this way by design. “Ontology” (= eidetics) is outlined as the *a priori theory of objects*.

The construction of the science of the material and formal essences of objects is effected by the method of ideation for Husserl. Ideation is an act of consciousness that presents something itself. In this act, the “ideal object,” the essence, originally shows itself and as a result institutes an insight into the universal style of being of the individual entities standing under this eidetic universality. The eidetics outlined as the theory of objects is, as the theoretical procedure of ideation, fully *naïve* as long as it only has the preliminary function of making the eidetic regions available for the intentional-analytic problem of the presentation of the entities themselves which stand *under* the eidetic universalities, as long as it provides the “*ontological guiding clues*,” as Husserl expressed it, for intentional analysis. This eidetics claims to be the originary presentation of the *eidos* itself, but it is not the intentional-analytic justification of this claim. This means that even logico-mathematical evidence (as an example of the evidence of ideative knowledge) – traditionally praised as the paradigm of evidence as such – requires a clarification.

Husserl terms ideation, as a method that is used and a method that naively establishes eidetic knowledge, an *intuitive* knowledge. In order to emphasize its being a mode of intuition, Husserl also called ideation “the seeing of an essence” [*Wesensschau*]. Once again, however, “intuition” and “seeing” must not be equated with sensory seeing, seeing with the bodily eyes. Essences are not visible things. Nevertheless, ideation is a seeing and, indeed, one so

forceful that the seen essence as it were springs up before one's eyes. The methodical structure of ideation can be characterized by the *two stages* of the phenomenological grasping of essences. An ingenious eidetic insight that comes like lightning is always *possible*. However, it can never become a method. Even though it is precisely this ingenious insight which is occasionally meant by the word "intuition," it is not valid for the phenomenological concept of the seeing of an essence. This is a thoroughly jejune and circumstantial procedure. In the attempt to establish the essential structure of a domain of objects, a domain pre-given in its vague typicality – e.g., the essential uniqueness of the corporal, material thing of nature – the *first stage* in Husserl's method is to *vary* an exemplarily chosen thing in its given composition such that all the possibilities lying within its unawakened horizon of sense, the possibilities of the can-also-be-otherwise, are *tried out* as it were, are expressly run through. Again, this is not merely a vague "phantasying" the thing to be otherwise. Such a procedure would not enable one to clearly see the incompatibility of determinations imagined to be together. Rather, it is an intuitive, clear and elaborate *presenting* of the possibilities of being otherwise that do not destroy the identity of the thing. The possibilities which lie within the undeveloped sense of a thing cannot be ascertained by a quick glance of casual assessment. Rather, they are ascertained only by running through the range of intuitively presentable possibilities. We have *motivated* possibilities, which guide the variation initially, by means of our memory of determinations of a thing which were experienced in the past and do not occur in the present example and by indications of possible alterations given in the example. However, it is in *phantasy* that we first free ourselves from the bond of *de facto* reality and rush through the range of all possibilities, possibilities both motivated and unmotivated. The exemplary thing can then be freely modified with respect to all directions and all determinations. Series of individual possibilities are formed, even whole systems of ordered series. The genuine seeing of an essence, the establishment of the essence by objectifying it, takes place on the ground of this variation which explores the range of possibility, on the ground of this empiricism of phantasy. This *second stage* of ideation is as it were the bringing of the range of possibility *within* which the variation took place into view. It is the thematization of the invariance that bears all of the variants. The being-self-same which makes all being-other possible stands out from the innumerable, different, intuitively presented possibilities of being-other. *Possibility*, the essence which makes the variants possible, stands out from the multifarious variants which are possible. Moreover, what stands out is the essence *as object* and, in accordance with that discussed previously, as "existent."

An essence is the essence of the entities standing under it. For Husserl, the relation of an essence to the entities standing under it is initially – i.e., on the

provisional level of the problem – in no way determined by that relation which dominated the traditional metaphysics of essence; viz., the relation between a ground of being which externalizes itself and “appearance.” For Husserl, essence is taken to be the invariance of the sense of the object in contrast to the possibilities of the object’s being this or that which lie within its sense. From the beginning, this invariance has a sense that is related to cognition. Invariance is what is maintained in all, however varied, presentations. Therefore, a connection between being and consciousness is set forth even by the method of ideation. This connection becomes very important in the later, intentional-analytic clarification of eidetic evidence.

The important auxiliary position of the “theory of object” eidetics for the exposition of the phenomenologically central problem of evidence lies in the fact that it predelineates the general directives of the regions of the existent determined with respect to its ontological whiteness for the search for original knowledge of the genuine existent. Thus, it prepares the ground for the question concerning the connection between the fundamental types of objects and the fundamental types of originary evidence. However, fruitful methods lead all too easily to uncritical extensions. It is an open question whether the method of ideation just outlined could be carried out in all of the eidetic domains of the existent; for example, whether the essence of man could be apprehended by the phantasy-modification of possibilities. It is also a naivete, represented by the “early” Husserl, though later revised, to extend the eidetic method formed with regard to the existent as object to “consciousness” and its connection with its objects and, thus, to seek to develop the problem of evidence by an *investigation of correlates that proceeds eidetically*. The inquiry into the presentation of the existent itself, in so far as it has a method, can acquire significant “guiding clues” from the “theory of objects” ideation. However, the philosophical problem cannot itself be governed in its method by a naive “presentation of the essence itself.” The method of ideation itself forms a problem of evidence in which the originally giving consciousness is first to be analytically disclosed and then what the essence “is” is to be determined.

6. *Intentional Analysis*

The specific characteristic of the idea of an intentional analytic which emerges from the phenomenological fundamental question concerning the presentation of the existent itself should now be more closely defined by a discussion of the concept of “intentional analysis.” Is intentional analysis a thorough analysis of something previously given, something therefore which is at hand, or is it the access to intentionality? The phenomenological answer to the alternatives can be formulated by this thesis: “*intentionality as such is first brought to light by intentional analysis*. By this, Husserl’s concept of intentionality is clearly distinguished from the “sensationalism of

intentionality,” the theory which holds that intentionalities can be ascertained as data, as givenneses found on the tablet of consciousness, just as sensationalism ascertains sense data. Intentionality in the phenomenological sense is not merely a property of the psychic that we become aware of reflectively. We are well acquainted with consciousness = of as, for example, looking at something, judging something, acknowledging and rejecting something, loving and hating something, and the like. We do not need to discover intentionality in this sense. Just as we have things, ideal sense-formations (e.g., numbers) and unitary objects on the side of objects, we find unitary acts on the subjective side. Reflection shows us multifarious subjective processes, all of which bear in themselves the peculiarity of consciousness = of. Therefore, they bear the “property” of intentionality in themselves. Thus, a classification of acts grasped reflectively according to their respective intentional sense remains based upon “intentionality” being something “pregiven.”

It is Husserl's decisive, fundamental insight into the essence of intentionality that the apparently simple consciousness = of is the result of a simplification [Vereinfachleistung], such that consciousness = of is a confluence of many multiplicities of consciousness into a compact consciousness = of that conceals the moments of sense which are active and operative in it. The task of intentional analysis is to uncover the modes of consciousness, modes that are *laden with sense* [*sinnerfüllten*], which operate in concealment and are veiled by their result. Its theme is *functioning intentionality*, the actively sense-forming, sense-producing and sense-transforming function of consciousness which in concealing itself, forms the simple, psychic act-unities. Both the pre-given and ever available intentionality and functioning intentionality have the same formal characteristic; each is precisely consciousness = of. The *problem* of intentionality is to inquire back to the syntheses of the intentional accomplishments [*Leistungen*] which contribute sense, syntheses by which a “simple” act of consciousness is formed, by departing from the gross act-unities of subjective life. Therefore, the passage back to an originally legitimizing consciousness required by the fundamental problem of the presentation of the existent itself obviously cannot stop with a simple, primal-modal *act*, however much this act, as opposed to its intentional modifications, is demonstrated to be the sense-bestowing consciousness. Rather, it is necessary to then make the originary consciousness = of expressly and analytically thematic and, thus, to understand it in its function, in its active formation of sense. The simplified act-form of evidence must be taken back to the beginning of the process of simplification and be demonstrated to be the result of this process of functioning intentionality. With this, however, the idea of an intentional analytic is determined to be an inquiry of enormous proportions. Not only are all the modes of human knowing of the existent to

be traced back to the grounding, originary modes that bestow sense and to be understood from that point; in addition, these primal modes of consciousness which present something itself are themselves to be explicated and differentiated, a procedure that exhibits the whole dimension of the intentional sense locked up in them.

The question of how functioning intentionality, which otherwise remains latent, is to be brought to light by intentional analysis, of how to go back to the functioning intentionality behind the simple act-form, appears to be answered by the possibility of *reflection*. By reflection we usually understand the explicit mode of our self-consciousness, the explicit mode of our knowledge of the knowing of objects, which consists in a cognitive turning toward the subjective life. We turn as it were from the perceived to the perceiving, from the judgment to the judging, from the objects to the subjective. Such reflective turnings, however, are always well known and familiar to us. We are acquainted with the correlation between object and consciousness = of the object, and with the fact that the unity of the act corresponds to the unity of the object. However, reflection on the act, *noetic* reflection, is determined with respect to its possible range and depth by the sense of the *object* from which the reflection turns to that which corresponds to it subjectively. This insight is an essential moment of the phenomenological method of intentional analysis. Since reflection always merely turns away from the *compact unity* of the object, from the thing to consciousness of the thing, from number to counting, reflection concerns just such a compact, subjective unity of life, the act, and does not get behind it. The fundamental uniqueness of intentional analysis rests in the method of *noematic reflection*; i.e., in reflection on the *object in the how of its being meant*. The objective sense, the *noema*, the sense of the existent – that from which the turning back to the subjective consciousness = of begins – is investigated according to its inexpressly given horizon of sense, the horizons of sense implicitly given along with the object, *prior to genuine-noetic* reflection. As a result, the latter acquires a guiding clue for breaking up the compact act-unity and inquiring methodically into the implicit, sense-forming intentionalities within it. Husserl's elementary example is the phenomenological analysis of the perception of a corporal thing. If we turn back immediately from the seen tree to the subjective process of seeing, without first developing the seen tree expressly according to its moments of sense, the analysis rapidly comes to an end. Against this, Husserl begins with reflection on the tree in the *how of its modes of appearance*. The seen tree, for example, is seen from one side. However, the whole tree is implied by this side; i.e., the sides that are not yet seen but which have possible modes of being seen. I could walk around the tree, but would again have only *one* side with the implication of the others. The tree appears to me in a precisely investigatable system of the givenness of sides, a system of the modes of appearance which are inseparable from the tree. One normally does not

pay attention to this structure of appearance, especially when a simple, thematic interest is involved.

In such a case, the modes of appearance are lived through [*durchlebt*], not observed [*erlebt*]. The thematic interest is focused, as if by a lens, upon the one, unitary object. *Noematic* reflection shatters this thematic simplicity of consciousness and objectifies the whole system of the lived-through modes of appearance by which the simple object is given. All of the *noematically* established moments of the givenness of sides, the givenness of nearness and distance, the outer and inner horizons and so forth, become indices for *noetic*-reflective inquiries. Further, noematic reflection is directed towards the object in the *how of its modes of givenness*, towards its self-sameness in the differing modes of perception, memory, phantasy, etc. It is directed towards the implicit horizon of previous, “sedimented” experiences which lie in the sense of the object and provide indications for subjective accomplishments which institute sense. Continuing along these lines, there results an ever increasing quantity of differentiations that constitute the *essential aspect* of intentional analysis. The style of phenomenological work is expressed precisely by Husserl’s demand for an analytic that is *carried through*. The problem of evidence is transformed into the nearly infinite task of explicating the universe of consciousness in all of its still unforeseeable, hidden implications and tracing consciousness’ ability to legitimate the existent to its utmost depths.

We cannot portray here what the intentional analysis which is *carried out* is like, which abundance of structures, which forms of intentionality it enables one to see, with the fullness and range of the analyses actually performed by Husserl. Our concern here is only with an interpretation of the fundamental sense of phenomenology. According to its idea, intentional analytic is the development of the problem of evidence, the development of the problem of the presentation of the existent itself. According to its method, it is characterized as a *determining that uncovers*. It does not determine something already given, something already present. Rather, it discloses what is to be determined – which is concealed – for the first time. It raises functioning intentionality, which conceals itself in its own results, from unconsciousness and establishes it by making it an object. As the awakening, the “explication of implications” of intentional sensuousness, intentional analytic is guided by the *noematic*-reflective explication of the object. The objective horizons of sense then refer to the clarification of the formations of sense, a clarification to be accomplished analytically.

The specific, methodical characteristic of the phenomenological analysis of intentionality, which is shown by the “bringing forth,” by the uncovering of that which is certainly not something given at first, is easily misunderstood if one interprets Husserl’s designation for intentional analytic made in the context of his *theoretical statements* – viz., the title “intentional description”

– on the basis of the usual type of description instead of, conversely, deriving the sense of description from the peculiarity of intentionality. The general sense of description, by which is meant a procedure of faithfully rendering that which one sees such that it is rendered in the way that he sees it, *prior to* all “explanatory” theories, also remains valid for intentional description. However, we are all too easily committed, on the basis of the so-called descriptive natural sciences, to the idea that description should be the faithful depiction of something present, something given as being present. *Intentional* description, however, is not a depiction of psychic “things” called intentionalities that are present in the sphere of consciousness. Intentional description is intentional in that it has functioning intentionality as its theme and is itself a mode of the functioning.

This signifies a particularly difficult problem for the *conceptualization* of the phenomenological intentional analytic. It is the question of whether the sense-forming, sense-producing life becomes an object in the analytic in the same sense that things, that objects in general become objects for us. Is it not the case that this analytic shows that the simple consciousness of objects takes place on the concealed ground of an active, functioning system of intentional sense-formation? Is that *by which* we have things and objects conceptually determinable by the concepts which apply to things and objects?

In its essential formulation, this is the question concerning the *being* of intentionality. By this question, the interlacing of the two moments of the phenomenological problem of the presentation of the existent itself makes itself felt. Because the being of intentionality has not been clarified, the intentional analytic of the originary evidences of the existent articulated in accordance with eidetic universalities faces the disturbing problem which drives it beyond what has here been characterized as the *formulation* of the fundamental question of phenomenology.

TRANSLATOR'S NOTES

^aConsternation or terror.

^bThat which stands under.

^cIn this essay, Fink completes sections A and B of this proposed project.

^dCommunion

AUTHOR'S NOTES

1. The following exposition forms the first part of a book with the same title. The space available here necessitates our limiting the discussion to the *formulation* [*Ansatz*] of the problem of phenomenology.
2. Cf. Plato, *Theaetetus*, 155D: “This sense of wonder is the mark of the

philosopher. Philosophy indeed has no other origin, and he was a good genealogist who made Iris the daughter of Thaumas." In addition, cf. Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, 982b11: "For it is owing to their wonder that men both now and at first began to philosophize."

3. E. Husserl, *Ideas*, Section 24, p. 84.

OPERATIVE CONCEPTS IN HUSSERL'S PHENOMENOLOGY*

EUGEN FINK

When attempting to discuss the *operative* concepts of Husserl's phenomenology, one cannot simply present a report, an apology or a critique, for each of these above all involves taking a theoretical position on what is expressed in a philosophical doctrine, on the ideas that a thinker made thematic. Certainly any such position-taking, as long as it arises out of philosophical interest, is guided by a reference to the matter in question. It is because we strive for truth that we read what philosophers have written; we try to penetrate through what they say to the "matter" [*Sache*] which stood before their eyes and was the *theme* of their mental glance. In following and understanding what they said about the matter of thought [*die Sache des Denkens*] we hope to approach this matter itself. Whether one presents, defends or criticizes a philosophy, one presupposes that philosophy is above all an attempt to express something which is true. Our participation in the truth of a philosophical doctrine makes possible a genuine and just presentation, defence, or criticism. The appropriate relation to a philosophy is obviously that of philosophizing-along-with. Philosophizing-along-with takes the form of a sharing in our common relation to the matter of thought. We have here, as it were, a *redoubled thematic*: the philosophizing thought becomes a "theme" with respect to its assertions about what, for itself, is the original theme.

Sometimes, to be sure, a shift of interest occurs, for instance, when the thoughts of a thinker are exhibited not for the sake of their possible truth, but for their symptomatic significance, as when one sees in them documents of the times, existential attitudes or social manifestations. It is incontestable that philosophical statements are always also socio-historical symptoms; they are evidence for the greatness and misery of our finite existence. But they are not merely testimonials to the life of man. They cannot be adequately comprehended by psychological or sociological categories, for in philosophy man does not remain in the closed compass of his life. In understanding he

*Translated by William McKenna from Eugen Fink, "Operative Begriffe in Husserls Phänomenologie," *Nähe und Distanz* (Freiburg i. Br./München: Verlag Karl Alber, 1976); originally published in *Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung*, Band XI (1957), pp. 321-37.

reaches into the farthest corners of the universe, and seeks to determine all that is in accordance with its sense: the depths of the earth and the heights of heaven, Gods and men, land and sea, animals and plants, natural and artificial things, sensible and mathematical [*Zahlenhaft-figurales*] objects, things which simply are and things which are creations of freedom, like, for example, institutions. Man questions all such things, asking for their specific character [*Art-Charakter*] (*eidos*) and thingliness (substantiality). He calls it “being” [*das “Seiende”*^a] and, in thinking, he is filled with wonder at Being an entity [*Seiendsein*] as such, at actuality and possibility, at Being, becoming and appearing, at the relatedness of thought to Being and the capacity of beings to be thought.

In everyday life, to be sure, man avails himself of these distinctions without thinking – he *makes use of* them, but he does not explicitly reflect on them. Philosophy has the peculiar task of fixing the understanding of Being, thoughtlessly employed in everyday life, from the detachment of an original wonder, of unsettling it and probing it by thinking it out. However, no valid criterion for this examination exists beforehand, rather the *criterion* is precisely what is most *questionable*. The “ontology of everyday life” seems to be “ready-made.” One uses with ease and familiarity the requisite distinctions of “things” and “property,” “form” and “matter,” “essence” and “appearance,” “actuality” and “possibility,” “fact” and “ideal,” but one does not think them over when employing them. They nonetheless appear to express something that everyone more or less understands. The “ontology of philosophy” in contrast is by no means ready-made and settled once and for all, it is *open*. All thinking wherein we try to conceptualize Being penetrates deeper and deeper into the unfathomable. However, philosophy, in its quest, does not always just proceed from the unquestionability of everyday life. Rather, its impulse dies out again and again in the course of history and it sinks down into something which is a matter of course and ordinary – it ends in everyday acceptance. The usual, unquestioned and everyday understanding that man has of Being is prephilosophical and also postphilosophical. There is a peculiar kind of tension between philosophizing and the normal way of life. Philosophy does not merely introduce a distrust, a skeptical doubt and an extreme suspicion into the general trust in being of non-philosophizing existence, it also introduces a distrust into its own distrust and suspects that it is itself, in its endless quest, placed in question by that basic unquestionability. Reflection does not unconditionally have a higher rank than the naiveté of life. Taken ontically, “Spirit” [*Geist*] is a passion of man, perhaps the most fearful, yet at the same time, most fruitful passion. Aristophanes’ jesting at Socrates’ brooding and chiseling away at concepts is perhaps always justified.^b

Once we leave aside such reservations, we can ask: In what does turning thematically to a philosophy consist? One can answer: It consists in thinking along with, reflecting on, and thinking over the ideas that a thinker has

verbally formulated and expressed concerning the matter of thought and which he has set down in the form of a book. But here many problems arise. What is the *matter of thought*? Is it an object [*Gegenstand*] that is accessible to all? Does the usual and current understanding of “subject matter” [*Sache*] suffice to give valid information here? Do the thoughts of a thinker always concern the same object? With some entity or other – or with the highest entity – or with all existing things in general? Even if philosophy essentially arises from wonder, the finding of particular things or subject matters is perhaps less characteristic of it than is a rational interpretation of being a matter [*Sachheit*] as such, an interpretation of the being [*Seiendheit*] of things which are. The “theme” of philosophizing, so to speak, cannot be determined outside of philosophizing at all. Philosophy does not only inquire into something concealed, hidden or disguised; it is itself, with respect to its theme, continually questionable. But if it cannot even unequivocally clearly and surely be said what the proper *theme* of philosophy is, a report on a philosophical statement documented in literary form, or even an apology or criticism of one is a still more precarious affair. For here an interpretation of verbal meaning is always involved, but the sort of verbal meaning that does not concern something established and commonly known, but which attempts to express the unsettling of all established acquaintance. The thoughts of a thinker cannot be “reported on” like other opinions and theses which stem from the unquestioned human life-world. Since philosophy, in its concrete thematic, is already “interpretation,” is already a speculative determination of what being an existent is for all existing things, the report on a philosophy is unavoidably an *interpretation of an interpretation*.

There is already a controversy as to what the *thematic* basic concepts of a given philosophy are. To be sure such basic concepts are usually explicitly named by each thinker and strongly stressed. Nevertheless, there is often a related controversy between interpreters who are following and understanding an author, interpreters who occasionally want to understand the author better than he had understood himself, or who seek to draw into the light what is silently in the background, the esoteric heart of his world of thought. Our discussion of the *operative* concepts of Husserl's phenomenology is not oriented toward such a venture. Here, it will not be a matter of superelevating Husserl's thoughts, if ever so little, as if we were like the sparrow, who, borne high by the eagle, by beating his wings upward rises slightly higher. Many times the exaltation of a thinker is attempted by epigones after the model of striving to exhibit methodological naivetés and unproved presuppositions in his philosophy or by assigning him a place in a constructed course of history during which he is overtaken “with historical necessity” by the thinkers who come after him. One can certainly speak of the *operative* concepts of a philosophy as “methodological naivetés,” as “unproved assumptions,” or even as “historically conditioned” and the like.

But then the sense which is here decisively important still remains in the fog of generality. Not every naive presupposition of a thinker is an *operative concept*.^c Thus we must first of all attempt to indicate what we mean by the title “operative concept.”

We terminologically distinguish “thematic” from “operative concepts.” Thinking (taken in the philosophical sense) is the ontological [*seinsbegriffliches*] understanding of the reality of the world and of what is in the world. Thinking remains in the milieu of the concept. Conceptualization in philosophy aims intentionally at those concepts in which thought fixes and preserves what is being thought. We call these concepts “thematic concepts.” Of course such thematic concepts of a philosophy are never univocal, free of problems; rather they contain the whole tension of an understanding which is aimed towards the ineradicable enigmatic character of being as such. The concept of “*idea*” in Plato, of “*ousia*,” “*dynamis*” and “*energeia*” in Aristotle, of “*hen*” in Plotinus, of “*monad*” in Leibniz, of “transcendental” in Kant, of “*Geist*” or of “absolute idea” in Hegel, of “will to power” in Nietzsche, of “transcendental subjectivity” in Husserl – all the like are *fundamental thematic concepts* which must be reflected upon if we want to reach the dimension of the problem of the thinker at all.

But in the formation of thematic concepts, creative thinkers *use* other concepts and patterns of thought, they *operate* with intellectual schemata which they do not fix objectively. They think *through* certain cognitive presentations toward the basic concepts which are essentially their themes. Their understanding moves in a *conceptualfield*, in a *conceptualmedium* that they are not at all able to see. They expend intermediate lines of thought to set up that which they are thinking about. We call that which in this way is readily *expended* and *thought through* in philosophical thinking, but not *considered* in its own right, operative concepts. They form, metaphorically speaking, the *shadow of a philosophy*. The clarifying power of a way of thinking is nourished by what remains in the shadow of thought. An immediacy still has its effect in the most intensified reflectivity. Thinking itself is grounded in what remains unconsidered. It has its productive impetus in the unreflective use of concepts that remain in the shadow. However, this is not meant as a psychological statement about the mental processes involved in thinking, nor as a reference to an anthropological fact of our finitude. Rather there is something essential here. Philosophical thinking is never omniscience. The human grasping of what is comes about on the whole in concepts of totality, but not in a way that the All could be revealed in a completely clarified, shadowless universal concept. The human grasping of the world thinks the totality in a thematic world-concept which is, however, a finite perspective because concepts are expended in its formulation, concepts which, as a result, remain in the shadow. For philosophy itself this is a constant scandal and a disconcerting embarrassment. Philosophy tries again and again to jump over

its own shadow. This assumes many forms, both insignificant and radical. An epistemology of philosophical knowing is demanded, a methodology of its method, a reflection on implicit presuppositions, a self-criticism of its critical spirit, or a typology of world views and "forms of thought." But it is a *question* whether this could bring the operative concepts of a philosophy into view. For example, if we carry out a reflection on a certain philosophical act of thought and then reflect on this reflecting, we could, in this way, pursue an endless chain of interconnected experiences without at any time moving out of that thematic light of comprehension [*Verständnishelle*] in which the first experience was given to us. But forcing our mental glance back onto that *with which and through which* the thematic light of comprehension had been formulated in the first place, involves something else. This requires a further explication.

We speak, in pedagogy, for instance, of an educative "shaping" and "forming" of a pupil by the educator or else of a handling which tends and cultivates, a careful escorting and "letting grow." In the pedagogical situation such ways of speaking are fully understandable although they are *metaphors*. In order to conceptually formulate that relationship of educator and pupil in which human beings are shaped, we spontaneously and unreflectively make use of concepts which actually have their place in the relation of men to nonhuman things, in the work-world of craftsmen or farmers. We formulate this relationship of being-together [*co-existenzielle*] in *technical* categories. We apply concepts to a relationship of fellow-men which are ultimately unfitting and alien to it. We operate with analogical notions without investigating the extent of the analogy. But does the educator actually shape the pupil in a manner analogous to the way the smith shapes iron, does he tend and cultivate him as does the farmer the seeds? And can the work-world for its part be grasped so readily with adequate concepts? The work-world is a fundamental existential dimension of man, but, for this very reason, it is bound to other spheres of life which are equally fundamental. So it becomes apparent even here that often the interpretation of one dimension of human existence uses or expends the categories of another dimension. Perhaps the greatness and impressive closedness and consistency [*Geschlossenheit*] of the Marxist interpretation of life rests on thematically taking "work" as the real essence of man. But in order to explain *work*, Marx uses and expends categories of *domination*, he formulates the history of the economic process as a history of class conflict. The operative employment of categories of domination in the thematic interpretation of the work-world is itself not clarified further. This is not said as a reproach. After all there is a profound necessity here. For instance, if we reflect on *time*, we grasp it perhaps as the all-embracing unitary nexus of all events and occurrences. We distinguish the *thing in time* from *time itself*. The being-in-time of a temporal entity has the characteristics of rest and movement. Being at rest and being

moved are possible ways in which an entity is in time. But in order to grasp rest conceptually, we operate repeatedly with concepts derived from the horizon of movement, and vice versa. Rest and movement are explained by one another. But if “being moved” is a possible way that an entity can be in time, why, and with what right, do we also speak of a *movement of time itself*, of a *flow of time*? Why and with what right do we employ concepts belonging to the way entities are in time to time itself? Must not the movement of the temporal flow itself in turn then be in a time, and, thus, there would be a time of time of time, and so forth? On the basis of time, we understand movement, and on the basis of movement, time. Isn’t that a vicious circle? Philosophy answers this by referring to the “speculative proposition” [*spekulativen Satz*], which takes up the naive, natural sense of a word, but at the same time goes beyond it, expending it as a *metaphor* which has broken down. Time, which does not flow like the water in a brook, is nonetheless considered to be a “flowing.” Or even more fundamentally: in philosophy we speak of *Being* as if it were an existing thing and nonetheless we are cognizant of a fundamental distinction between *Being* and something which is. Or we explicate structures of *Being* and in doing so covertly employ temporal concepts; or we inquire into time and in doing so ask what and how it “is.” In the thematic explication of *Being*, we remain operatively within the light which the understanding of time provides, and vice versa. The Platonic dialogue *Parmenides* provides a well-known and compelling example of the relation of the thematic and the operative where “*on*” and “*hen*,” being and one are reciprocally determined. If “*on*” is determined and stands in the light, “*hen*” remains in the shadow; if “*hen*” is “thematically” thought, “*on*” is “operatively” thought.

But to say something is put in the operative “shadow” does not mean that it would be *out of the way* as it were, outside our interest. Rather, it is the *interest itself*. It is not “in the theme” because we relate to the theme through it. It is what is not seen because it is the *medium of seeing*. If the tension between thematic and operative concepts belongs to the unrest of philosophy, which, in trying to jump over its own shadow, devises hypercritical methodologies of its own methodology, or speaks of the necessary “circle of understanding,” of the “speculative proposition,” of the repeatedly disavowed reification of *Being*, which is not a thing, of the inadequacy of innerworldly categories for the world-whole – this is valid as well, in a special way, for *Husserl’s phenomenology*. For here, this tension is not merely “in itself,” or for us, who strive to understand phenomenology. Rather, precisely this tension becomes a theme for Husserl’s thinking.

What was just said might sound like an exaggeration. One could doubt whether the opposition and tension between thematic and operative concepts

in human philosophizing can be definitively objectified and thus to a certain extent overcome and resolved. If it could be, then the finitude of our thought would be reduced to a knowable and surveyable state of affairs. Between a finite being, who could know his limitations unambiguously, dependably and clearly, and the all-knowing god there would be only a difference in degree in the scope of knowledge. To claim to be able to draw the boundaries of human reason with unmistakable surety, to mark out the field of what we can know *a priori*, fencing it off from the unknowable sphere of “belief,” comes close to equating human philosophy with divine knowledge. The difference between Kant and Hegel is not too great. Now it cannot be said of Husserl’s philosophy that it ever made such an unconditional claim. But, in an essential way, it is a *remarkable attempt* to “fix” the inner unrest of human thinking through a methodological comprehension. The extent to which concepts still remain in the operative shadow of thought in this undertaking is a second question.

The first question is: How does Husserl understand the opposition of and tension between *theme* and *medium* of understanding? We can answer that it is precisely his fundamental method of “phenomenological reduction” which is concerned with this opposition. The theory of the “reduction” interprets, in a decidedly original way, the universal thematic of human living, but does so with a view toward what is athematically presupposed by this thematic. Husserl calls the basic *thematic* attitude of humanity the natural attitude. Living in it, we are immersed in the world and are directed towards the things we encounter as objects. Here we can leave out of consideration the fact that this natural attitude is many-layered, and contains a basic level called the life-world upon which is founded first the world of science. In the ordinary living of our lives we are thematically turned towards the things, the objects that emerge from the encompassing world-horizon and confront us, objects that we perceive, desire, handle or contemplate. Every specific turning towards things sets a single theme off from the *universal theme*; but the continual change of individual themes remains entirely within the thematic world-field of the natural attitude. Husserl sees the task of philosophy first of all in the self-assurance of world-related man with respect to his theme, the world. Philosophical thinking makes the general theme of human life into its *object*; it tries to thematize this life-theme as such. For that reason Husserl takes up the Cartesian motive of *epochē*. But one understands it too hastily if one sees the moment of non-acceptance in the method of *epochē* above all else, i.e., that suspension of the previous world-theme and throwing off of the initial “naiveté.” Rather we must contemplate precisely this naiveté as such, we must watch ourselves, so to speak, as we participate in our own world-theme. As experiencing human beings we cannot cease believing in the Being of the world, but as thinking onlookers “we abstain” from this thematic believing in Being, we perform the *epochē*.

We split ourselves into one who experiences and one who observes that experiencing. A great effort is required on the part of the thinker to maintain this methodological schizophrenia, especially if it is not to be a brief passing reflection, but a habitual attitude of research. In the process of holding on to the world-theme as such, more and more athematic presuppositions of the natural attitude come into the periphery of thought. We are, for example, led from the perceived things to the givenness of aspects, to the perspectives, to the manifold phenomena of consciousness in which the objective sense of things becomes a given for us. From this point on we also pay attention to the subjective experiencing previously only, so to speak, lived-through [*durchlebte*] and not grasped objectively. Prior to this we had only a rough knowledge of our own modes of experience. But at this point it becomes increasingly clear to us that in order to fully understand the world, which we naively experienced as a theme in the natural attitude, it is also necessary to understand the experiences that we otherwise live through and are not aware of explicitly. What we previously operated with by living it [*erlebend*] becomes an object of a consistent reflection, of a methodical investigation. With this the field of *transcendental subjectivity* in Husserl's sense is opened up.

This presentation could be criticized by saying that the opposition of "the thematic" and "the operative" is referred to *experience* [*Erleben*] in general, and not to *concepts*. Certainly. But by distinguishing the experiencing [*Erleben*] involved in the natural attitude and the conceptual experiences of transcendental reflection, Husserl succeeds in forming a new conception. Of course he does not merely come by new concepts as does a scientific researcher in discovering a new sphere of objects; he achieves a conceptual expression of something that we certainly always lived through but never properly grasped as an object. In exhibiting the operative presuppositions of life for the human world-thematic, *operative concepts*, which we normally use in the interpretation of things, are *brought out of the shadow*. In Husserl's theory of the phenomenological reduction, not only is the important distinction between theme and athematic medium of understanding, through which and in which the theme appears, elaborated in all its detail, but at the same time it is methodologically fixed. Husserl's philosophy doesn't just "operate" with the distinction of theme and operation, it also thematizes it expressly, for instance with the terms "naivete" and "reflection," "natural" and "transcendental attitude."

Nevertheless, the question which remains is whether or not, in spite of this, Husserl's philosophy still operates with concepts which remain thematically

unclarified. Perhaps no human philosophy at all is in full, complete and “shadow-free” self-possession of all its concepts, has them in the clear, penetrating light of truth. Otherwise the entire history of thinking would be at an end, and, as Hegel thought, philosophy could then in fact abandon its name of “love of wisdom,” because it would have become complete and absolute knowing. But doesn’t an absolute knowing which “becomes” at all, which follows a course and has a history, and essentially must return home through alienation and externalization contradict the idea of absoluteness? Hegel mastered this contradiction because he defined the absolute as contradiction, as the “opposite of itself,” because he took into Being non-being as negativity. But does Husserl enable us to understand the origin of the naïveté of the natural attitude? Don’t we always return to this naïveté once we have performed the reduction and have entered the absolute ground of transcendental subjectivity? Certainly a phenomenological praxis is possible which is not explicitly assured of the transcendental horizon at every step. A psychology is also possible which apparently returns to the horizon of the natural attitude. In truth, however, this phenomenological psychology is only a selective darkening of the deep transcendental layers. For once natural life’s naïveté about its world-theme is broken through by the phenomenological reduction, this naïveté can no longer return, it is broken through forever. But this in no way means that we then always live in the light of transcendental self-understanding. The break which splits open the concealing shell can no longer be closed. Once someone becomes certain of himself as a constituting subjectivity, he can no longer assume his previous relation to things with the old indifference. He must now know himself as the “center of the world” in a peculiar sense. Of course this should not be understood in the primitive sense of an appraisal of himself as the most important being in the universe. It is not a matter of rank which every I, as a thinking thing, assumes among many other things, but of the *transcendental priority of constituting life* to all constituted sense formations. As long as I interpret myself as a human being in the world, as a member of a species of organisms and natural creatures, this interpretative character is itself a constituted sense and therefore simply cannot be attributed to the transcendental subject-for-the-world. The constitution of the mundane character of the subject, in which it conceals its originality as prior to the world, was not carried out by Husserl in a sufficiently explicit and convincing manner.

It is for this reason that Husserl’s concept of phenomenon curiously shows a play of colors. Not only may several meanings be distinguished in it, but also several levels of thought. The expression “phenomenon” has also a current, well-known sense within the naïveté of the “natural attitude.” There it means first of all the thing which shows itself, the thing in its appearing. An existing thing shows itself in that it emerges in the medium of that universal presence which we usually call the world’s reality. As something which exists from

itself in this manner, as the thing [*Ding*] standing on its own, it is the valid measure for all human opining and speaking about matters [*Sachen*]. The thing as “thing itself” [*Sache selbst*] opens up the possibility of human access to it by its appearing. The adequacy of human utterance about a thing is mediated by the self-appearing of the thing. The maxim “to the things themselves” [*zu den Sachen selbst*] already presupposes a plurality of modes of human knowledge that have access to the self-appearing of an entity. A shift in the meaning of the concept “phenomenon” takes place when the thing [*Ding*] is taken as object [*Gegenstand*] – and only as object. In being an object, an entity is related to the human power of presenting an object; it is the intentional correlate of a subjective system. To be sure a conceptual distinction can still be made here between the thing itself and its being an object for us. But the focal point of interest is already in the analysis of the subjective experiences in which the thing comes to givenness for us. The familiar reasoning appears: but we have no other things at all of which we could be able to talk sensibly than the ones we perceive in our perceptions, encounter in our encounters, think in our thoughts. A thing-in-itself free from our subjective system of intentionality is a concept which has no sense. The phenomenon is interpreted in its phenomenality primarily on the basis of the horizon of presentation [*Vorstellung*]. But the act of presenting [*Vorstellen*] is itself still understood in the way that the human subject of such acts, living in the natural attitude, understands them: The act of presenting *does not produce* the entity which is presented. At most, it only brings about the being-an-object of something existent. When one speaks on this level of a constitution of objects in the experiences of a natural human subject, “constitution” means only the building up of the intentional sense in which something is given – but not the production of it. For example, occasionally it happens that an intentional sense of an object is built up in subjective experiences and after a certain time, disintegrates again into nothing, perhaps into a hallucination, a perceptual illusion and the like. We distinguish, then, the subjective sense of an object from the thing itself, the merely subjective phenomenon from a phenomenon which is grounded and validated in the thing itself. But with the help of this distinction, we can then again distinguish in the presentational sense related to something, the sheer object sense, and its “thetic character.” Through the blocking of our positing performance, thus through an epoché of the positing of Being, we transform (for ourselves) the existing thing into a “phenomenon.” But here phenomenon does not mean that which shows itself, but an “appearance” [*Schein*] which shows itself, so to speak a “neutralized” entity, stripped of its thetic character. But what, *within* the natural attitude, is to a certain extent a *rare* occurrence, namely the epoché, the abstention from belief with respect to the being of a determinate and individual entity, Husserl takes up and employs as a guiding methodological

model to break open the “natural attitude” as a whole. The naiveté of man’s natural life-thematic is interpreted as the universal and continuous performance of belief in a general thesis. The beginning of philosophy is put forth as a critical neutralization of the belief in the world. The conceptual means that Husserl employs to break through the imprisonment in the world of natural living, and with which he *operates* in the fundamental method of his philosophy, he takes directly *from* the sphere which he wants to break through.

The problem for us to consider here is whether there is not, as a consequence of this, ultimately an indeterminateness in the operative concepts of epochē and reduction. But this is not at all to say that Husserl has not made very comprehensive and subtle statements about his basic method, nor that the works he left behind do not deal with this in numerous manuscripts. Epochē and reduction are certainly also “*thematic concepts*” of his thinking. But our question is: do *operative shadows* remain despite the comprehensive discussion of these central concepts and despite the heightened methodological self-consciousness of Husserlian phenomenology. Within the horizon of the “natural attitude” the concept of phenomenon has at least five meanings which we have already distinguished: 1) the thing in its appearing in general, 2) the thing in the sphere of human presentifying, 3) the thing interpreted as the correlate of a subjective system of presentifications (thus excluding the “thing-in-itself”), 4) the intentional sense of an object, abstracting from thetic characters, 5) the sense of an object with the methodically exercised neutralization of the thetic characters. Since Husserl now uses the fifth meaning as a methodological model in order to shake the whole “natural attitude” out of its foundations, he obviously must *speculatively transform* this fifth meaning so that it comprises all the other meanings, indeed so that it can embrace even *itself in its naive form*. Within the horizon of naiveté, the neutrality modification is certainly only possible as the suspension of our belief in the Being of a specific, *individual* entity. The modification remains, therefore, within a comprehensive field of unbroken belief, on the *ground of the world*. But to treat the general thesis, in which this world-ground is posited, as a singular thesis can be treated, to “neutralize” the thesis of the world in a manner analogous to an intra-worldly epochē – this necessarily signifies an explosive tension between the natural sense of a model and its new universal function. For the neutralization which is now attempted is to result in a neutralization of the universal situation within which the method of epochē, until this attempt, had a limited sense and was borne and comprehended by an unbroken belief in Being. Husserl did not sufficiently recognize this tension between the prior “natural” sense of epochē and the new “transcendental” sense of a neutralization of world-belief as a problem. Furthermore, when elaborating upon the transcendental withholding of belief, he frequently spoke on the basis of the horizon of understanding

belonging to the neutralized phenomenon in the “natural attitude.”

These two facts are signs of an operative shadow at the center of his philosophy. As a consequence of this shadow a series of other main concepts remain unclarified. Through the basic method of the reduction, Husserl opens up the field of absolute subjectivity in whose intentional life-processes all worldly objectivities are “built up.” *Self-temporalization* is attributed to this absolute subjectivity, and the “constitution” of mundane entities is attributed to its self-temporalized intentional life. But what does *constitution* mean? From whence is this concept determined? Doesn’t it first of all have a naive sense within the horizon of the “natural attitude?” Constitution, literally translated as “putting together,” can obviously be a putting together in many ways. “Putting together” [*Zusammenstellung*] can mean putting things in an order; or, on the other hand, making and producing things; or even ordering our representations [*Vorstellungen*] of things; or producing the objective sense of things which are given to us by way of representations. When Husserl takes the concept of constitution at first from the naive use of the word and assigns to it a novel, transcendental sense all these meanings are echoed in each. But this assignment does *not* happen in such a way as to bring out the distance between the speculative concept and the naive, natural model. This is true as well of the nearly synonymous concept “production” [*Leistung*]. The life of transcendental subjectivity is characterized as a “productive life.” What we usually call existing things are results of subjective performances [*Leistungen*]; mundane things are indices for systems of intentional performances [*Leistens*]. Roughly, this may be understood as follows: Things do not exist independently in themselves, they are necessarily related to subjectivity; they are poles of unity in which, in aiming toward them, manifold acts and habitualities of the subject are unified, synthetically brought together. But to what extent is this subjective system of presentation a production? What is produced here, and how? Naively, no doubt, the term “performance” may be understood as a doing that has a result, a consequence, that brings something about. But this can be understood in a crude or in a subtle manner. Roughly understood, it means a production, a making or manufacturing. The craftsman performs beautifully when he turns out a technical piece of work in a masterful way. But also an orator performs beautifully when he is able to say the true thing in an agreeable way. Or love can be a rare production of the human heart. It is not accidental that Husserl takes such concepts from the naive sphere to designate the reference of the transcendental subject to the world of things, that he uses and expends concepts which, even in their proper sphere, are characterized by an unresolved *indeterminacy*. This indeterminateness increases with the *speculative transformation* of the concepts of constitution and production.

The well-known conflict between interpreters, over whether there is, in Husserl, an epistemological idealism, in which the subject produces [*erzeuge*]

the world of objects, or whether there is a realistic position, in which the basic character of knowing is essentially receptive, cannot be dogmatically decided. This is because in the “natural” sense of the terms “constitution” and “production” everything is already left open and the field *to which* the distinction between a production [*Erzeugung*] of things and a receptive understanding of them is indigenous is indeed *transcended* through Husserl’s transcendental philosophical use of these terms. Surely one can say: Husserl’s concepts of constitution and production stand beyond the alternatives of “making” [*Erzeugen*] and “receiving” [*Vernehmen*]. But, then, what is positively meant by them is not *conceptually* clear.

Nevertheless, *with* these basic concepts which remain in an operative shadow of thought, Husserl unfolded the immense and extremely fruitful intellectual task of exploring the intentional systems of subjectivity. An essential problem here is the distinction between the transcendental interpretation of intentional experiences, which are related to non-human things, and those in which fellow men and co-subjects of the objective world are experienced. Obviously the constitution of things is somehow different from the constitution of co-subjects. Although Husserl makes highly interesting and subtle analyses here to separate the self-consciousness of transcendental intersubjectivity from the universal consciousness of objects related to things, the concept of constitution nevertheless does not attain sufficient clarity. This perhaps has its deeper reason in the fact that Husserl had not yet posed to himself the problem of a “transcendental language.” The phenomenologist, who carries out the reduction, cognitively puts himself at a distance from the “natural attitude,” but does so not to leave it behind, rather to understand it as a sense formation of the sense-constituting transcendental life. But, to take it strictly, in doing this he steps *outside of the situation* in which human speech is fashioned as the naming of things, the call to the gods, the conversation with fellow men. Can he still be master of the logos in the same sense as before? Doesn’t the problem of a transformation of the act of speaking [*Sagens*] arise in the speculative proposition? Here is another unilluminated shadow in Husserl’s thought. He uses “transcendental concepts” but he does not clarify their possibility. In the work *Formal and Transcendental Logic*, questions of sense constitution are put to formal logic and a clarification is attempted by going back to the constitutive sense-bestowing processes. However no *logic of transcendental expressions* themselves is elaborated. The connection between speech and the transcendental-phenomenological understanding of Being remains in the dark.

Let us bring our considerations together. Although Husserl, in his methodology, has inquired into the remarkable relationship that we designated as the difference between “thematic” and “operative” media of understanding, and, indeed, has to a certain extent expressly thematized this distinction in the theory of the “phenomenological reduction,” the central concepts of his thought remain in the twilight. The concepts of phenomenon, epoché, constitution, performance and transcendental logic are by far used more operatively than they are thematically clarified. They all represent problems which are still open. To see that these problems are not yet resolved is not to make an unsuitable criticism of Husserl, nor is it to overpass this thinker. The presence of a shadow is an essential feature of finite philosophizing. The more original the force which ventures to open a clearing, the deeper are the shadows which accompany basic thoughts. Only God knows without shadows.

It could be asked whether the operative constraint which great thinkers labor under is a tribute which they, too, must pay to human frailty. Isn’t it an old, traditional and venerable idea to interpret man on the basis of his distance from God and on that basis to explain human wisdom as bounded, confined and imperfect? But isn’t this thought precisely an operative presupposition of Western metaphysics? Doesn’t it lie in the essence of Being to be in the light and dark at the same time, to be at once the gleam of the appearing and the closed abyss. Isn’t man, when in the ecstasy of thinking, evidence of such a double notion of the world? However that may be, it is only in view of the ideal “absolute truth,” in which everything that is would be transfigured in the light and raised up to knowledge, that the shadow of human philosophy appears as a lack, as poverty, as weakness. It could be, however, that man only comes to his own essence when he no longer engages in the hopeless competition with the gods.

The shadow of finite truth became an explicit theme in a special sense at the beginning of metaphysics, with Plato. What we mortals usually call “that which is” was declared there to be a mere shadow-image of the idea. The idea alone exists truly. Man can catch sight of it in the almost super-human possibility of thinking, standing in the radiance of the Good [*zuhöchst im Sonnenglanz des Agathon*].^d Plato took the conceptual means by which he devaluated earthly reality from that sensuous world itself; it is in the sphere of sensuous light that there are shadows. He referred operatively back to the “*horatos topos*,” while he transgressed it in the theme of his thought.

To point out “shadows” in the monumental conceptual work of the man to whom this conference is dedicated does not contradict the respect which is due him, above all does not contradict Husserl’s passionate sincerity nor the attitude with which he worked. Such a reference remains an insufficient

attempt to indicate a hidden dialectic which phenomenology as *philosophy* leaves open.

TRANSLATOR'S NOTES

^a“Being” (with a capital “B”) will be used to translate “*Sein*; “being,” “entity,” “what is,” to translate “*Seiende*.”

^bThe reference here is no doubt to Aristophanes’ *The Clouds*.

^cAs in this sentence, we have often made less frequent use of typographical emphasis than does Fink.

^dSee Plato, *Republic*, Book VII.

A TRANSCENDENTAL-PHENOMENOLOGICAL INVESTIGATION
CONCERNING UNIVERSAL IDEALISM, INTENTIONAL
ANALYSIS AND THE GENESIS OF *HABITUS**
ARCHĒ, PHANSIS, HEXIS, LOGOS^a

GERHARD FUNKE

The problem of phenomenology is the phenomenon, which is to be determined according to its being and sense. In this way, phenomenology, as philosophical science, is distinguished from the natural sciences and the natural attitude they manifest, an attitude in which man remains “turned towards things in both intuition and thinking.”¹ The possibility of knowledge is self-evident in the precritical attitude. Here knowledge means knowledge of objects:^b the grasping of an object comes about “through the sense immanent to the grasping, by means of which the grasping is related to the object.”² The task is to elucidate this sense. In this way, it will also be shown what can be validly held to be an “object;” that is, whether “object” can be interpreted in the sense of the traditional opposition between subject and Object.

It is a fact that valid objects exist for consciousness, objects that are found within consciousness as “a continuous Heraclitean flux of phenomena.”^{3c} Therefore, the philosophy of consciousness is not rationalism, which is distant from life. Rather, it comprises every study that has phenomenon-containing mental acts [*Erlebnisse*] in both their genetic formation and their static moments of sense as its theme. Thus, the phenomenon’s showing itself has two aspects: It is an appearance in its appearing, an appearing in which something is pre-given, and it is an appearance “as what is pre-given.”⁴

Problēma, then, is not only that set forth as questionable in a scientific-technical investigation, something that, as a result, only awaits further description and explanation. It is also the “setting forth” as such. As a result, inquiry is directed to the continual investigation of the field of appearance, which leads from the respective, pre-given points of departure to the contextual horizons which are opened up from them. At the same time, it

*Translated and edited by Robert M. Harlan from “Transzendentalphänomenologische Untersuchung über ‘Universalen Idealismus,’ ‘Intentionalanalyse’ und ‘Habitusgenese,’” *Il compito della fenomenologia* (Padova: CEDAM – Casa Editrice Dott. Antonio Milani, 1957), pp. 117–54. Sectional divisions have been added, and paragraphs have been altered to conform to English standards.

is referred to the pre-giving, functioning mental acts as such, the acts by which something, as something with determination and sense, appears. In a word, both the accomplishment [*Leistung*] of sense-determination and the determined sense come into view.

The phenomenon is the object for critical philosophy in a completely different way than it is for natural science, which is turned immediately towards the thing. Critical philosophy inquires into the phenomenon's sense and being. Moreover, when it is necessary "to clarify the essence of knowledge and of the objects of knowledge, then it is a phenomenology of knowledge and of the objects of knowledge."⁵ For assertions can be made only concerning that which manifests itself or manifests a determinate sense; therefore, concerning the phenomenon. However, everything that appears as a phenomenon is determined in a double sense: It is qualified *de facto* in this or that manner as a "this-there," and it is evident ontically as "real," "ideal," "axiomatic," "*ousial*," etc. In each case, it is a question of the moments of sense which pertain to the total sense of the phenomenon.

The point of departure is the phenomenally evident. The aim, however, must be the discovery of the structures "by virtue of which and through which the phenomenon manifests and shows itself in its ontic character at any given time."⁶ The phenomenon "rational (ethical) feelings" belongs to what appears as a phenomenon in this respect as does the phenomenon "reality of the external world"; the phenomenon "God" belongs in the same way as does the phenomenon "social subject."⁷ The phenomenological method of "bracketing" and "intentional analysis" has the purpose of leading back from the world, from the domain of whatever is phenomenally graspable, to the subjective *a priori*.

What is and how it is shows itself only in the *cogito*. Consequently, when the point of departure is the *cogito*, the question is not how a "subject" acquires access to the world or how the world of "Objects" is mirrored in the "subject." For it is precisely the investigation which inquires back to the functioning *cognitiones* that makes clear that everything that signifies at all (including subject and Object) is given in *cognitiones*.

What must be held to be valid with respect to being and sense first becomes evident in *cognitiones*. This means that the *a priori ego cogito cogitatum*⁸ can be discovered by starting with the things "by means of a direction of intuition and thinking that is the opposite of the natural direction." As a matter of fact, consciousness is always "with the thing" in the *cogito*. Nevertheless, consciousness bestows sense upon whatever is called a "thing." To that extent, then, an "idealism" – in fact, a transcendental-phenomenological idealism – is presented, for it is the function of the *cognitiones* to establish the sense and being of every thing. Therefore, it is correct to say of phenomenology that it is a concretely carried out explication of sense. What is constituted in accordance with consciousness is performed on the one hand by object-

intentional accomplishments and on the other by accomplishments which ground *habitus*. Thus, a transcendental idealism arises that develops from the phenomenon. “The proof of this idealism, therefore, is phenomenology itself.”⁹

I

If it is correct that the problem of philosophy is philosophy itself or that the problem lies in philosophy’s own concept,¹⁰ then this holds respectively for phenomenology and the phenomenon. Admittedly, this assertion (with respect to philosophy) is tenable only when it is not understood that philosophy is concerned exclusively with philosophical opinions as the pre-givens for philosophical-*historical* research. Without doubt, the problem of philosophy is not treated exhaustively by the examination, presentation and critique of the available stock of philosophical standpoints and opinions; therefore, by dogmatics. Dogmatics themselves are problematic. It can be stated uncontestedly, moreover, that “as soon as a cultural activity is characterized by a historical or typological epithet, it is transformed into dogmatics . . . However, when a spiritual system acquires such a title, not only is its universal validity placed in question . . . but it is at the same time historicized.”¹¹ The ordinary history of philosophy, for which philosophy is a problem solely in the sense of such a history of dogmas, certainly is concerned with phenomena of this kind (i.e., the appearance of cultural and spiritual history and its “development”).

In contrast to this, the problem of phenomenology is not so much that which is immediately accessible. The immediately accessible forms only the (wholly anti-solipsistic) point of departure. The historically pre-given, the constituted theme and the situative context are all phenomena not only as past appearances with determinate senses and fixed significances, but are at the same time problems in their appearing. Consequently, consideration is directed to the functioning accomplishment and to the appearing of the phenomenon; therefore, to the occurrence of the appearing itself. That which makes the phenomena possible by pre-giving them is also a problem, though the phenomena, as already pre-given appearances, admittedly always attract attention to themselves to begin with.

Just as the problem of philosophy is its concept, the theme of phenomenology is self-legitimation. The question, then, is simply where a true self-legitimation is to begin. In any case, neither a preconceived shift of the question to the “epistemological domain” in the traditional sense nor a restriction to that “methodology” takes place. Rather, a grounding is required that arises from that given evidently in *cognitiones*. Traditionally, however, only reason is able to ground itself. Thus, the departure from the “things

themselves,” from how they are phenomena in *cogitationes*, refers to accomplishments prior to things [*vorsachlichen Leistungen*] which effect “grounding.” With this, the problem of origin emerges in connection with the question of idealism.

Whereas natural science as well as traditional ontology are concerned with entities, and whereas they aim at them in a direct attitude (whereby it matters little whether these entities are something “physical” or “metaphysical”), a “world” of “things” standing over against a “subject” is not found to begin with when we begin from the *ego cogito cogitatum*. Rather, the procedure is to go back from evidences manifested in the *cogitatio* to the presuppositions of the constituted evidences, presuppositions on the basis of which everything that “is” and has “sense” becomes transparent.

The condition for the possibility of such constitution, as that which makes something possible, does not have the same characteristics as that which is made possible. If the totality of what is mundane consists of that made possible, then that which makes it possible is premundane and cannot be understood in accordance with the characteristics pertaining to what is constituted, which has first become evident as a result of the accomplishment of that which makes the constituted possible. The condition for the possibility of experience, in the way that it becomes transparent in the evidences of intentional acts and in the occurrence of the living through of egological *habitus*, is the genuine *archē*.

On this basis we are justified in speaking of “phenomenological archaeology” (=*archē*-ology). For the inquiry back to the origin does not mean merely a going back to that prior to things (=subjective), to the pregiving (=making possible) and to the preconditioning (=functioning that accomplishes), but means an inversion of the natural attitude as well. It is a question of

digging up the constitutive structures whose component parts are concealed, of digging up the structures of apperceptive accomplishments of sense, the products of which are presented to us in a completed form as the world of experience. The inquiry back to and then exposure of the individual accomplishments that produce being-sense, an inquiry back finally to the ultimate accomplishment, the “*archē*” enables the self-evident unity of the ontic validities founded in different ways on the *archē* to become objects for mind.¹²

It is this *archē* on the basis of which pre-given “Objectivities,” “things,” etc. are possible. These pre-givennesses, the completely unsolipsistically experienced parts of the world, are what they are in evidences. And since their being a thing, being pre-given, being something to which we can refer, etc. first appear in evidences, the inquiry into the origin is connected to the inquiry into the “non-thing” *par excellence*; therefore, into subjectivity. Evidence and living through, in the way that they are actualized in the experience of objects and *habitus* respectively, are distinctive modes of experience, because “being”

and “sense” never appear without subjectivity. “An absolute beginning, called *principium* in the true sense of laying a foundation,”¹³ is presented here.

However, to understand thinking as a “mode of being”¹⁴ presupposes a pregiving type of *cogitatio* (one that makes this particular sense evident). The “*archai*,” the “*principia*,” could only be found where no orientation by pre-givennesses takes place and where an original projection manifests itself. However, a self-projection occurs only in the underivable going-into-action of mind [*Aufreten des Geistes*]. The *phainomenon* as appearance refers, in the being-thus and how of its evidence, to *phansis*. That which is ultimately constituting can only be absolute subjectivity, subjectivity from which all determinations of sense and of mental acts originate. It is the subjectivity which enables the significance-containing appearances to become evident in their appearing. Such a discovery-enabling accomplishment does not lead back again to a constituted “subject” but, rather, to “subjectivity” [*Subjektivität*] *par excellence*. “Subjectivity” in this sense – that which makes *being* aware of and *having* something evidently possible – is found only in the function which grounds its own concept. Reason, mind and *cogitatio* establish themselves and only establish themselves by enabling what can be valid as a *phainomenon* to emerge in *phansis*. That is, this functioning “subjectivity” grounds its concept, its *sense* (together with all moments of sense belonging to its sense) and its significance itself.¹⁵

In contrast to this, then, “Objectivity” means that a constituted sense is present which can be experienced as a “this-there” within the framework of the grounding accomplishments of subjectivity, and that this sense is “transcendent” in that the sense is something constituted by the constituting accomplishment. Any mundanely constituted actuality is related to *cogitative* executions [*Vollzüge*] such that the actuality, in its sense and significance, is unconditioned by the *hic et nunc*, actual *cognitiones* in the sense of being a component of the *cogitatio*, such that the actuality remains fundamentally an intentional correlate of the accomplishments corresponding to it. If the actuality is, it is what it is by this attribution.

The expression “transcendence in immanence”¹⁶ means nothing other than this. In experience, what is transcendent to the experiencing is the given, the phenomenon. The phenomenon shows itself in functioning accomplishments. However, that the functioning accomplishment is to be understood as the functioning accomplishment of mind, of reason, of *cogitative* projection becomes clear once one notes that only “thinking” (in the broadest sense) grounds its “being” and “sense” in its functioning.¹⁷

II

The problem to be discussed here lies beyond all questions concerning

“actuality” and “inactuality,” “reality” and “ideality” and “being” and “sense.” Only the *cogitatio* can be called self-grounding, for in exercising its function, the *cogitatio* is what it is an object for itself in a turning directed to itself, namely thinking. The moment of sense which lies in the concept “thinking” becomes a possible object of apprehension only through thinking. Though they are connected *phensis* and *phainomenon* are to be distinguished univocally in this regard.¹⁸

The attempt to derive “subjectivity” is simply nonsensical, because sense can only be given in subjective (making possible) accomplishments and because it is precisely this subjectivity which possesses the rank of “*archē*,” of “*principium*.” A derivation of subjective accomplishment would make exactly what is questioned vanish; namely, the subjectivity of the functioning itself. Any attempt at a derivation Objectifies that to be derived. Moreover, the attempt is itself possible only on the ground of the governance of subjective executions pertaining to the attempt. Thus, the occurrence of reason, the going-into-action of *cognitiones*, is the origin of that which is valid as “being” and “sense.”

The search for “*archai*” leads away from the phenomena and towards *phensis* which presents evidences. Thus, phenomenology for Husserl becomes, in a thoroughly consistent manner, “transcendental phansiology.”¹⁹ What belongs to appearance is the sense-projecting appearing as the process of appearing as well as that which appears itself in its particular sense and being. Along with the presentation of act-transcendent *cogitata*, the occurrence of object-intentional acts simultaneously temporalizes syntheses of flowing consciousness itself. Not only does the “being-thus” of the respective, intended *phainomena* appear, but the synthetic accomplishment of *phensis* as such manifests itself as well. Thus, there is nothing odd in saying: “Since the Greek expression *phensis*, in contrast to *phainomenon*, to that which appears and to appearance, designates the appearing itself as a mental process, we shall call the sphere in question here the phansiological sphere.”²⁰ That this phansiological moment is closely related to the synthetic genesis of *habitus* of consciousness is obvious.

The moment of the genesis of *habitus* is distinct from what pertains expressly to object-intentional acts.^d Subjectivity appears in the former as governing and grounding subjectivity. For,

each *cogito*, along with all of its component parts, arises and passes away in the flux of mental acts. But the pure subject does not arise and pass away, although it “comes forward” and again “withdraws” in its own way. It goes into action and then goes out of action. What this is and what the pure subject itself is and does as such we grasp or, rather, it grasps in self-perception, which is itself one of its actions.²¹

These actions are, accordingly, “hexiologial” actions, which are distinct from object-intentional actions. For when we speak of the “I as the substrate of

habitualities,”²² a hexiological ego is designated that is distinct from constituting, primal subjectivity (as subjectivity occurs in, e.g., “self-perception”) and that has first become an ego by the accomplishments of primal subjectivity.

While a transcendence in immanence is connected with object-intentional acts, the genesis of habitualities does not have this characteristic in this form. Without doubt, pure subjectivity or the pure I becomes positable as an object through its own accomplishing functions and is the correlate of a possible consciousness in the *cogitatio*, “reflection on the I.”²³ To the essence of the pure I belongs “the possibility of an originary grasping of itself, a ‘self-perception’; but in that case the corresponding modifications of self-grasping also belong to it...”²⁴ This possibility is established by the genesis of habitualities. Habitualities are formed on the occasion of the intentions of objects. Their genesis differs from the constitution of transcendent *noemata*. The I as substrate of habitualities is what it is through the historical execution of *cogitative* accomplishments. Thus, the I is the opposite of the transcendent correlate of *cogitative* accomplishment, a correlate that is precisely a “sense” that is atemporal.

The total complex of the pole of sense is constituted in the flowing *cogitationes*: historical consciousness becomes *along with* its course as a flowing course. For “the ego is constituted for itself, so to speak, in the unity of a history.”²⁵ Not only is that which has appeared as an appearance and is universally available dependent upon the constitutive *cogitatio*; the unity of historical consciousness is dependent upon it as well.

III

The *phainomenon* has sense and significance, *phansis* is historical. The task of phenomenology is, then, to make the intentional processes of consciousness visible as accomplishments of constituting, functioning subjectivity. As a result, the whole domain of *noemata* forms the guiding clue for inquiries into the grounding constitution. The whole of mundane history is nothing more than a part of the domain founded by constituting accomplishments. The “historical” as such, however, is the appearing of the *cogitationes* themselves. Therefore, the “historical” is *phansis*, which does not take place without effects but, rather, which grounds *hexeis*. As a result, unitary formations of a new type emerge.²⁶ These formations are of a monadic type, ones that are characterized by the fact that an “I think” can accompany intentional executions. Neither *de facto* dispositions nor real, empirical habits of this or that type are meant by this. What is meant is the *habitus* of the pure I.

What is expressed, then, is that the process of constituting, as *noetic*, primal founding, and not what is constituted, must be taken as the point of

departure. Thus, a distancing from the Objectively constituted formations and a passage back to constitution takes place. The habitualities are the sedimentation of primally founding, *noetic phansis*, and do not designate a *noematic*-Objective *phainomenon*. One is fully justified in saying that,

in returning to my habitualities, I do not return to that originally “founded” in its Objectivity but, rather, to the execution of the act in which this “founding” took place. This is the ground of my ability to return, a ground that abides precisely as a habituality and, with that, the fundament of my position-takings executed in regard to it.²⁷

Naturally, the passage back to the transcendental ego is a “deactualization” only in the sense that the premundane *cogitationes*, as sense-forming and world-constituting accomplishments, cannot once again be attributed to an objective unity of sense that is to be explained by constitutions – therefore, to no “part of the world,” no “psyche,” no “self” in the empirical, *de facto* sense – and that everything, including Objective time and Objective history, is then to be shown to be the accomplishment of the consciousness which temporalizes itself in evidences.

Habituality itself, however, belongs to that which must be so shown. Habituality is nothing other than the index for the fact that I am the same I that I am; in a word, that the I distinguished by habitualities can find itself in the course of its flow of mental acts as the identical I.²⁸ This depends on the I’s having become a unity in *phansis*, not on the fact that it, for example, has formed determinate, phenomenal particularities and habits and what types these are.

The transcendental ego, the ego we ourselves are as the centers of constitutive sense-formation prior to all mundane self-apprehension, is not to be defined abstractly. On the one hand, the transcendental ego is to be disclosed with the help of an analytic inquiry back on the basis of guiding clues which are predelineated by the historical situation, by the concrete possession of intersubjective experience and by occasional self-apprehension, such that anything come upon *hic et nunc* as constituted includes the transcendental accomplishments. On the other hand, however, the transcendental ego can be grasped by means of habitualities, “for a standing and abiding I could not be constituted if a standing and abiding flow of mental acts were not constituted; therefore, if the originally constituted unities formed between mental acts [*Erlebniseinheiten*] could not be taken up again, capable of a new emergence in recollection.”²⁹

Hexiological research is, thus, simply transcendental-phenomenological research. For in no case is it a matter of a description and characterization of the different empirical forms of the I. The so-called, “psychic,” “personal” and “characterized” I are certainly each transcendent to consciousness insofar as each is a constituted sense. However, the ego in the formal *ego cogito cogitatum* designates something else. Here the I is meant as the “substrate of

habitualities,” the I “in full concretion.” It is the ego which is formed on the occasion of intentional foundings of sense in a particular form of immanent transcendence – precisely the form of the phasiological genesis of *habitus*.

Absolute, super-temporal transcendental subjectivity, which first makes possible historical unities formed between mental acts and non-historical unities of sense, is prior to this ego just as it is prior to every *cogitatum*. Transcendental subjectivity is the “*nunc stans*” of the *cognitiones* as such. On this basis the disinterested, universal, phenomenological observer proves to be the subjectivity which is generated in evidences of all types, the basis upon which it is first possible to speak of “transcendence,” “transcendentality,” “immanence,” “history,” etc.

Acts of constitutive sense-formation are, then, accomplishments of subjectivity which culminate in intentions that are polarized on the objective side. The act’s *noema*, which is constituted as a unity of significance (that is essentially accessible intersubjectively), forms the point of departure for the transcendental-phenomenological intentional analysis. However, the bringing about of genetically formed unities culminates further in intentions as projecting intentions in that they, in going-into-action, produce what appears in retrospective, mundane reflection to belong to their concepts and in that they signify what they project upon their being executed and, hence, are “occurrences.” Consequently, the universal founding of unity should be the watchword for subjectivity. The founding of unity is no less present in habitualities than it is in the givenness of objects. It comes to light equally in *phensis* and *phainomenon*.

Two things, then, come into view. On the one hand, what comes into view is what is constituted on the ground of intentional accomplishments and what becomes in particular the object of regional-eidetic research or natural or humanistic research; therefore, the mundanely constituted and intersubjectively referable “appearance.” On the other hand, what forms the historical unities in its going-into-action also comes into view; therefore, the projections as such along with the habitualities dependent upon them, whereby the phenomenality of the phenomenon and the occurrence-ness of the occurrence or mind is manifested as that which is genuinely historical. The *cogito*, accordingly, not only has its *cogitatum* but also stands in an egological relation (irrespective of the object-intentional relatedness). That is, “because each *cogito* requires a *cogitatum* and this *cogito* stands, in the execution of this act, in relation to the pure I, we find a noteworthy polarity in each act: The I-pole on one side, the object as the opposite pole on the other. Each is an identity; however, the identity in each case has a radically different origin.”³⁰

If the *ego cogito* is now the point of departure, or if this *ego cogito* is the “ultimate basis for judgment”³¹ from which everything that appears must be investigated, then the ego itself is no exception, in that it is not an empty I-pole as a centered ego and as an ego that emerges with habitualities.³² In a word,

the genesis of habitualities once again refers back from the ego formed in its own, historical development to the genuine *archē* or to pure subjectivity in its functioning.

This shows that the “specific investigations related to the appearing and its moments,” which Husserl assigned to phansiology,³³ must stand in a close connection with egology and hexiology. It is, thus, the concrete, monadic ego, determined by the flux of *cogitationes* as such, which shows itself to be the “substrate of habitualities.” This subjectivity presents itself in the *cogitationes* as that which temporalizes and unifies. It projects *nunc stans* what can be conceived retrospectively as transcendental and mundane constitution. To speak of projection, however, is permitted only at the point, following the performance of the phenomenological reduction, where originally presenting intentions, corresponding respectively to *noemata*, prove to be the accomplishments of an ego that is itself not Objectively constituted and not genetically habitualized.

IV

The *archē* is found in pure subjectivity and “*archē*-ology” aims at the origin which establishes itself by projective accomplishments. Two things are expressed by this. When it is a question of *logos*, one certainly finds it to begin with as the unifying *logos* in the super-temporal unities of significance and in the habitual unities formed between mental acts. The unity in the latter case “is not a mere *abstractum* but, rather, a concrete unity of life.”³⁴ For the question there is obviously not about the “identical content of the conviction in every instance as an ideal unity but, rather, about the content as identical for the subject, the content as its own. The subject acquires the conviction in earlier acts, but it does not pass away with the acts. Rather, the conviction belongs to the enduring subject as something that endures and abides with it. The conviction remains the same if the evidences are the same.”³⁵

However, even if this distinction between the unity of an object and the unity of the I must be conceded from the first, this does not mean that the *logos* governing the unities is now the *archē*. The beginning lies in the *cogitatio* as the sourcepoint for *phansis* and *phainomenon*. What we have termed subjectivity is not, as is the case with something objective of any type, bound by further implications of sense which are to be traced back within a determinate horizon. Moreover, subjectivity is not the concrete, monadic ego with its habitualities even if it is true that subjectivity also reveals itself at each constituted temporal position correlative to what is constituted to be what temporalizes history in the auto-genesis of constituting consciousness.

The independence of transcendental subjectivity from the pre-given products of constitution, which distinguishes it in its accomplishing, is an independence

in the sense of underivability and absoluteness. In that case, then, what actually presents itself originally *from itself* and originally legitimates itself is transcendental subjectivity in its evidences that do not depend upon anything mundane. What can be valid as something given comes about by means of evidences: only what is projected appears as a something given. Evidence is the appearance-form of the original institution of sense and significance. The original accomplishment, *phansis*, however, must then be the historical phenomenon *par excellence*.

To begin with, then, historical occurring is to be understood more ontologically than ontically. The correlative connection between conscious life on the one hand and, respectively, the habitualities of the ego and the sense-structures of the *noema* on the other justifies the thesis of consciousness' *presenting something itself* [*Selbstgebung des Bewusstseins*]; that is, the thesis of lived through and intuitive evidence in which "transcendental experience" is given its due.³⁶ When something takes place as an occurrence, there is history. The genuine, historical occurrences must be the evidences which project pre-givennesses and not ones founded upon pre-givennesses. For what shows itself from itself is evident, and since evidences are the accomplishments of the *cogitatio* in the broadest sense, the characteristics of underivability and absoluteness in the sense of projective going-into-action and, hence, the characteristic of occurring in the genuine sense befit only the *cogitative* (therefore, "thinking").

In this case, then, the execution of the *cogitative* functions projects and accomplishes what is then "thinking" for reflective consideration. Therefore, thinking as such becomes an occurrence unconditioned by what it intends at any given time and by what it at the same time habitualizes in the intention. The *cognitiones*, as constituting and habitualizing *cognitiones*, are ones that make something possible. The unity-founding function of the *cognitiones* manifests itself in their egological and *noematic* poles. Thus, the function appears in one respect as the temporalizing living through of these *cognitiones* and in the other as the evident having of super-temporal moments of sense and significance.

Presenting something itself is valid only for *cognitiones* which imply, on the one hand, egological commitment and, on the other, the evidence of phenomenal Objectivities. Thus, transcendental subjectivity is "the *ratio* in the constant movement of self-elucidation."³⁷ In its functioning, transcendental subjectivity makes possible what should be, not what is. The originally presenting accomplishment, thus, does not consist exclusively in the Objectifying *ego cogito cogitatum* but, in addition, in the so-called "existential understanding," which is an egological-habitual understanding in that functioning subjectivity grounds both the understanding of the thing and knowledge of the mineness [*Jemeinigkeit*] of the understanding by means of the corresponding mental acts which show the thing itself. Its relation to the

phainomenon as constituted appearance can only temporarily conceal the phenomenon as appearance in its appearing; therefore, can only temporarily conceal *phansis*.

This *phansis*, which grounds temporality, is sedimented in the ego with its *hexeis*. For,

whatever occurs in my ego and, eidetically, in any ego whatever in the way of intentional processes, constituted unities and habitualities of the I has its temporality and participates, in this respect, in the system of forms of universal temporality with which every imaginable ego is constituted for itself.³⁸

Transcendental subjectivity is distinguished by the “*nunc stans*,” therefore, by the respective going-into-action of functioning, constituting and habitualizing accomplishments. Its projection does not manifest what already “is” in any one form but, rather, makes what should be a “problem.” As a result, the truth of transcendental subjectivity cannot be the “Objective truth” of something that is mundanely evident. It must be understood, rather, as being-in-the-truth, which is established in its occurring, in its coming forward.

A phenomenology oriented only by the objectively constituted unities of sense and significance could never completely legitimate the “things themselves.” For objective sense-wholes do not present themselves precisely as what they are, viz., as constituted phenomena. This means nothing other than the following: Their being a phenomenon is not accessible to *noematically* interested intentional analysis, because phenomenality as such is not a pre-givenness that can be disclosed by means of guiding clues from implications of sense, as can other *noematic* moments. Phenomenality is not something present at hand and can, therefore, only appear in the occurrence of phenomenalizing mind. As a result, the investigation is referred back to transcendental subjectivity, which “grounds” this occurrence.

The manifestation of *cogitative* accomplishments as such temporalizes the historical unities. However, the particular way in which these accomplishments are structured conditions the type of phenomena which present themselves as super-temporal unities of significance. Phansiology and phenomenology respectively, then, are concerned with historically formed and non-historical validations. The execution of *cogitative* accomplishments as such grounds the egological habitualities which are, consequently, the sedimentation of pure *phansis*. The intentionality of the *cogitationes*, nevertheless, leads to the *phainomena* by means of transcendence in immanence. As a result, the apparition of mind is responsible for two things.

In this context, however, “apparition” means making its appearance within a consciousness that is temporalized by this appearing and engaging itself on behalf of a pre-givenness constituted in an intuitive, intentional evidence as something manifested that should be not engaging itself on behalf of an

already constituted pre-givenness. Also, "if each *cogito*, along with all of its component parts, arises and passes away in the flux of mental acts,"³⁹ then pure (transcendental) subjectivity does not arise and pass away. Even if one could apprehend its arising and passing away originally, this would mean corroborating transcendental subjectivity itself as functioning subjectivity. The *archē* lies in the *cognitiones*. The same is stated when one says, "Acts in the specific sense of *cogito* occur in the flow of consciousness."⁴⁰ Transcendental subjectivity, however, establishes itself both egologically and phenomenologically.

V

The *cogitatio* which stands at the beginning in the formula *ego cogito cogitatum* accomplishes two things: It enables both the ego and the *phainomenon* to appear. Accordingly, it appears that "constitution" is presented in a very broad sense in connection with the grounding functions of the *cogitatio*. For while it is true that each act is a consciousness of something, it is equally true that we are conscious of the act as well. Expressed differently, this means that the intentional process, without itself being "meant," is lived through (or immanently perceived).⁴¹

The term "being lived through" (or "being immanently perceived") signifies nothing other than the fact that no new, second act of Objectifying turning towards is executed in relation to the original act.⁴² If this immediate living through is not a new, intentional act, then what can be given through this living through is without doubt not something objective in the sense of something intentionally constituted. Nevertheless, it is obviously not nothing. From this it follows that while the *cognitive* accomplishment certainly becomes known at first by means of what is objectively constituted, the accomplishment is not exhausted by this knowledge.

The genesis of inner consciousness, which takes place on the occasion of the execution of sense-bestowing acts (acts that "mean" something), is a second product of this functioning accomplishment. No infinite regress results in the sense that object-intentional acts would again be perceived by object-intentional acts. Instead of an intentional turning towards, a being aware of that is not one having the characteristic of an act appears.

It follows from the double function of the *cogitatio* just described, however, that the *cogitatio* is not only "sense-bestowing" in the sense of the constitution of something objective but, also, that it is itself subjectively lived through, independent of all particular mediations of significance. Genetic aspects emerge on the occasion of the execution of intentional acts, aspects which are not *noematic* ones. The acts present themselves as having a duration, as flowing and centered acts. Because of the particular way it is formed, their

pole of centering, the ego, is not a *noema*, standing alongside other *noemata*. Transcendental subjectivity “actually lives” in the acts.⁴³ As a result, the acts as mental processes have two aspects – “the purely subjective aspect of the mental process and the remaining, as it were I-modified content of the mental process”⁴⁴ – found in them at once such that a “subjectively oriented and an Objectively oriented aspect are to be distinguished”⁴⁵ in these mental processes. Transcendental subjectivity is found, if at all, only in its relations, which can be of such genetic and constitutive types. Transcendental subjectivity itself, as that which “discharges” everthing, has no apprehensible content and, thus, lives completely in its genetic and constitutive relations.

The genetic function becomes clear when the *cogitationes* impose themselves upon the inner consciousness of time as the unity of a flow of consciousness, independent of the transcendent, *noematic* pole they intend in their flowing. The *cogitationes* do not only “bestow” sense and significance. They also present themselves as “something of which we are conscious” when they are understood by the metaphor of a “flux.” Whenever the unity of a constituting consciousness becomes known, this unity is a genetically formed unity and not an “intended” unity. Without retentional formations, therefore, there is no ego as the I-pole of the lived, mental acts. Without a genetically formed ego, there is no flowing consciousness apprehensible as a flux.⁴⁶ Just as multiplicities are synthetically united in consciousness, multiplicities which are then sense-wholes, the moments of being conscious of converge in the synthetic unity of the conscious ego.

The *cogitatio* cannot, accordingly, be considered simply under the aspect of being an “act.” Without doubt, no object-intentional acts are executed in connection with the centering of consciousness and, therefore, in connection with either the formation of an ego or the genesis of habitualities, despite the fact that this formation takes place on the occasion of the execution of such intentional accomplishments. The Cartesian-Husserlian schema of a thorough-going, object-intentional structure of consciousness undergoes a correction here.⁴⁷ The *cogitatio* is incompletely interpreted in its accomplishment when it is understood only as a sense-constituting act. Significance related to things and the description of such significance in language are always found where the *cogitatio* functions as an object-intentional act. However, the ego is simply not such an intersubjectively referable “thing,” from which it follows that the *cogitatio*, merely by its occurring, is both conscious of something and conscious of itself. Thus, the relation which presents itself in the flux of consciousness is bivalent: On the one hand, the *cogitatio*, as an act, is intentionally directed to the *phainomenon* as its *intenta*; on the other hand, the *cogitatio* is, in its *phansis*, the origin for egological geneses in that it also brings about, in addition to the logical founding of unity, the living-historical (“temporalizing”) synthesis.

If the *ego cogito* is to be the point of departure as such or the “ultimate basis

for judgment”⁴⁸ from which everything else must be investigated, then the ego itself is no exception, since it will not be an empty I-pole as the ego which is centered and which emerges with habitualities. In a word, transcendental subjectivity in no way coincides with the I-pole of historically temporalized mental acts.⁴⁹ From this it follows that the constituted *noemata* meant in the flux of consciousness are not the only poles transcendent to the *cognitiones*. The “unity of inner consciousness” or the I-pole of the temporal mental acts is also such a transcendent pole.⁵⁰ Admittedly, this holds only when the immediately lived through, genetically formed habitualities as well as the “merely intentional correlates” of homogeneously appertaining mental acts are “contained within” the flux of *cognitiones*.⁵¹

The phenomenological schematism of legitimization and grounding means that a flowing life of consciousness cannot be simply asserted to be the case, but that the life of consciousness is itself to provide proof of its being a flowing life of consciousness by means of mental acts that originally present it as being such. However, in that the life of consciousness is experienced as a nexus, it becomes apparent that consciousness cannot simply be “there” but that an ego, an “I, who subjectively lives this and that, who lives through this and that *cogito* as the same I”⁵² emerges within the life of consciousness.

This particular form of the founding of unity appears in the genesis of *habitus*. That each objective sense correlative to the *cognitiones* is constituted by an act does not exclude the fact that genetic unities are formed in the flow of intentional acts. The form of legitimization pertaining to these genetic unities is the immediate living through. Therefore, the I of the mental acts, which “embraces the particular multiplicities of *cognitiones* collectively in its own manner; namely, as belonging to the identical I,”⁵³ is dependent upon functioning transcendental subjectivity.

Admittedly, everything that has sense and significance is constituted in *cognitiones*. At the same time, however, the flux of mental life and the pure occurrence as such leave behind their marks. A genetic-historical synthesis of identification runs parallel to the founding of unity as the latter appears correlative to object-intentional acts. Transcendental subjectivity can now be grasped as functioning exclusively in its accomplishments without coinciding with what is accomplished.

It has been said justifiably that it is necessary to leave out of consideration certain concepts of subjectivity.⁵⁴ In the case of transcendental subjectivity, the inquiry does not concern,

1. spirit or the psyche as that which makes man a man, the subject a subject,
 2. the empirical or personal I that one normally calls the subject,
 3. the subjective as being that is for the subject, the possession of the I.
- Everything that stands over against the I as a pre-givenness of the activity of the I is formally the subjective possession of the I. As Husserl says, “They are

subjective." Not, however, as acts or states of the I, but as that possessed by the I . . . ,

4. the subjective as the being of the subject, or I-ness itself, which is simply the "unity constituted as the flow of consciousness."⁵⁵

VI

At least two transcendencies, then, can be attributed to transcendental subjectivity when the *cogitationes* are polarized on one hand with respect to the act-constituted *noemata* and on the other with respect to the genetically formed *habitus*. However, the nature of the latter transcendence is still thoroughly problematic. For certainly "the flux of consciousness is also constituted in consciousness as a unity."⁵⁶ In that case, however, the functioning form of just this consciousness as transcendental subjectivity is then to be distinguished from the "founding of the unity of the flux of consciousness as it appears to itself."⁵⁷ For the so-called "inner perception" (therefore, the "I think" which can accompany all *cogitationes*), "as opposed to all of the Objects constituted in it, can never be objectified in the sense that then something like a constituted, immanent unity would emerge; that is, this consciousness is not a temporal Object."⁵⁸

While this consciousness is not a temporal Object, it does appear to be transcendent in a particular form nevertheless. To begin with, however, transcendence means something else. *Cogitationes*, as object-intentional acts, constitute the whole of the world. They ground at the same time the *habitus* of a unity formed between mental acts belonging to the I who is "determined by this abiding *habitus* as a persisting I."⁵⁹ If, however, the formation of *habitus* does not originate from "Objectifying" accomplishments, accomplishments that "mean" something, then no acts of cognition are in question. Rather, the *habitus* are established by the mental processes of being aware of and living through which are concomitant with acts of cognition.

Since the habitualities are qualified as abiding nevertheless, they must certainly designate something that is transcendent to the object-intentional flux of consciousness. Where the I as I-pole of mental acts and of the habitualities of the I are discussed, there emerges something different than the something meant in intentional acts; and something which in fact does not pass away with the *cogitationes* which occasion the something meant. Thus, the exception, that the genetic achievement of this type is not to be understood as something constituted *as an object* and *as such* transcendent to consciousness is justified.

In connection with the genesis of the I-pole of mental acts, the acts which "mean" something, which tend towards the *noematic* unities of sense, are not transcended in the same sense that they are transcended by the objects

they intend. Rather, they are transcended with regard to their having-been-lived-through, whereby this living through results in abiding sedimentations in the temporalized ego with its patent and latent possessions (therefore, with its *habitus* and habitualities). When we originally discussed “transcendence in immanence,” what was expressed was that the *intentum* with its significance remains transcendent to the mere, presenting act in accordance with the correlative connection between *noesis* and *noema*.⁶⁰ Accordingly, the sense-pole, as transcendent to the act, stands over against the object-intentional mental act. In contrast to this, *object-intentionality* is transcended with regard to the non-objective in connection with the genesis of the I-pole of mental acts such that, on one hand, a surpassing of the act as a moment of the fluxing life of consciousness itself and, on the other, a surpassing of the act as an object-intentional act takes place.

Therefore, the atemporal unity of significance, on the one hand, and the temporalized unity of consciousness, on the other, both of which refer back to original synthetic accomplishments, become transparent.⁶¹ Transcendental subjectivity reveals itself to be the formal structure of this flux of *cogitationes*, *cogitationes* which are themselves new with respect to “content” and new with respect to habitual consequences.⁶²

This transcendental subjectivity, then, is neither an objective unity that is composed in some way nor an I-pole of mental acts (together with *habitus* and habitualities). Precisely the term “subjectivity” shows that what is in question is function as form. Transcendental subjectivity abides, even though the mental acts flow: to that extent, it transcends the acts.

Husserl raises the question directly which imposes itself upon us here: “Does not the flux also have something that abides in a certain manner, even though no part of the flux can change into a non-flux?” And the answer is,

What abides above all is the formal structure of the flux, the form of the flux. That is, the flowing is not simply a random flowing; rather, each phase has one and the same form. The constant form is always newly filled with “content.” However, the content is not something external which is brought into the form. Rather, it is determined by the form of regularity; only such that this regularity does not alone determine the *concretum*. The form consists in this, that a now is constituted by an impression and that to the impression is joined both a tail of retentions and a horizon of protentions. The abiding form, however, enables there to be consciousness of constant change, which is a primal fact: consciousness of the change of the impression into retention while a new impression is always there; or, with regard to the “what” of the impression, consciousness of the change of this “what” while the just-now, which we are still conscious of as “now,” is modified and obtains the character of “just-having-been.”⁶³

Transcendental subjectivity functions as time-constituting consciousness in such a way that, because of the intentional structure of consciousness, it cannot actually be at all without something to intend. The form of the flux of consciousness becomes transparent, naturally, only when consciousness appears. However, consciousness occurs because,

two, inseparably integrated *intentionalities* that, like two sides of one and the same thing, require one another are interwoven with one another in the single flux of consciousness. By virtue of one, immanent time is constituted. This is an Objective time, a true time, in which there is duration and alteration of that which endures. In the other, the quasi-temporal ordering of the phases of the flux is constituted. This ordering always and necessarily has the flowing “now” point, the phase of actuality, and the series of preactual and postactual (the not-yet-actual) phases. This prephenomenal, preimmanent temporality is constituted intentionally as the form of time-constituting consciousness and is constituted within time-constituting consciousness itself. The flux of immanent, time-constituting consciousness not only is, but the flux is so remarkably and yet understandably composed that an appearance of the flux to itself necessarily subsists in it and, for that reason, the flux must necessarily be graspable in the flowing. The appearance of the flux to itself does not require a second flux; rather, it is constituted within itself as a phenomenon. The constituting and the constituted coincide, though naturally they do not coincide in every respect.⁶⁴

Intentional analysis takes into account the objects constituted in “Objective time.” The genesis of *habitus*, on the other hand, is evidence not only for the fact that the “flux of immanent, time-constituting consciousness” is but, in addition, for the fact that it has appeared to itself. Thus the problem of a “universal,” transcendental-phenomenological idealism consists in clarifying how the constituting and the constituted coincide and yet do not coincide.

VII

Transcendental phenomenology is concerned with the constitution of the givenness of Objects in accordance with consciousness. Accordingly, the *archē* is not sought in the transcendencies correlative to consciousness but in the transcendental form of this consciousness. The transcendental is the complete opposite of things and objects, since the conceptual-categorial structure of the latter is not commensurate with the transcendental. Thus, the transcendental is not to be understood as a “something,” for its sense is supercategorial: It is not a thing, not an objective unity but subjectivity. Subjectivity completely surpasses the domain of what exists and has sense. It presents itself in its surpassing as *transcententia in actu*. However, the transcendental form of the constituting and genetic function appears *in actu*. Transcendentality belongs to *metaphysica generalis*, which here refers not to *ens qua ens* but to subjectivity as that which makes possible. *Metaphysica specialis*, then, can account for everything that is something made possible – is formed – *correlative* to the presenting accomplishments without the two coinciding.

In accordance with the double polarization of the *cogitationes* with respect to the sense-pole and the I-pole, we must speak here of transcendence and para-transcendence.⁶⁵ It is true transcendence when the unities of sense and significance, in their categorial formation as “essences,” have intentional

existence beyond the *cogitative* executions, though the unities are connected with the *cogitationes* as their *intenta*. Para-transcendence appears to be presented when the “I of the mental acts” with its habitualities has appeared to itself in the flux of *cogitationes* and yet is not this flux.

However, it is also not a transcendent “essence.” The identical poles of the mental acts are distinct from the constituted unities of sense and significance, without themselves being something objective. For “the ego itself exists for itself in continuous evidence; therefore, it is an ego continuously constituted in itself as existing.”⁶⁶ The ego “grasps itself not merely as a flowing life but also as an I, the I who subjectively lives this and that, who lives through this and that *cogito* as the same I.”⁶⁷ The fact of transcendental genesis results in new abiding characteristics [*Eigenheiten*] because the multiplicities of *cogitationes* are synthesized as the *cogitationes* of the identical I. “According to a law of transcendental genesis,” this central I acquires “a new abiding characteristic with each act emanating from the I which has a new objective sense.”⁶⁸

With this abiding characteristic as it is manifested in the I as the substrate of habitualities, the time-constituting flux, as absolute subjectivity, is transcended, even though it is indeed a transcendence of a peculiar sort. For,

the persisting, the temporal enduring of such determinations of the I and the peculiar change the I undergoes in respect to them is obviously not a continuous filling of immanent time with mental acts – just as the abiding I itself, as the pole of abiding I-determinations, is not an act or a continuity of acts, even though it is essentially related back to the flow of acts by such habitual determinations.⁶⁹

Absolute subjectivity cannot appear without Objects. Nevertheless, a sort of “not-coming-forth” and, hence, a “para-transcendence” is certainly present in its appearance to itself.⁷⁰ Accordingly, the following holds:

When a primal datum, a new phase, emerges, the preceding one is not lost but is “maintained in grasp” (i.e., “retained”) and, thanks to this retention, a looking back to what has run off is possible. Retention is not itself a looking back that makes the phase which has run off an Object. Because I have the phase which has run off in my grasp, I live through the present phase, take the phase which has run off “in addition to” the present phase – thanks to retention – and am directed towards the phase which is coming (by protention).⁷¹

Everything here depends upon the “being-aware-of,” upon the “living through.” For by this the “not-coming-forth” indicated earlier becomes clear. Egological *habitus* are formed only because consciousness is necessarily consciousness in all of its phases.⁷² The constituting and what is constituted can coincide in a unique way only insofar as consciousness is not only consciousness of something but is at once that of which we are conscious as well. That is, when retentions of the sort just mentioned occur such that poles of centering arise on the occasion of *cogitative* executions in an immediate, genetic formation, the result is *not* a transcendence in the direction of the

noematic intenta which are the correlates of acts. Rather, a para-transcendence is actualized in the occasional appearance of the retentional centers themselves.

The I with its habitualities, which originates in intentional accomplishments, is not a unity of an object, thing, sense or significance. Nevertheless, the I has come about genetically by virtue of a synthesis that places an egological pole alongside the *noematic* pole of the *cogitationes*. On the ground of such a synthesis, there can then be an I with a style that endures changes, an I with a “thorough-going unity of identity” and with a “personal character.”⁷³ All of this depends precisely upon the *hic et nunc* of the *cogitationes*, without involving aspects transcendent in the objective sense. On the other hand, the flux does not remain simply a flux of *cogitationes*: The flux becomes evident as a “continuity of adumbrations” by means of the living through and is, hence, para-transcendent.

VIII

If phenomenology’s domain of research is in fact transcendentally purified consciousness, then this research must be concerned with the transcendencies and para-transcendencies dependent upon the transcendental structure of consciousness. As a result transcendentally purified consciousness is nothing other than the everyday consciousness for which both the I and world are, with the difference that “world” and “I” are not posited as existent for this purified consciousness. The so-called natural thesis of being itself also belongs to an immanent consciousness and, hence, becomes a transcendental moment of sense. A “transcendentally purified consciousness” can only originate from functioning *cogitationes*, for which there is no “pregiven” world-subject or world-Object. The “I” and “world” are first constituted correlative to one another such that a different I possesses a different surrounding world and a different consciousness.⁷⁴

The transcendent and para-transcendent formations “world” and “monadic ego” are formed in nexuses of sense and *habitus* that are products of *cogitationes* which constantly transcend themselves. As a result, the “transcendent” and “para-transcendent” can be distinguished on the model of the distinction between things and the psychic. Things are essentially distinguished by the fact that they can be given by “adumbrations,” while such adumbration, in view of the immediacy of being-aware-of, is not the case for the psychic. The adumbrations form multiplicity of appearances such that the thing which shows itself is given to consciousness without, however, coinciding with consciousness. It is precisely the essential transcendence of the essence of the thing, as it is clarified by the *noetic-noematic* correlation, which makes the reduction of things, objects and matters of fact to mental acts impossible.⁷⁵

Where there is a transcendence in immanence, it cannot be said that the “essence,” as the identical, specific *quid*, vanishes completely behind the appearance-*qualia* of the adumbrations. What the being of the respective essence is belongs simply to the moments of sense which specifically distinguish it and, hence, to what is constituted transcendentally. The *cogitationes* which constitute transcendentally never “are” in this way because they function by bestowing sense. However, the so-called “psychic” together with the whole multiplicity of I-forms (with the exception of the phenomenological, universal observer, who remains outside of all phenomenological questions) is not the *cogitatio* either. Thus, the “psychic” together with the pure I formed in “immanent transcendence” as the empty point of identity, with the I in full concretion, with the I as the substrate of habitualities or with the concrete ego as the primal monad, etc. is not the *cogitatio*. Rather, the psychic is sedimented as something that abides (as something “para-transcendent”) in its continual process of becoming.

IX

What is wholly other lies in transcendentality and not in what is categorially formed in this or that way. Accordingly, it surpasses the transcendent and the para-transcendent in the same sense that what grounds surpasses the grounded. Because phenomenology is concerned with that which grounds, with that on the ground of which givennesses first become graspable and conceivable, phenomenology becomes “idealism.” For,

idealism, in all of its forms, attempts to lay hold of subjectivity as subjectivity and to account for the fact that the world is never given to subjects and to communities of subjects as anything other than the world with its respective content of experience valid subjective-relatively. This world is one that receives ever new transformations of sense in and through subjectivity. Even the apodictically persisting conviction of one and the same world, presenting itself subjectively in changing manners, is a conviction that is motivated purely within subjectivity, a conviction whose sense – the world itself, the actually existing world – never surpasses the subjectivity which brings it about.⁷⁶

On this basis, transcendental-phenomenological idealism regards itself to be an actualism.

In this context, it need not be indicated that actualism cannot mean that all being exists in activity and that it would require no support. Where “being” itself emerges as a moment of sense of accomplishments which make understanding possible, being cannot exist in activity. Accordingly, phenomenological actualism does not signify the opposite of the so-called philosophy of substance in the sense that the pure flux of becoming would be posited in place of a “supporter” of activities. For being and becoming, activity and rest, are all, jointly and severally, moments of sense that presuppose sense-bestowing functions and first come to consciousness by

means of these functions. Transcendental subjectivity, which cannot be anticipated, is the *archē* itself in that it appears in *cogitationes* and makes ontological as well as ontic experience possible.⁷⁷

Nevertheless, it does not follow from the fact that subjectivity is a functioning subjectivity that “operational” groundings are as equally possible as “phenomenological” groundings.⁷⁸ When one speaks of an operational forming of the world, then it is understood that epistemology’s traditional subject-Object division is overcome, because actual and imagined things are to be nothing other than the *poiemata* of actual or imagined actions. The operationalistic reduction^e is to bring about the disregarding of every “opinion” which belongs exclusively to the individual I as something uncertain. What is to remain existing is only that which has validity independent of the I. Thus, a reinterpretation of the Cartesian-Husserlian beginning from doubt, according to which the I as mine remains certain and indubitable, is required such that precisely this I, as what is uncertain and dubitable, is now to rank behind the required validities which are independent of the I.

The operationalistic *epochē*, then, concerns procedures of consciousness, whereby the domain of actions and operations is to remain after the *epochē* as what is indubitable. The phenomenological abstention from judgment concerning the real validity of actuality is opposed by the *epochē* concerning all reflective procedures of consciousness. What becomes questionable is not what can become an “object” but what pertains only to me. The departure from actions would correspond to the passage back to the domain of *cogitationes* such that the counter-schema of *poesis* and *poiema*, of *facit* and *factum*, of construction and certainty opposes the phenomenological schema of *noesis* and *noema*, of *cogito* and *cogitatum*, of intuition and evidence. From the start, then, the departure from apparently problemless transcendental intersubjectivity replaces the departure from transcendental subjectivity. At the same time, then, the residuum remaining after the phenomenological reduction is not understood as functioning subjectivity but, rather, as a reservoir of “fundamental, non-operational concepts” and “directives for action”; therefore, as the fundamental, phenomenological stock for operational achievements.⁷⁹

It is obvious that this operational formulation does not extend as far as does the phenomenological formulation. For when it is said that “because the I, as conscious of itself, is bracketed, only that accepted and valid for others, also for myself as other, remains . . .”⁸⁰ then “something” is always still valid, something remains, therefore, a phenomenon. The appeal to pure operations and actions as such is always insufficient when the question concerns the formation of an order of being about which something can be determined and statements can be made.⁸¹ The order of *poiemata* (the made) is an order only for a consciousness that experiences the moments of sense. The moments of

sense and significance which determine the order, moments which have become a world through operations and actions, are constituted only by conscious processes.

Where it is a question of cognizing and knowing, one cannot go back behind the sense-bestowing *cogitationes*, *cogitationes* for which even operations and actions are “phenomena.” Only the *cogitatio* can grasp both itself and the *poiemata*, for it is related through transcendence and para-transcendence to both “what exists” and the appearing consciousness. Therefore, the *cogitationes* are actually something ultimate: They present both the transcendent “existent” and the para-transcendent consciousness which lives through, consciousness as the point of centering and the executor of the *cogitationes*, whereby both aspects of “immanent transcendence” are encompassed. A corresponding passage back (encompassing both *poiemata* and *noemata*) to what grounds itself that begins from operations is excluded. For “thinking can pass from the thinking of being to the thinking of thinking. Being cannot . . .”⁸² And the operations cannot be grasped as operations if they are not at bottom simply consciousness. The function *cogitationes qua cogitationes* is underivable because we first raise ourselves above the in-itself connection of operations by *cogitationes*. This is so because the impetus to “significance,” to “sense” and to the intentional moments of the retentions-having ego first takes place in *cogitationes* alone, correlative to the immanence of occurrence. By this, it first becomes possible to speak of “operations” and their accomplishments as such.⁸³ Therefore, transcendental-phenomenological, universal idealism and the problematic of constitution are connected.⁸⁴

X

In connection with the transcendental considerations which aim at grasping and elucidating an order of being as an order, the reduction to the synthetic accomplishments of the order is straight-forward in that the thing which is to be set within the order or is in the order is not a *factum brutum* but, rather, contains sense and significance. *Cogitative* functions are not to be disregarded, particularly since isolated (individual, “natural”) knowledge is only one instance of *cogitative* constitution in general. Moreover, they cannot be bypassed if the grasping of “essences,” which, on the basis of the natural, naive understanding of the world, is generally understood in the sense of a “philosophical hypostatization” or of a “natural-scientific substruction,” is to be clarified.⁸⁵ Just as it is true that the “natural,” “normal,” “everyday” and “naive” attitudes imply as attitudes the question concerning what makes them possible transcendently, it is equally true that they, as attitudes connected in a certain way, do not allow the transcendental form to shine through in a

straightforward manner. Looking away from the original experience of the world in the reduced attitude enables the essential transcendental correlation between “world” and “consciousness of the world”⁸⁶ to emerge for the first time. This correlation is “the absolute correlation between entities of every type and every sense, on one hand, and absolute subjectivity, as constituting sense and ontic validity in the broadest manner, on the other.”⁸⁷ At this point, the investigation of the variable *cogitative* achievements imposes itself upon us.

It is a question, then, of,

the systematic unfolding of the universal *a priori* innate to the essence of transcendental subjectivity (and, consequently, to a transcendental intersubjectivity as well), or the systematic unfolding of the universal *logos* of all conceivable being.⁸⁸

This *logos* must determine “*archē*-ology,” “phansiology” and “hexiology,” for it is the form of subjectivity.

Functioning subjectivity is *a priori*, and the question arises whether it also appears as intersubjectivity and what intersubjectivity is. The acquiring of a super-individual standpoint is always connected with transcendental philosophy because it is to be grounding in the broadest sense, for even the “individual,” the “constituted” I, the concrete “monad” is already constituted.¹ In that case, what is at issue is the problematic of constitution, the problematic by which the transcendental-phenomenological reduction must enable the exact apprehension of the *a priori* subjectivity, the systematic unfolding of which actually makes “all conceivable being” understandable as a phenomenally constituted formation.

In the carrying out of the fundamental, phenomenological intentions, then, the problematics of the reduction and constitution have a complementary relationship. When the question aims at making what exists and is given understandable as “appearance” (*phainomenon* and *phansis*) according to their sense, and when in doing so one departs from the intentional-functioning accomplishments of subjectivity, then the understanding which is gained has a different structure than the knowledge acquired under the governance of the so-called “natural attitude,” knowledge which departs from the definitive opposition between subject and Object. In the former case, knowledge of phenomena always means the grasping of phenomena with a mere claim to being. In that each and everything can “appear” in its abiding characteristic only as a pole of *cogitative* executions, the problematic of constitution reveals itself to be a universal problematic, not a merely limited one.

To what is constituted in *cogitative* executions also belongs that which presents itself with the claim of Objective validity. However, the sense of “Objective validity” requires intersubjectivity. At the same time, the question is raised, how is it possible to overcome the *de facto* illusion of a transcendental solipsism?

Transcendental subjectivity, which finds unity in the *nunc stans*,⁸⁹ is not the transcendental ego of the phenomenological reduction, since this ego is characterized as the abiding I of all convictions.⁹⁰ In phansiological and hexiologial analysis, all founded unities are referred back to the *cogitationes*, the unities being poles of the *cogitationes*. Existent and non-existent, true and false, valuable and valueless, senseful and senseless belong to the *noematic* domain just as habitualities and cancelled habitualities, etc. belong to the egological domain.⁹¹

Whatever else may be ascertained about the phansiologically or phenomenologically founded unity, the *cogitatum* as a unity is always attributed to an ego as a unity. This ego cannot be the pure, transcendental ego, for the transcendental ego is not the pole of specific convictions but, rather, of *all* convictions. If questions concerning being and non-being, sense and nonsense are raised, then an ego-pole, as the pole of the convictions pertaining to them, is established correlative to the corresponding *cogitata*. If one now analyzes the particular *cogitata* "I am" and "I am not."⁹² it is obvious that the negatively or affirmatively corroborated ego does not coincide with the ego which is generated concomitantly on the occasion of this type of intentional execution. In a word, the I of all my actual *cogitationes*, as a constituted I, is not necessary. In contrast to this, one cannot abstract from the transcendental I as the I-pole as such, who "is" when *cogitationes* "are." Hence, it follows: "only the *cogitatio* is given absolutely."⁹³ Everything that goes beyond the *cogitatio* is called "in itself"; it is a founded unity and can at most validly make a *claim to being*. This establishes the theme of universal idealism.⁹⁴

When one says that a "world" is given in accordance with consciousness, that does not mean that the world is in the ego. The world has this or that index of sense; e.g., even the characteristic of being "Objective." The term "intentionality of consciousness" expresses the alienness to the I (and, in this respect, "irreality") of the world which is given. Thus, the ego which governs in the functioning *cogitationes* proves to be transcendental, and each instance of something's being given is a transcending of the *cogitationes*.

At this point, the transcendental-phenomenological paradox emerges. Namely, the transcendental ego (the I-pole), as something absolutely, indubitably evident, is the universal *a priori* for the very reason that what itself transcends the *cogitationes* of this ego is constituted in the *cogitationes* which belong to the ego. Therefore, the intentionality of egological consciousness proves to be the ground for "transcendence in immanence."⁹⁵

With regard to the problem of transcendental idealism, it can be further stated that "natural being is not absolute being but, rather, being as the correlate of consciousness (cognition); this correlation means, however, that natural being is intentional being which necessarily refers back to the connections of the *intentio*, which is a thinking consciousness – a

consciousness that, on its side, is absolute because it does not again refer back in this manner." And because it belongs to the immanent essence of such connections of consciousness "that the object is thought, posited, finally determined in a valid manner and known in these connections of consciousness, Objective being resolves into connections of consciousness which stand under eidetic laws. The thing considered scientifically is what it is. This is the same for epistemology and metaphysics." Phenomenology, however, "performs the reflection which is unique to it. . . It shows that all Objectivities are 'appearances' in a unique sense, viz., unities of thought, unities of multiplicities which on their side (as consciousness) make up the absolute in which all Objectivities are constituted."⁹⁶

However, it is now necessary to get to the root of these Objectivities as intersubjectively referable and apprehensible. This can be done by the following argument:

1. There is a correlation between real being and actual (=effecting) subjectivity, for the proposition "there is the possibility of an object" is equivalent to the proposition "there is the possibility of valid knowledge of this object." Both possibilities include the possibility of experience by originally presenting consciousness.⁹⁷ Hence, it follows: "The hypothesis, the formulation 'this objectivity exists' implies, therefore, that an I must be positable who is related to this objectivity in a knowing *cogito*."⁹⁸
2. It holds for the real world that the possible appearance of precisely this real world from a certain here and now is *noematically* related to possible experience in general. However, it follows that: "According to the given idea of our world of things, the possibility of experience of the world of things presupposes that the experiencer himself must have a body in this world insofar as he is in the experienced world. . ."⁹⁹ As a result, it is shown that "a material world as a merely material world cannot be conceived; it can be conceived only as a psycho-physical world."¹⁰⁰
3. The proposition "the possibility of a material world requires the possibility of a being in the world who is capable of knowledge" signifies further that knowledge of an identical, material world by a so-called subject is "Objective" only if the world is valid not only for this subject but for all other, cognizing subjects. However, the identity between what is experienced by two subjects can only be asserted by either another, super-ordinated subject who overlooks the different accomplishments of subjectivity and the same world of experience or by a subject living with these world-experiencing subjects in a "relation of empathy." In that case, however, this means that all of these "subjects have an animate existence in the presupposed world of things."¹⁰¹

Two problems are interlaced here. On the one hand, the problem is to guarantee that the world which is produced by *cogitative* executions is in fact a material, psycho-physical, experienceable world. On the other hand, it should be shown that this world is an "Objective" and, hence, an essentially intersubjectively referable world. Accordingly, the following two considerations must be made in order to clarify "universal idealism" within the framework of the problematic of constitution.

If there is a material nature, then necessarily belonging to it as a correlate are subjects whose existence is not a merely logical possibility (an existence that need not be). When material nature is a phenomenon, the existence of cognizing, grasping subjects must be an actuality. Logically possible worlds require as a correlate logically possible subjects. If such a world is a phenomenon, the possibility must be a real possibility. Such a possibility is the case if the factors which establish a grasping are given: if they are given, the grasping itself, as constituting that phenomenalizes, is no longer merely (logically) possible but actual. The *possibility* of *legitimate* knowledge must be *real*.¹⁰² The supposition of the possibility of knowledge of a material world includes the possibility of egos who experience the world. For experience of the world takes place in *cogitative* constitutions, and the constitution of a material world requires the appropriate *cogitative* presuppositions; i.e., constituting, "psycho-physical," "animate," "embodied" subjects who are able to experience.

Each subject is a subject for the world belonging to him as a correlate. Consequently, the subject must possess the distinctive dispositions of experience and peculiarities of constitution which result in the intentional world belonging to him. Transcendental-phenomenological idealism becomes clear when one considers that each determinate world can be imagined only for the corresponding, actual subject with the "possible" dispositions of cognition and experience which pertain to the world; i.e., for subjects who belong to this world.¹⁰³ In a word, there must be a means of sensory-animate experience and grasping for a sensuous-materially interpreted world.

That what is experienced as having the significance "Objective" cannot be a merely solipsistically meant or presumed "Objective" is proven by the following argument. The phenomenal correlates of experience exhibit, in addition to the distinctive sense "Objective," phenomena of another sort, viz., other subjects. That the alter ego, however, is not something merely imagined and intentionally meant must be guaranteed for the constitutive theory of the experience of someone else by the transcendental guiding clue which lies in the particular *noetic noematic* manners of givenness of the alter ego.¹⁰⁴

If a reduction of transcendental experience to the subjective sphere of ownness is carried out, then a first, "*noematic*" sphere appears that is, by means of a self-apperception, the sphere of psycho-physical man. Within this

sphere are the first actualities and potentialities of the flow of mental acts reduced to ownness. However, what the experiencing ego possesses is not exhausted by this. In addition, the intentional object belongs to the ego. Transcendence in the sense of sensory objects joins para-transcendence in the sense of habitualities.

However, that these objects are to be “Objective” and, hence, ones that can demand intersubjective validity can be claimed only if the existence of other subjects is in fact guaranteed. The phenomenological principle, to let what shows itself evidently have its say, leads to the acknowledgement and explication of the experience of someone else. In this case, the other, who is another subject and not a mere thing, is not simply presented [*präsentiert*] and intended in accordance with consciousness in the way that a thing, a physical body or an object are. Rather, he is experienced in analogizing apperception as something exceptional. The mediate (empathizing) appresentation of the alter ego stands apart from the immediate presentation [*Präsentation*] of objects.¹⁰⁵

A peculiar kind of verification by mediate intentionality is involved in this case. While objects are presented in adumbrations on the ground of sensory data, other subjects are unobstructedly appresented as the centers of their own constitutive accomplishments, as egos.¹⁰⁶ Much in one’s own intentional life refers back to the constitutions of just these “others.” Above all, however, it is clear that the senses of “Objective,” “Objectivity” and “universal validity” can first be made apparent after the experience of the you has clarified what “is” only for me and what “is” also for another.

For an ego, “other” in the specific sense can only be an alter ego. As the center of possible constitutions, the alter ego is distinguished fundamentally from the mere *cogitatum* and cannot be understood on the basis of objects. The other is not found as a particular object among other, *noematic* unities. Rather, I have Objective objects because I possess, together with the alter ego, the world as a common *cogitatum*. Thus, communalization is not explained by the fact that I have along with the other the same world as a *cogitatum*. “Rather, conversely, it follows from the fact that subjects have a common world that they are already communalized subjects.”¹⁰⁷ Expressed differently: “The relatedness of the world, as a meant world, to the subject is, therefore, not a relatedness to me as an individual subject, but to intersubjectivity.”¹⁰⁸

XI

An experience of such a completely unique sort is presented here that the question of the connection between transcendental subjectivity, historical occurrence and the universal understanding of being must emerge.¹⁰⁹ For how does the *logos* genuinely makes its appearance? If “phenomenon,” beyond the

traditional observance of “idealism” and “realism,” is what identifies itself as a unity of sense of a specific type in the corresponding *cogitationes*, then it is the task of a phenomenology to lay open the intentional processes of consciousness as accomplishments of the constituting, functioning ego, whereby the whole, *noematic* domain serves as a guiding clue for the constitutive inquiries back and whereby, further, the whole field of mundane history forms a part of this domain founded by constituting accomplishments.

The ego and the life of consciousness, which remain as a residuum after carrying out the phenomenological reduction, are not “parts of the world” when “being,” taken in the sense of the “natural thesis of being” as “being present at hand,” is itself a moment of sense-forming accomplishments.¹¹⁰ The opposition between “nature” and “history,” with all of the derivatives such as “universal” and “particular,” “law” and “structure,” “Object” and “value” and “causality” and “teleology” become second in importance to the opposition between constitution in its constituting on the one hand and what is constituted on the other, for *all* mundane unities of sense, as *noematic* poles of actual, intentional acts, are related correlatively to the originally presenting accomplishments in which their senses are formed.¹¹¹

From the standpoint of intentional analysis and constitutive investigation, then, the decisive distinction is the opposition between the mundane and the extra-mundane, because the whole realm of intentional Objects is to be used as a guiding clue for constitutive inquiries back, the phenomenon of the Objective formation of sense is to be investigated and the origin of the “world” as such is to be explicated.¹¹² Thus, phenomenology cannot turn away from the “world” in its investigations or even exhibit a “world behind the world.” Rather, it must describe the egological life of consciousness. This means it must “see” how the ego constitutes its *cogitatum* in *cogitationes*, whereby the “how” of the *cogitatum*’s constitution is not itself either a natural or a historical pre-given “part of the world” but, rather, is pre-mundane.

Further, the turn towards (in this respect, transcendental) extra-mundane subjectivity does not mean a turn towards the irrational but, rather, is a remaining with the world which is to be understood on the basis of consciousness.¹¹³ Implications of sense are present in connection with all “parts of the world,” implications of sense which refer beyond the what of the actually given data. Likewise, the mundane being of this “part of the world,” the phenomenality of the phenomenon and the Objectivity of the Object respectively refer beyond the unity of sense which is immediately, matter-of-factly grasped. Thus, the “phenomenon” must be more than a mere “constituted appearance.”

Being an ego and understanding itself as an ego in the true sense does *not* mean, therefore, apprehending itself as a mundane givenness, does not mean an understanding derived from a product formed by an apprehension of itself or the apprehension of someone else that has already been constituted

historically in some way. Rather, it means executing the *ego cogito cogitatum qua cogitatum*,¹¹⁴ by which the correlative relation between the pre-mundane, constituting life of consciousness and the mundane, constituted unity of sense finds expression.

At the same time, the occurrenceness of conscious life, which “presents” itself from itself as constituting consciousness in the *noematically* polarized intuitions and intentions finds expression. If phenomenology does not wish to remain a regional-eidetic description of the essences of that mundanely constituted in the domain of natural Objects or historical facts, it cannot look away from the historical in the genuine sense. For constitutive inquiries back, which begin from a given historical situation, do not merely concern what is constituted as such but the constitution as well. And constitution is the appearance of sense in its appearing, or the autonomous occurring of the underivable itself; that is, the occurring of that which shows itself from itself.¹¹⁵

As mundanities, “nature” and “history” have their being as being having a completely determinate sense; viz., a sense that is essentially graspable intersubjectively. Being that is determined in this way, which is itself a moment of sense, requires a constituting consciousness as the ultimate origin for the bestowal of sense.¹¹⁶ Therefore, phenomenological idealism established in this way does not deny the reality of the world and its structures, for that this world exists is indisputable. However, it is necessary to clarify just this indisputability, which is also a moment of sense, because “sense” is bestowed only by mental acts, which are never “empty.” As pre-mundane, the transcendental ego with its accomplishments is not itself derivable. Thus, phenomenology becomes the philosophy of constituting consciousness, the consciousness which alone is irreducible. And the only meaning that the transcendental ego can have is “constituting’s making its appearance in the temporalization of history.”¹¹⁷

XII

Intentional analysis reveals what shows itself as an Objective object or as an historical fact in the natural attitude, an attitude in which interest is focused on the *noematic* pole of the intention, to be a constituted sense. As an *intersubjectively* constituted sense, however, this sense is a *mundane-historically* constituted sense. What is mundane-historical certainly has, as does everything constituted, its own forms of showing itself. Nevertheless, it remains a phenomenon in the sense of a constituted appearance.¹¹⁸

However, what the grasping of an object is for a mundane, already constituted consciousness is the projective constitution of sense for the pre-mundane, transcendental ego, for the question in this case does not involve a

universal consideration of *projected* appearances but the accomplishment of that which is the being-a-phenomenon of phenomena according to the formula *ego cogito cogitatum qua cogitatum*. This means equally that the (natural-objective or historical *de facto*) *noema* of intentional acts can be an individually or intersubjectively referable phenomenon only on the ground of the accomplishing projection of phenomenality. This takes place in the respective "how" of the actual *cogito*.¹¹⁹

The genuinely historical, accordingly, is not the mundanely historical, which is distinguished from other, mundanely constituted objects (such as natural objects) only by its particular manner of being originally presented. Rather, the genuinely historical lies in the appearing of the phenomenalizing *cogitatio*, an appearing that does *not* refer back to pregivennesses; that is, the genuinely historical lies in the manifestation of *noetic-noematic* consciousness.¹²⁰

Transcendental subjectivity, which is not identical with "consciousness in general" in the traditional sense, but rather means simply the constituting ego, is constituted in its *cogitationes* as unconditioned by pregivennesses. This is the formula I acquire myself "as the pure ego with the pure flow of my *cogitationes* . . ."¹²¹ It first becomes possible both through and in *cogitationes* to designate something as the historical "supporter" of *cogitationes* as such, something which then, as something constituted, could not be the origin. Rather, the pre-mundane *cogitationes* are the origin of everything constituted phenomenally, whereby the genuinely historical occurrence is the temporalization of the consciousness which is constituted in evidences.¹²² Since mundanities such as "nature," "history" or "sense-whole" first emerge with the evident mental acts of the pure life of consciousness, the transcendental ego is extra-mundane, without being by that any less actual. We are ourselves this transcendental ego as the functioning I-pole and, hence, not as constituted in this or that way. This means, however, that we are the transcendental ego as showing ourselves in constituting.¹²³

Within the domain of the phenomenological investigation of constitution belongs not only the manifested sense projected in evidences, intentions and intuitions, but the sense-projecting itself as well. For there are constituted senses which, as constituted and pregiven, are essentially accessible to a "universal observer," and there are senses which, without already being constituted and, hence, without being present as intersubjectively accessible, nevertheless remain senses even if they only, for example, make their appearance by being taken up, which is never empty of sense. In a word, sense lies not only in the "essences," "possibilities" and "ontic validities" as constituted unities of sense, but lies also in the evidence-bestowing manifestation of the *cogitatio* which first shows *what* its function is in its emergence.¹²⁴

The *underivability* of the *cogitationes* which manifest themselves in

evidences means that these accomplishments take place as occurrences. Not only does the underivability of the constituting ego show itself in the occurrence of evidences, but precisely its self-determination as “thinking” shows itself as well. The essence of the constituting *cogitationes* is exactly what they accomplish in acts of constituting, and constituting without resort to pre-givennesses is intuition.¹²⁵

XIII

Only the “conscious life of subjectivity which accomplishes the validity of the world”¹²⁶ cannot be reduced. And only the evidences of the correlative relation between conscious life and *noematic* sense justifies the thesis of consciousness’ *presenting something itself*; i.e., of intuition, which is “transcendental experience.” The following proposition, naturally, holds phenomenologically: The ego does not confront a reality that is merely to be considered and described; rather, entities of all types are constituted in the intentional act-life of the *cogito*, whereby the *protoxic* thesis of being necessarily belongs to the constituting intentions such that what is seen as an “existential belief” from the side of the subject emerges and what is seen as a being present at hand [*Vorhandensein*] from the side of the object makes its appearance.¹²⁷

That everything that is “something” or a sense-whole for transcendental subjectivity is a sense-whole constituted *for* and *by* this ego does not, however, limit consideration to mundanities such as “nature” and “history,” and the uncancelable, distinctive relevance of that which is intersubjectively, mundanely constituted for the “natural attitude” does not cause the pure, egological constitutions to vanish. The phenomenality of the phenomena is not a phenomenological “givenness,” a givenness that is itself a phenomenon.¹²⁸ Rather, it is *one* originally evidenced accomplishment effected in the projecting of the phenomenizing *cogitationes*, which is precisely the accomplishment of an ego that constitutes itself in its functioning.

The ego manifests the *being-a-phenomenon* of the intended phenomena in the execution of sense-containing *cogitationes* – and by this, there is only an egological evidence. What a determinate phenomenon is according to the idea of the thing-in-itself – i.e., that a re-execution by other subjects is possible which shows that it is the phenomenon or the ideal, *noematic* sense-pole of an actual, *cogitative* execution – presuppose the corresponding projective accomplishment itself. That is, it presupposes an unanticipatable execution of *cogitationes* that occurs as an event.¹²⁹ Each conceiving and understanding exhibits this accomplishment. What is constituted is the evident, and in evidence the *telos* of the transcendental ego becomes transparent.

Thus, the ego signifies the spontaneity of consciousness, the fiat which lies in *consciousness* itself and the fiat whose expression is evidence. As a result, the originary having something evidently is to be understood as a ray of the I.¹³⁰ This means that “thinking” or the *cogitatio* does not enter into a domain constructed in advance in which the ego freely wanders and manifests its spontaneity. Rather, conversely, the fact that something has sense indicates the manifestation of spontaneity. Or, if the *cogitatio*, as “sense-bestowing,” is the manifestation of spontaneity, then it is also spontaneity with respect to itself; that is, the *cogitatio* is original thinking, not another pregivenness, whereby it produces, *along with* the phenomenalization effected through intentions, the temporalization of constituting consciousness as a constituting unity.¹³¹

In the evidence of that which the intention “means,” each intentional *cogitatio* proves to be conscious. And consciousness of this original, sense-forming *cogitatio* remains consciousness of its own, constituting accomplishment in the intending.

The *cogitatio* can be conscious of itself in constituting only as a *cogitatio* not directed to mundane-natural or mundane-historical pregivennesses. Thus, one can say that subjectivity is characterized by intentionality as well as by self-consciousness. And the transcendental ego’s constituting (free) function becomes apparent in the auto-genesis of the immanent consciousness of time.¹³²

If every mundanity, every thing constituted as natural or historical, refers back to corresponding forms of sense-formation, then the truly historical, viz., the occurring, is thinking that projects givennesses. This thinking is not anticipatable in its accomplishment, for such anticipatability would contradict its sense. That is, thinking would itself appear within a horizon of anticipation. Therefore, this thinking is not pre-given but evidence-bestowing.¹³³ Moreover, what is original is neither “being” nor the existential belief of the *protodoxic* “natural thesis of being” but the should-be which is manifested in constituting. What is genuinely actual, viz., what effects, are the *cogitationes* in the broadest sense in the “how” of their accomplishment. They make possible - *post eventum* - the investigation of what is constituted as *noemata* and, hence, the investigation of experience in the ontic realm. In their accomplishment, they project the sense of experience, thinking and phenomenal evidence, whereby they are in an eminent degree historical; namely, world-constituting in the temporalization of “ontological experience.”¹³⁴

Everything that can be referred to as a unity of sense is mundane. Nevertheless, as a unity of sense it is dependent upon the *cogitative*, originary presentings of something itself. However, we can only speak of the presenting of something itself if the “how” of *cogitative* legitimation is underivable. The *noemata* always correspond to the respective, actual *cogitationes* in a strict

correlation such that the phenomena, as mundanely projected appearances, are dependent upon the *cogitatio* which *projects* and *accomplishes* phenomena, which are phenomena only in their appearing. In a word, the “things themselves,” which it is necessary to describe, and with regard to their constitutive formation as phenomena, to elucidate, are “things” only on the ground of the actual projecting of “thingness,” which must be manifested by the ego and, therefore, which must take place as an occurrence.¹³⁵

Everything that is constituted *noematically* is phenomenologically and intersubjectively graspable: What should be can be manifested egologically. For if whatever is determined as a unity of sense is formed in constitutions, intentions and intuitions, and if it is valid as a mundane existent, then everything depends upon the projection of constitutions, intentions and intuitions. As such, they have a special rank, for they are what they are and signify only *in the accomplishment* of that in which their concepts consist. Expressed differently, the constitution of transcendental subjectivity designates the occurrence *par excellence*, for the “world’s becoming a world” occurs here.¹³⁶

Projecting something *as a phenomenon* is the historically occurring, underivable accomplishment which can only be executed by the ego.¹³⁷ Accordingly, the attempt to uncover the sense that the respective phenomena contain implicitly is connected with the question concerning the sense of historical occurrence. Thus, the question “what is the sense of history?” is placed directly alongside the question “what does having a physical body mean?” or “what does being an alter ego signify?” – in a word, what must be established by the non-mundane elements in order that an X have this or that significance?¹³⁸

When it is a question of the occurring as such (and not something simply pre-given), the occurring itself is taken as a guiding clue for the corresponding inquiry back and not this or that occurrence as a mundane event; for what is questioned must be the constitution itself and not what is mundanely constituted. Therefore, an intention of a higher order is in question here: Something *beyond* the intention can be seen only *in that case* where something is accomplished *in* an intention that pertains to the necessary condition for the intention. By this, resort to *something pre-given* is essentially halted, for what is in question must be accomplished – i.e., “projected” – in the intention.¹³⁹

Therefore, when the sense of the *occurring* or appearance in its appearing is under discussion, it does not matter at first *what* specifically appears there at the time or what exactly occurs. The object of the discussion is the meaning of occurring itself, the meaning of showing-itself-from-itself. Only here is prephenomenological, egological experience in the sense of the projecting of what should be possible.¹⁴⁰ Subsequent reflection presents an intention other than the projecting execution. Thus, what is to be called the genuinely

“historical” are not “man,” “culture,” “society” and “class,” which are all something constituted and mundane. The essentially historical, rather, is the transcendental ego as the intentionally constituting ego, the ego which *makes discussions of man, culture, etc. possible*. This signifies a recourse to creative intuition.¹⁴¹

XIV

Subjectivity is constituted in evidences as functioning subjectivity, and this is its auto-genesis. The underivability of the primal ego means that what expresses the ego’s being is not that constituted as being present at hand but, rather, the execution of the constituting itself. Thus, the primal ego projects and accomplishes what its significance is. This underivability means further that this ego, in such an original, constituting life, projects at the same time an object-sphere that is a “primordial” sphere by means of the projection and that is, as an accomplishment, an occurring “appearance” of the ego which manifests itself as intentional by “self-consciousness,” “perception of someone else” and the “grasping of the you.”¹⁴² Egology is evidence of this I in its being-a-phenomenon; i.e., in the projecting of the origin. The origin, however, is thinking as accomplishing and, to that extent, as historical. The original is characterized by the expressions “intuition” and “evidence,” the historical by the expression, phenomenon as “occurrence,” “projection” or “evident bestowal of sense.”¹⁴³

Transcendental subjectivity is constituted in executions that bring something about, and it proves its cognitive character by this. However, transcendental subjectivity is constituted as *decision*, and neither can cognition be based upon decision nor decision upon cognition. In the projecting life of the flowing *cogitationes*, “what is” is “decided” by evidences, intuitions and intentions.¹⁴⁴

The being-a-phenomenon of *cogitationes* manifested upon their appearing is a mode of cognizing or thinking in the sense that the ego itself is what it “is” only in cognizing and thinking. As a result, any form of understanding is also knowledge. Consequently, any evident manifestation in the projecting of something not pre-given is not related to being for the actual accomplishment of the ego, an accomplishment which is *underivable*. Rather, what should be¹⁴⁵ is Objectively constituted as being-in-the-truth by the accomplishing of presuppositions, and this happens in unanticipatable evidences.

If it is the sense of phenomenology to accept *only* what shows itself from itself, then the genuine “thing” is transcendental subjectivity, for only *it* is not bound to something existing, which always refers to something else within determinate horizons and with determinate implications – refers, consequently, to a being in immanence. In the corresponding accomplishments, transcendental subjectivity is concerned with immanence

itself, not with transcendence in immanence.¹⁴⁶ The “thing” which in the true sense establishes itself from itself and accomplishes what it is in transcendental subjectivity *as* constitution; therefore, *as* the phenomenon which is an occurrence. That is, the *cogitatio* which lives in evidences is not primarily the *cogitatio* on the level of theoretical-universal consideration. Rather, it is the *cogitatio* on the level of the accomplishing of presuppositions on the basis of which something is manifested. And since the ego projects itself in its *cognitiones* without being dependent upon the world, it is concerned in its constitutions with *its* accomplishment itself; therefore, with what should be, not with what already is.¹⁴⁷

This ego is the “thing” which genuinely establishes itself, and it can be understood only from itself. Being-in-the-truth means exactly this, however, for it is the accomplishing fulfilment of the conditions for phenomenalizing and, hence, is at the same time the auto-genesis of transcendental subjectivity in its constituting.¹⁴⁸ As accomplishment, the egological projecting is not a comportment towards existing possibilities but, rather, is a making possible. It is that making possible which is historical and which in the genuine sense *begins*. It is not a question of something individually constituted as a unity of sense with this or that characteristic, but of the projecting of phenomenality as such.

To that extent, the accomplishment of the transcendental ego in the *cogitatio* is also the origenerative thinking [*er-denken*] about being, the absurd, nothing, etc. By means of this accomplishment alone the objectivity of objects, the being of the existents and the phenomenality of the phenomena become evident. Likewise, the historicity of what occurs historically becomes evident, which as a result becomes a phenomenon of a non-Objective type. This means, however, that “ontological projection” is the sole mode of “ontological experience,” and that any egologically evident phenomenon indicates what *should be*; therefore, indicates the historical.¹⁴⁹ We ourselves are egos in the ontological projecting and fulfilling of conditions. Therefore, we are egos as “I-poles,” not as ontic beings constituted in such and such a way. This means, however, that we are egos as constituting ourselves as historical, legitimating beings¹⁵⁰ and as being-in-the-truth in this understanding. History is the phenomenon as appearance in its appearing. It takes place in the occurrence of *cognitiones*.

The subjective *a priori* reveals itself in history. Thus it stands at the beginning as the *archē*, for without the *phansis* of the should be, there is no universal unfolding of *logos*, an unfolding that becomes apparent not only in the sense and significance of the *phainomenon*, but also in the *hexeis* of the concrete ego

which is concomitantly “constituted” or “generatively formed” in the constituting of the *phainomenon*. Parallel to the concrete “logic of being”¹⁵¹ stands the “logic of the ego.” Expressed differently, “ontology” and “egology” make visible both the phenomenal and hexiological founding of unity. However, what founds unity are the *cogitationes* in which the “I-ness” of transcendental subjectivity governs. The function of the I, however, indicates that here it is not a question of a subjective type of mundanity (therefore, the function of the “individual,” the “personal” or the “subject”). Subjectivity lies in the ability to let something arise in the way of an occurrence without reference to pre-givennesses.

This grounding of itself through accomplishments, which becomes clear in this, is evidence for an effecting actuality beyond the former types of “realism” and “idealism.” Insofar as the universal, subjective *a priori* not only is revealed but is revealed for itself, the first beginning is *logos*-ology. When it is a question of the historical projecting (“appearing as an occurrence”) of structures of being, transcendental phenomenology cannot be understood in terms of a “universal observer,” as it is in connection with intentional analysis and the investigation of *habitus*: Transcendental phenomenology becomes speculative.

The “ratio in the constant movement of self-elucidation”¹⁵² is in question here. So understood, transcendental phenomenology does not always have as its theme entities which it grasps and makes known. If it were understood in this way, it would be unable to acquire the concept of being in the objectively legitimizable phenomenon as such. Thus, transcendental phenomenology must return to the phenomenon of reason that accomplishes and projects presuppositions.

Reason “externalizes” itself in the emergence of *cogitationes*. These *cogitationes* do not themselves form a new, higher-level part of the world, they are not an entity established in some way. They function, rather, as the presupposition by means of which one can speak of entities, world, objects and *habitus*. As grounding, these *cogitative* presuppositions are not themselves like things. It is accomplishing transcendental subjectivity projected in *cogitationes* that is addressed when the being-a-phenomenon of “objects,” the being-a-thing of things, the being self-evident of what is in the world, the naturalness of an attitude and the familiarity of habitualities are under discussion. These *cogitationes* which ground apprehensions are themselves non-objective and show a projecting of structural frameworks that is not a reproductive projecting. In the *cogitationes*, for example, the object-structure as such becomes transparent without being intended as this structure.¹⁵³ Thus, a projection of experience expresses itself in the structure-predelineating *cogitationes*, which as a projection is not Objective but is the accomplishment of subjectivity.

The *cogitationes* are, thus, ultimately the locus of the “translucent

encounter of the world.” Concomitant with everything that can be apprehended in *cogitationes*, that which makes possible and is not objective becomes transparent indirectly. Perhaps it is correct to say:

It is precisely with this that there begins a philosophy with the deepest and most universal self-understanding of the philosophizing ego as the bearer of absolute reason which comes to itself, of the philosophizing ego as implying, in its apodectic being-for-itself, its fellow subjects and all possible fellow philosophizing egos. This is the discovery of absolute intersubjectivity . . . as that in which reason, in obscurity, in elucidation, in the movement of lucid self-understanding, is in infinite progress; the discovery of the necessary, concrete manner of being of absolute (in the ultimate sense, transcendental) subjectivity in a transcendental life of the constant “constitution of the world.”¹⁵⁴

Each *cogitatio*, which as such is intentionally directed to something that the *cogitatio* presents with this or that sense, is at the same time a *cogitatio* that proves intentionality and, hence, projects it. Genuine history precedes here in the becoming evident and manifesting of subjective forms. The result is an outline of the framework for that which not yet “is.” Transcendental subjectivity proves to be the ground of structure, of form as such. It cannot be grasped as something objective. Indeed, it is the presupposition for that which comes to view as something objective, particular, existent. If transcendental subjectivity is *subjectum veritatis*, then it is so only as the condition or the accomplishing ground for truth. For: “All the rationality of the fact lies in the *a priori*.”¹⁵⁵

TRANSLATOR'S NOTES

^aRespectively, “first principle,” “appearing,” “acquired disposition” (the Latin translation of which is “*habitus*”), and “reason.” The reader should also be familiar with the distinction between “*cogitatio*” (plural “*cogitationes*”), the act of thinking, and “*cogitatum*” (plural “*cogitata*”), the object of thought.

^bFunke uses two German words to distinguish between two senses of object: the correlate of any conscious act (*Gegenstand*), and the correlate of an act having the sense “accessible to anyone” (*Objekt*). To preserve this distinction, object spelled with a small “o” shall be the translation of *Gegenstand* and its derivatives. Object with a capital “O” that of *Objekt* and its derivatives.

^cThis rendering, approved by Funke, varies from the original text, which reads: “It is a fact that valid objects exist for consciousness; for consciousness, everything found within it is a ‘Heraclitean flux of phenomena.’” The sense in which objects or phenomena are “within” consciousness refers to Husserl’s doctrine of “transcendence in immanence” (cf. below, author’s footnote 16) and should not be confused with psychic or real immanence.

^dWe have added, with Funke’s approval, “what pertains expressly to,” for the two moments are, though distinct, nonetheless related.

^eReading “reduction” for “deduction.”

^fReading “constituted” for “grounded.”

AUTHOR'S NOTES

1. E. Husserl, *The Idea of Phenomenology* (IP), G-p. 17.
2. Ibid., G-p. 19.
3. Ibid., G – p. 47.
4. H. Barth, “Philosophie der Existenz,” *Jahrbuch d. Schweiz. Phil. Gesellschaft*, 2 (1943) pp. 31ff.
5. Husserl, IP, G p. 23.
6. A. Diemer, *Edmund Husserl* (Meisenheim: A. Hain, 1956), p. 18 and footnote 31.
7. E. Husserl, *Formal and Transcendental Logic* (FTL), G-p. 222. “The subjective *a priori* precedes the being of God and world, the being of everything, individually and collectively, for me, the thinking subject. Even God is for me what he is in consequence of my own accomplishments of consciousness; here, too, I must not look aside lest I commit a supposed blasphemy, rather I must see the problem.”
8. E. Husserl, *Paris Lectures* (PL), G-p. 13. Further *Cartesian Meditations* (CM), G-p. 70 and the *Crisis of European Sciences* (Crisis), E-pp. 170ff, G-pp. 173ff.
9. Husserl, CM, G-p. 119.
10. Cf. R. Höningwald, *Deutsche systematische Philosophie nach ihren Gestaltern*, I. ed. H. Schwarz (Berlin, 1931), p. 193.
11. Cf. the fundamental investigations of Erich Rothacker concerning “Die dogmatische Denkform in den Geisteswissenschaften und das Problem des Historismus,” *Mainzer Akademie d. Wiss. Jahr.*, # 6 (1954), pp. 253-54.
12. Cf. Husserl’s manuscript C16 vi. p. 1 in which phenomenology as archaeology appears. Cf. also Diemer, p. 19, footnote 33.
13. E. Husserl, *Ideas: General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology* (Ideas), E – p. 84. (Funke’s reference is to the 1913 ed., p. 44.)
14. Cf. N. Hartmann’s position in his *Der Aufbau der realen Welt* (Berlin, 1940), pp. 171ff.
15. Cf. T. Litt, *Mensch und Welt* (Munich: Federman, 1948), especially the “Unableitbarkeit des Geistes,” pp. 153ff or his *Denken und Sein* (Stuttgart: S. Hirzel, 1948), the chapter “Sein, Denken und Sichselbstdenken,” pp. 144ff.
16. Husserl, PL, G – p. 32. “Transcendence is an immanent characteristic of being that is constituted within the ego” is the clearest expression of Husserl’s understanding of “transcendence in immanence.”
17. Husserl, CM, G – p. 92. Husserl explains: “Reason is not an accidental, *de facto* ability, not a title for possible, accidental matters of fact but, rather, a title for an all-embracing, essentially necessary structural form belonging to all transcendental subjectivity.”
18. Cf. the exposition concerning “thinking thinking itself” by Litt, *Denken und Sein*, pp. 147ff. “An actuality whose only relation to thinking is that it can be thought and that, therefore, has the thinking contemplator external to itself under all circumstances – such an actuality has, in fact, the whole of its properties and modes of behavior for itself such that nothing is constituted with respect to its being and being thus whether it is thought or not. That it is a possible object of thought exhausts its relation to thinking. For actualities of this kind, to be thought is a fate that does not in the least alter their essence. The case is different, then, if thinking, through which the actuality is thought, does not have the actuality that is thought external to itself but, rather, exercises itself; therefore, if the being-thought is a self-thinking.”

19. Husserl's manuscript F I 23, p. 150. Cited by Diemer, p. 83, footnote 36.
20. Ibid., p. 148.
21. E. Husserl, *Ideen II*, p. 103.
22. Husserl, *CM*, G-p. 102.
23. Husserl, *Ideen II*, p. 101.
24. Ibid.
25. Husserl, *CM*, p. 109. (Our translation.)
26. Husserl, *Ideen II*, pp. IIIff. Husserl explains: "To these belong unities such as the abiding meanings of one and the same subject. One can call these 'habitual' in a certain sense. However, the question does not concern a habitual *habitus* that the empirical subject of real dispositions acquires, a *habitus* that is called habitual in that case. The *habitus* in question here belongs to the pure I, not the empirical I. The identity of the pure I lies not only in the fact that the I (again, the pure I) can grasp itself as the identical I of the *cogito* by looking at any *cogito*. Rather, the I is also the same I of the *cogito*, and is so *a priori*, because I exercise necessary consequences in my position-takings in a determinate sense. Every 'new' position-taking institutes an abiding meaning. . . ."
27. Diemer, *Edmund Husserl*, p. 180.
28. Husserl, *Ideen II*, p. 112.
29. Ibid., p. 113.
30. Ibid., p. 105.
31. Husserl, *CM*, G-p. 58.
32. Ibid., G-pp. 100ff.
33. Husserl's manuscript F I 11, p. 29. Also cited by Diemer, p. 83.
34. Husserl, *Ideen II*, p. 116.
35. Ibid.
36. Husserl, *Crisis*, E - p. 153, G - p. 156.
37. Ibid., E-p. 338, G-p. 273.
38. Husserl, *CM*, G-p. 108. (Our translation.)
39. Husserl, *Ideen II*, p. 103.
40. Ibid. In way of clarification, Husserl says: "To the pure I, therefore, belongs, instead of arising and passing away, only the essential peculiarity that it has its coming forward and departure, that it actually begins and ceases to function, to govern! 'It comes forward' and 'acts in the specific sense of the *cogito* occur in the flow of consciousness' say the same thing, since the essence of such acts lies in their 'being intentional processes executed' by the pure I."
41. Roman Ingarden, in his remarks concerning the *Cartesian Meditations*, has taken an informative position with respect to the problem presented here (i.e., the constitution of "habitual properties"). Cf. Husserl, *CM*, G-pp. 215ff. (Ingarden's commentary is not included in the English translation.)
42. E. Husserl, *The Phenomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness* (PITC), appendix 12.
43. Husserl, *Ideas*, E-p. 213. (Funke's reference is to the *Husserliana* ed., p. 194.
44. Ibid., E-p. 214, G-p. 195. For a different interpretation, cf. Diemer, *Edmund Husserl*, p. 176.
45. Husserl, *Ideen II*, p. 196.
46. Husserl, PITC, appendix 8.
47. Fr. Bassenge, "Hexit und Akt," *Philosophische Anzeiger*, (1920-30), pp. 163-68.
48. Husserl, *CM*, G-p. 58.
49. Ibid., G - pp. 100f.

50. Husserl, *PITC*, Sections 35, 36, and 39.
51. Cf. R. Ingarden's remarks, *CM*, G-p. 215.
52. Husserl, *CM*, G-p. 100.
53. Ibid.
54. G. Brand, *Welt, Ich und Zeit* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1955). Section 11.
55. Ibid., p. 61.
56. Husserl, *PITC*, E-p. 106, G-p. 434.
57. Diemer, *Edmund Husserl*, pp. 160ff.
58. Ibid., p. 161.
59. Husserl, *CM*, Section 32, "The I as the Substrate of Habitualities."
60. Husserl, *PL*, G-p. 32, and *CM*, Section 11.
61. Cf. R. Ingarden's remarks, *CM*, G-p. 216.
62. Ibid.
63. Husserl, *PITC*, E-pp. 153-54, G-pp. 466-67. (Our translation.)
64. Ibid., E-p. 109, G-pp. 436-37. (Our translation.)
65. The distinction between "transcendence" and "para-transcendence" is made here in a different sense than it was by Oscar Becker in his address to the Paris Congress (August 1-6, 1937) concerning "transcendence" and "paratranscendence." There "essence" (*Dawesen*) was contrasted with "existence" (*Dasein*) and "para-ontological identity" (the essence is identical to that of which it is the essence) was contrasted with "ontological difference" (being surpasses the existent). Cf. further O. Becker, "Para-Existenz (Menschliches Dasein und Dawesen)," *Blätter für deutsche Philosophie*, 17 (1943), pp. 62-95.
66. Husserl, *CM*, G-p. 100 (Our translation.)
67. Ibid.
68. Ibid. (Our translation.)
69. Ibid., G - p. 101. (Our translation.)
70. O. Becker, "Transzendenz und Paratranszendenz," *Travaux du IX Congrès intern. de philos.*, 8 (1937), p. 100.
71. Husserl, *PITC*, E-p. 161, G-pp. 471ff. (Our translation.)
72. Ibid., E-p. 162, G-p. 472.
73. Husserl, *CM*, G-p. 101.
74. Cf. Maximilian Beck's review and critique of Martin Heidegger's *Being and Time in Philosophische Hefte* (1928), Book 1, Section 2, #5 (concerning Husserl).
75. Ibid.
76. Husserl, *Crisis*, E-pp. 337ff. G-pp. 271ff.
77. The discussion here does not concern the metaphysical theory of actuality according to which the actual should exist in living effecting (Bergson) or the self-movement of spirit (Gentile) as opposed to being at rest. Cf. Bergson, *Wahrnehmung der Veränderung* and Gentile, *L'atto del pensare come atto puro*.
78. G. Frey, "Phänomenologische und operationale Begründung der Naturwissenschaften," *Kantstudien*, 45 (1953-54) pp. 33-54.
79. Ibid., p. 54.
80. Ibid., p. 44.
81. This was made clear in the confrontation between Descartes and Gassendi concerning the *Meditations*.
82. T. Litt, *Denken und Sein*, p. 165.
83. T. Litt, *Mensch und Welt*, p. 297.
84. W. Müller, *Die Philosophie Edmund Husserls nach den Gründzügen ihrer*

- Entstehung und ihrem systematischen Gehalt* (Bonn: H. Bouvier, 1956), above all, Section 19, pp. 69ff.
85. Ibid., p. 69.
 86. Husserl, *Crisis*, E – p. 151, G–p. 154.
 87. Ibid.
 88. Husserl, *CM*, G–p. 181.
 89. Diemer, *Edmund Husserl*, p. 181. Justifiably, Diemer refers to this again and again.
 90. Husserl, *PL*, G – p. 10, 15, 29.
 91. Husserl, *CM*, G – p. 101.
 92. W. Müller, *Die Philos. E. Husserls*, pp. 72ff.
 93. Husserl manuscript M III 9 II, pp. 4-5.
 94. G. Funke, *Zur transzendentalen Phänomenologie* (Bonn: H. Bouvier, 1957), above all, Chapter 3, pp. 26ff.
 95. Q. Lauer, *Phénoménologie de Husserl* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1955), Chapter 5, p. 317n.
 96. Husserl manuscript M III 9 II, p. 7.
 97. Husserl manuscript B IV 6 a Q 1.
 98. Ibid.
 99. Husserl manuscript B IV 6 a.
 100. Ibid.
 101. Ibid.
 102. N. Hartmann, “Der Megarische und Aristotelische Möglichkeitsbegriff,” *Akademie der Wissenschaften* (Berlin, 1937).
 103. Husserl manuscript B IV a and 6c.
 104. Husserl, *CM*, Section 42ff.
 105. Ibid., Sections 43-54.
 106. Ibid., Sections 50-54 concerning appresentation.
 107. W. Müller, *Die Philos. Edmund Husserls*, p. 81.
 108. L. Landgrebe, *Phänomenologie und Metaphysik* (Hamburg: 1949), pp. 168-80.
 109. The following ideas are summarized in the author's “Mundane Geschichte, ontologische Erfahrung und transzendentale Subjektivität,” *Philos. Jahrbuch*, 64 (1956), pp. 361-71.
 110. Husserl, *CM*, G–pp. 168ff.
 111. Husserl, *Ideas*, Section 84. (Funke's reference is to the 1928 ed., pp. 168ff.)
 112. E. Fink, “The Phenomenological Philosophy of Edmund Husserl and Contemporary Criticism,” in the *Phenomenology of Edmund Husserl*, ed. R. Elveton (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1970), p. 97.
 113. E. Fink, “Was will die Phänomenologie Edmund Husserls,” *Die Tatwelt*, 10, (1934), p. 31.
 114. Husserl, *CM*, G–p. 74.
 115. Cf. E. Levinas, *En découvrant l'existence avec Husserl et Heidegger* (Paris: J. Vrin, 1949), Section 11.
 116. Husserl, *Ideas*, Section 145. (Funke's reference is to the 1928 ed., p. 303.)
 117. Cf. T. Litt, *Mensch und Welt*, Chapter 10.
 118. Husserl, *CM*, G–p. 90.
 119. E. Levinas, pp. 40-41.
 120. Cf. Husserl, *CM*, Section 23 where he speaks of “transcendental constitution” as well as “reason” and “irrationality.”
 121. Ibid., G–p. 61.
 122. Ibid., G–p. 190.

123. Husserl, *Crisis*, Section 50.
124. Cf. T. Litt, *Mensch und Welt*, p. 293.
125. Ibid., pp. 168, 292ff.
126. Husserl, *Crisis*, E-pp. 151-53, G-pp. 154, 156.
127. Husserl, *Ideas*, Section 103. (Funke's reference is to the 1928 ed., p. 215.)
128. Cf. E. Fink, "L'analyse intentionnelle et le problème de la pensée spéculative," *Problèmes actuels de la phénoménologie*, ed. H.L. von Breda (Paris: Brouwer, 1952), pp. 70ff. This article is included in Fink's *Nähe und Distanz* (Freiburg: Karl Alber, 1976), pp. 139-57.
129. Cf. H. Barth, "Philosophie der Existenz," p. 34.
130. Cf. E. Levinas, *En découvrant l'existence*, pp. 40ff.
131. Ibid., p. 41.
132. Husserl, *PITC*, E-p. 100, G-p. 429.
133. Cf. H. Barth, pp. 34-35.
134. Cf. E. Fink, "Zum Problem der ontologischen Erfahrung," *Actas del primero congreso nacional de filosofía*, Mendoza (1950), pp. 739ff. Now available in Fink, *Nähe und Distanz*, pp. 127ff.
135. E. Fink, "L'analyse intentionnelle," pp. 70, 76, 78, 84.
136. T. Litt, *Mensch und Welt*, p. 293.
137. Husserl, *CM*, Section 60ff.
138. Cf. G. Berger, *The Cogito in Husserl's Philosophy*, tr. K. McLaughlin (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1972), pp. 85-86.
139. T. Litt, *Mensch und Welt*, pp. 153, 292ff.
140. Cf. E. Fink, "Zum Problem der ontologischen Erfahrung," pp. 739ff.
141. Cf. Berger, pp. 79ff.
142. Husserl, *Crisis*, Section 54b.
143. Berger, p. 79.
144. Cf. H. Barth, "Philosophie der Existenz," pp. 33ff.
145. Concerning egology, teleology and the should be, see Husserl, *Crisis*, Section 73G (appendix 4E).
146. Husserl, *CM*, G-p. 109. "The ego is constituted for itself, so to speak, in the unity of a history." (our translation.)
147. Cf. H. Barth, pp. 33-37.
148. E. Fink, "Zum Problem der ontologischen Erfahrung," p. 738.
149. Ibid.
150. Husserl, *Crisis*, Section 50.
151. Husserl, *CM*, G-p. 181.
152. Husserl, *Crisis*, E-p. 338, G-p. 273.
153. This relation returns anthropologically when one says: "Human reality is a question of something and is its own questioning of itself." J. Delhomme, *La pensée interrogative* (Paris, 1954), pp. 39ff.
154. Husserl, *Crisis*, E-p. 340, G-p. 275.
155. Husserl, *CM*, G-p. 181.

REFLECTIONS ON THE FOUNDATION OF THE RELATION BETWEEN THE A PRIORI AND THE EIDOS IN THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF HUSSERL*

THERESA PENTZOPOULOU-VALALAS

To compare the a priori and the eidos in the phenomenology of Husserl is to close oneself in a circle, to enter into a labyrinth the end of which is the same as the point of departure. For the eidos is truely a priori and the a priori is essentially eidetic. There is thus an identity of terms that an explicit note of Husserl appears to found *de jure*.¹ It is, however, an identity of two notions which must be grasped in a different movement of thought. In Husserlian language: one cannot intend the a priori in the same way that one intends the eidos.

All essence, that which is general in the individual, is necessarily a priori, for its generality appears to be independent of all experience. But is all a priori, essence? Or better still, is the a priori essence? On the other hand, can one speak at all of an essence which would not be a priori? Isn't the very formulation contradictory? How, then, are we to conceive of their relationship, posited from the start as a relation of identity? If we succeed in setting off the phenomenological sense of the a priori, we find ourselves at the very heart of the problem of the possibility of the phenomenological method, for once the a priori is established, the task of phenomenology stands out with clarity.

In view of the complexity of the problems presented from the start, it appears that there is but one way to proceed: that is, to search for the sense proper to each notion, remaining as close as possible to Husserlian thought. We are then going to situate ourselves in a double perspective that requires first of all a work of clarification. First, we will indicate the different senses that Husserl gave to the a priori, setting off the profound significance of this notion without turning it into a logical or ontological entity. We will then do the same with the notion of the eidos, and finally try to grasp the relation that unites the two notions through the laying bare of its foundation.

*Translated by Laurence E. Winters from “Réflexions sur le fondement du rapport entre l'a priori et l'eidos dans la phénoménologie de Husserl,” *Kant-Studien*, 1974(65), Heft 2, pp. 135–51.

This way is dictated by methodological considerations. For, if there is a philosophy which does not pass itself off as a rational system, founded upon concepts constructed by reason, it is definitely phenomenology, which does not intend to be a theory but a method of elucidation and of eidetic description, a method of uncovering the invisible, according to Husserl's formulation.² Thus to lay bare the phenomenological sense of the a priori, a sense that Husserl called the only "genuine" one,³ it is necessary to proceed in a sometimes pedantic way, but one that offers the advantage of casting some light onto the notions that, at first glance, are obscurely and confusedly presented.

The study, then, will be comprised of three parts. In the first two, we will attempt to remain close to the two notions in order to improve our grasp of their phenomenological sense. In the third part, we will try to see in what way the a priori and the eidos interpenetrate, are imbued with each other, which will lead us to pose the problem of the foundation of their relation.

A. THE HUSSERLIAN A PRIORI AND ITS DIVERSE SENSES

The reading of Husserl reveals an astonishing wealth of qualifications attributed to the a priori. In fact, Husserl speaks of a constitutive a priori,⁵ of an universal a priori,⁶ of an ontic a priori,⁷ of a subjective a priori,⁸ of an innate a priori.⁹ As well, he speaks in an indirect way of an essential a priori, of an a priori, that is to say, which he identifies with eidetic necessity.¹⁰

Before this wealth of expressions we have only one weapon that is effective for the comprehension of this notion. This weapon is the simplicity of Husserlian thought, which, through the labyrinth of a particularly complex terminology, is revealed with the clarity of the thought of a mathematician. This thought is expressed in the well known formulation: *cogito-cogitatum qua cogitatum*.

We did not mention above the formal a priori since the formal aspect of the a priori is the easiest to grasp, as it is understood that all the formal is necessarily a priori.¹¹ Certainly, this does not mean that this aspect of the a priori does not raise sensitive problems in phenomenology, for the formal draws near to the eidetic as it is itself essentially eidetic, taking a specifically phenomenological sense. For the moment let us limit ourselves to pointing out that the formal a priori is particularly apparent in the logical thought of Husserl.

In effect, formal ontology and pure logic are situated in the domain of the a priori from the start. This is because formal ontology is nothing but an a priori doctrine of the object and formal apophansis is nothing but the a priori science of the categories of signification. Categories of signification and objective categories place before consciousness an ideal objectivity and it was one of the

tasks of the *Prolegomena* to correctly bring to consciousness the ideal object in opposition to empirical fact.¹² And, as René Schérer remarks, all the movements of Husserlian thought in the first four *Investigations* lead to the formal a priori, to the a priori of abstract ideality. Thus, the formal a priori is the logical a priori, the objective a priori. This a priori is essentially designated by independence with regard to all empirical singularity.¹⁴ The formal a priori then determines the content of science in general. For, if for Kant, science is grounded on the givens a posteriori, the givens of experience; for Husserl, these same givens are a priori since they are constituted in the intentionality of consciousness.¹⁵

Now, it is necessary to oppose to this formal a priori the subjective a priori implied in the very notion of the intentionality of consciousness. This is the most interesting aspect of the Husserlian theory of the a priori. The two a priori are opposed and yet they are not independent of each other. They exist only through their a priori correlation, though this formulation may be a little surprising. Let us say immediately, anticipating what is to follow, that the subjective a priori designates the a priori structures of consciousness. The correlation between the objective and the subjective a priori signifies that to each structure of the object corresponds a priori a structure of consciousness. The expression “structure of the object” designates in its turn, all the a priori laws that govern the ideal objectivities, that is, the fundamental laws of pure logic.¹⁶

Thus, the subjective structures are correlated to the objective a priori, a correlation which is itself a priori.¹⁷ We find then that the correlation between the two notions becomes the essential theme, the very essence of phenomenology, according to Schérer. We will have occasion to return to this notion of correlation. What is of interest here is seeing that the formal a priori opens the way to the subjective a priori by displaying the independence of the ideal with regard to subjectivity: the question is henceforth, in what way does the subject grasp the objective ideality. Thus the formal a priori opens the way to the possibility of thinking the subjective act by which the objective is meant, posited a priori over against intentional consciousness.¹⁹

Let us turn then to the side of the subjective a priori which Husserl situated on the side of the knowing subject, on the side, that is to say, of intentional consciousness.²⁰ As we have already said, it is necessary to understand by the subjective a priori, the a priori structures of the modes of consciousness by which consciousness constitutes its object. That is, the subjective a priori designates the intentional structure of consciousness, an essentially a priori structure. The formulation “constitution of the object” in the Husserlian sense, signifies the a priori synthesis by which consciousness in intending the object, constitutes it by giving it sense, a sense with which the object is itself given evidently to consciousness.²¹ In Kantian terms, we would say that the Husserlian a priori is found in the object, in the subject, and in the synthesis by

which the subject grasps the object. It is evident that we cannot limit ourselves to this image which poorly expresses the thought of Husserl, because it appears to be founded upon the *cogito-cogitatio* relation and not on the *cogito-cogitatum* relation, the relation which is the foundation of the Husserlian phenomenological edifice. It is, then, in this fundamental idea of *cogitatum* that it will henceforth be necessary to attempt to specify the subjective *a priori*, and what is called *cogitatum*, intentional lived experience (*vécu*) and its noetic-noematic structure.

Let us, however, look more closely at what we call for simplicity's sake, "a *priori* synthesis." It is the act by which intentional consciousness which intends its object, grasps it in its phenomenal being, its sense that is the very essence of the object. It is through this same act that the object, intentionally considered, is constituted. The *a priori* synthesis designates, then, nothing other than the constitutive achievement of consciousness.²² And constitution signifies nothing other than the "giving of the thing itself," the "process through which the object of experience is formed."²³

Thus the constitution of the objective world comes about in and through intentional consciousness.²⁴ But this constitution does not only signify that the world is "present" to my consciousness at a certain moment, that is, at the moment when the gaze of consciousness intends it. The act of constitution signifies that the world is constituted in its essence as an object which, outside the limitations of time, remains self-identical, an object which is established as a set of unities that one is able at any moment to identify (*identifizierbare Einheiten*)²⁵ through the diverse perceptions that give it to us in the form of a phenomenal unity.²⁶ When we turn, then, to the side of the subject to seek the subjective *a priori*, we come up against the great phenomenological problem of constitution. And, as is well known, this problem is the very theme of phenomenology.²⁷

Let us consider more closely, then, the place of the *a priori* from the perspective of the intentionality of consciousness. We know in what sense Husserl understood the constitution of the objective world by consciousness. This world is in consciousness as a "phenomenon," it draws all its beings-sense from me, from this ego that is no longer the empirical ego, but the transcendental ego, the source of all constitutive accomplishments.²⁸ Now, this giving of sense that makes the world a phenomenal being existing uniquely for me, and drawing its validity from me, could not come about as the result of empirical observation. We do not factually establish that the world has received a sense. The world is constituted *a priori* according to rules that are themselves *a priori*, but that, however, do not exist outside the object.²⁹ In the contrary instance, we would find ourselves in a situation analogous to that in which the Kantian synthesis placed us.

Thus the constitution of the objective world by constituting subjectivity reveals the presence of an "*a priori* of the phenomenon," a phenomenon

which appears in the mode of the real or of the possible.³⁰ Doesn't this a priori of the phenomenon call to mind the a priori of the lived-through-experience (*vécu*) about which Schérer speaks when he displays the radicalism of the *Logical Investigations*?³¹ In effect, what does the expression "the world as phenomenon" fundamentally signify if not the a priori of being-an-object,³² since the sense of the being of the object is constituted, we are going to claim, by intentional consciousness? Thus we are able to formulate the following statement: for Husserl there is only transcendental constitution a priori.

Now, let us fully explicate this: the subjective a priori which one uncovers in the a priori of the lived-through-experience (*vécu*) is not the Kantian a priori which is posited as independent of and prior to experience. The Husserlian a priori is the a priori of experience in the phenomenological sense of the term.³⁴ The Husserlian a priori in no way implies the antithesis of reason and experience. On the contrary, it is positioned at the conjunction of experience, understood as evidence, and intelligibility which implies the constitution of the object as constituted sense. The a priori then becomes the "ultimate source of all rationality" as Schérer comments.³⁵

Let us stop here and attempt to summarize the path followed to this point. Beginning with the idea of the great diversity of sense that, for Husserl, accompanies the notion of the a priori, we have tried to clarify these different senses taking as a point of departure the notion of the formal a priori. This led us to the idea of the subjective a priori which can only be grasped through the prism of transcendental constitution. Indeed, the relation between the constituted object and the constituting subject permitted us to isolate the idea of the a priori of the phenomenon. Now, the a priori of the phenomenon is an a priori that can only be grasped in relation to the transcendental ego. Thus we arrived at the fundamental notion of the constitutive a priori. It is this constitutive a priori that reveals itself to be in its essence an universal a priori.

Let us attempt, then, to clarify the universal character of the Husserlian a priori. To do this it will be necessary to turn one more time to the side of the transcendental ego. For it is at the core of this transcendental subjectivity which Husserl calls the transcendental ego that we find the idea of universality. To this end, let us cite a text of the *Cartesian Meditations* which appears to us to be particularly revealing on this subject: "The universal a priori," writes Husserl, "pertaining to a transcendental ego as such is an essential form which includes an infinity of forms, an infinity of a priori types of (possible)^a actualities and potentialities of life along with the objects constitutable in a life as objects actually existing."³⁶ However, how must we conceive of the way the universal a priori belongs to the transcendental ego? It is here that the idea of the eidos emerges. For methodological reasons we will continue the analysis bearing on the universal a priori, granting as known the sense of the eidos.

In the fourth *Cartesian Meditation*, Husserl speaks explicitly of the

universality of the eidos, of the general essence. The eidos is “prior to all concepts” understood as verbal significations; these, as pure concepts, should be consistent with the eidos.³⁷ Universality characterizes the very essence of the transcendental ego, since this, isolated from the empirical self after the reduction, is the field of the constitution of all real or ideal possibilities.³⁸ The transcendental ego designates basically the essence of subjectivity, an essence that makes the transcendental ego the source of all the a priori. It is in this sense that it is necessary to interpret Schéller's formulation that the a priori signifies a science of the essence.³⁹ The elucidation of all the a priori forms of this science constitutes the nature of phenomenological description. To describe phenomenologically is not to submit to what happens, Schéller remarks, but it is to delimit the a priori of the invariant in all consciousness. The evidence to which phenomenological description refers is that of the consciousness of essence, of the “universe of the conceivable.”⁴⁰ The a priori of the invariant signifies the a priori of the eidos, and the “conceivable universe” is the universal a priori. We are then able to say that the expression “universal a priori” signifies in the last analysis, the universal unity of the whole (*ensemble*) of constitution (a priori) achieved in my ego according to its essential forms.⁴¹ Now, if we remember that the whole of constitution essentially includes the whole of the objective world continually constituted by consciousness according to the a priori laws of constitution, laws that are in fact the rules of a priori structure, we are able to comprehend how Husserl moved from an universal a priori to the idea of an ontological a priori because the constitution of the world poses the problem of the ontology of the world, a necessarily a priori ontology.⁴² And it should not be forgotten that the constituted world is a world constituted as phenomenon, which does not have existential pretension, while having, nevertheless, a sense of being of an objective validity. The study of the set of a priori structures of a world constituted as phenomenon would be the object of the a priori ontology of the real world.

We thus see the relation between the eidos and the a priori sketched at the core of the universal a priori. Let us dwell longer on this idea of the universal a priori which Husserl posited at the same time as a constitutive a priori.⁴³ We know that our conscious life includes all the objectivities that are actually or potentially constituted by the intentional achievements of our consciousness.⁴⁴ Now, when one speaks of all the objects-for-consciousness at the same time one implies the entire field of intentional consciousness according to the great phenomenological principle of correlation which requires that each *cogitatio* be accompanied by its *cogitatum*. There is, then, on the one side potential subjective accomplishments and on the other, potentially constituted objectivities.^b It would be this eidetic relation that would give concrete content to the idea of the universal constitutive a priori. It was thus that Husserl wrote: “the whole life of consciousness is governed by a universal constitutional a priori, embracing all intentionalities.”⁴⁵ Now we are again able

to throw into relief the presence of the idea of essence, since this correlation between the constitutive accomplishment and the constituted objectivities is an eidetic correlation.⁴⁶

This idea of correlation, then, is the idea which best serves to elucidate the relation a priori – eidos.⁴⁷ The correlation between the constitutive and the constituted signifies, quite simply, a correlation between that which gives sense and that which receives this sense. Now, this relation which we uncover at the heart of the correlation between the a priori and the eidos implies the eidetic (non-empirical) possibility of varying, as well, the constitutive forms, or alternately, the modes of intentional consciousness (I am able to see, to imagine, to feel, to will) which the forms constituted. It is known that that which receives its sense through the transcendental ego acquires the status of a phenomenal being uniquely valid for me. Therefore, to each constitutive form corresponds an ontic form. This is the true sense of the Husserlian a priori.⁴⁸

Arriving at this point in our exposition we are able only to observe a significant absence: that of the material a priori. Now it does not seem possible to fully grasp the material a priori in Husserl, if we do not from the outset proceed through the idea of the eidos and of essence in general. Thus we will undertake an exposition of the eidos which will allow us to cast some light, en route, on the material a priori.

B. THE HUSSERLIAN THEORY OF THE EIDOS⁴⁹

As is well known, for Husserl the eidos designates the general essence. But what is remarkable in this idea of essence is that it has in Husserl's eyes the status of an object.⁵⁰ It is evident that what is at stake here is an object of a totally new type, which we would grasp through a perception of a new type, eidetic intuition. What characterizes this perception is the ability to apprehend the object in its very *ipseity*. It is, then, an originary intuition which grasps its object in person. We are not going to dwell on the well known Husserlian theory of essence. We will try, to the contrary, to grasp in the most concrete manner the Husserlian idea of the Eidos.

We have said that the eidos designates the general essence. Now, this general essence is presented in the form of an “invariant”⁵¹ which does not change in form, that is to say, through all possible variations of an individual empirical fact serving to exemplify the general essence.^c The consequent eidos is disengaged through all the ontic variations of a fact which corresponds, as example, to the general essence. Thus, for example, “this red pencil here” serves as an example to illustrate the general essence of red. The consciousness of the eidos signifies that we are conscious that something is, and that this thing is individuated in a contingent fashion in this particular fact there. The

grasp of the eidos develops on the basis of a free exemplification of the free ability to seek the incarnation of the eidos in any individual case. Now, this is one of the most well known themes of phenomenology, the eidos, for Husserl, has the status of an object, as we have already indicated. How are we to comprehend the status of the eidos as object? To do this, it will be necessary to properly grasp the sense of this possibility of exemplification implied in the idea of general essence, for this possibility is tied to the very idea of object in general. The constitution of the eidos as object is inseparably tied to the constitution of objects in general in consciousness.⁵² The phrase “to grasp the eidos as object” signifies the grasping of it as an object which carries along with it a horizon of purely ideal possibilities of individuation.

It is important to comprehend that the essence is not a determination of the object. When we consider a color, a green tree for example, we do not direct the gaze of consciousness to the object, “this green tree here,” but to an ideal object, the green in general. Here, though, it is necessary to pay close attention: the relation of the individual object serving as example of the ideal object is not contingent but necessary.⁵³ To put it in a different way, at the foundation of the intuition of essence, of eidetic intuition, one always discovers with essential necessity, immanent necessity,⁵⁴ sensible intuition.

Then, let us turn to the side of eidetic intuition and see what a comparison with sensible intuition can reveal to us concerning the side of essence. Between sensible intuition and eidetic intuition there is, Husserl tells us,⁵⁵ a radical commonality. Both are originary. But at the same time it is possible to assert a profound divergence; the reality of essences is in no way an external reality.⁵⁶ That is, eidetic truth does not contain any given reference to the external world. Essence does not have ontological existence. Without doubt, it is often, as example, the essence of a particular individual fact.⁵⁷ But then the question of its “real” existence in no way enters into consideration. It does not interest the phenomenologist because very often this individual fact can be purely imaginary. The empirical facts that found eidetic intuition in the capacity of examples, include, as well, imaginary facts. Thus the intuition of essences in no way presupposes the existence of an other world in which these would have real individual existence. The essence, for Husserl, has a purely epistemological, non-ontological sense.⁵⁸

We have spoken of eidetic intuition. Now, we know that Husserl does not speak of eidetic intuition in the *Logical Investigations*, but of categorial intuition. This is the intuition through which we grasp the ideal forms of thought (categories, propositions, significations, etc.).⁵⁹

Now, eidetic intuition gives us material essences as, for example, the essence of red, of humanity, of memory. Yet the idea of a material essence in Husserl is tightly bound to the idea of a material a priori. Let us try, then, to disengage the phenomenological sense of the material a priori.

The material essence is able to make itself known, as example, in an

individual fact. This possibility of exemplification is the specific character of essence in general. Now, this possibility exists prior to individuation, that is to say, before eidetic intuition fixing on an individual object, gives it to us in person in its ideality as *cogitatum*. “This table here” represents in the state of pure possibility, and prior to its being grasped by consciousness, a material *a priori*. Once “incarnated” in the individual example, it is no longer an *a priori* matter except as the horizon of potentialities implied in the concrete example.

If we then define the formal *a priori* as the *a priori* which reveals the form of the object, the material *a priori* would be the *a priori* of the fact, if one can say this. The material *a priori* would be the *a priori* of a fact posited as such, in its pure possibility. Likewise, we believe that we are able to advance the formulation, with the purpose of clarifying the notion, that the material *a priori* is a possible *a posteriori*. And, in the idea of a *a posteriori* we have the idea of perception, of an originary perception.⁶⁰ This formulation which we propose here may be surprising. It displays, nevertheless, what we have always felt in Husserl: the importance of the *a posteriori*, of the sensible which may not be subsumed by the formal. And let us not forget that the intuition of essence remains essentially a founded act.⁶¹

Is it possible, then to assert the primacy of the *a posteriori* over the *a priori*? Certainly not, if one thinks that the phenomenological method is based entirely on eidetic intuition. But what is still significant, nevertheless, is that eidetic intuition is founded on nothing but the givens of sensible intuition. The *a priori* delivered by empirical intuition, however, are given as essences.⁶²

From what has gone before it follows that if there is a domain where the *a priori* and the general essence meet and mutually overlap, this domain is that of eidetic intuition. As is known, intentional analysis gives results which are not concerned with empirical facts, but with essences. And this constitution in which the act of giving of the thing itself is performed, has an unconditioned and universal validity. Again, we find at the core of the eidetic method the constitutive *a priori* which we encountered in the first part of this exposition. Now, constitution is the characteristic achievement of intentional consciousness, that is, of intentionality. But the very essence of intentionality is the eidetic necessity which dictates that to each constitutive act corresponds necessarily a constituted object. At the heart of the eidetic method of phenomenology the two ideas of the *a priori* and the *eidos* meet: “Therefore, if we think of a phenomenology developed as an intuitively *a priori* science purely according to the eidetic method, all its eidetic researches are nothing else but uncoverings of the all-embracing *eidos*, transcendental ego as such, which comprises all pure possibility-variants of my *de facto* ego and this ego itself *qua* possibility. Eidetic phenomenology, accordingly, explores the universal *a priori* without which neither I nor any transcendental Ego whatever is ‘imaginable’; or, since every eidetic universality has the value of an unbreakable law, eidetic phenomenology explores the all-embracing laws that

prescribe for every factual statement about something transcendental the possible sense (as opposed to the absurdity or inconsistency) of that statement.”⁶³

We think that we now possess enough rudiments for the attempt to isolate the foundation of the relation between the a priori and the eidos.

C. AN ATTEMPT AT AN EXPLANATION OF THE FOUNDATION OF THE A PRIORI-EIDOS RELATION

To seek the foundation of a relation in general is to examine the possibility of this relation. Now, we think that we are able to assert that the foundation of the relation between the eidos and the a priori in Husserlian thought is this very notion of pure possibility implied by each notion separately. But the objection will correctly be raised that a pure possibility cannot ever be a foundation. It is necessary, then, that behind this idea of pure possibility there lies another idea which would found in its turn the idea of the possible. Let us, then, attempt to clarify, in the first place, the notion of “pure possibility.”

Possibility, as an idea, is not only implied statically in the Husserlian eidos, but dynamically as well. In other words, the eidos ego, for example, implies that any one of the variants of the empirical ego implied by the eidos ego could be actualized, could be incarnated in an empirical I, without this “presentification,” which comes about as example, positing ipso facto an empirical I *hic et nunc*.

Now, the very possibility of the singularization of one of the variations of the transcendental ego is founded on another possibility, that of having the example constituted as object as such over against consciousness, an ideal object properly understood. This other possibility, to us, is nothing but transcendence in the phenomenological sense. In fact, if there is no transcendence, possibility remains itself purely possible. It is understandable, then, why Husserl insists so on the free possibility of the gaze of consciousness to direct itself toward any essence and, reciprocally, to the singular fact corresponding to it.⁶⁴ It is evident, then, that in order for a fact to take on the character of an intentional object posited as pure ideality over against the consciousness which “constitutes” it, it is necessary that this object transcend consciousness while remaining in the immanent sphere of consciousness as *cogitatum*.⁶⁵ If this transcendence is not realized, then the pure possibility implied by the idea of the eidos remains empty, it loses its sense, for a possibility from which one removes the possibility of “expressing itself” ceases to be possible. The pure possibility of exemplification remains possible by virtue of this same exemplification which, in its turn, is founded on transcendence, on constituted transcendence.

If we turn to the side of the a priori, we observe an analogous situation. Let us take, for example, the case of the material a priori which necessarily includes all the variations of empirical facts. We could say also that the material a priori contains all the facts – all the transcendent beings, in the phenomenological sense – which are constituted in the interior of the ego. In the same way, the formal a priori contains all the possible forms, empty forms par excellence, which are constituted as ideal objects in the interior of consciousness. And, in a general way, the universal constitutive a priori includes all the objectivities of which the world is comprised, and also includes all the beings transcendent to consciousness. This is what led Husserl to say that the universal a priori is a concrete a priori.⁶⁶

We are then able to say that the eidetic-a priori correlation existing between the constituting and the constituted is founded on transcendence, a transcendence which is the foundation of the cogitatum. Thus the relation *cogito-cogitatum* qua *cogitatum* takes on an extraordinary fullness because, being situated entirely on the side of the a priori, it includes the infinite field of pure eidetic possibilities.⁶⁷ It is easy, then, to grasp the profound sense of Suzanne Bachelard's formulation, namely, that all phenomenology is situated in the realm of the a priori.⁶⁸ Ultimately, aren't we able to invert the terms and to say that the a priori itself is situated within the realm of phenomenology? For the a priori which gives its sense to phenomenology is no longer the logical a priori, but an a priori which is itself eidos, an eidetic a priori.

At the end of this exposition, we again come to the identity of the a priori and the eidos, which had served as a point of departure for the investigation which we have here undertaken. Are we, however, going to hold to a notion of identity with logical resonances? It appears to us, in fact, that we must abandon the domain of logic that implies, at its ground, the notion of identity, and speak rather of interdependence, of interpenetration of the eidos and of the a priori. For the eidos is a priori and the a priori is eidetic since it encloses in itself the horizon of pure possibilities, the horizon of all potential intentional objects, which is the sense, by definition, of the eidos.⁶⁹

We now comprehend what was said in the introduction of our exposition, namely that one does not intend the a priori in the same way in which one intends the eidos. Because, if phenomenology studies being and consciousness,⁷⁰ one proceeds from the a priori to the eidos or inversely, depending on whether we intend consciousness or being. We thus prefer, in the final analysis, to speak of interpenetration and not of identity, a notion which implies a logical objectivation of the eidos and the a priori. How is it possible, in effect, to make a logical object of this a priori which is "innate" to transcendental subjectivity through an eidetic necessity? This interpenetration, which comes about in a dynamic manner, is itself sustained by the phenomenological idea of transcendence. This signifies ultimately, the arising (*surgissement*) of being in and through consciousness and its becoming aware of itself as such.⁷¹ Because,

it should not be forgotten that the transcendental ego, a domain par excellence where the a priori structures of the I and of the world are encountered, is itself an ego which manifests its own transcendence, this originary transcendence⁷² which is responsible for the fact that the transcendental ego, in positing itself, at the same time posits immanent transcendence, or better still, constitutes that transcendence which becomes a constituted transcendence.

The eidetic-a priori correlation, then, which displays the correlation of the constituting and the constituted becomes a correlation between constitutive transcendence and constituted transcendence. Thus phenomenology, as the eidetic a priori investigation of the ego and of the world, appears entirely to follow the guiding thread of transcendence.

TRANSLATOR'S NOTES

^a“possible.” This word is present in the original German text, and in the French version of Levinas, but not in Cairns’ English rendition.

^b“*objectités*.” A French neologism, intended to translate “*Gegenständlichkeit*” or “object for consciousness.”

^cHere she is following the work of A. De Muralt, *L'idée de la phénoménologie: L'exemplarisme husserlien* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1958); in English as *The Idea of Phenomenology: Husserlian Exemplarism*, trans. G.L. Breckon (Evanston; Northwestern University Press, 1974).

NOTES TO THE TEXT

All quotes from Husserl are given here in the accepted English translations except for those from *Ideen I* and *Phänomenologische Psychologie*, which we have translated ourselves.

1. *FTL*, E – p. 248, F – p. 332 n. (a), G – p. 255.
2. “... Phenomenological explication makes clear what is included and only non-intuitively co-intended in the sense of the cogitatum (for example, the ‘other side’), by making present in phantasy the potential perceptions that would make the invisible visible.” *CM*, E – p. 48, F – p. 41, G – p. 85.
3. Husserl, Ms. F 1 28, S. 298-99 (SS 1920), cited by Iso Kern, *Husserl und Kant* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1964), p. 56.
4. In the usual philosophical sense, the a priori designates that which is not chronologically, but logically prior. Kant, in the introduction to the second edition of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, stresses the fact that the notion of the a priori indicates in general that which is independent of experience and even of all sense impressions. But a principle which is itself based on experience cannot be called a priori. It is not only necessary that a knowledge not be derived from an experience, but that it is also absolutely independent of all experience (*Kr. d. r. V. B 2-3*). Max Scheler gives a phenomenological definition of the a priori: the a priori designates all the ideal unities of signification and the propositions which are given in person by an immediate intuition, without implying the position of the existence of a subjectivity which would think them, nor the existence of an

- object to which they would apply. See *Der Formalismus in der Ethik und die materiale Wertethik* (Bern: Francke Verlag, 1954), p. 68. The Husserlian influence in the thought of Scheler is felt, because, as Iso Kern indicates (p. 57), for Husserl the a priori designates principally that which is independent of all psychological subjectivity. Cf. equally the *Prolegomena*. Husserl posits the a priori conditions of knowledge as being the conditioned “which can be discussed and investigated apart from all relation to the thinking subject and to the Idea of Subjectivity in science. *LI*, Prolegomena, E – p. 233, F – p. 259, G – p. 238.
5. *FTL*, E – p. 246, F – p. 330, G – p. 218.
 6. *Ibid.*, E – p. 249, F – p. 334, G – p. 108.
 7. *Ibid.*, E – p. 248, F – p. 332, G – p. 220. Let us draw attention equally to the *Cartesian Meditations* where Husserl speaks of an “ontological” a priori tied to the idea of the a priori constitution of the world, a formulation which signifies the elucidation of the a priori of the universal structure of the world. *CM*, E – p. 137, F – p. 116, G – p. 164.
 8. *FTL*, E – p. 251, F – p. 335, G – p. 222.
 9. *PL*, E – p. 28, G – p. 28.
 10. “...such expressions as ‘essential necessity’ and ‘essentially determined’ forced themselves upon us – phrases in which a definite concept of the A priori, first clarified and delimited by phenomenology, receives expressions.” *CM*, E – p. 69, F – p. 59, G – p. 103. Cf. also *PL*, E – p. 27, G – p. 27. In the *Prolegomena* Husserl posits a priori laws as being laws that would be under the jurisdiction of theory as such, that is to say, under the general essence of the ideal unities which constitute the theory of science. *LI*, Prolegomena, E – p. 233, F – pp. 258-59, G – p. 238.
 11. The conjunction of the a priori and the formal was brought about in Kantian critique. Let us here recall that this identification of the a priori and the formal was vigorously criticized by Scheler, who saw in this a fundamental error in the Kantian system. Scheler, p. 74.
 12. In paragraph 65 of the *Prolegomena* Husserl considers the ideal conditions which make possible a theory in general. He is thus led to distinguish the ideal noetic conditions (founded a priori on the idea of consciousness as such) and the purely logical ideal conditions founded purely on the “content” of consciousness, a content which is itself properly understood as a priori.
 13. René Schérer, *La phénoménologie des “recherches logiques” de Husserl* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1967), p. 254. Our translation. “The notion of directed glance (*visée, abzielen*), intention or act has already been admitted without further examination. It was, in effect, sufficient for the advancement of the preceding *Investigations* to establish a general distinction between the real content of consciousness, its real parts or its lived content (*vécu*), and its intentional content, irreal or ideal in the sense of signification, and, again, the real in the sense of the actually existing object. It was sufficient to free the concept of consciousness from its psychological interpretation which would reduce consciousness to a web of psychic events, rendering incomprehensible the domain of ideality and the objective laws which govern it. This was an ascendent step: it led toward the formal a priori or generally, that of abstract ideality.”
 14. *LI*, Prolegomena, E – p. 233, F – p. 258, G – p. 238.
 15. As Quentin Lauer remarks in Husserl’s *Philosophie comme science rigoureuse* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1955), notes pp. 154-163, even the content of the science is a priori. “It is ‘constituted’ as given in the intentionality of consciousness, which constitutes the objectivity of the formal and the material

- sides, which makes it still more radically constitutive than the formal a priori of Kant." Our translation. All the notes in the original edition are not in the English translation, *Phenomenology and the Crisis of Philosophy*, trans. Quentin Lauer (New York: Harper and Row, 1965).
16. This is the sense of the principle which Husserl sets forth in the *Formal and Transcendental Logic*: "To every operational law of the theory of forms there corresponds a priori a subjective law concerning constitutive subjectivity." E – p. 182, F – p. 247, G – p. 162.
 17. "The subjective structures in question in the already described inquiries of a logic directed to the subjective has a congruity with the corresponding concepts pertaining to the theory of objective logic which is obviously not a matter of accidental psychological fact. They indicate an *Apriori which is perfectly correlated with the Objective Apriori*." *FTL*, E – p. 182, F – p. 246, G – p. 162.
 18. Scherer, p. 58. "It is a question of unveiling the hidden lived-experiences (*les vécues*) which are in correlation with the idealities defined in the first four *Investigations*. A displacement of interest is witnessed, and the theme of the last *Investigation* will properly be the uncovering of the acts by which the subject grasps these idealities, through which it becomes conscious of idealities." Schérer, p. 57. Our translation.
 19. The formal, then, requires the "placing into brackets" of the empirical, of the psychic. But at the same time the formal obliges us to turn to the side of a no longer psychological, but constitutive subjectivity. ". . . in return," writes Schérer, "what has awakened us to the idea of a possible indifference with regard to subjectivity, can be thought a priori as an object of a possible subjective knowledge; this turnabout leads to the idea of a treatment of the subjective act, not as a simple fact, but as pure possibility." Schérer, p. 56. Our translation. And he cites in support of this "conversion toward the subjective" the same text in which Husserl posits in explicit terms the correlation between ideal objects and constituting subjectivity: "Now although it was made evident," wrote Husserl, "that ideal objects, in spite of the fact that they are formed in consciousness, have their own being, being-in-themselves, there is nonetheless an important task here which has never seriously been seen nor embarked upon: the task, namely, of making this peculiar correlation between ideal objects of the purely logical sphere, and subjective psychic experiences as forming activity into a theme for research." *Phänomenologische Psychologie (PP)*, p. 26, cited in Schérer, p. 57.
 20. S. Bachelard comments that the phenomenological method is purely intuitive, for it aims at the uncovering of the profound sense of the world and of human being. Now, it is through this revelation that the idea of the a priori actively emerges. "But, this uncovering makes apparent the essences which call attention to the a priori structures. And these a priori structures are revealed not only in the objective world, but also in constituting subjectivity. This objective a priori cannot be 'philosophically intelligible' a priori unless it is referred precisely to the ultimate sources of intelligibility, that is to say, to the essential necessity which governs the transcendental sphere. To comprehend the world, it is necessary to lay bare the essential laws which determine the manner in which the objective world plunges its roots into transcendental subjectivity; in short, it is necessary to lay bare the subjective a priori. This a priori governs the set of the constitutive functions of the ego." S. Bachelard, *La logique de Husserl* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1957), p. 265. Our translation. In English as *A Study of Husserl's Logic*, trans. L. Embree (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1968).

21. ". . . to grasp in particular the already described relatedness of every straightforwardly derived *Apriori* to the antecedent *Apriori* of its constitution; accordingly, to understand also the *a priori* apprehensibility of the correlation between object and constitutive consciousness." *FTL*, E – p. 249, F – p. 334, G – p. 220.
22. "Now it is clear: Only by the aforesaid uncovering of the performance that constitutes the being sense of the given world can we avoid every countersensual absolutizing of this world's being and know, universally and in every respect, what we (as philosophers) are allowed to assign to that sense. . ." *FTL*, E – pp. 243-44, F – p. 362, G – p. 215.
23. *Ibid.*, E – p. 165, F – p. 224, G – p. 147.
24. *APS*, p. 213.
25. *Ibid.*
26. *Ibid.*
27. *Ibid.*, p. 218. "The great theme of transcendental philosophy is consciousness in general as a hierarchical structure of constitutive performances in which ever new levels or layers of ever new objectivities . . . are constituted." Our translation.
28. *FTL*, E – p. 276, F – p. 367, G – p. 244.
29. "Any 'objective' object, any object whatever (even an immanent one), points to a structure, within the transcendental ego, that is governed by a rule. As something the ego objectivates, something of which he is conscious in any manner, the object indicates forthwith an universal rule governing possible other consciousnesses of it as identical – possible, as exemplifying essentially predelineated types. And naturally the same is true of any 'imaginable' object, anything conceivable as something intended. Transcendental subjectivity is not a chaos of intentional processes. Moreover, it is not a chaos of types of constitution, each organized in itself by its relation to a kind or a form of intentional objects. In other words: the allness of objects and types of objects conceivable for me – transcendently speaking; for me as transcendental ego – is no chaos: and correlative the allness of the types of the infinite multiplicities, the types corresponding to types of objects, is not a chaos either: noetically those multiplicities always belong together, in respect of their possible synthesis. That indicates in advance a universal constitutive synthesis, in which therefore all actual and possible objectivities (as actual and possible for the transcendental ego), and correlative all actual and possible modes of consciousness of them, are embraced." We quote the whole passage. *CM*, E – pp. 53-54, F – p. 46, G – p. 90.
30. *FTL*, E – p. 292, F – p. 387, G – p. 257.
31. Schérer, pp. 350-51. "If, now," writes Schérer, "we define empiricism not as a radicalism diverted from its project while maintaining a fertile idea of reduction, but as an *a posteriorism*, and we contrast it to a rationalism founded on the position of *an a priori*, then phenomenology reveals to us lived-experience (*vécu*) as the ultimate *a priori*, the source of all rationality. Because it is the constant return to lived-through-experience which allows the rational elucidation of experience, opening to us the access to the unity of its origin and that, as Husserl correctly said, prior to all theory of experience, it was a question of the presence of animate beings acting in a natural environment. Before, that is to say, originally, and it is for this reason that we weigh the lived-through-experience, and that alone it is able to deliver itself to us if we elucidate it as it is, in its universal *a priori*." Our translation.

32. Schérer, p. 342.
33. Kern, pp. 60-61.
34. Experience in the phenomenological sense is evidence, and evidence is the fundamental character of intentionality Cf. *CM*, E – pp. 57-58, F – p. 49, G – p. 93. See also *FTL*, E – p. 233, F – p. 312, G – p. 206: “Experience is the performance in which for me, the experiencer, experienced being ‘is there,’ and is there as it is, with the whole content and the mode of being that experience itself, by the performance going on in its intentionality, attributes to it.”
35. Schérer, p. 351.
36. *CM*, E – p. 74, F – p. 62, G – p. 108.
37. *Ibid.*, E – p. 71, F – p. 60, G – p. 105.
38. “. . . that nothing exists for me otherwise than by virtue of the actual and potential performance of my own consciousness.” *FTL*, E – p. 234, F – p. 314, G – p. 207. “. . . in my intentionality it is legitimated, it receives its content and its being-sense. Naturally the world for every one presupposes that, in my ego – the ego who says, with the universality in question here, ego cogito, and included in his actual and possible cogitata everything actual and possible for him. . . .” *FTL*, E – p. 237, F – p. 318, G – p. 210.
39. “It concerns the essence of subjectivity in general, which is unveiled through the examples, but in a purely possible generality. It is a priori because it passes from the fact of a thought to the thinkable, to the unconditioned.” Schérer, p. 66. Our translation.
40. *Ibid.*, pp. 353-54.
41. *CM*, E – p. 137, F – p. 116, G – p. 164. “Tracing the essence of such constitution and its egological levels, we made visible an Apriori of a completely novel kind, namely the Apriori of constitution. We learned to distinguish, on the one hand, the self-constitution of the ego for himself and in his primordial own-essentialness and, on the other hand, the constitution of all the aliennesses of various levels, by virtue of sources belonging to his own essentialness. There resulted the all-embracing unity of the essential for belonging to the total constitution accomplished in my own ego – the constitution as whose correlate the Objective existing world, for me and for any ego whatever, is continually given beforehand, and goes on being shaped in its sense-strata, with a correlative Apriori form style. And this constitution is itself an Apriori.”
42. *Ibid.*, E – p. 137, F – p. 116, G – p. 164.
43. *FTL*, E – p. 246, F – p. 330, G – p. 218.
44. *Ibid.*, E – pp. 246-47, F – p. 330, G – p. 218.
45. *Ibid.*
46. “In this inquiry, the variation of the necessary initial example is the performance in which the ‘eidos’ should emerge and by means of which the evidence of the indissoluble eidetic correlation between constitution and constituted should also emerge.” *FTL*, E – p. 247, F – p. 331, G – p. 219.
47. This correlation is nothing but the noetic-noematic correlation, the cogito and the cogitatum qua cogitatum. Cf. *FTL*, E – p. 262, F – p. 349, G – p. 231.
48. “It thus becomes evident that an ontic Apriori is possible, as a concretely full possibility, only as the correlate of a constitutional Apriori that is concretely united with it, concretely inseparable from it.” *FTL*, E – p. 248, F – p. 333, G – p. 220. We understand here in what sense it is necessary to comprehend the concrete a priori to which Husserl so often refers. The concrete a priori designates the concrete unity of the ontic a priori and the constitutive a priori.
49. The Husserlian theory of essence is expounded in paragraphs 1-16 of *Ideas*. We

- are referring here to the work of Iso Kern, *Husserl und Kant*, pp. 55-62. Cf. also E. Levinas, *La théorie de l'intuition dans la phénoménologie de Husserl* (Paris: Félix Alcan, 1930), pp. 142-174; Eng. trans. A Orianne (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1973).
50. "The essence (eidos) is a new kind of object. Just as the given of individual or experiencing intuition is an individual object, the given of eidetic intuition is a pure essence." Our translation. *Ideas*, E - p. 49, F - p. 21, G - p. 14 (pp. 10-11 in 1913 ed.).
 51. "But, precisely with this coinciding, what necessarily persists throughout this free and always-repeatable variation comes to the fore: the invariant, the indissoluble identical in the different and ever again different, the essence common to all, the universal essence by which all 'imaginable' variants of the example, and all variants of any such variant, are restricted. This invariant is the ontic essential form (a priori form), the eidos, corresponding to the example, in place of which any variant of the example could have served equally well." *FTL*, E - p. 248, F - p. 332, G - p. 219.
 52. *APS*, Beilage XVII, p. 403.
 53. This is what Levinas shows very clearly in *La théorie de l'intuition*. "The individual object," he writes, "is an indispensable base for the perception of essence. The mode of existence of the ideal object directs us, in some way, to the individual object, implying a relation to it. But the existence of the individual object does not play the role of a premise in eidetic knowledge. It is independent of the 'actuality' of the individual objects." p. 156.
 54. *APS*, p. 213.
 55. "Presented here is not a mere external analogy but, rather, a radical commonality. Also, eidetic intuition is an intuition, just as the eidetic object is an object. The generalization of the concepts 'intuition' and 'object,' which belong together correlative, is not an arbitrary idea, but, rather, is one compellingly required by the nature of things (*Sachen*). "Our translation. *Ideas*, E - p. 49, F - pp. 21-22, G - pp. 14-15 (p. 11 in 1913 ed.).
 56. "... the intuitive grasping and positing of essences does not in the least imply the positing of an individual existent; pure eidetic truths do not in the least contain assertions concerning facts. Therefore, one cannot infer from eidetic truths alone any truths concerning facts." Our translation. *Ideas*, E - p. 51, F - p. 25, G - p. 17 (p. 13 in 1913 ed.).
 57. "... as a result, no eidetic intuition is possible without the free possibility of turning one's regard to a 'corresponding' individual and becoming conscious of it as example – just as, conversely, no intuition of an individual is possible without the free possibility of performing ideation and by this directing the regard to the essence which is exemplified in the individual seen. However, this does not alter the fact that both kinds of intuition are in principle different." Our translation. *Ideas*, E - p. 50, F - p. 23, G - pp. 15-16 (2. 12 in 1913 ed.).
 58. Ricoeur remarks quite correctly that essence is the pure signification which is fulfilled in eidetic intuition. *Ideas*, F - p. 18, n. 5. Essence is thus the correlate of each individual fact.
 59. In the sixth *Logical Investigation*, Husserl identifies the essence and the general. Categorial intuition which grasps the general is an act founded on empirical intuition; thus is constituted a new sphere of objectivities "given in themselves and sustained by fundamental acts." Our translation.
 60. "The material a priori," writes M. Dufrenne, "is not material solely through its content, but also according to its mode of presence." *La notion d'a priori* (Paris:

- Presses Universitaires de France, 1959), p. 107; Eng. trans. E.S. Casey (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1966).
61. See *LI*, E – p. 792 (Vol. II, paragraph 48), F – p. 136 (Tome 3), G – p. 152 (Band III). “Categorical acts are characterized as founded acts.”
 62. “Eidetic intuition could not be a criterion for the a priori, their evidence is not primarily logical, it is first of all sensuous.” Dufrenne, p. 118. Our translation.
 63. *CM*, E – pp. 71-72, F – pp. 60-61, G – pp. 105-06.
 64. *Ideas*, E – p. 50, F – p. 23, G – p. 16 (p. 12 in 1913 ed.).
 65. *CM*, E – pp. 83-84, F – p. 70, G – p. 117.
 66. Here it is necessary to understand the concrete a priori in the sense of the universal concrete life of the transcendental ego. We then see that Husserl entirely constituted an a priori system distinguishing within the a priori different levels. We pass, in effect, from the a priori of sensible intuition, which is the a priori of nature which surrounds us, to the constitutive a priori, that is to say, to the a priori of phenomenon, finally arriving at the higher level, the a priori of idealizing acts. Cf. *CM*, E – p. 146, F – p. 125, G – p. 173.
 67. It is in the fourth *Meditation* that this idea of pure possibilities enclosed in the transcendental ego, itself a pure possibility, is thrown into relief: “To me as the meditating ego, guided by the idea of a philosophy as the all-embracing science, grounded with absolute strictness, a science I took as a tentative basis, it becomes evident after these last considerations that, first of all, I must develop a purely eidetic phenomenology and that in the latter alone the first actualization of a philosophical science – the actualization of a ‘first philosophy’ – takes place or can take place. After transcendental reduction, my true interest is direct to my pure ego, to the uncovering of this *de facto* ego. But the uncovering can become genuinely scientific, only if I go back to the apodictic principles that pertain to this ego as exemplifying the *eidos* ego: the essential universalities and necessities by means of which the fact is to be related to its rational grounds (those of pure possibility) and thus made scientific (logical). It should be noted that, in the transition from my ego to an ego as such, neither the actuality nor the possibility of other egos is presupposed. I phantasy only myself as if I were otherwise; I do not phantasy others. In itself, then, the science of pure possibilities precedes the science of actualities and alone makes it possible as a science. With this we attain the methodological insight that, alone with phenomenological reduction, eidetic intuition is the fundamental form of all particular transcendental methods (that both of them determine, through and through, the legitimate sense of a transcendental phenomenology).” *CM*, E – p. 72, F – p. 61, G – p. 106. We quote the whole paragraph.
 68. Bachelard, p. 265.
 69. “The ‘phenomenological self-explication’ that went on in my ego, this explication of all my ego’s constitutings and all the objectivities existing for him, necessarily assumed the methodic form of an a priori self-explication, one that gives the facts their place in the corresponding universe of pure (or eidetic) possibilities.” *CM*, E – p. 84, F – p. 71, G – p. 117.
 70. *Ibid.*, E – p. 88, F – p. 74, G – pp. 120-21.
 71. Thus is realized what Husserl called the “... ‘unfolding’ of the universal Logos of all conceivable being.” *CM*, E – p. 155, F – p. 132, G – p. 181.
 72. *Ideas*, E – p. 157, F – p. 190, G – p. 138 (pp. 109-110 in 1913 ed.).
 73. *CM*, E – pp. 83-84, F – pp. 70-71, G – pp. 116-17. “Transcendency in every form is an immanent existential characteristic, constituted within the ego.”

REGIONS OF BEING AND REGIONAL ONTOLOGIES IN HUSSERL'S PHENOMENOLOGY*

LUDWIG LANDGREBE

The question of the “constitution [*Aufbau*] of the world,” understood for a long time as exclusively concerning its physical, scientifically determinable structure, has gained a more general and comprehensive meaning in philosophical thought in the last few decades. It has developed into the question of the multiplicity of entities, their kinds and corresponding categories, and the relationship of these kinds to one another. Thus, Nicolai Hartmann’s attempt to understand this relationship as one of layers of Being^a built up upon one another has received considerable approval. Husserl’s theory of the regions of Being has a special significance in the development of this problematic, not only because it was the historical starting point for this whole development, but above all because it allowed the methodical presuppositions, in accordance with which one can make distinctions of kinds, regions or strata of what exists, to be seen with exceptional clarity. Thus the justification and limits of such an attempt can be shown by critically discussing this theory.

The development of Husserl’s phenomenology is connected with a counter-movement against the naturalism that dominated the end of the nineteenth century. For this naturalism there was only one mode of Being, that of the “objective,” precisely and scientifically determinable object, and only one kind of law governing the connections between existents, namely the causal lawfulness of natural interconnection. For logic, the foundations of which Husserl investigated in his earliest works, this meant psychologism.^b Psychologism denied the specific character of objects of thought and their laws. It interpreted the objects of thought as psychic facts, and their lawful connection as a causal connection between the occurrences of psychic facts, a connection regulated by natural laws. In his critique of this conception, Husserl showed that Being must be spoken of in different ways, that not all Being is Being in the sense of the objects of natural-scientific determination,

*Translated by William McKenna from Ludwig Landgrebe, “Seinsregionen und regionale Ontologien in Husserls Phänomenologie,” in *Der Weg der Phänomenologie*, 2nd ed. (Gütersloh: Gerd Mohn, 1967); originally published in *Studium generale*, ix/6 (1956), pp. 313–24.

objects ultimately given by the senses. Rather, there are "objects of a higher order," among which must be included the objects of logic. Thus, in his earliest investigations, Husserl had already broken with the principle of a philosophical interpretation of the world oriented exclusively toward the model of being represented by the objects of natural science.

This insight had a further consequence: The Being of natural objects is related to sensory intuition, in which such objects are ultimately given and by means of which all concepts of such objects ultimately have to be verified. Now if this kind of objectivity is not the only one, but there are objects of another kind, of a higher order, then there must also be a corresponding intuition for them. For the distinction between a merely empty presenting, a reproduction, an empty, merely verbal meaning, and self-presence, along with the consciousness of self-givenness which corresponds to it, holds for objects. Thus the concept of intuition must be broadened and specified: to every kind of object there corresponds an appropriate way for it to be "itself there" ["*selbst da*"] for our consciousness, as distinct from merely being meant and given in a more or less intuitive, reproductive consciousness. Every such consciousness of something being itself there, of the self-givenness of an object, can be called intuition in an extended sense of that term. For objects of thought, this consciousness of self-presence is called "categorial intuition," to make clear the distinction between how an object of thought, a state of affairs, can be merely "meant" in a mere repetition of words, and how it can be made an object of insightful consciousness.

When we consider the way in which we become cognizant of such differences among entities as distinctions pertaining to the objects of our consciousness, we see that this cognizance cannot be gained simply from experience [*Erfahrung*]. For experience, as consciousness of the givenness of a diversity among entities, presupposes a point of view from which entities can be comprehended as alike and comparable and can be distinguished from entities of another sort. It would not be possible to examine entities on the basis of their similarities and differences, if they did not already offer themselves as alike in a certain respect and different in another. This is presupposed if entities we experience are to become objects of a science. Husserl proceeds, therefore, from the fact that the world of our experience has become an object of scientific determination along many lines, a process in which what everyday experience offers vaguely and incidentally is connected and conceptualized precisely. Each science has its province as a totality of objects of experience; however, it does not present this province to itself. Rather, the province is given to it beforehand, in so far as what exists is presented in experience with this structure of comparableness and distinguishedness. This structure precedes *a priori* the empirical science and delimits the domain of its inquiry. Considering the unitary and homogeneous character which allows objects to make up the province of a science, Husserl

designated the totality of objects of any possible experiential science a region.

The common characteristics of the objects of a region, which are essential for their having become objects of that region in the first place, are contained in the categories of the region in question. These are the fundamental concepts of the region. They capture and express the *a priori* presuppositions under which a manifold of experienced entities can be apprehended as so belonging together as to be able to become the theme of a science. Because they constitute the specific ontological constitution [*Seinsverfassung*], i.e., the objective-character, of the objects of a science, Husserl called the philosophical disciplines which develop the categories of any one of these regions regional ontologies. Thus a regional ontology provides the foundation for each empirical science, since it explicates the basic concepts of a science. Of course, this should not be taken to mean that such regional ontologies could be delineated prior to all empirical science. Rather, they become outlined on the basis of subsequent reflection on the conditions under which the delimitation of any province can and has come about. These ontologies explicate what must belong to an object with unconditioned generality and necessity in order for it to become an object of any determinate science, that is, its essential structure. Thus, Husserl also called these ontologies eidetic sciences in contrast to the empirical, factual sciences. The essential make-up of an entity of a given province precedes, in itself, its factual determination in experience and in an empirical science, although, of course, the discovery of this essential make-up only comes afterwards.

Husserl made this relationship between factual and eidetic sciences clear to himself, at first, by means of the relation between the Euclidean geometry of three dimensional spatial forms and the empirical investigation of spatial forms. The figures of Euclidean geometry are not the kind of things that can be discovered by means of abstraction and comparison of empirically given spatial forms, rather they are projected as ideal figures and proportions in accordance with which empirically given spatial forms can be understood. They explicate what belongs universally and necessarily to the triangle, etc., as such, and indicate how to subsume empirically given figures under this concept. Husserl further inferred: wherever a multiplicity of objects is so given that they can become the unified province of a scientific investigation, one marked off from other provinces, then likewise one must be able to discover an essential structure by which this unity is determined and which can be expressed by the basic regional concepts of this province. Furthermore, for every kind of objective existent there must correspond a way in which it is itself given, an intuition in the extended sense mentioned above.

Above the regional ontologies, which specifically explicate the basic concepts and the essential make-up of a definite province of objects which can become the theme of a science, stands formal ontology, which disregards all regional distinctions between objects, their specific material determination,

and only examines them with respect to their being objects of thought in general. It has as its object of inquiry the conditions under which anything can become an object of thought, can be held in thought and explicated. The basic concept of formal ontology is thus the empty “anything whatever” [“*etwas überhaupt*”], the object of thought in general, anything that can be conceptually grasped and determined. Formal ontology sets forth the conditions for thinking of objects in general, objects of any sort. Thus it is a part of logic taken as universal analytics. To distinguish them from formal ontology, Husserl also called the regional ontologies “material ontologies.”

Thus far we have dealt with the general program of a distinction of regions of being as regions of objects and the ontologies corresponding to them that was developed by Husserl already in the first volume of his *Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie* (1912-1913).^d One should notice here that an essential preliminary decision is already present in this program, and the presuppositions under which the distinction of regions of being gains its sense for Husserl are visible. The distinction between kinds of being and between their corresponding regions is obtained by reflecting on the conditions under which the entities we encounter have already become objects of the many sciences relating to them, on the *a priori* presuppositions of the scientific thematization of the world. But this distinction is more than just a problem for scientific theory. For today, the world also appears to non-scientific and prescientific consciousness in the light of the interpretation which was given to it by many centuries of scientific work. Thus the inquiry into the regions of being, into the origin of these regional distinctions, and into the justification for these distinctions is, at the same time, an inquiry into the perspectives and prejudices according to which things which exist in the world appear so obviously to us today to be dividable and distinct from one another.

The reflection on the conditions under which entities are set off as a possible province of a science is a reflection on how they become objects for consciousness in such a way that such a demarcation is possible. Thus Being, in respect to the consciousness for which it becomes an object, is considered as being-an-object-for-consciousness [*Gegenstand-Sein für das Bewusstsein*]. The question is: how does an object come to givenness, and perhaps to self-givenness, to that consciousness of self-givenness which in general is designated intuition by Husserl. Thus the differentiation of regions of Being does not arise through a simple description of entities and their differences, but only through a description that considers the correlation between what is given and the manner in which it is given to consciousness. In this sense Husserl speaks of the constitution of an entity, meaning not simply its inner structure, but its way of appearing to the consciousness which is directed to it and has it as an object. The investigation of the different regions of being thus becomes for him an investigation of constitutions.^e One must

inquire back from every type of object, in whatever way experience may already have differentiated it, and however on that basis it may have become an object of a science, to the mode of consciousness which corresponds to it and is in accordance with it. In general, whatever object, along with its essential regional or material structure, is being considered, the corresponding mode of consciousness in which such an object can be itself given, intuited, and which necessarily belongs to it, is to be investigated. This is above all a purely methodological concept of constitution, one which points to the task of searching for that consciousness corresponding to each region of being which gives the entities of that region themselves. In other words, this is the task of searching for the only legitimating “intuition” for all concepts pertaining to such an entity, an intuition in which it becomes evident that there “is” something of that kind at all.

It should be noted, therefore, that talk of regions of Being receives its sense only in the light of this essentially necessary correlation with the modes of consciousness in which an entity of any region is given, and that there could be no other way to justify making such distinctions of regions of Being, if these distinctions are to be anything other than generalizations of concepts already acquired empirically. It is in this sense that Husserl develops the inquiry into the regions of Being as a transcendental philosophical inquiry, as an inquiry into the necessary correlation of Being and consciousness, and this means into the constitution of Being for consciousness. So understood, this inquiry is prior to any metaphysical decision that would interpret this relationship in an idealistic or realistic sense.

In recent Husserl interpretation,^f it has been repeatedly pointed out that this methodological sense of the concept of constitution must be sharply distinguished from its idealistic interpretation, although it is true that, from the beginning, Husserl did not clearly make this distinction. Rather, it seems that the methodological concept of constitution is tinged with an idealistic sense. This can be seen already in the first volume of *Ideen*, where, from the very beginning, constitution, as an achievement [*Leistung*] of consciousness, does not merely signify making an entity appear for consciousness, but rather signifies “world creation,” as a creation of Being through the positing performances [*Leistungen*] of consciousness.¹ As a result, whatever exists, that is not itself consciousness, acquires the character of being something “merely” constituted, in contrast to what does the constituting itself, absolute consciousness. The latter is designated as a superior region, as the region of pure consciousness for which everything is what it is in such a way that it only has Being by virtue of the “grace” of consciousness. Thus consciousness itself is raised to the status of absolute existent.⁶ Clearly, one can speak of a “region” of pure consciousness only in an inauthentic sense. For this region of constituting Being cannot be compared with any of the regions of constituted Being. Reference to consciousness as a region acquires its sense, however,

from Husserl's intention to designate the "province" of transcendental phenomenology (region understood as the province of possible scientific inquiry) and to distinguish it from the province of non-philosophical sciences.

The task now is to trace how Husserl sought to carry out this program of the constitution of the regions of being in the second volume of *Ideen*,^h which was also [as was *Ideen I, trans.*] written in 1912, but only published in 1952 from the manuscripts Husserl left behind. Once the motive for the transition from a methodological to a metaphysical concept of constitution is seen, it will become apparent that this cannot possibly be a smooth transition. Rather it leads to a conflict, which, although not resolved by Husserl himself, can indicate, precisely by being unresolved, the direction in which the inquiry into the "constitution of the world" must be continued.

At first glance, the constitutive construction, as it is presented in *Ideen II*, seems to correspond completely to a traditional schema. The three sections, the constitution of material nature, the constitution of animate nature, and the constitution of the spiritual [*geistigen*] world, seem to refer to three distinct regions which are strata of being built on one another. The basic types of sciences, then, correspond to the three regions: the science of material nature (mathematical natural science), biology and the natural science of psychology (psychophysics), and the humanistic sciences [*Geisteswissenschaften*] in the widest sense. Each of these regions has its basic regional concept which provides the "clue" [*Leifaden*] for the exhibition of its constitution. For material nature this is the concept physical thing, the "mere thing" or *res extensa*, which can be determined in a purely quantitative and causal manner; for animate nature it is the concept of animated, embodied [*leibkörperlichen*] creature; for the spiritual world, the concept of spirit [*Geistes*], understood as the personal I [*Ich*] and its personal achievements, those on the basis of which things that are experienced appear as having "predicates of value," as being laden with significational characters, as useful things, works of art, etc. While causality is the fundamental law of the connection of occurrences in material and animal nature, the law of motivation governs the spiritual world. This is a law which, as an intentional relation of the personal ego to his surrounding world, must in principle be distinguished from causality.

From this it seems to be readily intelligible in what sense material nature is to be regarded as the undermost stratum in the structure [*Aufbau*] of the world. All life-processes could only be given as processes on and in a lived body [*Leib*] in so far as it is a material body. Psychic processes in particular could be localized as mental processes [*Erlebnisse*] of the very human being who here and now occupies his spatio-temporal place in the world of extended things. Likewise all personal acts and modes of behaviour can only appear as belonging to a creature who appears by means of a lived body, and all significational characters require a substrate that can be sensuously perceived, that is, a material thing. Thus, entities of both upper regions are founded

objectivities of a higher order, which, as such, are not given through the senses. Rather, these objectivities, as psychic occurrences, are given originally by means of “empathic projection” into a sensuously present body [*Leibkörper*], or, as significational characters, they have their origin in the activities of persons, such as those, for example, through which a material thing receives its character of “useful-for,” or of being a tool, etc. It is in this sense that material nature has a constitutive priority. It is the material thing which is the “primal object” [*Urgegenstand*], graspable in pure and simple sensory perception.

Thus an order in the founding relationships that exist between the regions of being is ascertained by reflecting on the way in which the entities of the respective regions are given, and, essentially, the only way they can be given. But once this reflection is carried out, it becomes apparent that the relation between the regions is not simply one of strata of Being built upon one another. Rather, the strata “interpenetrate” in a manner which makes the imagery of strata appear totally inadequate or appropriate only under specific conditions. In order to understand the nature of this interpenetration, we must first consider more closely how something shows itself as a real [*wirklich*], material, spatio-corporeal thing, i.e., how it is intuited as itself-given. It is necessarily given in perspectives, “adumbrations,” in whose change it appears as one and the same, as identical with itself. This distinguishes the real thing from the phantom, which, in the attempt, for example, to see it in another perspective by going around it, turns out to be nothing. But the self-maintenance of the unity of a thing in the multiplicity of perspectives, which allows one to speak of its sensory perception, is not sufficient to allow one to become certain of it as a real material thing. It could still be a phantom. The real thing is distinguished from the phantom in that its identity is verified through causal connection with other things, in the effects which it receives from them and exerts on them. Its materiality shows itself as such only in a causal nexus of occurrences, thus, when it is experienced as being subject to causal circumstances. In general, we cannot say whether an individual, allegedly perceived thing is a real thing, if we take it by itself. Its reality only shows itself when it is grasped in connection with other things, wherein it is effected by them and likewise effects them. “From a formal point of view, the concepts of real substance (understood concretely as thing in the widest sense) – to which also animated beings as ensouled things belong –, ‘real property, real state (real behavior), real causality, are essentially interrelated concepts. I say: real causalities, for, in the case of states, we are referred back to real circumstances in the form of the dependence of something real on something else real. Realities are what they are only with reference to other actual and possible realities in the interconnection of substantial causality.”²²

But this still does not exhaust the conditions under which something is

given to us as a material thing. The experience of being subject to causal circumstances is required. This was presented at first as if it were something merely taking place for our consciousness, a connection which we regard externally as an observer. But in this analysis, the one who is carrying out the reflection on the conditions of givenness has remained in an attitude of self-forgetfulness, and has not considered that he himself is immersed in this interconnection of circumstances, along with other things. The circumstances in which a thing "maintains" itself as one and the same do not only involve the causal interconnection with the happenings in other things; the observer, as the sensuous perceiver, also belongs to them. He experiences a particular perspective of a thing *because* he has turned his head or held his body in this or that way, and then, experiences a different, tactful perspective *because* he has grasped it with his hand. He is immersed in these circumstances along with other things by means of his sensing body, and gains thereby the evidence: "because I have touched it, it has shown itself to me to have this feature," etc. Thus whatever shows itself to be a material thing, as this founding substratum, stands in an inseparable correlation with the kinaesthetic movements of the perceiving body. Thus, what at first appeared to be a higher stratum of Being, i.e., the lived body founded on the material body, now seems to be the opposite, to be the condition for there "being" for us anything like material things at all, things whose reality can only show itself ultimately through their sensuous presence. "What the subject has over against himself as world, depends upon the lived body and what is specifically psychic."³

Of course what is meant here is not the factual dependency on a certain psyche, but only the essential correlation between the givenness of a thing with its sensuous properties and the structure of the perceiving subject. The way the regions "material thing" and "animate being" interpenetrate is indicated by this essential correlation. It is not a one-sided relation of foundation, but a relationship of correlation, since the sentient animate beings belong to the "circumstances" under which materiality shows itself and with respect to which speaking of material things can become meaningful. But "it is just this relativity that is required for the constitution of a physical thing which manifests itself in the intuited thing."⁴ For "it belongs to the sense of perception, and experience in general, that they have to do with things which should be determinable in themselves and should be distinguishable from all others. It belongs to the sense of judgments made on the basis of experience that they aim at objective validity."⁵ Thus, experience, according to its own sense, requires a determination of things that is not relative to the body's sensuous functioning. For the functioning of sense organs could break down or could be abnormally altered; even when normal they are different from subject to subject (visual acuity, etc.). Nevertheless to determine an experienced thing is to determine it in such a way that, without considering this relativity, an agreement on its identity with another, whose senses

perhaps function differently, becomes possible. The objective determination of a thing, the grasping of as it is in itself, is an intersubjective determination. An example of this is the fixing of a thing's spatial position not in terms of its relation to the location of my body, its being to the "right" or "left," but in terms of its place in an ideal system of places, within objective space. "A thing is always a form [*Gestalt*] in its position. The form, however, is qualified in each position. The qualities are fillings which are spread out over the surface and fill the corporeal form completely. However, qualifications, such as rays of light, heat, etc., extend from things into 'empty space.' Physical qualities cause qualities and qualitative changes in other things, and indeed such that the effect is a constant function of position: to each change in position corresponds a change in effect. By virtue of such reference to exactly determinable spatial relations, sensory qualities also become amenable to exact determination."⁶

In this way, the relativity to specific and different sensory functions can be set aside. It does not belong to the idea of an objective, material thing that it is given only through the senses we in fact have: "the senses could even be completely different, so long as they make possible a mutual agreement and constitute the appearing of a common nature. On principle, however, the subjects could not be blind in all their senses and accordingly blind to space, movement and energy. Otherwise there would not be any world of things there for them, and in any case not the same as is there for us, the very spatial world, nature."⁷ This means that it belongs to the idea of nature, as the universe of objectively determinable realities in the form of spatial things, that it is given through sensuousness of some kind or other, and that means that it refers back to an originary givenness. But "the objective determination determines a thing through those characteristics which are and must be attributable to it that enable it to appear to me or to anyone in communication with me, and which enable it to be taken as the same thing by each member of the communicative community, and also to me under all possible modifications of my sensibility."⁸ "Therefore, as an intersubjectively identical thing, a thing, in principle, has no sensuously intuitive content at all that could be given as intersubjectively identical. Rather it is only an empty, identical something, the correlate of the identification of what appears in changing appearances with diverse contents to subjects who are intersubjectively connected, subjects who have corresponding acts in which something appears and acts of experiential-logical [*erfahrungslogischen*] thinking, an identification which is possible according to experiential-logical rules and which is grounded in them."⁹

Nature as objectively determined by natural science is thus the product of conceptual determination, but it is not the free invention of thinking subjects. For they must be sensuous subjects to whom "something" is given through the senses. Conversely, it is then shown [by Husserl], in the subsequent sections [of *Ideen II*], that it is only through such a nature that a community of

communicating subjects is possible.⁹ In order to be able to enter into communication, they must appear to one another as embodied [*leibliche*] subjects such that their bodies are given through sensibility as material things, for the experience of an alien psychic subject is only possible as something “appresented” in an animate body [*Leibkörper*]. The starting point for naturalizing the psychic and the spiritual is in this relationship of founding.

Thus nature, in the natural scientific sense, as the idea of a universe of objectively determinable realities, and intersubjectivity, a community of subjects in communication, refer to one another. Intersubjectivity requires the givenness of nature. On the other hand, nature, in the sense of objective nature, is a formation of their cognitive performances. This clarifies the sense of the “being-in-itself” of nature. For one thing, it means that in order for subjects to be in communion with other subjects and to have knowledge of themselves as such, something must be unconditionally given, something which is not produced by their own performances, their cognitions, judgemental positings and objectivatings, but which is given through a “primordial sensibility,” i.e., given in a passivity which includes in itself no sediments of earlier active positing performances (even what has been once actively posited can then become conscious passively in the form of habituality, of something forcing itself into awareness reproductively). Of course nothing can be decided *a priori* concerning whether this sensibility must be the very kind we know of from normally functioning subjects. In other words, the subject, conceived as being in an intersubjective context, must be one who is capable of sensing with his body. But the being-in-itself of nature, in this fundamental sense of something simply given through sensory affectation, signifies only the givenness of an “empty identical something.” That a thing is there means nothing more than that there is a rule according to which the consciousness of an identical something, appearing in the multiplicity of the flow of sensuous appearances, perspectives, adumbrations, etc., comes about. In this sense, said Husserl, “the thing is a rule governing possible appearances.”¹⁰

If it is further said in this regard that the objective determinations of a thing made by natural science are determinations of the thing in itself, that objective nature is in itself, then the sense of “being-in-itself” here is inseparable from the correlation to subjectivity as intersubjectivity and its collective cognitive performances. It only means: wherever a sequence of appearances is given, the sequence must be able to be so determined that the conditions of its appearing can be established independent of specific sensory functions by means of determinations effected purely by thought and can be reenacted by every subject able to think (one who, in order to be able to function as a thinking subject in communication with others, must also be sentient). Thus, the being-in-itself of nature, in this sense, is a product of the method of objectivation, and this relation to the intersubjectivity exercising this method is inseparable from it.

As a consequence of this, a tension arises between two concepts of nature, “nature that is at first, and nature that accrues to us now that we are in cooperative interconnection,”¹¹ meaning nature as objectively determined. At first, nature seemed to be the universe of realities, the world, because everything that is to be given to us at all must have its basis in what is given to sensibility. Everything must be able to be integrated into the world’s nexus in order to be determinable, i.e., objectively determinable, by cognition, particularly scientific cognition. But now it becomes apparent that “this naturalistically considered world is not really the world,”¹² but that the world, as something which exists in itself in the second, just discussed, sense, is rather a formation produced within the world of subjects who are in communication with one another. Thus, while it seemed at first that nature, as the universe of spatially extended things, of objectively determinable *res extensa*, was the lowest stratum in all existents in the formation of the world, it now turns out that we cannot speak of such a stratification as one which subsists in itself. One can now see the significance of the principle from which Husserl proceeds in the inquiry concerning the regions of being and their basic regional concepts, namely the principle that such regions can only be considered in reference to their correlation to consciousness, in which the kinds and regions of being become objects. The necessary presuppositions emerge under which regions, strata and a foundational order among strata can be spoken of in the first place: to have an entity as an object in its regional peculiarity is dependent on an “attitude” [“*Einstellung*”] of the cognizing subject, a “predominant apperception”¹³ under which what is given is, so to speak, aimed at in a particular way. That is why the first theme which follows the introduction of the concept of the world as the universe of realities and the definition of this world as nature is the inquiry into the attitude that corresponds to this concept of the world, i.e., the “naturalistic” [*naturalistischen*] attitude.^k This is a focusing on “mere things” wherein “all predicates that we grant to things under the titles of agreeableness, beauty, usefulness, practical suitability, perfection remain completely out of consideration.”¹⁴ Thus this sphere of “mere things,” of “nature” does not really underlie all existents as a bottommost stratum, rather we reach it by a conscious abstraction from all the other characters, significational characters, etc., with which things appear to us. The object of physical and mathematical natural science is constituted only in that way. The reason that animate nature can appear as a higher situated^l stratum is that it is possible, and within certain limits justified, to regard animate life, which Husserl understood on principle as ensouled (the differences between human, animal and plant were not considered any further by him in this connection), as something occurring within a material body, as bound up with the body and its causally conditioned processes. Although it is not sensuously perceptible in the same way as a physical event, it is “attributed to”[“*eingelegt*”] the physical body; it is

something of which one is conscious along with the body by means of "appresentation" in such a way that the right of such an apperception has its own way of being legitimated. Just as the apperception "physical thing" must be validated in experience by the harmoniousness of the flow of experience, so also the appresented psychic [stratum] has its way of being confirmed in experience by the fulfillment of expectations which are bound up with such an apperception, expectations of certain behavioral patterns of object. The definition of the region of animate being through the concept of the soul in no way suggests that there is a substance which lies behind the modes of appearance of the living thing. Within the bounds of the "naturalistic" attitude, for which the psychic essentially counts as an "adjunct" to a physical body, soul, like the concept of thing for the region of material nature, signifies nothing else than a rule for the flow of possible appearances which are apperceived, in accordance with it, as modes of behavior of a living thing and are confirmed as such in experience. "Soul" is a unity of "manifestation" in a flow of physical events. This holds first of all for the alien psychic occurrences and for one's own in so far as they are already subject to the objectivating apperception.

While animate nature can be understood in this way, as founded in the physical stratum, the corresponding "attitude" directed toward psychophysical connections and dependencies being presupposed, this doesn't hold for the spiritual [*geistigen*] world. For the objects of the naturalistic attitude are reached precisely through a systematic abstraction from all "spiritual" predicates, from the significative characters, etc., which are not attached to things in themselves, but to things in their relation to the behavior of personal subjects. Although it is correct that things furnished with such characters, are also "embodied" [*Ihre "Leiblichkeit" haben*], for instance books, dwellings, etc., are also physical things, what constitutes such a thing as a book, etc., is something which cannot be discovered when considered physically.

Consequently a reversal of this whole consideration comes about in the transition to the question of the constitution of the socio-cultural world. The spiritual world can no longer be understood as a higher stratum "resting on" ["*aufruhend*"] (an expression of Nicolai Hartman's) the lower strata after it has been shown that speaking of the lower strata accessible in the "naturalistic attitude" is only meaningful in correlation with an attitude consciously chosen. Rather, the ascertainment of this correlation necessitates raising the question of the subject of this and every attitude, and this is precisely the person understood as the subject of freely executed acts, the subject of "position-takings." It is this subject through which Husserl defines the concept of spirit. While it seemed initially that the distinction of the naturalistic and personalistic attitudes (the one as the presupposition of natural science, the other of cultural science) concerned two separate attitudes

on the same level, attitudes which could be chosen and exchanged depending on one's scientific purpose, it is now apparent that there are not two equal attitudes here. Rather, "the naturalistic attitude is subordinate to the personalistic and it gains a certain independence through an abstraction or rather through a kind of self-forgetting on the part of the personal ego, a process by which, at the same time, it illegitimately absolutizes its world, nature."¹⁵ The "personalistic" attitude is prior because it is actually not an attitude chosen only for methodological purposes at all, but is the way in which we are immediately conscious of ourselves and our world: "The subject not only consciously encounters things in his surrounding world, but also other subjects; he sees them as persons who busy themselves in their surrounding world, who are determined by their objects and are always determinable by new objects. In this attitude it simply does not occur to him to 'attribute' [*einzulegen*] spirit [*den Geist*] to the body [*dem Leibe*], i.e., to regard it as something in the body in the sense of being founded in it, as something belonging to reality along with the body. Thus it would not occur to him to carry out the pertinent apperception by which its object is given as real (the naturalizing apperception)."¹⁶ "In the comprehensive experience of the existence of another, we understand him immediately as a personal subject and therewith as one who is related to the objects to which we are also related: to the earth and sky, field and forest, to the room in which 'we' spend our time together, to a picture that we see, etc. We are related to a common surrounding world; we are in a personal association – these belong together."¹⁷ The goal of the objective determination of what is given, which the naturalistic attitude, understood as the abstraction from all other determinations of entities, presupposes as the purely "material," is then a determinate goal of cognition for subjects who form a community and exist with one another as persons. It is an aim which has its absolute limit at the spiritual, because it would take from the spiritual its specific character and if applied to the spiritual would cause it to disappear as an object of cognition. In this sense, spirit is a "counterpart of nature," understood as objectively determined nature; it is not a stratum of being founded in it, but its necessary correlate with respect to which nature in this sense can at all be spoken of.

Of course today, the impossibility of a consistent naturalism seems to have become almost obvious and Husserl's battle against it seems to have only historical significance. But the difficulties of bringing views of man stemming from the biological and socio-cultural sciences harmoniously together, difficulties which today are not yet completely removed, show that there are clarifications involved here which still cannot be viewed as shared by all. For only if one sees that the naturalizing of spirit, a procedure which definitely has its methodological necessity in biological investigations of the surrounding world, does not simply signify the acceptance of ultimate givenness, but is a

result of a methodological attitude, only then can the difficulties arising from the absolutizing of what is only the product of method be overcome.

Although it seemed at first glance that one could speak of three regions of being, material nature, animate nature, and the spiritual world, and that in the second volume of *Ideen* these are depicted as forming a three-membered structure, it now becomes apparent that actually there is a two-fold articulation, the relationship of nature and spirit, i.e., of the world of nature and the world of spirit – with spirit having priority. This is because the naturalization of spirit has insurmountable limits for the above-mentioned reasons, since the understanding of nature, as a formation produced by spirit, seemingly comprehends all, leaving no remainder. Conversely, “it is not the whole truth to consider subjects as a part of nature, since that which gives nature its sense would then be missing. Nature is a field of constant realities, and can only be that in being always relative to an absolute which thus bears all relativities, i.e., to spirit.”¹⁸ Spirit alone is absolute, non-relative. For “if we strike all that is spirit out of the world, there would be no more nature. But if we delete Nature, that ‘true’ intersubjectively objective existence [*Dasein*], something still remains, namely spirit as individual spirit. Then, however, spirit loses the possibility of sociality, the possibility of a comprehension which presupposes a certain intersubjectivity of the lived body. We would then have an individual mind which is no longer a person in the narrower, social sense, one related to a material world and therewith also to a world of persons. However we would still have . . . an ego with its conscious life and it would also have its individuality therein, its ways of judging, valuing, of being motivated in its position-takings.”¹⁹

To put it another way: the things of nature have no essence of their own, no individuality. “What distinguishes two things that are alike is real-causal connection, which presupposes the here and now, and with that we are necessarily referred back to an individual subjectivity.”²⁰ Thus, “the unique, original individual” is “consciousness taken concretely with its I [*Ich*]. Any other individual is something which appears and has the principle of its individuation in the actual and possible appearings which in turn point back to an individual consciousness.”²¹ Hence “absolute individuation enters into the personal ego.” For “spiritual beings [*Geister*] are not unities of appearances, but are unities of absolute nexus of consciousness, more precisely ego-unities.” Nature in contrast “is the X and is fundamentally nothing but the X which is determined through general determinations. Spiritual being, however, is no X, but is that which is given in the experience of a mind itself.”²²

This concluding thought of the work indicates the way in which the transition from the methodological concept of constitution, i.e., the correlation between what is given and the consciousness which corresponds to

it, to the metaphysical concept of constitution takes place. With this transition the idea that all Being is Being through consciousness, Being posited by consciousness, arises from the methodological consideration that all Being is necessarily Being for consciousness. Thus consciousness, as far as we can become conscious of our ego as a reflecting ego, becomes absolute Being, an absolute “region.” The transition is guided by the consideration that spirit, in the sense of object-positing consciousness, is given immediately to itself in reflection, that there is nothing lying behind it which would not be accessible to self-experience, no hidden “substance” of which consciousness in its flow presents only the accidents. Nature, on the other hand, is never self-given in this sense, but is only the X further determinable *in infinitum*, into whose “interior” we cannot penetrate in the same way as we can the interior of spirit, because the latter is just that interiority itself given to consciousness. But our inability to penetrate into the interior of nature is not due to its remaining hidden from us, rather it is because it has no such self-sufficient interior, it is only a formation produced by spirit.

We have traced the way in which Husserl relativized the distinction of regions of Being, not merely methodologically, through the reference to methodological “attitudes” corresponding to them, but, as well, the way in which he absolutely preserved the distinction by deriving it from spirit, understood as a consciousness constituting all being. But at the same time what makes this transition from a methodological to a metaphysical preservation in the sense of an absolute idealism problematic becomes visible. This problem becomes apparent once we remind ourselves of the consequences of this transition for the concept of nature. The tension which emerged in the course of reflection between two aspects of nature – on the one hand, nature as the universe of realities and as the founding region on which is built all entities of higher regions, the animal and spiritual regions, and on the other hand, nature as a formation produced by spirit – was abolished to the advantage of the second aspect, so that there can be no more talk of nature as the lowermost region of Being founding the others. For in order for this to be the case, all regions must be on the same level, which would enable them to be compared to one another. But if spirit is absolute Being, and nature a mere relative being, “only” constituted in spirit, one can no longer speak of a relationship of founding, for the absolute cannot be founded in something relative. However this consequence is not compatible with the consideration which in the beginning led to conferring a foundational role on the physicalness of nature [*Naturdinglichkeit*], understood as spatio-temporal, causally determinable reality. There it was established that the physicalness of nature is the realm of “primordial objects” [*Urgegenstände*], the realm of what is given ultimately through “primordial sensibility” [*Ursinnlichkeit*] in a mere accepting, passive consciousness, a realm of givenness which bears in itself, at that point, nothing formed from active achievements of consciousness. But if all active

performances of consciousness ultimately depend on such givenness, as the “stuff,” the sensual *hyle* which forms the presupposition for all intentional “forming” by performances of consciousness,²³ then there is still something left over in the nature of which we are conscious on the basis of such givenness, a remainder which makes it impossible to understand nature as being completely a formation produced by mind. This is the limit which was kept to in Kant’s transcendental philosophy, since the given of sensibility, sensation, was acknowledged to be an index of the dependency of human understanding on givenness. In this manner Kant, in the “Refutation of Idealism” in the *Critique of Pure Reason*,²⁴ showed that the possibility of self-consciousness is dependent on the existence of “things outside of me.” Thus, this unqualified other, standing over and against consciousness, the “thing in itself,” obviously remained an unknowable ground of appearances. Now as much as Husserl’s talk of the thing as an “X,” a “rule” for the flow of appearances, is reminiscent of Kant, Husserl nevertheless overstepped the limit Kant held to when he passed from the methodological concept of constitution to a metaphysical concept, with its attendant dissolution of nature into a formation produced by spirit. But an unresolvable difficulty emerges here for the determination of the concept of sensation. For if mind is the absolute, it cannot have anything like a simply given “stuff” over and against itself. Sensation, as the power of giving the sensual stuff, would, then, in truth not be as it presents itself in immediate consciousness, namely a receptive merely accepting consciousness of affection. Rather, the fact that it appears that way would be only a result of determinate modes of apperception, an aspect which would itself rest on active positing performances of consciousness. In other words: the unqualified given and sensation as consciousness of unqualified givenness must, in the sense of absolute idealism, be deduced from the positing performances of spirit. In fact there are occasional attempts at this in Husserl’s later manuscripts. But such an attempt is in contradiction with the basic methodological principle of phenomenology, the principle to which it owes its success, the principle that consciousness is to be described purely as it is, and whatever is for consciousness is to be described purely as it is for consciousness, a principle which is designed to exclude any interpretation which stems from any scientific or metaphysical presuppositions.

This contradiction is not derived argumentatively from outside of Husserl’s exposition, but is a contradiction between the way he basically understands consciousness and the analysis in which consciousness is investigated in detail. Basically his method is one of universal reflection guided by the correlation of consciousness and object. Although consciousness does not exclusively consist in the positing of objects in judgments, in theoretically objectivating them, what consciousness consists of in a general sense is derived from reflection on its positing performances. It is the judgmentally positing theoretically objectivating attitude which “discloses” [“enthiüllt”] what

consciousness is *qua* consciousness,²⁴ and this is nothing but the positing performances which can become visible through reflection. Accordingly, the consciousness of myself, as an ego that senses by means of its body, also appears as the product of an objectivating apperception, one which already presupposes the constitution of an objective world of spatial things, a “nature.” In fact, this apperception, in which I apprehend my sensing as something added to a physical animate body, is indeed possible and, for certain scientific modes of questioning (the psychophysical), necessary. But prior to any such objectivating apperception is the immediate sensing consciousness with its kinaesthesias in which are constituted for me not only things in their manners of appearance, but in which I am aware of myself, not only as a positing ego, but as a sensuously affected ego. This state of affairs is effectively and incisively presented by Husserl in his analysis of embodiment [*Leiblichkeit*]. But since it is his basic presupposition that the sense of all consciousness can be discovered in the judgmentally positing attitude, the nature I am aware of in sensing is identified without further ado with the nature which is the result of objectification based on sensory givenness. In this way Husserl gives up the possibility of drawing the systematic consequences of his analysis of kinaesthetic consciousness as embodied consciousness. The fact that I possess a sensing body, of which I “am in control” in kinaesthesias, is then considered as irrelevant for the determination of what I myself am as an ego, and of how I am aware of myself as such. The embodiment, of which I am aware in sensing, is identified with the embodiment which I, objectivating, apperceive as a thing among things. This embodiment is distinguished above “mere” things, however, in that an inwardness is “appresented” in it. Thus only the pure ego, which is nothing but Kant’s “*intellektuelle Vorstellung der Selbsttätigkeit eines denkenden Subjektes*”²⁵ [intellectual representation of the spontaneity of a thinking subject], counts as that of which I am immediately aware, except in distinction to Kant, this is hypostasized into absolute being. But this overlooks the fact that nature is more than a result of this objectivating, and is more than what can be objectivated in general. My immediate consciousness of myself is a consciousness of my mind [*Geistes*] not only as one carrying out positing acts, but one which is in its very self already a consciousness of “nature,” insofar as I am precisely a sensing ego. Nature in this sense, of course, is not exhausted by the nature which is made into an object by natural science. But also it is not an X which remains unknown. Rather it has its structures which are correlative to the structure of sensing bodiliness and are disclosed in it, a structure which constitutes the way I always already find myself in my world prior to all striving towards objectivation.

But this should not be taken to mean that this manner of setting the problem was alien to Husserl. It is already indicated in his demonstration of the priority of the “personalistic” over the “naturalistic,” objectivating attitude. There it is

shown that the “personalistic” attitude is really not an attitude, but is the way that we immediately have the world, a way within which the thought of considering the psychic as an annex to a body, conceived as a thing, does not occur to us. The reference here is to his later, still unpublished writings on the “*Lebenswelt*,”¹⁰ in which this immediacy of our having of the world is analyzed. Whereas the inquiry concerning regions of Being was guided from the beginning by considering how entities are objectified in scientific explication and are themes of sciences, in these later investigations there is no more talk of regions of Being, since the concern in them is a dimension of immediate experience, which is prior to such scientific interpretation of what is experienced, a discussion of how the inquiry into the “constitution of the world” must be established on this basis is beyond the scope of this study. It will be sufficient to say that this constitution cannot be clarified as the correlate of the objectivating-positing pure ego. The correlation that must be considered must be one involving the entire sensing ego, concretely understood, i.e., as that ego is aware of itself not only as a thinking ego, but as one that has feelings and moods. Also, structures and relationships of founding would emerge in such a correlation that could not be understood as those pertaining to regions and strata of Being, since the presuppositions and limits of such distinctions were shown in Husserl’s investigations.

The approaches to this fruitful and important inquiry are indicated in Husserl’s work, but he was not able to draw the systematic consequences from them, consequences which would have kept him from that metaphysical absolutization of spirit, from passing from the methodological over to the metaphysical concept of constitution. He did not draw these consequences because he adhered in principle to the conception that consciousness is essentially objectivating, positing [*vergegenständlichend-setzendes*] consciousness, so that whatever we have as consciousness, and whatever we are conscious of through it, can be “disclosed” by reflecting on its positing performances. Whether this concerns a limit only of Husserlian phenomenology or one of transcendental philosophy in general would be a subject for further inquiries.

In spite of these limits, which are seen through a critical analysis of the second volume of *Ideen*, the abiding value of this project is that, in it, the impossibility of an absolutization of layered strata of Being and of a corresponding interpretation of “constitution of the world” became evident, and that, thereby, the limits of a universal naturalization was shown. This puts these investigations among the contemporaneous efforts to secure the autonomy and methodological independence of the socio-cultural science. But Husserl’s investigations achieve an incomparably greater clarity and penetration than the works of Dilthey and the southwest German school. Since Husserl’s analyses were not guided in their particulars by the idealistic program, nor by a concept of consciousness fixed in advance, but by the

phenomena themselves, in their richness they reveal to subsequent, appreciative understanding those points where thinking, which goes beyond his idealistic program, can begin. The special importance of Husserl's investigations lies in this.

TRANSLATOR'S NOTES

^aThe German word “*Sein*” will be translated “Being,” while “*Seiendes*” will be rendered “entity” or “what exists” or “being,” according to the context.

^bHusserl's major early work in this regard is his *Logische Untersuchungen*, which first appeared in 1900–01, especially the first volume of that work, *Prolegomena zur Reinen Logik*. See Edmund Husserl, *Logical Investigations*, trans. J.N. Findlay (New York: Humanities Press, 1970). His most significant later works dealing with the foundations of logic are *Formal and Transcendental Logic*, trans. D. Cairns (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1969) and *Experience and Judgment*, trans. J. Churchill and K. Ameriks (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1973).

^cSee *Logical Investigations*, Vol. II, Chap. 6.

^dFor a definition of the concept of “region,” see Edmund Husserl, *Ideas*, trans. W.R. Boyce Gibson (London: Allen & Unwin, 1931), Section 16, p. 77. For Husserl's discussion of formal and regional ontologies and their categories, see the entire first chapter of *Ideas* (“Fact and Essence”).

^eSee *Ideas*, Section 149, pp. 411 ff.

^fFor instance, Paul Ricoeur, “Études sur les ‘Méditations Cartésiennes’ de Husserl,” *Revue philosophique de Louvain*, LII (1954), pp. 75–109. An English translation is in Ricoeur's *Husserl: An Analysis of his Phenomenology*, trans. E. Ballard and L. Embree (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1967) – see especially p. 86 and p. 102. See also, Marvin Farber, *The Foundation of Phenomenology* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1943), pp. 537–73.

^gSee *Ideas*, Section 49, p. 153.

^hE. Husserl, *Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie*, zweites Buch, Husserliana IV, ed. M. Biemel (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1952); cited in “Author's Footnotes” and below as *Ideen* II.

ⁱThe essential relativity and not the factual one criticized below.

^j*Ideen* II, pp. 162 ff.

^kThe naturalistic attitude is not to be confused with the natural (*natürlich*) attitude. In the latter attitude objects are given to us and are taken by us to have precisely the spiritual “predicates” which the naturalistic attitude abstracts from. For Husserl's description of the natural attitude, see *Ideas*, Sections 27–30, pp. 101–106. For a comparison of the two attitudes, see *Ideen* II, pp. 180 ff.

^lReading “*situierter*” for “*studierter*.”

^mImmanuel Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, trans. N.K. Smith (London: Macmillan, 1968), pp. 244–47.

ⁿLandgrebe is probably referring to *Die Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaften und die transzendentale Phänomenologie*, Husserliana VI, ed. W. Biemel (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1954); English trans., *The Crisis of European*

Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology, trans. D. Carr (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1970).

AUTHOR'S NOTES

1. See the interpretation of the concept of constitution authorized by Husserl himself: Eugen Fink, "Was will die Phänomenologie Edmund Husserls?" *Die Tatwelt*, 1934 [English translation in *Research in Phenomenology* II (1972) pp. 5-27].
2. *Ideen* II, p. 126 [See translator's footnote "h" for the full reference.]
3. Ibid., p. 75.
4. Ibid., p. 77.
5. Ibid., p. 82.
6. Ibid., p. 84.
7. Ibid., p. 86.
8. Ibid., p. 87.
9. Ibid., p. 88.
10. Ibid., p. 86.
11. Ibid., p. 208.
12. Ibid.
13. Ibid., p. 2.
14. Ibid.
15. Ibid., pp. 183 f.
16. Ibid., p. 190.
17. Ibid., p. 191.
18. Ibid., p. 297.
19. Ibid.
20. Ibid., p. 299.
21. Ibid., p. 301.
22. Ibid.
23. See *Ideas*, Section 85, pp. 246-51. [See translator's footnote "d" for full reference.]
24. See *Ideen* II, pp. 11 ff. [The rest of Landgrebe's footnote refers to the book in which this essay appeared, and refers the reader to p. 38 and pp. 197 ff. See above for the reference.]
25. I. Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, pp. 246-47. [See translator's footnote "m" for the full reference. Here also Landgrebe refers the reader to another portion of his *Der Weg der Phänomenologie*, Chapter V.]

THE PROBLEM POSED BY THE TRANSCENDENTAL SCIENCE OF THE A PRIORI OF THE LIFE-WORLD*

LUDWIG LANDGREBE

The problem of the passage back to the life-world is the focal point of Husserl's later work. It is the theme of the *Crisis*,^a and the working out of this problem occupied him incessantly in the days prior to his terminal illness. With his essay on the crisis of European science, he sought to present a new way of introducing phenomenology and of grounding and justifying its historical necessity. This work is not an epilog to Husserl's life work that indicates a turn or break in his intellectual development. Rather, it is an incomplete, final work that can be seen to be the result of insights obtained earlier, particularly those presented in his lectures on "first philosophy."^b Not only his text, but also the reflections related to this composition and now offered as appendices portend how the unity and congruence of his earlier, individual analyses can be understood from this finally acquired position and where answers for the questions which remain open are to be sought.

It was in the first part of the essay on the "crisis," which was published in 1936 in the journal, *Philosophia*,^b that the expression "life-world" [*Lebenswelt*] first appeared in Husserl's published work. But its appearance in this torso did not enable the magnitude of the problems indicated by this expression to be recognized. Husserl did not use the expression "life-world" until late; it is encountered at the earliest in the manuscripts toward the end of the 1920's. However, it is only the new term for a state of affairs that Husserl had in mind, at least as a problem, since the time of the *Ideas* (1913), a work in which he began from the positivistic requirement that a "natural concept of the world" be accounted for. However, Husserl realized the full significance of this problem and the way it was to be treated only at the time of the Crisis essay, and he progressively developed it further in the last years of his life. It became apparent that the problem posed by the method of the phenomenological science of the life-world is not a specific problem to be

*Translated by Robert M. Harlan from "Das Problem der transzendentalen Wissenschaft vom lebensweltlichen *A priori*," *Phänomenologie und Geschichte* (Gütersloh: G. Mohn, 1967), pp. 148-66. The article was first presented at the International Philosophical Congress, Mexico, in 1963.

addressed by phenomenological-constitutive analysis but, rather, that it concerns the innermost dimension of the constitutive accomplishments of transcendental subjectivity. The difficulties which come to light with this problem, then, are related to the concept of transcendental subjectivity itself and to the method of its disclosure. Husserl reworked all of his earlier, fundamental expositions in connection with these difficulties, and the problems which could not be clarified by these expositions became visible. Thus, Husserl's thinking in this late work shows itself in its unflagging energy, by means of which everything previously attained is again placed in question and new dimensions of problems beneath that already attained are opened up.

In the first section of the following exposition, then, the context in which the problem of the life-world appears in the *Crisis* must be briefly discussed. In the second section, the concept of the life-world as the historical world and as the world arising from the immediate experience of nature is developed. In the third section, the method of acquiring the *a priori* of the life-world, its difficulties and the way in which it is to be clarified will be treated.

I. THE CONNECTION BETWEEN THE PROBLEMATIC OF THE *CRISIS* AND THE PROBLEM OF THE LIFE-WORLD

It is not possible here to critically analyze the design of the entire *Crisis*. As a new attempt at an introduction to phenomenology, the *Crisis* takes up all of Husserl's earlier considerations concerning the way into phenomenology, and in particular devotes the entire third part to the way through psychology. We must refrain from considering this here. The problem of the life-world is treated, particularly in the second part, in connection with the question of the way into phenomenology from the pre-given life-world. In connection with this, material not included in the text but now included in the appendices must be taken into consideration. The problem of the life-world, therefore, is connected with the question concerning phenomenology as that fundamental philosophical science which is to provide the ultimate justification and legitimization of human life. While its title implies that the *Crisis* is a discussion of the theory of science, working through this work shows how far Husserl has departed from the style of philosophical thinking which, since the end of the nineteenth century, understood philosophy primarily to be the theory of science. On the basis of this understanding, neo-Kantianism – the dominant school in Germany at that time – began from the fact of the sciences and inquired into the transcendental conditions for their possibility. To a large extent, Husserl's *Ideas* is also oriented by the theory of science in this sense. It takes as its given the regions of being as they are divided within the domain of scientific investigation and searches for the conditions for the possibility of this division by the development of the regional *a priori*. In contrast to this, the

concern in the *Crisis* is the *passage back behind the given sciences in their facticity and the inquiry into the facticity of this fact*. For a crisis has befallen the sciences because they are no longer in a position to give an account of the sense of their own deeds. These sciences, through whose application the world was reshaped into the modern, technical world, have become “empty of sense” [*Sinnentleerung*]. Thus, the *inquiry into the crisis of European science* is nothing other than the *inquiry into the crisis of the modern, technical world*. That this is not a question of a crisis of the foundations of science but, rather, of a crisis of modern life in general is something that has forced itself upon the general consciousness since the writing of the *Crisis* and has become most clearly visible in the moral problems which confront modern atomic physicists, who are faced with the practical and, in particular, the political consequences of their discoveries.

What path does phenomenology take in order to contribute to the overcoming of this crisis? Phenomenology inquires into its origin. And because it is the crisis of the sciences and of the world interpreted by and transformed through the sciences, phenomenology inquires into the origin of modern science: origin in the sense of the *a priori* conditions for their possibility. However, what is new in the path adopted in the *Crisis* is that these *a priori* conditions are no longer sought purely systematically by the grasping of the essence of the fundamental regional concepts but, rather, by a unique “interweaving of historical and systematic investigations.”³ Therefore, what the sense of the phenomenological inquiry into the origin actually obtains its last if not its complete clarification in this work. The question of the method of the science of the life-world is, therefore, nothing other than the question of the sense and method of the phenomenological investigation of origins as such. For Husserl, the inquiry into the origin of modern science is an inquiry into the historical and systematic conditions under which this or any science could arise within a world that is not yet understood in light of scientific interpretation; i.e., precisely the “life-world.” “The life-world was always there for mankind before science, then, just as it continues its manner of being in the epoch of science.”⁴ “The life-world is what we know best, what is always taken for granted in all of human life, always familiar to us in its typicality through experience,”⁵ “always already there, existing in advance, the ‘basis’ for all *praxis*, whether theoretical or extra-theoretical,” and, thus, “the foundation for all objective knowledge.” It is “pregiven to us not occasionally but always and necessarily as the universal field of all actual and possible *praxis*, as horizon. To live is always to live in certainty of the world.”⁶

Therefore, the first requirement for the inquiry into the origin of science is the *clarification of the relation the pre-scientific life-world has to the world interpreted by science*. We understand this relation as follows: the life-world is always pre-given prior to all science and is the basis for all *praxis* and aims which arise in the course of natural life. Thus, the new, Galilean natural

science which arose from pre-scientific life and its surrounding world served “a purpose which necessarily lay in this pre-scientific life and was related to its life-world. Man (including the natural scientist), living in this world, could put all of his practical and theoretical questions only to *it* – could refer in his theories only to *it* in its open, endless horizons of things unknown.”⁶ “This actually intuited, actually experienced and experienceable world in which our whole life takes place practically, remains unchanged as what it is, in its own, essential structure and its *own* concrete, causal style, whatever we may do with or without techniques. Thus, it is also not changed by the fact that we invent a particular technique, the Galilean, which is called physics.”⁷

The inquiry into the relation between the life-world and the world interpreted scientifically is divided, therefore, into two questions:

1. What purpose does science serve for life within its life-world?
2. To what extent does the life-world remain unaltered in spite of its transformation by the application of science?

1. The life-world is “the sphere of well-known certainties taken to be unconditionally valid and proven practically in human life prior to all requirements for scientific grounding.”⁸ “All life rests upon prediction or, as we can now say, upon *induction*. In the most primitive way, even the ontic certainty of any straight-forward experience is inductive. Things ‘seen’ are always more than what we ‘actually’ and ‘genuinely’ see of them. Perceiving is essentially a having-something-itself and at the same time a having-something-in-advance, a meaning-something-in-advance. All *praxis*, with its projects, involves inductions.”⁹ According to Husserl, the genuine, philosophical justification of empiricism lies in the fact that it is oriented by this inductive style of everyday life; empiricism is covertly guided by the “tendency toward a scientific discovery of the everyday, familiar and yet scientifically unknown life-world.”¹⁰

To what extent, therefore, has science itself grown out of this style of the pre-scientific life within the “life-world,” and to what extent does science serve this life’s purposes? Science performs “prediction extended to infinity.” “All *praxis* with its projects, involves inductions; it is just that ordinary inductive knowledge, even if expressly formulated and verified, is ‘artless’ compared to the artful, ‘methodical’ inductions which can be carried to infinity in the method of Galilean physics.”¹¹

2. To what extent does the life-world remain unaltered in spite of the transformation of the world by science? Alteration by science lies in the fact that its purposes and works themselves, as do all purposes and aims, “flow” into the life-world.¹² By this flowing, the life-world becomes a world altered at any given time by historical conditions. However, the life-world itself is not altered in its core: for “the scientists themselves are men within the life-world – along with other men. The life-world is the world for everyone; thus, the sciences, which are at first the worlds of the scientists, are there for all men as

ours and as achieved results . . . they are there for all – just as the life-world is for everyone.”¹³ This does not simply mean that men continue living as men who strive to act and who set aims for themselves using this new means of prediction. The alteration of the world by science can itself be intuited by the perception of the things and processes brought about by science. These things and processes themselves become perceptual things within the life-world, the world in which man lives as one who senses and perceives through his bodily senses. The invariance of the life-world is preserved in all historical alteration of the world by the deeds and works of man, whether they rest on artless induction or on the methodical induction of science. The *style* of the life-world, on the ground of which the world which stands immediately and sensuously before us as the world self-evidently valid for everyone, is preserved.

How is this extended prediction accomplished by science? By the fact that “in the open infinity of possible experiences, we measure the life-world – the world constantly given to us as actual in our concrete world-life – for a well-fitting garb of ideas, that of the so-called objective, scientific truths. That is, through a method which (as we hope) can actually be carried out in every particular detail and which can be continually verified, we first construct numerical indices for the actual and possible sensory plena of the concretely intuited shapes of the life-world, and in this way obtain possibilities of predicting concrete occurrences in the intuitably given life-world, occurrences which are not yet or no longer actually given. And this kind of prediction infinitely surpasses the accomplishments of everyday prediction.”¹⁴

By this we have not only characterized the Galilean method of *mente concipere*, of projection with its verification by experimentation, but at the same time have implied that the predelineative ideas are precisely *our projections*, projections that must precede experience and, in this sense, are *a priori* in contrast to experience, for they rest on the human reason’s capability to project in this way. As a result, science, from its origin in the beginning of the modern era, is guided by the presupposition that it can cognitively determine the world in such a way that the world is not conditioned by the relativity of sensory experience and the opinions founded on this experience; therefore, unconditioned by *doxa*. To that extent, science requires the hypothesis of the being-in-itself of cognitively determined nature. But this hypothesis is only “one among the many practical hypotheses and projects which make up the life of human beings in this life-world,” and they “belong, as do all aims, whether they are ‘practical’ in some other, extra-scientific sense or are practical under the title of ‘theory,’ *eo ipso* to the unity of the life-world, if we only take the life-world in its complete and full concreteness.”¹⁵

However, the sciences and philosophy of the beginning of the modern era did not recognize this hypothesis of being-in-itself as a hypothesis. Because they failed to recognize this, they were overcome at the time of their grounding

at the beginning of the modern era by a fascination with the metaphysical concept of truth, the concept according to which true being in itself is what is constant and abiding *behind* the alterable and changeable world of *doxa*, the world of illusion of the senses and their prejudices.¹⁶ This conviction that the world interpreted scientifically in the sense of modern science is the true world is what Husserl criticized as the objectivism of the modern era. Averting the crisis of the technological world depends on overcoming this conviction. In contrast to this supposedly in-itself, true world of science, the experienced actuality of the life-world is the domain of the merely subjective-relative, a domain of which there is no true knowledge and no true science. Nevertheless, “the contrast between the subjectivity of the life-world and the ‘objective,’ the ‘true’ world” – “which is always thought of in advance as nature in an expanded sense of the word” – lies in the fact that “the latter is a theoretical-logical subtraction, the subtraction of something that is in principle not perceivable, in principle not experienceable in its own proper being, whereas the subjective, in the life-world, is distinguished in all respects precisely by its being actually experienceable.”¹⁷ The life-world is a realm of original evidences of that which is given as “itself,” “for every mode of induction has the sense of being an induction of something intuitable, of something possibly perceptible as the thing itself or rememberable as having been perceived, etc.”¹⁸

Overcoming the crisis of objectivism means, therefore, the task “of bringing about the recognition of the primal legitimacy of these evidences and indeed of their higher dignity in the grounding of knowledge compared to that of the objective-logical evidences.”¹⁹ The necessity of this task is shown by referring to the very simple fact that all theoretical formations of science, no matter how complicated, can only be accepted as true if they are verified experimentally. This verification means, however, that the previously calculated and predicted process can be ascertained to occur by means of our sensory experience. For this reason, as Husserl pointed out, every construction of a scientific theory requires representative models [*Modellvorstellungen*.]²⁰ They are nothing other than life-world intuitions “which are suitable for facilitating the conception of the objective ideals in question.”²¹ In fact, the question of the sense and origin of the representative models which guide mathematical natural science has become a central issue in the current philosophical reflection on the foundations of mathematical natural science.

It is necessary, then, to inquire back from the objective-logical evidences to the primal evidence in which the life-world is constantly pre-given. For experience is “an evidence that takes place purely in the life-world and as such is the source of evidence for what is objectively established in the sciences.”²² The inquiry back to the life-world, therefore, means nothing less than *the justification of the domain of doxa*, for “the life-world is nothing other than the world of mere *doxa*, traditionally treated so disdainfully.”²³ For Husserl, the necessity of this passage back is in fact especially grounded in his

confrontation with modern thought. But this view does allow a *consideration of the historical and systematic significance of the problem of the life-world* within the history of European philosophy as a whole and *the relation of phenomenology to the tradition of metaphysics*.

Several observations could be included here in this connection. Modern philosophy was not the first to disdain *doxa*. Rather, such was the case from the moment Parmenides differentiated his two ways: the way of truth, which can be nothing other than the truth of a well-rounded, imperishable and unalterable being, and the forbidden way, which leads into night and in which becoming, change, alteration and the fluctuating opinions of mortal men are opposed to being. From that point on, what abides and is constant was understood as the truth of being, whether it was interpreted as the idea and the realm of ideas, the eternal *formae substantiales*, or as the abiding form of regularity pertaining to the course of the world, projected by the divine mind and imagistically understood by man. The presupposition of a truth pertaining to the imperishable and unalterable being behind the world, the world experienced as moving and altering and found to be constantly in flux, is the one which forms the basis for the development of occidental metaphysics in all of its variations. At the end of its development stands Nietzsche's demand for the abolition of every kind of "world behind the world" [*Hinterwelt*]. This means not only the abolition of the idea of a transcendent God, but also the abolition of the presupposition of an abiding "in-itself" standing behind constant change and a return to the "innocence of becoming" which is not measured by something abiding and constant. Thus, Heidegger justifiably called Nietzsche's philosophy the final word of occidental philosophy. It is an end insofar as Nietzsche's philosophy seeks to negate the basis of this metaphysics, the in-itself of constant being within the framework of the antithesis of being and becoming, of truth and *doxa*, from which the development of metaphysics departed, and to grasp the side of becoming. After this conclusion of metaphysics, Husserl proclaimed the "Heraclitean flux" itself to be the theme of the ultimately grounding, philosophical science. Thus, the claim was made that *the way of night forbidden by Parmenides is the genuine way to philosophical truth*, that the way of night can prove to be the "passage back to the origin" [*Rückgang zu den Müttern*]. One can also say that Feuerbach's demand that what is to be taken up in the text of philosophy is what is not philosophy finds its realization here, though admittedly in a way that Feuerbach could not have imagined.²⁴ *Doxa* should no longer be something disregarded by philosophy; *doxa* itself must be justified in its necessity and truth by way of a "passage back to the naivete of life – but in a reflection which rises above this naivete of life."²⁵ This does not mean, however, that problems emerge here which can no longer be managed by the conceptual tools of the metaphysical tradition. In his own way, then, Husserl confronts a task that Heidegger at approximately

the same time, termed the “passage back to the ground of metaphysics,” though the paths for this passage back are different for the two philosophers. It is that ground which has, in the history of metaphysics, first given rise to the distinction between *episteme* and *doxa*.

II. THE LIFE-WORLD AS THE HISTORICAL WORLD AND AS THE WORLD ARISING FROM THE IMMEDIATE EXPERIENCE OF NATURE

In the preceding discussion, the life-world was introduced as the domain of original evidences from which the sense of all other evidences attainable in practical life and in the theoretical activity of the objective sciences can be understood. The first step of the phenomenological passage back to the dimension of ultimate evidence is the phenomenological reduction with its suspension of the general thesis of the existential belief [*Seinsglauben*], the belief in the being of the world as a world existing in itself. Husserl established this program early in his writings. Therefore, the *passage back to the evidence of the life-world*, as the theme of constitutive analysis, turns out to be his *last step in the concrete carrying out of his program of the reduction*. For the life-world is this “pregiven world, pre-given to all of us as persons within the horizon of our being with other men; therefore, pre-given to us in every actual connection with others as *the world, common to us all*,” the “constant basis of validity, an ever available source of what is taken for granted, to which we, whether as practical men or as scientists, lay claim as a matter of course.”²⁵

Therefore, the “life-world” is not a new theme for Husserl, one that he had never taken up previously. Rather, the expression is nothing other than the designation for the correlate of what was called the “natural attitude” in the *Ideas*, a correlate henceforth understood in its full concretion. The prior certainty of the world’s givenness is the certainty pertaining to the “general thesis of the natural attitude,” certainty pertaining to the belief in the world integral to natural life. It is apparent that this belief in the existence of the world is not merely a problem for an “epistemology,” which would, accordingly, be concerned with the ground of the empty certainty of a “being outside of us.” Rather, this certainty is structured in itself, is filled with content and is differentiated. The world given with such certainty is the “life-world” in question. With the inquiry into its *a priori* – and this means an inquiry into the transcendental-constitutive conditions for its givenness – phenomenology is led back to the inner-most constitutive accomplishments of transcendental subjectivity, of the “residuum” remaining after the reduction, which make all other constitutive accomplishments possible.

After this demonstration of the origin of all scientific as well as all philosophical notions of a being-in-itself in its abiding and constant truth as a necessary hypothesis for existence within the life-world [*lebensweltlichen*

Dasein], the following question arises: *in what sense can this dimension of ultimate evidence*, which in comparison to the evidences of science appears to be purely subjective evidence, *be the domain of fundamental philosophical science [philosophischen Grundwissenschaft]*? “Can there be, in addition to objective truth, yet a second truth, the subjective?”²⁶ It would be a science, the exclusive task of which is “to comprehend precisely this style, precisely this whole merely subjective and apparently ungraspable ‘Heraclitean flux.’”²⁷ Therefore, its task is to comprehend the domain of *doxa*, which was excluded from the entire domain of the knowable from the beginning of the history of metaphysics.

In the *Crisis*, this science is introduced at first as a postulate, a postulate of “that novel, universal science of the subjectivity which prefigures the world.”²⁸ The fundamental philosophical science of the life-world, then, is nothing other than the carried out, transcendental phenomenology itself with its task of searching for the world-constituting accomplishments of transcendental subjectivity in their “innermost dimension.” Thus, with the inquiry into the life-world, the intention guiding Husserl from the beginning reaches a stage towards its fulfillment at which the problem pertaining to the method of constitutive disclosure can be posed in its most incisive form.

It is by no means sufficient – and this is a self-criticism that refers to the way Husserl introduced the reduction initially – “that we may use no sort of knowledge arising from the sciences as premises, and we may take the sciences into consideration only as historical facts, taking no position of our own as to their truth.”²⁹ This requirement already follows from the bracketing of the presupposition of a true world existing in itself. Objective science and its assertions, then, are not to be taken along with their claim to truth. Rather, only its arising and its presence as a cultural fact that appeared in history along with other cultural facts are to be noted. However, Husserl adds the following to this: “In a certain way, concern with matters of this sort belongs even more constantly to the objective thematic of the historian, who must, after all, reconstruct the changing surrounding life-worlds of the peoples and periods with which he deals The same thing holds if we thematize all periods and peoples and finally the entire spatio-temporal world in the unity of a systematic survey, paying constant attention, of course, to the relativity of the surrounding life-worlds of the respective men, peoples and periods in their mere facticity Each aspect (within a particular surrounding world) is considered individually. Then, at a higher level, each surrounding world, each temporality is considered individually. Each particular intuition yields an ontic validity, whether in the mode of actuality or possibility. The occurrence of the particular intuition always presupposes other intuitions having objective validity – presupposes for us, the observers, the universal basis for the validity of the world.”³⁰ This means that this comparative, universal observing is always founded on the “natural attitude.”

In view of this historically comparative, “cultural-historical” study of the world in its historical change and in its differentiation into the respectively different, historical surrounding worlds, a study based upon the general thesis of the natural attitude, the methodological requirement that we bracket this general thesis acquires new significance. This bracketing not only has the task of showing how consciousness of the world in the mode of horizontal consciousness is always implicit in every consciousness of an entity within the world but, in addition, it must show how this horizon is a *historical* horizon. This means, however, that it must not only suspend the ontic positing implicit in any consciousness of a particular something, e.g., in the perception of a thing, but must also become aware of the fact that every particular ontic positing is a positing within the horizon of the world as a world that has come to be historically. In every positing, the world is implicit not only as the horizon of what is present simultaneously but as the horizon of the past as well. “Because of this constantly flowing horizontal character, then, every validity brought about straight-forwardly (by a genuine act) in natural life within the world always presupposes validities extending back, immediately or meditately, into a necessary subsoil [*Untergrund*] of obscure, though occasionally available, reactivatable validities, all of which, together with genuine acts, makes up a single, indivisible nexus of life.”³¹

Moreover, this discovery of the world as what is implicit as the horizon of the positing of every particular entity shows that the world is not, as it was for Kant, the idea of the totality of all entities which can only be comprehended *subsequent to* one’s running through the multiplicity of entities. The world is not the concept of object arising from reason, a concept to which nothing corresponds in experience. Rather, the world is always given *as a horizon* along with the givenness and experience of particular objects. Kant was not able to see this because he was unaware of the structure of horizontal consciousness, which was one of Husserl’s most important discoveries.

To begin with, therefore, the task of the phenomenological clarification of the “life-world” is to grasp the style of this life within the world. Its systematic unfolding “as life within the world and of our own lives as living within the world leads . . . to its style of historicity. The *de facto* present is a present of a past and has a future before it and, thus, by means of free variation of the *de facto* present we see this is true of every imaginable present.” However, “all possible, historical variants are variants of the world valid for us.”³² The only way we can make sense of the idea of historical variations of our world is by regarding the variations to be “compossible” with the world known to us, with our historical world. Thus, the horizon of our life-world proves to be the horizon of world history, the history of the *one* world which includes all of its modifications by historical surrounding worlds. “World history – its concrete being in the modality of time as the flowing present with its past and future – can be understood as the history of the world valid for us, a validity

originating from me, as the history of our representation of the world in subjective temporality, the temporality in which our representations of the world emerge for us having validity and content.”³³

It becomes apparent here how the development of the problem of the life-world is the result of the further development of ideas which Husserl presented for the first time in his lectures on “first philosophy” (1923). In these lectures, Husserl discussed for the first time the structure of consciousness of the world as an encompassing, horizontal consciousness in its foundational, systematic significance and put forward the methodological requirement that the reduction must not be limited to the bracketing of the existential thesis involved in individual acts. Rather, we must bracket in addition the horizon of the world in its totality, a horizon that is always implicit in every ontic positing. Husserl termed this insight then his most important discovery. It became apparent only with his later work that Husserl discovered history phenomenologically in the following way. *The horizon of the life-world is nothing other than the horizon of world history*: implicit in the horizontal consciousness within the life-world is the horizon of world history. With this, the inquiry into the accomplishments of world-constituting, transcendental subjectivity is assigned its ultimate and most comprehensive task. The constituting accomplishments of transcendental subjectivity must include the *conditions for the possibility of experiencing the life-world as a historical world in its historicity*.

On the other hand, the life-world is obviously always the world of immediate experience, experience in which what is perceived shows itself in its “itselfness,” in the structures of its spatio-temporality, to men who are sensuously perceiving, kinaesthetic subjects; therefore, experience in which the world has already been revealed for man as *nature* prior to all scientific interpretation and objectification. That is, a particular and changing idea of nature is always included in man’s world-horizon. This idea of nature, which is always changing and is not the idea of nature in itself constructed by the objective sciences, is the idea which determines man’s behavior towards and intercourse with things. Nature, as this “nature of the surrounding world,” is not “alien to spirit”³⁴ but, rather, is always “idealized,” is understood on the basis of *eide* – on the basis of an *a priori* that serves to guide prediction, which is always necessary for natural life. As such, “history is presupposed.”³⁵ The *a priori*’s continued validity as the abiding and constant truth in contrast to the flux of the *de facto* realization of the *eide* in particular entities is, therefore, a “naivete,” just as the continued validity of the *a priori* of the modern, objective natural sciences is a naivete, because it absolutizes what is itself something formed by historical conditions and historical traditions. The immediate experience of nature in sensory perception and the historically changing ideas of nature which are formed on the basis of this experience gives rise, therefore to the question concerning those constitutive accomplishments

which make possible precisely this change and alteration and, thus, the history of the change of world-horizons. In other words, the *life-world is nothing other than the concrete, historical world with its traditions and, within these traditions, its changing ideas of nature*. Therefore, the question concerning the constitution of the life-world, understood in its full extent, is nothing other than the question concerning the constitution of the world as the historical world.

Admittedly, the following objection might be raised. The life-world is and remains the world of immediate, sensory experience, the correlate of which is spatio-corporeal nature. With this reduction to nature of the historically changing ideas of nature, in the way each forms a part of each historical, cultural world, is not nature denied as the constant and abiding subsoil of history which remains unaltered amidst the change of the historical worlds? According to the determination that the ideas of nature formed both by ordinary men and by philosophy and science are historically variable in the way that they belong to the horizon of each historical cultural world and are only hypotheses necessary for the prediction required by life, there would no longer be a criterion for their truth value. It would no longer be possible to say, for example, that the ideas of modern science are evidently more correct than those of Aristotle. Husserl would reply that the ideas of modern science are truer insofar as they make possible better prediction as required by existence within the life-world; however, they *are not true in the sense of final validity*. For all concepts of nature are “hypotheses” with the significance of being merely presumptive and, hence, of being surpassable by means of further discoveries; they are *never concepts of the being of nature in itself*. In its surpassability and merely pragmatic significance, modern science is also subject to the law of the “Heraclitean flux.”

In view of such misgivings, it is readily understandable “that, in the history of philosophy, theoretical man as it were plunges into the theme of ‘objective’ knowledge of the world, of truths knowable by reason and valid for everyone, truths which, at least, can be striven for by constant approximation.”³⁶ This possibility is treated as if it were self-evident. However, it poses “one of the most important problems of possibility and involved therein is the question of the justified, rational sense of this problem as such.”³⁷ “The naivete of philosophies which have appeared historically consists in this plunge.” They can certainly show the conditions for the possibility of objective knowledge of nature by means of their epistemology and, by means of this, understand, as Kant would say, what sort of light has dawned upon the natural scientists. However, these philosophies cannot exhibit [*darstellen*] the conditions by means of which this advance of objective science shows itself to be a historical formation and by means of which science understands itself in its historicity. For this to be achieved, “epistemology itself must become a historical inquiry back.” Admittedly, “epistemology has never been seen as a particularly

historical task. But this is precisely what we object to in the past.”³⁸ Philosophy must bear in mind, then, the “total historicity of the correlative manners of being of humanity and of the cultural world.”³⁹

However, does the change of the historical world not engulf everything abiding and fixed? Is not every possibility of truth denied relative to this becoming, which nevertheless as truth should be a universal and universally binding truth, capable of being understood by every rational being?

With this question, the problem posed by the method of the phenomenological science of the *a priori* of the life-world is presented. The question includes all of the difficulties which emerge in connection with this problem of method, and the difficulties place the inquiry on the path towards their solution. At the same time, the question concerning the ultimately grounding, phenomenological science of transcendental subjectivity is implicitly posed in a new way that surpasses Husserl’s earlier understanding of what this science is.

III. THE METHOD FOR ACQUIRING THE *A PRIORI* OF THE LIFE-WORLD, ITS DIFFICULTIES AND THE PATH TOWARD THEIR SOLUTION

The task posed for the phenomenological science of the *a priori* of the life-world has emerged as follows. This science must certainly make use of the intuitively obtained information provided by the empirical, historical science of the forms of human cultural worlds. However, it cannot restrict itself, as does the historian, to describing the *de facto* course and change of history with its succession of always new forms of human culture and to searching descriptively for what is common and different in them. For such a search for common structures would only obtain empirical generalities but not that which, in unconditioned universality, makes history as such and the changes of its forms possible. The *phenomenological science*, therefore, must go beyond the *fluxuating aspect of history*, in which nothing is fixed and abiding and in which all cultural worlds are, as horizons of life, relative to those who live in them. It must do so by means of a reflection on the conditions for the possibility of this relativity laid down by transcendental subjectivity, a relativity within which even objective science with its claim to truth is only a relative, historical formation. For “every history of facts remains incomprehensible because, as always merely drawing its conclusions naively and straight-forwardly from facts, it never makes thematic the universal basis of sense upon which such conclusions rest, has never investigated the immense structural *a priori* which is proper to it” as the “concrete, historical *a priori* which encompasses everything that exists as having become and coming to be or exists in its essential being as tradition and handed down.”⁴⁰

However, how can this historical *a priori* be disclosed methodically? Its disclosure requires that one go beyond the way in which Husserl had earlier investigated the essential correlation between constitutive accomplishments and accomplished, constituted being: “the phenomenology developed at first is merely static; its descriptions are analogous to those of natural history, which concern particular types and, at best, arrange them in their systematic order.”⁴¹ The investigations of this phenomenology remain, then, within the correlation between eidetic forms, the *eide* of the constituted entities and the constituting accomplishments essentially correlative to them. As a result, the entities which this first phenomenology investigates with respect to their essence and their eidetic distinctions are pre-given to phenomenology as mundane entities, as entities appearing within the horizon of the world. By means of such static distinctions pertaining to entities according to their eidetic genus, however, the first phenomenology does not catch sight of the horizon of their appearing, the world, and the accomplishments which constitute this horizon of the world. For “there is a fundamental difference between the way we are conscious of the world and the way we are conscious of things.” We are in principle always conscious of things and objects as objects within the world-horizon. We are conscious of this horizon only as “a horizon for existing objects, and the horizon cannot be actual without particular objects.” Therefore, the world does “not exist as an entity but, rather, exists with a singularity for which a plural makes no sense. Every plural and every particular drawn from a plural presupposes the world-horizon.”⁴² However, if the world-horizon is in fact the horizon of world history as the history of the one world, then *every static determination and conception of the correlation between eide and the corresponding constituting functions presupposes history and its a priori*. Therefore, the question of the method for disclosing this historical *a priori* arises.

What is obviously required for such a reflection that goes beyond static phenomenology is that the reflecting subjectivity itself must go beyond historical change to an *a priori* that makes history possible. However, “does this not apply to all science, no matter how different its particular characteristics may be, and thus, to all truth in the scientific sense, as science’s guiding ideal? Does science not arise from an idealization which is itself in the historical sphere, does it not presuppose the *a priori* of history, which itself arises from an idealization?”⁴³

By this, it is determined that all *a priori*, as the condition for the possibility of science, including the science of historical being, rests on an idealization. The concept of idealization in the passage just cited, (which was taken from a manuscript now included as an appendix to the text of the *Crisis*), has a broader and more fundamental significance than in the original essay on the crisis, where it was used to characterize the method of modern natural science. With this expanded concept of idealization Husserl poses the *fundamental*

problem posed by an a priori of history. In his book, *Lebensphilosophie und Phänomenologie*, (1930),⁴⁴ Georg Misch had criticized Husserl several years prior to the *Crisis* for seeking to bring, in a completely Platonic manner, the flux of history to a halt by means of the idea of flowing. Is it not the case that, on the one hand, the “Heraclitean flux,” this correlation between the historical world-horizon and the subjectivity constituting it and, on the other, the eidetic concept of this flux, which is an “idealization,” are irreconcilably opposed?⁴⁵

It is apparent from the passages quoted that Husserl was not blind to this consideration. In fact, this consideration was developed by him as the very difficulty whose resolution includes the solution to the problem posed by a historical *a priori*, and this is the *a priori* of the life-world as the historical world. This *a priori*, with regard to the empirical science of history, is *not only the total concept of the conditions for the possibility of a pre-scientific experience of history but of the conditions for the possibility of an empirical science of history as well.* For “every historical inquiry and demonstration, in the common sense of historical, presupposes history as the universal horizon of inquiry.”⁴⁶ The question is, then, what makes it possible that our life-world has this horizon of history, that our life-world is the historical world?

How is this difficulty resolved by Husserl and what questions remain open in the sense of not being answered?

It is resolved by means of the inquiry into the “primal evidences” which are acquired and explicated by the reduction to transcendental subjectivity as the ultimate grounding subjectivity. In the reflections on “first philosophy,” Husserl speaks of “absolute experience.” This *a priori* of history is, accordingly, not a realm of ideas located somewhere in a world behind the world, not a realm of “innate” ideas or root concepts of pure reason, demonstrable by means of the Kantian “regressive” analysis. Rather, it is the *domain of the innermost self-experience of reflecting transcendental subjectivity.*

What is the nature of the *a priori* of history which is experienceable in the passage back to these primal evidences? It is the temporal structure of the ultimately constituting subjectivity which constitutes itself as temporal, as a Heraclitean flux. This constitution takes place in the “living present.” Therefore, “what is historically primary in itself is our present. We always already know of our present world and that we live in it, always surrounded by an openly endless horizon of unknown actualities. This knowing, as horizontal certainty, is not something learned, not knowledge which was once actual and has merely sunken back to become part of the background. The horizontal certainty had to be already there in order to be capable of being explicated thematically; it is already presupposed in order that we can seek to know what we do not yet know. Every not-knowing concerns the unknown world, which nevertheless exists in advance for us as the world, as the horizon of every inquiry in the present and, thus, for every specifically historical inquiry as

well. . . . Accordingly, we need not first discuss critically the facts which the historian validates; simply the claim of their factuality is sufficient to show that, if the claim is to have sense, the historical *a priori* is presupposed.”⁴⁷

What, then, is the nature of the primal evidence which transcendental subjectivity, my I with its experience of the world and my experience of the historical horizon of the world, discloses? Primal evidence is not the mere experience of a pure facticity. “The propositions in which it (the world-horizon) is expressed must be fixed and be capable of being made evident again and again. Through what method do we obtain a universal and, hence, a fixed *a priori* of the historical world, an *a priori* that is always the most original? Whenever we consider it, we find ourselves, and so find ourselves evidently, to have the capacity to reflect, to turn to the horizon and penetrate it by explicating it. We also have, and know that we have, the capacity to freely imagine and phantasize our human, historical existence and what is explicated therein as its life-world to be otherwise. And precisely by this free variation and fantasizing it to be otherwise, an essentially universal set of elements stands out with apodictic evidence . . . as the essence always implicit in the flowing, living horizon.”⁴⁸

This means that *the conditions for the possibility of having a world as a historical world are not only the accomplishments of the sensory-perceptual constitution of a natural world, but are also the accomplishments of the temporal self-constitution of transcendental subjectivity*, accomplishments by which each living present is a present with its “comet tail” of the past which is sinking back and with an open horizon of the future. They are, thus, the conditions for the possibility of having a world with its traditions; therefore, of having a historical world. These accomplishments can remain anonymous. Access to the basis for our having this world-horizon can be concealed or blocked. However, this horizon can never be lacking, for without it our world would no longer be a world as the potentially universal human world with its unconditioned possibility for communication.

Therefore, the primal evidence of the self-experience of transcendental subjectivity does not simply include the becoming aware of its own facticity as the Heraclitean flux. In addition, it includes the evidence of the it-could-not-be-otherwise as the condition for the possibility of having a world as a historical world, so that every “establishment of a historical fact that lays claim to unconditioned objectivity likewise presupposes this invariant or absolute *a priori*.”⁴⁹ By means of this insight, we stand, as Husserl says, before the “most profound problem-horizon of reason, the same reason which functions in every man, the *animal rationale*, no matter how primitive he is.” That is, facticity of every type has “a root in the essential structure of what is universally human, through which a teleological reason running throughout all historicity manifests itself.”⁵⁰ This *a priori* of history is to be distinguished from the objective-logical *a priori*, for it is an *a priori* which has itself come to

be historically, an *a priori* derived from the predictions arising from the projects of natural life. The *a priori* of history is the concept of the invariant style⁵¹ of life-world existence. This style is based upon induction. However, statements about this *a priori* are not themselves acquired by induction but, rather, are eidetic statements having unconditioned universality.

To what extent is the flux, which is necessary, understood as a flux and not once again brought to a halt by the idea of flowing? Husserl himself stated that every comprehension of an *a priori* is an idealization. He gives no answer which would weaken this objection. However, there are hints in his discussions as to where the answer to this question would have to begin and hints as to the task which the “ultimate logic” which was demanded by Husserl, the logic of the disclosure of transcendental subjectivity itself as opposed to “world-logic,” must have.

This *a priori* is acquired by a reflection on the ultimately grounding ego and its primal evidences as primal experiences. This I is “indeclinable” and is in fact called “I” by an equivocation, as we learned earlier. This indeclinability is obviously nothing other than what Heidegger termed “mineness” [*Jetmeinigkeit*]. It signifies a *singularity that lies beyond the difference between logical universality*, a universality always acquired by idealization, *and individual particularity which is subsumable under universality*. Therefore, in order to grasp essentially the ego’s constituting functions, the *a priori* of history, and the life-world as the historical world, as the world known immediately and ultimately, the problem of the mediation of the individual particular by the universal is dissolved, a dissolution in which Eley saw the “crisis of the *a priori*.⁵² Hints as to how the crisis of the *a priori* can be overcome are to be sought in Husserl’s remarks regarding the grounding ego. A mediation is superfluous because, in its indeclinability, ultimately grounding subjectivity *is beyond the dialectic of the one and the many*, as is its correlate, the world constituted in subjectivity. This subjectivity, in its singularity, implies in itself the *one* world common to everyone and, thus, to humanity. Thus, subjectivity reveals itself in the reflection on its ultimately constituting accomplishments to be, as it were, the immediacy which mediates itself.

But in what way has subjectivity revealed itself by this? The answer which Husserl gives to this question must be made more precise by a critical examination. Husserl himself indicates that the concepts of the invariant structures in all of the historically changed worlds which can be understood as worlds belonging to our world, concepts which express the *a priori* conditions for the possibility of having a world, are derived from an idealization, as is any *a priori*. This means, however that these concepts form a projection that is not complete but, rather, that must be transcended in its acquisition. The one reason, therefore, cannot be characterized as a totality of what can be comprehended in the world, as the possession of an abiding, available set of

concepts which make this totality possible. It is *intentional reason* which, as intention, is always ahead of itself and transcending itself. The *a priori* is something invariant; however, it is not exhausted when it is comprehended, for if this were the case, it would be brought to a halt. However, since this *a priori* itself is the Heraclitean flux, the *reason* which *comprehends* it, which is the reason of the *de facto*, reflecting subjectivity in its indeclinability, *must transcend itself in its comprehending*.

It seems to me that the resolution of the difficulty in the *a priori* of history is already outlined in Husserl's concept of intentionality and in the idea that history and its teleology begins with a still empty, primal intention,⁵³ an intention from which ensues the intentional reaching out towards a still undetermined, open horizon that is filled in only progressively in the process of becoming. However, this filling, which itself opens up the new horizon of transcendental life, is not the realization of a possibility that already exists "in itself" and that can be established *a priori* – the establishment of which could only be in terms of absolute spirit, as Hegel saw. Rather, it is a possibility primarily as possibility caught sight of and grasped. If the metaphysical relation of the *a priori* to a constant world of ideas, to a divine intellect or to an absolute spirit is set aside by the reduction, then so is the idealized concept of possibilities which exist "in themselves" and become "for themselves" once realized. As a result, the Hegelian problem of the mediation between the unconditioned universality of the *a priori* and its constitution in *de facto* transcendental subjectivity is dissolved. Only the direction of the aim predelineated by the primal intention is fixed, a direction that, however, is open-ended. Phenomenological reason is not one limited by a fixed *a priori* that is to be objectified but, rather, is an *open reason*. Hence, it does not comprehend itself and its ground "theoretically" (by logical idealization or objectification). Rather, its possibility only becomes a possibility by its being taken up in its "purposiveness" [*Willentlichkeit*]; that is, by being appropriated and realized and, hence, in the exercise of its freedom. In the exercise of its freedom, transcendental subjectivity becomes acquainted with that which both grounds and makes possible the style of its life. Its *a priori* possibilities for a teleological unfolding are *not possibilities in themselves* but, rather, possibilities only grasped in "absolute experience." The possibilities are constituted as such by transcendental subjectivity's accomplishment. However, the instance, which affords transcendental subjectivity this style of constituting ability and which cedes its freedom, the ground of its being, is "experienced" only in the exercise of freedom and cannot be comprehended "theoretically" by abstracting from this exercise of freedom. Accordingly, there is a *connection between the theoretical unknowability of freedom (Kant), the theoretical unknowability of its ground and the inability-to-be-objectified, and the inability-to-be-idealized of the innermost life-world a priori*, understood as the style pertaining to the structure of change within the

world-horizon in its undetermined openness, an openness within which constituting subjectivity is at any given time situated *de facto*. Thus the filling of the primal intention of rational subjectivity occurs only in its experience, in the “experiment” which is ventured.

Thus, the root of overcoming the traditional opposition between the *a priori* and the empirical-historical rests in such an understanding of the essence of intentionality. The unconditionally universal structure of the subjectivity which constitutes the life-world, its “purposiveness” (Husserl), would then be intentionality in the sense of “being-already-ahead-of-itself” (transcendence in the sense of Heidegger) and would be unable to grasp itself in this structure in an objectifying reflection. This is the possibility of a resolution of the difficulty posed by an *a priori* of history which arises as a consequence of Husserl’s formulations. However, Husserl obviously did not apprehend it, because his theory of reflection stood in the way. That, however, cannot be discussed here.⁵⁴

TRANSLATOR’S NOTES

^aCf. E. Husserl, *Erste Philosophie (EP)*.

^bThis essay forms the first two parts of the work now entitled *Crisis*. For information regarding the composition of this text, see Carr’s introduction to the English translation, pp. xvi ff.

AUTHOR’S NOTES

1. E. Husserl, *The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology* [References to the English translation will be indicated by an “E,” those to the German text by a “G.” Where a reference only to the German text appears, the particular appendix has not been included in the English translation. Unless otherwise noted, Carr’s translation will be used, though minor changes required by the context in which a passage is quoted will be made.]
2. Ibid., E – p. 351, G – p. 364.
3. Ibid., E – p. 123, G – p. 125.
4. Ibid., E – p. 123, G – p. 126.
5. Ibid., E – p. 142, G – p. 145.
6. Ibid., E – p. 50, G – p. 50.
7. Ibid., E – p. 50, G – p. 51.
8. Ibid., G – p. 441.
9. Ibid., E – p. 51, G – p. 51. [Landgrebe inserted “and mean” following “genuinely see,” which does not appear in the German text. Where Landgrebe’s citation varies from the original text, the latter will be used.]
10. Ibid., G – p. 449.
11. Ibid., E – p. 51, G – p. 51.
12. Ibid., G – p. 466; also E – pp. 130-31, G – p. 134.

13. Ibid., p. 466.
14. Ibid., E – p. 51, G – p. 51.
15. Ibid., E – p. 131, G – p. 133.
16. Ibid., E – p. 124, G – p. 127.
17. Ibid., E – p. 127, G – p. 130.
18. Ibid., E – p. 128, G – p. 130.
19. Ibid., E – p. 128, G – p. 131.
20. Ibid., E – p. 129, G – p. 132.
21. Ibid.
22. Ibid., E – p. 129, G – p. 131.
23. Ibid., G – p. 465.
24. L. Landgrebe, *Phänomenologie und Geschichte* (Gütersloh: G. Mohn, 1967), pp. 169 ff.
25. Husserl, *Crisis*, E – p. 122, G – p. 124.
26. Ibid., E – p. 175, G – p. 179.
27. Ibid., E – p. 156, G – p. 159; also E – p. 177, G – p. 181.
28. Ibid., E – p. 147, G – p. 150.
29. Ibid.
30. Ibid. [Our translation.]
31. Ibid., E – p. 149, G – p. 152.
32. Ibid., G – p. 500.
33. Ibid., G – p. 501.
34. Ibid., E – p. 272, G – p. 317.
35. Ibid. [Landgrebe's reference to the *Crisis*, G – p. 302, is incorrect.]
36. Ibid., G – p. 491.
37. Ibid.
38. Ibid., E – p. 370, G – p. 379.
39. Ibid., E – p. 369, G – p. 378.
40. Ibid., E – p. 371-72, G – p. 380.
41. E. Husserl, *Cartesian Meditations*, E – p. 76, G – p. 110.
42. Husserl, *Crisis*, E – p. 143, G – p. 146. [We have altered Carr's translation to conform with Landgrebe's development of the "singularity" of the world, below.]
43. Ibid., E – pp. 350-51, G – p. 363.
44. G. Misch, *Lebensphilosophie und Phänomenologie* (*Philosophischer Anzeiger*, 3 + 4: Berlin, 1929 + 30).
45. L. Landgrebe, *Phän. und Geschichte*, p. 17.
46. Husserl, *Crisis*, E – p. 373, G – p. 382.
47. Ibid., E – p. 374, G – p. 382.
48. Ibid., E – p. 374, G – p. 383. [Our translation.]
49. Ibid., E – p. 377, G – p. 385.
50. Ibid., E – p. 378, G – p. 386.
51. Ibid., E – p. 181, G – p. 185.
52. L. Eley, *Die Krise des A Priori in der transzendentalen Phänomenologie Edmund Husserls*, *Phaenomenologica*, 10 (The Hague: M. Nijhoff, 1967).
53. Husserl, *Crisis*, G – p. 393.
54. Landgrebe, *Phän. und Geschichte*, pp. 192 ff.

NOTES ON THE FIRST PART OF *EXPERIENCE AND JUDGMENT* BY HUSSERL*

JEAN WAHL

This posthumous book¹ is clearly opposed to what had appeared to be Husserl's theories in *Ideas* and in the *Cartesian Meditations*. From the first, a realist affirmation seems to predominate: ". . . if the striving for knowledge is directed toward the existent, if it is the effort to formulate in a judgement what and how the existent is, then the existent must already have been given beforehand . . . that it can become the object of a judgement."² What Husserl called the discourse of evidence signifies nothing other than, ". . . self-givenness, the way in which an object in its givenness can be characterized relative to consciousness as 'itself-there,' 'there in the flesh' . . . "³ There are, then, for him, evidences which do not lead back to the apodictic evidence of classical logic.

This will, then, lead us to affirm a pre-predicative evidence behind, or rather, beneath predicative evidence.⁴

It is possible to find in this the origin and first formulation of one of Heidegger's ideas, namely that logical truths have their foundation in a more fundamental truth, and that their pretension to validity in itself must be questioned. In their application, they have reference to a world of substrates.⁵

What we have said not only obtains for categorial judgements, but also for what could be called their modalization, for example, judgements of resemblance, judgements which are presented in the mode of *as if*, judgements of phantasy.

At this point, a question may occur to the reader of Husserl, one which Husserl himself formulates. Even if one extends the evidence of experience in the way which is proposed, doesn't the evidence of judgement seem better, doesn't it seem that it is to this that the ideas of knowledge and cognition [*de savoir et de connaissance*] apply in their proper sense? What can the turn from the domain of *epistêmê* toward the domain of *doxa*, that is, of vague

*Translated by Laurence E. Winters from "Notes sur la première partie de *Erfahrung und Urteil* de Husserl," *Revue de métaphysique et de morale*, 56, no. 1 (1951), pp. 6-34.

experience, and, as it is said, of deceptive appearance, mean? Isn't the predicative judgement the core of cognition, of authentic evidence, and doesn't this pre- or ante-predicative evidence have inferior value? What could be the significance of a theory of the origin of judgement which draws its evidence from a dimension which is of evidently lesser value? How can the better be explained through a turn to that which is less than it?⁶

Nevertheless, it is necessary to maintain that intellectual apprehension is always preceded by affection which, moreover, is never the fact that an isolated object affects us.⁷ We note here an apparent divergence from what Husserl just said, and what he says four pages before when he asserted that the substrate of judgement could only be an individual object, and maintained a nominalist theory, according to which even the most primordial generality always refers to an act by which a plurality of individuals is assembled.⁸ But here, going beyond the sphere of judgement, he tells us that, unlike judgement, which, in the end, is always applied to individuals, affection always stands out from an environment which is the domain of the pre-given, that is to say, from what is already there as the passively pre-given, without the assistance of the apprehending gaze, and without the awakening of an interest. This domain of the passively pre-given is presupposed by all cognitive activity; and we see, thus, that the passive *doxa* is prior to *epistēmē*, and gives to us, pre-gives to us, the object in a unity of passive *doxa*.⁹

We are able to go from there to the idea of "world" which is the ground on which all cognitive activity develops, and which, from the first, signifies, Husserl tells us, "... a ground of universal passive belief in being which is presupposed by every particular cognitive operation." "The being of the world in totality is that which is not first the result of an activity of judgement but which forms the presupposition of all judgement. Consciousness of the world is consciousness in the mode of certainty of belief."¹⁰ "The world as the existent world is the universal passive pre-givenness of all judicative activity, of all engagement of theoretical interest."¹¹ Thus Husserl, who in the *Ideas* and in the *Cartesian Meditations* brought to light, quite particularly, the activity of the mind, and who, in a general way, had proposed to place the world within brackets, here, to the contrary, sees being in the world as a fundamental trait of the human intelligence.

It is true that, according to certain passages, it could be thought that if it is thus, it is because cognition had already begun to do its work; that is, he tells us, the reason why we appear always to know more than what reaches our cognition. Thus, we have a sort of pre-cognition of the thing. It is an indeterminate, or imperfectly determined, pre-cognition, but is never completely empty. But we must see that this cognition has already taken place within the world.¹²

We must, as well, take account of the fact that everything which has been said holds not only for the world of pure and simple sense experience, for

nature pure and simple, but also, meditately, for everything that is "mundane," that is, for men and animals as subjects of the world, for cultural goods, for tools and everything which we utilize, for works of art, etc. For everything which has its place, meditately or immediately, in the spatio-temporal sphere: "Everything is here or there, and its place is determinable," similarly, time, by physical instruments. It is thus that everything non-sensuous participates in the sensuous, and is an existent which stands out from the world, "existing in the one spatio-temporal horizon."¹³

Everything which has been said points to a primordial apprehension which is ultimate and originary.¹⁴ If we now consider what conclusions may be drawn from this concerning judgement, we will see that what has been said of the foundation of predicative evidences in ante-predicative evidence, holds generally for the genealogy of logic; the evidences of the logician himself have their sensuous foundation.¹⁵

But let us precisely return to this idea of a turn to a world which is the universal ground of all particular experiences, and which is the world of immediate experience, prior to all logical performance. Thus, what must be brought about, is the return to the "life world" (*le monde vital*). That is, to the world in which we always and already live, and which will be the foundation of all accomplishments of cognition and of all scientific determinations. The experience will be an experience of the world.¹⁶

But, in fact, it will be very difficult to rejoin this fundamental world. For it has been, in a way, decreed by our understanding that the space and time of our ordinary world are identical with the space and time that the mathematico-physical science of nature takes as its task to determine.¹⁷ That is to say, that the world of our experience is interpreted with the assistance of an "idealization" which we do not see as already an accomplishment of our cognitive methods, which are, in their turn, founded on the pre-givens of our immediate experience. But this immediate cognition does not know any exactly determined space, time, or objective causality.¹⁸ We have taken as constitutive of reality, as actual being, what is nothing but a method.¹⁹

And yet we now see that the domain of *doxa* is not one of less dignity than that of *epistēmē*, but it is the domain of ultimate primordiality, and that exact cognition is only a method.²⁰

Let us add once again that this primordial domain is not only the foundation of the theoretical, and is itself not only theoretical, but also contains the experiences of action and of sentiment, experiences in the mode of willing, of valuation, and of practical action, which also have their horizons of familiarity.²¹ These diverse modes are more essential to primordial experience than the mode of cognition and judgement, and the idea of primordial experience applies even more to them.²²

To go toward the ultimate and originary evidences of pre-predicative experiences, we must turn from founded experiences toward pure and simple

experiences.²³ We will, thus, go toward the purely affective pre-given of the passive “belief in being,” toward sensations as they happen to us, without elaboration and even without attention on our part.²⁴ Here, already, we will apprehend “unities of identity” which are pre-given, and passively pre-constituted; which do not, in themselves, contain any predication, and which will later be apprehended by virtue of predication, as explicit, identical unities.²⁵

A question still remains, namely, to what extent is there passive pre-givenness, and to what extent is there pre-constitution of objects? Up to this point, Husserl says, all passive consciousness is always and already constitution of objects, or, more exactly, pre-constitution. Without doubt, it is only the activity of objectification, the activity of consciousness which is not pure passive *doxa*, which creates the objects of consciousness and of judgement. But it seems correct that within the passive *doxa*, one may uncover what could be called an activity of pre-cognition.²⁶

Now, if we take account of the fact that this *doxa* is also practical and evaluative, grasping things as amusing, useful, etc. . . prior to arriving at pure theoretical interest, we see that the I, living concretely within its environing world (*Umwelt*), given over to its practical goals, is by no means ultimately a contemplative, or attentive I. For the I, in its concrete life world, the consideration of the existent is an attitude which it is able to take up occasionally and provisionally, while not giving it a special privilege.²⁷

We have said that perception as such presupposes that something is always and already pre-given to us, and towards which, in perception, we must direct ourselves. Let us add that what is pre-given is not only isolated, particular objects, but there is always a field of pre-givenness in which the particular stands out.²⁸ It is this field which we must take up through an admittedly abstractive process.²⁹

Husserl proceeds here to a phenomenological analysis of attention, as an inclination toward an intentional horizon, a tendency which always moves in advance toward ulterior determinations,³⁰ toward a “plus ultra,” continuously, without end.³¹ There is a continual enrichment of the given, a tendency to view it in all its aspects;³² but it is urgent here to note two points; first, that the beginning of the act is the consciousness of being next to the object itself; perception is the consciousness of the grasping of the object in its corporeal presence, so to speak.³³ In the second place, the object remains the same, and the successive appearances are the appearances of the same object. It is a question of bringing the object, with all of its sides, to givenness.³⁴ We know, in fact, that the side of an object which we see is only a side in so far as there are sides which are not seen.³⁵ Perception directs itself toward an identical object which is presented in all its appearances.³⁶

The act of attention is accompanied by kinesthetic acts which are activities, although not voluntary ones.³⁷ We must distinguish here, in a general way,

actions which are not actions of an ego, which are prior to the act in which attention is turned (toward the object), and other actions which are actions of the ego, without, however, being voluntary. It is thus that I involuntarily direct my eyes while I turn myself attentively toward the object.³⁸

The object is thus given to me in what Husserl calls a "duration at rest," and the expression which he adds, "or changing," perhaps would have to be suppressed, since what he wishes to bring to light here is the identity of the object.

He now analyzes more closely what he calls interest, a word which he translates at one point with "*Dabeisein*," being by [*auprès de*].³⁹ The interest which is in question here, is not that which gives birth to goals, and to voluntary actions; it is only a moment of the effort which belongs to the essence of normal perception.⁴⁰ Husserl attaches such importance to the study of this interest because he sees in it the effort which, once it attains the form of an authentic will, will become the will to knowledge.⁴¹

What he is now going to try to have us apprehend is the origin, within the pre-predicative sphere, of negation, and of the different modalities of judgement. "It thus appears that negation is not first the business of the act of predicative judgement but that in its original form it already appears in the pre-predicative sphere of receptive experience."⁴² It is in the process of disappointment, of deception, that he uncovers the primary form of negation. We may add that, since negation is primarily deception, it implies something which is prior to it. "In its originality, negation presupposes normal, ordinary object-constitution, which we designate as normal perception, the normal, unobstructed execution of perceptual interest. It must be present in order to be able to be modified in its originality. Negation is a modification of consciousness which manifests itself as such in accordance with its own essence. It is always a partial cancellation on the basis of a certitude of belief which is thereby maintained, ultimately on the basis of the universal belief in the world."⁴³ Thus situation is first.

Just as for negation, Husserl seeks within the ante-predicative sphere for the presence of the consciousness of doubt, and of the consciousness of possibility. These are phenomena, in the sense that phenomenology takes this word, which are present, like negation, within this sphere, and, originally, have their home there.⁴⁴ It is in hesitation that he finds their origin, as he found the origin of negation in deception.

The question arises as to what comes before negation, and before possibility. For, in a certain way, the "yes," although it gives us the assurance of belief and of being, is, like the "no," a modification of the originary mode which is totally primordial, totally "un-modified." The originary mode is the most pure and simple certitude.⁴⁵ We must begin from there, and the theory of the modalities of judgement remains suspended in air when it is developed simply in relation to predicative judgement, as is the case in traditional logic,

and when the origins of the phenomena of modalization are not sought within the ante-predicative sphere. We reach the conclusion that the primordial form is the most pure and simple certainty of belief, and that all other phenomena: negation, consciousness of possibility, recovery of certainty through affirmation or negation, can only occur through a modalization of this primordial form.⁴⁶

Now let us study pure and simple apprehension, perception as immanent temporal unity. A first point which must be taken into account, and which, until now, has not been made evident, is the presence of our body. If we hear a musical tone, it is apprehended as sonorous within a proximity or at a spatial distance, as spatially localized: these determinations are related to a spatial zero point which is our body, in relation to which everything here, and everything over there is oriented.⁴⁷

In this first way, we see the tone as a unity of passively pre-given duration [*durée*].⁴⁸

There is an unity of the tone to which we orient ourselves. ". . . we are not turned toward the momentary and yet continuously changing present (the phase sounding now) but through and beyond this present, in its change, toward the sound as a unity by which its essence presents itself in this change, in this flux of appearances. When we examine this more closely we see that the activity of apprehension is directed toward the sound which is presently vivid in such a way that it is apprehended as a sound which continuously endures as present. . . ."⁴⁹

It would be interesting to compare Husserlian duration and Bergsonian "*durée*." There is in both the same continuity, but the "now" has a greater role in the first: ". . . the primary ray of apprehension of the ego traverses the central moment of the original now (toward the moment of the sound appearing in this form); and that is to say that it goes toward the now in its continuous transitional flux. . . ."⁵⁰ Each moment becomes a past moment, then a past moment for the past moment. There is, he says, a flowing unity of activity. The same holds true for protention as for retention, for memory as for expectation. Thus, Husserlian duration seems to be more articulated than the Bergsonian "*durée*".⁵¹ There is a series of individual apprehensions, of discontinuous steps which form the polythetic unity by means of which theses are unified.⁵²

We proceed from this activity to an underlying passivity. In fact, Husserl says, the activity of the apprehension of the tone has a complicated architecture in virtue of, and on the foundation of the lawfulness of the living duration, prior to all activity, and residing within a natural passivity. He concludes from this that there is not only a passivity prior to activity, the passivity of the pre-constituting temporal current, but also a passivity which lingers above the first, which explicates and thematizes the objects, which belongs to the act not only as substructure, but as act, and which could be

called a passivity within activity. In this way, he adds, we can see that the separation between activity and passivity is not a fixed separation, that it is not a question, here, of terms which could be defined once and for all, but only of means of description and distinction, the sense of which, in each particular case, must be seen in the light of the concrete situation of the analysis; something which holds for all descriptions of intentional phenomena.

It is by virtue of this passive-active apprehension that we are able, in a pure and simple perception, to grasp an enduring object, that is, what was, is, and will be.⁵³

We now must reintroduce the idea of a horizon of familiarity, by virtue of which we understand not something completely new, in the continuation of our perceiving activity, but approximation and a correction of anticipations.⁵⁴ We always orient ourselves toward an object. "This process is a developing contemplation, a unity of articulated contemplation. Through the entire process the S retains the character of theme; and while, step by step, we gain possession of the moments, the parts, one after another – and each one of them is precisely a moment or part, i.e., what is generally called a property or determination – each is nothing in itself but something of the object S, coming from it and in it. In the apprehension of the properties we come to know it, and we come to know the properties only as belonging to it."⁵⁵ "In the development, the indeterminate theme S turns into the substrate of the properties which emerge, and they themselves are constituted in it as its determinations."⁵⁶ We have here, thus, what could be called a sort of empirical deduction of the difference between substance and properties. Husserl expresses this well: "With this, we are at the place of origin of the first of the so-called 'logical categories.' It is true, we can only begin to speak of logical categories in the proper sense in the sphere of predicative judgement, as elements of determination which belong necessarily to the form of possible predicative judgements. But all categories and categorial forms which appear there are erected on the pre-predicative syntheses and have their origin in them."⁵⁷

When Husserl comes to the study of the perception of pluralities, he will insist, similarly, on the role of passivity. Combination (*Verbindung*) does not come from activity, but has its source in passivity.⁵⁸

From these diverse analyses, perception of unities, perception of pluralities of unities, he turns to the idea of familiarity and pre-cognizance.⁵⁹ But it is appropriate to add that, according to him, each new act of explication lays down what he calls a knowledge [*un savoir*], a habitual knowledge.⁶⁰

On the other hand, nothing is closed definitively. "Clarity, although it is always the fulfilling, the showing-itself, of what was previously prescribed in an empty way, meant in advance, is never a pure and simple giving of something itself, as if the prescription were able to proceed to the point that

the sense prescribed was already meant in advance in an absolute determination and only passed over into the intuitive clarity of the ‘in itself.’ Even where the object is ‘completely familiar,’ this completeness does not correspond to its idea. What is meant in advance in an empty way has its ‘vague generality,’ its open indeterminateness, which is fulfilled only in the form of a more precise determination.⁶¹ And, in so far as nothing is definitively closed, nothing has an absolutely precise outline. Merleau-Ponty will take up this tendency of the phenomenology of the later Husserl, when he rehabilitates the idea of indeterminateness in his study of perception.⁶²

Throughout this part of the book, Husserl qualifies the idea of the necessary intentionality of judgement, adding that it is a founded intentionality, founded, that is, on a sphere prior to judgement.⁶³

After having demonstrated the genesis of the distinction between substrate and determinations, Husserl shows that this distinction is, from the start, relative. “Everything that affects and is objective can just as well play the role of substrate as that of object-determination of explicate. And just as we can, continuously and at ever higher levels, make explicates independent and thus make them into substrates, ‘substratize’ them, in the same way we can also colligate every object, every autonomous substrate, with other objects, and then make the collection as a whole into a theme, enter into its members by explication, in this way exhibiting the whole by determining it, so that each of the formerly independent object-substrates henceforth acquires the character of explicate; or it can from the first be a collection, consisting of substrates independent in themselves, affecting us as a whole in the same way as an individual object.”⁶⁴

But, having stressed the relativity of the distinction, we can see that beneath the relative distinction there is an absolute one. “With this, we come finally and necessarily to substrates which do not arise from substratification. In this context, they merit the name of absolute substrate.”⁶⁵ An absolute substrate is designated by the fact that it is purely and simply recognizable, immediately apprehensible, and that its explication may immediately be brought to bear.⁶⁶

Among such purely and simply apprehensible substrates, Husserl tells us, there are, above all, the individual objects of external sensuous perception, that is, bodies. This is one of the decisive priorities of external perception, as it pre-gives the most originary substrates of experiential activities, which are later explicated by predication.⁶⁷ Thus, after establishing the relative character of the distinction, we come to see that beyond it there is an absolute distinction, since there are absolute substrates. These absolute substrates are bodies, and we may see here a phenomenological justification for empiricism.

What has been said holds as well for a multiplicity of bodies, as a spatio-temporal configuration, or as a causal totality. There is, again, something purely and simply experienceable in the specific sense which we have

described. For example, in the case of a machine, the pure and simple apprehension, by virtue of the intention which would perceive it, leads toward the determination of this multiplicity in its essential characteristics.⁶⁸

Within this empirical domain (*Erfahrungssphäre*) which Husserl attempts to define and describe, there is no infinite divisibility. "In actual experience there is no division in infinitum, and, above all there is no experienceable plurality which, in the process of experience (for example, in drawing nearer), is resolved into ever new pluralities in infinitum."⁶⁹

To return to the distinction about which we were speaking, there is, then, within the sphere of experience, a fundamental distinction between absolute substrates, which are the purely and simply experienceable, individual objects, and absolute determinations. ". . . Everything capable of being experienced is characterized either as something for and in itself or as something which is only in another, in an existent for itself. Otherwise expressed: absolute substrates are those whose being is not that of mere determinations, those to which, therefore, the form of determination is non-essential, consequently, whose being-sense does not lie exclusively in this, that in its being another being 'is such.'"⁷⁰ Absolute determinations are those which have the precisely contrary character. Absolute substrates are independent, absolute determinations are dependent.

Now, each body is a body within a unique whole, which is ultimately that of the world, and consequently, we are able to direct ourselves toward the totality of the world as toward a theme of experience.⁷¹ As Kant had seen, and whose teachings inspired Husserl here, though he does not mention him by name, the world is not experienced in the manner of a substrate, in pure and simple experience; the experience of nature as a totality is founded in prior individual experiences. But the world also is "experienced"; we are able, also, to direct ourselves to the world. Thus all substrates are bound together; and when we move about within the world as universe, no substrate is without real relation to others, to all the others, meditately or immediately.⁷² We are, thus, able to affirm that the world, from this point of view, is an absolute substrate, that is, everything is in it, but that it is not something which could be in anything else, it is not a relative unity within a larger multiplicity. It is the all-existent, not within something, but "everything whatsoever." We may conclude from this that, ". . . everything mundane, whether a real unity or a real plurality, is ultimately dependent; only the world is independent, only it is absolute substrate in the strict sense of absolute independence. . . ."⁷³

But this world is not an originary substrate in the sense that it would be able to become the simple theme of an apprehension of the first order (we translate the word *schlicht* by "of the first order"; Husserl opposed to this the word *fundiert* – founded – which we generally translate by: "of the second order"). We can say, thus, that the phenomenology of Husserl is distinguished from classical philosophy, of Descartes or Kant, for, after trying to place the world

within brackets, it is reintroduced in a central position, whereas Descartes had it intervene only after having demonstrated the existence of God, and whereas Kant put into question the very idea of world. But, we must add that for Husserl, as for Kant, the idea of the world as totality, cannot be grasped in an apprehension of the first order.⁷⁴

Everything that we have seen so far was considered from the point of view of the analysis of the receptivity of external perception. It is from the point of view of this analysis that Husserl concluded that there is, ultimately, nothing grasped by an apprehension of the first order other than spatio-temporal, corporeal, individual things.⁷⁵

In the following, it is a matter, for him, of distinguishing what he calls parts and moments, emphasizing the idea that the whole is always more than the sum of its parts.⁷⁶

Having studied the general structures of receptivity, and then, apprehension of the first order, Husserl moves on to the study of the apprehension of relations, and of the foundation of this apprehension within passivity. He leads us to see that if we wish to study what he calls the field of experience, we must take into account the entry of the gaze into the external horizon of the object, by virtue of which the environment of the object is thought. Henceforth, it is no longer a question of a thought which goes toward the interior, and only explicates the given, but, rather, of a thought which moves to the exterior, and forms relations.⁷⁷

This horizon is constituted by a multiplicity of substrates, but this multiplicity itself is a multiple unity (*Vieleinigkeit*) of affection, constituted according to the laws which govern the field of passivity.⁷⁸

When we direct our gaze to an object, there is always present, in the background, its environment, which affects us at the same time, but less strongly, not reaching the I, and not constraining it to turn its attention toward it.⁷⁹

Moreover, we must take into account what Husserl calls the horizon of typical pre-cognition, in which each object is pre-given. "This typical familiarity co-determines the external horizon as that which always contributes, even though it is not co-present, to the determination of every object of experience. It has its ground in the passive associative relations of likeness and similarity (*Gleichheit, Ähnlichkeit*), in the 'obscure' recollections of the similar."⁸⁰ Now these relations, instead of remaining hidden as was the case in the example studied in the preceding chapter, can themselves be thematized. There may be activity which will place in relation the object given in perception with that which is given in memory. We come to a domain which is intermediary between the passive and active domains, which could be called the domain of active pre-constitution.⁸¹

In conformity with what has been previously said, we find here, before all movement to predication, a difference between a passing interest, and the

more stable interest of a tendency to view the object within its situation and in its measure by reference to other objects.⁸²

We will now consider what relational contemplation is, and in what manner it assembles individuals into a collectivity. Husserl leaves aside the question whether it is passively founded, or if it is founded in an activity of the ego, and is only later founded in passivity. What he maintains is that the act of assembling objects, the act of adjoining objects to an object which serves as a starting place, is no longer relational contemplation, and is able, at best, to create the necessary presuppositions for it to arise. “Directly apprehending a plurality of objects by running through them successively only involves taking more and more objects together while those previously apprehended still remain in grasp, as when, for example, I successively run through the objects on the table: inkwell, book, pipe, penholder, etc., by letting my glance ‘slide over them.’ Without my actively taking these objects together in a specific act to form a set or number of objects, the preceding object still remains in grasp with each new apprehension, the consciousness of a plurality of objects run through is realized – but, for all that, nothing is apprehended of a relation which the one object may have to the others.”⁸³

It is when interest intervenes that we come to apprehend the relation, and that we apprehend that the penholder is on the table; but without predicative form this remains momentary. Starting with the unity of the set in a consciousness, we come to apprehend the “to the side of,” the “on the top of,” as differences of thickness.⁸⁴

It is within this sphere of the pre-predicative that we will find the *fundamentum relationis*.⁸⁵

The unity about which we have spoken need not be thematic for relational contemplation to be engaged. Rather, we should say that it acts in a purely passive way, as a *mutually* affecting of all the objects which are pre-given in a consciousness, and makes possible, thus, the synthetic transition from the one to the other. To comprehend relational contemplation, we do not need to suppose that there was, from the outset, a gaze which attends the unity, and that the unity is, from the start, actively grasped. “. . . the relational determinations certainly appear as determinations of the substrates: it is the substrate which manifests itself as greater or smaller, etc.; but these determinations do not appear as attached to, or in, the unity between the two members of the relation, as would have to be the case if relational contemplation were an explication of the unity.”⁸⁶

According to Husserl, we must rather say that the determinations of relations are made on the foundations of a pre-given unity which is, itself, not thematic; what is thematic is the object considered in this relative way. We grasp relative properties as attached to the object.⁸⁷ Here it is possible to bring together phenomenology and the philosophies of Bradley and James, in their stress on a unity prior to judgement.

It is always this unity which Husserl studies in the following paragraphs. He says that it is possible to have a unity of the “given in person” in perception. The unity is one of pre-given objects which simultaneously affect us. It is an unity of the simultaneity of the affective, which dwells, as originally pre-given, within a field of perception, affecting as one, with stimuli flowing from this toward the ego. “This unity of the field, on the basis of which any orientation of apprehension toward individual objectivities affecting us, as well as their explication and reciprocal putting-in-relation, is first possible, has been, up to this point, simply presupposed; and it has only been mentioned that these are achievements of the passive synthesis of time consciousness. . . .”⁸⁸ There is, then, a temporal structure of the passive field itself which is prior to all acts, and which constitutes the passive unity of the pre-givenness of the multiplicity of perceived things. We have thus come to see the passive temporal foundation of everything which has been said.

We may conclude from this that a multiplicity, a simple co-existence of pre-given, individual objects, is unified, bound together, not as a categorial unity produced in creative spontaneity, but as a unity of the same kind as that of an isolated individual. “Certainly, it is not itself an individual, but it has the basic phenomenological property of all simply given objectivities: namely, that it must be given originally and as a sensuous unity and that, for it, all active apprehension requires a unitary pre-givenness of sensuousness. To be sure, what has already been preconstituted in passivity first becomes a theme only through active apprehension. Accordingly, the temporal form is not only a form of individuals, but it also has, further, the function of uniting individuals in a unity of connection.”⁸⁹ It is the unity which lies at the foundation of the previously examined relations of juxtaposition, and, in a general way, of relations of spatial situation. “The unity of the perception of a plurality of individuals is thus a unity on the basis of a connecting temporal form.”⁹⁰

In a most precise manner, the time by which they are bound is not the subjective time of perceptions, but objective time, not only because the perceptions are simultaneous in an immanent way, and belong to a unique perception of multiplicity which includes them, but also because the objects which are signified by them as objective, are signified as enduring in an objectively simultaneous way.⁹¹

We thus come to the idea of a unity of an objective whole.⁹²

But, in this way, we are led to go beyond the domain of the ever different individual, to which, from the start, our investigation was limited. Until this point, objects were thought as objects for me, as objects in a world which was only for me. But the consideration of objective time, which has now become inevitable if we are to fully comprehend the oppositions between perception and memory, on the one hand, and fantasy on the other, and the resultant differences, leads us to transcend the limits of this “being-only-for-me.” Objective time, objective being, and all the determinations of the existent as

objective, affirm a being which is not only for me, but also for others.⁹³ We are thus led to assert, beyond individual consciousness, and objective time, our being with others.

Beginning with this, we are able to study the separation of what is perceived and what is in memory, on the one hand, and, on the other, their union. First, let us consider their separation. Husserl says that it is asserted with good cause. If I live in memory, I have an unity of the intuition of the memory. What is remembered is there before all comparison, before all separation, before all relation, and is something sensuous, intuited in its flowing parts in an unique way, as closed in itself, as long as I live in the intuition of a continuous memory, as long as I do not jump from memory to memory. Thus, as in perception, there is a unity, the event which I perceived is intuited also in memory, in a unitary manner, although there would be, each time, only an extension of determinate time, intuited in its own way. There is, thus, the same principle of closure which was discovered in perception, operative in memory. It is dependent on the unity of temporal duration. It is an unity not only for thematization, but also for the impression within which the unity of the objectivity, multiple though it may be, is sensuously and passively pre-given. It is an image constituted in an originary way. This image, whether an image of perception, or of memory, is always for itself, and it is only the intentional horizons which give it a relation to objectivity, to the objective world of which it is a part.⁹⁴

Upon the foundation of these horizon intentions may occur what we could call a continuous running through in memory, moving from the past to the originary present, going from memory to memory.⁹⁵

These unities of remembrance are separated from each other, and what is presented in them as sensuous unities, as objects, as relations, is always separate, and separate from what is presented in perception. If we compare memory and perception, we cannot say that the object of the one would be within the same spatial world as the object of the other, because they are no longer in the same time.⁹⁶

Nevertheless, after having seen the differences, we must view the unity between the worlds of memory and of perception, for that which I remember exists in the same world as what I am looking at now. What I remember belongs to the same objective world as that which is given in my present perception. Even the world of the others, the world which they remember, and about which they give accounts, may be, without doubt, a different world than that in which we presently find ourselves; yet all these worlds of memory are pieces of a unique and identical, objective world.⁹⁷

Now this world, which is, in the most comprehensive sense, the life-world (*Lebenswelt*) for a humanity which is in possible communal understanding, is our earth, which encloses within itself all these environing worlds, with their

metamorphoses, and their pasts, since we have no knowledge of other stars which might be worlds for men who might live on them. Husserl remarks, moreover, that even if the objective world is identified with the *Lebenswelt* of humankind, as a comprehensive unity of possible understanding, one could, nevertheless, leave aside for the moment the problem of knowing how the world, as *Lebenswelt* of humanity, is connected to the objective world in the strong sense, that is, to the world in the sense of the physico-natural determination of nature.⁹⁸

Husserl then attempts to determine the temporal foundation of the connection of representations. Here again, it is within the sphere of passivity that he believes that he must seek this foundation.⁹⁹

On the other hand, he stresses the necessity of the constitution, or, rather, the self-constitution of an objective time which is formed amidst all the subjective times.¹⁰⁰ He distinguishes the objects of imagination from the objects of perception because the former lack an absolute temporal position.¹⁰¹ It is upon the foundation of absolute temporal position that individuation, and the identity of the individual are possible.¹⁰²

We must again return to the sphere of passivity in order to explicate the union of perceptions and of memories, through the fact of association;¹⁰³ the similar recalls the similar. There is a partial, reciprocal connection within this sphere of passivity, and of the receptivity which is founded on it. Again, this is not a connection in the logical sense, in the sense of a spontaneous and creative consciousness, within which such a relation is constituted.¹⁰⁴

This is the same sort of consideration that is carried on when he comments that, between similars, there is already, passively constituted, a sensuous unity, a unity within the subconscious, which binds the different situations of actual intuitions, submerged in forgetfulness. Thus, through all the situations, and in accordance with all the likenesses and similarities, there are constant connections, and, ". . . the 'awakening,' the calling to mind of the earlier, is only the vivifying of something which previously was already there."¹⁰⁵ Thus, "All these occurrences of associative awakening and linkage take place in the domain of passivity without any participation by the ego. The awakening radiates from what is presently perceived; the memories 'rise up,' whether we will or no."¹⁰⁶

There are, to be sure, cases where the I is able itself to perform the effort of remembering. Then, only fragments are present at first, which are not yet ordered with respect to earlier and later. Certain intermediary fragments could be missing, and it is only piece by piece that the ego will be able to revivify the memory, making present the intermediary fragments, until the entire process is before it. But this active memory is, itself, possible only on the foundation of associative awakening. Such awakening is always an event which is introduced passively: "The activity of the ego can provide only the

conditions for this. . . ."¹⁰⁷ A comparison might be made between such passages, and what Marcel Proust taught us about the functionally lived-experience of memory.

To complete the study of ante-predicative experience, it is appropriate again, to study the relations of connection, the relations of reality or of fact, those that rest on a real bond, and, ultimately, on what is presented here and now. The unity which founds them is the unity of the actual connection in a time in which the bound representations have their absolute place. The liaison here is not founded in a repeatable essence, but in a time which is produced only once. It is the individual of becoming which founds, here, the relation.¹⁰⁸

This holds as well for the order of spatial situation, which is, moreover, founded within the temporal order of individual objects. Space is the order of simultaneous individual things given sensibly, of material things. The individualizing moments, (and Husserl comments here that it is the here and now which individualizes, in the temporal form of the "at the same time") are able to found a nexus.¹⁰⁹

Certainly, when in place of isolated objects, I have the space which embraces them, and it is intuitively represented to me, I have a *more*; but I have full individuation only if I return to my here and now. It is only when I appeal to the here and now that I obtain (in spite of the lack of logical determination) the determinability necessary for individual intuition.¹¹⁰

We must, moreover, always come back to the distinction between the passively founded unity of two objects, and what is apprehended in the receptivity which is founded on it, apprehended as likeness and similarity, and, to a still higher degree, what is constituted in spontaneous production, as a relation of resemblance properly speaking.¹¹¹

Comparison always, originally, presupposes an identity, or a sensible resemblance, ". . . something operative in sensibility prior to any apprehending of particulars and bringing them into relation."¹¹² It is in returning to what is sensuously given that we are able to understand the birth of excitation, it is this sensuous given which awakens interest at its lowest level.¹¹³

We must, moreover, indicate those perceptions which are still more elementary than those to which we have paid attention until now, and which Husserl calls absolute impressions. They occur on the basis of the members of a relation which remains in the background. It is thus that we have absolute impressions of height, or of weight, which cannot be decomposed, and are given from the very first.¹¹⁴

In this first part, thus, Husserl ceaselessly invites us to seek the foundation of not ordinary perception, but of judgement, and of predication, in this passive, ante-predicative sphere. It is one of the merits of this book to cast light on that which is naturally hidden.

We are able to see in *Experience and Judgment*, more than in any other work of Husserl, the way in which the philosophy of Heidegger is connected to Husserlian phenomenology.¹¹⁵ This is the case not only with regard to the point which we have particularly brought to light, being in the world, but also in some other elements, such as the denial of self-evident truths, and the theory of truth. If what Husserl said is true, and if not only judgements of experience, but all possible evident predicative judgement, and even the judgements of the logician, with their apodictic evidence, are, in the final analysis, founded on experience, then there is no truth in itself which soars freely. Without doubt, in Heidegger, the denial of such truths in themselves would come, rather, from the affirmation of their bond with *Dasein*, while, in Husserl, it comes from their relation to experience. It is no less true that the Husserlian rejection prepares the way for Heidegger's.¹¹⁶

On the other hand, the idea that the real presents itself, shows itself as it is,¹¹⁷ seems to be the origin of the Heideggerian idea of truth, which is, moreover, explicitly derived from phenomenology. ". . . it is really only on the higher level that the confirmation of the existent, of its how and what, which constitutes the objectifying function of the judgement, becomes a confirmation to which we can return again and again and, as such, a permanent possession of knowledge. This is the level of the act of predicative judgement, the sedimentation of which is found in the declarative statement."¹¹⁸ The truth is, thus, essentially, ". . . the disclosure of determinations . . ."¹¹⁹ within the domains of actions, and of theory.

To mention a third point: what we are given in perception is not presented only as a detached given, but as belonging to types of being, as a thing, as Human; this is, no doubt, one of the origins, in Heidegger, of the idea of different types of being, and of regional ontologies.¹²⁰

It is possible to find another starting point for a comparison between Heidegger and Husserl in their conception of form as non-*a priori*. ". . .form" designates here the character which necessarily precedes all others in the possibility of an intuitive unity."^{121,a}

Further, this form, the most universal, the form of forms, is for Husserl, as for Heidegger, time.¹²²

We have already seen a sixth similarity between the two philosophers. This is their conception of the pre-predicative, to which both give so much importance.

Finally, the role that the others, the world, and, in a sense, objectivity, play in their theories is similar. We will give only one example. "These cases will compel us to go a little beyond the domain of what is proper to oneself alone. . . . objective time, objective being, and all determinations of existents as objective certainly designate a being not only for me but also for others."¹²³

Many questions come to mind in the exposition of these ideas of Husserl.

When he speaks of the goal of judgement as being something a-temporal,¹²⁴ doesn't this idea of a-temporality lead us beyond the phenomenological sphere, where he appears to wish that we remain?

Doesn't the idea of the affirmation of the unity of the world as totality of what can be validated in experience, which contains not only experiences of fact, but also possible experiences of phantasy, also seem to go beyond the frame of phenomenology?¹²⁵ There are two ideas here, that of totality, and that of possibility, which must be examined. Is there a totality of everything verifiable? Is there a possible world integrated in which is such or such phantasy? Aren't these ideas which go beyond pure experience? As does, similarly, the idea of the unity of our experience.¹²⁶

A still more important point is the introduction of a transcendental subjectivity, analogous to that which intervened in the *Ideas* and in the *Cartesian Meditations*, and which he compares to the Cartesian ego.¹²⁷

Let us also note that whereas it is said in certain passages that we directly apprehend man, or living being, in other passages, this is attributed to a spiritual sense, which leads outside of what is simply experienceable in a sensuous way.¹²⁸ Husserl seeks pure and simple experiences beyond those experiences which he indicates as founded: "The world as it is always already pre-given entire in passive *doxa*, furnishing the ground of belief for all particular acts of judgement, is at bottom given in simple experience as a world of substrates apprehensible simply by sense."¹²⁹ In our experience, as soon as we encounter animals and persons, cultural objects, whether these are instruments, useful tools, works of art, or whatever else, we no longer have simple nature; we have gone beyond the domain of what is sensuously expressible purely and simply, we have an expression of our spiritual sense of being.¹³⁰ According to him, at least in these passages, we must put out of function, place in brackets, all expression of this sort, and leave in play only sense perception. We must consider the world only as a world of perception, and abstract from everything which is comprised of familiarities and of determinations which do not have their origin in a purely perceptive attitude, but in an evaluative attitude, whether it be of the others or of oneself.¹³¹ Certainly, he recognized that we have here, in comparison to the concrete world, an abstraction, a voluntary neglecting of something which is there for me, and which remains there. On this point, it is none the less true that he comes to a conception of pure, universal nature, as in Galilean science,¹³² whereas certain of his other indications permit us to glimpse, or even to fully see, a totally different point of view.¹³³

The abstraction does not stop here. We must also confine ourselves within the sphere of purely individual judgement, and abstract completely from the communicative function of judgement, from the fact that it always presupposes a prior communication. There will only be objects which are objects for me.¹³⁴

Another line of questioning could concern the role that Husserl accords to activity in what appeared to be, from the start, the work of the passive *doxa*, if, here, one may speak of "work." ". . . the perceptive contemplation of the pre-given sensuous substrate, is already an activity, a cognitive performance of the lowest level . . . an act, and not a mere suffering of impressions."¹³⁵ It is, already, an "achievement of cognition," although of a lower level. Particularly in attention, there is, already, such an "activity of a lower level."¹³⁶

This leads us to inquire whether, between activity and passivity, there is a difference in nature, or simply a difference of degree, "This phenomenologically necessary concept of receptivity is in no way exclusively opposed to that of the activity of the ego . . . receptivity must be regarded as the lowest level of activity."¹³⁷ It could be asked whether it would not have been more fitting, at least to one of the tendencies of phenomenology, to view activity as a higher stage of passivity, or whether they must be kept separate.

We again encounter the same problem concerning the activity of the ego, in the analysis of attention. Attention is considered as a specific act of the ego.¹³⁸ "The ego lives in the *cogito*, and this gives to all the content of the *cogito* its distinct ego-relation."¹³⁹

Concerning the origin of negation, we may question whether the genealogy which Husserl gives does not, itself, presuppose negation. If, in deception, we say that the object is not thus, but otherwise, doesn't the "not thus" presuppose negation? Doesn't the fact that a sensation, to which we are not attending, wins over another by its power to fulfill, give us the idea of negation, if we do not already have it?¹⁴⁰ The suppression of the former sense by the latter is no longer sufficient for us here. Husserl tells us that what is immediately attained by the suppression, what carries the character of the *not*, is the color red, for example, to which we have attended, and its anticipated qualification of the "existent."¹⁴¹ But, this is to admit right away, the idea of the *not*. Husserl would reply, it is true, that he does not presume, here, to explicate, but only to describe.¹⁴² The description, however, is apparently insufficient, and, on the other hand, in reality, it is a genesis which he seems to wish to bring about.

Concerning doubt and its origin, the first question which comes to mind is whether, phenomenologically, doubt is, as Husserl says, a mode of passage between affirmation and negation, an intermediary between them.¹⁴³

A second question may be posed concerning doubt. What characterizes perception is what Husserl calls its bodily presence. But if we hesitate between one manner of qualifying perception and another (for example, is it a man, or a marionette?), do we say that there are two perceptions, each of which has the character of bodily presence successively? But what do we say of our perception before our hesitation? Husserl proposes that we must say then, that there is not only a mode of bodily presence, but, added to it, a mode of

value or being, so that to the bodily presence of each of the two successive interpretations, it will be necessary to add a mode of value, which will be that of the questionable or of the criticizable.¹⁴⁴

When passing to the study of the idea of substrate, Husserl asserts that there are substrates which do not arise through substratization, absolute substrates, and that multiplicity leads us to absolute unities, to ultimate bodies which are no longer in a configuration.¹⁴⁵ We may ask whether this is legitimate from a purely phenomenological viewpoint. Let us comment, moreover, that he said that, on the one hand, all finite substrates have the determinability of the being-in-something, and that this holds to infinity.¹⁴⁶ But on the same page, he admits an absolute substrate, the world. How can this be, since we have seen that one is able to go from determination to determination infinitely? Isn't it necessary to say that the world exists prior to determinations, exists as that in which are all determinations, and is it not a matter of going from them to the world? And, in fact, from this perspective, it is possible to maintain Husserl's two assertions.

But another question presents itself. It seems that he admits, beside the absolute of the world, another absolute, a real finite multiplicity, a multiplicity, he says, which is one *qua* reality, which is permanent, or at least persistent, within the causality of its transformations. How can he say, then, that only the world is independent, and, what becomes of the other absolute about which he speaks, at the bottom of the same page?"... only the world is independent, only it is absolute substrate in the strict sense of absolute independence. . . ."¹⁴⁷

A new question may be posed concerning the very content of the idea of the world; in fact, the world of our experience, taken concretely, is not only the totality of nature; there are also within it, as Husserl notes, the others, our companions in humanity, as well as the things which do not have only natural determinations, but which are determined as objects of culture, as things molded by humanity, with their predicates of value, of utility, etc.¹⁴⁸ But, instead of saying, as we would expect, that the world of persons, of animals, and of cultural objects, is apprehended immediately as the external world, Husserl asserts, on the one hand, that we can grasp everything corporeal by a direct perception; but, on the other hand, when we encounter men, animals, or cultural objects, we no longer have simple nature, but what he calls an expression of the "spiritual sense of being." Then, he says, we are led beyond that which is experienceable by the senses. He maintains that the determinations, on the basis of which an existent is not only a natural body, but is determined, and experienceable as person, as animal, as cultural object, are determinations of a completely different order than the determinations of body as body. They are not at all perceived, in comparison to the thing, in a perception of the first order, as is a determination such as their color. Certainly, an existent which is not simply natural, but which is perceived as

person, as animal, or as cultural object, has its personal determinations;¹⁴⁹ and he adds that, with regard to these determinations, it is, itself, a substrate.

But this last observation concerning the personality and the character of the substrates of the perceptions of the second degree, which seems to be supportable, does not eliminate what seems to us to be disputable in the separation which he just effected. Even if he said that these substrates have their independence, he adds that this independence is only relative, and that it is not an independence with regard to the objects of the first order, on which perception of the second order is founded.¹⁵⁰

In this way we are brought back to the idea that substrates are only absolute in the sense of being originally experienceable in an originary experience of the first order, of being the individual objects of external sensuous perception, that is, bodies.¹⁵¹ It is only in a broader sense that we are able to call objectivities of the second order, absolute substrates.¹⁵²

Concerning the broadest concept of absolute substrate, which could be called the absolutely indeterminate something, the question is whether this concept can have any value within a theory which so completely separates the objects of the first and second orders; moreover, can't this completely indeterminate something be identified with the "this here" except if one admits the ideas that Hegel maintained in the *Phenomenology of Mind*?¹⁵³

Later on, Husserl comes to the distinction between the relation subsisting between a thing and its surface, and the relation of a thing with its quality of being polished or rough. The surface, he says, is bound to the thing only mediately, through the intermediary of the idea of extension.¹⁵⁴ But, one might ask, aren't there more fundamental differences than those which he brings to light, between these two attributions of the thing?

In the third chapter, we again encounter some of the presuppositions which have already been criticized: first, the idea that we start from a multiplicity of substrates which affect us simultaneously.¹⁵⁵

Concerning this question of the plurality of objects which are taken as a point of departure, it may, most certainly, be observed that Husserl tells us that this multiplicity must be considered as a bound unity, similar to that of an isolated individual.¹⁵⁶ From this point of view, if it is retrospectively applied, to the end of correcting the preceding passages, his descriptions would escape our criticisms.

We have noted the difficulties which arise as a consequence of the separation between the active and the passive spheres of consciousness.¹⁵⁷ Here we see that he interposes between the two, the sphere of active pre-constitution.¹⁵⁸

Where as he wishes to restrict himself, as far as possible, to the ante-predicative sphere, and to what is given in person in perception, he recognizes that it will be necessary to go above these spheres.¹⁵⁹

Idealist tendencies are seen equally when Husserl, here conforming to the

Kantian tradition, leads us to the idea of a unity of intuition, that, he declares, is larger than had been exposed until now, but which, nevertheless, entails an entirely idealist construction.¹⁶⁰ Similarly, he speaks further of a unity of lived experiences which constitute objectivities.¹⁶¹ He is led to distinguish a time of lived experiences, which is different from the time of objectivities, which are the objects of their intentions.¹⁶² As in Kantian philosophy, he must seek the condition of the possibility of all unity of intuition within the unity of the temporal intuition.¹⁶³ When he comes to the question of the foundation of formal relations, he sees it within a formal, ontological unity, which bears neither on a real connection of unified objects, nor on the essential moments. "It is a unity which extends to all possible objects, individual or not individual; it is the collective form of unity, that of assemblage."¹⁶⁴

He comes, in this way, to the idea that everything is intuitable in a single consciousness, all the possible, which, moreover, includes all the real. This consciousness is the originary intuition, as possible, and as actual. Naturally, he adds, to make an object of the totality of the collection of things, is an accomplishment of a higher order, and not an accomplishment of receptivity, but of productive spontaneity. Although he adds that these formal relations would assume the accomplishments of predicative thought, it is none the less true that we are in danger of losing all the precious acquisitions of ante-predicative realism which we have stressed, to a constructive idealism.

TRANSLATOR'S NOTE

¹⁶⁰In the text, paragraph 82, page 32, Wahl's translation of Husserl's text (see footnote 121) changes the affirmation concerning "form" which is in the original, to a negation. We have rectified this. Whether or not this is a simple error, as the following paragraph suggests, or represents an unclarified moment in Wahl's interpretation, is not clear.

NOTES TO THE TEXT

1. The work was first printed in Prague, in 1939, and became unavailable until it was reprinted in 1948. It is appropriate to note that *Experience and Judgment* cannot, in its totality, be attributed to Husserl. The work is "edited and published" with the assistance of Ludwig Landgrebe. In 1928, Husserl asked Landgrebe to assemble and put in order a certain number of his manuscripts concerning the domain of transcendental logic. A course which was given by Husserl in 1919-20 furnished the starting point for this arrangement. Landgrebe also called on a group of older manuscripts (1910-14), and on some lectures of 1920. Husserl reviewed and completed what Landgrebe had done. After the publication of *Formal and transcendental Logic* (1929), a second drafting was envisaged, which would take account, along with the manuscripts previously cited, of others dating from 1919-20, and of the *Formal and Transcendental*

Logic. But, given the diversity of the manuscripts, and their fragmentary character, a general revision became necessary, to the end of making the whole more homogeneous, of economizing the transitions, and of establishing a division into paragraphs and chapters. This revision was not accomplished by Husserl but by Landgrebe, and, what is most important, most significant, "where the analyses had only been indicated, it would be necessary to complete them." This was to be, again, the task of Landgrebe. But, we must also say that he conversed frequently, and at length with Husserl on these subjects, so that, he tells us, "even where the text could not be directly supported by the manuscripts, it contains nothing, however, which could not be supported by the oral expression of Husserl, and which did not have his consent." Finally, Husserl, himself, added some remarks. We must note, particularly, that the introduction (*EJ*, E – pp. 11-68, F – pp. 11-80, G – pp. 1-72) was drafted by Landgrebe, who had "freely rendered" the thoughts of Husserl, following his writings in the *Crisis*, and in the *Formal and Transcendental Logic*, aided by the conversations between himself and Husserl and having recourse to the manuscripts of 1919-34. Husserl approved the whole, Landgrebe tells us. It is none the less true that he did not hurry to publish this text, holding on to it until his death.

2. *EJ*, E – p. 19, F – pp. 20-21, G – p. 11. It would be interesting to give, in this footnote, this fragment of a letter of W. Biemel which, while recognizing the realist character of the text, tends to diminish its importance: "I ask myself if the first pages of your study are entirely just. In fact, in the reading of *Experience and Judgment*, one is struck by its 'realist' character. It is thus, perhaps, because Husserl did not begin with an exposition of the nature of consciousness, but through a consideration of the manner in which the existent is given to us. I would not say that there is a true opposition. It seems to me that it is, rather, another aspect which is brought to evidence, and that, nevertheless, the original starting point is maintained. Thus, in *Ideen II* also, it is possible to find passages which are in line with the citation given (*EJ*, E – p. 19, F – pp. 20-21, G – p. 11). Properly understood, Husserl speaks constantly of the constitution of the existent (object), but this constitution is not possible without the subject being already affected by an existent, which must, thus, exist previously."
3. *EJ*, E – p. 19, F – p. 21, G – p. 12.
4. *EJ*, E – p. 19, F – p. 21, G – p. 12.
5. *EJ*, E – p. 20, F – p. 22, G – p. 13. Let us note the first appearance of the word "world" in this book.
6. *EJ*, E – p. 28, F – p. 31, G – p. 22.
7. *EJ*, E – pp. 29-30, F – pp. 33-34, G – p. 24.
8. *EJ*, E – p. 26, F – pp. 29-30, G – p. 20.
9. *EJ*, E – p. 30, F – pp. 33-34, G – p. 24.
10. *EJ*, E – p. 30, F – pp. 34, G – p. 25.
11. *EJ*, E – p. 31, F – p. 35, G – p. 26.
12. *EJ*, E – p. 32, F – p. 36, G – pp. 26-27.
13. *EJ*, E – p. 34, F – p. 38, G – p. 29.
14. *EJ*, E – p. 37, F – p. 43, G – p. 33.
15. *EJ*, E – p. 40, F – p. 47, G – p. 37.
16. *EJ*, E – p. 41, F – pp. 47-48, G – p. 38.
17. *EJ*, E – p. 43, F – p. 49, G – p. 40.
18. *EJ*, E – p. 43, F – p. 50, G – p. 41.
19. *EJ*, E – p. 45, F – p. 52, G – p. 43.

20. *EJ*, E – p. 46, F – pp. 53-54, G – p. 44. Here are place some passages concerning accomplishments, which are, following the observations of Biemel, the starting point of the labors of the *Crisis*, the publication of which he prepared.
21. *EJ*, E – p. 50, F – p. 58, G – p. 49.
22. *EJ*, E – p. 52, F – p. 61, G – p. 49.
23. *EJ*, E – p. 56, F – p. 65, G – p. 56.
24. *EJ*, E – p. 60, F – p. 61.
25. *EJ*, E – pp. 60-61, F – pp. 70-71, G – p. 62.
26. *EJ*, E – p. 62, F – pp. 72-73, G – p. 64.
27. *EJ*, E – pp. 64-65, F – p. 75, G – p. 67.
28. *EJ*, E – p. 72, F – p. 84, G – p. 74.
29. *Ibid.*
30. *EJ*, E – p. 80, F – p. 95, G – p. 85.
31. *EJ*, E – p. 82, F – p. 96, G – p. 87.
32. *EJ*, E – p. 83, F – p. 97, G – p. 88.
33. *EJ*, E – p. 81, F – p. 96, G – p. 86.
34. *EJ*, E – p. 83, F – pp. 97-98, G – p. 88.
35. *EJ*, E – p. 35, F – p. 40, G – p. 31.
36. *EJ*, E – p. 83, F – pp. 97-98, G – p. 988.
37. *EJ*, E – p. 84, F – p. 98, G – p. 89.
38. *EJ*, E – p. 86, F – p. 100, G – p. 91.
39. *EJ*, E – p. 86, F – p. 101, G – p. 93. Cf. on *Dabei*. *EJ*, E – p. 81, F – p. 96, G – p. 86.
40. *EJ*, E – p. 86, F – p. 100, G – p. 91.
41. *EJ*, E – p. 86, F – p. 101, G – p. 92.
42. *EJ*, E – p. 90, F – p. 105, G – p. 97.
43. *EJ*, E – p. 91, F – p. 107, G – p. 98.
44. *EJ*, E – p. 95, F – p. 112, G – p. 104.
45. *EJ*, E – p. 100, F – p. 118, G – p. 110.
46. *EJ*, E – p. 101, F – p. 119, G – p. 111.
47. *EJ*, E – p. 106, F – p. 124, G – p. 116.
48. *EJ*, E – p. 107, F – p. 124, G – p. 117.
49. *EJ*, E – p. 107, F – p. 125, G – p. 117.
50. *Ibid.*
51. *EJ*, E – p. 107, F – pp. 125-26, G – p. 118.
52. *EJ*, E – p. 112, F – p. 131, G – p. 124.
53. *EJ*, E – p. 109, F – p. 126, G – pp. 118-19.
54. *EJ*, E – p. 113, F – p. 132, G – p. 125.
55. *EJ*, E – pp. 113-14, F – p. 133, G – p. 126, Merleau-Ponty will bring to light similar ideas.
56. *EJ*, E – p. 114, F – p. 133, G – p. 126.
57. *EJ*, E – p. 115, F – p. 134, G – p. 127.
58. *EJ*, E – p. 121, F – p. 142, G – pp. 135-36.
59. *EJ*, E – p. 122, F – p. 143, G – pp. 136-37.
60. *EJ*, E – p. 122, F – p. 144, G – p. 137.
61. *EJ*, E – p. 125, F – p. 147, G – p. 141.
62. *EJ*, E – p. 125, F – pp. 146-47, G – pp. 140-41.
63. *EJ*, E – p. 126, F – p. 149, G – p. 143.
64. *EJ*, E – p. 133, F – p. 157, G – p. 151.
65. *EJ*, E – p. 134, F – p. 158, G – p. 152.
66. *EJ*, E – p. 134, F – p. 158, G – p. 153.
67. *EJ*, E – p. 134, F – p. 158, G – p. 152.

68. *EJ*, E – p. 135, F – p. 159, G – p. 153.
69. *EJ*, E – p. 135, F – p. 160, G – p. 154.
70. *EJ*, E – p. 136, F – p. 161, G – pp. 155-56.
71. *EJ*, E – p. 137, F – p. 162, G – p. 156.
72. *EJ*, E – p. 137, F – p. 162, G – p. 157.
73. *EJ*, E – p. 138, F – p. 163, G – pp. 157-58.
74. *EJ*, E – p. 139, F – p. 165, G – p. 159.
75. *EJ*, E – p. 140, F – p. 166, F – p. 160. Here it might well be asked to what extent this is Landgrebe's interpretation.
76. *EJ*, E – p. 144, F – p. 170, G – p. 165.
77. *EJ*, E – pp. 149-50, F – p. 177, G – p. 171.
78. *EJ*, E – p. 149, F – p. 178, G – pp. 171-72.
79. *EJ*, E – p. 150, F – p. 178, G – p. 172.
80. *Ibid.*
81. *Ibid.*
82. *EJ*, E – pp. 152-53, F – p. 180, G – p. 174.
83. *EJ*, E – p. 152, F – p. 181, G – p. 175.
84. *EJ*, E – p. 153, F – p. 182, G – pp. 176-77.
85. *EJ*, E – p. 154, F – pp. 183-84, G – p. 178.
86. *EJ*, E – p. 155, F – p. 184, G – p. 178.
87. *EJ*, E – p. 155, F – pp. 184-85, G – p. 178.
88. *EJ*, E – p. 156, F – p. 186, G – p. 180.
89. *EJ*, E – p. 158, F – p. 188, G – p. 182.
90. *EJ*, E – p. 158, F – p. 188, G – pp. 182-83.
91. *EJ*, E – p. 158, F – pp. 188-89, G – p. 183.
92. *EJ*, E – p. 159, F – p. 189, G – p. 183.
93. *EJ*, E – p. 159, F – p. 189, G – pp. 183-84.
94. *EJ*, E – pp. 160-61, F – p. 191, G – pp. 185-86.
95. *EJ*, E – p. 161, F – p. 191, G – p. 186.
96. *EJ*, E – pp. 161-62, F – pp. 192-93, G – p. 187.
97. *EJ*, E – p. 163, F – p. 194, G – p. 189.
98. *Ibid.*
99. *EJ*, E – p. 165, F – p. 197, G – p. 192.
100. *EJ*, E – pp. 166-67, F – p. 198, G – p. 194.
101. *EJ*, E – p. 169, F – p. 202, G – p. 198.
102. *EJ*, E – pp. 173-74, F – p. 207, G – p. 203.
103. *EJ*, E – p. 177, F – p. 211, G – p. 207.
104. *EJ*, E – p. 177, F – p. 212, G – p. 208.
105. *EJ*, E – p. 179, F – p. 214, G – p. 210.
106. *Ibid.*
107. *Ibid.*
108. *EJ*, E – pp. 181-82, F – pp. 219-222, G – pp. 216-18.
109. *EJ*, E – p. 185, F – p. 222, G – p. 218.
110. *EJ*, E – p. 186, F – p. 223, G – p. 219.
111. *EJ*, E – p. 190, F – p. 227, G – p. 224.
112. *EJ*, E – p. 189, F – p. 227, G – p. 224.
113. *EJ*, E – p. 190, F – p. 227, G – p. 224.
114. *EJ*, E – p. 194, F – p. 233, G – p. 230.
115. This certainly would be the place to take account, also, to an extent, as A. Koyre suggested to us, of Husserl's desire in his last years, to make clearly visible that his doctrine contains the better part of the sound ideas which were developed by

Heidegger, while avoiding the sophism, the adventitiousness, and the faults which he saw there. The question again comes to mind, particularly in the introduction (for example, *EJ*, E – p. 20, 35, 62; F – pp. 22-23, 39-40, 72-73; G – pp. 13, 30, 64), how much is Husserl's, and how much is the interpretation of Husserl by Landgrebe.

116. *EJ*, E – pp. 19-20, F – p. 22, G – p. 13.
117. *EJ*, E – p. 34, F – pp. 39-40, G – p. 30.
118. *EJ*, E – p. 62, F – p. 73, G – p. 64.
119. *EJ*, E – p. 65, F – p. 77, G – p. 68.
120. *EJ*, E – p. 38, F – pp. 44-45, G – p. 35.
121. *EJ*, E – p. 165, F – p. 196, G – p. 191. See translator's note a.
122. *EJ*, E – p. 165, F – p. 196, G – p. 191, Cf. *EJ*, E – p. 156, F – p. 186, G – p. 180.
123. *EJ*, E – p. 159, F – p. 189, G – p. 184.
124. *EJ*, E – pp. 23-24, F – p. 26, G – p. 17.
125. *EJ*, E – p. 39, F – p. 46, G – p. 36. Cf. *EJ*, E – p. 54, F – p. 63, G – p. 54.
126. *EJ*, E – p. 40, F – p. 47, G – p. 37.
127. *EJ*, E – p. 49, F – p. 57, G – p. 48.
128. *EJ*, E – p. 55, F – p. 65, G – p. 56.
129. *EJ*, E – p. 54, F – p. 63, G – p. 54.
130. *EJ*, E – p. 55, F – p. 64, G – p. 55.
131. *EJ*, E – p. 56, F – p. 65, G – p. 56.
132. *EJ*, E – p. 56, F – p. 66, G – p. 57.
133. For example: *EJ*, E – pp. 64-65, F – pp. 75-76, G – p. 67.
134. *EJ*, E – p. 58, F – pp. 67-68, G – p. 59; E – p. 67, F – p. 79, G – p. 71.
135. *EJ*, E – p. 59, F – p. 70, G – pp. 61-62.
136. Cf. also *EJ*, E – p. 52, F – p. 58, G – p. 49. Where the life-world seems to depend on subjective accomplishments.
137. *EJ*, E – p. 79, F – p. 93, G – p. 83.
138. *EJ*, E – p. 80, F – p. 94, G – p. 85.
139. *EJ*, E – p. 85, F – pp. 99-100, G – p. 90.
140. *EJ*, E – pp. 88-91, F – pp. 103-106, G – pp. 95-97.
141. *EJ*, E – p. 90, F – p. 106, G – p. 97.
142. Cf. *EJ*, E – p. 90, F – p. 106, G – p. 97.
143. *EJ*, E – p. 92, F – p. 107, G – p. 99.
144. *EJ*, E – pp. 93-94, F – p. 110, G – pp. 101-102.
145. *EJ*, E – pp. 134-36, F – pp. 157-60, G – pp. 152-54.
146. *EJ*, E – p. 137, F – p. 163, G – p. 157.
147. *EJ*, E – p. 138, F – p. 163, G – p. 157.
148. *EJ*, E – p. 138, F – p. 163, G – p. 158.
149. *EJ*, E – p. 138, F – p. 164, G – p. 158.
150. Here we must take account, following Father van Breda, of the idea of a structure of the *Lebenswelt*, an idea by virtue of which some of our criticisms lose part of their importance.
151. *EJ*, E – p. 139, F – p. 165, G – p. 159.
152. *EJ*, E – p. 139, F – p. 165, G – p. 160.
153. *EJ*, E – pp. 139-40, F – p. 166, G – p. 160.
154. *EJ*, E – pp. 145-46, F – p. 173, G – p. 168.
155. *EJ*, E – pp. 149, 152, 156, 173-74; F – pp. 177, 180, 185, 207; G – pp. 171, 174, 179, 203.
156. *EJ*, E – pp. 149, 158-59; F – pp. 177, 188; G – pp. 171, 182.
157. *EJ*, E – p. 150, F – p. 178, G – p. 172.

158. *Ibid.*
159. *EJ*, E – pp. 150-51, 157; F – pp. 179, 186; G – pp. 173, 180.
160. *EJ*, E – pp. 174-75, F – p. 208, G – p. 204.
161. *EJ*, E – p. 175, F – p. 209, G – p. 205.
162. *Ibid.*
163. *EJ*, E – pp. 158-59, 182; F – pp. 187-88, 218; G – pp. 182, 214.
164. *EJ*, E – pp. 188-189, F – p. 226, G – p. 223.

A LETTER FROM LUDWIG LANDGREBE TO JEAN WAHL*

I have read with great pleasure your study of *Experience and Judgment*. For all the recensions that have appeared until now have been simple book reviews. Your study is the first attempt at a real discussion of this work, and the first attempt to further the thought of the problems which are raised.

First, concerning the question of knowing to what extent the introduction is an authentic exposition of the thoughts of Husserl, and to what extent it presents my interpretation of these thoughts, I would say this:

The introduction, throughout, elaborates elements drawn from Husserl's manuscripts, and from the results of my conversations with him. When you underline the fundamental realistic tendency of the work, I can say that this tendency in no way comes from my interpretation alone. To the contrary, the phenomenology of Husserl, on the whole, is run through by this *divergence between his idealistic program*, as may be seen above all, in the *Ideas* and in the *Cartesian Meditations*, and the *results of his detailed analyses*, particularly those of the last period, which, without his having become clearly conscious of this, break with that program. In my book *Phänomenologie und Metaphysik*,¹ I have already, frequently, indicated something of this, and in my new book which will soon appear, *Philosophie der Gegenwart*,² I apply myself to the presentation of these things in a clearer way. But, as at the moment of the editing of *Experience and Judgment* I still held an idealistic position, this divergence did not appear clearly to me. This is why the developments which have an idealistic tone remain side by side with analyses that, in their ultimate results, are irreconcilable with them, without my having modified them in any way. But perhaps precisely this absence of accommodation between these divergent tendencies gives a more lively image of the tensions which run through Husserl's work, than if an attempt had been made to polish the whole, which, moreover, could not be done due to the material from which I began. In retrospect, it could perhaps be said that Husserl's phenomenology had, as *an historical function, the triumph of*

*Translated by Laurence E. Winters from "Lettre de M. Landgrebe sur un article de M. Jean Wahl concernant *Erfahrung und Urteil* de Husserl," *Revue de métaphysique et de morale*, 57 (1952), pp. 282-83.

idealism over itself through the efforts to think to the limit a theory which had, as its starting point, the subject.

In order now not to be too long, I could perhaps limit myself to a fundamental problem which your study touches upon from different sides. This is the problem of the absolute substrate. You say, on page 13 [17 in the French text], that one could see, in the way this concept is determined by Husserl, a phenomenological justification for empiricism. In fact, here lies the key that will permit a response to all the questions which you raise at the end of your study. Husserl's return to a pure, immediate, and ultimate experience, a return which, through an abstractive destruction of all the sense givings which come from activity, leads to the "sensuous Hyle,"³ again hides, in fact, the elements of a sensualism over which Husserl never completely triumphed. This explains how the corporeal thing, in its sensible appearance, becomes, for him, the final substrate, and how the characters of signification are understood as products of intentional accomplishments founded in this sensibility, interpreted in a sensualist manner.

The phenomenologically verifiable core of this conception lies in the fact that all experience is founded on self-givenness as sensuous presence in person (*sinnlichleibhaft*), or that which is encountered. But the accomplishment of sensibility is not interpreted in a satisfactory way if the hyletic givens (The descendants of Humean impressions!) are conceived as their ultimate elements. Here, again, is hidden a residue of the "principle of dissociation," criticized by the partisans of Gestalt theory. It is only Erwin Straus and Merleau-Ponty⁴ who have, it seems to me, triumphed in a definitive way over this sensualism of phenomenology.

It is this difficulty which explains, as well, why the concept of the world is ambiguous in Husserl. On the one hand, the world is understood in a Kantian way, as the totality of appearances, for, after placing in parentheses the presupposition of the objective world in itself, Husserl treats the world as meant world (*vermeinte*), that is to say, a world given for a consciousness, and appearing in a consciousness. The world is here, thus, the idea of the "et cetera" of experience, in such a way that everything which is given for a consciousness, and which can be considered by it, must necessarily be thought as appearing in the unity of a consciousness and of its possible experience and, correlatively, in the unity of a world. From this point of view, a world is a *concept* that we achieve in thinking the belongingness of all individual being in a comprehensive unity. In this sense, a world is an absolute substrate, as everything which is encounterable, and is thinkable, can only be thought as a mundane existent and, in consequence, as non-independent in relation to that comprehensive unity.

On the other hand, Husserl's analyses demonstrate that the world, as the horizon of all that is encountered in every experience of individual beings *before* all conceptual predicative thought, is always already co-experienced.

As a consequence, there is also an experience of the world for a consciousness which is not capable of constructing the concept of the world as totality of that which may be encountered. But this consciousness of the world as immediate presence in itself, is not interpreted in a satisfactory way as long as the sensualist concept of sensibility is not abandoned. This is why the concept of the world in Husserl is ambiguous, as result of this sensualist concept of sensibility. Alongside the concept of a world which comes from the individual existent sensibly given, and signifying the idea of its totality, there is another concept of a world, as the horizon always co-encountered, which presages Heidegger's concept of being-in-the-world.

In this way, some other difficulties can be clarified. You ask, on page 28 [30 in French text], if the phenomenon of deception, of the "not thus, but otherwise" which for Husserl constitutes the ground of negative judgement, does not, in itself, presuppose negation. I would answer that here, Husserl has described well the origin of the negative judgement. For all judgement is, from the start, judgement on an existent which is in the world,⁵ whether it is particular or general, and not judgement on the being or non-being of the world in its totality. It thus presupposes the belief in the world as a foundation. But we are only able to judge a being which is felt to be menaced by nothingness. Being found in the world is already, in itself, to be understood as being so threatened. But, "to be understood" need not include in itself anything which would come from this judgement on the non-being of the world. If we conceive negation in this sense, and, in consequence, not in the sense of a negative predicative judgement, then it is, in fact, the presupposition of the possibility of deception which, in its turn, makes possible the negative judgement. But this is a group of thoughts which was not developed by Husserl because he lacked a satisfactory concept of sensibility and a satisfactory concept of world.

Concerning the distinction between activity and passivity, I will give you only one terminological remark. Husserl comprehended receptivity, that is to say, preception itself, as a mode of activity, distinguishing from it a pure passivity of simple affection. Thus, for him, the difference between activity (at its lower level, receptivity; and, at its higher level, spontaneity) and passivity is not relative, but absolute. Certainly this distinction leads to great difficulties, but a full article would be necessary to develop them.

NOTES

We have here elaborated on the notes in the original text – translator.

1. Ludwig Landgrebe, *Phänomenologie und Metaphysik* (Hamburg: M. von Schroder, 1949).
2. Ludwig Landgrebe, *Philosophie der Gegenwart* (Frankfurt: Ullstein, 1957).

3. *Ideas*, E – pp. 226-27, F – pp. 287-88, G – pp. 207-08.
4. Erwin W. Straus, *Vom Sinn der Sinne* (Berlin: Springer, 1956); Eng. trans., *The Primary World of the Senses*, trans. J. Needleman (New York: Free Press, 1963). For Merleau-Ponty, see especially the Preface and Chapter 1 of *Phenomenology of Perception*, trans. C. Smith (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1962); originally, *Phénoménologie de la perception* (Paris: Editions Gallimard, 1945).
5. *FTL*, Chapter 4.

A NOTE ON SOME EMPIRICIST ASPECTS OF THE THOUGHT OF HUSSERL*

JEAN WAHL

The phenomenology of Husserl is ordinarily considered to be a theory of essences. And it is a fact that his first great work, the *Logical Investigations*, is directed against psychologism. Certainly, it has been observed that the Platonic conception of essences, which was affirmed at the beginning of the Husserlian meditation, was later replaced by a conception which situated essences at the core of life itself; consequently, essence and existence were no longer separated as they were at the outset. Similarly, it should be noted that, at a certain point, Husserl acknowledges what he calls inexact essences.¹ It is none the less true that the affirmation of ideal objects always remains in his thought; and we can give as proof of this the following passage from the *Formal and Transcendental Logic*: “The evidence of irreal objects, objects that are ideal in the broadest sense, is, in its effect, quite analogous to the evidence of ordinary so-called internal and external experience, which alone – on no other grounds than prejudice – is commonly thought capable of effecting an original Objectification. The identity and, therefore, the objectivity of something ideal can be directly ‘seen’ (and, if we wished to give the word a suitable amplified sense, directly experienced) with the same originality as the identity of an object of experience in the usual sense. . . .”²

Although phenomenology is thus presented to us from the start as a theory of essences, what will interest us here especially, and what seems to us the most valuable, are the consequences of the realist and empiricist postulates which we are able to discover in it. Putting aside everything that depends upon idealist presuppositions, we will consider this system obliquely, in order to discover there, in preference, the consequences of his few realist presuppositions.

We read in the *Formal and Transcendental Logic*: “. . . we are busied with objects. . . .”³ and not with our consciousness. When we judge, the relation to the object is presented in this very judgement. We do not judge the judgement, but, always, the objects to which the judgement pertains, the state of affairs. All our judgements are directed toward the object.

*Translated by Laurence E. Winters from “Notes sur quelques aspects empiristes de la pensée de Husserl,” *Revue de métaphysique et de morale*, 57 (1952), pp. 17–45.

We find the same thought in *Experience and Judgment*: "The confirmation of what exists, how and what it is, is the sense of all cognitive activity."⁴

Among all the modes and essential types of consciousness, which can have an identical object of which we are conscious, there is one which is originary, and to which all the others refer, in so far as they are intentional modifications. Now, Husserl tells us that, in a general manner, an intentional modification has the property of leading us back to unmodified givens. "But intentional modifications have, quite universally, the intrinsic property of pointing back to something unmodified. The modified manner of givenness, when, so to speak, we interrogate it, tells us itself that it is a modification of an original manner of givenness, to which it points. . . . The fulfilling clarification takes place with the transition to a synthesis in which the object of a non-original mode of consciousness becomes given either as the same as the object of consciousness in the mode 'experience' (the mode 'it itself') or else as the same object 'clarified'"⁵

What we have called realism is naturally completed through an empiricism. As Husserl said in his lectures, *The Idea of Phenomenology*, what he wishes to explicate is the idea of the possibility of attaining the object, of viewing the object.⁶ A vision does not permit a demonstration; the blind who wish to see will not do so through the force of scientific demonstrations. Let us add, however, that the concept of experience must be taken in a very broad sense, including not only the self-givenness of an individual existence in a certitude of being, but also the modifications of this certitude which may be transformed into assumptions, into probabilities, into the mode of "as if," as well as into the images of phantasy.⁷

What is important here is that intentionality is founded, that is, founded on a sphere prior to judgement.⁸

The conceptions which will be set forth here are bound up with the Husserlian theory of evidence. We will certainly see that there are different sorts of evidence; but all are referred to a fundamental type. "To each region and category of would-be objects corresponds phenomenologically not only a basic type of sense, or assertions, but also a basic kind of original presenting consciousness for such senses, and, pertaining to it, a basic type of originary evidence which is essentially motivated by originary givenness of such a nature."⁹

As Husserl said in the *Cartesian Meditations*: "Experience in the ordinary sense is a particular evidence. All evidence, we may say, is experience in a maximally broad, and essentially unitary, sense."¹⁰

This very idea of experience is bound to that of *Erfüllung* (fulfillment).

The claim that all the categories which are presented within the sphere of judgement are constructed on pre-predicative syntheses, and have their origin in them, is a consequence of what we have called the empiricist postulate. And, this is true as well for the claim that it is within the pre-predicative sphere that

may be found the origin of the divisions essential to judgement. It has been correctly asserted that “intentional genesis takes place neither on the abstract plane of conditions of possibility, nor on the psychological plane of mental constructions.”¹¹ And, as the same author says, “the spontaneous course of sensuous experience already implies, in the case of modalization, a moment of ante-predicative abstraction, where moments (form, color, etc.) are separated from the object, which is maintained in its general unity.”¹²

It is already in this pre-predicative sphere that the substrate, in a passive modification of consciousness, enriches itself through determinations. There is, thus, a passive pre-constitution within this ante-predicative activity, and it is onto this that fully active constitution will be grafted. “Determination is always constituted twice.”¹³

This sphere itself must be tied to movements which we passively undertake in order for us to take account of the world which is around us.

Thus we see how our activity of judgement and of perception are intelligible, for we are conscious of being close to (*auprès de*) the object, and, that in this way we are able to apprehend it in its bodily presence, so to speak.

The thought of Husserl assumes, thus, that prior to all judgements that we form, there is, in his words, something pre-given. “We need not give any transcendental philosophy here. We have only to explicate correctly what concerns us: at present, namely, when we are judging, the relation to the object is effected in our judging itself. It must be noted in this connection that the object can indeed be given already by experience, prior to the predicative judgement. . . .”¹⁴

From this idea of the pre-given we are easily able to go to another idea which is presented particularly in *Experience and Judgment*: “We here take the ‘this’ as, so to speak, the zero-point of attribution in this series. (This is its logical significance. Its fully concrete significance is naturally more than this. To it belongs the ‘deictic’ character of pointing to, of calling attention to, of the demand to take cognizance of).”¹⁵ We see thus that Husserl places in the foreground what would disappear in the theory of Hegel; although it retains nothing of the “this” but its abstract universality, Husserl brings to light that fact that it indicates to us some particular point. In this way we understand that, for him, the objects of perception distinguish themselves from the objects of imagination by their absolute temporal situation.¹⁶ I reach full individuation of my objects only if I return to the here and now; it is through them that I obtain the determinability necessary for individual intuition.

What we have said of the here and now should not lead us to believe that everything will be presented in our experience in a clearly delimited way. As Husserl said, as early as the *Ideas*, there is surrounding our perceptions, “. . . an obscure horizon of undetermined reality.”¹⁷ It is an idea to which he returns in *Experience and Judgment* particularly; where he demonstrates that all experience implies a prior knowledge of the thing which comes before us, and

of the kind of being to which it appertains, he adds that this pre-knowledge is indeterminate, or incompletely determined, without it ever being completely empty.¹⁸

It is this experience, at once precise in its designative character, and indeterminate through the horizon which surrounds these objects, which will evidently be displayed. “Evidence of experience is therefore always presupposed. . . .”¹⁹ From this we can comprehend the preeminence of reality over all sorts of illusions and irrealities; all irrealities are such only through an essential relation to an actual or possible reality.²⁰ This preeminence of reality leads us to grant a privilege to perception. “One and the same object can, a priori, be intended to in very different modes of consciousness (certain essential types: perception, recollection, empty consciousness). Among them the ‘experiencing mode,’ the original mode of consciousness of the object in question, has a precedence; to it all others are related as intentional modifications.”²¹ This is what Husserl calls the originary mode, or *Urmodus*. It is what he as well calls *doxa*. “Here positing (*Setzung*) is understood as *doxa*, as belief in being. . . .”²² This theory of *doxa*, already sketched in the *Formal and Transcendental Logic*, will be completed in *Experience and Judgment*. “. . . this realm of *doxa* is not a domain of self-evidence of lesser rank than that of *epistēmē*, of judicative knowledge and all its sedimentations (*Niederschläge*) but precisely the domain of ultimate originality to which exact cognition returns for its sense, such cognition (it must be recognized) having the characteristic of being a mere method and not a way leading to knowledge by itself.”²³

We are able, thus, to understand the Husserlian idea of the return to the “things themselves.” It is a question of seeing the object itself in its originary character, in its act of originary self-givenness, of grasping it and of having it directly. The object is that which is there (*da ist*). It is thus necessary to distinguish the evidence which shows itself in judgement from the evidence of the pre-given objects themselves.²⁴ The decisive privilege of external perception consists in the fact that in it originary substrates are pre-given.²⁵ As Husserl had already said in the *Formal and Transcendental Logic*, the originary mode of self-givenness is perception. We must, thus, maintain that intellectual apprehension is always preceded by affection, which, however, is never the fact that an isolated object affects us,²⁶ and, as we have already seen, the domain of *doxa*, far from having less dignity than that of *epistēmē*, is the domain of ultimate primordialness; exact cognition, mathematics in particular, is not at all a given, but is, rather, a method.²⁷

Thus we come to the non-predicative sphere. “. . . the intrinsically first judgement theory is the theory of evident judgements, and the intrinsically first thing in the theory of evident judgements (and therefore in judgement theory as a whole) is the genetical tracing of predicative evidences back to the non-predicative evidence called experience.”²⁸

The idea of evidence must be completed by that of intentionality. “The concept of any intentionality whatever – any life-process of consciousness of something or other – and the concept of evidence, the intentionality that is the giving of something itself, are essentially correlative.”²⁹

Further, it may be said, as Husserl does in the *Formal and Transcendental Logic*, concerning an intentionality of experience itself: “. . . certainty and modalities of certainty, suppositive intention and fulfillment, identical existent and identical sense, evident having of something itself, trueness of being (being ‘actual’) and truth as correctness of sense – that none of these is a peculiarity exclusively within the predicational sphere, that, on the contrary, they all belong already to the intentionality of experience.”³⁰ It is thus seen that being and sense cannot be separated.

Intentionality governs and supports all our thought, whether we are conscious of it or not: “The living intentionality carries me along, it predelineates; it determines me practically in my whole procedure, including the procedure of my natural thinking, whether this yields being or illusion. The living intentionality does all that, even though, as actually functioning, it may be non-thematic, undisclosed, and thus beyond my ken.”³¹

This allows us to move on to the Husserlian idea of the non-reflective, as expressed, for example, in the *Ideas*: “The experience as really lived at the moment, as it first enters into the focus of reflexion, presents itself as really lived, as being ‘now’; but not only that, it presents itself as just *having been*, and so far as it was unnoticed as precisely such as not having been reflected on.”³² Thus, we reflect on the unreflected. We discover here the idea of the pre-given, as we have already seen,³³ and we also comprehend the bond between this affirmation of the unreflected, and the realism of Husserl: “. . . lived-experiences do not only exist when we are turned toward them and grasp them in immanent experience; we believe that they actually exist, that they were really lived by us. . . .”³⁴ Thus, as Husserl says in the *Formal and Transcendental Logic*: “As for the cores, they refer us to the fact that judicial action continually presupposes things given beforehand.”³⁵

This pre-given is, moreover, a whole, appearing as a field. “And it is not mere particular objects, isolated by themselves, which are thus pre-given but always a field of pre-givenness, from which a particular stands out, and, so to speak, ‘excites us’ to perception and to perceptive contemplation.”³⁶ Immediate cognition knows no exactly determined time, space, or objective causality.³⁷ And it is wrong to interpret the given itself with the aid of mathematics, which is only a method of idealization acting on the given.

There is thus a horizon of familiarity within which our experience takes place.³⁸ The world, the world of our experience is the universal ground of all our particular experiences, an immediate foundation of these experiences and prior to all experiences and to all logical accomplishments. It is, thus, a question of returning to this world of experience, to this life-world in which we

now and always live, and which is the foundation of all cognitive action and of all scientific determination.³⁹ Moreover, the idea of experience itself must be expanded, for, "this commonplace, familiar, and concrete sense of the word 'experience' points much more to a mode of behavior which is practically active and evaluative than specifically to one that is cognitive and judicative."⁴⁰

The familiarity of which we are speaking is what Husserl calls a typical familiarity; by which he means that there are modes or forms of objects *a priori*, into which we come to classify each object.⁴¹

The idea of a priority and, in a sense, of a preeminence of passivity is introduced little by little into Husserl's meditations: "The access to problems of the universal lawfulness of phenomenological genesis appeared rather late, and disclosed at bottom a passive genesis, instrumental in the foundation of new intentionalities and apperceptions, yet without any active participation of the 'I.' In this connection a phenomenology of association was developed. Its conception and origin received a fundamentally new form through the at first surprising realization that 'association' is a monstrous name for lawfulness, that is, for an inborn *a priori*, without which the ego as such is unthinkable."⁴² This idea of a passive genesis is particularly developed in *Experience and Judgment*: ". . . all passive consciousness is already 'constitutive of objects' . . ."⁴³ "In receptivity, although the ego is indeed actively turned toward what affects it, it does not make its knowledge, and the individual steps of cognition as the means to its achievement, an object of will."⁴⁴ Moreover, the separation of activity and passivity is not fixed; it is not a question of terms which could be defined once and for all, but only of means of description and distinction, the sense of which must be taken from the concrete situation in each particular case.

A problem arises here. Must we not say that the ideas of passivity and of the unconscious are only limit concepts? This is a question which Husserl poses in the *Formal and Transcendental Logic*,⁴⁵ and to which Tran-Duc-Thao calls attention.⁴⁶

The idea of evidence which plays such a great role in phenomenological thought, must not be taken in the strict classical sense of the word. In the lectures, *The Idea of Phenomenology*, Husserl already had written: "In contemporary philosophy, insofar as it claims to be a serious science, it has become almost a commonplace that there can be only one method for achieving cognition in all the sciences as well as in philosophy. This conviction accords wholly with the great philosophical traditions of the seventeenth century, which also thought that philosophy's salvation lay wholly in its taking as a model of method the exact sciences, and, above all, mathematics and mathematical natural science."⁴⁷ Similarly, in the *Formal and Transcendental Logic*, Husserl wrote: "Thus it happens that evidence is usually conceived as an absolute apodicticity, an absolute security against

deceptions . . . The usual theorist sees in evidence an absolute criterion of truth . . .”⁴⁸ Now, we must take into account that the structure of evidence is not, in all cases, the same. “. . . imperfect experience is still experience, still a consciousness that is a having of something itself (*Bewusstsein der Selbshabe*), can experience adjust itself to experience and correct itself by experience. For this same reason, moreover, it is wrong for a criticism of sensuous experience, which naturally brings out its essential imperfection (that is: its being at the mercy of further experience!), to end with rejecting it – whereupon the critic in his extremity appeals to hypotheses and indirect arguments, with which he attempts to seize the phantom of some (absurdly) transcendent ‘in-itself.’ All Transcendental-realist theories, with their arguments leading from the ‘immanent’ sphere of purely ‘internal’ experience to an extra-psychic transcendency, are attributable to a blindness to the proper character of ‘external’ experience as a performance that gives us something itself and would otherwise be unable to provide a basis for natural-scientific theories.”⁴⁹ And again, similarly: “The trader in the market has his market-truth. In the relationship in which it stands, is his truth not a good one, and the best that a trader could use? Is it a pseudo-truth, merely because the scientist, involved in a different relativity and judging with other aims and ideas, looks for other truths – with which a great many more things can be done, but not the one thing that has to be done in a market?”⁵⁰ Husserl continues: “It is high time that people got over being dazzled, particularly in philosophy and logic, by the ideal and regulative ideas and methods of the ‘exact’ sciences – as though the in-itself of such sciences were actually an absolute norm Actually, they do not see the woods for the trees. Because of a splendid cognitive performance, though with only a very restricted teleological sense, they overlook the infinitudes of life and its cognition, the infinites of relative and, only in its relativity, rational being, with its relative truths. But to rush ahead and philosophize from on high about such matters is fundamentally wrong; it creates a wrong skeptical relativism and a no less wrong logical-absolutism, mutual bugbears that knock each other down and come to life again like figures in a Punch and Judy show.”⁵¹ Husserl reminds us that what he calls the essential style of experience indicates the “Being-sense” of the world, of all essentially relative realities which it would be absurd to try to rectify through an appeal to divine veracity. We can conclude this set of suggestions and indications by an assertion from the *Ideas* which already cited: “To each region and category of would-be objects corresponds phenomenologically not only a basic type of sense or assertions, but also a basic kind of original presenting consciousness for such senses, and, pertaining to it, a basic type of originary evidence which is essentially motivated by originary givenness of such a nature.”⁵²

It is appropriate to enlarge the idea of evidence, not only, as we have said, integrating it with sensuous and empirical experience, but also, integrating it

with the entire affective domain. "Cogito can signify 'I perceive,' 'I remember,' or 'I expect' – modes of consciousness that indeed belong to the doxic sphere, though not in the sphere of predicatively determining thinking. But it can also signify: I exercise 'valuing' emotional activities, in liking or disliking, in hoping or fearing, or volitional activities, or the like."⁵³ It is through this interpretation, which is quite close to the Cartesian cogito, and which may be linked to a reflection on Hume's theory of belief,⁵⁴ that we are able to understand this broadening of evidence and its application to the affective domain. "But always preliminary to this grasping is affection, which is not the affecting of an isolated, particular object."⁵⁵ The pre-given of which we have spoken is, thus, an affective pre-given, outside of cognitive performances.

If we study the possible consequences of the theories which we have considered, on the idea of truth, we will see that three quite different conceptions are developed from them: "Everything that exists is 'in itself,' in a maximally broad sense, and stands in contrast to the accidental being 'for me' of the particular acts; likewise every truth is, in its broadest sense, a 'truth in itself.' "⁵⁶ It is possible to recognise here the theories of Bolzano and, at the same time, one of the origins of the distinction between noesis and noema.

Nevertheless, we must add that for external perception, in opposition to internal perception, an essential characteristic is its partial nature, that is that to every perception there belongs a complex horizon of un-fulfilled anticipations which demand to be fulfilled, and thus contain simple significations oriented toward potential corresponding evidences. "This imperfect evidence becomes more nearly perfect in the actualizing synthetic transitions from evidence to evidence, but necessarily in such a manner that no imaginable synthesis of this kind is completed as an adequate evidence: any such synthesis must always involve unfulfilled expectant, and accompanying meanings."⁵⁷ "The inability to be perceived immanently, and therefore, generally to find a place in the system of experience belongs in essence and 'in principle' altogether to the thing as such. . . . Thus the thing itself, *simpliciter*, we call transcendent."⁵⁸ Husserl takes up this idea again in *Experience and Judgment*: "Where, in virtue of their essence, the underlying substrates themselves can never come to perfectly adequate givenness. . . and perfectly adequate givenness is an idea located in infinity. . . ."⁵⁹ There is a perpetual anticipation of new givens. The completely determinate subject, "the identical self fully determinate in itself" is an idea of reason.⁶⁰

We must certainly, here as well, take into account the fact that there is an evidence, a truth; but the judgement of perception cannot ever contain the state of affairs itself which it designates; and we must satisfy ourselves with this fundamental inadequacy, for it is the nature of our perception.⁶¹

A second conception of truth, implicit and even sometimes explicit in the works of Husserl, has been thoroughly elucidated by Thao in his penetrating book mentioned above: "Dogmatism necessarily ends in skepticism, both are

founded on the definition of truth as absolute." It was this point which we were making by citing the passage of Husserl which shows how each of these doctrines calls up the other, and negates it. "Now, this is precisely the intrinsic absurdity of this common postulate that phenomenology denounces. . . . Truth, as defined through evidence, may not, by that very fact, be posited in the absolute of an in-itself, for it belongs precisely to the sense of all evidence to be able to be mistaken. . . . Thus , truth is defined only through its becoming, that is to say, not as an intelligible movement of ideas, but as effectively lived temporality. Constituting consciousness is a living present which constantly flows, and each moment, in its turn, acquires the privilege of actuality."⁶²

But we find a third conception of truth, particularly in the *Formal and Transcendental Logic*, a conception which allows us to comprehend how the theory of truth, which will later be developed by Heidegger, is linked to an aspect of the theory of Husserl. "We must start by going back from the judgement to the judgement-substrates, from truths to their objects-about-which."⁶³ We must distinguish, on the one hand, truth as correctness of judgement, which we will lead back to self-givenness (experience in the broad and the narrow senses), and to adequation; and on the other, veritable being.⁶⁴ As Thao says, in developing a similar idea, "the actual order does not go from purely verbal effectuations of predicative forms to the consideration of their possible truth. In fact, we start from effective judgements where the world is constituted in intelligible determinations, and logic is originally defined as a doctrine of being."⁶⁵ "The problem of the passage from the evidence of distinctness to the evidence of clarity – in vulgar terms: the problem of the passage from formal signification to the real signification of logic – is thus not raised, distinctness is only a moment, artificially detached from clarity."⁶⁶

We can now move to a group of concepts which will lead us toward the idea of world.

All perception is surrounded by an environment: "The specifically apprehended thing has its environment of things, which perceptually appear with it, but which lacks a separate positing of existence. . . . It is to a certain extent a unity of potential situations."⁶⁷ We find an analogous idea in the *Formal and Transcendental Logic*, which is called there "horizon intentionality"; "without which the surrounding world of daily living would not be an experienced world, is always prior to its explication by someone who reflects. And it is the factor that essentially determines the sense of occasional judgements – always, and far beyond what at any time is, or can be, said expressly and determinately in the words themselves."⁶⁸ And we again discover the same idea in *Experience and Judgment*, there called a "field of experience," which is the environment of other presences which are always co-given as a plurality of substrates which co-affect the same subject. It is a multiple unity of affection.⁶⁹

The importance of the idea of world in phenomenology is well known. A

world, as Husserl tells us in the *Formal and Transcendental Logic*, does not come as if from the outside through a door into my ego, as Aristotle expressed it. "The relation of my consciousness to a world is not a matter of fact imposed on me either by a god, who adventitiously decides it thus, or by a world existing beforehand accidentally, and a causal regularity belonging thereto."⁷⁰ There is, then, a primordial experience of the world, an experience of a universal style in which I move.⁷¹ Here again we are able to complete the indications of the *Formal and Transcendental Logic* with those of *Experience and Judgment*: "It is this universal ground of belief in a world, which all praxis presupposes, not only the praxis of life but also the theoretical praxis of cognition. The being of the world in totality is that which is not first the result of an activity of judgement but which forms the presupposition of all judgement. Consciousness of the world is consciousness in the mode of certainty of belief. . . ."⁷² And this world, Husserl tells us, must not be confused with the totality of nature; it is something prior: it is absolute substrate; that is to say that in it is everything and that it is in nothing external to it.⁷³ It is what Husserl calls the *Lebenswelt*, that is, the world in which we always and already live, and which furnishes the ground for all achievements of cognition and of all scientific determination.⁷⁴ It is what we have already called the passive pre-given.⁷⁵

Following Husserl, all our experience takes place in space and time. This holds, above all, for the world of purely sensuous experience, to which he calls our attention in *Experience and Judgment*; but it also holds, mediately, for human subjects or animals, for the products of culture, for the things of which we make use, for works of art, etc. "Everything mundane participates in nature. The naturalization of spirit is not an invention of philosophers – it is a fundamental error if falsely interpreted and misused, but only under these conditions. In fact, it has its ground and its justification in this, that mediately or immediately all that is worldly has its place in the spatio-temporal sphere. Everything is here or there, and its place is determinable, as are places in general, in the same way that everything spatio-temporal is determinable, i.e., temporally determinable by means of physical instruments. . . . In this way, everything non-sensible partakes of the sensible: it is an existent from the world, existing in the one spatio-temporal horizon."⁷⁶ But we must again repeat that physical time is only an idealization of something more fundamental, of this immediate experience which does not know exact space, objective time, or objective causality.⁷⁷

Prior to the scientific world and even prior to the world of common sense, there exists something which we could call the "pre-world,"⁷⁸ that is, a world which is not articulated through forms and categories. There is something which is, ". . . my bodily organism, which is, according to its sense, spatial and a member of an environment made up of spatial bodies, a nature (within which I encounter the bodily organism of someone else) – it points back, I

say, to the fact that none of these can as yet have objective world significance. My intrinsically first psycho-physical ego (we are referring here to constitutional strata, not temporal genesis), relative to whom the intrinsically first someone-else must be constituted, is, we see, a member of an intrinsically first nature, which is not yet objective nature, a nature the spatio-temporality of which is not yet objective spatio-temporality. . . .”⁷⁹ Certainly this is the same conception which may be found in the *Cartesian Meditations*, which is called there “world” or “primordial transcendence,” or, as Husserl says, “primordial.” The world is exterior to me, but not external in the spatio-natural sense;⁸⁰ it is within this world, whose externality is prior to all conceptual externality, that other egos live and move.⁸¹

It is to this prior world, prior not to experience, but in experience, that the analyses of *Experience and Judgment* apply, and, in particular, the assertion that we may find there the presence in experience of relations. “We carefully consider the pen-holder, for example. Our attention wanders from it, which, (as our theme) is still retained in grasp, to the table top. We also draw the latter within our sphere of observation, not as a principal theme but only as a theme in relation to the pen-holder. Without our having once again to turn expressly to the pen-holder in a new original apprehension, it is for us, as long as it is retained in grasp, ‘the pen-holder lying on the table.’ In the same way, when we bring into consideration the pencil, which lies beside the pen-holder, there follows an apprehension of the ‘lying next to’ but still without any predicative formation.”⁸² We find here something analogous to the radical empiricism of James, in so far as it includes relations within experience.

If now, after what we have said about the world, we approach the question of space and time, while not fully respecting the order of Husserl’s exposition, we are able, from the outset, to stress the objectivity of space and time. “The unity of the perception of a plurality of individuals is thus a unity on the basis of a connecting temporal form. It is the unity which is at the bottom of the relation already alluded to, namely, that of ‘lying beside one another,’ hence of relations of spatial position. Individual objects of perception have their reciprocal spatial positions on the basis of their belonging-together in a single time.”⁸³ In a most precise way, the time by which they are united is not the subjective time of lived experiences of perception, but the objective time which belongs to their sense as objects. It is thus not simply a matter of fact that lived experiences of perception are immanently contemporaneous, that is, inclusive in a general way, of a manner to form a unique perception of the multiplicity, but it also concerns the fact that the objectivities which are intended in themselves as real, are meant as enduring contemporaneously, objectively. The unity of intuition which we find here is, thus, not only united on the foundation of the intuitive intending of the multiplicity in the living present, but is also the unity of the objective whole. This will become clearer when contrasted to other cases where there also is intuitive unity, but where

the things intuitively unified are intended objectively as existent in different times, as, for example, the objects of fantasy, in so far as they do not exist in an objective time. This is why we will be forced to go beyond the domain of the things which are always particular, a domain in which, so far, our investigations have been confined. Up until now, perception has been at issue, that is to say, positional consciousness which intends its object as existent; and these objects were only thought as objects for me; as objects of a world which was only for me. But the reference to an objective world which is inevitable here, and in the following, constrains us to go beyond the domain of the "being-only for me," so that we may understand the oppositions between perception and memory, on the one hand, and the lived-experiences of imagination on the other, as differences which are conditioned by this opposition. "Objective time, objective being, and all the determinations of existents as objective, certainly designate a being not only for me but also for others."⁸⁴ We may say, from another point of view, that there is a temporal structure of the passive field, which is prior to all acts, and which constitutes the passive unity of the pre-given of the multiple perceived things.⁸⁵

It is starting from the things given in experience that the orders of space and time are constituted, the situations within space and time. "The individuality of this becoming founds the connecting unity and order (relations). Matters are similar with the order of spatial position, which is founded in the temporal order of individual objects. Space is the order of the individual simultaneity of sensuously given (material) things. The individualizing moments (and in the temporal form of at-the-same-time, the here and there individualizes) can found continuity (*Zusammenhang*); and spatial position, spatial extension, founds spatial continuity."⁸⁶ In this way, space is constituted as a form of order.

From this space, the human mind will constitute the space of common sense, and the space of science, through a process of idealization and nominalization. It is the result of this process of idealization that we finally take for reality. ". . . to interpret the world of our experience always according to the sense of this garb of ideas thrown over it, as if it were thus 'in itself.'"⁸⁷ Moreover, nominalization transforms collections, numbers, and relations, the operations and the results of operations which consciousness reaches, into independent objects.⁸⁸

But there will always remain an element of indeterminacy in a space thus constituted. "I have complete individualization only when I return to my *hic et nunc*. Otherwise, I have a non-intuitivity; an intuitive representation, certainly, but, with regard to that which individualizes the situation, it is an indeterminateness; I have a relative individualization of bodies compared with other bodies in a relative spatial order, but the latter itself is, however, not yet fully determined as regards its position."⁸⁹ It is only when I appeal to the here and now that I obtain, in spite of the absence of logical

determination, the desired determinability for individual intuition as such.

On the other hand, we know that within the domain of primordial experience, there is no exact space or objective time.⁹⁰ Thus determination appears in the sphere intermediate between primordial experience and the completely formalized experience of science.

It is none the less true that, for Husserl, everything mundane is here or there, and that the place is determinable, as we have already underlined.⁹¹ It seems legitimate to conclude from this that when he formulates this claim, Husserl places himself at the point of view of this intermediate experience, situated between the two extreme experiences.

It is now appropriate to study more closely the Husserlian theory of time. For the moment, we will not take into account the lectures on the *Phenomenology of Internal Time Consciousness*, as Husserl had the intention to change them profoundly. From the start, we will emphasize duration (*durée*), properly so called. "The evidence of the absolutely original present of a sounding tone in the momentary now-point (naturally we are not referring to a mathematical point) functions, of essential necessity, in connection with an evidence of the 'just gone' and an evidence of the originally 'coming.'"⁹² This example is taken up again in *Experience and Judgment*: "If we come now to the active (receptive) apprehension of the sound which rings out, then the apprehension itself endures continuously. . . . we are not turned toward the momentary and yet continuously changing present (the phase sounding now) but through and beyond this present, in its change, toward the sound as a unity by which its essence presents itself in this change, in this flux of appearances. When we examine this more closely, we see that the activity of apprehension is directed toward the sound which is presently vivid in such a way that it is apprehended as a sound which continuously endures as present, so that the primary ray of apprehension of the ego traverses the central moment of the original now (toward the moment of the sound appearing in this form); and that is to say that it goes toward the now in its continuous transitional flux, i.e., from a now to an ever new now, and therewith to an ever new moment appearing in the flux of moments emerging for the first time. A now never remains as such; each one becomes one just past and then becomes the past of the next. . . ."⁹³ There is thus a continuity of past experiences; and all this constitutes the flowing unity of activity. One may say the same of the wave of the horizons of the future. We thus see that the activity of apprehending the tone which concretely endures, has a complicated structure which is erected on the foundation of the lawfulness of the constitution of the living duration which flows, prior to all activity, in its own passivity.⁹⁴ As Thao says: "The movement of the living present consists in constantly going beyond, while maintaining in itself its past as a moment overcome, conserved, gone beyond; . . . it is this movement. . . which constitutes the tone

in its different modes; the past as that which is gone beyond, the present as the going beyond itself, in so far as it is actually accomplished, the future as that which is coming to consciousness as it is going beyond toward it. In retention, the past is maintained in itself; in protention, the future announces itself; the transcending of the past into the future constitutes the actuality of the present, as passage from the in-itself to the for-itself.⁹⁵

We are led, thus, to say something about the theory of protention and retention. It is in *Zeitbewusstseins* that the first study of it is found. Even beneath memory properly so called, there may be found retention, or primary remembrance, which is close to immediate intuition, and, as a fundamental phenomenon, gives birth to memory, and is the foundation of it. It is, as Ricoeur says, the lived-through (*vécu*), still retained in the present.^a The consequence of the affirmation of retention is that, as Husserl says in the *Ideas*, evidence applies as well to the experiences that have just been immediately lived through as to those which are presently lived. ". . . it would be absurd to doubt whether that which we discover as 'still' consciously there when we give a glance backwards (the immediately retained) ever existed. . .

⁹⁶ Between *Zeitbewusstseisns* and the *Ideas* are situated the lectures on the *Idea of Phenomenology*, in which we find the same assertion. There Husserl considers as givens not only the present cogitatio, but also that which is given later, in a "fresh recollection."⁹⁷ We find the same idea much later in the *Formal and Transcendental Logic*: "An intentionally modified and much more complicated mode of the giving of something itself is the memory that does not emerge emptily but, on the contrary, actualizes 'it itself' again: clear recollection."⁹⁸ Certainly, it seems that there is something different here than primary retention, but it is, in all cases, founded on it.

This entire theory of retentions, which must, moreover be completed by the theory of retentions of retentions, and by the theory of protentions, must not cause us to forget that, according to Husserl, the entire theory of time is essentially founded in the present. "Every experience is in itself. . . a constant flow of retentions and protentions mediated by a primordial phase which is itself in flux, in which the living now of the experience comes to consciousness contrasting with its 'before' and 'after.' "⁹⁹ And it may even be noted that the theories of retention and protention have, as a goal, the enrichment of the characteristic which we attribute to the living present. As Thao says, ". . . when consciousness which is in time, loses itself constantly, the modes of temporalization of the living present represent a maintaining, and a perpetual conquest of the self: the past is there retained as that which is again (retention), and the future comes to pass as that which is already (protention). In this continual movement, where each present moment passes immediately into retention, and sinks more and more into the past, but into a past which is again, while the future, always and already possessed in protention, is

actualized in a living-present, the self remains self-identical through constant self-renewal. It is, precisely, the same, only as always other, in this absolute surge of an eternal present.”¹⁰⁰

This present is what Husserl calls the “streaming present” (*strömende Gegenwart*).¹⁰¹

But in spite of the flowing character of time, we must attend to an aspect which must complete it. This is what, in *Experience and Judgment*, Husserl called the principle of the unity of recollection. There is an unity of duration which characterizes each of our remembrances; there is an unity of memory, as there is of perception; and these are the “horizon intentions” which place it in relation to objectivity.¹⁰²

Finally, it is equally necessary to complete the Husserlian theory of time through what Husserl calls “omni-temporality” (*Allzeitlichkeit*).

Certain, again as Thao says: “. . . ‘eternal’ consciousness could not be known apart from consciousness which is lost in time.”¹⁰³ “. . . supertemporality turns out to be omnitemporality, as a correlate of free producibility and reproducibility at all times.”¹⁰⁴ “The timelessness of the objectivities of the understanding, their being ‘everywhere and nowhere,’ proves, therefore, to be a privileged form of temporality, a form which distinguishes these objectivities fundamentally and essentially from individual objectivities. That is, a supertemporal unity pervades the temporal multiplicity within which it is situated: this supertemporality implies omnitemporality. The same unity is present in each multiplicity of this kind, and it is such that it is present in time essentially. If I now make a judgement, then the what of the judgement, the judicative proposition, is present to consciousness in the mode of now; and yet it is not at a point in time and is not represented in any such point by an individual moment, an individual singularization. . . . such an irreality has the temporal being of supertemporality, of omnitemporality, which, nevertheless, is a mode of temporality.”¹⁰⁵

After having been concerned with the ideas of world, and then, of space and time, we can now pass to the domain of reflection, and examine the ideas of negation and of possibility. Husserl wrote in the *Ideas*: “In this connection we must first of all be clear on this point, that every variety of ‘reflexion’ has the character of a *modification of consciousness* . . . we speak of modifications here just in so far as every reflexion has its essential origin in changes of standpoint, whereby a given experience or unreflective experience-datum undergoes a certain transformation . . . ”¹⁰⁶ There is a certain tension, within phenomenological doctrine, between the claim that within the domain of consciousness there are not the diverse perspectives which are found in the domain of external things, and that there is an identity of the intuited and the intuiting, and the affirmation, which we have just seen, of a modification of consciousness through reflection.

"It thus appears that negation is not first the business of the act of predicative judgement but that in its original form it already appears in the prepredicative sphere of receptive experiences."¹⁰⁷ In the processes of disappointment, of deception, we will find the primary form of negation. A second idea which Husserl proposes to us concerning negation, is that it presupposes the normal originary objective constitution, that is, what we call normal perception. "It must be present in order to be able to be modified in its originality. Negation is a modification of consciousness. . . . It is always a partial cancellation on the basis of a certitude of belief which is thereby maintained, ultimately, on the basis of the universal belief in the world."¹⁰⁸

We find in the *Paris Lectures*, a number of clues to the idea of possibility. "Potentiality in existence is just as important as actuality, and potentiality is not empty possibility. Every cogito – for instance, an external perception, a recollection, etc. – carries in itself a potentiality immanent to it and capable of being disclosed. It is a potentiality for possible experiences referring to the same object, experiences which the ego can actualize, horizons, and in various senses. Perception occurs and sketches a horizon of expectations, the future as it might be perceived that is to say, it points to coming series of perceptions. Each series, in turn, carries potentialities with it, such as the fact that I can look in one direction rather than in another, and can redirect the run of my perceptions. Each recollection leads me to a long chain of possible recollections ending in the now; and at each point of immanent time it refers me to other present events that might be disclosed; and so on."¹⁰⁹ Thus, as he will say later in the *Cartesian Meditations*, ". . . every actuality involves its potentialities which are not empty possibilities, but rather possibilities intentionally predelineated in respect of content – namely, in the actual subject process itself – and, in addition, having the character of possibilities actualizable by the ego."¹¹⁰

In *Experience and Judgment*, Husserl goes back further toward the psychological origin of the phenomenon, back toward the struggle between the tendencies of belief. Thus, possibility appears as a phenomenon which already appears, as does negation, within the pre-predicative sphere, and is "most at home" in this sphere. While deception is the origin of negation, hesitation is the origin of possibility.

As we have seen, one of the most important points here is the distinction between empty and fulfilled possibility; and, as with negation, we may discover rapprochements between the Husserlian and the Bergsonian theories of possibility.

To go further into the study of the forms and activities of our mind, we must take into account the fact that propositions involve not only syntactic forms, forms of subject and predicate but also a syntactic matter: the core formations, for example, bodies.¹¹¹ Therefore, we come, naturally, to the study of the idea of object, and of thing. We may begin here with a passage

from the lectures, *The Idea of Phenomenology*. It is a question, Husserl tells us, of "... distinctly connected and as it were congruent unities, and unities of cognition, which, as unities of cognition have also their unitary objective correlates."¹¹² We have to take account of a reservation which Husserl expresses in *Experience and Judgment*, in a footnote: "This talk about objects is, to be sure, admissible here only with reservations. For in the natural process of external perception we do not have sense data objectively, but through them we are directed toward the 'perspectively shaded' perceived things appearing in them. They first become objects in the proper sense (thematic objects) in reflection by means of abstractive separations."¹¹³ In spite of the reservations that this note displays, the importance of this theory of objects in phenomenology is well known.

In all these reflections on the ideas of object there are implicated certain ideas concerning substance. The distinction between substance and its determinations is, from the start, for Husserl, relative. "Everything that affects and is objective can just as well play the role of object-substrate as that of object-determination or explicate."¹¹⁴ We are always able to call what comes under the attentive gaze, a substrate, and, in this way, conceive of the idea of substrate in general.

From the general theory of objects, we are able to move naturally to the theory of the thing. "'Perception' in the normal sense of the word does not only indicate generally that this or that thing *appears* to the ego in *embodied presence*, but that the ego is *aware* of the appearing thing, grasps it as really being there, and posits it."¹¹⁵ In the *Formal and Transcendental Logic*, Husserl tells us how, "in repeated experience – before any repetition, in the continuous modification of the momentary perception in retention and protention, then in possible recollections, repeatable at will —there comes about, with their synthesis, the consciousness of the same, moreover as an 'experience' of this self-sameness. The possibility of such original identification belongs, as essential correlate, to the sense of every object of experience . . . a sense determined to the effect that experience is an evident seizing upon and having of either an immanent or a real individual datum itself."¹¹⁶ "Essentially in the continuous and discrete syntheses of manifold experiences, the experiential object, as such, is built up 'visibly': in the varying show of ever new sides, ever new moments belonging to its own essence. And from this constitutive (*aufbauenden*) life, which predelineates its own possible harmonious flow, the sides and moments and the object itself (as showing itself only thus, variously) draw their respective senses, each as the identical that belongs to possible and – after their actualization – repeatable shapings of something itself (*Selbstbildungen*)."¹¹⁷ Similar ideas are brought forth in the *Paris Lectures*: "It follows that the stream of consciousness is permeated by the fact that consciousness relates itself to objects (*Gegenständlichkeit*). This relation is an essential characteristic of every act of consciousness. It is the

ability to pass over – through synthesis – from perennially new and greatly disparate forms of consciousness to an awareness of their unity.”¹¹⁸

And again we can find the same elements of a theory of the thing in *Experience and Judgment*.¹¹⁹ The successive appearances are apprehended as appearances of the same object, toward which perception directs itself, in a way to apprehend a unity of identity, something which was and will be, as it is.¹²⁰

Starting from this, we would be constrained to move to the indications which Husserl gives about the particular thing which is my body. But it is to Volume II of *Ideen* that we should refer for such a study, as well as for a study of the soul, as it is what Husserl calls a founded object, that is, an existent which can only be perceived on the foundation of another existent, especially in the case of the soul of another.

A certain number of Husserl’s meditations are devoted to the idea of nature. “From the phenomenon world, from the world appearing with an objective sense, a substratum becomes separated, as the ‘nature’ included in my ownness, a nature that must always be carefully distinguished from nature pure and simple – that is to say: from the nature that becomes the theme of the natural scientist. This nature, to be sure, is likewise the result of abstraction, namely abstraction from everything psychic and from those predicates of the objective world that have arisen from persons.”¹²¹ In nature, in the full sense, by body will be found, whereas in simple nature, there will figure body in general, body as extended.

Within nature in the full sense, we find the presence of others. Here Husserl presents a problem with which he deals in the fifth *Cartesian Meditation* and in *Ideen* II. Let us, for the moment, hold on only to the formulation of the problem. “The character of the existent ‘other’ has its basis in this kind of verifiable accessibility of what is not originally accessible.”¹²² The question is of knowing how, from the midst of my world, I am able to have the idea of the world of the other, at the heart of which is the other.

Because of the fact that the world of our experience also includes others, things do not simply display natural determinations, but are also determined as objects of culture, as things molded by man, and in this way, endowed with predicates of value, or utility, etc. We are, thus, led beyond pure and simple nature.¹²³

Must the idea of the world make us take up the idea of god? “The relation of my consciousness to a world is not a matter of fact imposed on me either by a god, who adventitiously decides it thus, or by a world accidentally existing beforehand, and a causal regularity belonging thereto.”¹²⁴ Thus the idea of the world appears prior to that of god. There is, however, a subjective a priori which precedes the being of the world, as it does the being of a god. It seems nevertheless, that there would be a difference between the case of the world, and that of a god, although Husserl does not expressly call attention to this

point. Even admitting that the subjective a priori precedes the world, as it does a god, there is a much stronger bond between the world and this a priori, than there is between god and it. But this Husserl did not say. What he said is only that, in the case of a god, as in the case of the other, the fact that I posit the problem need not imply that it is I who imagines, and makes this higher transcendence.

In this way, we are led to say some more about the idea of transcendence in phenomenology. Husserl tells us that among lived-experiences, it is transcendently directed perceptions which posit being; that is, what we call external perceptions.¹²⁵ In the lectures on the *Idea of Phenomenology*, Husserl tells us that what is mysterious and problematic in the possibility of cognition, is its transcendence: "All cognition of the natural sort, and especially the prescientific, is cognition which makes its object transcendent, it posits its objects as existent, claims to reach matters of fact which are not 'strictly given' to it, are not 'immanent' to it."¹²⁶ Husserl distinguishes two senses of the word "transcendence." In the first sense, he wishes to express the fact that the object of cognition is not really contained in the act of cognition, the word "real" taken here as synonymous with the word "immanent." The thing that cognition signifies, and that it claims to perceive, or to remember, cannot be found in the cogitatio itself, taken as a lived-experience, and cannot be considered an element of it. In the second sense, the word "transcendence" applies to all non-evident cognitions which intend, or posit, something objective, but which do not intuit it. This second transcendence is opposed to a second sort of immanence, which is the fact that something is an absolute and clear given, self-givenness in the absolute sense. Husserl remarks that there is often confusion between these two sorts of immanence and transcendence, in so far as a deeper critical interpretation has not been introduced. He observes that someone who rejects the first position, that is to say, that of the possibility of the first transcendence, brings the second sense into play at the core of the first, that is, tends to admit as given only that which is given evidently.¹²⁷ At the end of the first lecture, he concludes that in all investigation of the theory of cognition, it is necessary to accomplish the reduction relative to that theory, that is, to affect all transcendence, which is here introduced, with the mark of exclusion, or with the mark of indifference, that is, to put completely out of play all transcendences.¹²⁸

We rediscover transcendence in the *Cartesian Meditations*: "This 'transcendence' is part of the intrinsic sense of anything worldly . . ."¹²⁹

Later, in the same work, he observes that transcendence, in each of its forms, is an immanent characteristic, constituted in the interior of the ego. "Every imaginable sense, every imaginable being, whether the latter is called immanent or transcendent, falls within the domain of transcendental subjectivity, as the subjectivity that constitutes being and sense."¹³⁰ This affirmation leads him to the transcendental idealism of the *Cartesian*

Meditations. It is, nevertheless, true that all perception of the type that Husserl studied, is transcendent in the sense that it is an act by which there is posited something more than is simply there.¹³¹

We are able, thus, to preserve two ideas from the *Cartesian Meditations*: the first is the distinction between the two transcendencies, and the assertion that there had been in the philosophical problematic, a confusion between the transcendent as different from the psychological given, and the transcendent as unclear and problematic by itself. The second is the affirmation, ultimately idealistic, of immanent transcendence.

In the *Formal and Transcendental Logic*, perception is newly defined as self-giving, and as a self-giving of the transcendent: “ . . . in the manner of something instituted originally, this transcendence lies in the proper essence of the experience itself.”¹³²

What we have said of Husserl’s attitude toward transcendence shows us the dual tendencies within his reflections, since after bringing to light the element of transcendence in perception, he tries to bring it back to immanence. But casting a glance at the different elements of phenomenology which we have revealed, we may ask ourselves whether all the stress on the pre-predicative, on the affective, on the intentional, and also on the hyletic, is not in danger of being lost, or, at least blurred, if, insisting too much on the immanence of transcendence, we neglect what has made us respect the phenomenon, that is, what, in consciousness, makes us apprehend that which is beyond consciousness.

TRANSLATOR'S NOTE

^aRicoeur says, in a note to his translation of *Ideas*, “*The Phenomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness* gave us the first analysis of phenomenological time, and opposed for the first time, retention or ‘primary memory,’ which still participates in immediate intuition, and recollection, memory properly so called. The lived-experience ‘retained’ in the present, is again a moment of the lived. Reflection rests on this ‘retentional’ structure of the lived-experience. *PITC*, paragraphs 11-13; appendix I (pp. 84-86) on retention; paragraphs 14-18 on recollection. Memory, or recollection, thus reflected upon, rests on a pre-reflexive memory, on the property of the lived-experience of retaining the past: I perceive the same thing as ‘coming to be as expected’; thus reflection is able to come after its object, and to uncover from the lived-experience what ‘had been,’ without having been reflected upon.” Our translation. *Ideas*, F – p. 248 n.

NOTES TO THE TEXT

1. See on this point, as on many of the following M. Merleau-Ponty. *The Phenomenology of Perception*, trans. Colin Smith (New York: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1962); French ed., *Phénoménologie de la perception*, (Paris:

- Éditions Gallimard, 1945). In this article we have made use, on many occasions, of the excellent first part of the book by Tran-Duc-Thao. *Phénoménologie et matérialisme dialectique*, (Paris: Éditions Mihn-Tan, 1950). We have taken the liberty here, to take up again some citations which appeared in our article, "Notes on the first part of *Experience and Judgment*," *Revue de la métaphysique et de morale*, 1951. [Translated above.]
2. *FTL*, E - p. 155, F - p. 211, G - p. 139.
 3. *Ibid.*, E - p. 111, F - p. 152, G - pp. 98-99.
 4. *EJ*, E - p. 197, F - p. 238, G - p. 231.
 5. *FTL*, E - p. 314, F - pp. 408-9, G - p. 276.
 6. *IP*, E - p. 4, F - pp. 1067, G - p. 6.
 7. *EJ*, E - pp. 27-28, F - p. 31, G - p. 22.
 8. *Ibid.*, E - p. 126, F - p. 149, G - p. 143.
 9. *Ideas*, our translation, E - pp. 356-57, F - p. 467, G - p. 340.
 10. *CM*, E - p. 57, F - pp. 48-49, G - p. 93.
 11. Thao, our translation, p. 193.
 12. *Ibid.*
 13. *Ibid.*, p. 202.
 14. *FTL*, E - p. 111, F - p. 152, G - p. 99.
 15. *EJ*, E - p. 234, F - p. 283, G - p. 279.
 16. *Ibid.*, E - p. 169, F - p. 202, G - p. 198.
 17. *Ideas*, our translation, E - p. 92, F - p. 89, G - p. 59.
 18. *EJ*, E - p. 32, F - p. 36, G - p. 27. This is a point on which the studies of M. Merleau-Ponty corroborated the assertions of Husserl.
 19. *FTL*, E - p. 156, F - p. 212, G - p. 139.
 20. *Ibid.*, E - pp. 167-68, F - pp. 228-29, G - p. 150.
 21. *Ibid.*, E - p. 314, F - p. 408, G - p. 276.
 22. *Ibid.*, E - p. 302, F - p. 396, G - p. 265.
 23. *EJ*, E - p. 46, F - pp. 53-54, G - p. 44.
 24. *Ibid.*, E - pp. 19-20, F - pp. 22-23, G - p. 13.
 25. *Ibid.*, E - p. 134, F - p. 158, G - p. 153.
 26. *Ibid.*, E - pp. 29-30, F - p. 53, G - p. 24.
 27. *Ibid.*, E - p. 46, F - p. 53, G - p. 44.
 28. *FTL*, E - p. 209, F - p. 283, G - p. 186.
 29. *Ibid.*, E - p. 160, F - p. 217, G - p. 143.
 30. *Ibid.*, E - pp. 209-210, F - p. 283, G - p. 186.
 31. *Ibid.*, E - p. 235, F - p. 315, G - p. 208.
 32. *Ideas*, E - pp. 197-98, F - pp. 247-48, G - p. 179.
 33. *FTL*, E - pp. 111-12, F - p. 152, G - p. 99.
 34. *Ideas*, our translation, E - p. 198, F - p. 248, G - p. 179.
 35. *FTL*, E - p. 337, F - p. 430, G - p. 295.
 36. *EJ*, E - p. 72, F - p. 84, G - p. 74.
 37. *Ibid.*, E - p. 43, F - p. 50, G - p. 41.
 38. *Ibid.*, E - p. 113, F - p. 132, G - p. 125.
 39. *Ibid.*, E - p. 41, F - pp. 47-48, G - p. 38.
 40. *Ibid.*, E - p. 52, F - p. 61, G - p. 52.
 41. *Ibid.*, E - p. 150, F - p. 178, G - p. 172.
 42. *PL*, E - p. 29, G - p. 29.
 43. *EJ*, E - p. 62, F - p. 72, G - p. 64.
 44. *Ibid.*, E - p. 198, F - p. 238, G - p. 232. This region of passivity is also a region of

- anonymity. Beneath the cogito we find a thinking, anonymous life, *CM*, E – p. 74, F – p. 63, G – p. 84.
45. *FTL*, E – p. 319, F – p. 412, G – p. 280.
 46. Thao, p. 174.
 47. *IP*, E – p. 19, F – p. 45, G – p. 23.
 48. *FTL*, E – p. 157, F – p. 213, G – p. 140.
 49. Ibid., E – pp. 161-62, F – pp. 219-20, G – pp. 144-45.
 50. Ibid., E – p. 278, F – p. 369, G – p. 246. Cited by Thao, p. 222. Citing the passage of Husserl in the scientific universe which is but a garb of ideas thrown over the world of intuition and immediate experience, Tran-Duc-Thao, in his most penetrating book mentioned above, said that, “... the last analyses of Husserl, due to his genetic method, ended practically in a total skepticism; and the relativity of knowledge, for Husserl, must be understood in a sense which assimilates all types of truths.” Our translation, Thao, pp. 221-22. But, in fact, we cannot speak here of a total skepticism unless we adopt a dogmatism which reduces everything to scientific cognition. And we can equally dispute the claim of an assimilation of all types of truths; they remain distinct, each having its own value.
 51. Ibid., E – p. 278, F – pp. 369-70, G – pp. 245-46.
 52. *Ideas*, our translation, E – pp. 356-57, F – p. 267, G – p. 340.
 53. *FTL*, E – p. 135, F – p. 183, G – p. 120.
 54. Ibid., E – p. 210, F – p. 284, G – p. 186.
 55. *EJ*, E – pp. 29-30, F – p. 33, G – p. 24.
 56. *CM*, E – p. 61, F – p. 51, G – p. 96.
 57. Ibid., E – pp. 61-62, F – p. 52, G – p. 96.
 58. *Ideas*, E – p. 121, F – p. 136, G – p. 96.
 59. *EJ*, E – p. 287, F – p. 348, G – p. 346.
 60. Ibid.
 61. Ibid., E – p. 288, F – p. 349, G – pp. 346-47.
 62. Thao, our translation, p. 138.
 63. *FTL*, E – p. 202, F – p. 173, G – p. 179.
 64. Ibid., E – p. 192, F – p. 259, G – p. 170.
 65. Thao, our translation, p. 191.
 66. Ibid., p. 192.
 67. *Ideas*, our translation, E – p. 292, F – p. 380, G – p. 274.
 68. *FTL*, E – p. 199, F – p. 269, G – p. 177.
 69. *EJ*, E – pp. 149-50, F – p. 177, G – pp. 171-72.
 70. *FTL*, E – p. 251, F – p. 335, G – pp. 221-22.
 71. Ibid., E – p. 283, F – p. 376, G – p. 250.
 72. *EJ*, E – p. 30, F – p. 35, G – p. 25.
 73. Ibid., E – pp. 162-63, F – p. 163, G – p. 157.
 74. Ibid., E – p. 41, F – pp. 47-48, G – p. 38.
 75. Ibid., E – p. 30, F – p. 33, G – p. 24.
 76. Ibid., E – p. 34, F – pp. 38-39, G – p. 29.
 77. Ibid., E – p. 43, F – p. 50, G – p. 41.
 78. Cf. on this point, M. Merleau-Ponty, *The Phenomenology of Perception*, and the study, “Cézanne’s Doubt,” in *Sense and Non-Sense*, trans. H. Dreyfus (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1964); French ed., *Sens et non-sens*, (Paris: Editions Nagel, 1961).
 79. *FTL*, E – p. 240, F – p. 323, G – p. 213.

80. *CM*, E – p. 106, F – p. 89, G – p. 136.
81. *Ibid.*, E – p. 110, F – pp. 92-93, G – p. 140.
82. *EJ*, E – p. 153, F – pp. 181-82, G – pp. 175-76.
83. *Ibid.*, E – p. 158, F – p. 188, G – pp. 182-83.
84. *Ibid.*, E – p. 159, F – pp. 188-89, G – pp. 183-84.
85. *Ibid.*, E – p. 157, F – pp. 185-86, G – p. 180.
86. *Ibid.*, E – p. 185, F – pp. 221-22, G – p. 218.
87. *Ibid.*, E – p. 45, F – p. 52, G – p. 43.
88. *FTL*, E – p. 79, F – p. 109, G – pp. 69-70.
89. *EJ*, E – p. 186, F – p. 222, G – p. 219.
90. *Ibid.*, E – p. 43, F – p. 50, G – p. 41.
91. *Ibid.*, E – p. 34, F – pp. 38-39, G – p. 29.
92. *FTL*, E – p. 287, F – p. 380, G – p. 253.
93. *EJ*, E – p. 107, F – p. 125, G – p. 118.
94. *Ibid.*, E – p. 107, F – p. 126, G – p. 118. Cf. E – p. 112, F – p. 131, G – p. 124.
95. Thao, our translation, pp. 143-44 notes.
96. *Ideas*, E – p. 204, F – p. 257, G – pp. 184-85.
97. *IP*, E – p. 59, F – p. 100, G – p. 74.
98. *FTL*, E – p. 158, F – p. 147, G – p. 141.
99. *Ideas*, E – p. 202, F – p. 254, G – p. 182.
100. Thao, our translation, p. 139 n.
101. *Ideas*, E – p. 130, F – p. 149, G – p. 107. CM IV + V. Cf. also Ms. C21: "Dieses zugleich ist strömendes zugleich." Cited by Thao, p. 143 n.
102. *EJ*, E – p. 160, F – p. 191, G – pp. 185-86.
103. Thao, our translation, p. 139.
104. *CM*, E – p. 127, F – p. 108, G – p. 156, Cf. M. Merleau-Ponty, "Phenomenology and the Sciences of Man," in *The Primacy of Perception*, trans. J. Wild (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1964), pp. 49-50; French ed., "Les Sciences de l'homme et la phénoménologie," (Centre de Documentation Universitaire: Paris), p. 8.
105. *EJ*, E – p. 261, F – pp. 315-16, G – p. 313.
106. *Ideas*, E – p. 200-201, F – p. 252, G – p. 181.
107. *EJ*, E – p. 90, F – p. 105, G – p. 97.
108. *Ibid.*, E – p. 91, F – p. 107, G – p. 98.
109. *PL*, E – p. 18, G – pp. 18-19.
110. *CM*, E – p. 44, F – p. 38, G – pp. 81-82.
111. See Thao on this, p. 209 n.
112. *IP*, E – p. 10, F – p. 115, G – p. 13.
113. *EJ*, E – p. 255 n, F – p. 308, G – p. 151.
114. *Ibid.*, E – p. 132, F – p. 156, G – p. 151.
115. *Ideas*, E – p. 291, F – pp. 378-79, G – p. 274.
116. *FTL*, E – pp. 115-16, F – p. 212, G – p. 139.
117. *Ibid.*, E – p. 165, F – p. 224, G – p. 147.
118. *PL*, E – p. 18, G – p. 18.
119. *EJ*, E – pp. 35, 60-61, 83, 107-108; F – pp. 40-41, 70-71, 97-98, 125-126; G – pp. 31, 62, 88, 118.
120. Thao, pp. 172, 216.
121. *CM*, E – p. 96, F – p. 80, G – p. 127.
122. *Ibid.*, E – p. 114, F – p. 97, G – p. 144.
123. *EJ*, E – p. 138, F – pp. 163-64, G – p. 158.
124. *FTL*, E – p. 251, F – p. 335, G – p. 222.

125. *Ideas*, E – p. 291, F – p. 378, G – p. 274.
126. *IP*, E – p. 27, F – p. 59, G – pp. 34-35.
127. *Ibid.*, E – p. 28, F – pp. 60-61, G – pp. 35-36.
128. *Ibid.*, E – p. 31, F – p. 65, G – p. 39.
129. *CM*, E – p. 26, F – p. 22, G – p. 65.
130. *Ibid.*, E – p. 84, F – p. 71, G – p. 117.
131. *Ibid.*, E – p. 122, F – p. 103, G – p. 151.
132. *FTL*, E – pp. 164, 223; F – pp. 233, 312-13; G – pp. 146, 206.

THE SPECIFIC CHARACTER OF THE SOCIAL ACCORDING TO HUSSERL*

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Husserl did not hesitate to apply the methods of eidetic phenomenology to social phenomena, understanding by this the descriptive but systematic study of essences. Nor did he limit himself to it either: social facts are phenomena amongst many others, it does not seem necessary to accord them special consideration. Paradoxically, it was at the point where, elaborating the simply eidetic phenomenology in order to give philosophy a firm and scientific foundation, and believing himself, by a move which recaptures and revises the Cartesian Cogito, to have found it in the individual subject and in the domain which is its own, what he called the Transcendental ego and the monadological sphere, that Husserl was led to envisage and to study social being. If there is unshakable certainty only for the subject itself, then there is no hope for a philosophy and a science which, by definition, seek to establish theories valid for all. It is necessary, at all costs, to surmount solipsism; the reduction of the social world must lead to a phenomenology of society.

Husserl left us many investigations on the fundamental problems of sociology, although he never gave them a systematic treatment. The only one of these investigations which was known for a long time was the fifth *Cartesian Meditation*, which, nevertheless, is open to misleading interpretation, for, even if it represented, until recently, the principal document concerning the experience of the other.^{1,a} the properly social fact according to Husserl, cannot be discerned there. The *Crisis*, which contains analyses utilizable by the sociologist, was known also, but its center of interest is, rather, the philosophy of history. Moreover, the complete text of this work was published only after Husserl's death. Among the other posthumous publications, the most important from the sociological perspective is *Ideen II*, but the theory of society appears there only in an embryonic form.² The significance of the published texts can hardly be grasped other than by comparing them to the unpublished texts which have directly sociological themes.³ It is also through these central texts that the sociological importance

*Translated by Laurence E. Winters from "La spécificité du social d'après Husserl," *Cahiers internationaux de sociologie*, 25 (1958), pp. 135-51.

of a mass of connected analyses, and, as well, the incidental remarks dispersed throughout the manuscripts, may be comprehended.

We will not attempt here to display the theories of Husserl on life in society in their totality.⁴ We will be content, after having traced the major lines of his conception concerning the origin and nature of human society, to investigate what response Husserlian phenomenology is able to give to one of the most classical questions of sociology: that of the specific nature of the social.

Numerous and diverse phenomena converge in the appearance of social facts and in the formation of societies. In a first stage, individuals group themselves by virtue of their parental bonds and, in a general manner, following instinctive relationships. On the other hand, the cultural elements such as religion and science, played and still play an important role in the formations of certain peoples, and of certain groups. But amongst all these factors of social constitution, the latter presuppose the pre-existence of the state of society, and the former are pre-social. Doubtlessly, biological and instinctive phenomena establish internal relations between humans, but they precede the exercise of consciousness and, in all cases, self-consciousness, which is specific to humanity. "The activity of the individual subjects developed on the grounds of an obscure blind passivity; this is true as well of social activity."⁵

One can only have society by virtue of an internal relationship between its members. A society is specifically human by virtue of an internal relationship which is established at the level of consciousness, and which binds humans as conscious beings. The problem is, then, to find the specific point where the relation between humans becomes a human relationship, to disclose the phenomenon which brings about this mutation, and which does not presuppose any other of a similar type as prior. This is the problem of the phenomenon essential to the formation of human society, of the phenomenon which is, essentially, its origin.

This original phenomenon might be believed to be "intersubjectivity." The first transcendence [*dépassement*] of solipsism consists in the experience of the other, through which the subject recognizes the existence before him of a being which is similar to him; this operation can repeat itself, and the experience of the other become that of intersubjectivity, of an open multitude of subjects conscious of themselves and conscious of each other. Doesn't "intersubjectivity" imply the relation of consciousnesses, since all conceivable subjects could be reciprocally included in their respective fields of consciousness? Doesn't it entail the constitution of a surrounding world which, for them, is "common," and which they recognize as such?

However, intersubjectivity is not the only fundamental social phenomenon, for it does not create the effective union of consciousnesses, and does not display any act which would be truly common to two or more subjects. I am able to see the same thing, and thus to accomplish an act of perception which

has the same object as that of the other. This makes two acts which converge on a point, outside of our two consciousnesses. If we apperceive one another, and are conscious of it, there is definitely a convergence, but not a union of consciousnesses. My act and his are not only distinct, but, as well do not unite to form a single, and unique total act; they are simultaneous, juxtaposed, tangential, their fields overlap, but they are not essentially directed by each other. Each one understands for himself, and is sufficient to himself. The other [*autrua*] remains literally an other [*autre*]; I take no part in his activity, and he participates in no way in mine. "The fact of existing for the others and at the same time of having in common with them the same spatio-temporal surroundings . . . does not count as being 'socially' united within a community."⁶

For Husserl, the elementary social phenomenon, at the specifically human level, is communication. "All social unity has for a foundation . . . the actual relationship that is community through the exchange of thoughts, the simple community that is realized through discourse and the reception of discourse or, more clearly, by the fact of speaking and hearing."⁷

Communication is a complex phenomenon which requires the combination, and the superposition of many activities. It evidently presupposes the experience of the others, and of an environing world common to the subjects involved. But, in addition to these general conditions, other preparatory stages must be passed through: the experience of the others must be reciprocal and attentive; the reciprocity and the attentiveness must be comprised by each of the subjects face to face, and this, moreover, must be manifested in their mutual comprehension. The essential aspects of the phenomenon of communication itself are: on the part of the subject who takes the initiative, the deliberate resolve to manifest his thought to the other, and the manifesting of it in the form of a discourse, of a language which normally, but not necessarily, is oral; on the part of the subject whom he addresses, attention turned toward the discourse, comprehension of the discourse, and the manifestation of the comprehension by either an expressive attitude, or by another discourse. The agreement on the object of the communication and on the conclusion which the communicating subject desires, deepens and reinforces the union of the speakers, but it is not essential.

The relation realized through communication, by means of discourse, is a human social phenomenon, and is the very first one. It is a relation which is effectuated at the level of functional consciousness. It is established between two conscious subjects by means of active operations. It is a relation where I do not only accomplish certain acts, and am not only understood by the other as the author of these acts, but where the accomplishment of an act which is my own, motivates in the other the accomplishment of a complimentary act, in the form of an act of reception, confirming my intention to "say" something to him. The act of speaking is inconceivable without the act of listening and

reciprocally; they cannot exist without each other, and have sense only in being constituted entirely by each other. It is the relationship which is the first of this type, for it is the condition of all the unities of subjects, who could not agree on a theory, on a project, on an action, if they did not know what was the matter at hand. Their lives could not be unified at the conscious level if, first, there was not communication between their consciousnesses.

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Communication opens access to the state of society. For society to exist, it is necessary, in addition, that the unity of subjects be made and developed through the content of the communications, and it is necessary that the unity, which is evanescent in communication, acquire a certain permanence.

The extension of the effective unity of subjects is realized, first of all, on the level of sensible experience. "We do not see, we do not hear, etc. only next to each other, but as well, with each other."⁸ By the very fact of the experience of the other, we know already that the others would see and hear the same things as us. But the communication creates a quite different state of affairs: it gives us a world which is not only the "same," "identical" for all the subjects who are mutually familiar with it, but which, while remaining identical, is most truly "common." That which I do not perceive of a particular object and, in general, of the surrounding world, the others perceive, and that which they do not perceive, I perceive. In communicating our respective experiences, we obtain a total experience of an object and of a milieu, which unifies our particular experiences, which are partially different, granting them the status of complimentary experience, of "moments" of a single and unique, collective experience.

The unification of subjects is continued by the unification of efficient operations, by actions properly speaking, expressing the union of wills. It is thus that the "community," the collective unity, appears as a real existent in the world. "The community arises from an interpenetration of wills and from willed ends in the form of a community of plans and of labor, and the work that results is their common product."⁹ The accomplished deed is not a set of similar and parallel products of many agents, but a unique work that, due to the union of the efforts of all, is a common accomplishment. "In all these cases where we know ourselves bound unilaterally or reciprocally, by an intention such that it produces a unity of active work bearing on the common surrounding world. . . . the individual person without doubt works, but he embraces with his consciousness the other persons in the work and that which has been accomplished by them. . . ."¹⁰

Collectivation or socialization is able to effect all the modalities of the life of conscious subjects. That which is true of cognitive sensibility and laboring activity, is equally valid for affective sensibility, for our feelings, our needs,

our tendencies, and for the activities which follow from them. At the opposite extreme, the rational life, thought properly speaking, active, logical, and scientific, is also susceptible of taking on collective forms.

Thus instrumental social unions are formed, actual communities, in the double sense of communities which are constituted by means of acts, of operations of aware subjects, and of communities which are constituted in the present, at the actual moment. In order for there to exist an authentically human community, this aspect of activity, in the form, at least, of attentive consciousness, and this aspect of temporal actuality, is absolutely required.

But consciousness cannot ever be entirely active, and its activity leaves traces in the form of relatively permanent acquisitions, "gains" [*Erwerbe*]. These essential traits of individual consciousness are again found in the collective consciousness. Through oral, as well as written communication, the acquisitions of the one are able to become the benefit of the others; a considerable set of collective acquisitions is called culture. Through communication, assuring the transmission of the acquisitions, a society can perpetuate itself, and cooperation can be realized in succession as in co-existence. The permanence of the results permits the union of persons across time, and the union across time confers the historical dimension on the community.

Social unions do not all have the same degree of depth and intimacy. Although they transcend the importance of simple communication, many establish between their members only loose, or very delimited relations: this is what is observed in informal parties. They found a certain unity which is, for the most part, felt by the participants, since they designate themselves by the pronoun "we," but this "we" is momentary. To the contrary, an association ruled by statutes, and fixed by definite goals, a city and its population unified under a municipal administration, or, as well, a nation unified into a state, are societies in the full sense of the term. There the union of persons is as durable as it is because it is cemented by means of a group of collective acquisitions. It is penetrated by a functional, collective will. These communities are unified in a manner analogous to the individual, and possess a sort of "I," around which are centered, and to which are related, collective operations. A society of this type is what Husserl called a "person of a higher degree."¹¹ The notion of person is, thus, a generic concept which includes in its extension two types: the individual person, and the collective person.¹² A supra-personal consciousness is formed, but one which operates like the consciousness of a person, which lives in all the participants, which flows into them and yet, at the same time, emanates from them: it is the "collective spirit" [*Gemeingeist*].

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To grasp the specific nature of the social, it is indispensable, according to Husserl, to transcend what he calls the natural attitude, which consists in

attributing to all the beings in the world the mode of existence of material things. In this attitude, a human is considered as a body, and psychic phenomena, as derivative reality, caused by the physical and organic phenomena. Human bodies do not form between them a spatial continuity. Since there is no immediate action at a distance, the psychic lives which have their seats in bodies are, and remain, separately situated realities within the spatio-temporal extension of the universe. The only psychology which is at first possible is individual psychology, studying the general aspects present identically in the separate selves. Individual psychology is, then, the foundation of social psychology, of sociology, and the study of cultural phenomena.¹³ Moreover, societies do not form realities of a new type, and do not involve anything original from the psychological point of view. Everything which can be asserted concerning them are the manifestations of individual psychic beings, relating themselves to alien psychic individuals. If one takes the natural attitude, sociology cannot be anything but an interpsychology, for individuals, alone, have real existence.¹⁴

To the contrary, when the personalist attitude is adopted, which sees in subjects beings endowed with intentionality, society and social relations need no longer be perceived through the intermediary of individual psychology. The experience of the other, and the experience of social life, do not appeal to the exact and causal laws of nature. Without doubt, the subject knows the other through sensible phenomena, and corporeal manifestations, but he does not consider the body separately, and still less as a thing. Similarly, in a social relation such as communication, the subject directly grasps the relationship between his own acts and those of his co-speakers, their motivation through the foreign acts, and the union of the one with the other. All of this is grasped in and by consciousness, without the intrusion of any causal, and law-like element.

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A social phenomenon and, with good reason, a true society, cannot be confused with a sum, the arithmetical sum of acts, or of individual beings which compose it. A given sum disappears as such, as one removes from it one or several unities, but this is not the case with a social group which subsists as such, after the death, the expulsion, or the voluntary departure of even a considerable number of its adherents. "The nation is not a sum of individual persons, what would result from the death of certain individuals would not be the destruction of the existence of the nation."¹⁵

An arithmetical sum is the result of an operation which presupposes another, prior operation: the perception of a plurality, or rather, of a "collection." Couldn't society simply have the being of a collection? Husserl denies this expressly.¹⁶ To understand this denial, we must return to a conception which he sought to elaborate in the first of his works, and which he

never disavowed.¹⁷ A set appears as such to our eyes by means of an operation called “collective relation” [*kollektive Verbindung*], in which a unique interest, an effort of attention unites objects of consciousness with different contents into a whole. “If we ask ourselves what the relationship consists in when, for example, we think a plurality of things as disparate as redness, the moon, and Napoleon, we obtain the response that it consists uniquely in the fact that we think these contents together, that we think of them by a unique act.”¹⁸ However, most collections must have their unity in addition to their “objective” elements, in the sense that they are not uniquely constituted by considering their components at the same time, and by a single “glance” of consciousness. The apprehension of a collection is facilitated by what Husserl calls “figurative moments” [*die figuralen Momente*], that is to say, on the one hand, by virtue of the identity, or of the considerable sensible similarity of each of their elements, and, on the other hand, by their “figure,” or their “form,” by their “configuration,” by their gathering in space or in time. It is under these conditions that we perceive a heap of apples, or a swarm of bees and, with the intervention of temporal “configuration,” a melodic suite, or the twelve chimes of midnight.¹⁹

A social being and a being which is simply put together; a society and a collection are similar in that, in each case, there is a plurality of similar elements, and a certain unity of the whole. But, from the start, the elements of a social phenomenon, or of a social being, are not any being whatever: they must be living beings and, what is more, alert conscious beings. Moreover – and this is essential, for it is not inconceivable that conscious beings form simple collections – the social phenomenon and, above all, society properly speaking, requires a kind of unity completely different than that of a collective assemblage. The unity of the collection is purely external. When its elements are disparate, the unity is due to nothing other than the conscious act that collects them into a whole. When the elements form part of a “configuration,” their connection is purely spatio-temporal, thus again, completely external; when the elements are identical, or similar, this similarity facilitates the act of joining effectuated by consciousness, but this does not mean that they are, themselves, intrinsically tied together. On the contrary, the communal unity entails internal connection of the component elements, that is to say, of the subjects, by means of their acts and their works.²⁰ “My life is a life in my we and our life is, through and through, a life with, for, and against others, and, thus, in all cases, a life consisting not in an external collection of things that are united in space and time, but in an internal participation of the life of the others through experience, thought, caring, love, or adversion, etc.”²¹

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In emphasizing the unity of subjects in society, Husserl is led to a comparison with unities of the physical order and of the organic order.

Subjects which find themselves involved in a social relation, and, still more, those who form a “person of a higher degree” are truly, “a subject-whole, in a certain sense, a subjectivity composed of individual subjects – in a manner similar to that in which a physical whole is a physical object, composed of physical objects as parts.”²² On the other hand, “the collective person, a collective spirituality . . . is actually and truly personal, there is a higher concept of essence here, that unites the individual person and the collective person, there is an analogy here, exactly as there is an analogy between a cell and an organism composed of cells, this is not a simple image, but a generic community.”²³ Elsewhere Husserl, in attempting to set up a program of studies for the phenomenology of history, raised the problems posed by social “organization,” by hierarchies of persons, where lower echelons serve as “organs” for higher echelons, as well as by the historical evolution of these “organisms.”²⁴ Must we see in these claims a return to naturalism and, more particularly, a profession of organicism?

Not at all. Husserl’s phenomenology makes evident the traits which essentially distinguish the unity of a physical whole and those of the unity of a social whole. The connections between physical realities are effected in the form of causes which bind them to each other externally; social bonds are effectuated in the form of motives which penetrate into the interior of the consciousness. Many bodies may be in relation, and exercise mutual action on each other. This does not mean that they unify themselves, that they have made their union. “Communication creates the unity. Separate things remain exterior to each other; they can never have any identity in common. But consciousness actually coincided with consciousness . . .”²⁵ placing acts, the contents of which are identical, into conscious and effective connection with each other. In one and the same body, the parts which are contiguous, or even continuous, do not overlap; what belongs to one, does not belong to the other. What is more, physical causality is exercised under completely different conditions than personal “causality,” of which social “causality” is only a particular case. “My past decisions become alive again in the memory that reproduces them and exercises now a new and immediate effectiveness. This is unlike the case in nature, where an action takes place continuously in time and where each moment includes in itself the residue of the effect of what has preceded and where each temporal instant is alone real and contains in itself all causality.”²⁶ Physical action, properly understood, is able to propagate and it can be asked how long it takes. But this propagation proceeds step by step, it is continuous and irreversible. Only the energy which is present at the instant is exercised. Physical action is instantaneous in the sense that it is propagated uniquely, from instant to instant, and from the present instant to the one which immediately succeeds it. Consciousness, to the contrary, is not a prisoner of the instants, and their irreversible continuity. Through memory, it can revive the contents of past acts, sometimes separated from the present by a

long temporal "distance." Bringing about a return from the past, it transcends the irreversibility; overcoming the distance, it liberates itself from physical continuity. The past relived is able to act with the force of present forces. "The past I exercises on itself action at a distance."²⁷ In society, the relations between subjects, and their bonds, are due, properly, in large part, to the permanence of the efficacy of past acts, in other words, to the "overlapping" of the present by the past, and not to the passage of what one could call a "wave" of causality. Finally, the action of things is exercised in virtue of absolutely permanent properties, according to characteristics determined once and for all; the properties of collective subjects are, essentially, relatively variable, and the action of the past, or of acquisitions is not constant.²⁸ If there is "composition" in the social whole as there is in the physical whole, the manner in which elements in each are composed, or are bound, is essentially different.

The fundamental conception proposed by Husserl concerning human society is not organicist. The lowest social phenomenon of the human plane displays, as we have seen, a decisive transcendence of the biological level. Society has a development, an "evolution," much like an organism, but its evolution proceeds on the foundation of results acquired by conscious activities, and preserved, or put aside by the collective consciousness. "Evolution . . . is a meaning structure."²⁹ Like an organism, society includes a multiplicity of actions which are combined in different degrees. The lower complex unities are united to form social systems comparable to systems of organs, but all that presupposes the exercise of effective, collective consciousness, and of the participating individual consciousnesses. The most unified forms of the social life are the "persons of a higher degree," where a central consciousness embraces, to a certain extent, the individual consciousnesses, just as in an organism, the life of the whole dominates, and regulates the life of the cells. But the central ego does not totally absorb the particular egos, it imposes itself on them only to a certain extent, and, in every way, the life of the whole presupposes the activity of the individual consciousnesses, in the form of a functional participation. Moreover, to the extent that the social whole dominates its parts, it is precisely after the manner of a consciousness. There is an analogy between the individual person and the collective person, "exactly as" there is between the cell and the organism, but Husserl did not say that it is "exactly the same" analogy.

Human society forms a successive whole, just as an organism is one from its birth to its death. But we must not be mistaken about the sense of this successive social unity. Human generations are evidently tied together by way of descent and ancestry. But, just as the linking of successive phenomena at the core of individual consciousness is not sufficient to give it the status of a temporal consciousness, physical and organic genealogy does not constitute the historical unity between the persons of the present, and those of a past time. This unity is situated on the level of consciousness, which, now, is a

collective consciousness. Historical unity across the generations requires, first of all, in the persons of the present time, the consciousness of those who have passed, then the consciousness of the works which they effectuated, and, finally, the recognition of the valid results they obtained. In that way, the present generation recognizes itself as tributary to the past generations, collecting the heritage in the form of traditions and, on these traditional foundations, continuing the work which they had begun, to the end of enriching the culture destined to be transmitted to future generations. The historical bond through the epochs of each human society is that of genealogy, a specifically spiritual genealogy.³⁰ Human society is the only one which creates a culture, and this is one of the essential characteristics that distinguishes it from animal societies. Even in the most ‘social’ of animals, there are no spiritual inheritances which serve as ‘premises’ for the works of the following generations. A given generation takes no account of what had been done by their predecessors. The work of each is a kind of absolute beginning; each swarm undertakes to construct its hive as if there had never been a hive in the world. A human society always has biological foundations, but as the example of political society shows, and it could not be shown more clearly, it cannot be reduced to them. Even though the members of a nation are united by ties of blood, to these are added juridical bonds: at the heart of the nation, not only infants, but future citizens are born.³¹

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Human society is, then, neither a sum, nor a collection for it is endowed with an internal unity; it is neither composed, nor unified in the same way as a physical whole, or as an organism. But this is not sufficient to warrant the specificity of the social. We apprehend that the social unity is quite real, although it does not exist in the same mode as physical things. We apprehend that the idea of social personality is not a fiction, and that the concept of “collective spirit,” about which German Idealism had spoken, is not a “mystical” concept,³² a fruit of the Romantic Imagination.³³ But we still do not know if social unity essentially differs from individual unity. As Husserl wished, let us grant that the notion of person is a generic concept which has two types in its extension: the individual person, and the collective person. The problem is, then, to determine the specific differences, and, for that, we must be able to define not only social being, but also individual being.

Now, Husserl ceaselessly underlined the similarity, the “parallelism,” of individual consciousness and collective consciousness.³⁴ The comparisons can be reduced to three kinds. The first consists in analyzing a phenomenon given in individual consciousness, then in demonstrating that it exists equally in the collective consciousness. It is thus that Husserl saw in memory and the individual’s acquisitions the prefiguration of history, and of culture, as social

facts. The second type of comparison is more complex. It consists in calling attention to the similarities which exist between the relations of the phenomena situated in individual consciousness, and the relationships between different consciousnesses, or, to speak the language of Tarde, the similarities of intra-individual relations, and of inter-individual relations. It is thus that Husserl attempted to establish a "parallel between my community with myself and my community with others."³⁵ The third is still more complex, since he laid side by side the inter-individual relations and the relations between social unities, groups, and societies. Individuals are able to establish social bonds between them; likewise, a social group has the faculty of forming a bond, as a group, with another group, and, moreover, with individual persons, to constitute a collectivity of a higher degree. Friendships and hostilities are formed between collectivities as between individuals.³⁶

Taken separately, the comparisons might be correct. But, by multiplying the similarities, we will end in going beyond the analogy, and reaching an identity. If everything which happens, and is observed in individual consciousness, is encountered equally in collective consciousness, there is no longer any essential difference between the individual and the society, but merely a difference of degree, that is to say, of scope and duration.

For a long time, Husserl reflected on the problem of individuation, and devoted a great number of investigations to it, directly, or indirectly.³⁷ Most often, however, these reflections and investigations concerned the individual as opposed to the general, consequently, what must, rather, be called the singular. Moreover, they concerned the individuality of the phenomena of consciousness, for example, of an acoustic perception, rather than of a concrete being, that of the subject, or of the individual person. Besides, the concept of individuation held by Husserl is verified as well on the level of the collectivity as on that of the individual properly speaking. The individuation of a phenomenon depends, fundamentally, on its unique situation in the unfolding of consciousness, and, secondly, on its uniqueness in objective space and time. From this point of view, a phenomenon, or a social being, is equally individual and singular. "The 'form' of the world in which man. . . lives . . . is an individual form. Each member of this world, that is to say, each member belonging to the same community that is my we, describes the same and necessarily the same individual form. A Chinese, to the extent that he does not belong to it, describes an other. . . ."³⁸

Husserl's analyses would allow one to understand why Europe is not China, why France is not Germany, and why Pierre is not Jacques, nor Helmut or Siegfried. They would, as well, allow us to rigorously grasp the difference between Siegfried and Germany, or between Pierre and France. As opposed to individual habit, costumes and traditions, social phenomena would appear as universals, as general facts in a given milieu. "The general, habitual uniformity of life, custom, develops, in the community, from such habits, in the same way

as the individual develops under normal conditions, by imitation, taking on what is suggested and called for by others."³⁹ But they do not allow a clear solution to the problem of the distinction between the notion of individuality, and that of society, or, speaking with Husserl, between the "general forms"⁴⁰ of individuality and community.

Husserl does not seem to have been preoccupied explicitly and thematically with this special aspect of the problem of individuation. On this precise point, we can glean from him only a few remarks, which are always episodic, and sometimes banal – as when he notes that the individual has only one body, whereas there are many in society⁴¹ – or much too fleeting to be utilizable.⁴²

In Husserl, there are echoes of Tarde, for example when he partially attributes the formation of customs to suggestive imitation, but, more often still, of Durkheim, from whom, to a certain extent, he derives, or reproduces implicitly, the distinction between strict and diffuse constraint. To the extent that it is not customary, law has a determinate origin, which is known, or at least knowable. Juridical obligation has its source in the will of the Prince, of a legislative assembly, of the state. This is an externally imposed obligation. "The state is a unity created by force, by domination."⁴³ However, the government does not always have the need to resort to force; in the long run, the subjects adopt the habit of subordination, and acquire a permanent disposition to act voluntarily, as members of the society, in the sense desired by those who govern them.⁴⁴ Tradition and custom have their origin in a relatively indeterminate collectivity, the reference to which is manifested in the recourse to the indefinite pronoun "one." "The point of view of custom is that in which we situate ourselves, when, concerning our actions, we ask ourselves aloud, or quietly to ourselves: what would one say about it? What judgement would one pass on it?"⁴⁵ The norms, the totality of which constitute custom, do not even need to be expressed internally. "These norms have their validity in the mode of the 'one', they rule practice without being formulated."⁴⁶ Like juridical obligation, customary norms have an origin external to the individual: "Action, in the sense of custom, which we have again and again been trained to perform from our childhood, and then further in social relations, have in themselves, for those that execute them, the phenomenological character of that which is imposed from the outside."⁴⁷ Morality is close to law, and to tradition, in that it has a general importance within a given milieu, but limited to this milieu, and that it is felt as coming from the outside. Action which one praises is, as a general rule, approved by witnesses in the same way as vice is blamed, and these judgements are reciprocal. "The agent knows himself praised or blamed by a normal spectator as he would praise or blame the others in a similar case. He judges himself with the eyes of the others."⁴⁸

But the "externality" of the law, of custom, of tradition, of morality, is something completely different than the externality which characterizes

physical action of material beings. Social constraint acts by means of a motive: one assents to the general custom, or to the will of the state, in so far as they are known. This knowledge interiorizes them, establishes an intrinsic and effective bond between the consciousnesses, and it is only through this that constraint becomes social. Custom, as custom, "is characterized by the social ought in this sense . . . that it is accompanied by the thought of society as social subject, as a unified collectivity of persons who evaluate, approve, and disapprove. . . ."⁴⁹. Furthermore, and above all, the facts of suggestion, as those of "strict" or "diffuse" constraint, represent to Husserl nothing but possible forms of human social union, those that are in the category of heteronomy. But the specific character of man is reason; and the rational life, theoretical and practical, is characterized by autonomy. The theoretical, philosophical, and scientific activity of man remains traditional, historical, and thus social, but "reactive" to traditions in order to apprehend their validity. The ethical life consists in realizing between consciousnesses the most intimate union that could be conceived, but by virtue of a free decision, taken in the light of rational evidence, that the devotion to the community is the best means of promoting the value of the self.

The essence of society is not found in constraint or in some analogous phenomenon. The aspect of constraint cannot serve to characterize the social in relation to the individual. The problem remains. Social being is constituted by the intrinsic bond of a plurality of conscious phenomena. But an intrinsic bond of the same type may be ascertained as well in individual consciousness.

Where, then, is the essential difference, if there is one, between "sociality" and individuality? If we hold to Husserl's analyses, a single response seems possible: the individual is "present" to himself, whereas society is "appresented" to individuals. For Husserl, each subject has no other direct experience than that of a single consciousness, his own; he directly perceives the bodily aspects of others and, by virtue of the similarity of these aspects and certain manifestations of his own body, he associates with the other, an organic, psychological, and rational life similar to his own. The consciousness of the other, or the other as a conscious being, is not given directly, but through an "oblique" experience, through an "appresentation."⁵⁰ If we grant this conception, it necessarily follows that society, in the same way as culture in all its forms, cannot be entirely grasped by a direct experience, but only by an experience where "appresentations" predominate.

* * *

The theory of the experience of the other is among the most problematic aspects of Husserlian phenomenology. Without recourse to reasoning by analogy, it takes this experience to be, however, the result of an "analogical transfer" [*analogisierende Übertragung*] of the subject's own consciousness,

and does not seem to require in the least, any but the most rudimentary form of reflection. Now, the existence of this transfer, of this sort of projection, and of this reflection, in the matter of the fundamental, and primary experience of the other, is highly suspect. It is the experience of the consciousness of the other which is more direct than the consciousness of the self.

As a consequence, the only truly essential difference which Husserl maintained between the notion of individuality and that of collectivity is effaced, and one has left, on both sides, only more or less systematic sets of conscious phenomena, intrinsically bound to each other: the individual, like the collectivity, is "legion."

It is evident that the individual grouping serves as the model of the social grouping. Husserl did not definitely free himself of individualism, failing to give a clear conception of the individual in relation to society.

We must also assert that he did not avoid a restoration of organicism. The clearest manifestation of this deviation may be recognized in the metaphysical extensions which he believed were proper to furnish to his phenomenology. The world is ultimately presented as an immense society, the members of which occupy places, and exercise functions of different, and hierarchically ordered types, in the same way as there are many types of cells and functions in an organism. The universe's evolutionary path has, for a model, the development of the human being, from the embryo to the highest manifestations of reason: phylogenesis repeats ontogenesis. It is not by accident that Husserl saw in the community of philosophers and scientists a sort of "functional brain" of society and of Western Culture.⁵¹ As in Plato, from whom he takes the formulation, society is "man writ large."⁵²

For the profound analyses of Husserl to bear fruit, we must rid them of their "egocentrism," take up the study of the experience of the other, and arrive at a notion less deliquescent to individuality.

TRANSLATOR'S NOTE

^a Much of the material referred to in this article may be found in E. Husserl, *Zur Phänomenologie der Intersubjektivität*, Husserliana, Vols. XII, XIV, XV, ed., I. Kern (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1973) which had not been published when this article appeared.

NOTES TO THE TEXT

1. This situation will change, perhaps, when the important group of documents is transcribed – more than a thousand pages in shorthand – relating to this theme, and conserved at Louvain.
2. Cf. especially the paragraph: "Die Person in Personenverband," *Ideen II*, pp. 190-200.

3. We hope to be able to present at a future date a translation of the most important amongst these documents.
4. It will be the task of a work in preparation, *L'essence de la société selon Husserl* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1962).
5. "Wie die Einzelsubjekte ihre Aktivität auf dem Grund einer dunklen, blinden Pässivität entfalten, so gilt dasselbe auch von der sozialen Aktivität." F I 33 (1926-27), p. 163. The manuscripts will be cited with their classification from the Husserl Archives in Louvain, and with their date, insofar as this is known. With the exception of the document entitled by Husserl, *Gemeingeist II*, which will be cited by that title [See *Husseriana XIV*, pp. 192-204].
6. "Das für Andere da sein, das ineins damit dieselbe raumzeitliche Umwelt gemein haben . . . ist noch nicht 'sozial' vergemeinschaftet sein." A V 6 (1932), p. 30.
7. "Aller Sozialität liegt zugrunde . . . der aktuelle Konnex der Mitteilungsgemeinschaft, der blossen Gemeinschaft von Anrede und Aufnehmen der Anrede; oder deutlicher, von Ansprechen und Zuhören." A V 6, p. 35.
8. "Wir sehen, wir hören, usw., nicht bloss nebeneinander, sondern miteinander. . . ." K III 1 III, pp. 18-19.
9. "So entspringt die Gemeinschaft aus einem Ineinander der Wollungen und Willensziele als eine Zwecks- und Arbeitsgemeinschaft und das Werkgebilde ist gemeinsame Tat." K III 3 (1934 ?), p. 60.
10. "Wo immer wir im Einverständnis, im einseitigen oder wechselseitigen, uns so verbunden wissen, dass Einheit der leistenden Aktion auf die gemeinsame Welt erscheint . . . da leistet zwar die einzelne Person, aber sie umgreift bewusstseinsmässig Leisten wie Geleistetes der anderen Personen." *Gemeingeist II*, pp. 3-4.
11. "Personalität höherer Stufe, 'Ordnung.' "
12. Cf. *Gemeingeist II*, p. 25.
13. Cf. *Crisis*, E - p. 292-93, G - p. 340.
14. Cf. *Ideen* III, p. 20.
15. "Das Volk ist nicht eine Summe von einzelnen Personen, wie schon daraus hervorgeht, dass der Tod von Einzelnen das Sein des Volkes nicht aufhebt." A IV 12 (1934), p. 6.
16. Cf. A V 5, p. 24.
17. *Philosophie der Arithmetik*, Husserliana xii, ed. Lothar Eley (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1970), particularly chaps. III, XI.
18. Ibid., p. 79.
19. Cf. *Philosophie der Arithmetik*, chap. XI, and in particular, pp. 227-36. In a note Husserl specifies the chronological relationships of his conception with the *Gestalt-theorie* of Ehrenfels.
20. Employing symbolism in the mathematical style, the formula of a collection, and of a sum is: $a+a=2a$. That of the most simple social act, communication (A), composed of the act of discourse (a_d) and that of reception (a_r), is: $[a_d f(a_r)] [a_r f(a_d)] = A$.
21. "Mein Leben ist Leben in meinem Wir, und unser Leben ist durchaus miteinander, für einander, gegen einander Leben, also jedenfalls ein Leben nicht in äusserlicher Kollektion des Zusammen im Raum und in der Zeit Seins, sondern des innerlichen an dem Leben der Anderen in Erfahrung, in Denken, in Sorgen, in Liebe oder Abneigung, usw. Anteil Habens." E III 8, (1934), p. 4.
22. ". . . Subjektganzes . . . in gewissem Sinn eine aus Einzelsubjekten zusammengesetzte Subjektivität – ähnlich wie ein physisches Ganzes ein

- physisches Objekt ist, zusammengesetzt aus physischen Objekten als Teilen." F I 33 (1926-27), p. 164.
23. "Die Gemeinschaftsperson, die gemeinschaftliche Geistigkeit . . . ist wirklich und wahrhaft personal, ist ein wesensoberer Begriff da, der die individuelle Einzelperson und die Gemeinschaftsperson verbindet, es ist Analogie da, genau so wie Analogie da ist zwischen einer Zelle und einem aus Zellen gebauten Organismus, kein bloses Bild sondern Gattungsgemeinschaft." *Gemeingeist* II, (1921), p. 25.
 24. Cf. K III 21 (1931), p. 82. "Die Personalitäten (historische Individualitäten) verschiedener Stufen, die der niederen Stufe als 'Organ' der höheren Stufe. Soziale Organization überhaupt, die historische Entwicklung dieser 'Organismen' inner-historisch entfaltet." Note the quotation marks here.
 25. "Kommunikation schafft Einheit. Gesonderte Dinge bleiben äusserlich; sie können nie ein Identisches gemein haben. Bewusstsein deckt sich wirklich mit Bewusstsein. . ." *Gemeingeist* II, p. 16.
 26. "Meine vergangenen Entscheidungen werden reproduktiv wieder lebendig und wirken jetzt von neuem und unmittelbar. Es ist nicht wie in der Natur, wo kontinuierlich zeitliche Wirkung der vorangegangenen in sich birgt und jeder zeitliche 'Augenblick' allein real ist und alle Kausalität in sich schliesst." *Gemeingeist* II, pp. 22-23.
 27. "Das vergangene Ich übt Fernwirkung auf sich selbst." *Gemeingeist* II, p. 23.
 28. Cf. *Gemeingeist* II, pp. 26-27.
 29. "Entwicklung . . . ist Sinn-Aufbau." K III 22 (1936-37), p. 34.
 30. Cf. K III 3 (1934 ?), p. 59.
 31. Cf. A IV 12 (1934), pp. 6-8.
 32. Cf. F I 33, p. 163.
 33. Cf. K III i IX (1934), p. 18.
 34. It is this that Georges Gurvitch calls the "reciprocity of perspectives between the individual and the social."
 35. Cf. E III 9 (1931), pp. 83-86.
 36. Cf. E III 8 (1934), p. 20.
 37. Cf. in particular *The Phenomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness (PITC)*, *Experience and Judgment (EJ)* and the manuscript D 8, which is entitled, "Individuation."
 38. "Die 'Form' der Welt, in der der Mensch . . . lebt . . . ist eine individuelle Form. Jeder dieser Welt Angehörige, d.i. jeder zur selben Gemeinschaft als meinem Wir Gehörige, beschreibt die selbe und notwendig dieselbe Individual-form. Ein Chinesee, sofern er nicht zu ihr gehört, beschreibt eine andere. . ." A V 5 (1930), p. 196.
 39. "In der Gemeinschaft erwächst aus solchen Gewohnheiten, in gleicher Weise individuell erwachsend unter normalen Verhältnissen, durch Nachähmung, suggestiv von den Anderen übernommen und von ihnen angefordert, die allgemeine gewohnheitliche Uniform des Lebens, die Sitte." A V 5, p. 26.
 40. Cf. A V 5 (1930), pp. 196-97.
 41. Cf. *Ideen* II, p. 243.
 42. For example when Husserl observes that there is "a will of the state, different from the will of each of its citizens." (F I 33, p. 165) his remark proceeds in the sense of a classical argument, but it is too brief to judge its exact significance.
 43. "Staat ist eine Einheit durch Macht, durch Herrschaft." A V 10 (1931), p. 53.
 44. Cf. A V 12 (1933 or 1934), pp. 15-16.
 45. "Der Gesichtspunkt der Sitte ist der uns bei unseren Handlungen zu fragen,

- laut oder innerlich-leise. Was würde man dazu sagen, wie würde man darüber urteilen." F I 24 (1920), p. 95.
46. "Diese Normen haben ihre Geltung in der Weise das 'man,' sie regeln informuliert die Gewohnheit." A VII 21 (1934), p. 2.
 47. "Das Handeln im Sinne der Sitte, zu dem wir von Kindheit her und dann weiter im Gesellschaftsverkehr immer wieder dressiert worden sind, had für jeden so Handelnden an sich den phänomenologischen Charakter des von aussen her Auferlegten. . ." F I 24 (1920), p. 93.
 48. "Der Handelnde weiss sich von einem normalen Zuschauer gelobt oder getadelt, wie er selbst andere in eben solchem Falle loben oder tadeln würde. Er beurteilt sich selbst mit den Augen der anderen." Note that the 'Sartrian' formula is found in a Husserlian text of 1920: F I 24, p. 94.
 49. ". . . die phänomenologische Charakteristik der Sitte als Sitte: sie ist charakterisiert durch das soziale Sollen in dem . . . Sinne, dass die Sozialität als soziale Subjektivität hinzugedacht ist, als eine verbundene Gemeinschaft von bewertenden, von billigenden und missbilligenden Personen . . ." F I 24, p. 94.
 50. CM-E - pp. 108-17, F - pp. 91-99, G - pp. 138-47 and *Ideen* II, pp. 162-63.
 51. "Das fungierende Gehirn." *Crisis*, E - p. 290, G - p. 338.
 52. Cf. EP I, F - p. 21, G - p. 16.

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