

WILHELM DILTHEY

SELECTED WORKS · VOLUME III

*The Formation of
the Historical World in
the Human Sciences*

EDITED, WITH AN INTRODUCTION, BY

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PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS

PRINCETON AND OXFORD

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Translated by Rudolf A. Makkreel and John Scanlon

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PREFACE TO ALL VOLUMES

This six-volume translation of the main writings of Wilhelm Dilthey (1833–1911) is intended to meet a longstanding need. It makes available to English readers translations of complete texts representing the full range of Dilthey's philosophy. The multi-volume edition will thereby provide a wider basis for research not only in the history and theory of the human sciences but also in Dilthey's philosophical understanding of history, life, and worldviews. His principal writings on psychology, aesthetics, ethics, and pedagogy are also included, together with some historical essays and literary criticism.

Whereas the Spanish-speaking world, which assimilated Dilthey early and intensively under the influence of Ortega y Gasset, has had an eight-volume translation since 1944–45, the English-speaking world has approached Dilthey more hesitantly. The efforts made by H. A. Hodges to acquaint the British public with Dilthey met with only limited success. H. P. Rickman has translated parts of Dilthey's writings, and his introductions have sought to dispel the distrust of Continental Philosophy, which characterized the early phases of the Analytical Movement. While a few individual works have also been translated, a systematically collected edition will provide a more consistent rendering of important terms and concepts.

An increasing interest in continental thought (Husserl, Heidegger, Sartre, hermeneutics, structuralism, and critical theory) has created a climate in which the still not adequately recognized philosophy of Dilthey can be appropriated. As phenomenological and hermeneutical theories are being applied to more complex and problematic questions, it is becoming more evident that the nineteenth-century roots of these philosophical theories must be reexamined. This is especially the case with problems surrounding the theory of the *Geisteswissenschaften*. As given its classical formulation by Dilthey, this theory has been entitled in English as that of the “human studies” in order to differentiate it from the positivistic ideal of a “unified science.” Currently, the more forthright title, “human sciences,” has been adopted—but at the risk of becoming submerged in a universal hermeneutics and post-Kuhnian philoso-

phy of science. Given this new situation, the difference between the natural sciences and the human sciences will need to be reconsidered. If interpretation and the circularity associated with it are inherent to both the natural and human sciences, then the task will be to determine what kind of interpretation is involved in each and at what level.

The translations of Dilthey's main theoretical works on the human sciences will show that Dilthey's overall position was more flexible than has been realized. His distinction between understanding (*Verstehen*) and explaining, for example, was not intended to exclude explanations from the human sciences, but only to delimit their scope. Moreover, the importance of methodological reflection in the human sciences should become more evident and serve to eliminate the persistent misconceptions of understanding as empathy, or worse still, as a mode of irrationalism. The German term *Geisteswissenschaften* encompasses both the humanities and the social sciences, and Dilthey's theory and works assume no sterile dichotomies rooted in a presumed opposition between the arts and the sciences.

The limits of a six-volume edition did not permit inclusion of some significant works: full-scale historical monographs such as the *Leben Schleiermachers*, major essays from *Weltanschauung und Analyse des Menschen seit Renaissance und Reformation* and *Die Jugendgeschichte Hegels*. We trust that our volumes will generate enough interest in Dilthey's thought to justify the future translation of these and other works as well.

This edition arose through a close cooperation among the editors, their respective universities (Emory University, Atlanta, and Ruhr-Universität Bochum), and a great number of colleagues from various disciplines who served as translators. This kind of large-scale cooperation required an organizational framework. A group of Dilthey scholars consisting of Professors O. F. Bollnow, K. Gründer, U. Herrmann, B. E. Jensen, H. Johach, O. Pöggeler, and H. P. Rickman met twice in Bochum to assist the editors in selecting the content of this edition. Several translation sessions were held at Emory University to bring the translators together to discuss terminological difficulties, and other scholars have advised us as well (see list of advisory board in the front matter and Editorial Note to this volume).

Dilthey is difficult to translate. In an effort to render the translations as coherent as possible, the editors prepared a comprehensive lexicon for the use of the translators. To guarantee the quality

of the translations, they have been carefully edited. First we scrutinized the translations for problems left unresolved by the lexicon and collected data for our bibliographical references. Then we went over each text, making revisions where necessary (1) to ensure that the allusions and idiomatic meanings of the original German have been preserved and (2) to make Dilthey's complex and indirect prose accessible to the modern English reader.

An Alexander von Humboldt Fellowship in 1978-79 made it possible for the editors to begin their cooperative efforts. The Fritz Thyssen Stiftung in Cologne enabled them to execute this project through a ten-year grant. The Translations Program of the National Endowment for the Humanities and Emory University have also made substantial means available for this project. The editors are grateful to all these institutions for their very generous support. Of course, this project would not have borne fruit were it not for the commitment of Princeton University Press and the encouragement of Sanford Thatcher, Ann Wald, and Ian Malcolm. Our appreciation to all who have helped in this time-consuming but worthwhile endeavor.

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FRITHJOF RODI

EDITORIAL NOTE TO VOLUME III

In the preface we have already described our general procedures in revising translations for this edition. Coherence in the use of terminology has been our aim throughout, but when Dilthey uses terms nontechnically, we have allowed the context to determine the best English equivalent. Thus while we normally translate *Erlebnis* as "lived experience," when Dilthey uses it together with other adjectives such as "religious," we tend to drop the "lived" to avoid awkwardness. Brief notes about some of our most important terminological decisions have been provided where such terms first occur.

Words and phrases added by the editors of Dilthey's *Gesammelte Schriften* have been placed in <>; those added by the editors of *Selected Works* in [].

The titles of works not already translated into English have been left in German. Otherwise, only the English title is used. When figures and works that are now no longer so well known are mentioned by Dilthey, we have provided brief annotations. But since they are not repeated, the index should be consulted for the first mention of names.

Dilthey's own footnotes will be marked with a (D). Those added by the *Herausgeber* or editors of the *Gesammelte Schriften* will have an (H) at the end. Our own footnotes will be unmarked.

We have attempted to identify the many passages that Dilthey quoted without giving any citation. This has sometimes proved to be especially difficult; some passages could not be located even by the experts we consulted.

We gratefully acknowledge the bibliographical assistance of Stefanie Stein of the Ruhr-Universität Bochum. The person who has assisted us the most with our editorial and bibliographical work is Holly Martin of Emory University. We owe her special thanks for her patience and diligence.

INTRODUCTION TO VOLUME III

The title of Wilhelm Dilthey's 1910 masterpiece, *The Formation of the Historical World in the Human Sciences* (*Der Aufbau der geschichtlichen Welt in den Geisteswissenschaften*), may raise certain questions. The historical world is obviously not *created by* the human sciences, so what does it mean to say that it is *formed in* the human sciences?

The word “formation” has been chosen as the main translation of Dilthey’s term *Aufbau* to suggest both a process and a resultant form. *Aufbau* has often been translated as “construction,” but this is inappropriate because Dilthey contrasts *Aufbau* and *Konstruktion*. The natural sciences are constructive in that they appeal to basic elements on which everything in nature depends. But the constructs of the natural sciences abstract from many aspects of our lived experience. The human sciences, by contrast, analyze lived experience while never losing sight of its overall qualities. The cognitive task of the human sciences is to bring out the incipient sense that history already has for us in ordinary life. Cognition of history is possible because we are at root historical beings. The *formation* of the historical world in the human sciences is thus really an articulation of the general structures of historical life *in conjunction* with the human sciences.

LIFE-KNOWLEDGE AND SCIENTIFIC COGNITION

The task of the human sciences, according to Dilthey, is to gather the direct knowledge (*Wissen*) that already exists about the various aspects of historical life and to attempt to order this in terms of conceptual cognition (*Erkenntnis*) as much as possible. One of the tasks of the epistemology (*Erkenntnistheorie*) of the human sciences is to consider the limits within which it is possible to form a system of the human sciences and to what extent their procedures and methods can be distinguished from those of the natural sciences. But these epistemological and methodological problems are contextualized by Dilthey as part of much broader questions about the nature of human understanding. These are questions

about life in general that already crop up in our prescientific knowledge. They may be clarified to some extent by scientific cognition and its epistemology. However, they cannot be resolved until we attain a more integral theory of knowledge (*Theorie des Wissens*). This indicates that Dilthey's overall goal of a Critique of Historical Reason will require a progression from an immediate kind of knowledge of life to the conceptual cognition of the human sciences to a reflective knowledge that constitutes mature understanding.

The general structures that can be delineated within the manifold domains of such human sciences as sociology, cultural studies, economics, and religion derive their meaning from basic life-concerns that we all manifest in everyday existence. According to Dilthey, my lived experience of these life-concerns makes me see “people and things either as . . . expanding my existence and heightening my powers, or as restricting the scope of my existence. . . . From this subsoil of life, objective apprehension, evaluation, and the positing of purposes emerge as types of attitude with countless nuances that merge into each other” (153–54).

What is phenomenologically described by Dilthey as a general mental attitude (*Verhaltungsweise*) can be understood in terms of some specific stance (*Stellungnahme*) (258) deriving from basic life-concerns (*Lebensbezüge*): references to life that concern specific individuals both in the sense of being about them and of mattering to them. It is the task of the human sciences to analyze the cognitive, evaluative, and purposive attitudes operative in reflection on the historical world without losing sight of their original togetherness in the concrete concerns of ordinary life. Dilthey's Critique of Historical Reason is thus much broader than this Kantian label would suggest. It must be rooted in the immediate knowledge of everyday life, which encompasses what is prized as well as cognized. The certainty of the knowledge that comes with lived experience constitutes a kind of elementary understanding, which is then analyzed in terms of the higher forms of understanding made possible by the human sciences. Elementary understanding knows the meaning things have in their normal, common context. Higher understanding focuses on more specialized contexts to transform what is already known into conceptual cognition, but it also makes it possible to systematize this cognition in terms of a universal framework.

Dilthey calls the context of elementary understanding “objective spirit.” We are already historical because we grow up amidst the

ways in which the spirit of the past has been objectified and preserved in our present context. Objective spirit is the medium through which we participate in our socio-historical situation, understand our place in it, communicate with each other, and interact. Dilthey appropriated the concept of “objective spirit” from Hegel, but reconceived the universal speculative character it assumed in Hegel’s idealism in terms of a more empirical and verifiable commonality (see 171–74). To think that Dilthey simply redefined objective spirit epistemologically is to underestimate his ontological leanings toward realism and to ignore his cognition-knowledge distinction. Objective spirit does not provide conceptual cognition; it merely embodies elementary knowledge as passed down to us by the reality of the past. Epistemic or critical conditions of consciousness only become relevant when the higher understanding of the human sciences transforms the real knowledge of ordinary life into the conceptual cognition of disciplinary discourse. This transition makes possible the move from commonality to universality. Many of the certainties inherited from a common ethnic or national past may prove to be provincial when compared to the customs of foreign nations. The narratives of universal historians such as Ranke and Schlosser helped to give a multinational scope to history, but for Dilthey universal history must also be coordinated with a radically pluralistic set of human sciences, each of which analyzes what happens in human history in terms of more specialized but general concerns, whether those be political, economic, legal, cultural, literary, or religious.

Although universal history must be correlated with the various modes of conceptual cognition made possible by the human sciences, it retains for Dilthey an intuitive core that makes it more appropriate to consider it as a mode of knowledge. Thus the movement from the immediate knowledge of life to universal disciplinary cognition can always be augmented by a reflective knowledge whereby individuals articulate what they cognize, value, and strive for.¹ There is a sense, then, in which knowledge can encompass conceptual cognition, but never in any final way. Such knowledge, whether it is based on surveying history or on philosophical reflection, can at best formulate a tentative world-view.

¹ In the First Study, Dilthey makes it clear that the foundation of the human sciences “must refer to all classes of knowledge: . . . to the *conceptual cognition of reality*, to the *positing of values*, and to the *determination of purposes* and the *establishment of rules*” (VII, 5 [this volume, 25]).

The human sciences include both the humanities and the social sciences, and each provides the opportunity to study human behavior, interaction, and cooperation up close. Some human sciences such as psychology and history are primarily descriptive; others such as economics and sociology are more systematic. In the *Formation*, the overall stream of history is diverted, as it were, into structural systems in which selected currents can be tracked to examine the ways in which they interact. Some of these structures are called cultural systems, especially if they serve shared purposes that have been fashioned by human choice. But some institutional structures such as nation-states and families, although also purposive, are not simply voluntary—these make up the external organization of society. These purposive systems or associations are already familiar from Dilthey's *Introduction to the Human Sciences* of 1883.²

HISTORY AND ITS PRODUCTIVE SYSTEMS

One of the advances of the *Formation* is to not subsume all these structures under the concept of a purposive system. A more neutral covering concept is used to capture all the ways the forces of life can converge. This is the idea of the “productive nexus or system” (*Wirkungszusammenhang*).³ The efficacy of life and of the historical world is to be understood in terms of productivity before any causal or teleological analysis is applied. The carriers of history, whether they be individuals, cultures, institutions, or communities, can all be conceived as productive systems capable of producing value, meaning, and, in some cases, realizing purposes. Each is to be considered structurally as centered in itself.

According to Dilthey, “The fundamental form of a productive system arises in the individual who gathers together present, past, and possibilities of the future in a life-course” (177–78). Human individuals are productive systems in that their lived experience apprehends what is of interest in the present relative to past evaluations and future goals. This more explicit formulation makes

² See Wilhelm Dilthey, *Introduction to the Human Sciences: Selected Works*, vol. 1 (SW 1), eds. Rudolf A. Makkreel and Frithjof Rodi (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989), esp. pp. 99–136.

³ In Rudolf A. Makkreel's *Dilthey: Philosopher of the Human Studies* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975), these were analyzed as “dynamic systems.” See esp. pp. 314–22.

references to the three aspects of lived experience—the cognitive, the evaluative, and the volitional—and Dilthey offers a detailed analysis of them, each with its distinctive purposive structures, in the three “Studies Toward the Foundation of the Human Sciences” that open this volume. These studies were to a certain extent inspired by Husserl’s *Logical Investigations*, which Dilthey saw as advancing his own earlier efforts at structural description. However, instead of merely linking the subject to its perceived object by means of a general intentional relation, Dilthey shows that inherent in lived experience are all kinds of attitudes to things, not just cognitive, but felt and willed as well, that disclose concrete lifeconcerns. The productivity of the psychic nexus lies in the ways these three aspects of experience interact. For example, as feelings inform our evaluations, these can influence not only our volitional decisions but also our cognitive apprehension of the world. Often, the productivity of the individual is merely immanent, without a specific outcome as its product.

Although individuals as productive systems are centered in themselves, they are not self-sufficient. They are inherently related to other more inclusive productive systems that are also at work in history. These larger productive systems come about because of the need for communication, interaction, and cooperation among individuals. But they can also take on a life of their own and survive the individuals that formed them. In the *Introduction to the Human Sciences*, Dilthey was unwilling to consider these larger groupings as subjects or carriers of history. In the *Formation*, he qualifies his opposition to transpersonal subjects by allowing them to be considered logical subjects.⁴

It is important to recognize public modes of belonging together, but unacceptable to ground them “in subjects that are real in some sense, over and above the subjects of individual psychology” (304). The solution is to regard such productive systems as logical subjects that transcend individuals without positing them as superempirical real subjects. These more inclusive productive systems are not collective in the Hegelian sense.

Even if individuals are immersed in cultural systems and organizations of society, they will never be completely submerged by them. This is because each such productive system only engages some aspects of an individual. Dilthey is also convinced that the

⁴ For an account of this shift, see Makkreel, *Dilthey, Philosopher of the Human Studies*, pp. 312–14.

individuals active in a cultural system will put their stamp on its mode of productivity so that more than the rationally agreed upon function of the system is achieved. Summing up these two points, Dilthey suggests there is a difficulty in conceptualizing the sciences of these cultural systems in terms of the function of purposes alone: “The individuals who cooperate in such a function belong to the cultural system only through those processes by which they contribute to the realization of the function. Nevertheless, they participate in these processes with their whole being, which means that a domain based purely on the system’s functional purpose can never be constructed” (208). Individuals give only part of themselves to these more inclusive systems, yet they can express their whole being through this part. No cultural system will embody merely the purposes it was meant to fulfill. That is why it makes sense to understand even purposive systems as productive systems. A productive nexus or system may be purposive without fulfilling a determinate purpose. It is to be conceived more generally as producing objectifications that express human values as well as purposes—leaving open the extent to which specific goals are achieved. The important thing is how human values and purposes are expressed in productive systems and how their meaning is to be understood.

In attempting to understand the historical world, the human sciences must do justice to both the facticity of particular events and the universal demands of conceptual thought. Their ultimate challenge is to be able to articulate the individuality of a historical phenomenon as a kind of concrete universal. To do so, we must also understand the historical world “as a productive nexus centered in itself, at the same time containing other productive systems within it. . . . All are to be understood as structurally linked into a whole in which the sense of the nexus of the socio-historical world arises from the significance of the individual parts” (160). Productive systems articulate the intermediate structures through which historical order can be discerned. They provide the synchronic systems whereby diachronic development can be established. Developmental order in history will not be found by observing particular events or speculating about overall historical purposes but by analyzing what has happened into intermediary productive systems. Thus Dilthey writes,

Whereas no law of development is to be found in the concrete course of events, its analysis into specific homogeneous pro-

ductive systems opens up the prospect of sequences of states that are determined from within and presuppose each other. It is as if one stratum always leads to a higher one that adds increased differentiation and comprehension. (190)

When productive systems become more comprehensive, their functions are at the same time more differentiated. Thus a people does not become a superindividual, for unlike an individual subject, it cannot be self-conscious. Dilthey allows that “individuals who pursue their own purposes . . . find at the same time a domain with its own ends in the nation. In this domain they act as a single subject. . . . Outer events, destinies, and acts are measured by the purpose that is central to the life of the nation at the time” (303). In that such convergence tends to be transitory, communal consolidation is rarely a threat. In a similar vein, Dilthey points out that “since no nation takes its own death into account, plans and purposes have a completely different role here than in the individual’s life” (303).

Dilthey repeatedly asserts that he is not proposing a philosophy of history that can establish an end for history. It is beyond our capacity to know whether there is a final purpose of history and, if so, whether it can be found in individuals or in some national community. His theory of history, as distinct from a philosophy of history, is content to find meaning in history. The philosophy of history of Kant and Hegel was in search of a universal history with one grand purpose. Dilthey’s theory of history embraces a universal history where the universality being claimed is more limited and generated on the basis of particular productive systems analyzed by the various human sciences. Thus there is no basis for claiming overall progress in history. Dilthey does find progress within limited domains such as in the sciences and in the international consolidation of information. But the Hegelian thesis that all history is about the realization of human freedom is unwarranted (see 366–67). Development is a legitimate category of history, but progress is not, because it cannot be applied globally.

THE CATEGORIES OF THE HUMAN SCIENCES

Development is one of the real categories of life operative in our lived experience. We should note that Dilthey distinguishes between formal and real categories. Formal categories arise from elementary operations of thought that are at work in all objective

apprehension, including simple perception. Such elementary logical operations include comparing, noting sameness, differentiating, separating, and relating. These operations are conceived by Dilthey as bringing out what is inherent in experience. They are like perception to the extent that they find what is given; they are like thought in that they explicate what is merely implicit in the given (144). Their logic is phenomenological in that they do not impose order but explicate it on the basis of what is known perceptually. They make possible the transition from perceptual knowledge, which is prediscursive, to conceptual cognition, which is discursive. Although the elementary operations of thought are still prediscursive, they provide the basis for the discursive thought involved in making judgments. The noting of sameness of prediscursive thought prepares the way for unifying concepts of discursive thought; similarly, differentiating and separating anticipate the discursive procedures of abstraction and analysis, and, finally, relating provides the basis for all kinds of synthetic procedures. Together these prediscursive and discursive logical operations articulate the formal categories of unity, plurality, identity, difference, degree, and relation that are shared by the natural and human sciences (see 218–19).

The differences between the natural and human sciences begin to come out more clearly relative to the real categories employed by them. Causality is a category appropriate for the natural sciences; but in history, Dilthey claims that the counterparts for the necessary relation of cause and effect are the relations of “agency and suffering, of action and reaction” (219). Whether causal explanations are altogether ruled out from the special systems analyzed by some of the human sciences is not clear. However, in any historical narrative, the priority must be given to the task of understanding the significance of the relevant events in the particular context. Because Dilthey insists that there is no metaphysical divide between nature and history, we should not exaggerate the differences between their respective sciences. After all, the spiritual content that is studied by the human sciences does not hover in a realm that is independent from nature. The events of history take place on a natural terrain with the consequence that the fertility of the soil can sometimes explain why it is that certain civilizations thrive and others languish.

But even if the natural and human sciences share some of the same real categories, they may take on different shapes. Thus Dilthey points out that the categorial part-whole relation as applied by the natural sciences to space, time, and organized beings is

transformed in the human sciences to become “a nexus in which the parts are interconnected” (219). The task of understanding one’s life, for instance, is one in which the parts of the whole are not merely spelled out in sequence, but in which a nexus is produced that can even incorporate relations to things outside. A natural organism is already able to ingest foreign contents, but a productive system is human and historical only to the extent that it can incorporate relations to the outside qua relations and center them in itself. Spirit in the minimal sense that Dilthey conceives it could perhaps be defined as the capacity to interiorize both content and form.

Interiorization may involve re-presentation (*Repräsentation*) in one of three senses: either (1) in the elementary sense of noting the form inherent in the content of the given or (2) in the psychological sense of having a representation (*Vorstellung*) of something or (3) in the more general semantical sense of being representative (*Vertretung*) (see 149). Earlier writings had focused more on the first two functions; the writings in this volume also aim to work out the third, namely, how a part can be understood to be representative or typical of a whole.

Of all the categories used by Dilthey to re-present and conceptualize history, those of time, value, meaning, purpose, and productive force prove to be the most important. Time is already referred to in the natural sciences, but in the human sciences it is lived—it is not merely an abstract frame of reference. Dilthey considers Kant’s efforts to conceive time as an ideal form to be inadequate for a Critique of Historical Reason. Time in the human sciences is a real category that is not just a formal condition of experience, but an experienced content as well. Rather than being merely the background for observing change and movement, time can be experienced as the nature of advancement as such. Dilthey writes,

Even the smallest part of the advance of time still involves the passing of time. The present never *is*; what we experience as present always contains the memory of what has just been present. Among other things, the continued efficacy of the past as a force in the present, namely, what the past means for it, imparts to what is remembered a distinct character of presence, whereby it becomes incorporated in the present. (216)

Time is experienced not just as given in the present, but as the continuum connecting it to the past and future. The relation between the past and present becomes the source for the category of

meaning; the relation between present and future points to the category of productive force.

The category of meaning (*Bedeutung*) is Dilthey's main historical category. Meaning is what understanding looks for, and we obtain it in history by fashioning a nexus out of the relation between past and present: "When we look back through memory, we see the nexus of the past parts of a life-course in terms of the category of meaning. When we live in the present, the positive or negative value of the realities that fill it are experienced through feeling. And when we face the future, the category of purpose arises through a projective attitude" (222). From the perspective of value, life appears as a multiplicity of juxtaposed values. From the perspective of purpose, everything in a life-course is subordinated to some future moment. "Only the category of meaning overcomes the mere juxtaposition or subordination of the parts of life to each other. As history is memory and as the category of meaning belongs to memory, this is the most distinctive category of historical thought" (223).

Whereas the category of meaning structures the temporal relations of history retrospectively to obtain a relatively stable mode of connectedness, the category of productive force (*Kraft*) relates the present to the future, but it does not necessarily do so in terms of a definite purpose. The productive force of life can also display itself "in dreams of future happiness, in the play of imagination with possibilities, in indecision, and in fear" (224). These inchoate modes of expanding ourselves in relation to the future can be said to be striving toward something without necessarily having fully defined it. They manifest the mere "*intention to actualize something* that was not already part of reality" (224).

Productive force as a category of the human sciences is experienceable and not just hypothetical, like many forces in natural science. The force inherent in a productive system of history is conceived not as an abstract potential but as actualizing itself, working something out. When a productive system merely reinforces itself, it can be said to exhibit an immanent purposiveness. Cultural systems arrived at for the sake of definite, as yet unactualized, purposes form a special subset of productive systems, but their historical realization also incorporates other factors that tend to modify these ends. Most productive systems—especially the lives of human individuals—do not even approximate a set of definite purposes. Because "individuals are only the points of intersection for cultural systems and social organizations with which

their existence is interwoven" (270), biography can never find closure by tracing the specific life-goals of individual subjects. Autobiography will prove to be more fruitful than biography for understanding history.

What attracts Dilthey to autobiography as a form of history is that it is "the highest and most instructive form of the understanding of life" (221). Here life grasps life because the one understanding the life-course is also the one living it. The life-course becomes a productive nexus in which its own meaning is being produced. As long as a life is not yet completed, its meaning is still in process. The nexus or coherence of a life is yet to be acquired.⁵ The process of acquiring meaning is not willed, but unfolds as a kind of "being-pulled-along by the state of affairs itself to ever more constituent parts of the nexus" (51). Here meaning is the explication (*Darstellung*) of the productive force of life itself. It is not yet the expression (*Ausdruck*) that re-presents what life has produced. We obtain the latter when a historian defines a life or a time that has fully elapsed.

EXPLICATION, EXPRESSION, AND DISCURSIVE RE-PRESENTATION

The move from prediscursive explication to discursive re-presentation can be seen as coming to full expression when Dilthey articulates the meaning of history in terms of past ages or epochs. An age or an epoch is perhaps the most complete form of a productive system or nexus. It is complete not only in that it constitutes a definite cut in the continuity of history but also in that it re-presents an affinity between many different forces and movements. An age is not necessarily homogenous and may not have a real center until something or someone is designated retrospectively by a historian as having that function. Thus Dilthey attempts to capture what is representative of the German Enlightenment by designating Lessing as typical of its efforts to reconcile reason and religion.

Epochs are best conceived as phases in the development of a cultural system such as a science or a particular art form such as music. The fact that the Baroque phase in music does not coincide

⁵ In his descriptive psychology, Dilthey speaks of the acquired psychic nexus of an individual as a historical achievement.

with the Baroque in painting has to do with technical matters affecting their respective media. There is always a factual core to historical development that cannot be resolved into a rational dialectic. The only kernel of truth to be found in the dialectical approach to history is that there is often some negative development or deficiency that leads one age to break down and give rise to another. However, there is no general logic that can explain why one negative moment rather than another becomes a catalyst for change. We tend to delineate epochs in terms of the distinctive structures of their achievements, but we can understand them only as productive systems that were generated by human needs and life-concerns.

The concept of productive nexus finds its usefulness in being rooted in the dynamism of life while allowing for the kind of structural articulation demanded by the human sciences. Functionally, it becomes a system whose parts are reciprocally related. It is because of this that some parts can be analyzed as having representative significance. So far, the productive systems of history have been characterized as the intermediary structures of commonality or objectified spirit that allow Dilthey to reconcile the conflicting demands of the human sciences for both specificity and universality. We can also show the intermediary nature of these systems by tracing how they differentiate objective spirit relative to the task of hermeneutics.

FROM ELEMENTARY TO HIGHER UNDERSTANDING

It became increasingly clear to Dilthey that human understanding is inherently interpretive. This is as true for self-understanding as it is for the understanding of others. Both require the intermediary of expression. Thus Dilthey's hermeneutic triad of "lived experience, expression, and understanding" (153). Lived experience gives access to the human world, but its insights do not constitute understanding. To understand myself is to be able to see myself as others can see me. Understanding thus proceeds from the outside to the inside, from an overall context to a content.

Dilthey's most successful formulation of the task of hermeneutics is to be found in "The Understanding of Other Persons and Their Manifestations of Life" (226–47). There he distinguishes three kinds of life-manifestations that need to be understood: theoretical judgments, actions, and expressions of lived experience.

The first kind communicates cognitive contents independently of who utters them and is quite open to full understanding. Actions are not meant to communicate, but they nevertheless disclose something about the purposes of agents. Yet no matter how much personal deliberation went into an action, it can express only some aspects of that person and provide limited understanding. Expressions of lived experience are very different in that they disclose the personal more fully. However, they often do so in ways that are quite impersonal. They tend to reveal more to understanding than was intended, and instead of being true about what was first possessed in consciousness, may even disclose what was unconscious. As such, an expression of lived experience can be “truthful in itself” (228).

When understanding is conceived in the most general terms, it can be said to be “about connectedness” (276) and this is best judged relative to objectifications of experience. Whereas lived experience provides immediate access to reality and self, understanding is usually mediated and indirect. We understand more about ourselves through the ways we relate to others and express ourselves than through introspection. Our self-understanding is always more than personal, because most of what is expressed uses the communal signs of the language we grew up with, and more generally, all the discursive practices of objective spirit. This means that in normal or elementary understanding, expressions have a public transparency. National languages are thus productive systems that serve as intermediaries between lived experience and understanding. In elementary understanding, the relation between an expression and what is expressed is not inferential but directly representative. People participating in the same productive nexus of objective spirit normally attach the same meanings to expressions. This elementary function of objective spirit is representative in a public discursive sense rather than in a private mental sense. For the elementary understanding of expressions, it is not necessary that we share the same psychic representations (*Vorstellungen*). They need merely be part of a productive nexus that is expressive in a discursively representative sense (*Vertretung*).

Objective spirit is the productive nexus of commonality from which all elementary understanding starts. Higher understanding is only needed when this self-evident context of commonality breaks down and pits particulars against each other. Then we must analyze the medium of commonality into more specific contexts. Once the normal relation between an expression and its

meaning is rendered questionable, it becomes necessary to develop an understanding based on finding the appropriate context of that expression.

Here the relation between an expression and what is expressed goes over into that between the multiple manifestations of another person and the inner nexus that underlies them. This leads us to also take into account changing circumstances. What we have here is an inductive inference from particular manifestations of life to the overall nexus of life. It presupposes a knowledge of psychic life and its relation to milieu and circumstances. (232)

We thus advance from objective spirit as the background productive nexus of meaning to more situational and restricted productive systems, such as the psychic nexus of the speaker, his or her social circumstances, work situation, etc. Whereas elementary understanding proceeds directly from particular to particular within an accepted common medium, higher understanding identifies more localized contexts and moves inductively from particulars toward generalizations. Higher understanding must attempt to account for the anomaly that an author's expression seems not to be used in any typical sense. We then consider whether something about the author's historical situation, state of mind, or professional position produced a shift in meaning. But, Dilthey cautions,

Not all higher forms of understanding rest on the fundamental relationship between a product and productivity. We already saw that such an assumption is not correct for elementary forms of understanding; but a very important portion of the higher forms is also based on the relation between expression and what is expressed. In many cases, the understanding of human creations is directed merely at the nexus in which the successively apprehended parts of a work form a whole. (232)

Sometimes higher understanding aims at an overall understanding of a work, a sense of how everything fits together as a whole. This requires a shift from simply following the action of a play as it unfolds to a more reflective response once the performance has been completed. Among other things, this could involve an effort to grasp how the tensions between the characters are worked out, how everything from the setting to the words uttered by the actors

creates an overall effect. This totality of the work is not simply derived from the background productive nexus of objective spirit, nor contextualized in relation to more specific productive systems, whether psychic, social, or cultural, but becomes itself a productive nexus. The higher understanding of the overall work makes possible the transition from common meaning to universal significance. That is, to be able to understand the greatness of a play like *Macbeth* requires a sense of its overall coherence. Only such efforts at higher understanding can explain its universal appeal. Elementary understanding can grasp common or typical meanings, and higher understanding can aim at more systematic relations that can give a sense both of what is of universal import in human products and of what individualizes them.

The important breakthrough for Dilthey is that human products do not normally need to be related back to the psyches of their producers. Although the possibility of relating a work of art back to its creator is not ruled out, it is far from being the primary source of its understanding. Indeed, a great work of art can take on a life of its own and can become itself a productive nexus generating an ever deeper meaning over time.

DILTHEY'S *FORMATION* AND ITS PRODUCTIVE HISTORY

This is the only volume in our *Selected Works* (hereafter SW) edition that reproduces a volume of the *Gesammelte Schriften* (hereafter GS). This is a testament to the importance of GS VII, edited by Bernard Groethuysen, one of Dilthey's closest disciples in his last years. The first part of the volume consists of three "Studies Toward the Foundation of the Human Sciences," which Dilthey read to the Prussian Academy of the Sciences in Berlin from 1904 to 1909. Only the first of these studies was published during Dilthey's lifetime in the *Proceedings of the Prussian Academy*. The second part of the volume is the *Formation* essay, which was published in 1910 as a treatise by the Prussian Academy. The extensive materials that make up the "Plan for the Continuation of the *Formation*" were never published by Dilthey himself and, like the Second and Third Studies, did not appear in print until Groethuysen published them in 1927, sixteen years after Dilthey's death.⁶

⁶ For details, especially concerning where the handwritten remains were found, see GS VII, 348–80.

That same year, Heidegger published his *Being and Time*, in which both the importance and limits of Dilthey's contributions to the understanding of history and historicality are noted. When Heidegger speaks of the need to address the presuppositions of a "possible 'Formation of the Historical World in the Human Sciences,'" he could only be alluding to Dilthey's 1910 Academy essay.⁷ The full *Formation* volume, as we have it here, goes some way in also addressing these presuppositions (see below, e.g. 213–25; 297–98; 310–11).

In his preface to the German *Formation* volume, Groethuysen distinguished between two sets of problems or perspectives governing the materials that he had assembled. For the sake of simplicity, he characterized these perspectives as those of psychology and hermeneutics. The first two studies and some parts of the appendix are seen as contributions to psychology, whereas everything else is considered to be part of the hermeneutical approach. This distinction set the stage for the question whether the hermeneutical approach was able to overcome the psychological approach. As editor, Groethuysen remains neutral and does not try to answer the question, but unfortunately, it would remain central in Dilthey scholarship for many decades. The view that Dilthey was finally able to leave the psychological approach behind led many interpreters such as Ludwig Landgrebe and Otto Bollnow to refer almost exclusively to this volume in their own writings.⁸

In this concluding section, we will attempt to transform the continuing psychology-hermeneutics debate about the *Formation* into a more productive posthistory. When it comes to evaluating the importance of the psychological and the hermeneutical approaches in the late Dilthey, it should be said that he indeed did distance himself from certain early explanatory psychological tendencies. But his structural psychology, which he called "descriptive and analytical," was never renounced. Indeed, structural psychological and hermeneutical insights often re-enforce each other in Dilthey's writings. And if the appeal to a pre-given context is assumed to be

⁷ This allusion gets lost in the two translations of *Being and Time*, but it can be clearly discerned on page 376 of Martin Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit*, 11th ed. (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 1967).

⁸ See Ludwig Landgrebe, "Wilhelm Diltheys Theorie der Geisteswissenschaften (Analyse ihrer Grundbegriffe)," *Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung*, IX, ed. Edmund Husserl (Halle a.d.S.: Max Niemeyer, 1928), pp. 237–367, and Otto Friedrich Bollnow, *Dilthey: Eine Einführung in seine Philosophie*, 2nd ed. (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1955).

the original position of hermeneutics, then Dilthey's structural psychology of the 1890s is at least protohermeneutical. There is always already a structural nexus of consciousness within which lived experiences and mental functions locate their meaning. Hermeneutics places this nexus of the self in a medium of commonality with others so that access to the self's experience is by way of incorporating representative meanings. The understanding of others serves the further specification of one's own experiences and thus makes it possible to define one's own individuality.

Dilthey's structural psychology and his hermeneutics are both about the articulation of meaning. In the former, the meaning of an experience is articulated by placing it within general structures of consciousness. In the latter, the meaning of things is articulated by regarding them as part of some larger context. Because Dilthey relied on an inner-outer distinction to fully explicate the meaning being articulated, whether psychologically or hermeneutically, one might assume that he merely developed a psychological mode of hermeneutics. But there is in Dilthey's use of the inner-outer distinction a productive ambiguity that works against this assumption. Psychologically, one might think that the inner is primordial and that the outer manifestation merely confirms it. We have shown, however, that the expressions appealed to in this volume are representative in a public discursive sense. Expressions need not merely manifest what was first represented psychologically. Rather, they are conceived as semantically transparent for any given community so that their meaning involves simply "reading off inner relations from outer forms" (62). This is not just an operation that starts from without to probe within, reversing the direction of the process of psychological manifestation. Discursively or semantically, the relation between an expression and the meaning expressed is that of an "inner unity" (61), which means that they are inseparable. Accordingly, "inner" comes to mean that to which we have direct access without needing to resort to inference. Even what we have access to as inner experience requires this inner unity of meaning provided by language.

Instead of reading Dilthey's *Formation* volume as the overcoming of the middle psychological works of the 1890s, it is more useful to see it as a return to the earlier efforts of the *Introduction to the Human Sciences*. As such, its project of a Critique of Historical Reason, which is here revived and expanded, makes room for multiple modes of higher understanding. The task of a critique of the human sciences is to transform the elementary mode of un-

derstanding that comes from being immersed in objective spirit as the medium of commonality into higher modes of understanding provided by the various productive systems that can be analyzed in history. Here the psychic nexus is only one of many reference points.

It is also worth noting that the idea of a productive nexus or system, which is so central to the *Formation*, was first introduced in Dilthey's psychological writings immediately following the publication of the *Ideas for a Descriptive and Analytic Psychology*.⁹ The mode of structural articulation from within, which Dilthey had developed in his psychology, is made applicable to the social and cultural systems in which individuals participate. But the fact that productive systems are also structurally centered in themselves does not require us to isolate them from each other. Instead, they can be shown to intersect structurally.

The most important contribution, however, that productive systems make to the understanding of history is their capacity to relate the categories of meaning and productive force. The category of meaning is in service of the structural articulation of how things in history are related. Structural systems do for history what laws do for nature; they account for order. The category of productive force, by contrast, develops Aristotle's categories of agency and suffering, action and reaction, in an effort to capture the dynamism of history. Productive force is to history what causality is to nature. What is distinctive of Dilthey's productive systems is that they are conceived in terms of both structure and force. The structural search for meaning points to similarities in things. Force can be channeled into structures, but it also has the capacity to move beyond them and produce difference. The challenge for historical understanding is to hold these tendencies in balance.

Dilthey distinguishes two kinds of forces that can work together to generate instability and discontinuity in the structural continuum of the status quo. One force derives its impetus from a negative tension, the other is a more positive striving for something new. Acknowledging their role in history, Dilthey asserts that "in the productive nexus of the great world events, the relationships of pressure, tension, the feeling of the insufficiency of the existing state of affairs—that is, feelings of aversion with a negative prognosis—form the background for action sustained by feelings of positive value toward goals to strive for and purposes to be set"

⁹ See Dilthey, SW 2.

(187). No matter how successful any epoch in the development of a society or a cultural system may be, there always comes a point when some felt lack produces the need for change.

It could be objected that to posit a feeling of insufficiency as accounting for historical change is too anthropomorphic. This may be a fair criticism. Despite his efforts to reduce the role of psychology in the overall system of the human sciences and to do justice to transpersonal forces operative in history, Dilthey persisted in the belief that the role of individuals could not be eliminated if history is to be assigned meaning. Without human beings and human sciences, there cannot be a formation of the historical world. It may seem that we have accentuated the problem of anthropomorphism for Dilthey by translating *Geisteswissenschaften* as “human sciences” rather than more literally as “spiritual sciences.” But Dilthey was not particularly happy with the term *Geisteswissenschaften*, and one of the alternatives he used was “sciences of man, society, and state.” We can, however, save Dilthey from anthropocentrism by reiterating that in the *Formation*, individuals are no longer considered to be the sole carriers of history but merely the co-carriers.

Even when history “transpires in individuals” (304), its significance lies in the way these individuals experience commonality. For as Dilthey writes: “Individuals qua individuals remain separate from each other. They do not allow us to grasp the most profound essence of history, which is to objectify the spirit of community” (278). The historical role of individuals is to “re-present something more encompassing by gathering it within themselves, endowing it, as it were, with a singular, bounded visibility” (274). But not everything in life can be made visible—Dilthey also acknowledges the importance of a religious sense of being related to the invisible. There are some striking passages to be found in this volume about “the heightened way in which great religious individuals experience life” (285). They transcend the everyday experience of commonality, even the ideal of community, by pursuing a more thorough search for communion. Describing how religious people seek to overcome isolation, Dilthey writes: “They transport themselves toward the invisible and into the fundamental nature of life itself, uniting with other souls through love and understanding” (285).

True religiosity allows “no evasion, no yielding to the superficiality of being caught up in life, nor to the everyday forgetfulness of past and future” (285). Religious consciousness, then, need

not be an escape from this life into otherworldliness, but can itself contribute to historical understanding. The invisible, characterized as “something pressing in on life from outside, yet coming from its own depths” (285), seems to challenge our usual ability to distinguish the inner and the outer. Accordingly, the scope of understanding may need to be broadened beyond the three modes of representation already discussed to also encompass what cannot be interiorized or brought into visible focus. Although historical understanding for Dilthey is centered in individuals, we obtain hints that it is susceptible to a decentering that leaves room for invisible forces.

R.A.M.
F.R.

PART I

STUDIES TOWARD THE FOUNDATION
OF THE HUMAN SCIENCES

TRANSLATED BY
RUDOLF A. MAKKREEL AND JOHN SCANLON

First Study

THE PSYCHIC STRUCTURAL NEXUS¹

3

The human sciences form an epistemic nexus that strives to attain objectively engaged and objectively valid conceptual cognition² of the interconnectedness of lived experiences in the human-historical-social world. The history of the human sciences shows a constant struggle with the difficulties encountered here. Gradually and within certain limits, these difficulties are overcome; research approaches, though only from afar, this goal, which incessantly beckons every true scientist. The investigation of the possibility of such objective conceptual cognition forms the foundation of the human sciences. In the following, I present some contributions to such a foundation.

The human-historical world as it confronts us in the human sciences is not a copy, as it were, of a reality existing outside it. The cognitive process³ cannot produce such a copy. It is and remains bound to its means of intuiting, of understanding, and of conceptual thinking. Nor do the human sciences want to produce such a copy. Rather, they refer what happens and what has happened—the unique, the contingent, the momentary—to a system of value and meaning. As it progresses, conceptual cognition⁴ seeks to penetrate this system ever more deeply. It becomes ever more objective in its grasp, without ever being able to surpass its own essence, namely, it can experience what is only through re-feeling and reconstruing, through connecting and separating, through abstract

¹ Pagination in the margins refers to *Gesammelte Schriften* (hereafter GS), vol. VII.

² Dilthey speaks here of a “gegenständliche und objektive Erkenntnis,” recalling Goethe’s account of his own “gegenständliches Denken,” according to which thought is “objectively active” and “does not separate itself from objects.” See J. W. Goethe, *Schriften zur Wissenschaftslehre*, in *Sämtliche Werke*, vol. 16 (Zurich: Artemis-Verlag-AG, 1977), p. 879f.

³ *Erkennen*.

⁴ “Conceptual cognition” is the translation of *Erkenntnis* in this edition. It designates the theoretical consciousness necessary for science and is to be distinguished from knowledge (*Wissen*), which may also be directly acquired from life or from reflection on life. See the introduction to this volume.

systems and a nexus of concepts. And it will become evident how even the historical narrative of what once happened can approach an objective grasp of its object, within the limits of the means of its understanding and of its conceptual grasp, only on the basis of the analytic sciences of the particular purposive systems.

Such conceptual cognition of the processes themselves in which the human sciences develop is at the same time the condition for the understanding of their *history*. On that basis, one recognizes the relation of the particular human sciences to the coexistence and sequence of lived experiences upon which they are founded. They cooperate to make the system of value and meaning that underlies this coexistence and sequence of lived experiences understandable in its totality, and then to make the singular intelligible on its basis. And at the same time one understands, on the basis of these theoretical foundations, how the outlook and the horizon of a period are always the presupposition for the fact that this period views the historical world in a definite manner. The possible historical perspectives are traversed, as it were, in the epochs of the human sciences. And one last point becomes intelligible. The development of the human sciences must be accompanied by a logical-epistemological self-reflection, that is, by the philosophical consciousness of the way in which the intuitive-conceptual system of the human-socio-historical world is formed on the basis of the lived experience of what has happened. It is hoped that the following discussions will prove useful for the understanding of these and other procedures in the history of the human sciences.

I. TASK, METHOD, AND OUTLINE OF THE FOUNDATION

1. *The Task*

Obviously, no other procedure is possible for the foundation of the human sciences than the one that applies to the foundation of knowledge^s as such. If there were a *theory of knowledge* that had achieved universal recognition, then it would just be a matter of

^s "Knowledge" is the translation of *Wissen* in this edition. It is to be distinguished from both the cognitive process (*Erkennen*) and its specific outcome, namely, conceptual cognition (*Erkenntnis*). Knowledge can already be had at the prescientific level of elementary understanding, and when it is claimed at the higher levels of science and philosophy, knowledge encompasses what is valued and willed as well as what is conceptually cognized. See next page.

applying it to the human sciences. But such a theory is one of the youngest of scientific disciplines. Kant was the first to conceive the problem in its general character; Fichte's attempt to unite Kant's solutions in a complete theory was premature, and today efforts in this domain are just as irreconcilably opposed to one another as those in metaphysics. Thus our only recourse is to select from the entire scope of philosophical foundations a set of propositions that satisfies the task of grounding the human sciences. No attempt can escape the danger of one-sidedness at this stage of the development of the theory of knowledge. Nevertheless, the more universally the task of this theory is conceived and the more completely all means for its solution are considered, the less the procedure will be exposed to that danger.

And that is just what is demanded by the peculiar nature of the human sciences. Their foundation must refer to *all classes of knowledge*. It must extend to the *conceptual cognition of reality*, to the *positing of values*, and to the *determination of purposes* and the *establishment of rules*. The particular human sciences are composed of knowledge about facts, about valid universal truths, about values, purposes, and rules. And human-socio-historical life itself constantly proceeds from the apprehension of reality to determinations of value and from these to the setting of purposes and the establishment of rules.

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Whenever history presents a historical course of events, there occurs a selection from what has been handed down in the sources, and that selection is always determined by an assessment of the value of the facts.

This relation is even clearer in those sciences that have the particular systems of culture for their object. The life of society differentiates itself into purposive systems, and a purposive system is always realized in actions that are bound by rules. And these systematic human sciences are not only theories in which goods, purposes, and rules appear as facts of social reality. Rather, just as the theory arose from reflection and doubt about the attributes of this reality, about the value of life, about the highest good, about traditional rights and duties, so it is also the point of transition toward the goal of gaining determinations of purposes and norms for the regulation of life. Political economy has its logical foundation in the theory of value. Jurisprudence must press forward from particular positive legal maxims to the universal legal rules and legal concepts that are implicitly contained in them; finally, it will confront those problems that concern the relations in this domain be-

tween evaluation, rule-giving, and the conceptual cognition of what is the case. Is the exclusive legitimation of legal order to be sought in the coercive power of the state? And if universal principles are to have a place in law, are they grounded in a binding rule immanent to the will or in evaluation or in reason? And these same questions return in the domain of morals; in fact, the concept of an unconditionally valid binding of the will, which we call an ought, forms, properly speaking, the chief question of this science.

Thus the foundation of the *human sciences* requires the same extension to all classes of knowledge as is demanded in the general foundation of *philosophy*. For the latter must extend to every domain in which consciousness has shaken off the rule of authority and strives to attain valid knowledge through the standpoint of reflection and doubt. First, a philosophical foundation must justify knowledge in the domain of objective *apprehension*. Our naive consciousness of an objective reality and its attributes is overturned when scientific knowledge seeks to derive from what is given in the senses an objective order according to laws. Finally, the problem arises of furnishing the proof of the objective necessity of the procedures and results of the conceptual cognition of reality. But our knowledge of *values* also requires such a foundation. For the values of life that arise in feeling are subjected to scientific reflection, and from this too there arises the task of producing an objectively necessary knowledge. The ideal of its completion would be reached if the theory assigned a ranking to the values of life according to a fixed measure—the old, much discussed question that first appeared as the question of the highest good. Finally, such a philosophical foundation is no less necessary for the domain of *setting purposes* and *establishing rules* than for the other two domains. For even the purposes that the will sets for itself and the rules to which it finds itself bound, as they first derive from the tradition of ethics, of religion, and of positive law, are undermined by reflection; and the human spirit must produce valid knowledge on its own here too. Everywhere, life leads to reflection about what is posited in it, reflection leads to doubt, and only if life is able to assert itself in the face of such doubt can thought end up with valid knowledge.

This is the basis for the influence of thought in all attitudes of life. Although resisted again and again by lively feeling and genial intuition, the influence of thought prevails; for it springs from the inner necessity to establish, amid the inconstant variation of sense perceptions, desires, and feelings, something stable that makes possible a constant and unitary direction of life.

This work is accomplished in all forms of scientific thought. But it is finally the function of philosophy to complete these scientific reflections concerning life by gathering, generalizing, and grounding them. Thus thought receives a definite function in relation to life. In its tranquil flow, life constantly produces all sorts of realities. Many of its remnants are deposited on the banks of our little ego. The same process allows us to enjoy all sorts of values in the life of our feelings or drives—sensuous, religious, and artistic life-values. And amidst the changing relations between needs and the means of their satisfaction there emerges the process of setting purposes. Purposive systems are formed that pervade the whole of society and embrace and determine every member of it: Laws, ordinances, and religious precepts act as coercive forces and determine the individual. Again and again, it is the business of thought to apprehend the relations in and among these realities of life as they exist in consciousness and to progress from the singular, contingent, discovered facts thus brought to clear, distinct consciousness to the necessary and universal nexus contained in them. Thought can only intensify the energy of our becoming conscious of the realities of life. It is bound by an inner necessity to the experienced and the given. And philosophy is merely the highest endeavor to make conscious: it is the consciousness of every mode of consciousness and the knowledge of all knowledge. Thus it finally takes as its problem the way thought is constrained by forms and rules as well as the inner necessity that binds thought to the given. That is the final and highest stage of philosophical self-reflection.

If one conceives the problem of knowledge to have this scope, then its solution in a theory of knowledge can be designated as *philosophical self-reflection*. And at first, that will be the exclusive task of the grounding part of philosophy; the encyclopedia of the sciences and the theory of world-views grow from this foundation, and the work of philosophical self-reflection is completed in them.

2. The Task of the Theory of Knowledge

Accordingly, philosophy accomplishes its task first as a founding discipline or as a theory of knowledge. Its givens are all the thought processes that are determined by the purpose of producing valid knowledge. Its task lies finally in answering the question whether and to what extent knowledge is possible.

If I consider what is meant by knowledge, it should be distinguished from a mere representation, presumption, question, or

assumption by the fact that a content appears here with a sense of objective necessity, which is the most universal character of knowledge.

- 8 This concept of objective necessity contains two moments, and these are the points of departure for the theory of knowledge. One lies in the evidence that adheres to properly completed thought processes, and the other is contained in the character of the reflexive awareness⁶ of reality in a lived experience or in the character of givenness that binds us to an outer perception.

3. The Foundational Method Used Here

The method for accomplishing this task consists in the regress from the purposive system that is directed toward the production of objectively necessary knowledge in its various domains to the conditions upon which the attainment of this goal depends.

Such an analysis of the purposive system in which knowledge is to be brought forth is different from what is accomplished in psychology. The psychologist investigates the psychic nexus on the basis of which judgments are passed, realities are asserted, and truths of universal validity are expressed. He wants to establish the nature of this nexus. The origin of error has, of course, just as good a place in the course of his analysis of thought processes as its elimination. For the process of knowledge could neither be described nor explained as to its origin without those intermediaries of error and of its elimination. Thus in a certain respect, his point of view is the same as that of the natural scientist. Both want merely to see what is and have nothing to do with what ought to be. Nevertheless, there is an essential difference between the natural scientist and the psychologist, and it is conditioned by the properties of what is given to them. The psychic structural nexus has a subjective immanent teleological character. By that I understand that a striving toward goals is inherent in the structural nexus. This concept of structural nexus shall be examined thoroughly. With it nothing is said yet about objective purposiveness. The subjective immanent teleological character of psychic processes is foreign to outer nature as such. Immanent objective tele-

⁶ "Reflexive awareness" is the translation of *Innewerden* or *Innesein* in this edition. Reflexive awareness in its most basic sense is an immediate prereflective mode of self-givenness in which the dichotomies of form and content, subject and object, characteristic of reflective consciousness do not yet exist.

ology is projected into the organic world, as physical, only as a way of interpreting on the basis of our psychic experience. By contrast, a subjective immanent teleology is given in psychic attitudes and in their structural relations within the psychic nexus. It is contained in the nexus of psychic processes. Within objective apprehension as the basic psychic attitude, this character of psychic life, according to which a striving toward goals is inherent in its structure,⁷ makes itself felt in both main forms of apprehension, namely, of lived experiences and of external objects, as well as in the sequence of forms of representation. For the forms of re-presentation are connected as stages in a purposive system by the fact that in them something objective comes to ever more complete, more conscious, re-presentation, which corresponds increasingly to the demands of objective apprehension, and which makes it ever more possible to properly locate the particular object in the total nexus that is given as primary. Every lived experience involved in objective apprehension already contains a tendency, grounded in the total nexus of psychic life, toward grasping the world. Thus a principle of selection, according to which representations are to be preferred or rejected, is already given in psychic life. It considers whether representations fit into the tendency to grasp the object in its connectedness with the world as it is primarily given in the sensory horizon of apprehension. Therefore, a teleological nexus is already grounded in psychic structure, one that is directed toward grasping what is objective. And this nexus is then raised to clear consciousness in the theory of knowledge. But the theory of knowledge is not satisfied with that alone. It also asks whether the attitudes inherent in consciousness actually reach their goal. Its criteria for that are the first principles that abstractly express the attitude to which thought is bound if it is in fact to realize its goal.

4. Point of Departure for a Description of the Processes in which Knowledge Originates

It turns out that the task of a theory of the sciences can only be accomplished on the basis of an intuition of the psychological

⁷ See my *Ideas for a Descriptive and Analytic Psychology* (hereafter *Ideas*), GS V, 207f. (D), *Selected Works* (hereafter *SW*), vol. 2.

nexus in which the functions to which the production of knowledge is bound cooperate empirically.

Accordingly, the following relationship between psychological description and theory of knowledge arises. The abstractions of a theory of knowledge refer back to the lived experiences in which knowledge develops in a twofold form and through various stages. They presuppose insight into the processes whereby, on the basis of perceptions, names are given, concepts and judgments are formed,
 10 and whereby thought progresses gradually from what is particular, contingent, subjective, relative, and therefore permeated with errors, to what is objectively valid. Thus it is to be established in each single case what kind of lived experience takes place and is conceptually designated when we speak of the process of perception, of something objective, of naming and the meaning of verbal signs, of a judgment and its evidence, and of a scientific system. In this sense, I have emphasized in the first part of the *Introduction to the Human Sciences*⁸ and in the *Ideas for a Descriptive and Analytic Psychology*⁹ that the theory of knowledge requires a reference to the lived experiences of the cognitive process in which knowledge originates,¹⁰ and that these preliminary psychological concepts need merely describe and analyze what is contained in the experienced cognitive processes.¹¹ Thus such a descriptive-analytic account of the processes within which knowledge arises seemed to me to comprise a first task as a precondition for the theory of knowledge.¹² The excellent investigations of Husserl, which have created a "strictly descriptive foundation" of the theory of knowledge as a "phenomenology of the cognitive process," and thus a new philosophical discipline, proceed from similar points of view.

I have further claimed that the demand for strict validity in the theory of knowledge is not invalidated by its reference to such descriptions and analyses. Indeed, the description only expresses what is contained in the process of producing knowledge. Just as the theory that is abstracted from these lived experiences and their relationships to one another cannot be understood at all without this reference, and just as the question concerning the possibility of knowledge also presupposes the resolution of the other ques-

⁸ See *Introduction to the Human Sciences* (D), SW 1, 50f.

⁹ *Ideas*, GS V, 146 (D), SW 2.

¹⁰ *Ideas*, GS V, 147 (D), SW 2.

¹¹ *Ideas*, GS V, 147 (D), SW 2.

¹² *Ideas*, GS V, 147 (D), SW 2.

tion as to how perception, names, concepts, and judgments are related to the task of grasping an object, so it is the ideal of such a grounding description that it actually only express states of affairs and create fixed verbal designations for them. The approximation to this ideal is subject to the condition that only the facts and relations of facts contained in the developed psychic life of historical man, as the descriptive psychologist finds it in himself, is apprehended and analyzed. It is also necessary to proceed ever further in excluding concepts of psychic functions that are especially dangerous here. The work on this entire task has just begun. Approximation toward precise expressions for the states, processes, and connections under discussion can be attained only gradually. And thus it is already evident here that the task of a foundation of the human sciences cannot yet be resolved in a manner convincing for every co-worker.

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However, we can at least satisfy one condition for the resolution of the problem now. The description of the processes that produce knowledge is not least of all dependent on the ability to encompass knowledge in all its domains. And this is also the condition on which the success of a theory of knowledge depends. Thus the ideal of the following attempt is a balanced look at the various systems of knowledge. But that is possible only by exploring the special structure of the great systems conditioned by the various attitudes of psychic life. A comparative procedure in the theory of knowledge can then be based thereon. This comparative procedure makes it possible to carry out the analysis of logical forms and laws of thought to the point where the appearance of a subordination of the matter of experience to the a priori of forms and laws of thought vanishes entirely. This happens according to the following method. The functions of thought that take place without the use of signs referring to lived experience and intuition can be found in elementary operations such as comparing, combining, separating, relating; in terms of their cognitive value, they can be regarded as perceptions of a higher order. And the forms and laws of discursive thought can then be resolved in accordance with their legitimating grounds into (1) the functions of the elementary operations, (2) the experienceable function of signs, and (3) the contents of such lived experiences as intuiting, feeling, and willing that serve to ground the apprehension of reality, valuation, determination of purposes, and the establishment of rules, both in terms of what they share and in terms of their formal and categorial peculiarities. In the domain of the human sciences, such a pro-

cedure can be coherently carried out, and thus the objective validity of knowledge in this domain can be grounded according to this method.

This means that description must transcend the limits of those lived experiences that present themselves as engaged in objective apprehension. For if the following theory is to encompass the knowledge involved in the cognition of reality as well as the knowledge involved in evaluating, setting purposes, and establishing rules, then it also requires a reference back to the nexus in which these various psychic functions are connected with one another. Furthermore, in the conceptual cognition of reality there arises a consciousness of norms governing the fulfillment of cognitive ends. This normative consciousness is connected with the cognitive processes in a distinctive structure. Moreover, we cannot banish from the givenness of outer objects a relation to the volitional attitude; this is another reason why the abstract results of the theory of knowledge are dependent on the nexus of the whole of psychic life. The same result follows from the analysis of the processes by which we understand other individuals and their creations; these processes are fundamental to the human sciences, but they themselves are grounded in the totality of our psychic life.¹³ From this point of view, I have emphasized again and again in earlier writings the necessity of apprehending abstract scientific thought as integrally related to the psychic totality.¹⁴

5. The Place of this Description in the System of the Foundation

Such a description and analysis of the processes occurring in the purposive system of the production of valid knowledge moves entirely within the presuppositions of empirical consciousness. In it the reality of external objects and other persons is presupposed, and that includes the presupposition that the empirical subject is determined by the milieu in which it lives, and in turn works back upon it. While the description presents and analyzes these relationships as facts of consciousness contained in lived experiences, it of course asserts nothing about the reality of the external world

¹³ See my treatise on hermeneutics in the essays dedicated to Sigwart, 1900 (D), SW 4, 235–58.

¹⁴ *Introduction to the Human Sciences*, SW 1, 50f.

and of other persons or about the objectivity of the relations of acting and suffering. Only a theory derived from description ought to bring about a decision concerning the legitimacy of the presuppositions contained in empirical consciousness.

It is equally self-evident, then, that the lived experiences described and the nexus they display can be considered here only from the point of view demanded by the theory of the sciences. The chief interest lies in the relations in which functions stand to one another, in the relations whereby these functions depend on the conditions of consciousness and on what is given, and finally in the relations whereby the particular processes that occur as part of the process of producing knowledge are conditioned by this nexus. For the subjective and immanent teleological character of the psychic nexus by virtue of which processes in it work together toward achievements and thus create a striving toward goals is the basis for selecting from the course of thought what counts as valid knowledge about reality, about values, and about purposes.

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Let us summarize our conclusion concerning the role of description within the foundation. It grounds theory, and the latter refers back to it. Now, whether the description of the cognitive processes and the theory of knowledge are referred to one another in the particular parts of the theory, or whether the overall description precedes the theory, depends on its use. The theory itself receives both criteria to which its validity is bound from the description of knowledge. All knowledge stands under the norms of thought. At the same time, in accordance with these norms of thought, it refers to something experienced or a given; and the relation of knowledge to the given is, more precisely, that of dependence on it. In accordance with the results of description, all knowledge stands under the highest rule of being grounded in something either experienced or given perceptually in accordance with the norms of thought. Subsequently, these two main problems¹⁵ of the foundation of the human sciences can be separated. The present studies concerning the foundation of the human sciences will interrelate them in a theory of knowledge, because both are decisive for grounding the possibility of objective conceptual cognition. The more precise determination of these two problems can be arrived at only on the basis of description.

¹⁵ Dilthey means the problems of being bound by the given and by the norms of thought.

II. DESCRIPTIVE PRELIMINARY CONCEPTS¹⁶

I. Psychic Structure

The empirical course of psychic life consists of processes; for each of our states has a beginning in time, changes with time, and will also disappear in it again. Further, this process of life constitutes a development; for the cooperation of the psychic stimuli is of such a character that it tends to give rise to an increasingly more determinate psychic nexus as it accords with the conditions of life—to produce a gestalt¹⁷ of this nexus, as it were. And this acquired nexus is operative in every psychic process. It conditions when and how we are attentive; apperceptions are dependent on it, and the reproduction of representations is determined by it. The occurrence of feelings and desires and decisions of our will are also dependent upon this nexus. Psychological description has to do only with the factual content of these processes; physiological or psychological explanation of the origin or content of such an acquired psychic nexus is beyond its scope.¹⁸

The particular, individually formed, psychic life in its development constitutes the subject-matter of psychological research, but its first goal is to establish what is common in this psychic life of individuals.

¹⁶ This descriptive part of the investigation is a further development of the standpoint taken up in my previous works. Those works were aimed at grounding the possibility of an objective conceptual cognition of reality, and, as part of that, especially the objective apprehension of psychic reality based on a familiarity with it. In opposition to the idealistic theory of reason, I did not refer back to an a priori of theoretical understanding or of practical reason, which would be grounded in a pure ego, but rather to the structural relations contained in the psychic nexus that can be demonstrated. This structural nexus “forms the underlying basis of the cognitive process” (*Ideas*, GS V, 151; SW 2). I found the first form of this structure in the “inner relation of the various aspects of an attitude” (*ibid.*). The second form of structure is the inner relation that links separate lived experiences within one attitude: thus, for instance, perceptions, memory images, and thought processes bound to language (*ibid.*). The third form consists in the inner relation of kinds of attitude to one another in the psychic nexus (*ibid.*). As I now seek to further develop my foundation of a realistic or critical and objectively directed epistemology, I must point out once and for all how much I owe to the *Logical Investigations* of Husserl (1900, 1901), which are epoch-making in the utilization of description for epistemology. (D)

¹⁷ Dilthey had already developed the idea of a gestalt of psychic life as the highest human achievement in *Ideas*, GS V, 220, SW 2.

¹⁸ *Ideas*, GS V, 177ff. (D), SW 2.

Here we emphasize a distinction. In psychic life, there are regularities that determine the succession of processes. The distinction to be discussed here holds between these regularities. The first sort of relation between processes or moments of the same process is a characteristic moment of the lived experience itself: accordingly, impressions of belonging together and of liveliness in the psychic nexus are produced. The other regularities in the succession of psychic processes are not characterized by the experienceability of their mode of connection. The connecting moment cannot be demonstrated in lived experience. A conditioning relation is inferred. Accordingly, our attitude is like that toward outer nature. Hence, these connections exhibit a rigidity and externality. Science establishes regularities of this latter sort by selecting particular processes from the nexus of psychic processes and inductively inferring regularities about them. Association, reproduction, and apperception are such processes. The regularity established about them consists of uniformities that correspond to the laws of change in the sphere of outer nature.

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Furthermore, the various factors in a present state of consciousness can condition the next state of consciousness even when they are layered upon one another without any inner connection, like strata in the psychic state of affairs (*status conscientiae*). An impression that impinges upon a present psychic state from without, as something quite foreign to it, alters it. Contingency, being thrown together, being layered upon one another—such relationships constantly make themselves felt in the state of consciousness of a given moment and in the emergence of psychic changes. And processes such as reproduction and apperception can be conditioned by all these moments of the state of consciousness.

A different sort of regularity is distinguished from these uniformities. I designate it as *psychic structure*. By psychic structure I understand the pattern according to which psychic facts of various characters are regularly connected with one another by an *inner, experienceable relation*.¹⁹ The relation can connect parts of one state of consciousness, or even lived experiences that are temporally separated from one another, or the attitudes contained in them.²⁰ Therefore, these regularities are different from the uniformities that can be established as belonging to the changes in psychic life. Uniformities are rules that can be exhibited as belonging

¹⁹ *Ideas*, GS V, 204 (D), SW 2.

²⁰ *Ideas*, GS V, 204ff., 207ff. (D), SW 2.

to changes; thus every change is an instance that can be subordinated to a uniformity. Structure, by contrast, is a pattern in which psychic facts are connected with one another by an inner relation; each of the facts thus related to one another is a part of the structural nexus. Thus the regularity here consists in the relation of parts to a whole. Before it was a matter of a genetic relationship in which psychic changes depend on one another; now, on the contrary, it is a matter of the inner relations that can be apprehended as belonging to developed psychic life. Structure is a complex of relationships in which, in the midst of the fluctuation of processes, in the midst of the contingency of the coexistence of psychic component parts and of the succession of psychic experiences, particular parts of the psychic nexus refer to one another.

- 16 What is to be understood by these determinations will become clearer by indicating which psychic facts show such inner relations. The component parts of the sensory objective world that is represented in psychic life constantly change according to the influences of the external world, and the manifold given in an individual's psychic life is dependent upon them. The resulting external relations include coincidence, separability, difference, similarity, equality, whole, and part. By contrast, in psychic experience an inner relation emerges by which this content is related to objective apprehension, to feeling, or to a striving. It is obvious that the inner relation is different in each of those instances. The relation of a perception *to* an object, sorrow *about* an event, striving *for* a good—these lived experiences contain inner relations clearly different from one another. Each kind of relation also establishes within its domain regular relations between temporally separated lived experiences. And finally there exist regular relations between the kinds of relations themselves—together they comprise a psychic nexus. I call these “inner relations” because they are grounded in a psychic attitude as such; mode of relation and mode of attitude correspond to each other. One such inner relation is the way in which an attitude is related to a given content in objective apprehension. Another is the way in which, when we set a purpose, an attitude is related to a given content as the representation of the object of the intended purpose. And inner relations between lived experiences within an attitude can be the relation of represented to representing or of grounding to grounded in objective apprehension, or of end and means, of decision and obligation in the volitional attitude. This fact of inner relation, like that of the unity of a manifold to which it is subordinate, is an exclusive char-

acteristic of psychic life. It can only be experienced and displayed, but not defined.

The theory of structure has to do with these inner relations. And only with them; not at all, on the other hand, with the attempts to classify psychic life according to functions or powers or faculties. It neither claims nor disputes that there are such. Nor does it prejudge the question whether psychic life develops from something more simple to the complexity of structural relations in human nature generally or in the individual. Such problems lie completely outside its domain.

Psychic processes are connected by these relations to the structural nexus, and this structural character of the psychic nexus has the consequence, as will be shown, that lived experiences work together to achieve a total effect. It is not purposiveness in the objective sense, but a purposive efficacy directed toward certain states of consciousness, that belongs to the structural nexus.

These are the concepts that determine in a preliminary way what is to be understood by psychic structure.

The theory of structure seems to me to be a main part of descriptive psychology. It could be developed as a distinctive, comprehensive whole. Above all, it provides the foundation of the human sciences. The inner relations that can be shown to pervade this whole are first those that constitute lived experiences, then those that hold between the components of a series of lived experiences within an attitude and that ultimately comprise the structural nexus of psychic life. Furthermore, there is the relation in which specific functions cooperate to form a subjective teleological nexus and, finally, the relation between real things, values, and purposes as well as that between structure and development. All these relations are fundamental for the *formation* of the human sciences. They are equally fundamental for the *concept* of the human sciences and for their *delimitation* from the sciences of nature. For the theory of structure itself shows that the human sciences deal with a form of givenness that does not occur at all in the natural sciences. The component parts of the sensory objective world, when apprehended in relation to the psychic nexus, belong to the study of psychic life; on the other hand, sensory contents through reference to outer objects constitute the physical world. These contents do not belong to the physical world, which, rather, is the object to which we refer the sensory contents in the apprehending attitude. Our intuitions and concepts of the physical world express the state of affairs that is given in these contents only qua

characteristics of objects. The natural sciences are not concerned with the attitude of objective apprehension from which they originate. The inner relations in which the contents can stand in psychic experience—act, attitude, structural nexus—are exclusively objects of the human sciences. These relations belong to their domain. And this structure, as well as the way in which the psychic nexus is experienced in us and understood in others, is sufficient to ground the special nature of the logical procedures of the human sciences.¹⁸ The matter will rest there: The object and the manner of givenness determine the logical procedure.

What means do we have, then, to arrive at an unobjectionable apprehension of the structural relations?

2. The Apprehension of Psychic Structure

Our knowledge of the structural nexus displays certain peculiarities. A knowledge of the regular inner relations to be discussed confronts us everywhere in language, in the understanding of other persons, in literature, in the expressions of poets and historians. Phrases such as "I am worried about something," "I have a desire to do something," "I wish for the occurrence of an event," and hundreds of similar ones contain such inner relations. In such phrases I express an inner state without reflecting on it. It is always an inner relation that is expressed in them. In the same way, I also understand immediately what occurs in someone who addresses such phrases to me. And the verses of poets, the narratives of historians from the earliest accessible times, before all psychological reflection, are filled with the same expressions. I ask, then, what grounds such knowledge? What is objective, insofar as it consists of sensory contents, and relations between them of simultaneity, succession, or of a logical nature, cannot be the grounds for knowledge of this sort. After all, it must somehow be grounded in a lived experience that includes an attitude such as joy about something, longing for something. Knowledge is already there; it is linked to the lived experience without reflection; and no other origin and ground can be found than precisely in the lived experience. And here it is a matter of going back from the expressions to the lived experience, and not of interpreting something into them. The necessity of the relation between a determinate lived experience and the corresponding expression of the psychic is immediately experienced. Structural psychology has the difficult task of

forming judgments that reproduce with a consciousness of adequation the lived experience of structures that [in turn] encompass more determinate lived experiences. The forms of expression of psychic life that have been developed and refined for a thousand years serve as an indispensable foundation; structural psychology has to develop these forms of expression further and grasp them more generally, while testing their adequation to the lived experiences themselves. If we contemplate for a moment the utterances of social intercourse and of literature in their entire scope and think of an art of interpretation directed toward them, then it becomes clear at once that this hermeneutics of all existing human intercourse is based precisely on the permanent structural relations that emerge regularly in all spiritual manifestations of life.²¹

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But just as surely as the knowledge of these structural relations refers back to our lived experience—and also makes our interpretation of all spiritual processes possible—just as difficult is it to establish the connection between this knowledge and experiencing. For lived experience remains present to inner observation only under very restricted conditions. We bring lived experience to a distinct, diagnostic consciousness in very different ways: sometimes in terms of one essential trait, sometimes in terms of another. We distinguish between memories. By means of comparison we lift regular inner relations into prominence. We explore things imaginatively as a kind of psychic experiment. The direct expressions of lived experience found by great poets and religious thinkers (the virtuosos of expression) can exhaust the entire content of lived experience. How meager and paltry our psychological acquaintance with feelings would be without the great poets who have expressed the entire manifold of feelings and have made conspicuous, often in a surprising way, the structural relations in the universe of feelings. Here again, it is entirely irrelevant for such description to relate a volume of poetry by Goethe to him as a person: the description deals solely with the lived experience and not at all with any person in whom it occurs.

If these problems are to be pursued further, then the psychologist has to be concerned with the careful distinction between what experiencing, introspection, and reflection respectively allow us to understand about lived experiences, and what is given of the structural nexus in these various ways. What needs to be said further

²¹ See the "Rise of Hermeneutics," GS V, 317 (D), SW 4, 235.

for the foundation of knowledge can be clarified only by a discussion of the particular attitudes.

3. *Structural Units*

Every lived experience contains a content. By content we here understand not all the parts contained in an encompassing whole that could be separated from this whole in thought. So understood, the content would be the sum total of what can be differentiated from what is contained in the lived experience as if it were an enclosing container. Rather, only a part of what is distinguishable in a lived experience is here designated as content.²⁰

There are lived experiences in which nothing is noticeable but a psychic state. In physical feelings of pain, the localized burning or stinging can be distinguished from the feeling, but in the lived experience itself, they are indistinguishable. Therefore, there is no inner relation between them; and a conception of the lived experience that would apprehend the feeling here as a displeasure about the gnawing or piercing does violence to the facts. In the same way, in the life of the drives, there appear states in which no definite object-representation is combined with the striving; here too nothing of an inner relation between act and object is contained in the state of affairs. Thus one must not exclude the possibility of lived experiences that do not contain a relation of a sense content to an act in which it is there for us, or to an object, or a relation of a feeling or a striving to this object.²² Now, one may account for this in various ways. One may say that these lived experiences form the lower limit of our psychic life and that upon their basis other lived experiences of perceiving or feeling or striving come about that contain, as distinguishable moments, an attitude and a content to which that attitude is related. The extensive existence of inner relations between act—this word taken in the broader sense—and content in lived experiences suffices to establish the structural unit in lived experiences that forms our object here. And it cannot be doubted that such relations are pervasive. Thus the

²² What is said here is intended to set aside the extremely difficult questions that arise when the indicated facts are classified under the concept of attitude; for the concept of structure developed here is independent of the answers to these questions. Especially for the foundation of an epistemology, it seems to be of no consequence whether a more detailed descriptive psychological investigation rejects such a classification, or, if it accepts it, how it then accounts for the state of affairs. (D)

object of outer perception is related to the sense content in which it is given to me. That about which I feel displeasure is related to the feeling of displeasure itself. The object-representation involved in setting a purpose is related to the volitional attitude that strives toward the realization of the object-image. What we call the content of a lived experience can be a visual image, a harmony, or a noise, and distinguished from this content and related to it is the attitude that presumes, asserts, feels, wishes, or wills this content. I imagine, judge, fear, hate, desire. These are attitudes, and there is always something to which they are related, just as every something, every determination of content, in these lived experiences is there only for an attitude.

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"I observe a color," "I make a judgment about it," "It delights me," "I desire its presence": with these expressions I designate different attitudes that refer to the same content in a lived experience. Similarly, the same attitude of judgment, e.g., relating to the color, can also be referred to other objects. Thus the attitudes do not determine the presence of the contents, nor the contents the occurrence of attitudes. Therefore, we are justified in distinguishing these two constituents of lived experiences from one another. And at the same time, we find them linked as a structural unit in lived experience. For there exists a relation between act and content that is grounded in the attitude. We call it an inner relation because it is experienceable and grounded in a general and regular feature of the attitude.

Thus lived experiences show themselves to be structural units, and from them the structure of psychic life is formed.

But there is another important reference point to be found in lived experience. Just as the content refers to objects, so it seems necessary that it refer, on the other side, to an I that manifests the attitude. However, this second reference point is by no means regularly contained in lived experience. The more the turn toward the object predominates in apprehension or striving, the less an I that apprehends or even one that strives is noticeable in lived experience. When Hamlet suffers on the stage, the spectator's own ego is effaced. In striving to complete a task, I literally forget myself. To be sure, this relation is always present in the feeling of life in which a situation relative to the surrounding world is felt in pleasure or displeasure, in hate or love. And the more decisively a willing sets itself against the world in determining its own purposes, the more strongly is its being restricted felt, and the more decisively there emerges the relation of the attitude involved in

willing both to objects and to that which has the attitude, that which does the wishing, the desiring or willing. The addition of the representation of an ego to these processes can be given various psychological interpretations. However, if one passes from lived experience to the standpoint of reflection, then the relation of the attitude to that which has the attitude is unavoidable. And that is just what is demanded in the standpoint of reflection by the use of the concept of relation. If a kind of relation is contained in an attitude, then reflection requires that we add in thought an ego that stands in a determinate relation to multiple contents or in multiple relations to a determinate content.

From the standpoint of the objectification of lived experience and of reflection upon it, the new lived experience is placed in relation to my familiarity with a psychic nexus, to which, among other lived experiences, this present one also belongs. The inner structural articulation that then comes about for reflection is that of the psychic nexus, of the way the new lived experience belongs to this nexus, and finally of an attitude that relates this psychic nexus to an objective world, in this and in every other lived experience. If I call this nexus my ego or my subject, then it stands in determinate relations to the world of objects: I see objects, suffer from them, or want to have them. This mode of expression is correct for objective thought even in those cases in which nothing about an ego shows itself in a particular lived experience.

4. *The Structural Nexus*

We shall now look at the *relations* that hold between the *structural units* apprehended in lived experiences. In certain lived experiences, we find an inner relation between act and content. This relation is characterized by an attitude toward content. The attitude here is not related to the content in a merely temporal or logical relation. Neither is it the case that, as it were, various layers of mental facts run side by side as contents and attitudes, nor that we are speaking only of a logical relation that originates in reflection upon them both; rather, the inner relation that we have designated as a *structural unit* holds between them. The relation of separable parts in a whole that makes up this inner relation is *sui generis*: It occurs only in psychic life. And further, it is the simplest case of psychic structure.²³

²³ *Ideas*, GS V, 204 (D), SW 2.

At the same time, all the lived experiences in which the same attitude toward contents is found are not only akin to one another in that respect but also give rise to *such relations between contents* as are grounded in the nature of that kind of attitude.

Finally, the kinds of attitude themselves are linked to one another by inner relations and thus comprise a complex whole. That is the origin of the concept of a *structural psychic nexus*.

A further remarkable characteristic of structure appears here. It also can interweave perception, feeling, volition into systems by connecting several inner relations into the whole of a process or of a state. Thus in a scientist, the cognitive process is a purposive system: Here the relation that we call volition is combined with the one that we designate as objective apprehension into the structural unity of one process; and in this whole purposive system, particular functions cooperate to bring about states that somehow have the character of value or purpose in consciousness.

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This structure of the psychic nexus displays apparent similarities to biological structure. But if one pursues these similarities, one arrives merely at vague analogies. Rather, the truth is that precisely in these properties of psychic life, according to which it is a structural nexus, rests the difference between what is given to us in lived experience and in reflection upon it, on the one hand, and physical objects that we construe on the basis of given sense complexes, on the other hand.

5. *The Kinds of Structural Relation*

The manifold of what is given as content is boundless. The entire objective world to which we are related in our attitudes is composed from such content. And what we designate as attitudes toward these contents present themselves also at first as indefinite in number. Asking, believing, presuming, claiming, taking pleasure in, approving, liking and its opposite, wishing, desiring, and willing are such modifications of the psychic attitude. Their differences cannot be derived from the variation in the content toward which an attitude is related; for the same attitude can persist in spite of change of content.

There are kinships among the modes of attitude. But when one compares these modes, one arrives at a relation such as that between objective apprehension and feeling: These two are akin only insofar as each is an attitude. It also becomes apparent that in the case of alteration of outer conditions, one mode of attitude passes

over into another. If the conditions upon which the realization of a desire depends are abolished, then the desire can pass over into a wish. And if the relation of a sense complex to an object has shown itself to be erroneous, then the assertion concerning the object turns into a doubt or a question.

A principle that brings order into this multiplicity of attitudes can only be attained by distinguishing the kinds of inner or structural relation that are found in them. Accordingly, we must apply this principle to the given psychic states of affairs.

THE STRUCTURAL NEXUS OF KNOWLEDGE

I. OBJECTIVE APPREHENSION

Three kinds of inner structural relations can be distinguished in the psychic nexus and are related to one another in it. Each kind forms a system in which lived experiences are connected into a whole by a mode of structural relation. And each has a function in the psychic nexus. Here I will attempt merely to delimit these modes of structural relation from one another and to describe the one that is at work in the process of cognition. A more precise analysis of feeling and of willing becomes important only when it is a matter of grounding the human sciences upon descriptive psychology.

i. Delimitation of Objective Apprehension

Representations, judgments, feelings, desires, acts of will are always interwoven in the psychic nexus: this is the empirical given of psychic life. A harmonious combination of sounds evokes a feeling of pleasure; then a visual perception crowds in upon this calm aesthetic enjoyment and reproduces memories that give rise to a desire; this is in turn suppressed on the basis of a judgment because of fear of the consequences of satisfying the desire. Thus the empirical constituents of psychic life display the interweaving of processes belonging to all classes of psychic attitudes. And the uniformities that we establish in this genetic system of psychic processes refer to the cooperation of these manifold factors interwoven with one another in the psychic nexus. Thus the reproduction of our representations is conditioned just as much by the interest and attentiveness with which impressions are appropriated and their representations reproduced as they are by the composition of these representations and the number of their repetitions.

Various kinds of inner relation permeate this manifold web of various factors in the genetic system of the processes of psychic

life. And each kind has the characteristic that the lived experiences belonging to it are connected with one another into a system by this inner relation. The relations within such a system form a main part of the permanent basic structures — the anatomy, as it were — of the developed psychic nexus, according to its permanent uniform existence. One of these inner relations holds between the perceptions, remembered representations, judgments, and combinations of judgments that constitute the systematic nexus of knowledge. Whatever else may be contained in these lived experiences, each of them shows a determinate mode of consciousness of something having content, which we designate as being objective. The uniformity of the structural unity of the relations constituted by these attitudes can be said to characterize an objective system.

Goethe expressed the ideal of this objective attitude and how its basic relations are directed toward an objective apprehension of the world with what could be called a high degree of transcendental awareness. The fact that not just a content is contained in lived experience, but also a mode of being conscious of it, is shown by the modifications that distinguish the various lived experiences of objects from one another. We find such modifications in the givenness that characterizes perception, in the supposition of a state of affairs involved in the imaginative representation of the painter or the poet, or the positing of reality in a judgment. No matter how many differences from a psychological point of view there may be between an imaginative representation and a perception of the same object — for instance, with regard to the contents — from a structural point of view, there is no difference in mode of consciousness as it relates to the objective system. Objects can be what is given to the senses, but they can also be our lived experiences, or partial contents of what is thus given, or similarities, or relations. Indeed, the world is only the sum total or the ordering of what is apprehended as being objective. And it is to this objective system that our feelings as well as our volitions then refer. The mode of consciousness in which something objective is there we designate as objective apprehension.

2. The Relation between Lived Experience and Psychic Object

All knowledge of psychic objects is founded on lived experience. Lived experience is first of all the structural unity of attitudes and

contents. My perceptual attitude with its relation to an object is just as much a lived experience as my feeling about something or my willing something. Lived experience is always certain of itself. And since lived experience constitutes the justifying ground for the entire system of my knowledge about psychic objects, I must analyze lived experience with regard to the certainty contained in it. Contents like a red or blue and attitudes like apprehending the red or being pleased by it are there for me. This being-there-for-me can be designated as being-conscious,¹ or as lived experience, if this word is taken as referring less to the life-process itself than to the way it is there. What is there for me can be a sense quality appearing in a representation as well as a feeling of pain, or a striving. It can also be a mathematical relation just as well as my consciousness of a contractual obligation. The expression "being-there-for-me" is already a reflection about the existing state of affairs, since it is defined as belonging to an I. Indeed, the relation of a lived experience to an I to which it belongs can be something of which I am conscious as a state of affairs, just as much as the relation of a sense complex to an outer object. What we are here discussing is not some content or other of lived experiences but what is common to them all, namely, that they are conscious and there for me. Every lived experience has this characteristic. The existence of an object may be asserted in the lived experience of a content. Yet at the same time, something common to every lived experience is also contained in it, [namely,] that this assertion about the object and about the determinations of its content is conscious, and is there and present as conscious. The noise that a feverish patient relates to an object behind his back forms a lived experience that is real in all its parts. Both the occurrence of the noise and its being related to the object are real. And the fact that the assumption of an object situated behind the bed is false does not affect the reality of this fact of consciousness.

This universal condition, which holds for everything that is there for me—consciousness or lived experience—must be contained in the kinds of attitude found in me; otherwise, they would not be there for me. But this consciousness is distinct from the attitude. Sorrow about something is experienced or there for me as an attitude. Likewise a desire for something. No matter how this is accounted for psychologically, the certainty of lived experi-

¹ *Bewußt-Sein.*

ence requires no further mediation. It can accordingly be called immediate.

Every assertion about what is experienced is objectively true if it is brought to adequation with the lived experience. For it does not explicate the relation of the perceptual experience to objects by a material determination of the objectivity of the latter; rather, it asserts only the occurrence of the perceptual attitude itself. And this state of affairs in consciousness is given to me as a reality.²⁷

Thus the question whether a state of affairs in consciousness exists cannot even arise here. A feeling exists insofar as it is felt, and it exists just as it is felt: The consciousness of it and its constitution, its being-given and its reality, are not different from one another. "Being-there-for-us," "being-given-to-us," or "fact-of-consciousness" are only different expressions for the same state of affairs, in which apprehension and the fact given in it are one instead of some object standing over against it. If I designate this as *reflexive awareness* (*Innewerden*), then this expression must be understood in such a way that the relations of sense-contents to an object are just as much there for me in such reflexive awareness as a feeling or a striving. The German expression *Innewerden* is inadequate insofar as it suggests that reflexive awareness involves *becoming (-werden)* aware. Instead, reflexive awareness is more a matter of "*being aware*" (*Inne-Sein*). No assumption whatsoever has been made about any *act* whereby reflexive awareness *becomes* possible.

The problems raised by Kant in his theory of inner sense have no bearing at all on this reality of a fact of consciousness as such. It concerns the question whether what is thus given can be apprehended as a product and analyzed into factors. Our life consists of processes emerging for consciousness in time; and whatever might be behind them is not something experienceable and consequently not required for the foundation of sciences that have as their subject matter lived experiences possessing the character of processes or events. The question whether we have sense-contents in consciousness only in relation to an outer object and, consequently, whether sense-contents are there for us only in that relation has no bearing on the question of the reality of sense-contents. For if sense-contents possess reality together with this fact of consciousness, then they have it precisely as parts of this fact of consciousness, quite apart from any consideration of this relation to an outer object. If the lived experience is real as a fact of consciousness, then so is every part that is contained in it. And each repre-

sentation denotes something real insofar as it is correctly fulfilled. Here the reality of the particular lived experience is raised to objectively valid knowledge in psychological concepts, judgments, and contexts.

In its historical development, the formation of concepts referring to lived experience is at the same time founded on understanding, which is in turn grounded in lived experience. Here we must disregard this complication in order to clarify the relation of lived experience to the apprehension of the psychic nexus. In lived experience, reflexive awareness and the content of which I am aware are one.

What happens if I pay attention to this lived experience and ask myself what it contains? Here is a second important problem for the foundation of the human sciences. I lie awake at night, for being conscious of my age, I worry about the possibility of finishing the works that I have begun. This worry causes me much suffering. Here is a structural nexus of consciousness for which objective apprehension forms the basis and in which an inner relation of feelings refers to the apprehended state of affairs as worry about it and as suffering from it: it is there for me as a complex of facts of my consciousness. Here reflexive awareness and what I am aware of are one. But I can also pay attention to this state of affairs. Then I shift to inner observation, whether it be of the lived experience or of its remembered content. As a result, a fact of consciousness becomes an object for me. But what I notice and use to clarify the object in terms of its content is contained in the lived experience itself or represented by it as remembered. To that extent, the object is immanent in the lived experience. On the other hand, a separation of the lived experience from the object occurs: The object comes to partially transcend it. And the decisive point is that this partial transcendence is grounded in the lived experience itself as well as in the relation of apprehension to it. By attending to the object, I bring the structural relations that are contained in the state of feeling to distinct consciousness. By means of elementary logical operations, I lift them into prominence, isolate them, and identify the structural relations found in the present lived experiences with those found in previous ones. As I continue to lie awake, I can discriminate individual characteristics of the lived experience as separate moments, to which others can then be related. And while I am thus distinguishing relations that are immanent in the lived experience, my apprehension of the lived experience itself is pulled along on the basis of the structure contained

in it to lived experiences structurally connected with it, to those that ground it. The representation of my manuscripts is the apprehended basis of my lived experience, and I focus on it attentively. I separate from my [sorrowful] feeling about this object the feeling of tiredness as underlying it and the resulting feeling of worry about finishing these manuscripts. By distinguishing in this way, I bring to consciousness the structural relations of these component parts. And precisely in virtue of the structural nature of this experiential unit, the apprehension of it requires moving on to structurally related prior lived experiences. I am tired from overworking; having reviewed my files, I worry about their unfinished contents, whose completion demands incalculably more work from me. All this "about," "of," and "toward," all these references of what is remembered to what is experienced, in short, all these structural inner relations, must be apprehended by me, since I now want to apprehend the fullness of the lived experience exhaustively. And precisely in order to exhaust it, I must regress further in the structural network to the memories of other lived experiences.

For the consciousness that lives in the present experience, the remembered experience is transcendent. It is something that lies beyond it. It is not posited as transcendent to consciousness as such, but as transcendent to the present moment of this consciousness filled by lived experience. I designate this *a transcendence for the experiencing consciousness*. Thus the flow of time and the memory that comprehends it is the objective ground for the appearance of the consciousness of transcendence from the perspective of lived experience. And at the same time, I am sure of the objective reality of this transcendent something because of the structural relation in which the memory is related to the lived experience. The regress from the lived experience through the structural relations contained in it to the psychic nexus shows me as its condition a tendency to capture the unfathomable scope of lived experience and thus to attain a congruence between the lived experience itself and assertions about it. This psychological fact cannot be explained further. The psychic energy generating the acts necessary for attaining congruence is such that the regular course whereby an essential structural [analysis] of what is given in lived experiences demands a regress to ever new constituent parts can release a feeling of contentment whenever and so far as this demand is satisfied. No other kind of value is contained in this process than that which is connected with the satisfaction of the act that captures the lived experience exhaustively. There is no voli-

tion here, but rather a being-pulled-along by the state of affairs itself to ever more constituent parts of the nexus and the satisfaction that lies in dealing with it exhaustively.

The completion of lived experience in the direction of the psychic nexus is grounded in a lawful progression that always goes beyond the apprehended content of the lived experience. This progression is conditioned by the state of affairs, and every step in it involves a satisfaction repeatedly instigated by the dissatisfaction stemming from the inexhaustibility of the lived experience. Later it will be shown that a necessary progression of acts toward a transcendent object also occurs on the basis of what is given in outer perception.

The intuition of the psychic nexus derives from the process [of completing lived experience]. When this nexus becomes the object of apprehension, lived experience is referred to it as a part of it. For this gathering consciousness, lived experience is now a part among other parts that form a continuum. But the special nature of this psychic object is not exhausted by the relation of the particular lived experience as a part to the psychic nexus as a whole. It is the nature of structure, of the structural unity of lived experience grounded in a determinate attitude, of the structural relations of lived experiences to one another, finally of the structural relations of the attitudes to one another, that is fundamental in the formation of the intuition of the psychic nexus. For when we ask what is meant when we speak of it, then, in contrast to a simple sum or an aggregate of parts that comprise a whole, it is a unity of psychic life constituted by relations that overlap and connect all constituent parts. Just as in the concept of the subject or the ego it is the attitude to what is objective that constitutes it, so it is the structural relations within and among acts of lived experience that constitute this concept. The psychic nexus is partially transcendent insofar as a lived experience is always contained in it as a part, and it is transcendent in this partial way only for the experiencing consciousness.

Only by means of an abstraction have we separated up until now the apprehension of lived experience as it occurs by means of elementary logical operations from discursive acts of thought. For the acts that strive to attain an exhaustive account of lived experience and that lead to the constitution of the psychic nexus as an object also involve the use of signs, the formation of concepts and judgments. The stability of the object is attained only in its being posited by a judgment. Accordingly, the other side of the process

in which the psychic nexus is grasped as an object is the progression toward apprehensions of the lived experience that bring what is contained in it to more adequate, more stable, and more fundamental expression. And that is also the basis of the double relationship of the adequate representation of lived experiences and of the transcendence that originates in apprehension. The judgment intends the lived experience. It is a re-presentative complex, conditioned by the nature of the signs, that refers to the lived experience. In it there are always contained moments that express essential determinations concerning the psychical. Even the simple assertion about a lived experience, that this suffering is unbearable, contains two such essential determinations that transcend the particular lived experience and, as such, stand before me as independent of this lived experience. What is meant in the judgment is accordingly a state of affairs transcending the lived experience and pointing to a psychic nexus by way of essential determinations or relations of essential determinations. And these essential determinations cannot be related back to the lived experience by adequation. They tend simply to exhaust them, to bring them to clear consciousness, to grasp them comprehensively.

The object of this kind of apprehension grounded in lived experiences is psychic life or the subject; it is brought to re-presentation by various approaches toward concept-formation. Each of these approaches is founded in the nature of this object and in the mode in which it is given. The demand inherent in consciousness for objectively valid knowledge and for unconditionally valuable purposes led the Socratic school to stipulate that a rational subject dwelling in psychic life is alone capable of fulfilling this demand. That was the beginning of the development of transcendental psychology. On the other hand, observers of humanity, poets, and historians have constructed a human essence from capacities such as wit, discernment, ambition, patriotism, egoism, and from virtues and vices. They imagine them as working together in certain proportions. From this approach, which constructs the psychic object from faculties, there also arises the theory of psychic functions when the teleological cooperation of these faculties directed at the overall function of psychic life comes to be apprehended as a further fact about the psychic nexus. This psychological perspective was developed by the German psychological school and found its classical representatives in Tetens and Kant. From another perspective, if one develops the thought of a strictly causal connection of psychic processes, if psychic changes are made intelligible on

the basis of uniformities concerning psychic events, then a different order of psychological concepts emerges. Or as is being attempted here, one can pursue the structural relations in which the lived experiences of the individual psychic life are linked by an immanent teleological system. And in addition to all these attempts at a conceptual apprehension of the psychic nexus, religious reflection is constantly operative, a reflection that, though it uses conceptual re-presentations, always discerns something in psychic life by which it has a real relation to the divine. Inner experience, communion with God, conversion from self-centeredness are the constitutive experiences for this perspective on the course of life and for this objectification of the inner world. Each of these objectifications of lived experience grasps an aspect of psychic reality. In fact, each of them has again and again enabled entire epochs to express experienced psychic reality in concepts and by means of these concepts to attain an appropriate influence upon this reality.

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Let us summarize the relation between experiencing and apprehending psychic objects. Attentiveness to a psychic fact, observation of it, apprehending this fact in the psychic nexus, judgments about what has been apprehended, and finally systematic unity of knowledge concerning psychic nexus—these various modes of apprehension all express reality to the extent that they can be brought to congruence with lived experiences. For we are always dealing here only with re-presentations of what is experienced. Likewise, the concept of the psychic nexus designates a reality insofar as the re-presentations by which it is produced are contained indubitably in lived experience. Indeed, the apprehension that is founded on lived experience corresponds to the apprehension that is founded on sensory intuition in the fact that it also contains a relation to an object; but it differs from it by a moment that is determinative for the theory and method of knowledge in this region. Constituent parts, regularities, attitudes, and inner structural relations are contained in the lived experience itself. Apprehending the psychic nexus is just as much an infinite task as apprehending outer objects. But it consists only in extracting from the lived experiences what is contained in them. Thus the reality of the psychic object is at the same time always possessed and always subject to efforts to explicate it conceptually. The process of apprehending always contains within itself both moments: the satisfaction in the convergence of the conceptual and the judgmental with lived experiences, and the unease of not being able to deal exhaustively with the

lived experience. Accordingly, mistakes in apprehending the psychic are found above all in the illusion of being able to do justice to the entire content of lived experiences by a determinate mode of concept-formation.

3. The Relation between Intuition and Sensory Objects

The apprehension of outer objects has to be distinguished from this apprehension of the psychic nexus. As the latter is characterized by its foundation in lived experience and by the properties of what is experienceable, the former is characterized by its foundation in sensory intuition and the basic properties thereof. To-be-represented, in the sense that a content exists, is the way for it to be there for me inseparably from what is intuitable for the senses. Feelings or strivings are kinds of attitude that can also be re-presented as contents, but what is intuitable exists only as content.
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Apart from the boundless multiplicity of contents, what is intuitable for the senses also contains differences in the way the contents are there for me. The free representation of a color or a sound, the appearance of indeterminate visual images before falling asleep, the fantasy image of vegetation larger and more brilliant in color than in reality, the perception of an object, and the memory image of it—all these are constituents of such a multiplicity. Two distinctions stand out prominently. What is intuitable to sense is either a free representation, as in a color, for instance, or it is something assumed in imagination as that wilderness of vegetation, or it is a given that is determined by the act of perception. On the other hand, what is intuitable is either in relation to an object, as, for instance, a particular perception of St. Stephen's Church; or it exists before me without any such relation of a content to an <object> distinct from it, as a represented color or a sound.

Several relationships hold among these forms in the manifold of what is intuitable for the senses. These relations are important both for distinguishing the kinds of attitude and for the theory of knowledge; for they concern the structurally conditioned and teleological relations grounded in the attitude of sensory apprehension.

Within the just mentioned manifold of what is intuitable, the relation between an act, a sensory intuitive given, and an object constitutes a structural unity. This relation is shown most clearly if

one starts with a sense-judgment. In it what is objective is determined by means of what is given to sensory intuition. Thus what is objective must in some way be predelineated in the perception in which it is given. And in fact it is.

I start with the perception of any object, a tree, for instance. What is actually given <in sensuous intuition>² are the trunk, parts of branches, and leaves as seen from a definite standpoint. I supplement this particular image by re-presentations. This product of apprehension acquires its unity from the relation to the same object. The most disparate modes of apprehension—intuition, linguistic designation, representations with various degrees of liveliness and fullness—are combined in a system of inner relations. We call the entirety of the system of these relations a *total representation*—using the word “representation” in the broadest sense. In this system, only a small part is given purely intuitively, as we saw. What is thus given we call a *pure intuition*. Here the object is itself given in sensory intuition. And this character of givenness belonging to sense perception is not a content in addition to the other contents that comprise the perceived as sensorily intuited; rather, it designates the way in which intuitable contents are there for me in sense perception. As opposed to the pure character of univocally determined givenness that belongs to this pure intuition, there is latitude for a freer attitude when re-presentations are combined with it into a total representation. The character of the latter givenness is clarified by reflection on the fact that the object recurs in different kinds of attitudes. Thus the existence of the perceptual object is connected by reflection to a lived experience deriving from the volitional attitude toward this object, namely, the experience of resistance, inability to alter it, pressure of the external world. For that which is perceived with the character of givenness resists; it cannot be altered; it exerts a pressure upon the subject. The character of objective necessity with which the content of perception and of all its re-presentations is posited in the processes of objective apprehension originates in these relations between perceptions. Thus the character of givenness that is proper to sense perception is the foundation for the necessity of every assertion about objects of sensory apprehension. If its character of givenness refers back to something that is not itself a perception, then this

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² Dilthey's text supplemented in accordance with a suggestion of the German editor. See GS VII, 354.

relation is without any content; and the sphere of apprehension, which always requires a "what," a content, terminates in the immanent relations between constituent parts having determinate content.

The remembered representation is to be distinguished from perception. It is a re-presentation of what has been perceived. The copy receives the character of re-presentation because the object can be recognized in the memory image. Here a re-presentation based on reproducing or imaging actually occurs, and the entire concept of cognition as reproducing or imaging can be traced back to the relation of memory to perception.

35 An important feature of the system in which the parts of the structural nexus of objective apprehension are related to one another is the distinction of the particular perception from the object and its relation to it. The particular perception is related to the object by means of a total representation. Here also we are dealing not with a genetic psychological relationship but with one that is foundational. Neither the real perception nor the progression that relates the perception to an object separated from it are part of experience. However, the logical relation of compulsion exerted by the state of affairs is clear. What falls within experience can serve merely to illustrate this compulsion. An object emerges at the horizon of the ocean. As it comes closer, it gets larger. The color of the object changes when the sun bursts forth. I assume that a Pacific Islander who never saw a ship before can nevertheless hold these images together. They are different, but the continuity that connects the moments of uninterrupted observation compels one to relate them to the same object. This process is only meant to illustrate how from the constraint of the concurring particular experiences themselves the demand arises to add in thought something not given in any single experience. This total representation represents a plurality of single perceptions, but it refers to only one object. It is intuitive and yet cannot be actually fulfilled in any intuition. It designates a task, and to fulfill it and to actually grasp the meant object, apprehension is driven forward to ever new acts of re-presentation.

Thus in sensory apprehension, there is a relation to the object that is different from the apprehension of the psychic nexus in a way that is important for the theory of knowledge and for methodology. The object transcends perception, every single perception is inadequate in relation to the object, and re-presentations are directed at approximating the object.

4. The Structure of the Lived Experiences of Apprehension

Thus three moments can be distinguished in the structure of the lived experience of apprehension in both domains. One of its properties is the relation to an object: in this respect, the same thing can be perceived, represented, imagined, assumed, or apprehended in a judgment. Each of the kinds of structural relation grounded in these various modes of apprehension can be directed toward the same object, or different objects can stand in the same structural relation, whether of being perceived, thought, or willed. A way of relating to objects and the objects themselves can vary independently of one another. I can judge about all possible objects, and one and the same object can enter into the most various structural relations other than my judging attitude toward it. But finally, the content that is contained in the lived experience and comprises the material directed at the object is to be distinguished not only from the attitude but also from the objective direction itself. The content—for instance, a sensory complex of the sense impression of a house—first makes the relation to the particular object of a house possible. Different contents at different times of the day, in different weather, from different standpoints, are referred to the same object, namely, this definite house. On the other hand, the same content—for instance, a nocturnal impression of an indefinite sort—allows a variety of interpretations, i.e., it can be referred to various objects.

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*5. Lived Experiences of Apprehension as Structural Unities
and Their Inner Relations to One Another*

I

All lived experiences that are characterized by the apprehension of objects contain inner relations to one another. These structural relations permeate all the interweavings in which feelings or volitional intentions are combined with the apprehension of objects. And no matter how much the lived experiences of apprehension differ from one another and how much they are modified by changing inner or outer circumstances, they can be connected with one another by relations common to the processes of apprehending objects. Together they form a distinctive type of nexus. Caught up in a cognitive train of thought, I am interrupted by some news, by

the entrance of a person, or by physical discomfort. It can be a long time before the cognitive train of thought in which I had been caught up is continued by me; nevertheless, these cognitive experiences so distant from each other are combined as parts in the whole of my cognitive nexus. These kinds of relations in the system of objective apprehension have a tendency to extend to the whole of psychic life.

The relations of the lived experiences within objective apprehension hold among the contents that appear in these lived experiences. They are contained in the state of affairs that is given objectively. With the existence of two intensities, the degree of intensity is also given. In the actual connection of the quality of color with extension is contained the fact that color cannot be represented without extension. Of course, the apprehension of this state of affairs presupposes the acts of connecting and separating; however, the relations hold not between these acts but between the contents contained in the facts of the situation. The validity of the relations under discussion is independent of the acts of consciousness in which they are apprehended. Likewise, the syllogism expresses only logical relations that are grounded in objects, not relations between acts of thought. In an argument, premises and conclusions are combined in a structure, the nature of which is the grounding of the conclusion by the premises. But in the syllogism, acts are not apprehended as foundational; rather, in it a state of affairs is apprehended. No consciousness of the operations of thought that we carry out accompanies objective apprehension. Only the contents and their relations are present to apprehension. The procedure that explicates the plurality of distinguishable elements in the content of objective apprehension by a multiplicity of acts that combine to produce the representation of a complex whole goes beyond the state of affairs that can be established descriptively: It attributes to the state of affairs, as conditions of consciousness, acts corresponding to the factual relations. "Act," then, designates the condition of consciousness for the knowledge of a factual relation. In objective apprehension, a demonstrable structural relation holds only between the attitude and the content that constitutes the material for the determination of the object.

This structural relation then determines in a twofold direction the advance toward grasping what is objective, an advance in which more and more relations are established in what is experi-

enced and intuited. In one direction, the advance in apprehending what is objective lies in the series of re-presentations that are to assimilate what is contained in lived experience and intuition. In the other direction, the lived experiences that grasp relations between the various objects become connected.

Therefore, the relations between the lived experiences of apprehension hold first between lived experiences in which the same object is there for us in different modes. Intuition, memory, total representation, naming, subordinating the particular under the universal, connecting parts into a whole, judgment—those are all modes of apprehension. Without any change in the object, the mode of consciousness in which it is there for us varies if one proceeds from intuition to memory or to judgment. Their common direction toward the same object connects them into a teleological nexus. Only those lived experiences that perform a function in the direction of apprehending this determinate objective domain have a place in that nexus. This teleological character, which is defined by being directed toward apprehending some object, is then further expressed in the fact that all relations between the modes of apprehending the same objective world have the characteristic that all modes of apprehension obtain the assurance of their truth value from identifying what is meant in them with what underlies them as intuited or experienced. The expression of this assurance is the consciousness of conviction. It is the reflexive awareness of the achieved congruence of the act of apprehension with what is experienced or intuited. Thus the judgment accords with the aim of grasping the object whenever it is accompanied by the consciousness that what is meant in it is the thing itself; and the consciousness of conviction that accompanies the true judgment is the expression of the immediately or meditately produced congruence with the thing itself, which is given intuitively. And the progress from part to part within the present nexus is conditioned exclusively by this teleological character. As we saw, the moment that leads apprehension on toward more and more adequate forms lies in what is given in lived experience, in the material of perceptual intuition, and in their relation to the same object. Each of these forms, as related to the same object, must [also] be able to realize an identification with the intuitions or lived experiences that provide the material for the apprehension of this object. And as long as the lived experience still is not exhausted or as the object given piecemeal and inadequately in single intuitions still has not come to adequate expression, there is always an inadequacy in what is meant and expressed that demands a more appropriate

expression. Thus we see a full array of relations between experiences of apprehension that are grounded in the structure of lived experiences of apprehension and in the structural relations of the modes of expression that follow from their relation to the same object.

³⁹ Let us attempt to clarify the formation in which the nexus that originates in this way is constituted. Perceptions about the same object are related to one another in a teleological nexus insofar as they advance toward the same object. When a perception relates to an object without including the backside or the inside, they are only co-intended. This perception then demands others that complete the material [needed] for apprehending the object. Memory is already included in this process of completion. In the nexus of objective apprehension, memory has a steady relation to the intuitive foundation in that it has the function of being representative of it. Here the difference can be very clearly shown between the apprehension of the experience of remembering by studying its underlying process in accordance with its uniformities, and the consideration of memory with regard to its function in the nexus of apprehension, by which it becomes representative of what has been experienced or apprehended. Under the impression and the influence of an emotional state, memory can appropriate contents that are different from its foundation—this is precisely the basis for aesthetic imagery—but memory located in the presently discussed teleological nexus of grasping an object is directed toward identity with the intuited or experienced material of objective apprehension. The fact that memory fulfills its function in objective apprehension is shown by the possibility of establishing its similarity with the perceptual foundation of objective apprehension.

Significative apprehension, which is formed on the basis of intuitive apprehension, is [also] grounded in lived experience or intuition. There is a system of relations among expressions. By “expression” we understand “each instance or part of *speech*, as well as each sign that is essentially of the same sort.”³ And these expressions differ from other kinds of signs by the fact that they mean something.

If we seek a foothold in psychological description,⁴ the concrete phenomenon of the sense-informed expression breaks

³ Edmund Husserl, *Logical Investigations*, trans. J. N. Findlay (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1970), I, p. 275.

⁴ Here Dilthey substitutes “psychological description” for Husserl’s “pure description.”

up, on the one hand, into the *physical phenomenon* forming the physical side of the expression, and, on the other hand, into the *acts* which give it the *meaning* and eventually the *intuitive* fullness in which its relation to an expressed object is constituted.⁵

Insofar as the expression refers in this way to something objective, it means something. Insofar as it establishes this relation for a present of presentified intuition or lived experience, the relation between name and named is realized in a "meaning-fulfillment."⁶ 40 The physical phenomenon of the expression and its relation to a meant object are not merely spatially or temporally coexistent, but form an inner unity. The relation is such that, while we experience the representation of a word, we are involved not in representing the word but exclusively in fulfilling its sense, its meaning.⁷ Our interest belongs to the meant object. It proceeds from the intuitive representation of the word, according to its function, to the object, and points to it. The lived experience of how a name not only means, but also refers to, an object, and that fully realizes this relation by a corresponding intuition, forms an inner unity that is characterized by the mode of relation found in the essence of meaning. The fact that it is composed of partial acts and is founded in an intuition does not matter. It is a structural unity.

The structural unity in the lived experience of judgment is even more complex.⁸ And here we again come upon an already observed relationship. The structural unity found in a lived experience, a unity that can be analyzed into several moments (partial acts), is always determined by a relation, to which the others are subordinated. In the lived experience of judgment, it is the relation of the meaningfully formed assertion to the objective domain about which something is expressed.

Let us now consider that aspect of the judgment by which it combines words into a proposition. Here we meet a new structural relation in the sphere of apprehension: that which governs the connection of parts of speech in an assertion. This is a matter of solving the problem of *pure grammar*.

The foundations of speech are not only to be found in physiology, psychology and the history of culture, but also in the *a priori*. The latter deals with the essential meaning-forms and

⁵ Husserl, *Logical Investigations*, I, 280. Translation modified.

⁶ Husserl, *Logical Investigations*, I, 281.

⁷ Husserl, *Logical Investigations*, I, 282.

⁸ Marginal note: Ed. Husserl, *Logische Untersuchungen*, II, 459. (H)

their *a priori* laws of compounding or modification, and no speech is conceivable that is not in part essentially determined by this *a priori*.⁹

The meaning of speech is limited by this lawfulness; its violation therefore yields nonsense.

But if we say "a round or," "a man and is," etc., there exist no meanings which correspond to such verbal combinations as their expressed sense.¹⁰

Here is an interesting example of the method of reading off inner relations from outer forms. An *a priori* lawfulness reigns in the region of meanings

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whereby all possible forms systematically depend on a small number of primitive forms fixed by laws of existence. This last generalization, through its *a priori* purely categorial character, brings to scientific awareness a basic chapter in the constitution of "theoretical reason."¹¹

But the progression from a lived experience or a particular intuition to the universal is already given in this tendency of experiences of apprehension to strive to grasp and express an object in ever more suitable forms, since the state of affairs can merely be clarified by means of names, concepts, judgments. Whether the end point of the path lies in establishing a fact or a regularity, the path to this end always goes through the universal. In both cases, the actual grasp of the object is only completed and the tendency to grasp objects is only fulfilled in the consciousness that one possesses the thing itself and possesses it fully. But if a progression to the universal is already contained in this tendency, it in turn requires an advance from the relations that are found in particular objects to those that occur in larger objective systems. Thus one set of relations leads over into a second one. In the first set, the lived experiences aimed at apprehending the same object by different forms of re-presentation, and ever more adequately, were related to one another. The second set connects those lived experiences that grasp relations between changing objects, whether in the same form of apprehension or by connecting various forms of

⁹ Husserl, *Logical Investigations*, I, 524.

¹⁰ Husserl, *Logical Investigations*, I, 517.

¹¹ Husserl, *Logical Investigations*, I, 521 [translation modified to match Dilthey's quotation from the first edition]. An incomplete sentence follows. Marginal note: from here on, Husserl (*ibid.*) 649. Then a gap. (H)

apprehension. Thus the more comprehensive relations contained in the objective state of affairs come about. They are especially clear in the homogeneous systems that delineate spatial, tonal, and numerical relations.¹² Every science relates to a delimitable objective domain in which it has its unity. And the systematic connectedness of the scientific domain gives knowledge claims their coherence. The completion of all relations contained in what is experienced and intuited would be the concept of the world. With this comes the demand that everything experienceable and intuitable should be expressed in terms of the nexus of factual relations contained therein. And thus one can finally say that the structural relation involved in the determination of an object by experienced or given contents produces a system of objective relations and expresses itself in them, and that by this structural relation the lived experiences of this class are related to one another ever more extensively and intimately.

As we summarize the already presented moments of objective apprehension, we arrive at an understanding of what turns out to be the essence of conceptual cognition. To know what conceptual cognition is, one must ask what is to be understood by its constituents: perceiving, verbal designations, judgments. The answer is, that which someone perceiving, representing, or judging means or intends when he performs these acts. The experiencer is certain of what he experiences. This mode of certainty refers back to nothing that might lie behind it; it rests in itself. If we then form the theoretical, ideal concept of a pure intuition, we also posit with the givenness a reality, which refers back to whatever fixes *(forms)* this givenness and makes possible its steadfastness and its imprint. This is to be accepted at first as a fact; but one must clarify it in order to do justice to the properties of the acts of cognition that are founded thereon. Every other act that is a component part of objective apprehension, as it develops on these foundations, designates, means, or signifies a reference back to lived experience or pure intuition. It¹³ designates, signifies, or means an object that is apprehended on the basis of what is contained in lived experience and intuition. In lived experience, the object is immanent; but in

¹² See my *Ideas*, GS V, 172 (D), SW 2.

¹³ Here, perhaps, to be added: on the other hand. (H)

the act of intuiting as it actually contributes to apprehension, the object is that to which the competing single intuitions refer. Acts of apprehension are first of all the elementary logical operations: equating, distinguishing, determining gradations, connecting, separating, discerning parts and wholes either as they occur together or as they can be combined, or as they are separable from a background, and finally, apprehending factual relationships. These elementary operations can be performed apart from any signification by words or other sorts of signs. They are perceptions of the second degree and merely express a state of affairs. As part of intuition, the elementary operations display the remarkable peculiarity of noticing states of affairs.¹⁴ These states of affairs are not there for me as facts of consciousness; rather, they emerge as realities independent of consciousness. To that extent, they contain something independent of the change characteristic of the stream of consciousness, a distinctive sort of universality. As a tonal quality remains identical even though sounds pass over into one another, so also the distance between two sounds as such remains a fact that is always the same amid the psychic change of the musical experiences. These states of affairs are essential determinations, and as such they are foundational for conceptual cognition insofar as it signifies more than something that emerges in or coexists with consciousness.

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The fact that, besides the sensory states of affairs, there is an analogue to value or purpose in the apprehension of what is experienced is suggested by the simple forms of assertion, that something is beautiful or good—not only for me, but in general—as something meant in the state of affairs, for which the reasons will have to be sought.

4. THE TENDENCY TOWARD SYSTEMATIC CONNECTION INHERENT IN THE STRUCTURE OF APPREHENSION AND ITS COMPLETION IN SCIENCE

Thus the demand to establish everywhere relations between all that can be experienced and what can be perceived is found in objective apprehension in accord with the nature of the facts themselves as offered by lived experience and intuition. And at the same time, there is in the structure of apprehension a unitary prin-

¹⁴ *gewahren*.

ciple that produces this connection and contains in itself the warrant of its validity.

There are several acts—the act of perceiving, the act of forming a representation of an object—in which single perceptual images are related to one another in a determining way so that a single object is materially determined by them, the acts of subordinating the particular under the universal, species under a genus, connecting parts into a whole, signifying acts, and the various forms of judgment that arise on their foundation, combinations of judgments leading up to the systematic nexus of a domain of conceptual cognition—all of which show a common trait: They all involve the relation of being re-presented and re-presenting. Each member of the indicated nexus is re-presented by another, and that which follows in this nexus is a re-presentation of its preceding member. Thus an image¹⁵ of an object re-presents the perceptual contents to which it refers. A general idea re-presents particular images. The connection of characteristics that defines a concept re-presents the individual images that belong within the scope of the concept. And finally, the system of conceptual cognition that encompasses an objective domain re-presents the sum total of the perceptions referring to those objects.

The psychology of this nexus of objective apprehension has this concept of re-presenting as its focal point, and its chief task is to clarify this concept. It is clear that quite different modifications of the re-presentational attitude are included in this concept and that the discovery of these modifications is a task as difficult as it is complicated. For a single memory-image represents a perception in a different sense from that in which a judgment re-presents what has been intuited or experienced.

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A lived experience that stands in a re-presentational relation to one or more lived experiences that condition it is grounded in them. The genetic relation of lived experiences to one another is not meant, for here to-be-grounded does not mean to be conditioned genetically. It designates rather that relation between a grounding act and a grounded act, according to which the former contains the legitimization for the latter. Here it becomes evident that the relation of grounding holds not between acts but between what is contained in the acts.

¹⁵ Because Dilthey uses both *Vorstellung* and *Repräsentation* in this context, the former term that is normally translated as “representation” is here rendered as “image” and “idea.”

Thus the relation between what grounds and what is grounded corresponds to that between what is re-presented and what does the re-presenting. The perceptual judgment ultimately has its foundation or its legitimacy in one or more acts of perception that are re-presented by the judgment. The same relation thus runs through all the above-mentioned lived experiences, according to which some are re-presented in others and ground them.

Thus each lived experience that is re-presentational contains a relation to lived experiences that are re-presented in it and ground it. Furthermore, all lived experiences that involve being-re-presented, grounding, re-presenting, or being-grounded are linked as part of one nexus by the homogeneity of attitude in these lived experiences and by the relations posited in this attitude. It is the kind of attitude that determines the sort of nexus of lived experiences that is produced, and it also contains in itself the moment of their connection into a whole. The enduring relations that are the basis for objective apprehension are contained in these relations. Here is the stable background on which the variable light of momentary consciousness wanders back and forth.

II. OBJECTIVE HAVING

1. *Feeling*

We now turn to a nexus that requires a preliminary survey of some determinate propositions about the structure of feeling and willing. For we are concerned only with preparing a comparative mode of consideration for a theory of knowledge. The point is to liberate logic as well as a well-rounded theory of knowledge from its predominant reference to the conceptual cognition of reality and to form logical, theoretical, and scientific propositions in such a way that they refer to the determination of value, the setting of purposes, and the establishment of rules, just as much as to the conceptual cognition of reality. Accordingly, the elementary operations that precede discursive thought are to be apprehended in their relation to discursive operations in all these different domains. This comparative mode of consideration will then establish what conditions from the structural nexus of objective apprehension, of feeling and of willing, are determinative for the logical forms.

Is the concept of structure applicable to the life of feeling? It is if the lived experiences of feeling are structural unities, if structural relations exist between these lived experiences of feeling, and if the totality of these relations fulfills a function that has a structural relationship to the functions of objective apprehension and willing in the subjective immanent teleology of the psychic nexus. On this basis, it will then be shown that the structural relationships of feeling constitute a domain delimitable from apprehension as well as from volition. And for logic and the theory of knowledge, this domain, with the determinations of value that occur within it, is to be exhibited accordingly as one of the three domains to which all universal logical, theoretical, and scientific statements must refer.

I. DELIMITING LIVED EXPERIENCES OF FEELING

First we must establish the common character of those lived experiences that are always designated as feelings in linguistic usage.

Whenever we pass from any of the forms of objective apprehension to feeling, the first thing that asserts itself is that there is no comparison between them and feeling. Hearing, seeing, touching are comparable to one another; a judgment about a seen object is comparable with a perception. But when I set a feeling next to these modes of cognition, I no longer find any point of comparison. Therefore, descriptive psychology, which merely apprehends what there is in developed psychic life, finds in feelings a realm of psychic facts whose members, though they are everywhere interwoven with the facts of apprehension and volition, present themselves as incomparable with them.

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I can, of course, find points of comparison between sensory perception, sensory feeling, and sensory desire; they lie in a commonality of the contents that can be discovered in the different attitudes. But the attitudes themselves are not comparable.

This experienced difference separates feeling from objective apprehension as well as from willing. It presents itself to analysis first in the fact that in feeling, a contrast occurs that is usually designated as that between *pleasure and displeasure*.

Feelings form a manifold that displays intensive and qualitative distinctions. They can be ordered in a sequence of intensities: On one side, degrees of intensity of pleasure, favor, and approval succeed one another in the positive direction; on the other side, the

different degrees of displeasure, disfavor, and disapproval succeed one another in the negative direction. Pleasure and displeasure in the narrower sense, approval and disapproval, favor and disfavor are noted as qualitative distinctions in feelings.

On the basis of this characteristic, let us now define the limits of feeling and thus set off in a preliminary way a domain of the life of feelings. Feelings are interwoven with intellectual and with volitional experiences; and their presence in them is so extensive that one could speak of an omnipresence of feelings in psychic life. Attentiveness is accompanied by interest, which is, however, a function of a feeling originative from the situation and the relationship to an object. Likewise, manifestations of wit and acuity, surprising combinations, are accompanied by pleasurable feelings. And whenever a tension or an interruption occurs in the volitional attitude, these states of will elicit a felt attitude of displeasure. By contrast, success is accompanied by pleasure.

47 However, it is an equivocation to speak of a feeling of similarity, a feeling of reality. Here what influences the double use of the word "feeling" is the common character of reflexive awareness. Affirmation and denial, doubt and certainty, are neither pleasurable nor painful in themselves. There is a pure unmixed joy¹⁶ in the settling of all sorts of hypotheses. And also in the volitional sphere, the reflexive awareness and consciousness of the obligation of my will in reference to carrying out a deed by an act in which I have obligated myself is not as such connected with a feeling of pleasure or pain, although such a feeling of pain or of restriction can readily supervene from the context of life. Thus there is also a consciousness of a volitional attitude that, though it is very similar to a feeling and is even connected with feeling, is not itself a feeling. Generally speaking, there is a reflexive awareness of one's own state that is very similar to a feeling and can be combined with feeling but should not itself be apprehended as a feeling. And because reflexive awareness is not sufficiently distinguished from feeling here, the expression "re-feeling" must be rejected as too narrow for those lived experiences in which another's state, be it actual or fictitious, is understood. What is involved here is rather a re-experiencing in which the entire psy-

¹⁶ The original idea is not really developed here. It would have to be shown that certain logical operations do not produce any feeling of pleasure or displeasure. (H)

chic nexus of another's existence is apprehended on the basis of a particular given.

2. THE GENERAL NATURE OF THE ATTITUDE IN THE LIVED EXPERIENCE OF FEELING

We must now demonstrate that the same attitude and the same structural properties can be found in all the lived experiences of the realm of feelings as we have delimited it. But once other lived experiences that are not characterized by pleasure or displeasure are also included, it becomes impossible to determine or define the structural unities, the structural relations, and the teleological function of this domain of feelings.

The nature of structure in this domain is conditioned by a basic characteristic of the feeling attitude, a characteristic to which one can only allude, which can only be expressed metaphorically but cannot be defined. In objective apprehension, an orientation toward the object is contained in the lived experience, and the different lived experiences are related in being directed toward grasping the object. The lived experience of willing is headed toward a decision, toward the realization of a state of affairs, both in a specific lived experience and in the relation of lived experiences to one another. But what do we find in the lived experiences of feeling? Activity and direction are excluded from this domain. Whether we feel our own state or some object, it involves only a state of being as a kind of attitude: a state of being that is either connected to the apprehension of given objects or grounded in the state of the subject. The way this state of being depends on outer objects or on the state of the subject is obscured through an inverse attitude that loses itself in the depth of the subject. The role that the apprehension of facts plays in any state of being gets lost in the distinctive way in which this role is submerged in a total state of being. Every state of feeling merely expresses the incomprehensible relation of this very depth of the subject to its states and to objects. In this way, then, one characteristic of the structure in the world of feeling is given, which is entirely different from that in the other two spheres. This holds both for the structural unity of a lived experience of feeling and for the structural relations of lived experiences of feeling to one another.

From this it follows that the moments that form the lived experiences of this class are subordinated to the chief structural mo-

ment, which is experienced as feeling. One's state is experienced in feeling; objects are savored and thoroughly enjoyed in feeling. All lived experiences of feeling share this characteristic, and wherever they are dominant in a state of mind,¹⁷ every life-relationship, every object, every other individual seems to be there in order to be thoroughly enjoyed, thoroughly suffered, and fully savored. To discover in our own lived experience the multiplicity of the world of feelings that arises in this way, we must turn to the poets, who teach us to find in ourselves what would otherwise perish unnoticed in the urgency of life: all the ways in which we must learn to bear the joy and sorrow of the earth, to relax our usual concerns with objective fixities, and to let nature speak to us. The structure of feeling lies in a regress from objects to attitude. When this regress also allows us to enjoy and suffer more delicate vibrations, it is a mood. The subject can capture the stable relationships of objects and human beings to itself by means of representations of past lived experiences of feeling and thus, as it were, retain a system of its felt relations to things, individuals, communities, even humanity. To the extent that the subject lives neither in a theoretical nor a practical attitude, but in these stable relations, we call its life-constitution an emotional state of mind. It rests upon memory, which re-presents lived experiences of feeling and puts these re-presentations in ordered relations to things, persons, and communities. Thus we see an ordered sequence ranging from emotional disposition concentrated by memory, constancy, and stability of felt life-relationships to the naive or even conscious and willed isolation of lived experiences of feeling in mere moods that express what is momentary. This is the life-constitution that wants to savor everything the world contains, everything for itself, everything at the moment. Given all this, it becomes evident that the structure of feeling makes possible a system of relations based on re-presentation, a system that aims at identical objects of multiple lived experiences of feeling. Further, it follows from these relationships that feeling, when it is given as a lived experience, presents itself in a great multiplicity of qualities. These qualitative determinations are most intimately combined in experience itself with the states and the objects in connection with which they emerge. By contrast to both the explanations of genetic psychology and the statements of an analytic procedure about what can be distinguished in feeling or separated by experiments, we pro-

¹⁷ *das Gemüt.*

pose here a mode of consideration that deals merely with the function of feelings in the psychic structural nexus. Accordingly, though feeling is not a system, its function is such that the universe can become the object of an all-encompassing sympathy. As harmonies and dissonances in the universe are enjoyed and suffered, the individual relates to things, persons, and communities through feeling, and permanent objective relations come to exist between universal states of affairs and aesthetic or ethical feeling. Thus in valuations, a conceptual and adjudicative attitude is built upon feeling. And the influence of these valuations extends to the formation of world-views as well as to the determination of values.

Three forms of value emerge: (1) life-values, which are grounded in the feelings of one's own state, (2) efficacious values, which relate to the milieu that conditions one's state, and (3) intrinsic values of objects and persons, which express feelings toward objects in judgments and concepts.

What is objective in values is the result of stable relations in the feeling of objects, [e.g.,] the principle of a state of affairs in morality; objective [representation] in aesthetics.

3. THE STRUCTURAL UNITY OF THE LIVED EXPERIENCE OF FEELING

Acts of objective apprehension form the foundation of feeling. Everything that belongs to this apprehension as an act can be such a foundation. And the relationship of subject and objective-world, which originates in these acts as the prevalent schema for apprehension, becomes the objective foundation of our feeling as well as of our willing. The lived experience of feeling is a felt attitude about situations or objects objectively given or represented as possible or as imagined.

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Bodily feelings and moods that are unattached to objects form the lower limit of the structural unity of lived experiences of feeling. Both are feelings, for they have the distinctive mark of the opposition of pleasure and pain. And just as they contain within themselves this opposition, they also gnaw at, pierce, or penetrate one's body in ways that are distinguishable from pleasure and displeasure. But they do not contain any noticeable attitude to this content. And we distinguish the localized sensations of feelings only if the latter stands at the center of attention. But physical pain can take place as if at a lower level of psychic life alongside another attitude; the dim awareness then attached to it is even

compatible with an extraordinary intensity of pain. Thus often in the excitement of the will in battle, wounds are not noticed. Also, as a rule, moods without objects provide only the background for another attitude; the latter can be compared to lights and shadows cast by the sun hidden behind the clouds.

Beyond this limit, the lived experience of feeling is a structural unity in which a state of feeling is structurally united by the nature of the attitude of feeling with the having or representing of a state of the subject or the perceiving or representing of an object. Here the object can be varied independently of the attitude of feeling. Moreover, this attitude can undergo multiple variations relative to the same object.

When a listener apprehends a musical theme conceived in imagination, when he follows it as it goes through different pitches, instruments, rhythms, and keys, and when he finds himself at the same time undergoing a corresponding change of feelings, then what is objectively apprehended or remembered is clearly distinguishable from the feeling. The change of tonal images does not coincide with the change of feelings; thus the variation in those images and the variation in feeling show themselves to be different from each other. The experienced difference becomes even clearer in reflection. In fact, the tonal images and the feelings are not stratified in consciousness like two different layers; rather—and this is what is decisive and characteristic—they exist in an inner relation to each other. And this relation is that of an attitude toward tonal images. It is not a relationship of association that a feeling might or might not have to a perceived or represented content. A pleasure exists only together with the content about which I am pleased. Language expresses this relationship: I am glad about something, or I am pleased at something, an event that concerns me makes me happy or pains me. Accordingly, an attitude is found here just as much as in a cognitive judgment about an object or in willing an object as a purpose.
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To be sure, attitude and object are independent variables of each other in feelings. But this means that they are ideally separable, not that they can really exist without each other. Differences can be shown only in the way in which they are connected. The way in which feelings are connected to states or objects produces distinctive structural differences when we look inversely at the depths of subjectivity.

The schema of the subject and the objective world arose from objective apprehension, and the fundamental distinction between

feelings corresponds to it: feelings of one's states and of objects. Feelings of one's states have as their intuitive foundation the subject in its relationship to objects and persons. The latter are here only indirectly causes of feeling, insofar as they condition modifications of the subjective state of being. Thus the feeling associated with success is a joyous consciousness of power; the feelings associated with the pressure of circumstances and impotence over against the world are hatred, fear, or gratitude. Object-feelings, however, relate our own state to the apprehension of objects. Some object-feelings are elicited by sensory contents or their relations, by simple perceptions without reference to conceptual or sensory objects. Others originate in the interpretation of the sensory manifestations of living creatures—an interpretation accomplished in re-experiencing or understanding. Success in understanding is dependent on the affinity of the psychic structural nexus.¹⁸

This points to or indicates a lived experience or its equivalent. Re-experiencing is erroneously conceived as re-feeling; for the full vivacity and range of our attitudes comes into play in these processes. The feelings that originate in the achieved apprehension of another's life—sympathetic joy, pity, contempt, reverence, admiration—are to be distinguished from re-experiencing. They arise to the degree that the interpretation of the expressions of another living being proceeds beyond their momentarily manifested states—for instance, in a cry or a gesture—to grasping the entire life of another. In this context, two kinds of lived experiences of feeling are often mixed; but they should be distinguished. Re-experienced feelings of another subject that appear as a proper constituent of the process of understanding constitute one part of these lived experiences. A feeling about the re-experienced feeling of the other person, such as pity or empathic joy, is a different constituent of the lived experience. We find them separated in the sphere that is most powerful in bringing about the interpretation of inwardness, namely, in the apprehension of instrumental music, where, connected with the sensory effects of tone and tone-complexes in melodies and their combinations in rhythms and harmony, the processes in another subjectivity come to expression by interpretation. The feelings aroused by instrumental music produce a full range of moods, which accompanies what is objectively given to sense. Nowhere does the role of feeling in re-experiencing stand out so independently. But feelings about these feelings are ruled out by the

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¹⁸ See my *Ideas*, GS V, 198 (D), SW 2.

fact that the musical sequence has been detached from the context of the course of reality. No one would pity Beethoven because of the expression of suffering in one of his adagios, and no one can rejoice sympathetically with the serene cheerfulness of an allegro by Haydn.

The interpretation of nature has an affinity with the interpretation of objects consisting of tones. Empathy with nature involves a felt interpretation of it, which, on the basis of the mood of the observer, re-feels something kindred in it. And discovering something in nature by feeling involves a retroactive effect on our mood, based on the already performed interpretation of a natural phenomenon, for instance, of the shining sea or the gloomy forest. Here too the object-feeling is not connected with any feeling about feelings.

On the other hand, both kinds of feeling, those contained in re-experiencing and those about another's feelings, are mixed in the readers of a novel or in the observers of a tragedy. They re-experience what happens to Mignon¹⁹ or to Julia,²⁰ and feel pity for their sufferings.

At first, a characteristic proportionality between subjectivity and objectivity manifests itself as a common fact within the world of feelings. Conditions that are located in the depths of the psychic nexus turn out to be operative here. Thus feeling is, as it were, the organ for the apprehension of our own individuality and that of others and, through empathy with nature, even for the apprehension of properties of nature that no knowledge can reach. Depths that are inaccessible to knowledge appear to reveal themselves in feeling. This turn inwards occurs on the basis of objective apprehension. Apprehension determined the object from the perspective of feeling, pressing forward to reach it, as it were; in the midst of the interplay between ourselves and objects, feelings measure the productive force of the self, the pressure of the world, and the energy of the persons around us.

Let us now focus on the nature of object-feelings. In a judgment about these feelings, what is objective can possess the attributes of

¹⁹ Mignon, a character in Goethe's *Wilhelm Meisters Lehrjahre*. Mignon is an orphaned acrobat without family or home. Wilhelm purchases her to rescue her from an abusive master and, in part, to try to fill the void he feels at the loss of his beloved Mariane.

²⁰ Julia, a character in *Don Juan* by George Gordon, Lord Byron. Julia enters into an adulterous affair with Don Juan, seven years younger than she, and is discovered by her husband.

beauty, meaning, and value. In self-approval and in being pleased with ourselves, we enjoy characteristics of our person that give our own existence value, meaning, and beauty; and this is the origin of self-evaluation. A similar conversion of favor or of an approving judgment into objective characteristics can also be found in judgments concerning sensory objects or other persons: this rose is beautiful, Socrates' remaining in prison was good. Thus corresponding to the structural unity of object-feeling, there is a judgment with a validity claim based on the object.

Feelings of one's states contain a different kind of structural relation, which begins with what Hegel speaks of as "the oppressiveness of spirit closed in upon itself." Here spirit is its own matter and has in itself all the material of its knowledge. Similarly, Ritschl²¹ designates feeling as "the spiritual function in which the ego is at home with itself." And in the same sense, there is an opposition in the attitude of feeling that has from antiquity been referred back to that of either fostering or impeding life.

Feelings of objects and of states demonstrate their specificity also in the fact that even where they enter into relations, they are separable from each other.

4. STRUCTURAL RELATIONS BETWEEN FEELINGS

We find specific feelings interwoven everywhere in the psychic nexus. They emerge in the context of objective thinking—as in uneasiness at its failure, as feelings of tension during mental work, or as satisfaction in the conceptual cognition achieved. They accompany the changes and the relations of our representations as well as the circumstances of our self. They permeate the texture of our entire volitional attitude, as in the disquiet of unsatisfied desire, the joy of effectiveness, unpleasant tension in action, or satisfaction at the change introduced in the world of objects or in our own circumstances. They exist in this context as determinatively connected with another attitude. The feelings that appear in this way have no inner relation to one another. But even where the attitude proper to feelings determines the composition of the lived experience, the lived experiences of feeling seem to stand in no stable ordered relations to one another. No relationship like that of re-presentation or of means and end exist between the lived

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²¹ Albrecht Ritschl, 1822–89, German theologian who emphasized the ethical-social content of theology.

experiences of feeling. Like a light that flashes upon the waves and fades away, they appear only to disappear again. They are distinct from objective apprehension and the volitional attitude in that the lived experiences in those two spheres are related to one another in a regular order, whereas the relations of feelings to one another in the course of an emotional state or a passion appear to be irregular and contingent: a difference that, in any case, gives a special character to this sort of attitude.

Relations between feelings occur only to the extent that representations serve as intermediaries. A feeling can, by means of its representation, probe within, as it were, and elicit a feeling about a feeling. One such feeling is pity about one's own suffering, another, joy at one's own good fortune. Suffering and happiness must be represented in images if they are to elicit a feeling concerning them. Self-pity is not a repetition of one's suffering but a distinctively mellow, moving feeling that is quite different from sharp physical pains, for instance, or sorrow at a bereavement. The feeling of happiness about one's own power elicits pride in oneself. Here too feeling and feeling about feeling are different in character, indicating the structural nature of this relation. Somewhat more complex, yet still undoubtedly factually demonstrable, is the structural relation between re-feeling another's feeling and pity or sympathetic joy. The simplest cases arise when a strong expression of feeling is re-felt by me. Then, pity for the other's suffering is neither an attenuated repetition of that suffering nor its re-feeling; rather, it stands in a structural relation to the process of re-feeling. Self-observation shows indubitably that, in many cases, gloating, envy, or a grudge arise because another's happiness leads to a decrease of one's own self-feeling. Then, through intermediary representations such as judgments, this decrease elicits a feeling of envy toward the happy person. In the case of gloating, we find that the re-living of another's unhappiness elicits joy at another's unhappiness only through a sense of one's own self-enhancement. When another pupil is punished, a lad rejoices at his own uninjured skin.

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Such relations can also connect more remote lived experiences with one another. A kindness shown by another is felt as pleasant, and it is perhaps only when repeated little kindnesses are added up that a feeling of gratitude is evoked. Here too it lies in the nature of the structural relation that the enjoyment of the kindness is not repeated as joy combined with a focus on its cause, but that a new feeling of a distinct sort arises. It lies in the nature of this relation that new members can be added, as one inference to another. An-

other's suffering elicits pity; the intensity with which I feel pity can elicit pity for myself as the one who now suffers so intensely.

We distinguish from the relation contained in feelings about feelings another relation that we designate as "transference." If part of an object has aroused a disagreeable feeling, this can then be imparted to the whole object. The disagreeable feeling produced by bad news can be transferred to the whole person who announced it.

5. THE SYSTEM OF THE RELATIONS BETWEEN FEELINGS AS DELIMITED FROM THE SYSTEMS OF OBJECTIVE APPREHENSION AND OF WILLING

The totality of feelings is delimited as a systematically connected whole on the basis of structural relations. And indeed, there can be no doubt, from the standpoint of pure description, about its delimitation from objective apprehension. We found the structure of these two systems to be thoroughly different. But the delimitation of the structural nexus of feeling from that of willing is much more difficult. Here we ask not whether willing is an independent function, but are concerned only with the descriptive question whether in its structure, willing is different from the structure of feeling.

Just as the attitude involved in feeling is <delimited> from that involved in objective apprehension, it can also be delimited from the volitional attitude. Any process of objective apprehension can serve as condition and foundation for feeling. Objective apprehension, together with feeling, similarly provides the foundation for the volitional attitude. Setting purposes is grounded in the lived experience of values. Thus there is an inner link that proceeds from feeling through impulse and desire to will. One could assume that feeling is merely the first form of those attitudes that achieve their final form in a voluntary decision and in purposive action. A continuum in which feelings, emotional states, and desires are so connected that they appear only as forms and stages of the same attitude is cited in support of this assumption. Also the opposition that we found between pleasure and displeasure appears to continue on into that between desire and resistance. But this continuity holds good in the same way at the boundary of sensation and feeling. In both cases, the continuity consists in the fact that one of the functions has its foundation in the other — feeling in sensation, and will in feeling — and that, given this foundation, intensification

occurs on the basis of a minimal activation of the higher functions. The opposition of pleasure and displeasure, of seeking and avoiding, is merely the foundation for setting purposes. Every volitional decision, as such, is positive, even when avoidance constitutes its content. The tendency to actualize the object of a drive, desire, or will separates this attitude entirely from that of feeling.

Although supported by feeling, the volitional attitude manifests something that can neither be derived from feeling nor compared with it.

Two reasons seem to me to speak compellingly in favor of separating the feeling attitude from the volitional. There is a broad range of feelings that release no incentives toward action. These are the feelings by which artistic enjoyment is produced. Such enjoyment derives from the fact that the objects of these feelings are removed from the context of reality in which our will intervenes. Processes that otherwise would incite us to action do not disturb us in our nonvolitional attitude. It is also important that no restriction of the will and no pressure toward me result from what I sympathetically experience about the persons or fates that appear here. As long as I remain in the region of art, the pressure of reality is lifted from my soul. What happens on the stage, given even the most extreme realism, can only arouse an uneducated person to take counteraction if he confuses the artistic illusion with reality. The most perfect instance of effects of feeling that are free of will is to be found in music. For here, mere imaginary creations, such as themes and melodies, evoke feelings. Although they draw their strongest relation to the human life of feeling from the mimical aspects of expression, these themes or rhythms are but shadows of expression in speech, lifted to the lawlike order of tonal relations and thus transfigured into pure beauty. They are liberated from the determinate volitional content of real life. Accordingly, the most intense expression of the aspiring will as it confronts us in a symphony of Beethoven still does not move us to resistance or exercise any pressure upon us. The expression of a powerful will, liberated from all content and raised to the regularity of relations of tones and transformed by them, invites us only to a volition-free apprehension of the forms of the volitional attitude. And that is not because weak, pleasant feelings are produced. There are artistic effects of such intensity that they can be surpassed only by few kinds of pleasure. The possibility peculiar to vocal music of allowing simultaneous objects of the highest intensity of feeling to affect us and of bringing the richness of life

itself to our consciousness produces so intense a feeling of rapture that we find here one of the highest possible effects of feeling as such. This happens, for instance, in the great ball scene of [Mozart's] *Don Giovanni*, or when Bach in his cantatas blends the sublime, calm seriousness of transcendent effects and the restless, sonorous fluctuations of the soul between hope and fear. It is not a case of a lack of strength of feeling, nor is there anything that interrupts the progression of this feeling toward willing. Rather, it is clear that there are circumstances in which our feelings have no tendency at all to stimulate volitional processes and actions. There are still other forms of strong feelings that are similar to those evoked by works of art and that also, as a rule, arouse no volition. The feeling for nature seems to provide such a further instance. And in the same way, the enjoyment of social pleasure in watching festivals and games need not arouse any striving to participate in them, even when the enjoyment is very strong.

SUPPLEMENT: COMPLETION OF THE INNER TELEOLOGY
OF THE STRUCTURAL NEXUS OF FEELINGS
IN OBJECTIVE FORMATIONS

The immanent teleology of the sequence of feelings finds its completion in the creation of objective formations and in experiencing them with feeling. Influences of the external world appear to intrude again and again, disturbing the regularity of the course of feelings. If we feel at one with nature, moments that tend toward the destruction of this unity seem to lie in nature itself. There seems to us to be something alien in nature, something that we can never entirely match in feeling; it manifests a lawfulness that has nothing to do with the lawfulness or regularity of the course of our feelings. It is the chasm between us and nature that dawns on us. But what destroys the harmony derives not only from nature but also from ourselves. Even while absorbed in nature, memories awaken and arouse feelings that are not based in nature but belong entirely to our own ego. We suddenly remember an offense someone has inflicted on us, and we are angered by it; we think of future occurrences; hopes and fears are awakened. What does nature know of all that? It lies calmly in the twilight while we torment ourselves with our thoughts. Man in his egoism becomes alien to nature; the unity is destroyed. Whereas these contradictions between egoism and what is objectively given drive humans to find a higher unity of value, they also seek to establish the unity

within their own moods by creating new, imaginative, objective forms. Works of art are created in which the divergence between the inner regularity of feelings and outer lawfulness is canceled. What is given to intuition is grasped in new forms, in new regularities. These forms alone make it possible to link what is intuited with a unitary complex or sequence of feelings. Only here do the structural relations between feelings get fully clarified. In the contemplation of art, feelings follow one another in inner lawlike structural relations; all these feelings form a whole. We can experience this whole again in a state of feeling, in an interpenetration of all our different lived experiences; all the feelings different from one another, but internally connected, are interwoven into a total result, a total mood. Often with music, for example, a definite state of feeling suggests itself; it is then thoroughly experienced sequentially until at the end the same state of feeling returns. Having been led through its various stages, it has achieved full consciousness. Only by a remote analogy with the cognitive process could one say that the total feeling finds its fulfillment through the single stages, that the total feeling has become a whole in which everything has found its fulfillment. Instead, this state of affairs manifests itself in each of the variations on one and the same theme in music and in the recapitulation or the perfected articulation of the theme at the end. What is already implicit in a total feeling is brought explicitly to consciousness in a regular sequence, in order then to become again a higher unity. Thus it may be the task of art as such to bring to distinct and thorough consciousness, to live through, the structural unities of feelings present or inherent in every human being. The most powerful means it has for this is contrast. Other feelings seem to want to press forward against the given state of feeling; but from each of these conflicts, the state of feeling emerges more purely and explicitly. It may be a law in the life of feeling that a total feeling can achieve full consciousness and find its fulfillment only in conflict with other feelings.

From this perspective, we can cast a glance into the teleology of the life of feeling. In the course of aesthetic feeling, means and end are not foreign to each other. There are no indifferent means toward a worthwhile end. It is the structured whole itself that is the end. This whole is not an abstraction, a concept; nor is it a categorial formation of elements disparate in themselves. Rather, the whole itself is given to us in its entirety in a lived experience, and

is realized in a structural nexus of simultaneously present emotional elements.

Now the question arises for the aesthetician, What characteristics must an intuitively given whole have in order that the feelings produced can be structurally unified with one another? If there were no inner relations between intuition and feeling, no art would be possible. Every form of art necessarily presupposes certain uniformities in the inner relations between feeling and intuition. It is necessary that, under the same conditions, the same state of feeling have a structural relation to intuitive equivalents. Thus there exist in art certain uniformities such as rhythm, variations of one and the same theme, or of the same linear motif, symmetry, that explicate and bring to consciousness equivalent states of feeling in different forms.

Since the inner lawfulness of sequences of moods finds its completion in art, it continues to be our human task to shape the sequence of our affective reactions into a completed unity and make it an affectively self-enclosed unity. History shows us ever renewed efforts of people to stylize themselves without them believing that they can shape all of their affective reactions into a unity. Only in the unity of a great passion can they attain unity for themselves. Everything small and trivial must be discarded. But human beings can never be content with the negation of their affective reactions in favor of one passion. The entire complicated web of such affective reactions calls for a unitary formation. Other kinds of feelings and states of feelings are raised to human consciousness by great artists and stimulate us to seek a new affective unity on the basis of other sorts of affective elements. Affective types of entire epochs and entire peoples are formed; in addition, the individual seeks to realize an affective unity unique to himself. On the basis of this regularization of the emotions, affective modes of expression also attain their definite formation. In visual art, in theatrical style, in the intercourse of human life, a certain uniformity of external movements arises as the expression for an inner affective unity.

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Finally, the structural system of the feelings of value finds its completion in certain objective universal systems of value. Here the whole world is apprehended from a unitary perspective of value. The world is good or evil, or a principle of good and a principle of evil exist in it. Or within this world, facts are singled out and designated as good or evil, and everything else is evalu-

ated in relation to these facts. Or one creates transcendent formations that alone give the immanent a completion of value. Then pervasive evaluative states of feeling emerge, such as pessimism or optimism. In conjunction with the various reactions of individuals, these great states of value-feeling obtain a distinctive coloration. There can be a pessimism that is despairing, or angry and rebellious, or sad and calmly resigned, or distressed and pitiful. But here too a human being cannot find satisfaction in being limited to *one* great value-feeling. Here too the totality of value-feelings calls for a unitary formation. We search for an objective nexus of values in which the multiplicity of our value-feelings, our satisfactions and dissatisfactions, our feeling for what is beautiful and ugly, for what is good and evil, and all other value-feelings find expression in their various stages and nuances. Here purposive systems arising from a volitional attitude can give values a systematic unity that objectively completes the inner structural nexus of value-feelings.

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2. *Willing*

(FIRST FRAGMENT)

1. THE SCOPE OF ITS LIVED EXPERIENCES

By willing, I understand a determinate attitude that emerges from a large multiplicity of lived experiences, and on the basis of which a nexus of determinate lived experiences results. In these lived experiences, we possess a reflexive awareness of an intention to realize a state of affairs. This is not comparable to the relationships of re-presenting and what is based on objective apprehension, or to joy about something or sorrow over something in feeling. Like the other two attitudes, willing displays a relation to something having content; this is the object that is willed. The process refers to this objective something. It is an attitude, but the special nature of this attitude can only be experienced; it cannot be presented in concepts. To say that it involves an intention, a tendency to realize an object, a causal efficacy, or to say that in it a purpose is posited to be realized is merely to give an external designation of this indefinable attitude. I specify that it refers to something having content in the determinate mode of a tendency toward realization; and in designating this attitude, I use categories that have their

origin precisely in the will. If this characteristic, which never occurs alone in a lived experience, is abstracted from lived experience, then it can be designated as a function, as a component of the psychic nexus. Wherever willing appears as constituting a lived experience, it is always related to something having content that ought to be realized; and, for that reason, we call it an attitude. It emerges in an ordered series of states that is determined by a progressive differentiation. Such states are drives, strivings, decisions, and a volitional nexus.

But since this intention is influenced by circumstances and emerges amid the cooperation of individuals, still further states arise that are conditioned by it and must be attributed to the same attitude. The circumstances in which any form of willing appears can hinder the intention contained in it: a consciousness of resistance emerges, pressure is exerted by the external world. This hindrance need not elicit displeasure in every instance; some people like to be disturbed in their work, and in any case, the reflexive awareness of this hindrance is distinct from the feeling of displeasure that arises from it. A special relationship originates from the cooperation of individuals, since a contract or a promise or the nature of the relation itself gives rise to an obligation of the will that constrains actions or forbids them. For our purposes, it does not matter how outer hindrance and inner obligation are interpreted psychologically. According to widespread usage, the reflexive awareness of these modifications of the volitional attitude is called a feeling. The consciousness of hindrance or of obligation is called a feeling. A sense of displeasure is, no doubt, often mixed in with these modifications of the volitional attitude. The hindrance is felt as painful; the obligation, as a restriction, elicits our displeasure. But not every hindrance or obligation is felt as a distressing pressure or as a restriction. There is also a happiness in restriction. There is something satisfying in binding a life to stable rules, as opposed to unbridled freedom. And the reflexive awareness of hindrance and obligation must be distinguished from added feelings of displeasure. These refer directly not to the object that hinders or the obligation that binds but to being hindered, to being bound. Here it suffices that they occupy an important place in the nexus of relations that is grounded in the volitional attitude. For all these sorts of lived experience distinguished here form one nexus, which we designate a *nexus of will*.

They are members of one whole, in which they occupy a definite position. Each such lived experience has a relation to the nexus of

will, the nature of which is determined by the distinctive volitional attitude. Lived experiences that extend over years can be connected with one another through these relations. Consider Michelangelo's involvement in the construction of St. Peter's Basilica. Long interruptions occur, other plans intrude, but countless acts of will are related to one another across these separations by the specified intention. Setting a purpose entails a decision concerning means, even means toward means become necessary, hindrances make themselves felt, and obligations connected with agreements enter in. An extremely complex whole [results] in which individual acts over the course of years are conditioned by an intention. All these acts in turn are permeated by the kind of relations that are conditioned by the nature of the volitional attitude. Feelings, perceptions, deliberations insert themselves everywhere. Determinations of the will continue to be effective in re-presentations, which are not themselves [acts of] will, but merely possess the capacity to re-present or to elicit willing.

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Thus we again confront a structural nexus that extends through the processes that emerge and vanish in psychic life, as they are variously conditioned from without or from within: a permanent framework, as it were, or an ordered system of relations that reflects the nature of the attitude.

In order to penetrate into the nature of this system, we must analyze these lived experiences more closely.

2. ANALYSIS OF WILLING

The form of willing in which the constituents of the process are most clearly distinguished occurs whenever it is directed toward the realization of an external change and when a conscious choice of ends and means continues along the path to this goal. In the context of life, there must always first be a moment contained in the present state, which makes itself felt as a need and is grounded in enduring dispositions such as drives, habitual desires, and passions. For even the efficacy of ethical norms of action is bound to their content. From without or from within, the course of life provides occasions that influence the conditions contained in such dispositions. Implicit in these conditions is the move to representations of a state that is to be realized and which has a relationship to those dispositions. If we call this state to be reached a purpose, then what is willed in this purpose is satisfaction of some sort, and the future state itself is basically only a means to this satisfaction.

Right away it is important to emphasize that such a satisfaction relative to objects as means is general in nature. This satisfaction can be sought because a determinate object awakens feelings of pleasure, or because the disposition itself seeks objects of satisfaction. The possibility of [arousing] positive feelings inherent in an object constitutes the value of that object for the subject.

Because several objects present themselves and memory preserves earlier objects as later ones appear, and because several needs can make themselves felt in succession and the consciousness of previous needs persists while later ones are already making themselves felt, a contest between representations of purposes emerges in us. In addition, since it is always merely a matter of producing a future state, or bringing about a change conducive to it as a means of satisfaction, other aspects involved in the change and the retroactive effects it has upon the life of feelings and drives can enter into conflict as negative versus positive values. Often enough, I do not know whether, finally, I will really feel happy about a change vehemently desired as a means of satisfaction. The same relationship holds between my life of feelings and drives and the representations of objects that are produced by the causal chain of life, such as perceptions of outer objects, or thoughts concerning the occurrence, be it reliable or dubious, of future states.

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Whenever several possibilities of bringing about inner or outer changes in order to satisfy the impulses contained in the acquired nexus of my psychic life present themselves thus, and whenever these possibilities are raised to consciousness, then a choice arises. And it is carried out in processes of deliberation that connect causal relationships and estimation of values with one another.

Here then, a distinction makes itself felt between an act of estimating values and a choice or preference. An estimation of values does not yet involve the urgency of having to posit a definite purpose in a given moment. Willing presupposes the represented possibility of realizing an inner or outer process. The choice that it involves and that puts an end to the contest of representations of purposes allows the characteristic of self-activity or spontaneity contained in willing to appear especially clearly. Deliberations are by their nature endless; a decision puts an end to them, whenever one chooses, by considering that something must be done. The moment that serves as the telling factor in a decision we call the motive.

At first, the execution of a decision has its schema in the causal connection of the means-ends nexus as contained in reality, subject

to the determination already involved in the deliberations of choosing that the purpose is realizable. Then the process of execution, of course, becomes subject to all the modifications of relationships that emerge in time. They can bring about a suspension of the process; they can make it advisable to choose other means than the ones foreseen.

Additional properties assumed by the nexus of the sphere of willing are influenced by the fact that it brings about purposive systems that are realized in a community. Even the external organization of society can be regarded as encompassing such purposive systems. Thus willing manifests itself in community. That is only possible because, as soon as one goes beyond the individual person, willing involves a relationship of determining and being determined, of commanding and obeying. In itself, a command is not subject to any *ratio*; it can proceed quite peculiarly from the untransferable motives of one person to influence others through the possibility of coercion inherent in the causal system. This fundamental relationship of commanding and obeying makes possible the external organization of society and finds its completion in the state's right of coercion. Purposive systems, however, must have a different ground for the possibility of cooperation. It consists in the fact that a purpose that can be fulfilled only in cooperation can find support in the commonality of human nature and especially in those properties that are basic to the same purpose in all. Accordingly, in every purposive act, a personality distinct from and raised above the empirical individual emerges, corresponding to the purposive attitude.

Thus the following nexus emerges in the sphere of willing. Each satisfaction is already related to the state that is necessary for it to be realized as something more general.²² Hence, whenever willing proposes a change as its purpose, this purpose stands as a particular relative to the universality of the proposal, that is, to a satisfaction. Accordingly, the willing of satisfaction can also be apprehended as a rule grounded in the subject and under which individual possible changes as they produce satisfaction can be subsumed. In the same way, a means, insofar as it makes possible a whole series of satisfactions, can also be grasped as a rule, to which those individual cases are subordinate. Thus a complex of rules emerges that a subject sets for itself in order to bring about a satisfied life. These rules presuppose the empirical needs of this subject. They

²² Marginal note: Sigwart, *Logik*, vol. II, 743. (H)

presuppose the typical causal system in which it is situated, and they determine objects and means that are thereby posited. These are rules of prudence and rules of life.

The satisfaction of the subject taken as a whole rests upon a relationship of values to which its life is predisposed. This estimation is distinctive from the start and is perfected in the subject's life-experience.

But a purposive system rests upon the possibility of there being an interchange of value-assessments between individuals.

Thus as we saw, the task of a common system of values was established.

Regulations, laws, and rules are formed first on the basis of a commonality that has developed in some sphere. This commonality makes possible an agreement in value-assessment, which in turn is the origin of common law, ethics, artistic technique, etc.

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If this community dissolves, then the need for a rational system arises, the ideal of deriving norms from the rational order of value determinations, and finally from them the order of prescripts, rules, regulations, and laws. This is the origin of the natural system of regulating life. In it, the highest norm would be that which is inherent in the very setting of purposes within a community. The Kantian moral law. Then, in every individual domain, norms would have to be selected insofar as they are posited by the specific purpose in accord with value-relationships.

(SECOND FRAGMENT)

1. THE FOUNDATION OF WILLING IN OBJECTIVE APPREHENSION AND IN FEELING

Objectifying acts form the common foundation first for feeling and then for willing. For the volitional attitude either involves an object that is desired, wished for, or grasped as a purpose, or it involves an inner obligation to or an outer determination by something. Indeed, there is also a limit-case here, etc.

2. DELIMITING WILLING FROM FEELING

We find that a kind of attitude exists in the lived experience of willing. For here too a relation of the psychic nexus to an object exists in a lived experience. Of course, here again there is not always a regular relation to an object in the lived experience of will-

ing, as was also indicated in the case of feeling. In drives and striving, we are not always conscious of a specific object toward which they are directed. But this only means for the time being that the objective is indeterminate. When hurried agitation aims at change, everyone experiences a striving that is always directed toward a new situation without its being fixed in a stable representation of a goal.²³ And as a feeling can continue even when the subjective state or the outer objects that elicited it are no longer noticed, because another lived experience claims our attention, so also, the inner agitation that reaches out toward the indeterminate, or the tension that is aroused by aiming at a purpose, can persist in sensory impressions or in related feelings that re-present the striving, even though the striving itself no longer exists.²⁴

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And indeed, just as the attitude of willing is distinct from that of objective apprehension, so also is it distinct from that of feeling. Feeling and willing should be conceived as different attitudes, and not as aspects of the same attitude. I have developed the reasons for this claim. If they were aspects of the same attitude, then with increasing strength, feeling would have to pass over into willing whenever the threshold of intensity for releasing the will were passed, so to speak, and whenever no hindrance to this release were present from without. But many strong feelings provide counter evidence for that. And further, the foundation of willing would always have to be set in a feeling or in a representation of value as its counterpart. And this is not the case either.

Action does not always take place in the context of striving toward a good; it can also be the result of an obligation of the will. I have made a promise; so I must act, and I resolve to act. If I now form the concept of a value determining me, of loyalty, reliability, etc., then these virtues can only be defined by the inner relationship in which the will finds itself obliged and recognizes this obligation as compelling. The question whether this is connected with the nature of personality is irresolvable, and concerns the interpretation of a finding, but not its grounding. For the absolute *ought* that appears here can never be derived from an *is*.

Kant's categorical imperative contains only the logical condition under which a moral law is possible. The *ought* itself, which necessitates the moral law, is not contained in it. One confuses the nature of the moral law whenever one draws up a code of duties

²³ Marginal note: Husserl, *Logische Untersuchungen*, vol. II, 373. (H)

²⁴ Husserl, *Logische Untersuchungen*, II, 372. (H)

that interprets the love of God or of people or the striving for perfection as binding in the same way as the constraint of an obligation and the truthfulness and honesty based on it. Without fail, violation of the latter excludes a man from cooperating with others in an order of common life. Violation of the so-called duties of love excludes one from the sphere of sympathy, and that of the so-called duties of perfection, from a communal striving for perfection. The dignity of these duties varies considerably. And the point of departure for every sound ethics is contained in this distinction.

3. THE STRUCTURAL UNITY OF THE VOLITIONAL ATTITUDE

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The lower limit is formed by those lived experiences in which a displeasure without an object is connected with a striving toward discharge, or a mere quality of pleasure appears without an object.

The feeling of a lack of nourishment is connected with a tension and a striving. Spheres of drives and of longing without an object [can be cited as] mere facts without any psychological explanation appealing to energy or pleasure. Beyond these spheres, separate structural unities are constituted. They are characterized by the inner relation either of the act in which an intuition of or a judgment about an object is constituted, or of the act of relating all that to feeling, or of the act of striving. "Act" is a mere designation for the psychic moment in which a relation is realized. These different acts form a structural unity according to a law connecting various attitudes. These acts can from the beginning manifest the quality of liberation from constraint or pressure and of realizing different pleasures.

4. THE LEVELS OF STRUCTURAL UNITY IN LIVED EXPERIENCE AND THE RELATIONS BETWEEN LIVED EXPERIENCES

1. The most basic structural relation consists in this, that an actual or remembered object elicits a reaction of feeling, and this passes over into a volitional attitude. Longing, striving, desiring, wishing. Here objects simply offer themselves, as it were, in a state of unreflected naivete and without being connected.

2. Then judgments emerge as determinations of the object. Possibilities of pleasurable satisfaction are weighed; the realizability of the object of satisfaction is established. Willing in the narrower sense. The affinity of this level with judgment is based upon its dependence on judgment.

3. Approval and disapproval as a result of value-assessment become motivating grounds for action. Ethical action in the narrower sense.

Relations of these lived experiences to one another:

I. In the direction of a hierarchy of structural unities. The lower levels condition the higher ones. And at the same time, the certainty of a decision and its rightness for a given person lies in the possibility of congruence with (verification by) lived experiences of feeling. Many errors arise when unfamiliar lived experiences of feeling, approvals, disapprovals, etc. are substituted.

- 69 2. The connection of lived experiences according to the relations inherent in what is given in the willing of objects.

I. Purpose and means

II. Obeying and commanding

III. The forms of obligation:

- A. Obligation by an act that is common to two persons.
 B. Obligation by one's own voluntary decision. The expansion of obligation in the course of life:

1. By work done, which binds one to the object
2. By relationships to other persons
3. By the disposition inherent in a voluntary decision

These obligations permeate all of life, on the one hand stabilizing, and on the other hand, restricting life. Goethe's poem.²⁵ Old age.

5. THE SYSTEM OF LIVED EXPERIENCES

IN THE VOLITIONAL ATTITUDE²⁶

²⁵ Dilthey is perhaps referring here to Goethe's *Urworte. Orphisch* in the verse cycle *Gott und Welt*.

²⁶ Dilthey notes here that the material originally intended for this section is to be distributed to earlier sections.

THE DELIMITATION OF THE HUMAN SCIENCES (THIRD DRAFT)

Interesting debates about the nature of the human sciences, especially of history, have taken place in recent decades. How can the human sciences be delimited from the natural sciences? What comprises the essence of history and its difference from the other sciences? Is objective historical knowledge attainable? Without entering polemically into the opposed views that already exist in these debates, I set forth some considerations devoted to these same questions.

1

I begin with the question as to how another class of sciences can be delimited from the natural sciences, whether one chooses for them the expression *Geisteswissenschaften* or *Kulturwissenschaften*. The answer to this question is not a matter for speculation; it has a firm foundation in a fact of great importance. Besides the natural sciences, a group of conceptual cognitive results has emerged naturally from the tasks of life itself. These results are linked to one another by their affinity and mutual grounding. History, political economy, the sciences of law and of the state, the studies of religion, of literature and poetry, of art and music, of philosophical world-view, as well as the theory and conceptual cognition of the historical process, are such sciences.

Wherein, then, lies the affinity between them? In attempting to go back to something ultimate that they have in common with one another, I find that all these sciences refer to human beings, their relation to one another and to outer nature. At first, I disregard every epistemological discussion concerning the reality-value of what appears in experience. Such a discussion can only be undertaken later; for the validity of concepts such as reality and objectivity in the human sciences can be considered only on the basis of analytic preliminary work. What, then, is common to all these

71 sciences in their reference to human beings, their relations to one another and to outer nature? They are all founded in lived experience, in the expressions for lived experiences, and in the understanding of these expressions. Lived experience and the understanding of every kind of expression of lived experiences provide the basis of all judgments, concepts, and cognitions that are distinctive of the human sciences. Thus a network of knowledge emerges in which what is experienced and understood, and representations thereof in conceptual thought, are connected with one another. And this network recurs in all the disciplines that the theory of the human sciences is about. All the properties that are correctly noted as constituting the essence of these sciences only follow from this their common essence. Thus there is a special relation between what is unique, singular, or individual and general uniformities within this group of sciences. But there is a further consequence: all the leading concepts with which these sciences operate differ from the corresponding concepts of natural science. "Reality" has a different sense in the human sciences than when in our knowledge of nature we predicate it of physical objects. The categories involved in what is experienced and understood and those that make their re-presentation possible in the sciences are different. The objectivity of knowledge that is sought here has a different sense; the methods for approaching the ideal of objectivity of knowledge here display essential differences from those by which we approach the conceptual cognition of nature. Thus this group of sciences forms its own domain, which stands under its own laws grounded in the nature of what can be experienced, expressed, and understood.¹

I shall now explicate this conceptual definition. The complete and self-enclosed, clearly delineated process contained in every part of history as well as in every concept of the human sciences

¹ An inserted sheet follows here (Fasz. 54:122), designated as sheet Ia: "The first task is to establish what is meant by the words 'experience,' 'expression,' and 'understanding,' and to bring these three defined phenomena to clearest consciousness by reflection on them.

"I begin with life.

"The clearly delimited and self-enclosed process that is contained in every concept of the human sciences is the course of a life. By it is understood the nexus that is bounded by birth and death. What do we understand by this nexus? For the empirical consciousness, it is to be found first of all in the existence of a person during his lifetime; and this existence is uninterruptedly continuous because it is attached to the sensory appearance of the person. But this is merely a first impression (FR) for us. For we are accustomed . . ." <Manuscript breaks off here.> (H)

is the course of a life. It forms a nexus bounded by birth and death. For outer perception, this is the existence of a person during his lifetime. The property of uninterrupted constancy belongs to that existence. But independently thereof, there is an experienceable connection that links the parts of the course of a life from birth to death. A decision provides an action that extends over several years; this nexus is often interrupted for a long time by life-processes of a quite different sort; yet without a new decision in the same direction having to take place, the decision continues to influence the action. Work on a related set of ideas can be separated by long stretches of time, and yet it is the same old task that is taken up again. A life-plan extends itself, without its having to be tested again, and connects decisions, actions, resistances, wishes, and hopes of the most diverse kinds. In short, there are connections that link the parts of the course of a life into a unity, quite independently of their succession in time and of their direct conditioning relations. This is the way the unity of the course of a life is experienced, and it has its certainty in such lived experiences.

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2

The determination of the temporality of life is contained in the course of a life; the expression "course" designates just that. Time is not merely a line consisting of equivalent parts, a system of relations, of successions, of simultaneity, of duration. If we think of time in abstraction from what fills it, then its parts are equivalent to one another. In this continuity, even the smallest part is linear; it is a sequence that elapses. There is never an *is* in the smallest part. Concrete time, however, consists in the restless advance of the present,² in which what is present³ continually becomes past and the future becomes present. The present is the filling of a moment of time with reality. It is a lived experience in contrast to the memory of one and in contrast to wishing, hoping, expecting, or fearing something experienceable in the future. It is this being fulfilled with reality, then, that always and continually exists in advancing time, while what makes up the content of the lived experience constantly changes. This process of being contin-

² *die Gegenwart.*

³ *das Gegenwärtige.*

uously fulfilled with reality in the time line, which constitutes the character of the present, in opposition to a representation of what has been or is to be experienced, this constant sinking of *what* is present back into a past and the becoming-present of what we have just expected, willed, or feared, which also was only in the region of the represented—this is the character of real time. The result of this is that we always live in the present and that our life is marked by a constant corruptibility. This process of continuously filling the moment of time with reality entails further that, whenever its continuity is not interrupted—as in sleep or other states of a similar sort—the present follows without break or tear and is always there. Only in it is there the fulfillment of time and

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consequently the fullness of life. The ship of our life is, as it were, borne forward upon a stream that is constantly advancing, and the present is always the wave where we live, suffer, and will—in short, where we experience our reality in its fullness. But we are incessantly propelled forward with this stream, so that at the same moment in which the future becomes a present, the latter already sinks into the past. The difference between a lived experience—which also includes the lived experience of remembering or of expecting the future or of willing to realize it—and the representations of a past or future that emerge in the lived experience is always experienceable by us. The character of the course of our life consists in the endless relations between such a present, past, and future. Since the present never is, and even the smallest part of the continual advance in time contains the present and a memory of what was just present, *what* is present as such is never experienceable. Moreover, the connection of what is remembered with the present, the continued existence of the qualitatively determined reality, and the continued efficacy of the past as a force in the present imparts to what is remembered its own character of presence. Whatever forms a lived unit of experience in the flow of time, because it has a unitary meaning in the course of life, is the smallest unit that we can designate a lived experience. But beyond that, linguistic usage designates as lived experience even that more comprehensive ideal unity of the parts of life that has a meaning for the course of life, and applies this concept even when the moments are separated by intervening processes.⁴

⁴ There follow some sketchy notes written in pencil in Dilthey's hand, beginning with "Lived experience in the Middle Ages." (H)

3

Thus we come upon the category of meaning. It provides the relation that determines and articulates the apprehension of the course of our life. But it is also the point of view according to which we grasp and explicate simultaneous and successive life-courses in history, making prominent what is significant, shaping every event according to its meaning. Generally, it is the category distinctive of life and the historical world. It inhabits life as the distinctive relation that holds between its parts, and this relation inhabits life and makes it possible to explicate and narrate it wherever it extends.

In accordance with the nature of time, I possess the distinctive nexus of my life only if I recollect its course. Memory involves an extensive series of cooperative processes; not one of them is reproducible in isolation. Even in memory, a selection takes place; and the principle for this selection consists in the meaning that the particular lived experiences had for the understanding of the nexus of the course of my life at the time when they occurred and as retained in the assessment of later times, or else the meaning that they received from a new comprehension of my life-nexus while the memory was still fresh. And now, as I think back about what I can still reproduce, only that which has a meaning for my life as I regard it today gets a place in the nexus of my life. On the basis of my present comprehension of life, each part of my life that is significant today receives the gestalt in which it is apprehended by me. From this comprehension, a relation of concern about other significant parts emerges; it belongs to a nexus that is determined by the relations of the significant moments of life to my present interpretation thereof. These meaning references or concerns constitute the present lived experience and permeate it. On the occasion of a renewed visit with a person who means something to me, this lived experience receives its fullness from what was significant in previous meetings: the older lived experiences merge into a stronger unity that arises from their reference to something present. This reference or concern is so intimate and special that I can feel as if I have never been absent from this person. Similarly, in a gallery that I have visited repeatedly, the entire fullness of my present artistic experience proceeds from what was already meaningful for me, no matter how much time separates today's visit from the previous ones.

The expression of this is autobiography. It is an interpretation of life in its mysterious combination of chance, destiny, and character. Wherever we look, our consciousness is working to come to terms with life. We suffer from our destinies as from our nature, and thus they force us to reconcile ourselves with them through understanding. The past entices us mysteriously to come to know the web of meaning of its moments. And its interpretation remains unsatisfying. We will never be done with what we call chance: what has become significant for our life, whether wonderful or fearsome, seems to enter always through the door of chance.

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The same relation between the meaning of particular lived experiences and the sense of the whole course of life holds in poetry. But here it displays an entirely new freedom, for the imagination can release events from the constraint of reality and shape them based on the consciousness of their meaning for life.⁵ Great epic poems arise when, on the basis of a relation significant for life, which we designate as a motif, a historical event passes over into the presentation of its significance. Then everything about the event that is not a necessary moment for the narration of its meaning sinks away. The heroic epic is a higher compound in which certain heroic poems that belong together attain a higher dignity in grasping the meaning of life by virtue of the relation of their motifs to a comprehensive nexus of meaning. The chivalrous epic contains a still higher level in the interpretation of life.

A higher form of interpretation arises in drama. The interpretation of life becomes proportionately more concentrated and pronounced when tragedy . . .

The same relationship of the meaning of the particular to the understanding of a [larger] context of lived experience also holds in the fine arts. This is the basis for the affinity between the arts of a historical age, namely, an understanding informed by the meaning of particulars and the techniques dependent on it in the artistic domains. The visual arts are differentiated from photographs or wax moldings by the fact that they bring the significant to understanding and give it validity. In the multiplicity of momentary visual experiences of landscapes, of interiors, of human counte-

⁵ Insertion in Dilthey's hand: "The configuration received by an event when the meaning of its parts is thrown into relief by a given stretch of a life-course constitutes a poetic whole. And since this coherence of the event at the same time contains in itself a part of the meaning of life, the event becomes symbolic. Not by any extraneous trait of poetry, but because it is already that way in life. And technique is determined accordingly." (H)

nances, the apprehension of the significant moment constantly changes. What appears here is not an objective portrayal or presentation but always a life-concern. A forest at dusk stands powerfully and almost fearsomely before the spectator; similarly, the houses in a valley with their quiet lights elicit the impression of an intimate coziness because they are apprehended on the basis of some life-concern. The life-images we have of a person are variously conditioned by how that person relates to a life-concern. This emerges even more strongly in scenic paintings where the understanding of an event forms the focal point.

All the changes that the fine arts experience in their development have no effect on this relationship, by which every work produces the understanding of something appearing in space through the meaning-relation between its parts, and only the mode of this relation is different. . . .

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PART II

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THE FORMATION OF THE HISTORICAL WORLD IN THE HUMAN SCIENCES

TRANSLATED BY

RUDOLF A. MAKKREEL AND JOHN SCANLON

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My aim is to provide a preliminary delimitation of the human sciences from the natural sciences, by means of certain characteristics. Interesting debates have taken place in recent decades concerning the natural sciences and human sciences, especially history. Without entering into the views that oppose one another in these debates, I propose a different attempt to cognize the nature of the human sciences and to delimit them from the natural sciences. Only further investigation will be able to attain a complete grasp of the difference.

I

I take my point of departure from a wide-ranging state of affairs that provides the firm foundation for every dispute concerning the human sciences. Besides the natural sciences, a group of conceptual cognitive results emerged naturally from the tasks of life itself. These results are linked to one another by their common object. History, political economy, the sciences of law and of the state, the study of religion, literature, poetry, architecture, music, of philosophical world-views and systems, and finally, psychology are such sciences. All these sciences refer to the same grand fact: the human race—which they describe, narrate, and judge, and about which they form concepts and theories.

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What one customarily separates as physical and psychical is undivided in this fact of the human sciences. It contains the living nexus of both. We ourselves belong to nature, and nature is at work in us, unconsciously, in dark drives. States of consciousness are constantly expressed in gestures, looks, and words; and they

¹ Papers delivered to the Academy of the Sciences over many years up to January 20, 1910, on such topics as the delimitation of the human sciences, the structural system of knowledge, lived experience, and understanding form the basis for the present work. My study "The Structural Nexus of Knowledge" has its foundation in the study "The Psychic Structural Nexus," which was read on March 2, 1905, and printed in the *Proceedings of the Academy*, March 16 (see the preceding studies in this volume). These can merely be briefly summarized and expanded here. Of the unpublished studies included in the present work, "The Delimitation of the Human Sciences" is simply reproduced here; those on lived experience and on understanding are expanded. For the rest, what is presented here follows my lectures on logic and on the system of philosophy. (D)

have their objectivity in institutions, states, churches, and scientific institutes. History operates in these very contexts.

Of course, this does not exclude the possibility that the human sciences employ the distinction between the physical and the psychical whenever their purposes require it. But then they must remain conscious that they are working with abstractions, not with entities, and that these abstractions are valid only within the limits of the point of view within which they are projected. I now present the point of view from which the following fundamental study distinguishes between the psychical and the physical, and which defines the sense in which I use these terms. The first givens are lived experiences. But, as I have attempted to show previously,² they belong to a nexus that persists as permanent amidst all sorts of changes throughout the entire course of a life. What I have previously described as the acquired nexus of psychic life emerges from that foundation; it encompasses our representations, evaluations, and purposes, and it exists in the connection of these constituents.³ And in each of these constituents, the acquired nexus exists in distinctive connections—in relationships of representations, in assessments of values, in the ordering of purposes. We possess this nexus; it operates constantly in us; representations and states found in consciousness are oriented to it; our impressions are apperceived by means of it; and it regulates our affects. Thus it is always present and always efficacious, but without being conscious. I cannot imagine what objection could be raised if this nexus of lived experiences within the course of a life is singled out from a person by an abstraction and, as the psychical, is made the logical subject of judgments and theoretical discussions. The formation of this concept of the psychical is justified by the fact that what is singled out in it as a logical subject makes possible judgments and theories that are necessary for the human sciences. The concept of the physical is equally legitimate. Sensations, impressions, and images appear in lived experience. For practical purposes, physical objects are posited as underlying our impressions as a constructive device. Both concepts can be used only if we remain conscious that they are merely abstracted from the factually given human being—they designate not full realities but only legitimately formed abstractions.

² *Proceedings*, March 16, 1905, pp. 332ff. See above, GS VII, 11ff. [this volume, 32–36]. (D)

³ Concerning the acquired nexus of psychic life, see my “Poetic Imagination and Madness,” Address, 1886, pp. 13ff. (GS VI, 142ff.), “The Imagination of the Poet” (SW 5, 96–98), *Ideas* (GS V, 217ff. [D]; see SW 2).

The [logical] subjects of assertions in the human sciences vary in their scope—individuals, families, more complex groups, nations, epochs, historical movements or developmental sequences, social organizations, systems of culture, and other segments of the whole of humanity, and finally humanity itself. They can be the subjects of narratives, they can be described, and theories can be developed concerning them. But they always refer to the same fact: humanity or human-socio-historical reality. Thus the possibility occurs at first of defining this group of sciences by their common reference to this same fact, humanity, and of delimiting them from the natural sciences. Also, this common reference has as a further consequence a relationship of mutual grounding among assertions concerning the logical subjects contained in the fact of humanity. The two classes of the above mentioned sciences—the study of history up to the description of the present state of society and the systematic human sciences—are everywhere dependent on each other and thus form a stable nexus.

2

Although this conceptual definition of the human sciences contains correct assertions concerning them, it does not exhaust their essence. We must inquire into the kind of relation the human sciences have to the fact of humanity. That is the only way their object can be precisely established. For it is clear that the human sciences and natural sciences cannot be logically divided into two classes by means of two spheres of facts formed by them. Physiology also deals with an aspect of man, and it is a natural science. Consequently, the basis for distinguishing the two classes cannot be found in the facts taken on their own. The human sciences must be related differently to the physical and to the psychical aspects of man. And that is in fact the case.

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A tendency that is grounded in the subject-matter itself is at work in these sciences. The study of language includes the physiology of the speech organs just as much as the theory of the meaning of words and the sense of sentences. The course of a modern war encompasses the chemical effects of gunpowder just as much as the moral characteristics of the soldiers who stand in the smoke from the guns. But there is a tendency in the nature of the group of sciences that we are considering to reduce the physical aspect of processes to the mere role of conditions or of means of understanding. And this tendency develops ever more strongly as these

sciences advance. It is the direction toward self-reflection; it is the path of understanding from without to within. This tendency utilizes every expression of life for the comprehension of the inner [life] from which it proceeds. In historical narratives we read of economic work, settlements, wars, the founding of states. They fill our souls with grand images, they instruct us about the historical world that surrounds us. But what moves us especially in these reports is something inaccessible to the senses, something found only in lived experience, which is implicit in the outer processes that arise from it and which in turn react back on it. And this tendency does not rest upon a perspective that approaches life from without. It is grounded in life itself. For every value of life is contained in this experienceable aspect; all the outer noise of history revolves around it. Here purposes appear of which nature knows nothing. The will brings about development and organization. And it is in this creative, responsible, spiritual world rising sovereignly from us—and only in it—that life has its value, purpose, and meaning.

One could say that two great tendencies come to play in all scientific endeavors.

Man finds himself determined by nature. This can even include sparse psychic processes that emerge here and there. From this perspective, they appear as interpolations in the great text of the physical world. At the same time, this idea of the world based on spatial extension is the original source of all knowledge of uniformities, and we are advised from the start to reckon with them. We gain control of this physical world by the study of its laws. These laws can only be discovered insofar as the lived character of our impressions of nature, the connection we have with nature to the extent that we are ourselves part of it, and the lively feeling in which we enjoy it recede ever more behind the abstract comprehension of it according to the relations of time, space, mass, and motion. All these moments work together to ensure that man effaces himself in order to construct—on the basis of his impressions—this great object, nature, as an order governed by laws. It then becomes the center of reality for man.

But the same human being then turns back from it to life, to himself. This return of man to the lived experience by means of which nature is there for him, to life in which alone meaning, value, and purpose appear, is the other great tendency that determines scientific work. A second center emerges. Everything that confronts mankind, all its creations and activities, the purposive

systems in which it lives out its life, the external organizations of society in which individual human beings unite—all that obtains a new unity here. Here understanding returns from the sensorily given in human history to that which never appears to the senses but nevertheless works itself out and expresses itself externally.

And as that first tendency aims to comprehend even the psychic nexus in the language of natural-scientific thought, with its concepts and methods—alienating itself, as it were—so this second tendency expresses itself in the reference of the sensorily external course of human events back to something that never appears to the senses—in reflection upon what manifests itself in that external process. History shows how the sciences that refer to human life are engaged in a constant approximation to the more remote goal of human self-reflection.

But this tendency also reaches out beyond the human world to nature itself, which—though it can never be understood, only constructed—it strives to make intelligible by means of concepts that are grounded in the psychic nexus, as was done by Fichte, Schelling, Hegel, Schopenhauer, Fechner,⁴ Lotze,⁵ and their followers. They attempt to discern the sense of nature, which can never be fully cognized, however.

At this point, the sense of the conceptual pair of outer and inner becomes clear, as well as the right to use these concepts. They designate the relation that holds in understanding between an outer sensory appearance of life and that which produced it and expresses itself in it. This relationship of outer and inner exists only as far as understanding reaches, just as the relationship of phenomena to that by means of which they are constructed exists only as far as the conceptual cognition of nature reaches.

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Now we arrive at the point at which a more precise determination of the essence and connection of that group of sciences with which we began can be made.

⁴ Gustav Theodor Fechner (1801–87), German physicist, philosopher, and psychologist; founder of psychophysics; author of *Vorschule der Aesthetik* and other works.

⁵ Rudolf Hermann Lotze (1817–81), German philosopher, who developed a metaphysics that grounds life and consciousness in the mechanistic order of nature but orients them to ideal values; author of *Mikrokosmus*.

We separated off humanity first from a kindred organic nature and then from a more remote inorganic nature—differentiating parts from the whole of the earth. These parts constitute levels; and humanity could be delimited from the level of animal existence as that level in which concepts, estimations of value, realizations of purpose, responsibility, and consciousness of the meaning of life appear. We then defined the most universal property of our group of sciences as their having a common reference to human beings, to humanity. The system of these sciences is grounded therein. Then we contemplated the special nature of this relation that holds between these sciences and the fact of humanity. This fact may not simply be designated as the common object of these sciences. Rather, their object only arises in a special relationship to humanity, but one that is not brought to it from without but is founded in its essence. Whether they be institutions, customs, books, works of art, such phenomena always contain, like man himself, a reference back from an outer sensory aspect to one that is withdrawn from the senses and therefore inner.

Now we need to determine this inner aspect further. Here it is a common error to resort to the psychic course of life—psychology—to account for our knowledge of this inner aspect. I shall attempt to overcome this error by means of the following considerations.

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The apparatus of law books, judges, plaintiffs, and defendants, as manifested in a specific time and place, is first of all the expression of a purposive system of legal rules and norms in terms of which this apparatus functions. This purposive system is directed toward the external obligation of wills in a univocal estimation that brings about the coercively realizable conditions for the perfection of the relationships of life and delimits the spheres of power of individuals in their relation to one another, to things, and to the common will. The form of law must therefore be one of imperatives behind which the power of a community stands to enforce them. Thus the historical understanding of the laws existing within such a community at a determinate time consists in a regress from that outer apparatus to the system of legal imperatives that has its outer existence in that apparatus, and that was produced by the common will. Ihering⁶ discusses the spirit of Roman law in that sense. The understanding of that spirit is not psy-

⁶ Rudolf von Ihering (or Jhering) (1818–92), German legal scholar, considered the founder of sociological jurisprudence; author of *Geist des römischen Rechts* and *Der Zweck im Recht*, among other works.

chological cognition. It is a regress to a spiritual formation that has its own structure and lawfulness. Jurisprudence rests on it, from the interpretation of a point in the *Corpus Juris* to conceptual cognition of Roman law and the comparison of legal systems with one another. Consequently, its object is not identical with the external facts and occurrences through which and in which the law runs its course. These facts are the object of jurisprudence only insofar as they realize the law. The capture of criminals, the illnesses of witnesses, or the apparatus of execution belong as such to pathology and technology.

The same thing is true of aesthetics. The work of a poet lies before me. It consists of letters on a page that were composed by typesetters and printed by machines. But literary history and poetics are concerned only with the reference of this sensory nexus of words to what is expressed by them. And the decisive point is this: What is expressed is not the inner processes in the poet; it is rather a nexus created in them but separable from them. The nexus of a drama consists in a distinctive relation of material, poetic mood, motif, plot, and means of presentation. Each of these moments performs a function in the structure of the work. And these functions are interconnected by an inner law of poetry. Thus the object that literary history or poetics deals with at first is completely distinct from psychic processes in the poet or his readers. Here a spiritual nexus is realized that enters the world of the senses, and which we understand by a regress from that world.

These examples illustrate the subject-matter of those sciences of which we are speaking, how their essence is based on it, and how they are delimited from the sciences of nature. These too have their object, not in the impressions as they appear in lived experiences but in the objects created by conceptual cognition in order to make those impressions intelligible. In both cases, the object is created on the basis of a law imposed by the facts themselves. The two groups of sciences agree in that respect. Their difference derives from the tendency or direction by which their object is formed. It lies in the procedures that constitute those groups. In the former group, a spiritual object emerges in the act of understanding; in the latter group, a physical object in the act of cognition.

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And we can use the words "human sciences" with a clear sense of what is meant. Ever since the eighteenth century, as the need arose of finding a common name for this group of sciences, they were designated as moral sciences, or as *Geisteswissenschaften* (human sciences), or finally as *Kulturwissenschaften* (cultural sciences). This change of names alone shows that none of them is

quite adequate to what is to be designated. At this point, I merely indicate my use of the term *Geisteswissenschaften* (human sciences) and the way it refers to *Geist* (spirit). It is the same way in which Montesquieu spoke of the spirit of the laws, Hegel of objective spirit, and Ihering of the spirit of Roman law. To compare the usefulness of the concept of human sciences [and its reference to spirit] with that of the other concepts mentioned will be possible later.

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Only now are we able to satisfy the last requirement for a proper definition of the human sciences. We can delimit the human sciences from the natural sciences by means of certain clear properties. The object of the human sciences, in contrast to that of natural scientific cognition, refers to spirit as just discussed. From the perspective of perception and cognition, humanity would be for us a physical fact; and, as such, it would be accessible only to natural scientific cognition. But, as object of the human sciences, it emerges only insofar as human states are experienced, insofar as they come to expression in life-expressions, and insofar as these expressions are understood. This nexus of life, expression, and understanding embraces the gestures, looks, and words by which human beings communicate, the enduring spiritual creations in which the depths of the creative artist are revealed to the one who apprehends them, and the constant objectifications of spirit in social formations by means of which the community of human nature shines forth and is constantly intuitive and certain for us. The psychophysical life-unit is familiar with itself by means of the same double relationship of lived experience and understanding; it is reflexively aware of itself in the present and finds itself again in memory as something past. But when it strives to hold onto its states and to comprehend them, when it directs attention to itself, the narrow limits of such an introspective method of self-cognition become apparent. Only his deeds, his fixed life-expressions, and their effects upon others can instruct man about himself. Thus he can learn to recognize himself only by the detour of understanding. We experience what we once were, how we developed and became what we are, from how we acted, from what life-plans we once fashioned, from our professional activities, from old forgotten letters, from judgments about us that were uttered a long time ago. In brief, it is the process of understanding through which life obtains clarity

about itself in its depths. On the other hand, we understand ourselves and others only if we project our experienced life into every sort of expression of our own and others' lives. Thus the nexus of lived experience, expression, and understanding is everywhere the distinctive procedure by which humanity is present for us as an object of the human sciences. These sciences are founded upon this nexus of lived experience, expression, and understanding. Only here do we obtain a clear criterion by which the delimitation of the human sciences can become definitive. A discipline belongs to the human sciences only if its object is accessible to us through the attitude that is founded upon the nexus of life, expression, and understanding.

This common core of the above sciences is the source of all those characteristics that have been enumerated in discussions concerning the essence of the human sciences, sciences of culture, or history. For example, it is the source of the special relationship in the human sciences between what is unique, singular, individual, and universal uniformities, and of the connection here among factual assertions, value judgments, and concepts of purposes.⁷ Accordingly: "The apprehension of what is singular and individual is for them as much a final purpose as the explication of abstract uniformities."⁸ Another consequence is that all the leading concepts with which this group of sciences operates are different from the corresponding concepts in the domain of the knowledge of nature.

What justifies us in designating disciplines as human sciences is first and foremost their endeavor to relate human life, and the objective spirit realized by it, back to a creative, evaluative, and active source, something that expresses and objectifies itself.

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II. DIFFERENT MODES OF FORMATION IN THE NATURAL SCIENCES AND IN THE HUMAN SCIENCES

Historical Orientation

I

The formation of the historical world occurs in the human sciences. With this figurative expression, I designate the ideal system in

⁷ See my *Introduction to the Human Sciences* (D), SW 1, 78f.

⁸ *Introduction to the Human Sciences* (D), SW 1, 78.

which the historical world is known objectively through a sequence of operations rooted in lived experience and understanding.

What, then, is the connection of a theory of this sort with its most closely allied sciences? First, this ideal system of the human world and the historical knowledge of the actual process through which the human world has gradually become accessible mutually condition each other. They are distinct from each other, but they have their common object in the human world: That is the basis of their inner relation. The process by which the knowledge of this world has emerged provides a clue for the understanding of its ideal formation, and this formation makes possible a deeper understanding of the history of the human sciences.

Such a theory will be based on insights into the structure of knowledge, the forms of thought, and scientific methods. We will discuss certain necessary logical issues, but a full treatment of logic would entangle our investigation in endless controversies right from the beginning.

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Finally, there is also a relation between this theory of the formation of [the historical world] in the human sciences and the critique of our cognitive capacity. The full significance of our subject-matter becomes apparent only when one undertakes a clarification of this relation. Like logic, the critique of conceptual cognition is an analysis of the present system of sciences. In epistemology, analysis proceeds from this system back to the conditions that render science possible. But here we confront a relationship that is decisive for the development of epistemology and its present situation. Epistemological analysis was first undertaken in relation to the natural sciences. For, in the progress of the sciences, it happened that the conceptual cognition of nature developed first. Only in the nineteenth century did the human sciences enter a stage that made it possible to utilize them for epistemology. For the time being, the study of the formation of these two classes of sciences must precede their foundation in an overall epistemology: it provides a preparation for a coherent epistemology both generally as well as in detail. It falls under the perspective of the problem of conceptual cognition and works toward its solution.

The modern European nations, having come of age through humanism and the reformation, began to advance in the second half

of the sixteenth century from the stage of metaphysics and theology to that of autonomous experiential sciences. This was a greater advance than the one in third-century B.C. Greece when mathematics, mechanics, astronomy, and mathematical geography similarly emancipated themselves from logic and metaphysics to form an interconnected system. In this formation of the natural sciences, induction and experiment did not yet achieve their true place and significance, and they did not yet emerge in their full fruitfulness. Only in the slave-free industrial and commercial cities of the modern nations as well as in the courts, academies, and universities of large military states in need of money did a goal-oriented intervention in nature, mechanical work, discovery, invention, and experimentation really become possible. As these operations were connected with mathematical construction, genuine analysis of nature came about. Through the cooperation of Kepler, Galileo, Bacon, and Descartes in the first half of the seventeenth century, the mathematical science of nature was formed as the conceptual cognition of the order of nature according to laws. And still in the same century, it developed its full potential through a constantly growing number of scientists. Accordingly, epistemology at the end of the seventeenth century and in the eighteenth century, in Locke, Berkeley, Hume, d'Alembert, Lambert, and Kant, was almost exclusively about this [lawfully ordered] nature.

The formation of the natural sciences is determined by the way in which their object, nature, is given. Images emerge from a continual flux, they are referred to objects, these objects fill and occupy empirical consciousness, and they form the object of descriptive natural science. But even empirical consciousness notices that the sensory qualities exhibited in images are dependent upon the standpoint of observation, upon distance, and upon illumination. Physics and physiology show ever more clearly the phenomenality of these sensory qualities. Thus the task arises of thinking of objects in such a way that both their phenomenal changes and the uniformities emerging ever more clearly amidst these changes become intelligible. The concepts through which this happens are auxiliary constructions that thought creates for this purpose. Thus nature as foreign to us, transcending the apprehending subject, is elaborated by auxiliary constructions based on the phenomenally given.

But at the same time, this way in which nature is given to us contains the means for subordinating it to thought and making it serve the tasks of life. The articulation of the senses occasions the comparability of impressions in every system of the sensory mani-

fold. The possibility of an analysis of nature is based on this. Sensory phenomena that are affiliated as part of specific spheres manifest regularities of succession or in the relations of what is simultaneous. By attributing unchangeable substrates of change to these regularities, it becomes possible to derive them from a lawful order in the conceived manifold of things.

But the task can only be solved when a further characteristic of the given is added to the phenomenal regularities established by induction and experimentation. Everything physical has a magnitude: It can be counted; it is extended in time; for the most part it also fills a space and can be measured; measurable movements can then be discerned in the spatial, and if audible phenomena do not include spatial extension and motion, they can nevertheless be attributed to them. The connection of strong sound-impressions with the perception of vibrations of the air suggests such an attribution. Thus mathematical and mechanical constructions become the means of hypothetically deriving all sensory phenomena from motions of unchangeable substrates according to unchangeable laws. Expressions such as "substrate of change," "something," "fact," "substance," designate mere logical subjects transcending conceptual cognition, of which lawful, mathematical, and mechanical relations are predicated. They are mere limit concepts, something that makes natural scientific assertions possible, a point of departure for such assertions.

- 91 There is another factor determining the structure and the formation of the natural sciences. Space and number are given in nature as conditions of qualitative determinations, and motion becomes the general condition for the rearrangement of parts and the vibrations of air or ether that chemistry and physics attribute to changes. The systematic relations between the sciences in the conceptual cognition of nature are a consequence of these relationships. Each of these sciences has its presuppositions in the preceding one; but it comes into existence when these presuppositions are applied to a new region of facts and of the relations involved in them. As far as I know, this natural order of the sciences was first established by Hobbes. The objects of natural science—Hobbes obviously goes further and also includes the human sciences in this order—are according to him bodies, their most fundamental properties are the relations of space and number as established by mathematics. Mechanics depends upon them, and when light, color, sound, and heat are explained in terms of the motions of the smallest parts of matter, physics emerges. That is the schema that was developed in accordance with the further course of scientific work

and was related to the history of the sciences by Comte. The more mathematics disclosed the boundless region of free formations, the more it surpassed the limits of its next task of grounding the natural sciences. But that did not change what is true of the objects themselves, namely, that the laws of spatial and numerical magnitudes contain the presuppositions of mechanics. Further advances in mathematics merely expanded the possibilities of derivation. The same relationship exists between mechanics and physics and chemistry. Then when the living body appears as a new complex of facts, its study has its foundation in the truths of chemistry and physics. Everywhere [we see] the same stratified formation of the natural sciences. Each of these strata forms a self-enclosed domain, and at the same time each is supported and conditioned by the stratum underlying it. From biology on down, every natural science contains the lawful relationships that the strata of sciences under it display, all the way down to the most general mathematical foundation. Moving upwards, something that was not contained in the preceding or lower scientific stratum emerges in every higher stratum as a further or new fact.

Distinct from the group of natural sciences in which natural laws are recognized is another group of natural sciences that describes the world in its structure as a singular process, establishes its evolution in the course of time, and applies the laws of nature acquired by the first group to explain its composition under the presupposition of an original arrangement. To the extent that they go beyond the establishment, the mathematical determination, and the description of the factual order and the historical course [of nature], they rest upon the first group. Thus here too the investigation of nature is dependent upon the formation of the conceptual cognition of laws of nature.

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Because epistemology had its primary and chief object in this formation of the natural sciences, a complex of problems arose. The thinking subject and the sensory objects standing before it are separated from each other; the sensory objects have a phenomenal character, and as long as epistemology remains in the region of the knowledge of nature, it can never overcome this phenomenality of the reality that stands over against it. In the order of laws attributed to these sensory phenomena by the natural sciences, sensory qualities are re-presented by forms of motion that refer to these qualities. And even when the sensory facts, with whose acceptance and re-presentation the knowledge of nature began, become objects of comparative physiology, still no developmental investigation can make intelligible how one of these sensory functions

changes over into another. One can of course postulate the transformation of a dermal sensation into a sensation of sound or color, but one can by no means imagine it. There is no understanding of this world, and we can transfer value, meaning, sense into it only by analogy with ourselves, and only from that point where psychic life begins to stir in the organic world. In light of this formation of the natural sciences, the definitions and axioms that form their foundation, the necessity peculiar to them, and the law of causality have acquired a special meaning for epistemology.

And since the formation of the natural sciences permitted a two-fold interpretation, two directions of epistemology (each of which allowed further possibilities to be pursued) developed from that twofold interpretation, prepared by epistemological tendencies of the Middle Ages.

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In one of these directions, the axioms upon which this formation was grounded were combined with a logic that based the correct system of thought upon formulas that had attained the highest degree of abstraction from the matter of thought. Laws and forms of thought, these extreme abstractions, were apprehended as grounding the system of knowledge. Leibniz's formulation of the principle of sufficient reason lay in this direction. And when Kant gathered the entire content of mathematics and logic and sought the conditions for them in consciousness, his theory of the *a priori* emerged. This background of his theory of the *a priori* shows as clearly as possible that it designates above all a grounding relationship. Outstanding logicians such as Schleiermacher, Lotze, and Sigwart have simplified and transformed this perspective, although quite different attempts at a solution appear in their works.

The other direction has its common point of departure in the uniformities displayed by induction and experimentation, and in the predictions and applications grounded on them. Within this direction again quite different possibilities were developed by Avenarius, Mach, the pragmatists, and Poincaré, especially in conceiving the mathematical and mechanical foundations of knowledge. Consequently, this direction of epistemology also fragmented into a multiplicity of hypothetical assumptions.

comparatively short period, encompassing the contributions of Wolf,⁹ Humboldt, Niebuhr,¹⁰ Eichhorn,¹¹ Savigny,¹² Hegel and Schleiermacher, Bopp,¹³ and Jacob Grimm, that was decisive for the foundation of the human sciences. We must attempt to comprehend the inner coherence of this movement. Its great methodological achievement consisted in founding the human sciences upon socio-historical facts. That made possible a new organization for the human sciences, in which philology, criticism, and historiography, the execution of the comparative method in the systematic human sciences, and the application of the idea of development to all domains of the spiritual world were placed into an inner relationship to one another for the first time. Thereby, the problem of the human sciences entered a new stage; and every step that has been or still needs to be taken toward the resolution of this problem requires an immersion in this new factual system of the human sciences. It provides the framework within which all later human scientific achievements fall, up to the present day.

This development that will now be recounted was prepared for by the eighteenth century. A universal-historical conception of individual parts of history originated at that time. The natural sciences generated the leading ideas of the Enlightenment, which brought a scientifically grounded coherence to the historical process for the first time: the ideas of a solidarity of nations despite their power struggles, and of their common progress, grounded in the universal validity of scientific truths. According to this idea of progress, scientific truths constantly increase and build in layers upon one another, leading to the growing dominion of the human spirit over the earth by means of such conceptual cognition. The great monarchies of Europe were regarded as the stable carriers of

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⁹ Friedrich August Wolf (1759–1824), a classical philologist, especially influential through his *Prolegomena ad Homerum* (1796), which concerns the origins of Homeric poetry. See also his *Vorlesungen über die Altertumswissenschaft* (5 vols., 1831–35), where he develops a broad, comprehensive view of the nature of classical studies.

¹⁰ Barthold Georg Niebuhr (1776–1831), German historian. His influential work, *Römische Geschichte*, began a new era of historiography based on scientific historical scholarship.

¹¹ Johann Gottfried Eichhorn (1752–1827), German Protestant theologian, orientalist, and historian.

¹² Friedrich Karl von Savigny (1779–1861), German jurist; a founder of the historical school of jurisprudence who influenced the modern study of medieval law with his *Geschichte des römischen Rechts im Mittelalter* (1815–31).

¹³ Franz B. Bopp (1791–1867), founder of comparative linguistics in Germany and Sanskrit scholar.

this progress. Then, when industry, commerce, wealth, civilization, together with the sciences, were seen to develop on their foundation, this complex of advances was summed up under the concept of culture. The development of this culture was followed out, its eras were depicted, and cross sections were taken of them, specific aspects were subjected to separate studies and related to one another in the totality of each era. Voltaire, Hume, and Gibbon were the typical representatives of this view. And even though the individual aspects of culture were assumed to instantiate rules, rules that would be derivable from their rational construction, it gradually prepared the way for a historical comprehension of the regions of culture.

Once the Enlightenment thought of every part of culture as determined by a purpose and as subordinated to rules to which the attainment of this purpose was bound, it went on to see in past epochs the realization of their rules. Arnold,¹⁴ Semler,¹⁵ Böhmer,¹⁶ and the school of church law, as well as Lessing, explored primitive Christianity and its constitution as the true type of Christian religiosity and its external orders. Winckelmann and Lessing found their regulative ideal of art and poetry realized in Greece. Behind the study of the moral person bound by the duty of perfection, man in his irrational and individual reality could emerge more fully in psychology and poetry. On the one hand, the Enlightenment idea of progress posited a rationally definable goal; this idea did not allow the earlier stages of this path to be appreciated for their own distinctive content and value; the goal of government was established by Schröder¹⁷ as the formation of great states with centralized and intensive management, the cultivation of welfare and culture, and by Kant as the peaceful community of states realizing justice; in the same vein, limited by the ideals of the time and

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¹⁴ Gottfried Arnold (1666–1714), Lutheran theologian and church historian. His work *Unparteiische Kirchen-und Ketzerhistorie* is an “impartial history,” based on his extensive knowledge of the original writings of heretics and separatists of every period of church history, rather than on the accounts of orthodox writers.

¹⁵ Johann Salomo Semler (1725–91), German Lutheran theologian and a forerunner in scientific biblical textual criticism; author of *Abhandlung von der freien Untersuchung des Kanons*.

¹⁶ Johann Friedrich Böhmer (1795–1863), German historian and compiler of the six-volume *Regesta imperii*, an annotated collection of imperial German documents starting from A.D. 911.

¹⁷ August Ludwig von Schröder (1735–1809), German historian, whose chief works include *Vorstellung seiner Universalhistorie* and *Vorbereitung zur Weltgeschichte für Kinder*.

natural theology, Winckelmann and Lessing also prescribed finite rational goals for other great cultural forces. On the other hand, it was Herder, by acknowledging the independent value that each nation and each of its periods actualize, who revolutionized this historiography that had been guided by an intellectual concept of purpose. Accordingly, the eighteenth century stood at the threshold of a new age for the human sciences. The path to the great age in which the human sciences claimed their place next to the natural sciences leads from Voltaire and Montesquieu, Hume and Gibbon, through Kant, Herder, and Fichte.

Germany was the arena for this constitution of a second system of sciences. This land of the center, of inner culture, had preserved effectively within itself, from the Reformation on, the powers of the European past, Greek culture, Roman law, and original Christianity. How they were epitomized in "Germany's teacher," Melanchthon! Thus the fullest and most natural understanding of these powers could develop on German ground. The period in which that happened had disclosed in poetry, music, and philosophy depths of life to which no nation had previously penetrated. Such a flourishing of cultural life evokes a greater intensity and multiplicity of lived experience in historical thinkers and an increased power of understanding the most diversified forms of existence. Romanticism especially, with which the new human science was so closely allied, particularly the two Schlegels and Novalis, cultivated together with a new freedom of life also that of immersion in everything foreign. The Schlegels expanded the horizon of enjoyment and understanding to encompass the full multiplicity of creations in language and literature. They created a new comprehension of literary works through the study of their inner form.

And this idea of inner form, of composition, was the basis for Schleiermacher's reconstruction of the system of Plato's works and later for the understanding that he was the first to gain of the inner form of the Pauline epistles. This strict view of form also provided a new instrument for historical criticism. And it was precisely on this basis that Schleiermacher discussed the processes of literary production and understanding in his hermeneutics and that Boeckh¹⁸ developed them further in his encyclopedia—a procedure that was of the greatest importance for the development of methodology.

¹⁸ August Boeckh (1785–1867), German classical philologist. His *Enzyklopädie* includes his famous lectures on hermeneutics.

W. von Humboldt is situated in the midst of the Romantics. He
 96 was different from them in the Kantian composure and resolute-
 ness of his personality, yet was akin to them in a capacity to enjoy
 and understand every kind of life, in a philology based on this,
 and in an experimentation with the new problems of the human
 sciences whose approach was just as systematic as Friedrich Schle-
 gel's project of an encyclopedia. F. A. Wolf, who showed an intel-
 lectual affinity with W. von Humboldt, proposed a new ideal for
 philology, in accordance with which it, while firmly grounded in
 language, would encompass the entire culture of a nation in order
 to attain on this basis an understanding of its greatest cultural
 creations. Niebuhr and Mommsen, Boeckh and Otfried Müller,¹⁹
 Jacob Grimm and Müllenhoff²⁰ were philologists in that sense, and
 an infinite blessing for the sciences of history issued from their
 rigorous concept [of philology]. Here we see the origin of a me-
 thodologically grounded historical cognition of the full life of indi-
 vidual nations and an understanding of their place in history, from
 which the idea of nationality developed.

From this approach, the study of the earliest available periods
 of individual peoples first attained its true significance. The Histor-
 ical School discovered the creative power [of a people] at work in
 religion, custom, and law, and derived this power from the com-
 mon spirit active in the communal creations of those early times
 when political institutions were smaller and individuals more uni-
 form. These discoveries conditioned their entire conception of the
 development of nations.

And for such times filled with myth and saga, historical criti-
 cism was the necessary supplement to understanding. Here too
 F. A. Wolf was the leader. When he investigated the Homeric
 poems, he arrived at the assumption that the epic poetry of the
 Greeks before the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* had arisen from oral recita-
 tion, and thus arose from smaller forms. This initiated an analytical
 mode of criticism of national epic poetry. Niebuhr proceeded
 further in the tracks of Wolf, from the criticism of tradition to the
 reconstruction of the most ancient Roman history. In addition to
 the above assumption of Homeric criticism, Niebuhr adopted, as a
 further principle for the clarification of tradition, the assumptions

¹⁹ Karl Otfried Müller (1797–1840), classical scholar and professor in Göttingen.

²⁰ Karl Müllenhoff (1818–84), German philologist; author of works on German philology and antiquities.

that reporters of events are partisan in nature and that later times are unable to understand older constitutional relationships. Christian Baur, the great critic of Christian tradition, then made the most fruitful use of this principle of clarification. Niebuhr's criticism was most closely connected with the new development of Roman history.

Niebuhr understood ancient Roman times by way of a basic intuition of a communal national spirit that works through custom, law, and the poetic tradition of history to produce the specific structure of a particular people. And here too the influence of life upon the science of history made itself felt. Added to the philological instruments were his familiarity, acquired in important positions, with the economy, law, and government life, and the comparison of analogous developments. Savigny's intuition of the history of law, which found its strongest expression in his doctrine of common law, issued from the same intuitions. "All law originates in the mode that the prevailing linguistic usage designates as common law." "It is produced first by custom and popular belief, then by jurisprudence; thus everywhere by inner, silently working powers, not by the will of a legislator."²¹ Jacob Grimm's great conceptions of the development of the German spirit in language, law, and religion were also in agreement with these intuitions. This became the basis for a further discovery made in this epoch.

In the spirit of the Enlightenment, the natural system of the human sciences saw in religion, law, morality, and art an advance from barbaric anarchy to a rational purposive system that is grounded in human nature. For according to this system, lawful relationships that can be explicated in fixed concepts are contained in human nature. And they produce the same basic lines of economic life, of legal order, of moral law, of rational belief, and of aesthetic rules everywhere and uniformly. To the extent that humanity brings them to consciousness and strives to subordinate its life to them in economy, law, religion, and art, it comes of age and becomes ever more capable of guiding the progress of society by scientific insight. But what had succeeded in the natural sciences—the establishment of a universally valid system of concepts—would turn out to be impossible in the human sciences. The different nature of the subject-matter of the two regions of

²¹ Friedrich Carl von Savigny (1779–1861), "Entstehung des positiven Rechts," in *Vom Beruf unserer Zeit für Gesetzgebung und Rechtswissenschaft*, 2nd ed. (Heidelberg, 1840; reprinted Hildesheim: Georg Olms, 1967), p. 13f.

knowledge became evident. Thus this natural system destroyed itself by splintering into various directions that, to be sure, had the same scientific foundation—or the same lack of one. In its conflict with the conceptual system of the eighteenth century, the great epoch of the human sciences established as evident the historical character of the sciences of economy, law, religion, and art. They develop from the creative power of nations.

In this way, a new intuition of history came to prominence.
98 Schleiermacher's *Reden*²² first recognized the significance of communal consciousness and how it is expressed in religious communication. His conception of primitive Christianity, his Gospel criticism, and his discovery of the religious subject, of the role of religious assertions and of dogma in communal consciousness, so distinctive of the standpoint of his theory of faith, all rest on this recognition. We now know²³ how Hegel's concept of history, whose advance makes possible development in history, arose under the influence of Schleiermacher's *Reden*. Not without some influence from such philosophical concepts, the Historical School arrived at a similar result in going back to the past of a people and finding there a creative common spirit that produces a national treasury of custom, law, myth, epic poetry, which then determines the entire development of a nation. Language, custom, constitution, law, according to Savigny's basic intuition, "have no isolated existence, they are only individual powers and activities of one people, united inseparably in nature."²⁴ "What binds them into one whole is the common conviction of a people." "This youthful time of the peoples is poor in concepts, but it enjoys a clear consciousness of its states and relationships, it feels them and lives through them fully and completely." This "clear, natural state is also well preserved in civil law," as embodied in "symbolic deeds where legal relationships may arise or perish." "Their importance and their dignity correspond to the significance of the legal relationships themselves." They provide "the proper grammar of law in this period." The development of law occurs in an organic process; "as culture develops, all the activities of the people are increasingly differentiated, and what would otherwise be carried out by the community, now becomes the responsibility of particular

²² Friedrich Schleiermacher, *Reden über die Religion* (Braunschweig: Schweschte, 1879). (D)

²³ See my *Jugendgeschichte Hegels*, GS IV, 1-187. (D)

²⁴ Savigny, "Entstehung," p. 8.

professions.”²⁵ The separate profession of jurists emerges and represents the people in its legal functions. Conceptualization now becomes the tool for the development of the law. It grasps the guiding principles or determinations from which the others are derived. The scientific character of jurisprudence rests upon their discovery, and jurisprudence becomes more and more the foundation of the further development of the law by legislation. Jacob Grimm demonstrated an analogous organic development in language. These approaches enabled the study of nations and of the various aspects of their life to advance in a coherent way.

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A very significant advance in methodology accompanied this great perspective of the Historical School. Since the time of Aristotle's school, the development of the comparative method in the biology of plants and animals had provided the point of departure for its application in the human sciences. Ancient political science had been raised by this method to the most highly developed discipline of the human sciences in antiquity. Inasmuch as the Historical School repudiated the derivation of universal truths in the human sciences from abstract constructive thought, the comparative method became for it the only procedure by which to ascend to truths of greater universality. It applied this procedure to language, myth, and national epics; and the comparison of Roman law with German law, which was flourishing at the time, became the point of departure for the development of the comparative method in the domain of law in general. Here too we can point to an interesting relationship with the contemporary state of biology. Cuvier took as his point of departure the concept of the combination of parts in a zoological type, and that concept allowed the construction of the form of extinct animals on the basis of their remains. Niebuhr adapted an analogous procedure, and Franz Bopp and Jacob Grimm applied the comparative method to language, entirely in the spirit of the great biologists. Earlier attempts by Humboldt to penetrate the inner form of nations was finally realized by means of the comparative study of language. Then, in France, de Tocqueville, the great analyst of political life, joined in this direction. On the model of Aristotle, he traced the functions, coherence, and development of political bodies. A common perspective, which I would call “morphological,” pervades all these generalizations, and leads to concepts of new depth. From this

²⁵ Savigny, “Entstehung,” pp. 2ff.

standpoint, universal truths do not constitute the foundation of the human sciences, but their final result.

The limit of the Historical School lay in its inability to develop any relation to universal history. Johannes von Müller's²⁶ general history, which relied on Herder's incomplete *Ideas* to do so, demonstrated the utter inadequacy of the available means to solve this problem. Here Hegel, who was active at the same time as the Historical School, and at the same place where it was centered, intervened.

Hegel was one of the greatest historical geniuses of all time. He gathered the great productive forces of the historical world into the calm depths of his being. His intuitions were nourished by the history of the religious spirit. The Historical School had demanded a strict philological approach, and had applied the comparative method; Hegel adopted quite a different approach. Under the influence of his own religious-metaphysical experiences, in constant interaction with the sources but always going back from them to the deepest religious inwardness, he discovered a development of religiosity in which a lower stage of the common religious consciousness brings about, by forces that are active in it, a higher stage that from then on contains the lower stage. The eighteenth century had looked for the progress of humanity in the increasing conceptual cognition of nature and in the resulting mastery over it; Hegel grasped the development of inner religiosity. The eighteenth century saw the solidarity of the human race in the progress of the sciences; Hegel discovered in religiosity a collective consciousness as the subject of development. The concepts used in the eighteenth century to grasp the history of humanity referred to happiness, perfection, and the rational calculation aimed at realizing these goals; Hegel agreed with their intention of expressing the various aspects of human existence by means of a universally valid system of concepts, but he was no less effective than the Historical School in rejecting the intellectualist conception of human-historical reality. The conceptual system sought by him would not formulate and regulate the various aspects of life abstractly. He strove for a new complex of concepts that could comprehend development in its entire scope. He broadened his approach beyond religious development to that of metaphysics and from there to all areas of life. Thus the entire realm of history became his object. Every-

²⁶ Johannes von Müller (1752-1809), Swiss historian; author of *Geschichten Schweizerischer Eidgenossenschaft* and 24 *Bücher allgemeiner Geschichten*.

where, he discerned activity and advancement, which consisted essentially at every point in relations between concepts. Thus the science of history passed over into philosophy. This transformation was possible because of the way that German speculative philosophy was then approaching problems of the human spirit. Kant's analysis had probed the depths of consciousness to discover forms of intelligence such as sensory intuition, categories, schemata of the pure concepts of understanding, concepts of reflection, theoretical ideas of reason, the moral law, and the power of judgment, and he had determined their structure. Each of these forms of intelligence is essentially an activity. But this only became fully evident when Fichte allowed the world of consciousness to emerge from acts of positing, counterposing, and synthetic comprehension—discerning energy and progression everywhere. Since history is realized in consciousness, Hegel claims that the same cooperation of activities that makes development possible in positing, counterposing, and in the higher unity of a superindividual subject must be found again in history. That formed the foundation for Hegel's task of explicating the shapes of consciousness in concepts and of comprehending the development of spirit through them as a system of conceptual relations. A higher logic than that of the understanding was to make this development comprehensible: it was the most difficult work of his life. The guiding thread for the sequence of the categories he took from Kant, the great discoverer of the various orders of relations or, as one could say, of the structural forms of knowledge. According to Hegel, the realization of this system of ideas in actuality had its culmination in world history. Thus he intellectualized the historical world. In opposition to the Historical School, he found the universally valid grounds for the systematic science of spirit in the system of reason that spirit actualized. Moreover, by means of this higher logic, he subordinated to the system of reason everything that the rationalism of the eighteenth century excluded from its rational system as individual existence, particular form of life, chance, and arbitrariness.

Ranke's understanding of the historical world issued from the cooperation of all these moments.

He was a great artist. His intuition of the "unknown history of the world" grew up in him quietly, steadily, without struggle. Goethe's contemplative life-mood and its artistic perspective on the world were extended by Ranke to history. Thus he wants only to present what has been. With complete fidelity and with the perfected technique of criticism that he owes to Niebuhr, he brings to

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expression what is contained in the archives and in the literature. Artist by nature, he felt no need to go back to a system of the historical factors operative beneath the events, as the great scholars of the Historical School had done. Unlike Niebuhr, he was afraid of losing in such depths not only his certainty but also his joy in the multiplicity of phenomena that are visible in broad daylight. Ranke stopped short of analysis and conceptual thought concerning the connections that work together in history. That is the limit of his historiography. He was even less pleased with the colorless conceptual order of the historical categories in Hegel's conception of the historical world. "What has more truth," he asked, "what leads us closer to the recognition of essential being, the pursuit of speculative thoughts or taking hold of the conditions of humanity from which our innate way of thinking always emerges? I am for the latter because it is less subject to error." That is the first new trait in Ranke: he was the first to fully express the view that the foundation of all historical knowledge and its highest goal is the narrative presentation of the singular nexus of history—one goal at least: for Ranke was limited in that he saw his goal exclusively in this one—without condemning other goals. Here he departed from other historical approaches.

With his poetic attitude toward the historical world, he was able to feel most keenly and bring out a sense of fate, the tragedy of life, all the splendor of the world, and the great self-confidence of men of action. In this interweaving of history with the consciousness of life peculiar to poetry, he resembled Herodotus, his own model Thucydides, Johannes Müller, and Carlyle. Viewing life as if from a high place that allows it to be fully surveyed was necessarily connected in this being so akin to Goethe with a conception of history based on a standpoint comprehending it in its entirety. His horizon was universal history; he grasped every object from that point of view. In that respect, he was in agreement with the whole development of historiography from Voltaire to Hegel and Niebuhr. But his own peculiar contribution to this consisted in the manner in which he attained new insights into the relations between political power, the inner development of the state, and higher culture, on the basis of how nations worked together and against one another. This universal historical point of view goes far back into his youth; he once spoke of an "old intention to discover the story of the history of the world, that course of events and developments of our race that is to be regarded as its

distinctive content, its core, and its essence.”²⁷ Universal history was the favorite topic of his lectures; the connectedness of his individual works was always present to him, and it was also the object of his last work, undertaken when he was over eighty years old.

The artist in him desired to narrate the sensory breadth of events. He could do that only by bringing his universal historical point of view to bear on some particular object. His choice of such an object was decided not only by the interest with which the reports of the Venetian embassies captivated him but also by his sense for what is open to the light of day and an innate sympathy with an epoch filled with the power struggles of great states and important sovereigns. “Gradually, a history of the most important moments of modern times composed itself for me, almost without my assistance; to bring it to evidence and to write it will be my life’s calling.” Thus the formation of modern states, their power struggles, and the effect thereof on their inner conditions became the object of his narrative art and led to a series of national histories.

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An incomparable will and capacity to be historically objective expressed itself in those works. The universal sympathy for historical values, the joy in the multiplicity of historical phenomena, the versatile receptivity for all of life already found in Herder and that rendered Johannes Müller’s receptive spirit almost powerless in the face of historical forces—this most special talent of the German spirit filled Ranke completely. Although his work was not without Hegel’s influence, it was mostly in opposition to him. For he developed all kinds of purely historical means of bringing an infinite wealth of events into an objective historical nexus without appealing to a philosophical construction of history. In that way, the most distinctive feature of his historiography discloses itself to us. It wants to grasp reality as it is. That sense of reality that alone can create a formation of the historical world in the human sciences filled him. In opposition to the demand often put to historians to act directly upon life by taking a stance in its battles, no one represented the character of history as an objective science so successfully as Ranke. We can exercise a true influence on the present only when we at first disregard it and raise ourselves to the level of a free objective science. In Ranke, that goal also led him to

²⁷ Leopold von Ranke, Letter to Heinrich Ranke, November 24, 1826, in *Neue Briefe*, ed. by Bernard Hoeft and Hans Herzfeld (Hamburg: Hoffmann und Campe Verlag, 1949), p. 90.

develop all the means of criticism. That the spirit of Niebuhr lived on in him is best illustrated in the critical supplement to his first major work.

In addition to Ranke, two other great historians of the time opened up new insights into the formation of the historical world.

Carlyle shows the same irresistible will to penetrate into reality in another way. He seeks the historical man — the hero. If Ranke is all eye, living in the world of objects, Carlyle's historiography rests upon his struggle with the problem of inner life. Thus these two complement each other, like the two directions of poetry, of which one starts with objects and the other with the development of one's own essence. Carlyle projects into history the battle that he had waged in himself. His autobiographical philosophical novel is therefore the key to his historiography. His one-sided and quite singular genius is of an intuitive sort. According to him, everything great springs from the unifying and organizing powers of faith and work. They create the external forms of society in economic life, law, and government. Those epochs in which these unifying powers assert themselves independently and straightforwardly he terms positive eras — a designation in which the physiocrats had anticipated him. After the positive eras have produced a stable stock of institutions on the foundation of faith, advancing thought dissolves this positive content, and negative times are launched. The affinity of this basic intuition with the German Historical School and Schelling's philosophy of history is unmistakable. But Carlyle's intuitive spirit develops its greatest power only in the application of these thoughts to his conception of great historical men — the shapers of life and society on the basis of faith. He reads into their souls more deeply than anyone before him: he pictures to himself the interiority of their will in every one of their gestures and facial expressions, and in the intonation of their speech. The poet or thinker, the politician or religious genius, is not understandable on the basis of particular talents but only on the basis of the simple power to unite and control human beings by a faith. Fichte's influence upon him speaks clearly in all of this.

Tocqueville was the third original historical mind of Ranke's time. He was the analyst among the historical scholars of the time, and of all analysts of the political world, the greatest since Aristotle and Machiavelli. If Ranke and his school exploited the archives with meticulous thoroughness in order to grasp the network of diplomatic relations embracing all of Europe in modern times, the archives were used for a new purpose by Tocqueville.

He examined them for those conditions that are significant for the understanding of the inner political structure of nations. His analysis was directed at the cooperation of functions in a modern political body, and he was the first to use, with the precision and meticulousness of a dissecting anatomist, every part of political life that was preserved in literature, the archives, and in life itself, for the study of those inner and enduring structural relationships. He provided the first real analysis of American democracy. The recognition that there exists a "movement," a "continuous, irresistible tendency" to produce a democratic order in all states, dawned on him from the development of society in various states. This recognition of his has since been confirmed by events in all parts of the world. As a genuine historical and political mind, he saw in this tendency of society neither progress nor something harmful in every respect. The art of politics must reckon with it and the political order specific to each country must be adjusted to this social tendency. And in his other book, Tocqueville was the first to penetrate the real relation between the political order of France in the eighteenth century and the revolution. This kind of political science also allowed applications to political praxis. Especially fruitful was his adaption of Aristotle's thesis that the healthy constitution of every state rests upon the proper relationship of achievements and rights, and that to pervert this relationship by transforming rights into privileges is to necessarily bring about its disintegration. Another important application of his analyses to praxis consisted in the recognition of the dangers of exaggerated centralization and in an insight into the blessings of independence and self-government. Thus he derived fruitful generalizations from history itself, and accordingly, a new, more basic relationship to the present arose from a new analysis of past realities.

The whole sequence that I have described could be said to constitute the rise of historical consciousness. It conceives all phenomena of the human world as products of historical development. Under its influence the systematic human sciences were grounded on developmental history and on comparative procedures. When Hegel made the idea of development the central theme of the human sciences, which were in turn subsumed under the schema of progress in time, he was able to connect the retrospective study of the past with our advance into the future, into the ideal. History achieved a new dignity. This emerging historical consciousness was expanded by important historians to encompass ever new domains and ever new problems right up to the present, and it trans-

106 formed the sciences of society. This significant development in which the tendency to attain increasingly pure and strict objective knowledge of the human world in the social sciences as well as in history comes into conflict with the domain of political and social strivings needs no comment here, since that is among the problems of the following investigations themselves.

Theory is supposed to present in concepts and ground epistemologically the system of human sciences that has thus arisen. And if one begins with Ranke and links the Historical School to him, then a second problem arises. In his great historical works, Ranke locates the sense, meaning, and value of eras and nations in themselves. They are, as it were, centered in themselves. In those works, historical reality is never measured by an unconditional value or purpose or by a basic idea. And if one then asks about the inner relationship that makes that centering of history in itself possible when we move from individual, to commonality to communities, then this is where the studies of the Historical School become relevant. This kind of historical thinking itself needs to be grounded epistemologically and clarified by concepts, without being transformed into something transcendental or metaphysical by a relation to the unconditioned or absolute.

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Thus from the end of the eighteenth century until the second half of the nineteenth, the human sciences, emanating from Germany, gradually reached the stage whereby an access to their logical and epistemological problems became possible through establishing the true system of their tasks. The historical world as their unitary object and historical consciousness as a unitary relationship to it had now emerged. All further advances in the human sciences, as important as they were, only expanded that nexus that had been gradually instituted from the time of the Enlightenment on, which situated every individual historical study under the standpoint of universal history, grounded the human sciences upon this kind of history, and connected philology, criticism, historiography, comparative methods, and developmental history into one whole. Thus history became philosophical; it acquired a new dignity and significance through Voltaire, Montesquieu, Kant, Herder, Schiller, and Hegel; and through the Historical School, reflection upon it attained its foundation in the great nexus just presented. The the-

ory of history is the effort to apply the insight of the Historical School slowly and gradually to that nexus, and we are still in the midst of executing that task. But no matter what positions were taken up in that course, they were all oriented to the great fact of the new formation of the human sciences.

In modern times, writings on the study of history always accompanied the development of historiography, and their number grew steadily during the period of Enlightenment in the various nations of our culture. Especially since the end of the seventeenth century, the battle of skepticism against all kinds of knowledge began. It was directed also against the historical tradition, and that in turn evoked strong impulses toward the consideration of method. In addition to inspiring works on the foundation of historical knowledge, encyclopedias of historical science claimed recognition in university life. But what a distance there is even between Wachsmuth's²⁸ attempt at a theory of history, which appeared in 1820 at the height of the new historiography, and Humboldt's essay²⁹ of the same time, which was affected by the spirit of the new historiography. There is a sharp division here.

The new theory of history naturally had its two points of departure in German philosophical idealism and in the transformation of historical science. Let us begin with the former.

Kant had addressed the problem how a unitary nexus, "a regular path," could be discovered in the course of history. He did not ask from the epistemological standpoint about the conditions of the nexus available through existing science; rather, his question concerned how principles for conceptualizing historical material could be derived *a priori* from the moral law to which all action is subject. The course of history is a part of the great system of nature; but beginning with the emergence of the organic, that system cannot be known in terms of causal laws, but is accessible only to the teleological point of view. Thus Kant denies the possibility of discovering causal laws in society and in history. Instead, he attempts to connect the goals of progress that the Enlightenment had placed in perfection, happiness, the development of our capacities, and in culture generally, with the *a priori* of the moral law, and thus to establish *a priori* the sense and meaning of the

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²⁸ Ernst W. G. Wachsmuth (1784–1866), German historian; author of *Theorie der historischen Forschungen*, 1820.

²⁹ Wilhelm von Humboldt, "Über die Aufgaben des Geschichtschreibers" (1821), in *Gesammelte Schriften* (Berlin: Prussian Academy, 1903–36), vol. IV, pp. 35–56.

teleological system. In doing so, Kant simply transposed the duty of perfection assumed in the school of Christian Wolff as the teleological principle for historical progress into his a priori of the moral law. Similarly, the contrast between empirical and philosophical sciences in Wolff returns in the contrast between an empirical, anthropological conception of the human race and an a priori conception demanded by practical reason. The teleological interpretation of history as progress in the development of those natural capacities that are directed toward the use of reason—a progress that regulates these capacities in a society that administers justice universally and aims at a “perfectly just civil constitution” as the “ultimate purpose of nature for the human race”—provides the a priori clue by means of which the confused play of human affairs becomes intelligible. That the just peaceful society, which is to overcome the relationships of power, justifies itself before reason as a condition arising from the recognition of duty and not as a “merely physical good,” and that by means of it a “great step toward morality” would be taken, emerges more strongly in other works than in his “Idea of a Universal History,” which is ‘limited’ by the cosmopolitan point of view,” and restricted by its occasion. Accordingly, Kant’s importance in this area consists first of all in the fact that he applied the transcendental philosophical point of view, founded by himself and Fichte, to history and thereby inaugurated an enduring conception of history, the essence of which consists in the assertion of an absolute measure grounded in the essence of reason itself, of an unconditioned value or norm. The power of this conception consists in its allotting to action the determinate direction toward a permanent ideal that is justified by its own ethical tendency, and in its evaluating every aspect of history according to its purposive direction toward the fulfillment of that ideal.

Further important determinations result from that essential point of view. The rule of reason is realized only in the species. But that goal is not attained by means of peaceful cooperation of individuals. “Man wishes concord, but nature, knowing better what is good for the species, wishes discord.”³⁰ Nature attains its goal precisely by means of the movement of passions, egoism, and the conflict of powers.

³⁰ Immanuel Kant, “Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose,” in *Political Writings*, 2nd ed., ed. by Hans Reiss (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), p. 45.

This standpoint of Kant worked itself out in the historiography of Friedrich Schlosser,³¹ whose natural tendencies and life-course made him receptive to Kant's ideas. Schlosser undertook each individual historical work from the standpoint of universal history; he subjected historical personalities to a rigid moral concept and thus lacked any sense for the splendor of historical life and the individual charm of great personalities. He was not able to resolve the dualism that existed between this moral judgment and the acknowledgment that there is an amoral tendency in states to seek power and unscrupulous political greatness. Since Schlosser, like Kant, sought the focal point of history in culture, the cultural-historical perspective was the basic tendency of his treatment of history. Certainly, Schlosser's history of cultural life is the most brilliant part of his works. One can even say that Gervinus's³² account of our national literature in the eighteenth century depended on these works in its basic features. Schlosser demonstrated the value of silent deep inwardness as opposed to all the pomp of the world. And his greatest contribution was that his history pursued the purpose of educating his people to a practical world-view.³³

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The transcendental philosophical standpoint proceeds from the given to its a priori conditions. Fichte also maintained this standpoint in opposition to Hegel's philosophy of history: the factual and historical can never be "metaphysicized," the chasm between it and ideas cannot be filled in by means of a conceptual poetry; the unconditioned cannot be dissolved by means of concepts into the flow of history and be resolved into an ideal system. Ideas stand above this world like stars that point the way for man.

Fichte made an important advance beyond Kant in conceiving history from the transcendental standpoint. He proceeded from the Kantian enlightenment to the above sketched dawn of the historical consciousness. In the time between the catastrophe of Jena³⁴ and the beginning of the wars of liberation, he witnessed how all

³¹ Friedrich Christoph Schlosser (1776–1861), German historian; author of *Geschichte des 18. Jahrhunderts und des 19. bis zum Sturz des französischen Kaiserreichs* and *Weltgeschichte für das deutsche Volk*.

³² Georg G. Gervinus (1805–71), German historian and literary critic. One of his main works is *Geschichte der deutschen Dichtung* (History of German Literature), 5 vols. (1835–42).

³³ I refer here to my essay on Schlosser. (D) See "Friedrich Christoph Schlosser and the Problem of Universal History," SW 4, 279–324.

³⁴ Dilthey alludes to Napoleon's victory in the 1806 Battle of Jena and to the collapse of the Prussian state.

German intellectual interests were shifting to the historical world and the state. In this time frame, we see Romanticism develop a scientific interest in history, Schelling's construction of history, Hegel's phenomenology of spirit, and the beginning of his logic. These were the conditions under which Fichte took up the problem of how history becomes intelligible on the basis of an ideal order. Like Kant, he did not address the epistemological question of how the knowledge of the nexus of history contained in the factually existing science of history was possible. Rather, from the very beginning, he submitted the sum of the historical events to the a priori evaluative standpoint of his moral principle, which formed the basic idea of all his studies in the philosophy of history up to the last step in the "Deduction of the Object of Human History." From that point of view, history appears as a system that is grounded in the free deed of the absolute ego and that runs its course in the temporal development of the human race, a system in which the "Cultivation of Humanity" is carried out in accordance with a divine world-plan. "For the philosopher, the universe of reason develops purely from thought as such."³⁵ And "Philosophy reaches its limit" where "the comprehensible ends."³⁶ The philosopher of history "investigates only that in the full course of time whereby humanity actually advances toward its goal; neglecting and despising everything else."³⁷ Thus a selection of historical material is made here from the standpoint of an unconditioned value to produce a system. By contrast, the "empirical historian," the "annalist,"³⁸ begins with the factual existence of the present. He strives to grasp the state of the present as exactly as possible and to discover the presuppositions of its emergence in previous facts. It is his task to gather the historical facts carefully and to disclose their succession and their productive nexus in time. "History is merely empirical; it has only facts to offer, and all its proofs can be furnished only as factual."³⁹ These established results of the historian serve philosophical deduction not as proofs but only as illustrations. Only a domain including both those

³⁵ Johann Gottlieb Fichte, *Die Grundzüge des gegenwärtigen Zeitalters*, in *Sammlung der Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften / Hrsg. von Reinhard Lauth und Hans Jacob*, series I, vol. 8 (Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt: Frommann, 1962-), Seventh Lecture, I / 8:276.

³⁶ Fichte, *Grundzüge*, Ninth Lecture, I / 8:301.

³⁷ Fichte, *Grundzüge*, Ninth Lecture, I / 8:304.

³⁸ Fichte, *Grundzüge*, Ninth Lecture, I / 8:304.

³⁹ Fichte, *Grundzüge*, Ninth Lecture, I / 8:301.

modes of procedure can contain what Fichte once designated "the logic of historical truth."⁴⁰ Therefore it falls short of a consciously methodological analysis of the science of history. It should, however, be acknowledged that important thoughts occurred to him on the path of his teleological deduction. He separated physics, which has what is permanent and periodically recurring in existence as its object, and history, whose object is the course of time. But on the basis of his *Science of Knowledge*,⁴¹ this course became development for him: indeed, Hegel's concept of development was conceived on the basis of Fichte. His theoretical and practical science of knowledge were already intended to present the inner dialectic of real progress as it issues from the creative power of the ego. It set out to trace the course of what occurs in the ego and to project a pragmatic history of the human spirit. Here the concept of development was rooted in the determination that everything in the ego is activity, that every activity begins from within, and that its fulfillment is the condition for subsequent activity. In his *Deduction of 1813*, Fichte grapples with the same intuition of the free productive force of the ego in opposition to nature, which is inert and dead. History manifests a teleologically necessary nexus, the individual members of which are produced by freedom, and whose terminus is the moral law. Every member of this series is factual, unique, individual. The value that Kant had placed in the person insofar as the moral law is realized in it was transferred to individuality by Fichte and Schleiermacher. Because the rationalistic perspective saw the value of the person only in the fulfillment of the universal moral law, the individual became for it an empirical, contingent addendum. Fichte was able to connect the meaning of the individual more intimately with the problem of history. He united the value of the individual with the concern for the goal of the species by means of the profound thought that creative individuals grasp that goal from a new, previously hidden aspect, give it a new form in themselves, thereby raising individual existence to a worthwhile moment in the context of the historical whole. Fichte's heroic nature, the task of the time, and his historical problem combined to produce a new esteem for the value of the deed and of the man of action. But at the same time, he understood the heroism of the religious seer, of the artist, and of the thinker. In that respect, he anticipated Carlyle. The unique and the factual in

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⁴⁰ Fichte, *Grundzüge*, Seventh Lecture, I/8:277.

⁴¹ *Wissenschaftslehre*.

history acquire a new meaning when they are apprehended as achievements of creative power and of freedom. And if he conceived the irrationality of the historical from this standpoint, then he had to ascribe a value even to the irrational insofar as it is essentially a product of freedom and stands in relation to culture and the moral order.

In addition to these theories of history that asserted the transcendental philosophical standpoint, other theories that have also claimed a lasting worth were developed at the same time on the basis of other approaches. Works were written in France and England from the standpoint of natural science. The French works were based predominantly upon the evolution of the universe, the history of the earth, the emergence of plants and animals there, the affinity of higher animal types with man, and finally the lawful connection of human history and the manifestation of intellectual and social progress. The English works, by contrast, were based predominantly on the new associationist psychology and its applications to society. Their further development in Comte and Mill will be dealt with later. Another contemporaneous approach was instituted by the German monists, Schelling, Schleiermacher and Hegel. They undertook to make the course of history available to a conceptual construction.⁴²

In the 1820s, the Historical School had developed the systematic coherence of its methodological procedures, and idealism had worked out its various forms. This launched a period in Germany when historical studies influenced philosophical thought in many ways. Conversely, the transcendental philosophy of Hegel and Schleiermacher exercised considerable influence upon the historical thinkers. They went back to the creative power at work in men, they grasped it in the communal spirit and in organized communities, and beyond the cooperation of the nations they sought a system of history grounded in the invisible. From there the general reflections of Humboldt, Gervinus, Droysen, among others, developed the notion that ideas govern history.

The famous treatise of Humboldt on the task of the historiographer is based upon the thesis of transcendental philosophy that whatever is operative in the history of the world also stirs the inner life of human beings. Humboldt's point of departure was the individual human being. The period sought a new culture in the

⁴² See above, GS VII, 98ff. [this volume 120–23], and the already cited *Jugendgeschichte Hegels*. (D)

shaping of personality. Because it found this kind of shaping realized in the Greek world, the ideal of Greek humanity arose. But through transcendental philosophy, the ideal of humanity acquired a new depth in its most important representatives, such as Humboldt, Schiller, Hölderlin, and Friedrich Schlegel in his first period. In the school of Leibniz, the intrinsic value of the person had been defined as perfection. For the Kantians it appeared as dignity on the basis of the person as an end in itself, and for Fichtleans as the energy of giving shape. In each of these forms, the ideal of humanity derives from the background of individual existence, a universally valid regularity of human nature, its configuration and purpose. And from this Humboldt and Schleiermacher at the same time developed the intuition of the transcendental unity of human nature in all individuals, which is the basis for organized communities and a communal spirit. This transcendental unity of human nature is then individualized in races, nations, and individual persons, and these forms represent the highest formative power of this transcendental unity. And when the creative power of this humanity actualizing itself in individuals was related to the power of the invisible, the belief arose that history serves to realize some ideal implanted in mankind. "The goal of history can only be that the idea to be explicated through humanity be actualized in all directions and in all the configurations in which a finite form can be connected with this idea."⁴³ That was the source of Humboldt's concept of ideas in history. Ideas are creative forces that are grounded in the transcendental universal validity of human nature. They penetrate our needs, passions, and whatever seems contingent just as light passes through the earth's atmosphere. We perceive them in the eternal archetypal ideas of beauty, truth, and justice; at the same time, they give the course of history both a force and a direction. They express themselves as tendencies that exert an irresistible hold on the masses, and as a productive force that, in its scope and sublimity, cannot be derived from the accompanying circumstances. After the historian has studied the shape and transformations of the earth, the changes of climate, the intellectual capacity and sensory character of nations and their even more distinctive counterparts in individuals, the influences of art and science, as well as the decisive interventions and widespread influences of bourgeois institutions, there remains the even more powerful but not immediately visible principle of ideas that lends impulse and

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⁴³ Humboldt, "Über die Aufgaben des Geschichtschreibers," p. 56.

direction to those productive forces. These ideas have their ultimate source in the divine governance of the world. The agent must submit to the tendency contained in the idea in order to achieve positive historical effects. And the highest goal of the historian is to grasp this. Just as the free imitation of the artist is directed by ideas, so the historian should grasp such ideas over and above the effect that finite forces have on events. The historian is the artist that exhibits this invisible nexus in the events. Humboldt published his treatise at the beginning of the 1820s in the midst of a great flowering of the human sciences. Since it brought to expression the moments working together in that movement, it exercised an extraordinary influence.

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In the year 1837, Gervinus's *Grundzüge der Historik* (Outlines of a Theory of History) appeared. It provided a comprehensive survey of the historical literature, its forms and directions. But at its core there was still the same historical mood and the same basic conception of historical ideas "invisibly penetrating events and external phenomena;"⁴⁴ providence reveals itself in these ideas, and to investigate their essence and efficacy is the proper task of the historian. Ranke's intuitive insights about history, which developed gradually hand in hand with his works, still show a kinship with Humboldt, but grasp historical movement much more vitally and truthfully. These ideas become tendencies for him; generated by the historical situation, "they are moral energies."⁴⁵ These tendencies are always one-sided, are embodied in great personalities and work through them. At the height of their power, these tendencies incite countertendencies, and thus the fate of every finite force befalls them. They cannot be expressed in concepts, "but one can intuit them, perceive them," and sympathize with their existence. Because Ranke then locates the course of history within the perspective of the divine governance of the world, these tendencies become "God's thoughts in the world" for him. In them "lies the secret of the history of the world."⁴⁶ Then Droysen's *Historik* appeared in 1868, in conscious opposition to Ranke, yet intimately connected with him by means of the common idealism of the epoch. Even more than Humboldt, Droysen was strongly influenced by the speculation of the time, by the con-

⁴⁴ Georg Gottfried Gervinus, *Grundzüge der Historik* (Leipzig: Verlag Wilhelm Engelmann, 1837), p. 66.

⁴⁵ Leopold von Ranke, "Politisches Gespräch," in *Sämtliche Werke*, vol. 49/50 (Leipzig: Duncker & Humblot, 1887), p. 327.

⁴⁶ Ranke, "Politisches Gespräch," pp. 328–29.

cept of active ideas in history and of an external teleology in the historical nexus that produces a cosmos of ethical ideas. He subordinated history to the ethical order of things, which worked against an impartial conception of the course of world events; it was the expression of a faith in an unconditional ideal system of things based in God.

These works contain important insights; Droysen was the first to use the hermeneutic theory of Schleiermacher and Boeckh for methodological purposes. But a theoretical formative system of the human sciences was not attained by these thinkers. Humboldt possessed a deep awareness of the new ways in which the German human sciences attempted to tap what is universally valid in spirit. Thus he was the first to grasp that the historian, in spite of being bound to his object, nevertheless creates from within himself. He recognized his kinship with the artist. And all the work of historical research is encompassed in some way and summarized within the narrow framework of his treatise. But here too the articulation of his overall insight into history was denied him. The ultimate reason for this is that he had not placed the problem of history in relation to the epistemological task that history poses for us. This question would have led him to the more comprehensive investigation into the formation of the historical world in the human sciences and thereby to the recognition that objective knowledge in the human sciences is possible. In the final analysis, the objective of Humboldt's treatise was to ascertain what history looks like under the presuppositions of the idealistic world-view and how it is to be written. His theory of ideas is the explication of this standpoint. What was old-fashioned in allowing religious faith and idealistic metaphysics to interfere with historical science became central to the historical perspective of Humboldt and the historical thinkers that followed. Instead of looking into the epistemological presuppositions of the Historical School and into the presuppositions of idealism from Kant till Hegel and thus recognizing their incompatibility, they connected these standpoints uncritically. The connection between the newly constituted human sciences, the problem of a critique of historical reason, and the formation of a historical world in the human sciences did not dawn on them.

The next task was to apply such a purely epistemological and logical problematic to history and to separate it from attempts to philosophically construct the course of history as undertaken by Fichte with his five epochs and Hegel with his phases of development. The former problematic had to be distinguished from that

of the philosophers of history in order to fully develop the various positions that can be adopted by epistemologists and logicians regarding history. From the final decades of the nineteenth century till the present, various approaches toward the solution of this task have developed. Positions that had been adopted earlier were revised; new positions also emerged. But when we survey all of them, one overarching opposition asserts itself: Either one attempted to solve it on the basis of German idealism as developed from Kant to Hegel, or one looked to the reality of the world of human spirit for the coherence of history.

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The former approach produced two main tendencies to solve the task based on the course of German speculative thought. The first tendency was based on Kant and Fichte. Their point of departure was universal or superindividual consciousness, in which the transcendental method discovered something unconditional, such as norms or values. The determination of what is unconditioned and of its relationship to the understanding of history took very many forms within this great and influential school. The two ultimate presuppositions at which Kant's transcendental analysis arrived, his theoretical and his practical *a priori*, were brought together in one unitary-unconditioned by following out Fichte's path. What is unconditioned could be considered as norm, as idea, or as value. The problem could either be the formation of the human world of spirit on the basis of the *a priori*, or a principle of selection and coherence for more restricted spheres of individual life histories.

Over against this tendency of German idealism, Hegel's genial contribution to history has been too much overlooked till now. His metaphysical position was overwhelmed by critique from the side of epistemology. But in the systematic human sciences, there remains up to this day a link between his great ideas and positive inquiry. His influence also continues in the ways the phases of spirit are still ordered in the writing of history. The time will also come when his attempt to form a nexus of concepts to rein in the incessant stream of history will be evaluated and appreciated.

In opposition to this theory, there arose a conception that rejects every transcendental and metaphysical principle for understanding the world of human spirit. It negates the value of the transcendental and metaphysical method. It denies all knowledge of an unconditional value, of an absolutely valid norm, of a divine plan, or of a system of reason grounded in the absolute. Inasmuch as it acknowledges the relativity of all human, historical givens without exception, it sets itself the task of acquiring objective knowledge concerning human reality and the connection of its parts from the

material of the given. It has at its disposal for the execution of those tasks only the combination of the various species of what is given and the various modes of procedure.

Among those who have attempted to ground this standpoint theoretically and consistently, quite different tendencies have evolved, just as in the other group. Especially significant is the opposition that already differentiated the schools of Comte and Mill concerning the formation of the historical world. The coherence of the world of human spirit, on the one hand, is given only in individual psychological beings and, on the other hand, in the course of history and societal states. Because inquiry combines these two kinds of givens differently in light of its conception of their import, multiple approaches to the formation of the human sciences develop. They range from those that strive to dispense with psychology to those that grant it the status in the human sciences that mechanics has in the natural sciences. Other differences manifest themselves in basic epistemological and logical conceptions of the formation of the historical world, in the way psychology or a science of psychophysical life-units is worked out, and in the determination of regularities that arise from the social relationships between these life-units. Finally, the manifold solutions to ultimate questions about historical and social laws, about progress, about order in the course of history, depend on these differences.

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I shall now attempt to define the task that my present inquiry about the formation of the historical world in the human sciences has set itself within the above sketched scientific context. It is a continuation of the first volume of my *Introduction to the Human Sciences* of 1883. The point of departure of that work was the task of a critique of historical reason. It positioned itself in relation to the factually existing human sciences as the Historical School organized these sciences and sought their epistemological foundation, but in a way that resisted the intellectualism of the epistemology that was dominant then. "A historical as well as psychological approach to whole human beings led me to explain even knowledge and its concepts (such as the external world, time, substance, and cause) in terms of the manifold powers of a being that wills, feels, and thinks."⁴⁷ The human sciences proceeded

⁴⁷ See my *Introduction to the Human Sciences*, preface (D), SW 1, 50.

from life and understanding, and from the relationship of reality, value, and purpose that is implicit in life. This approach undertook to demonstrate the independent position of the human sciences over against the natural sciences, to sketch the basic features of their epistemic and logical system in its fullness and totality, and to assert the importance of taking the singular into account in history. Now I will attempt to justify the standpoint of that work more fully by investigating the formation of the historical world in the human sciences as an epistemological problem. The connection between epistemology and this formation is that the analysis of the latter points to an intersection of functions that becomes accessible through such a differentiated mode of epistemological inquiry.

- 118 I will briefly sketch the line that is supposed to lead from what has been discussed earlier to the conceptual cognition of the formation of the human sciences in order to right away make visible the contrast that exists in the way the natural and human sciences were formed. The factually existing human sciences as they were developed in the epoch of their constitution has been described. It was further shown that these sciences are grounded in lived experience and understanding. On this basis, their formation must be conceived in accordance with the way they were constituted independently by the Historical School. This opens up an insight into the sharp difference between the formation of the natural and the human sciences. What is distinctive about the formation of the human sciences will thus become the main theme of this work.

Beginning with lived experience, this formation proceeds from reality to reality. It penetrates ever more deeply into historical reality both to extract ever more from it and to survey it more fully. Here there are no hypothetical assumptions that impute something to what is given. For understanding penetrates into foreign manifestations by means of a transposition based on the fullness of one's own lived experiences. We saw that nature is a constituent of history only insofar as it has an effect and in how it can be affected. The proper domain of history is, to be sure, also external; yet the tones that form a musical composition, the canvas on which we paint, the courtroom in which a verdict is pronounced, the prison in which a sentence is served, merely have their material in nature. Every operation of the human sciences dealing with such external states of affairs has to do merely with the sense and meaning they receive through the activity of spirit and how it serves the understanding that grasps this meaning and sense in

them. And now we move beyond what has already been said. This understanding does not just designate a distinctive methodological approach that we assume over against such objects. The difference between the human and natural sciences is not just about the stance of the subject toward the object; it is not merely about a kind of attitude, a method. Rather, the procedure of understanding is grounded in the realization that the external reality that constitutes its objects is totally different from the objects of the natural sciences. Spirit has objectified itself in the former, purposes have been embodied in them, values have been actualized in them, and understanding grasps this spiritual content that has been formed in them. A life-relationship exists between me and them. Their purposiveness is grounded in my capacity to set purposes, their beauty and goodness in my capacity to establish value, their intelligibility in my intellect. Furthermore, these realities are not reducible to my lived experience and understanding: they form the nexus of a representational world in which the externally given is connected with the course of my life. I live in this representational world, and its objective validity is guaranteed to me through a constant interchange with the lived experience and understanding of others. Finally, the concepts, the universal judgments, the general theories [of the human sciences] are not hypotheses about something to which we relate external impressions but derive from lived experience and understanding. Just as here the totality of our life is always present, the fullness of life also resonates in the most abstract propositions of this kind of science.

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We can now recapitulate the relationship between both kinds of science and the fundamental differences in their formation as recognized so far. Nature is the substratum of the human sciences. Nature is not merely the arena of history; the physical processes and the necessities inherent in nature, and the effects that issue from them, form the substratum for all relationships, such as doing and suffering, action and reaction, in the historical world. And the physical world also provides the material for the entire realm in which spirit has expressed its purposes, its values—its essence. But on this substratum there arises a reality into which the human sciences probe ever more deeply from two sides—from the lived experience of one's own states and from the understanding of objectified spirit in the external world. This marks the difference between the two sorts of sciences: In external nature, the connectedness of phenomena is derived from a combination of abstract concepts, but connectedness in the human world of spirit is expe-

rienced and understood. The system of nature is abstract, whereas the nexus of psychic and historical reality is lived and saturated with life. The natural sciences supplement phenomena by adding thought. Although the properties of organisms and the principle of individuation of the organic world have up till now resisted conceptual comprehension by the natural sciences, nevertheless, the postulate of such comprehension will always remain alive: merely some missing causal intermediaries stand in the way. Ideally they must be discoverable. The perspective that seeks to introduce a new principle of explanation into this intermediary realm between inorganic nature and spirit will always find strong opposition from this ideal. By contrast to the natural sciences, the human sciences classify phenomena by primarily and mainly translating the immeasurable external reality of the sociohistorical, human world back into the spiritual life from which it arose. The natural sciences seek hypothetical causal grounds for individuation, whereas in the human sciences, its causes are experienced vividly.

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This allows us to disclose the stance that the following inquiry into the formation of the historical world in the human sciences will adopt. The central problem for an epistemology solely concerned with the natural sciences consists in grounding abstract truths, in establishing the character of the necessity of such truths and causal laws, and in relating the reliability of inductive inferences to their abstract foundations. Because epistemology as based on the natural sciences has disintegrated into the most varied directions, it may seem to many that it will share the fate of metaphysics. By contrast, our survey of the formation of the human sciences has already demonstrated a very different cognitive stance toward objects in this region. For now, the future of a general epistemology appears to depend on its taking account of the human sciences. But that requires that the formation of the historical world in the human sciences be studied by starting with the epistemological problem. Only then can general epistemology be revised on the basis of the results of this study.

III. GENERAL THESES ABOUT THE SYSTEM OF THE HUMAN SCIENCES

The foundation of the human sciences must fulfill three tasks. It must define the general character of the system in which universally valid knowledge emerges on the basis of the givens in this

domain. This concerns the general logical structure of the human sciences. Then it is necessary to explicate the formation of the human world of spirit in terms of specific domains and to show how the human sciences complete this formation in a system of intermeshing functions or contributions. This is the second task, and its solution will gradually produce the methodology of the human sciences by abstracting from its procedures. Finally, there is the question of the epistemic value of these contributions of the human sciences and to what extent this cooperation makes it possible for there to be objective knowledge in the human sciences.

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There is an even closer connection between the last two tasks. Separating the respective functions of the human sciences makes it possible to test their epistemic worth, and this shows the extent to which the reality of the human sciences and their system is raised to the level of knowledge. In this way, an independent foundation is obtained in our domain for epistemology. This also opens up the prospect for a general epistemological system whose starting point would lie in the human sciences.

The general character of the system of the human sciences is our first problem. Its starting point is the structural theory of objective apprehension in general. It shows in all apprehension a progressive line that goes behind the given to the basic relationships of reality available to conceptual thought. The same forms of thought and the same kinds of logical functions belonging to them make it possible to constitute a scientific system in the natural and the human sciences. From this substrate, there then emerge from the application of these forms of thought and logical functions the specific methods resulting from the particular tasks and the special conditions of the human sciences. Since the tasks of the sciences give rise to the methods for their solution, the specific procedures form an inner system conditioned by the end of knowledge.

Section One: Objective Apprehension

Objective apprehension forms a system of relations in which perceptions and lived experiences, remembered representations, judgments, concepts, inferences, and their combinations are contained. All these functions in the system of objective apprehension are alike in that only relations within the factual are present. Thus only contents and their relations are present in syllogisms, and no consciousness of logical operations accompanies them. The pro-

cedure that makes what is given dependent on specific acts as conditions of consciousness in which actual relations are correspondingly thought and that derives the actuality of objective apprehension from their cooperation involves a hypothesis that is never verifiable.

122 Specific lived experiences within objective apprehension are members of a whole that is determined by the psychic nexus. Within this psychic nexus, objective cognition of reality is the condition for the correct establishment of values and purposive action. Thus perceiving, representing, judging, and inferring are functions that cooperate in a teleology of the system of apprehension, which then assumes its place in the nexus of life.

I

The first function or contribution of objectively apprehending the given is to raise its content to distinct consciousness without introducing any change in the form of their givenness. I call this function primary, because the analysis that proceeds backwards from discursive thought can find no more simple function. It lies outside discursive thought, which is bound to language and proceeds in terms of judgments. Any objects about which we judge already presuppose logical functions.

I begin with the function of *comparison*. I find similarity, dissimilarity, and apprehend gradations of contrast. When two sheets of paper with different gray coloring lie before me, contrasts and degrees of contrast will be noted, not in reflecting about the given, but as part of the state of affairs, just as the color itself is. Similarly, I can distinguish as part of having an experience degrees of satisfaction, as when after sounding a bass note and its mere octave I proceed to play the full chord. This function of comparison is purely logical and simple. The truth value of its result is no different from the noting of a color or a tone; something that is there is noted. Yet identity and difference are not properties of things as are extension and color. They arise when a psychic being brings to consciousness relationships that are implicit in the given. Insofar as equating and differentiating merely find what is given, just as extension and color are given, they are analogous to perception itself; but insofar as they create logical, relational concepts such as identity, difference, degree, and affinity that are implicit in perception, but not given in it, they belong to thought.

On the basis of this logical function of comparison, there emerges a second such function. When I *separate* two states of affairs, we

have logically speaking—for we are here not concerned with psychological processes—a different logical function than distinguishing or noting contrasts. When two states of affairs within a given are held apart, their separateness is noted. Thus in a forest a human voice, the rushing of wind, and the song of a bird are not merely distinguished from each other but apprehended as a multiplicity. When a tone with the same character, that is, with the same pitch, tonality, intensity and duration occurs a second time at another point in the time sequence, the consciousness arises in accordance with this second logical function that the subsequent tone is a different tone than the first. Another relationship can be apprehended in a second example of separation. I can separate the color and shape of a green leaf in the following way: that which belongs together in the unity of the object and which cannot be really separated is nevertheless found to be ideally separable. Even where the preconditions of this function of separation are very complex, the function itself is simple. Separation is just as much determined by the state of affairs that it brings to apprehension as is comparison.

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At this point we can gain a prospect on the process of abstraction, which is important for the formation of logic. When separation is applied to the member parts of a body, it still must take account of the concrete reality of this body; the whole reality of the body is preserved in each of its parts. But when extension and color are separated from each other and thought attends to the color, then such a separation leads to the logical function of abstraction: from that which has been ideally taken apart, one side is focused on by itself.

The connection of several separated items can only be achieved on the basis of a *relation* between them. We apprehend the spatial locations of separated states of affairs or the intervals at which processes follow each other temporally. This kind of relating and connecting again merely brings existing relationships to consciousness. It does this, however, by means of logical functions that have as their basis relations such as those of space and time, acting and suffering. Such a gathering together is the condition for the formation of the intuition of time. When the strokes of a clock follow each other repeatedly, there is a succession of these impressions, but the apprehension of this succession is only possible in a gathering together. This grasping together produces the logical relationship of a whole to its parts. On the basis of relationships of being separated, and of a gradation of relational contrasts inher-

ent in the tonal system, there emerges something that has been produced in a gathering together: a chord or a melody. Here it is especially clear that the grasping together is about something already contained in the broad experience of perceiving and remembering, and yet something emerges that would not exist without the grasping together. Here we approach a limit in establishing what inheres in relationships and move into the region of free imagination.

These examples, and that is all they are, demonstrate that elementary logical functions *explicate* the given. They precede discursive thought and contain its rudiments, because the finding of similarities prepares for the formation of general judgments, universal concepts, and the comparative method. Similarly, separation prepares for abstraction and the analytic procedure, and finally relations prepare for synthetic operations. Thus there is a foundational continuum that proceeds from elementary operations of thought to discursive thought, from apprehending the states of objects to making judgments about them.

The givenness of what is experienced or perceived by the senses passes over into a further stage of consciousness as a remembered representation. Here we see another function of objective apprehension, a function that involves a new product with a special relationship to its substratum. This relationship of the remembered representation to what has been sensuously apprehended or experienced is that of *reproducing or imaging*. For within the realm of objective apprehension, the spontaneity of representations is limited by the intention to approximate reality, and all modes of representational formation are determined by their directedness at reality. Total representations and universal representations also arise in this way and prepare for a new stage of consciousness that appears in discursive thought. The relation of reproducing or imaging now makes way for another relation within objective apprehension.

Discursive thought is dependent on expression, especially on language. Here there is the relation of *expression* to *what is expressed* by which, on the basis of the movements of speech organs and of the representations of their products, linguistic forms arise. Their function arises from the relation to what is expressed in them. As constituents of a sentence, linguistic forms have a meaning, whereas the sentence itself has a sense. The direction of apprehension proceeds from word and sentence to the object expressed

by them. This also leads to the relation between the grammatical sentence or an expression by means of other signs and the judgment established by all modes of discursive thought.

What kind of relationship is there between what is given or represented, conditioned as it was by the various functions of the experience of apprehension, and the *judgment*? A state of affairs is asserted in a judgment, which already entails that we are no longer speaking of a copy of the given or represented. For a positive definition of the relationship, I will proceed from the idea of a system of thought. Each judgment is analytically contained in this system and is understood as a part of it. In the logical system of objective apprehension, each part refers to its being contained in reality by means of its place in that logical system. The highest rule governing any judgment is that its content must be contained in the given in accordance with the formal laws of logic and the logical forms. Even judgments that attribute properties or actions to Zeus or Hamlet are referred within the logical system to something given.

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Thus a new relationship emerges between the judgment and the previously described forms of objective apprehension. This is a two-sided relationship that is accounted for by the fact that the judgment, on the one hand, is founded in the given, but on the other hand, explicates that in it which is only implicitly there and needs to be inferred. The first aspect leads to the relationship of *being representative*. The judgment is representative of the states of affairs contained in the given by means of logical constituents that satisfy the demands of knowledge through constancy, clarity, distinctness, and through fixed connections with linguistic signs. Considered from the other aspect, judgments realize the intention of objective apprehension to approximate the fundamental structures of reality on the basis of the conditioned, the particular, and the changeable.

The relationship of being representative applies to the entire discursive logical system of objective apprehension, since it occurs by means of judgment. The given in its intuitive concreteness and the *representational world* that is its image are being represented in every form of discursive thought by a system of relations between fixed logical components. Inversely, a return to the object can by the fullness of its intuitive existence verify or establish as true the judgment or the concept. Especially for the human sciences, it is very important that the full freshness and power of lived experience is revived in the return from understanding to experiencing.

The relationship of being representative makes it possible that what is given and what is thought discursively are *exchangeable* to some extent.

When the discursive logical system is analyzed, then one comes upon kinds of relations that regularly recur independently of change of content and that coexist at every point in the nexus of thought. Such logical forms are judgment, concept, and inference. They appear at every point in the discursive logical system and form its structure. Also the classes of functions subsumed under these elementary forms of discursive thought, namely, comparison, inference by analogy, induction, classification, definition, and finally, the grounding relation, override any delimitations of realms of thought, especially the distinction between the natural and human sciences. They can be articulated on the basis of the tasks of the system of thought as a whole posed by reality according to its fundamental universal structures. By contrast, specifically configured methods are conditioned by the features of particular realms.

The regularity of these discursive forms corresponds to the validity of their logical function, and we are assured of this by the consciousness of evidence. The most general and constant properties to which the validity of these different forms is bound independently of change in objects, and despite the comings and goings of the experiences of thinking and of their subjects, find their expression in the laws of thought. We need not go beyond the relationship of being representative or of re-presenting when moving from judgments about reality to necessary judgments. An axiom of geometry is necessary because it expresses the basic relationships that can be established everywhere in spatial intuition through analysis. Similarly, the character of necessity in the laws of logic is adequately explained by the fact that it is analytically contained everywhere in the nexus of thought.

A scientific method emerges when logical forms and general functions of thought are combined into a complex whole by means of the purpose of solving a specific scientific problem. If there are other problems similar to this one, then the method that is applied to a limited domain can prove to be fruitful for a larger domain. It is often the case that a method associated with an individual who invented it is not yet understood in logical terms and according to its full import. Because of the way in which the concept of method has evolved over the centuries, especially in scientific usage, a procedure dealing with a question of detail, and therefore very complex, can also be designated as method. When several paths can be

taken toward the solution of the same problem, they are separated as different methods. When the procedures of an inventive spirit manifest common properties, the history of science may speak of Cuvier's method in paleontology or of Niebuhr's method in historical criticism. With a theory of method, we enter the domain in which the special character of the human sciences begins to assert itself.

All lived experiences belonging to the teleological system of objective apprehension are aimed at grasping what is—grasping reality. Knowledge constitutes a hierarchy of functions: the given is explicated in elementary logical functions, it is reproduced in mental representations, and it is logically represented in discursive thought—the given is thus subjected to various kinds of re-presentation.⁴⁸ The explication of the given through elementary logical operations, its reproduction in the remembered representation, and its being logically represented in discursive thought can all be subsumed under the encompassing concept of *re-presentation*. Time and memory liberate apprehension from its dependence on the given and select out what is significant for apprehension. What is singular is subjected to the ends of apprehending reality by its relation to some whole and by being subordinated to what is universal. The mutability of what is intuitively given is transformed into a relation between concepts and universally valid re-presentation; abstraction and analysis either raise the concrete into homogeneous sequences necessary for the assertion of regularities or allow the articulation of the concrete to be conceived by means of classification. Thus apprehension increasingly mines that which is accessible to us in the given.

2

The lived experiences belonging to objective apprehension are logically connected in two directions. In one direction, lived experiences are referred to each other insofar as they are stages in the apprehension of the same object and seek to exhaust it by means of what is contained in experience or intuition. In the other direction, the apprehension of one state of affairs is connected with another state of affairs by the apprehended relations between them.

⁴⁸ Dilthey was able to use three different words for the English “representation”: *Vorstellung* (mental representation), *vertreten* (to represent by substituting for), and *Repräsentation* (re-presentation).

The former leads to an in-depth concentration on a single object, the latter leads to a universal expansion of scope. Both concentration and expansion are dependent on each other.

Intuition, memory, total representation, naming, judgment, subsuming a particular under a universal, and relating parts into a whole are all ways of apprehending. Even without any change in the object, a change in the consciousness of it, of the way that it is there for us, occurs when we shift from intuition to memory. Their common focus on the same object places them into one teleological nexus. Only those lived experiences that fulfill a function aimed at grasping this specific object can play a role in this nexus. Our advance from part to part in this objective given is conditioned by the teleological character of the just described nexus. As long as lived experience has not yet been exhausted or objective affairs that are given one-sidedly and piecemeal have not yet been fully grasped and completely expressed, there is always some dissatisfaction that forces us to go forward. Perceptions relating to the same object are related to each other in a teleological nexus to the extent that they advance toward the same object. Thus one particular sensuous perception demands ever more perceptions to complete the apprehension of an object. This process of completion already requires memory as a broader form of apprehension. Memory stands in the nexus of objective apprehension in a stable relation to the substratum of intuition, namely, it has the function of reproducing and remembering this substratum and thus to make it usable. Here we can clearly show the difference between the conception of an experience of remembering that studies the underlying process according to its uniformities and our approach to remembering according to its function in the nexus of apprehension, which is to reproduce what has been experienced or apprehended. Memory as such can appropriate many contents that are different from its base due to some new impression or the influence of a state of mind, and this is the point where aesthetic fictional images have their origin. But memories that fall within the teleological system aiming to grasp the domain of the objective are directed at an identity with the intuitive or experienced content of the apprehension of objects. That memory has fulfilled its function within objective apprehension is proved by the possibility of establishing its similarity with the perceptual substratum of the apprehension of objects. In this directedness of experiences of apprehension to a particular object, there is always already the advance to something new. Changes in the object point to the pro-

ductive nexus or system in which it is located, and since these states of affairs can only be explicated by means of names, concepts, and judgments, again an advance from particular intuition to the universal is required. Accordingly, the first direction already demands an advance to some whole, to what is productive, and to universality. Correspondingly, there is an advance from relations that can be found within an individual object to relations that occur within larger objective systems. Thus the first direction of relations leads to a second.

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The first direction relates all those lived experiences of apprehension that strive to grasp the same object ever more appropriately by means of various forms of re-presentation. The second direction connects those lived experiences that embrace ever more new objects and that grasp the relations between them, be it in the same mode of apprehension or by combining several forms of apprehension. This leads to encompassing relations that are especially prominent in homogeneous systems exhibiting spatial, tonal, and numerical relations.⁴⁹ Each science refers to a delimitable objective domain that provides its unity. The correlation of the various domains of science provides its cognitive claims with a systematic coherence. The completion of all relations contained in everything that has been experienced or intuited would be the concept of world. This concept asserts the demand that everything capable of being experienced and intuited be articulated into a system of the relations of the factual givens of the world. This concept of world is the explication of a togetherness that is first given in the spatial horizon.

Explication, reproductive imaging, and representing are stages in the process of referring to the given by which objective apprehension approaches the concept of world. They are stages, because in each of these attitudes of objective apprehension, the earlier stage forms the basis of the next stage.⁵⁰

⁴⁹ See my *Ideas*, GS V, 132 (D), SW 2.

⁵⁰ This point provides a glimpse into the logical task of reducing the forms of discursive thought to expressions of relationships in the given as explicated by the elementary logical functions. The facts within the domain of sensuous apprehension lead us to the insight that order is immanent to the material of our sensuous experience. The separation of the material of impressions from the forms of comprehension proves to be a mere instrument of abstraction. The principle of identity signifies that every positing is valid independently of its changing position within the nexus of thought and of changes in the subjects that assert it. The principle of contradiction has the principle of identity as its substratum. It adds negation to the

Section Two: The Structure of the Human Sciences

When the system of objective apprehension is related to the conditions of the human sciences, then we can define their special structure. Although they use logical forms and universal logical functions, the human sciences set themselves special tasks and find their solution in the integration of their own methods.

In the formation of these procedures, the human sciences have generally been influenced by the natural sciences. Because the natural sciences developed their methods earlier, they were to a large extent adapted to the tasks of the human sciences. This is especially clear in two cases. Comparative methods that first emerged in biology were applied to the systematic human sciences to an ever-increasing extent, and experimental methods developed in astronomy and physiology were transferred to psychology, aesthetics, and educational theory. Even today, when psychologists, educationalists, linguists, and aestheticians tackle specific problems, they will often ask themselves whether the means and methods for the solution of analogous problems in the natural sciences can be fruitfully applied to their own field.

But despite such particular points of contact, the procedures of the human sciences are from beginning to end different from those of the natural sciences.

CHAPTER I: LIFE AND THE HUMAN SCIENCES

I am here concerned only with the general principles that are decisive for attaining insight into the system of human sciences, for an

principle of identity. It is merely the rejection of an assumption that presents itself either within or without us; it refers always to an already presupposed assertion, whether it be contained in a conscious act of thought or in some other form. The principle of identity assigns a constant validity to what is posited, and that is why the cancellation of this posit is excluded. We are incapable of affirming and negating the same thing as long as we are conscious of the relationship of contradiction. If I declare the negative judgment false, then I refuse to cancel what has been posited, thus confirming the affirmative assertion. This state of affairs expresses the law of the excluded middle. These logical laws do not constitute a priori conditions for our thought. And the relationships contained in equating, separating, abstracting, and relating reappear in the discursive logical operations as in the formal categories about which we will speak later. The assumption that judgment involves the supplementation of the categorial relationship of a thing and its properties is unnecessary, because it can be understood on the basis of the relation between an object and that which is predicated of it. (D)

account of its methods belongs to the exposition of the formation of the human sciences. I shall begin with two terminological clarifications: by "psychic life-units" I mean the constituents of the socio-historical world; by "psychic structure" I designate the nexus in which various functions are connected within the psychic life-unit.

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1. LIFE

The human sciences rely on the relationship between lived experience, expression, and understanding. Their development depends as much on probing the depth of lived experiences as on increasing efforts to extract their contents. At the same time, the development of the human sciences is dependent on extending understanding to all objectifications of spirit and on the ever more complete and methodical extraction of the spiritual content from the various manifestations of life.

What we grasp through lived experience and understanding is life as it encompasses the human race. When we first confront this vast fact, which we consider the starting point not only for the human sciences but also for philosophy, we must go behind its scientific elaboration and grasp life in its natural state.

Wherever the life of the human world presents itself to us, we also see its manifestations in particular life-units, that is, in their life-concerns, in their conduct and stance toward things and people, and in the suffering created by them. This enduring subsoil of life, from which differentiated functions arise, contains nothing that is not also a life-concern of a self. Just as everything is related to the self, the state of the self changes constantly in accordance with how things and people relate to it. There are no people or things that are merely objects to me, that do not involve pressure or furtherance, the goal of some striving or a restriction on my will; they are either already important to me or demand my consideration; they are either close to me or distant, resistant, and strange. This life-concern, whether it be limited to a given moment or lasting, makes me see these people and things either as bearers of happiness, expanding my existence and heightening my powers, or as restricting the scope of my existence, bringing pressure to bear on me and diminishing my powers. And just as there are predicates that can only be assigned to things on the basis of this life-concern of mine, so it produces corresponding changes in my condition. From this subsoil of life, objective apprehension, eval-

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uation, and the positing of purposes emerge as types of attitude with countless nuances that merge into each other. In the course of a life, they are connected as inner systems that embrace and determine all activity and development.

We can illustrate this by the way in which the lyrical poet expresses lived experience; he starts from a situation and allows us to see how human beings and things relate to the life-concern of an ideal ego in whom his own existence and the course of his lived experiences are imaginatively heightened; this life-concern determines what the genuine lyrical poet sees and expresses about humans, things, and himself. Similarly, the epic poet can only tell us what follows from some exhibited life-concern. When the historian depicts historical situations and persons, he will be all the more effective in arousing a strong impression of real life the more he reveals about such life-concerns. He must accentuate those characteristics of humans and things that are prominent and active in these life-concerns—he must, I would say, give persons, things, and events the shape and color of the perceptions and memories to which they gave rise in life itself.

2. LIFE-EXPERIENCE

Objective apprehension proceeds in time and therefore already contains memory afterimages. Since, with the advance of time, that which has been experienced constantly grows and recedes ever more, memories of our own life-course are formed. In the same way, the understanding of other people produces memories of their states and existential images of various situations. In all these memories, some state of being is linked with its milieu of external states of affairs, events, and persons. An individual's life-experience results from the generalization of what has thus accumulated. It arises through procedures that are equivalent to induction. The number of instances on which the induction is based constantly increases in the course of a lifetime, and the generalizations formed are constantly corrected. The certainty attributable to personal life-experience differs from the universal validity of science, for these generalizations are not arrived at methodically and cannot be reduced to fixed formulas.

The individual perspective involved in personal life-experience is corrected and broadened by general life-experience. By this I mean the beliefs generated amidst a sphere of persons living together and that are shared by them. These are assertions about the course

of life, value judgments, rules of the conduct of life, determinations about purposes and goods. Their hallmark is that they are the products of common or shared life. They influence the life of individuals as much as that of communities. On the one hand, they exert power over the specific life-experience and conduct of individuals through custom, tradition, and public opinion. Because the community has the weight of numbers behind it and outlasts the individual life-will, its power usually proves superior. The reliability of this general life-experience increasingly exceeds that of personal life-experience the more that individual points of view cancel each other out and the more that the number of cases accumulate on which its inductions rely. On the other hand, with this general experience, there is even less opportunity to control the genesis of its knowledge of life than with individual experience.

3. DIFFERENT LIFE-ATTITUDES AND THE ASSERTIONS OF LIFE-EXPERIENCE

Life-experience includes various assertions that are based on different life-attitudes. For life is the source of knowledge not merely by supplying the content of experience; typical human kinds of life-attitude also condition the various kinds of assertion. For the moment, I merely want to affirm the existence of this relation between the various life-attitudes and the assertions of life-experience.

From the specific factual life-concerns that relate the self to things and other humans, particular states of life emerge: differentiated states of the self, feelings of the diminution or intensification of one's existence, desire for an object, fear, or hope. And as things or human beings that make a demand on the self come to occupy a place in its existence, become sources of assistance or hindrance, objects of desire, striving, or aversion, these life-concerns allow us to also characterize things and people in ways that supplement our apprehension of reality. All these determinations of self, things and others, as they emerge from these life-concerns, are raised to the level of reflection and expressed in language. Thus we come to distinguish between factual assertion, wish, exclamation, and imperative. A survey of the expressions used for the kinds of attitudes of the self toward others and things shows that they fall into certain main classes. They establish what is real, they evaluate, they designate a positing of a purpose, they formulate a rule, or they articulate the meaning of a fact in the wider context into which it is interwoven. We can show the following relations between these kinds of assertions contained in life-experience: ap-

prehensions of reality form a layer on which valuations rest; the layer of valuations, in turn, serves as a substratum for the setting of purposes.

The kinds of attitude involved in life-concerns and their products are objectified in assertions that confirm the reality of these attitudes. It is equally the case that the characterizations of human beings and things become independent of the life-concerns from which they stem. These facts are then raised to a general knowledge of life in life-experience by a procedure equivalent to induction. This is the origin of the many kinds of assertions that take the form of proverbs, maxims, and reflections about passions, characters, and values of life in generalizing folk wisdom and in literature. These forms again manifest the distinctions noted in the expressions of our stances or kinds of attitude.

The assertions of life-experience manifest even further differences. The cognition of reality, evaluation, the giving of rules, and the setting of purposes are each differentiated into various levels in life itself, where each level presupposes the others. We have already pointed to such levels in objective apprehension, but they also exist in the other kinds of attitude. Thus estimating the practical value of things or people presupposes that we have already become aware of the capacity of objects to be useful or harmful. Likewise, a decision only becomes possible when we have considered how representations of a goal relate to reality and what means are available in the latter to help actualize these representations.

4. IDEAL UNITS AS CARRIERS OF LIFE AND OF LIFE-EXPERIENCE

The individual existence of single persons unfolds into an infinite richness of life on the basis of their concerned relations to their environment, to other people, and to things. But each individual is also a point of intersection of systems that penetrate both it [and other] individuals, that exist within them, but that also reach beyond their life. These systems possess an independent existence and development of their own through the contents, values, and purposes that they realize. Thus they are subjects of an ideal kind. A kind of knowledge of reality is inherent in these systems; perspectives of evaluation develop within them; purposes are realized in them; they possess a meaning that they assert in the context of the world of human spirit.

This is already the case in some of the systems of culture—for instance, art and philosophy—where there is generally no overarching organization to link their parts. But organized associations

also develop. Economic life produces companies; science creates centers for the fulfillment of its tasks; religions develop the most enduring of organizations among the cultural systems. The highest development of common goals within a community is found in the family, in the state, and in the various intermediate forms between them.

Each organized unit of a state develops a cognizance of itself, such as of the rules on which its existence is founded and of its place in the whole. It enjoys the values that have been cultivated in its domain; it realizes the purposes that are essential to it and that serve to maintain and further its existence. It is itself a human good and realizes goods. Within the human whole it has its own meaning.

We have now reached the point where society and history unfold before us. It would be a mistake, however, to confine history to the cooperation of human beings for common purposes. A single person in his seemingly self-reliant existence is already a historical being. He is determined by his position in the time line, his place in space, his role in the cooperation of cultural systems and communities. The historian must, therefore, understand the whole life of an individual as it manifests itself at a specific time and place. It is the overall continuum proceeding from individuals—insofar as they aim at the development of their own existence—to cultural systems and communities and, finally, to humanity at large that constitutes the character of society and history. Individuals, as much as communities and systems, are the logical subjects of history.

5. THE EMERGENCE OF THE HUMAN SCIENCES FROM THE LIFE OF INDIVIDUALS AND COMMUNITIES

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Life, life-experience, and the human sciences are intimately related and constantly interact. The basis of the human sciences is not conceptualization but the reflexive awareness of a psychic state in its wholeness and its rediscovery in re-experiencing. Here life grasps life, and the power with which these two elementary tasks of the human sciences are fulfilled is a necessary precondition for the perfection of every aspect of these sciences.

Here we notice a decisive difference between the natural sciences and the human sciences. In the former, scientific thinking stands apart from our ordinary contact with the external world, rendering its productive achievements esoteric. But in the human sciences, a connection between life and science is retained, so that

the thought-provoking work of everyday life remains the foundation of scientific creativity. In certain circumstances of everyday life, there can be a self-transparency that surpasses the power of a Carlyle and a virtuosity in the understanding of others that even Ranke cannot equal. On the one hand, great religious personalities, like Augustine and Pascal, provide the eternal exemplars of life-experience based on personal lived experience. On the other hand, the intrigues of court and politics serve the understanding of other people by training us in the art of looking behind outward appearances. A man of action such as Bismarck, who is by nature aware of his goals whenever he writes a letter or conducts a conversation, cannot be rivaled in the art of reading intentions behind an expression by any interpreter of political documents or critic of historical accounts. In many cases, there is no real difference between a poetically sensitive listener's conception of a play and the most excellent literary-historical analysis. Also, concept-formation in the historical and social sciences is continuously determined by life itself. I see a continuum that constantly leads from life, from conceptions of fate, character, passion, value, and the purpose of existence, to history as a science. There was a time in France when political influence was based more on a familiarity with people and leading personalities than on a scientific study of law, economics, and politics. During this period, when one's position in the life of the court depended on cultivating this familiarity, the literary form of memoirs and writings about characters and passions reached a height they have never attained again, even though they were produced by people who were very little influenced by the scientific study of psychology and history. There is a continuum that links these observations of high society to the writers and poets who learn from them, and the systematic philosophers and scientific historians who are educated by poetry and literature. We see in the beginnings of political science in ancient Greece how concepts of constitutions and their political functions originate from the life of the state itself so that new creations in it lead to new theories. This relation is clearest in the earlier stages of jurisprudence among the Romans and Teutons.

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6. THE RELATION OF THE HUMAN SCIENCES TO LIFE AND THE PROBLEM OF UNIVERSAL VALIDITY

The first basic trait that defines the structure of the human sciences is the fact that life is their starting point and abiding con-

text. The human sciences rely on lived experience, understanding, and life-experience. This direct relationship between life and the human sciences leads to a conflict in the human sciences between the aims of life and those of science. Insofar as historians, economists, teachers of law, and students of religion are involved in life, they want to influence it. They subject historical personages, mass movements, and tendencies to their judgment, which is influenced by their individuality, the nation to which they belong, and the age in which they live. Even when they think they are proceeding without any presuppositions, they are determined by their horizon. Every analysis of the concepts of a past generation reveals constituents in them that derive from the presuppositions of that generation. Yet every science contains the demand for universal validity. If there are to be strictly scientific human sciences, they must aim ever more consciously and critically at this goal of universal validity.

Many of the scientific controversies that have recently surfaced in the logic of the human sciences stem from the conflict between these two tendencies [of life and science]. Because this conflict manifests itself most strongly in history, it has become the focal point of its discussions.

The resolution of this conflict will come only as the human sciences undergo their formative development. However, the general statements that follow about the system of the human sciences already contain the principle for this resolution. We can reaffirm the results we have reached. Life and life-experience are the ever freshly flowing sources for understanding the socio-historical world. Starting with life, understanding penetrates into ever new depths; only by reacting back on life and society do the human sciences achieve their highest importance, an importance that is constantly increasing. But the road to such efficacy must pass through the objectivity of scientific cognition. The awareness of this already existed in the great creative epoch of the human sciences. After many disturbances deriving from our national development as well as from the employment of a one-sided ideal of culture since Jacob Burckhardt,⁵¹ we are today filled with the striving to cultivate this objectivity of the human sciences critically,

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⁵¹ Jacob Burckhardt (1818–97), Swiss-German historian and art historian. Some of his most influential works are *Kultur der Renaissance in Italien*, *Griechische Kulturgeschichte*, and *Weltgeschichtliche Betrachtungen*. The first of these is reviewed by Dilthey in SW 4, 271–77.

rigorously, and with ever fewer presuppositions. I find the principle for the resolution of the conflict within the human sciences in the understanding of the historical world as a productive nexus centered in itself, at the same time containing other productive systems within it, which by positing values and realizing purposes⁵² also have their center within themselves. All are to be understood as structurally linked into a whole in which the sense of the nexus of the socio-historical world arises from the significance of the individual parts. Accordingly, every value judgment and every purpose projected into the future must be grounded exclusively on these structural relationships. We will be approaching this ideal principle in the following general theses about the system of the human sciences.

CHAPTER II: THE PROCEDURAL MODES IN WHICH THE WORLD OF HUMAN SPIRIT IS GIVEN

The system of the human sciences is determined by their rootedness in lived experience and understanding, both of which lead the human sciences to differ radically from the natural sciences and give the formation of the human sciences a character of its own.

Each optical image differs from the others referring to the same object in accordance with the perspective and conditions of apprehension. These images are connected into a system of inner relations by the various kinds of objective apprehension. The total representation that arises from the series of images in accordance with the basic relations involved in the state of affairs is something added by imagination or thought. By contrast, the lived experiences of a human being refer to each other in a time sequence; each of them has a place in a sequence, the parts of which are linked by memory. Here I am not yet concerned with the problem of the reality of these lived experiences or with the difficulties involved in their apprehension. It suffices to observe that the way in which a lived experience is there for me is completely different from the way in which images stand before me. The consciousness of a lived experience is one with its nature, its being-there-for-me and what in it is there for me are one. The lived experience does

⁵² Reading "Werten" as "Zwecken."

not stand over against an observer as an object, but its existence for me is indistinguishable from what in it is there for me. Here there are no different positions in space from which what is there in it could be seen. Different points of view from which to apprehend it can only arise afterwards through reflection and do not affect its character as lived experience. It is exempted from the relativity of what is given by the senses, according to which images can only be referred to what is objective through their relation to the observer, to his position in space and to what lies between him and the object. Thus starting with lived experience a direct line proceeds from re-presentations to the order of concepts by which lived experience is grasped in thought. Lived experience is first clarified by elementary operations of thought. In this regard, the memories through which an experience is further apprehended have a special importance. And what happens when a lived experience becomes the object of my reflection? I lie awake at night and worry whether I shall be able, in old age, to complete the works that I have begun; I consider what is still to be done. This lived experience contains a structural nexus of consciousness: objective apprehension forms the background for an attitude of care and sadness about the objectively apprehended state of affairs as well as for a striving to get beyond it. All this is there for me as a structural nexus. I bring the whole situation to distinct consciousness. I accentuate what has been structurally related, and isolate it. All that I accentuate or highlight in this way is contained in the experience itself and is only being clarified. However, my apprehension of the lived experience is also pulled along to other lived experiences in the course of my life. These are lived experiences that are structurally related to moments in the present experience, even though they may be separated by long stretches of time. From an earlier perusal, I know about my manuscripts. This is linked with memories going far back into the past when these manuscripts were begun. A different movement leads toward the future. These piles of paper will demand incalculable work from me. I am worried about it and prepare myself inwardly for the task. All this "about," "from," and "towards," all these relations of lived experience to what is remembered and to what lies in the future, pull me along both backwards and forwards. This being-pulled-along occurs because living through an experience involves a sequence that demands ever new members. Interest, originating in the emotional power of lived experience, may also play its part. But it is a being-pulled-along, not a volition, least of all the ab-

stract will to know from which dialectic has been derived ever since Schleiermacher. In the sequence that arises this way, the past, the future, and the possible transcend the experience-filled moment. But both what is past and what is futural [in this nexus] are related to the lived experience in a sequence that, through these relations, is articulated into a whole. Because remembering something past involves recognition, it must be structurally related to a prior lived experience as reproducing it. Future possibilities are also linked to the sequence by how it determines the range of what is possible. Thus through this process, it becomes possible to intuit the psychic nexus in the time frame that constitutes the course of a life. In this life-course, each particular lived experience is related to a whole. This life-nexus is not the sum or totality of successive moments but a unity constituted by relations that link all its parts. From the present, we survey a series of memories back to the point where our small, malleable, and unformed selves become lost in the twilight, and we press forward from the present to possibilities that are inherent in it, but assume vague and broad dimensions.

All this has an important consequence for the system of the human sciences. The constituents, regularities, and relations that constitute awareness of the life-course are all contained in life itself; knowledge of the life-course is as real as knowledge of lived experience.

Lived experiences present us with the reality of life in its manifold references, but the experiencing as such seems to only give us knowledge of something singular, namely, our own life. It remains knowledge of something unique, and no logical aid can overcome this limitation of lived experience, which is rooted in the way it is experienced. Understanding first overcomes this limitation of the individual lived experience and, at the same time, bestows the character of life-experience to personal lived experiences. Extending to various people, creations of human spirit, and communities, it widens the horizon of the individual life and, in the human sciences, opens up the path that leads from the common to the universal.

Mutual understanding assures us of what individuals have in common. Individuals are linked by a commonality that involves belonging together, continuity, similarity, and affinity. This same

relation of continuity and similarity pervades all spheres of the human world. This commonality is expressed in the selfsameness of reason, in sympathy as part of the life of feeling, and in the mutual commitments of duty and justice accompanied by a consciousness of obligation.

What human beings have in common is the starting point for all the relations between the particular and the universal in the human sciences. A basic experience of commonality permeates the whole conception of the world of human spirit. This experience connects the consciousness of a unitary self, that of similarity with others, the selfsameness of human nature and individuality. This is the presupposition for understanding. From an elementary interpretation that only requires familiarity with the meaning of words and the regularities by which they are linked into sentences to make sense—commonality of language and thought—we see a constant widening of the scope of common conditions that allow the process of understanding to be extended to more complex combinations of objectifications of life.

The analysis of understanding discloses a second basic relationship that is decisive for the structure of the system of the human sciences. We have seen that the truths of the human sciences are based on lived experience and understanding; on the other hand, understanding does presuppose the application of the truths of the human sciences. Let me illustrate this with an example. Suppose the task is to understand Bismarck. The available material consists of an extraordinary wealth of letters, documents, anecdotes, and reports about him. All this refers to the course of his life. But in order to understand what influenced this great statesman and what he achieved, the historian must expand the range of this material. Indeed, as long as the process of understanding continues, the delimitation of relevant material cannot be concluded. Simply to recognize people, events, and circumstances as belonging to this productive system, the historian will need some general propositions. Thus his understanding of Bismarck will also be based on them. These general propositions extend in range from the common properties of human beings to the particular properties of special classes. From the perspective of individual psychology, the historian will place Bismarck among men of action, and in tracing out the traits common to such people, locate the combination that is distinctive of him. From another perspective, the historian will recognize in the sovereignty of his nature, in his habit of dominating and leading, and in his strong will the traits of the Prussian

landed aristocracy. As his long life occupies a specific span in the course of Prussian history, another group of general statements must determine the features common to people of that age. The enormous pressures that the circumstances of his state exerted on its political self-confidence naturally evoked the most varied reactions. To understand this requires general statements about the pressure that a situation exerts on a political whole and its members and about their reaction. The degree of methodological reliability achieved in understanding all this depends on having developed general truths grounding this relationship. It now becomes clear that this great man of action, whose roots lay solely in Prussia and its monarchy, must have experienced the external pressures exerted on Prussia in a special way. He had to assess internal questions about the constitution of the state mainly from the point of view of the power of the state. Because he was the point of intersection of commonalities such as state, religion, and judiciary system, and because, as a historical personality, he was able to strongly influence and move one of these commonalities while at the same time working within it, the historian needs a general knowledge of these commonalities. In short, his understanding will reach its final perfection only by reference to the totality of all the human sciences. Every relation that must be elaborated in giving a narrative account of this historic personality reaches the highest achievable reliability and distinctiveness only when defined by scientific concepts about specific domains. The relation between these domains is founded ultimately on an overall impression or intuition of the historical world.

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Thus our example has brought out the dual relationship implicit in understanding. Understanding presupposes experience, but lived experience only becomes life-experience if understanding leads us from the narrowness and subjectivity of experiencing into the region of the whole and the general. Moreover, the understanding of an individual personality, to be complete, requires systematic knowledge, while systematic knowledge is equally dependent on the vivid grasping of the individual life-unit. The conceptual cognition of inorganic nature proceeds through a formation of sciences in which the lower stratum is always independent of the one that it grounds; in the human sciences everything from the process of understanding onwards is determined by the relationship of *mutual dependence*.

The historical course of the human sciences also shows this mutual dependence. Historiography is always conditioned by the

knowledge of the systematic relationships interwoven into history, and grounding them more thoroughly determines the progress of historical understanding. Thucydides⁵³ relied on the political knowledge that had arisen from the practice of the independent Greek states and on the constitutional doctrines that had developed in the period of the Sophists. Polybius⁵⁴ assimilated both the entire political wisdom of the Roman aristocracy at the peak of its social and intellectual development and the study of Greek political works from Plato to the Stoics. Linking the wisdom about matters of state developed in Florence and Venice by a sophisticated upper class given to lively political debate with a renewal and development of classical theories made possible Machiavelli's⁵⁵ and Guicciardini's⁵⁶ historiography. The ecclesiastical history written by Eusebius⁵⁷ and the history written by the supporters and opponents of the Reformation, such as Neander⁵⁸ and Ritschl,⁵⁹ were full of systematic concepts about religion and church law. Finally, the formation of modern historiography is based, in the case of the Historical School, on relating the new science of jurisprudence to experiences of a revolutionary age and, in the case of Hegel, on a systematization of newly developed human sciences. Ranke gives the appearance of facing reality with naive narrative abandon; nevertheless, his historiography can only be understood by tracing the manifold sources of systematic thought that converged in his education. As we advance toward the present, this mutual dependence of the historical and the systematic increases.

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Even the great epoch-making achievements of historical criticism have always been dependent not only on the formal development of its method but also on a deeper grasp of systematic con-

⁵³ Thucydides (died c. 401 B.C.), regarded as the first critical historian and as the greatest historian in antiquity; wrote the *History of the Peloponnesian War*.

⁵⁴ Polybius (c. 200–c. 118 B.C.), Greek historian; wrote *Histories*, a general history of Rome and surrounding countries from 220–146 B.C.

⁵⁵ Niccolò Machiavelli (1469–1527), Italian political philosopher. His most influential work, *Il principe*, contains his theory of government and statecraft.

⁵⁶ Francesco Guicciardini (1483–1540), Florentine historian and politician; author of *Storia d'Italia*, a principal historical work of the sixteenth century.

⁵⁷ Eusebius of Caesarea (c. 260–c. 339), ecclesiastical historian; author of *Historia ecclesiastica*, a history of the church to 324; *Chronicon*, a universal history to 303; *Life of Constantine*; and other theological works.

⁵⁸ Johann August Wilhelm Neander (1789–1850), German historian and theologian.

⁵⁹ Albrecht Ritschl (1822–89), German theologian and founder of the Ritschlian school, which emphasized the ethical-social content of theology.

texts—on advances in grammar, on the study of the context of speech first cultivated in rhetoric, and then on the modern conception of poetry (familiar to us from Wolf's predecessors who used a new poetics to draw conclusions about Homer). In Wolf himself, we see a dependence on the new aesthetic culture; in Niebuhr, on economic, juridical and political insights; in Schleiermacher, on a new philosophy, congenial to Plato; and in Baur,⁶⁰ on an understanding, generated by Schleiermacher and Hegel, of the process in which dogmas arise.

Conversely, the progress of the systematic human sciences has always been conditioned by our capacity to experience more deeply and to extend understanding to a wider range of expressions of historical life, by the disclosure of hitherto unknown historical sources, and by the emergence of ever new experiences with changing historical situations. This is already shown by the development of the first outlines of a political science in the age of the Sophists, Plato, and Aristotle, as well as the emergence of rhetorics and poetics as theories about what was being created in those times.

It has always been the interplay between lived experience and the understanding of individual persons or of commonalities such as superindividual subjects that has produced the great advances in the human sciences. Geniuses of the art of narration such as Thucydides, Guicciardini, Gibbon,⁶¹ Macaulay,⁶² or Ranke produced timeless historical works despite their individual limitations. Yet only the human sciences as a whole can produce progress. Insight into the systems that cooperate in history is gradually appropriated by historical consciousness. History probes into the relations among these systems that constitute a nation, an age, a line of historical development; at that point, the depths of life exhibited at particular points of history are again disclosed in a way that transcends all previous understanding. How could a past historian's understanding of artists, poets, or writers ever be compared with that of a current historian?

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⁶⁰ Ferdinand Christian Baur (1792–1860), German theologian and scholar; founded Tübingen school of biblical criticism, which was influenced by Hegel's metaphysics of history.

⁶¹ Edward Gibbon (1737–94), English historian. His most famous work was *The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*.

⁶² Thomas Babington Macaulay (1800–1859), English writer and politician; author of *History of England* and *Lays of Ancient Rome*.

*3. THE GRADUAL ELUCIDATION OF THE OBJECTIFICATIONS OF LIFE
THROUGH THE CONSTANT INTERACTION OF HISTORICAL
AND SYSTEMATIC HUMAN SCIENCES*

The basic relationship between lived experience and understanding that we have acknowledged is that of mutual dependence. More closely defined, it is one of gradual elucidation through the constant interaction of two classes of truths. The obscurity of experience is illuminated, the mistakes that arise from narrow conceptions of the subject are corrected. Lived experience itself is expanded and completed in the understanding of other persons, just as other people are understood through our own lived experiences. Understanding constantly widens the range of historical knowledge by the more intensive use of sources, by re-examining a hitherto uncomprehended past, and, finally, by the advance of history itself, which produces ever new events and thus broadens the very object of understanding. This progression demands ever new general truths if this world of nonrecurring events is to be penetrated. At the same time, the extension of the historical horizon makes possible the formation of ever more general and fruitful concepts. Thus at every point and at every period in the project of the human sciences, there is an interplay between lived experience, understanding, and a general conceptual re-presentation of the world of human spirit. Every stage of this project possesses an inner unity in its conception of the world of human spirit. Because historical knowledge of the singular and [the articulation of] general truths develop in interaction with each other, they become part of one integral point of view. At every stage, there is an implicit understanding of the world of human spirit, from its general idea to methods of criticism and individual investigations, that is uniform or homogeneous.

Here I would like to look back, once more, to the time when modern historical consciousness emerged. This occurred when the concept-formation of the systematic human sciences came to be consciously based on the study of historical life, and when knowledge of the singular was permeated with an awareness of the systematic sciences of economics, law, politics, and religion. At this point, the overall order of the human sciences could be methodologically grasped. The same world of human spirit becomes the object of two classes of human sciences, each with its distinct approach. Universal history as the singular nexus whose object is

humanity and a system of independently constituted human sciences dealing with human beings, language, economics, state, law, religion, and art supplement each other. They are distinguished by their goals and the methods determined by them, but, at the same time, they constantly cooperate in the formation of our knowledge of the world of human spirit. Starting with the basic achievement of understanding, experiencing and re-experiencing are linked with general truths. Concept-formation is not based on norms and values that transcend objective apprehension but arises from the tendency, governing all conceptual thought, to lift what is stable and lasting from the flux of events. Thus method moves in a dual direction. When directed at what is singular, it moves from the part to the whole and back from it to the part; when directed at the universal, the same reciprocity holds between it and the particular.

CHAPTER III: THE OBJECTIFICATIONS OF LIFE

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When we grasp all the functions of understanding, we confront the objectifications of life as distinct from the subjectivity of lived experience. In addition to lived experience, observations about the objectivity of life, that is, of its externalization in manifold structural systems, become part of the foundation of the human sciences. The individual, the communities, and the works into which life and spirit have entered form the outer realm of human spirit. These manifestations of life, as they present themselves to understanding in the external world, are embedded, as it were, in the context of nature. This great outer reality of human spirit always surrounds us. It is an actualization of human spirit in the world of the senses — from a fleeting expression to the rule of a constitution or code of law that lasts for centuries. *Each single manifestation of life re-presents something common or shared in the realm of objective spirit.* Every word or sentence, every gesture or polite formula, every work of art or political deed is intelligible because a commonality connects those expressing themselves in them and those trying to understand them. The individual always experiences, thinks, and acts in a sphere of commonality, and only in such a sphere does he understand. Everything that has been understood carries, as it were, the mark of familiarity derived from such common features. We live in this atmosphere; it surrounds us con-

stantly; we are immersed in it. We are at home everywhere in this historical and understood world; we understand the sense and meaning of it all; we ourselves are woven into this common sphere.

Because of the variety of life-manifestations to which we are exposed, we are constantly challenged to new understanding. However, in that each manifestation of life and its intelligibility is connected with others, there is in understanding itself a being-pulled-along by relations of affinity that leads from the given particular to the whole. As the relations between what is akin accumulate, the possibilities of generalizations, already implicit in commonality as a determination of what has been understood, also grow.

Understanding brings out a further property of the objectification of life, which defines both its articulation in terms of affinities and the movement toward generalization. The objectification of life encompasses a manifold of articulated spheres. From distinctions of race down to the variety of expressions and customs in an ethnic group, even in a village, we find an articulation of spiritual differences that is influenced by nature. Other kinds of differentiation emerge in cultural systems; still others separate periods from each other. In short, many lines that delimit areas of kindred life from some point of view or other, cross the world of objective spirit and intersect in it. The fullness of life manifests itself in innumerable nuances and can only be understood through the recurrence of these differences.

Only through the idea of the objectification of life do we gain insight into the nature of the historical. Everything here derives from acts of human spirit and bears the hallmark of historicity. As a product of history, everything gets interwoven with the world of sense. The distribution of trees in a park, the arrangement of houses in a street, the handy tool of the artisan, and the sentence propounded in the courtroom are everyday examples of how we are constantly surrounded by what has become historical. What the human spirit is today projecting into some manifestation will tomorrow, when it stands before us, be history. Through the passage of time we become surrounded by Roman ruins, cathedrals, and the country palaces of autocrats. History is not something separated from life or remote from the present.

Let me summarize our results so far. The human sciences have the objectification of life as their comprehensive data. But once an objectification of life becomes something we understand, it involves the relation of outer to inner throughout. Accordingly, this objectification is always related in understanding to lived experi-

ence through which a life-unit becomes aware of its own meaning-content and capable of interpreting that of others. If this relation holds for the givens of the human sciences, then we see right away that the fixity and estrangement peculiar to the images of the physical world must be removed from our concept of givenness here. Everything given in the human sciences has been produced and thus is historical; it is understood and thus contains something common; it is familiar because understood. What is manifold in this givenness is already ordered, and this order becomes the basis for interpreting life-manifestations through higher understanding. Thus the classification of the manifestations of life is already incipient in the givens of the human sciences.

This completes our account of the concept of the human sciences. The scope of the human sciences is identical with that of understanding, and understanding now has its unified material in the objectification of life. Thus the concept of the human sciences, in accordance with the range of the phenomena subsumable under it, is defined by the objectification of life in the external world. Human spirit can only understand what it has created. Nature, the subject-matter of the natural sciences, encompasses reality insofar as it has arisen independently of the efficacy of human spirit. Everything on which human beings have impressed their productive stamp forms the subject-matter of the human sciences.

Thus the reference to spirit in the term *Geisteswissenschaft* (human science) receives its justification. Earlier we spoke of the spirit of the law, of justice, of the constitution. Now we can say that everything in which human spirit has objectified itself falls within the scope of the human sciences.

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I have also called the objectification of life "objective spirit." The term is an insightful and happy coinage by Hegel. However, I must distinguish precisely and clearly the sense in which I use it from that which Hegel gave it. This difference concerns its systematic role as much as its function and its scope.

¹⁴⁹ In Hegel's system, objective spirit designates a stage in the development of the spirit. He places this stage between subjective and absolute spirit. Accordingly, the concept of objective spirit has for him a place in an ideal construction of the development of spirit that, although based on historical reality and on the relations that hold sway there, tries to speculatively comprehend them. For this

very reason it leaves the temporal, empirical, and historical relations behind. The idea that externalizes itself into otherness in nature, and thus steps outside itself, returns on the basis of this nature to itself in spirit. World-spirit regains its pure ideality. It realizes its freedom in its development.

As subjective spirit, it is the manifold of individual spirits. Once the individual develops a will on the basis of the conceptual cognition of the rational purpose unfolding in the world, it makes a transition into freedom. This provides the basis for the philosophy of objective spirit, which shows how a free, rational, and therefore implicitly universal will objectifies itself in an ethical world: "Freedom, which aims at the content and purpose of freedom, is, in the first instance, merely a concept, a principle of the heart and spirit destined to develop into objectivity, into a legal, ethical, religious and scientific reality."⁶³ This posits the development from objective to absolute spirit: "Objective spirit is the absolute idea, but only in itself; because in this way it stands on the ground of finitude, its real rationality retains the aspect of outward appearance."⁶⁴

The objectification of spirit takes place in law, morality, and the ethical. The latter actualizes the universal, rational will in the family, civil society, and the state. And the state actualizes its essence in world history as the outer reality of the ethical idea.

With this the ideal construction of the historical world has reached the point where the two stages of spirit, the universal rational will of the individual and its objectification in the ethical world as its higher unity, make possible the last and highest stage: spirit's knowledge of itself as the creative power of all reality in art, religion, and philosophy. "The subjective and the objective spirit are to be looked on as the road on which" the highest reality of spirit, absolute spirit, "rises to maturity."⁶⁵

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What was the historical status and content of this concept of objective spirit discovered by Hegel? The much misunderstood German Enlightenment had recognized the importance of the state as the all-embracing community through which the inherent ethical nature of individuals is actualized. Not since the days of the Greeks and Romans had the understanding of state and law been expressed as powerfully and profoundly as by the leading officials

⁶³ Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, *Philosophie des Geistes*, in *Werke*, vol. 7, sec. 2 (1845), p. 375. (D)

⁶⁴ Hegel, *Philosophie des Geistes*, in *Werke*, vol. 7, sec. 2, p. 376. (D)

⁶⁵ Hegel's *Philosophy of Mind*, trans. from *The Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences* by William Wallace (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1894), p. 167.

of Frederick's state, namely, Carmer,⁶⁶ Svarez,⁶⁷ Klein,⁶⁸ Zedlitz,⁶⁹ and Herzberg.⁷⁰ Their views of the nature and value of the state were linked by Hegel to the ideas of antiquity about ethics and the state, and to his sense of how these ideas were actualized in the ancient world. As a result, the historical significance of common perspectives was validated. At the same time, the Historical School discovered the same communal spirit that Hegel had found through a peculiar kind of metaphysical-historical insight, but by way of historical research. This school also attained a better understanding than the Greek idealist philosophers that the essence of community in ethics, state, law, and faith is not derivable from cooperation among individuals. Here we see the dawn of historical consciousness in Germany.

Hegel concentrated the result of this whole movement in one concept—that of objective spirit.

Today we can no longer embrace the presuppositions on which Hegel based this concept. He constructed communities from the universal, rational will. Today we must start from the reality of life in which the totality of the psychic nexus is active. Hegel constructs metaphysically; we analyze the given. The contemporary analysis of human existence fills us all with a sense of fragility, with the power of dark instincts, with the suffering caused by mysteries and illusions, and with the finitude shown by all that is living, even where the highest creations of communal life arise from it. Thus we cannot understand objective spirit through reason, but must go back to the structural nexus of life-units that extends itself into communities. We cannot assign objective spirit

⁶⁶ Carmer, Johann Heinrich Casimir von (1720–1801), Prussian minister and jurist, and last Great Chancellor under Frederick II; codified the Common Law and instituted law reforms.

⁶⁷ Svarez (Schwarz), Carl Gottlieb (1746–98), Prussian jurist and reformer. From 1791 to 1792 taught law and politics to the Prussian crown prince (who later became Frederick William III). Collaborated with Carmer to codify the Common Law.

⁶⁸ Klein, Ernst Friedrich (1744–1810), jurist and high government official in Prussia.

⁶⁹ Zedlitz (Zedlitz-Leipe), Carl Abraham Freiherr von (1731–1810), Prussian justice minister. Head of the Ecclesiastical Department from 1770 to 1788. Pursued the reform of higher education. Founded the provincial high school colleges and established the *Abitur* as the qualification for entry into the university.

⁷⁰ Herzberg (Hertzberg), Ewald Friedrich Graf von (1725–95). Suggested the designation of the two parts of Prussia as East Prussia and West Prussia—officially adopted in 1773. Helped to bring about the 1763 Peace of Hubertusburg. Served as Prussian *Kabinettsminister* from 1763 to 1791.

a place in an ideal construction, but must ground its reality in history. We will attempt to understand this historical reality and to explicate it in adequate concepts. Once objective spirit is extricated from its one-sided foundation in a universal reason that expresses the essence of world-spirit and from ideal constructions, a new conception of it becomes possible that encompasses language, custom, every form and style of life, as well as family, civil society, state, and law. And what Hegel distinguished from objective spirit as absolute spirit, namely, art, religion, and philosophy, also falls under this same concept. Especially in art, religion, and philosophy, the creative individual shows himself at the same time as representing commonality. Human spirit objectifies itself in its powerful forms and is recognized in them.

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This objective spirit displays an articulation that extends from mankind down to the most narrowly defined types. This articulation results from a principle of individuation. When something individual is made intelligible on the basis of, and by means of, the universally human, we re-experience the inner nexus that leads from the universal to its individuation. This development is grasped in reflection, and individual psychology projects the theory that grounds the possibility of individuation.⁷¹

The systematic human sciences are based on the same set of fundamental uniformities and the individuation that emerges from them. Accordingly, they depend on general theories and comparative procedures. General truths established by these human sciences about ethical life or poetry thus become the foundation for insight into differences concerning moral ideals or poetic creativity.

The past in which the great, overall forces of history took shape becomes a present reality in objective spirit. Individuals, as carriers and representatives of the commonalities interwoven in them, can appreciate and grasp the historical genesis of these commonalities. Individuals can understand history because they themselves are historical beings.

The concept of objective spirit developed in this work diverges from that of Hegel in one final way. Because I replace Hegel's universal reason by life in its totality (lived experience, understanding, historical context, and power of the irrational), the problem of how scientific history is possible arises. For Hegel this problem did not exist. His metaphysics (in which world-spirit is

⁷¹ See my treatise "Contributions to the Study of Individuality" (1895–96) GS V, 241–316 (D), SW 2.

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inherently identical with nature as its externalization, with objective spirit as its actualization, and with absolute spirit, culminating in philosophy, as the realization of the knowledge of it) has left this problem behind. But today the task is the reverse—to recognize what is given in historical objectifications as the true foundation of historical knowledge and to find a method of answering the question how universally valid knowledge of the historical world is possible on the basis of this given.

CHAPTER IV: THE WORLD OF HUMAN SPIRIT AS A PRODUCTIVE NEXUS

Through lived experience and the understanding of the objectifications of life, the world of human spirit becomes accessible to us. It is now our task to define more closely the nature of this world—the historical as well as the social world—as the object of the human sciences.

Let us first summarize the results of the preceding investigations about the system of the human sciences. It is based on the relationship between lived experience and understanding from which three main principles have emerged. Our knowledge of what is given in lived experience is extended through the interpretation of the objectifications of life, and this interpretation, in turn, is possible only on the basis of the subjective depth of lived experience. Likewise, the understanding of what is singular depends on the general knowledge inherent in it, which, in turn, presupposes understanding. Finally, the understanding of a part of the historical course of events can attain completeness only through relating this part to the whole, just as the universal-historical survey of the whole presupposes the understanding of the parts united in it.

This results in a reciprocal dependence of the way we apprehend each particular state of affairs of the human sciences within the communal, historical whole of which it is a part and of the way we grasp the conceptual re-presentation of this whole in the systematic human sciences. In the progress of the human sciences, we see at every point the reciprocal influence of lived experience and understanding as we apprehend the human world [around us], then the reciprocal dependence of universal and singular knowledge, and finally the gradual illumination of the world of human spirit. Therefore we find this again in all the operations that provide the general basis for the structure of the human sciences. We will have to acknowledge the interdependence of interpretation,

criticism, the combining of sources, and the synthesis of a historical context.

A similar interdependence can be shown in developing subject-terms such as "economics," "law," "philosophy," "art" and "religion," that designate the productive systems whereby different persons aim at a common task. In scientific concept-formation, the determination of the marks that constitute the concept presupposes that we first establish which states of affairs are to be gathered in the concept. But to establish and select these states of affairs requires marks by which we confirm whether or not they belong to the scope of the concept. To define the concept of poetry, I must extract it from everything that constitutes its denotation; and to ascertain which works belong to poetry, I must already possess a mark by which a work can be recognized as poetical.

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This relationship is, therefore, the most general feature of the structure of the human sciences.

*1. THE GENERAL CHARACTER OF THIS PRODUCTIVE NEXUS
OF THE WORLD OF HUMAN SPIRIT*

Our resulting task is to conceive the world of human spirit as a productive nexus or as a totality constituted by its enduring products. This productive nexus and its creations are the subject matter of the human sciences. They analyze it [1] as itself a productive system or [2] as it exhibits itself in stable formations or structures with their respective logical, aesthetical, or religious systems or [3] as [its products], such as a state constitution or a legal text, and how they point back to the productive nexus from which they arose.

This productive nexus of the world of human spirit is distinguished from the causal nexus of nature by the fact that, in accordance with the structure of psychic life, it produces *values* and realizes *purposes*; and this occurs not occasionally, not here and there; rather, it lies in the very structure of human spirit to establish a productive system that generates values and realizes purposes on the basis of objective apprehension. I call this the immanent teleological character of the productive nexus of human spirit. By this I mean a system of *functions* based on the *structure* of a productive nexus. Historical life is creative. It is constantly active in generating goods and values, and all concepts about them are merely reflections of this activity.

The carriers of this constant creation of values and goods in the

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world of human spirit are individuals, communities, and the cultural systems in which individuals cooperate. This cooperation is determined by the fact that, in order to realize values, individuals subject themselves to rules and set themselves purposes. All these modes of cooperation manifest a life-concern connected to the human essence and that links individuals with each other—a core, as it were, that cannot be grasped psychologically but is revealed in every such system of relations among human beings. The productivity of such a system is determined by the structural connections between objective apprehension, the psychic states expressed in valuation, and those expressed in positing purposes, goods, and norms. Such a productive system operates primarily in individuals. They are the points of intersection for systems of relations, each of which is a lasting carrier that exerts influence. Consequently, in each such carrier, communal goods and the regular procedures for realizing them emerge and are accepted as unconditionally valid. In every lasting relation among individuals values, rules and purposes are developed, brought to consciousness, and consolidated by reflection. This creative activity, which occurs in individuals, communities, cultural systems, and nations under natural conditions that constantly provide material and stimulation for it, attains reflective awareness of itself in the human sciences.

In accordance with the nature of the structural system, each spiritual unit has its center within itself. Like the individual, each cultural system, each community, has its own center. In each, apprehension of reality, evaluation, and the generation of goods are linked into a whole.

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But a new fundamental relationship emerges from the productive system that is the subject matter of the human sciences. The different carriers of creative activity are integrated into broader socio-historical contexts; these are nations, ages, historical periods. In this way more complex forms of historical connectedness develop. The values, purposes, and obligations that are exhibited in these forms, carried and sustained by individuals, communities, and systems of relations, need to be comprehended by the historian. He compares them, brings out what is common to them, and synthesizes the various productive systems. From the way that each historical unity is centered in itself, a new form of unity can be shown to emerge. The individuals, cultural systems, and communities that are active and interactive at the same time produce a constant spiritual interchange that allows one life to be completed by the lives of others; nations already live in a relatively more self-

contained manner and, because of this, have their own horizons; but if I now consider the period of the Middle Ages, I find its horizon to be separate from that of previous periods. Even where the results of these periods persist, they are assimilated into the system of the medieval world, which has a *closed horizon*. Thus an *epoch is centered in itself in a new sense*. The individual persons of an epoch find the norm for their activities in something common. The various productive systems that make up the social life of an epoch display similar structural features. The ways in which objects are apprehended derive an inner affinity from an epoch. The way humans feel, their emotions and the impulses that arise from them, are similar to each other. The will too chooses commensurate goals, strives for kindred goods, and finds itself committed in a related way. It is the task of historical analysis to find in the concrete purposes, values, and ways of thinking of an epoch a concordance about something common that governs it. Even the contrasts are determined by this common background. Thus each action, each thought, each common creation, in short, each part of this historical whole, has its *significance* through its relationship to the whole of the epoch or age. And when the historian passes judgment, he ascertains what the individual has achieved within this context and how far his vision and deeds may have extended beyond it.

We must consider the historical world as a whole, this whole as a productive system, and this system in turn as positing values and purposes, namely, as creative. Similarly, we must understand this whole from within itself and its values and purposes as centered in ages, in epochs, in a universal history. These are the perspectives in terms of which the system of the human sciences to which we aspire must be conceived. The scientific tendency toward universal validity has as a consequence that the direct ways in which a life-concern, its values, and its purposes refer to some historical object are replaced with the experience of immanent relations among productive forces, values, purposes, meaning, and sense within the productive nexus of the historical world. Only on the basis of such objective history does the problem arise whether and to what extent it is possible to predict the future and to subordinate our lives to the common goals of mankind.

At first the comprehension of a productive nexus occurs in the experiencing subject for whom the sequence of inner events unfolds in structural relations. Such a nexus is then rediscovered in other individuals through understanding. The fundamental form

of a productive system arises in the individual who gathers together the present, the past, and possibilities of the future in a life-course. Such a life-course recurs in the course of history into which [it and other] life-units are integrated. When the broader connections of an occurrence are observed by a spectator or reported in a narrative, a conception of historical events arises. Particular events occupy a position in the course of time that at every point presupposes an influence from the past and has consequences that reach into the future. Thus everything that happens demands further development, and the present leads beyond itself into the future.

Other kinds of connectedness exist in works that, separated from their authors, have their own life and are a law unto themselves. Before we arrive at the productive system in which they originated, we must grasp the relations that are there in the completed work. The logical nexus that links legal principles into a code of law emerge in understanding. When we read one of Shakespeare's comedies, we find that the component parts of what happens, which are already related by time and influence, are brought to a higher unity in accordance with the laws of poetical composition; this unity lifts a beginning and end out of the productive course of things and links its parts into a whole.

2. THE PRODUCTIVE SYSTEM AS A FUNDAMENTAL CONCEPT OF THE HUMAN SCIENCES

In the human sciences, we grasp the world of human spirit in the form of productive systems as they arise over the course of time. Efficacy, energy, passage of time, and process are the moments that concept-formation in the human sciences must characterize. But the universal function of a concept in the ideational nexus of the human sciences requires determinacy and constancy in all judgments and must remain independent of these moments of content. The marks that combine to give a concept its content must meet the same requirements. And the propositions into which concepts are linked may not contain contradictions either within or among themselves. This timeless validity existing in the ideational nexus and determining the form of concepts has nothing to do with the fact that the content of concepts in the human sciences can re-present the passage of time, efficacy, energy, and process.

We see in the structure of the individual a tendency or impetus that communicates itself to all more composite forms of the world of human spirit. In that world collective forces emerge that affect

the historical nexus in a particular direction. All the concepts of the human sciences, insofar as they re-present some constituent of a productive system, contain this character of process, passage, something happening, or action. Even when we analyze objectifications of spiritual life as something finished and, as it were, at rest, we still need to grasp the productive system from which these objectifications originated. So, to a large extent, the concepts of the human sciences are fixed re-presentations of something in process, a pinning down in thought of what is itself in passage or moving in a certain direction. Nevertheless, the systematic human sciences have the task of forming concepts that express life's inherent tendency, its changeability and restlessness but, above all, the purposes that life sets for itself and fulfills. The historical and systematic human sciences have the further task to cultivate these relations conceptually.

It was Hegel's contribution to have tried in his logic to give expression to the restless stream of events. But he was mistaken when he thought that this could not be reconciled with the principle of contradiction; insoluble contradictions only arise if one wants to *explain* the flow of life. It was and is equally mistaken to reject, on the basis of the same presupposition, the possibility of forming systematic concepts for the historical sphere. As a consequence, the manifold nature of historical life is impoverished and fossilized by Hegel's dialectical method, whereas opponents of systematic conceptualization in the historical sphere drown in unre-presentable depths of life.

At this point, one can understand what Fichte intended when he claimed that the ego deeply absorbed in itself discovers itself not as substance, being, or event but as life, activity, and energy. He was also able to develop concepts for the energy of the historical world.

3. THE PROCEDURE FOR ESTABLISHING PARTICULAR PRODUCTIVE SYSTEMS

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A productive system as such is always complex. To establish such a system, we start with a single effect for which we then seek the productive moments by going back step by step. Of the many possible factors, only a limited number can be determined and shown to be relevant to the effect. If, for example, we are looking for the interrelated causes that allowed German literature to move beyond the Enlightenment, we must distinguish the various causes, attempt to rank their weight. At some point we must delimit the

infinite causal nexus in the light of the significance of these factors and our purpose. Thus we bring to the fore a productive system to explain the change in question. On the other hand, we can separate out from the concrete productive system special systems based on methodical analysis and in accordance with various perspectives. It is this kind of analysis that really makes possible genuine progress in the systematic human sciences and in history.

Our knowledge of a productive system arises mainly from the following procedures or their equivalents: from induction, which ascertains facts and causal moments; from synthesis, which with the help of induction links them into causal chains; from analysis, which separates out special productive systems; and from comparison. We use the same methods when we study the lasting creations that have emerged from such productive systems: pictures, statues, plays, philosophic systems, religious writings, and legal books. Each has its characteristic connectedness, but here too analysis of the complete work on the basis of induction must be counterbalanced by synthetic reconstruction of the whole, again on the basis of induction, and with constant awareness of general truths. This theoretical interest of the human sciences in systematic connectedness is related to another mode of inquiry that proceeds from the particular to the general and back to search for regularities in productive systems. Here we find the most encompassing reciprocal dependence among procedures: Generalizations serve the formation of systematic connectedness, and the analysis of concrete and universal systems into special systems is the most fruitful path to the discovery of general truths.

¹⁵⁹ When we look at the procedure for establishing productive systems in the human sciences, we see a great difference from the natural sciences. What has enabled the natural sciences to be so enormously successful is that they are based on the spatial system of phenomena. The discovery of exact universal laws becomes possible because what is extended and movable in space can be counted and measured. But the inner dynamic system [of the natural sciences] is added by thought, and its ultimate elements cannot be observed. On the other hand, the ultimate units of the historical world are, as we have seen, given to us in lived experience and understanding. Their unitary character is based on a structural nexus in which objective apprehension, values, and purposes are related to each other. The lived experience of this characteristic of a life-unit is such that only what is posited by its will can be a purpose, only what has proved itself in its thoughts is true,

and only what is positively related to its feelings is valuable for it. The correlate of this life-unit is a body, moving and activated by inner impulses. The human-socio-historical world consists of these psychophysical life-units. This can be shown reliably through analysis. These life-units exhibit a productive system with special characteristics that are not exhausted by the relations of unity and multiplicity, whole and part, composition and reciprocal action.

We can further conclude that the psychological life-unit is a productive system that has the advantage over nature of being accessible to lived experience. However, the intensity of its productive constituents cannot be measured, only estimated, and its individuality cannot be divorced from the universally human. As a consequence, humanity is merely an indeterminate type. Therefore, every single psychic state involves a new stance of the whole life-unit, rooted in its overall concern for things and people. Since every manifestation of life emanating from a community or belonging to a cultural system is the product of cooperating life-units, the constituents of such composite products have a corresponding character. However much every psychic process belonging to such a whole may be determined by the goal of the productive system, it is never entirely determined by it. The individual in whom it takes place can intervene in the productive system, and the outcome shows the efficacy of the whole individual. Nature has been separated into different, homogeneous systems by the differentiation of the senses, each of which is uniform. The same object, such as a bell, is hard, bronze-colored, and capable of producing a range of sounds when struck; each of its properties assumes a place in one of the systems of sense apprehension, but we are not given an inner nexus or system linking these properties. However, when I have a lived experience, I am presented to myself as a continuum. Every changed state produces a new overall life-stance. Similarly, the whole of life discloses itself in any life-manifestation that becomes intelligible to us. This is why neither lived experience nor understanding presents us with homogeneous systems in which it is possible to discover laws of change. Understanding reveals commonalities and affinities as well as innumerable nuances of differentiation ranging from the great differences among races, tribes, and nations to the infinite variety of individuals. Whereas in the natural sciences laws of change predominate, in the world of human spirit we are predominantly concerned with the comprehension of individuality—from that of the single person to humanity

as an individual. It is the task of the comparative method to give conceptual order to this variety of individuality.

These relationships define the limits of the human sciences, both of psychology and the systematic disciplines. Later methodological considerations will have to deal with them in detail. Speaking generally, it is clear that psychology and the particular systematic disciplines will have a predominantly descriptive and analytical character. Here my earlier discussions of the analytical method in psychology and in the systematic human sciences are relevant, and I refer to them in their entirety.⁷²

4. UNDERSTANDING HISTORY THROUGH THE SYSTEMATIC HUMAN SCIENCES

The conceptual cognition of the human sciences comes about, as we saw, through the interdependence of history and systematic disciplines. And as the intention to understand always precedes conceptualization, we will start with the general properties of historical knowledge.

HISTORICAL KNOWLEDGE

The comprehension of the productive nexus formed by history is at first generated from individual points at which related remnants of the past are linked in understanding through their relation to life-experience: what is close to us helps us to understand what is distant and past. The condition needed for this interpretation of historical remnants is that what we transfer into them must be characteristics that possess constancy over time and a general human validity. Thus we transpose our familiarity with customs, habits, political relations, and religious processes. Ultimately, transposition always presupposes the connections that the historian has experienced within himself. The germinal cell of the historical world is the lived experience in which the subject discovers itself in a productive life-nexus with its environment. This environment, which consists of the physical and cultural surroundings, acts on the subject and the subject acts on it. In every part of the historical world there exists, therefore, the same productive connection between a sequence of psychological events and an environment. Here we must assess the influence nature exerts on hu-

⁷² See my *Ideas* [SW 2]; also my "Studies Toward the Foundation of the Human Sciences" in this volume and my *Introduction to the Human Sciences* (D), SW 1.

man beings and establish the effect the spiritual environing world has on them.

Just as raw materials in industry are subjected to several kinds of processing, so the remnants of the past are made fully, historically understandable through various procedures. Criticism, interpretation, and procedures to achieve a unified understanding of a historical process intermesh. But here too it is characteristic that a simple grounding of one operation on the others is not possible; criticism, interpretation, and the gathering of things in thought involve different tasks, but the solution of each of these tasks demands the insights gained through the others.

From this it follows that the justification of the historical nexus is always dependent on an interrelation of functions that cannot be completely explicated logically and cannot, therefore, be defended against historical skepticism by undisputable demonstrations. We have only to think of Niebuhr's great discoveries about older Roman history. His criticism is inseparable from his reconstruction of the true course of events. He had to establish how the existing tradition of older Roman history had come about and what conclusions about its historical value could be drawn from its origin. At the same time he had to try to derive the basic outlines of the real, historical course of events from what could be argued from the facts. Undoubtedly this methodical procedure moves in a circle when measured by the rules of strict demonstration. And when Niebuhr, at the same time, argued analogically on the basis of similar developments, the knowledge of these related developments was subject to the same circle; and the analogical inference, which made use of this knowledge, produced no compelling certainty.

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Even contemporary accounts must first be tested for the point of view of the reporter, his reliability, and his relationship to the event. And the further removed from the time of the events narrations are, the less their credibility, unless the constituents of such a narrative can be checked by reference to older, contemporary reports. The political history of the ancient world is reliable where witness accounts exist, and that of the modern one where the documents that shaped the course of a historical event are preserved. Therefore, reliable knowledge of political history only began with the methodical and critical collection of documents and free access to archives for historians. This knowledge can, as far as the facts are concerned, stand up to historical skepticism. On such secure

foundations, a historically probable reconstruction, which only overexcited, unscientific minds would deny usefulness, can be generated by analyzing the sources of the accounts and examining the points of view of the reporters. Such reconstruction provides reliable knowledge of actions and events, if not of the motives of the actors, and any errors about specific facts to which we remain exposed do not cast doubt on the whole.

Historiography, where it deals with mass-phenomena or, even more so, with artistic or scientific works that stand up to analysis, is much more favorably placed than when it tries to comprehend the course of political events.

163 STAGES OF HISTORICAL INTELLIGIBILITY

The mastery of historical material takes place in various stages that gradually penetrate the depths of history.

Manifold interests lead at first to the narration of what has happened. Above all, this satisfies a most primary curiosity about human affairs, particularly about those of one's native land. National or civic pride asserts itself as well. This was the origin of narrative art, whose model for all ages is Herodotus.⁷³ Then interest in explanation moves into the foreground. The Athenian culture of the time of Thucydides first provided the right conditions for this. Deeds were perspicaciously traced back to their psychological motives; the course and outcome of the power struggles between states were explained in terms of their military and political strengths; the effects of state constitutions were studied. And because a great political thinker such as Thucydides elucidates the past through the sober study of the productive systems in it, it turns out that history also illuminates the future. When an earlier productive sequence is recognized and proves to resemble the first stage of a process, the occurrence of a similar consequence can be anticipated on the basis of analogy. This inference on which Thucydides based his belief that history had lessons for the future is, indeed, of decisive importance for political thought. As in the natural sciences, so also in history, a regularity within a productive system makes possible prediction and intervention based on knowledge. Contemporaries of the Sophists had already studied constitutions as political forces; then Polybius offers us historiography

⁷³ Herodotus (c. 484–between 430 and 420 B.C.), Greek historian, who traveled most of the known world of his time; wrote a history of the Greco-Persian wars from 500 to 479 B.C.

in which *the systematic human sciences are applied methodically to explain a productive system of history*. This makes it possible to introduce enduring productive forces such as state constitutions, military organizations, and fiscal systems into the explanatory procedure. Polybius's subject matter was the interaction of states that, from the beginning of the struggle between Rome and Carthage to the destruction of Carthage and Corinth, shaped the historical world of European civilization. Polybius undertook to derive specific political processes from the study of enduring forces in these states. At the same time, his point of view becomes that of universal history, because within himself he linked Greek theoretical culture, the study of the subtleties of politics and warfare in his native land, and a familiarity with Rome, which only intercourse with the leading statesmen of the new, universal state could provide. Manifold spiritual developments occurred in the time span from Polybius to Machiavelli and Guicciardini, above all the infinite deepening of subjectivity and the simultaneous widening of the historical horizon. Nevertheless, the methods of the two great Italian historians remain strongly similar to those of Polybius.

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A new stage of historiography was not attained until the eighteenth century. Two great principles were then introduced successively; the concrete productive system lifted into prominence by the historian as his subject matter from the general stream of history was *divided into the specific systems*, such as the judicial, religious, and literary systems that are involved in the unity of an age. This presupposed that the historian looked beyond political history to cultural history, that the function of each cultural sphere had been recognized by the systematic human sciences, and that an understanding of the cooperation of such cultural systems had developed. This new historiography began in the age of Voltaire. Beginning with Winckelmann, Justus Möser,⁷⁴ and Herder, a second principle was added—*a principle of development*. This assigns a new fundamental characteristic to a historical productive system, namely, that by its very nature, it undergoes, from within, a series of changes, each of which is only possible on the basis of the previous one.

These are the various moments that, once grasped, have remained alive in historiography. The joyful art of narration, penetrating explanation, the application of systematic knowledge, its

⁷⁴ Justus Möser (1720–94), German historian, jurist, and publicist; author of *Osnabrücker Geschichte*, *Patriotische Phantasien*, and other works.

analysis into specific productive systems, and the principle of development represent moments that combine and re-enforce each other.

ISOLATING A PRODUCTIVE SYSTEM FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF THE HISTORICAL SUBJECT MATTER

The importance of analyzing a concrete productive nexus or system and scientifically synthesizing the specific productive systems contained in it has become increasingly clear to us.

The historian cannot follow the nexus of events in all directions from a given point to infinity. Instead, the historian's very task of grasping the unity of the particular subject matter that constitutes his theme provides a principle of selection. The treatment of a historical subject matter requires not only that it should be singled out from the overall concrete productive nexus or system but also that it contain a principle of selection. To study the fall of Rome, the liberation of the Netherlands or the French Revolution, we must select those events and contexts that contain the particular and general causes, the productive forces with all their transformations, that brought them about. The historian who works with productive systems must select and combine in such a way that those familiar with the details will miss nothing because each of them is represented by significant features of the gathered productive system. This involves not merely a descriptive art but is also a product of a definite way of seeing. When we examine these distinct, pervasive systems, we see once more how insight into them arises from the combination of an improved historical understanding of sources and ever deeper comprehension of the systematic aspects of psychological life. If, then, we look more closely at the kind of productive system encountered in the greatest events of history, the rise of Christianity, the Reformation, the French Revolution, the national wars of liberation, we can apprehend it as the formation of a total force, which, moving in a single direction, overthrows all resistance. We will always find two kinds of forces cooperating. Some are tensions that consist of the feeling of urgent, unfulfilled needs, of longings of all kinds prompted by them, of an increase of frictions and struggles, and also of the consciousness of an insufficiency in the forces that can defend the status quo. The other kind of forces arise from onward-pushing energies—positive willing, capabilities, and beliefs. They rely on the vigorous instincts of the many but are illuminated and heightened

by the lived experiences of important characters. And as these positive tendencies grow from the past and direct themselves toward the future, they are creative. They incorporate ideals, their form is an enthusiasm that has a special way of communicating and spreading itself.

From this we deduce the general principle that in the productive nexus of the great world events, the relationships of pressure, tension, the feeling of the insufficiency of the existing state of affairs—that is, feelings of aversion with a negative prognosis—form the background for action sustained by feelings of positive value toward goals to strive for and purposes to be set. Great changes in the world originate from the cooperation of these two [kinds of force]. The real agency in productive systems comes from psychic states that find their formulation in terms of value, good, and purpose; among these states not only cultural aspirations but also the will to power, even the inclination to subjugate others, must be considered as productive forces.

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ANALYSIS OF THE DISTINCT PRODUCTIVE SYSTEMS IN HISTORY

1. Cultural Systems

We saw that to define the object of a historical work already demands a selection of events and systems. History involves an ordering system that allows its concrete nexus to exhibit particular isolable domains in which distinct functions are fulfilled. As a consequence, activities of specific individuals directed at a common function form a uniform and homogeneous productive system. This relationship has already been discussed by me,⁷⁵ and it provides the basis for the concept-formation by which systems of a general character can be recognized in the science of history. The analysis and isolation by means of which such productive systems are selected define the critical operation that needs to be investigated in a logical articulation of the human sciences. There is an obvious affinity between this analysis and that by which the structural nexus of the psychic life-unit is found.

The most simple and homogeneous productive systems that fulfill a cultural function involve education, economic life, the law, political activity, religion, sociability, art, philosophy, and science.

I will explicate the characteristics of such a productive system.

⁷⁵ See my *Introduction to the Human Sciences* (D), SW 1, 93ff.

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Each such system fulfills one function. Thus the judicial system actualizes the enforceable conditions for the perfection of life-relationships. Poetry's essence is to express the content of lived experience and to present the objectifications of life in such a way that some occurrence chosen by the poet effectively displays its meaning for life as a whole. Individuals are connected with each other in the functioning of a productive system. Particular processes in individuals are oriented to the function of the productive system and belong to it. These processes are parts of a system that fulfills the function.

When we consider the judicial rules of the code of law, the trial in which parties negotiate about an inheritance in a court of law on the basis of these rules, and finally, the decision of the court and its execution, then we can also see a long series of particular psychic processes involved here. These can be distributed among many persons, and they intermesh in manifold ways in order to finally solve a legal problem in relation to a specific life-relationship.

The fulfillment of the poetic function is much more tied to a coherent process in the poet's psyche, but no poet is the exclusive creator of his works. He takes an event from a legend, and the epic form that he uses to raise it to the level of poetry preexists him. He studies the efficacy of specific scenes in predecessors, he uses meter, he receives his conception of the meaning of life from a national consciousness or from prominent individuals, and he needs receptive listeners who are capable of enjoyment and who will assimilate the impression of his verses and thus realize his dream of having an effect. Thus the contribution of law, poetry, or any other purposive system of culture is realized in a productive system that consists of determinate processes in specific individuals linked by some function.

The productive nexus of a cultural system manifests a second characteristic. Besides his function in the legal system, a judge also takes part in various other productive systems. He works for the interests of his family, he performs an economic role, he serves his political functions, he may even write verses. Thus the fullness of individuals is not captured by any productive system. Rather, amidst the various kinds of productive relations, only those processes or operations are called upon that are needed by a specific system. An individual is interwoven into various productive systems.

The productive nexus of such a cultural system operates by means of a differentiated placement of its members. The steady

support for each is supplied by persons who have made the operations serving the system's function the main business of their lives, either from inclination or because it is connected with their profession. Among them appear persons who embody, as it were, the intended contribution of the system. A combination of talent and calling makes them into representatives of this cultural system. In the final analysis, the real carriers of creativity in such a domain are productive types: founders of religions, discoverers of a new philosophical world-view, scientific inventors.

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Several things are integrated in such a productive system: accumulated tensions in a broad sphere press toward a resolution in which needs are satisfied, productive energy finds the way in which satisfaction can be achieved or produces a creative idea that leads society further, others join in to continue the work, and finally, there are the many recipients.

We pursue our analysis further. Each cultural system that fulfills such a function embodies a common value for all those who are directed at this function. What individuals need and yet can never realize is imparted to them in the contribution of the whole—a commonly created comprehensive value in which they can participate. The individual needs the security of his life, of his property, of his family connections, but only the independent power of the community satisfies his need by preserving the enforceable rules of social life that make possible the protection of these goods. In primitive stages, the individual suffers from the pressure of uncontrollable forces around him. These forces lie beyond the narrow sphere of action of his tribe or people. The reduction of this pressure first allows for the creation of trust through a communal spirit. In each such cultural system there arises, from the nature of the function served by its productive nexus, an order of values. This order is created in common work aimed at this function. Objectifications of life arise as the consolidation of this work, e.g., organizations that serve the fulfillment of the functions of cultural systems: codes of law, philosophical works, literary creations. The good that is to be realized by the function becomes public, and it can be continually perfected.

The parts of such a productive system receive their significance from their relationship to the whole as the carrier of values and purposes. First, the parts of a life-course possess a meaning according to their relationship to life, its values and purposes, and the space that something assumes within it. Historical events become meaningful when they are parts of a productive system,

when they cooperate with other parts in actualizing the values and purposes of the whole.

169 Whereas we stand helpless vis-à-vis the overall nexus of historical events and can observe in it neither a structure nor regularities nor a development, every productive system that actualizes a function of culture displays its own structure. When we grasp philosophy as such a productive system, then it first presents itself as a manifold of functions: raising world-views to universal validity, reflecting on knowledge, relating our purposive activity and practical knowledge to the system of conceptual cognition, gathering and grounding the spirit of criticism that pervades the whole culture. Historical inquiry demonstrates, however, that these are all functions that arise under historical conditions but are ultimately grounded in a coherent function of philosophy. This is universal reflection, which constantly advances to the highest generalizations and ultimate groundings. Accordingly, the structure of philosophy lies in the relationship of this basic feature to its specific functions in accordance with temporal conditions. Everywhere metaphysics develops against the backdrop of life, life-experience, and world-views. Because the striving for stability that always struggles with the contingency of our existence finds no lasting satisfaction in the religious and poetic forms of world-view, the attempt is made to raise a world-view to universally valid knowledge. Furthermore, we can find an articulation of specific forms in the productive nexus of a cultural system.

Each cultural system manifests development on the basis of its function, its structure, and its uniformities. Whereas no law of development is to be found in the concrete course of events, its analysis into specific homogeneous productive systems opens up the prospect of sequences of states that are determined from within and presuppose each other. It is as if one stratum always leads to a higher one that adds increased differentiation and comprehension.

2. *External Organizations, the Political Whole, and Politically Organized Nations*

a

On the basis of the natural articulation of the human race and historical processes, we see the emergence of the nation-states of the cultural world, each of which unites within itself the productive spheres of cultural systems. Here the nations that are orga-

nized as states stand out, and our analysis will limit itself to this typical form of current political organization.

Each of these states is an organization that is composed of various communities. The capacity to hold together these communities gathered within it ultimately constitutes the sovereign power of the state over which there exists no higher authority. And who could deny the fact that the sense of history that is grounded in life manifests itself just as much in the will to power of these states and their need to rule both inwardly and outwardly as in the cultural systems? Despite all the brutal, fearsome, and destructive aspects inherent in the will to power, despite all the pressures and constraints involved in the relationship of dominance and obedience, are they not linked to the consciousness of community, of solidarity, of joyful participation in the power of a political whole, lived experiences that belong among the highest human values? The complaint about the brutality of state power is odd, because as Kant saw already, the most difficult task of the human race consists in taming the willfulness of individuals and their efforts to expand their spheres of power and enjoyment. This taming must come from a collective will and from the coercion exerted by it. For such collective wills, [external] conflicts can only be decided by war, and internally, they resort to coercion as the final authority. On the basis of this will for power inherent in political organizations, the conditions arise that first make possible cultural systems. A complex structure then comes about in which power relations and interrelated, purposive systems form a higher unity. First the reciprocal influences of cultural systems produce a common perspective. I will try to explicate this commonality by going back to the earliest German society still accessible to us as described by Caesar and Tacitus. Here economic life, state, and law are just as closely linked with language, myth, religiosity, and poetry as in every subsequent period. Reciprocal influences among the properties of the particular domains of life pervade the whole [society] at any given time. Thus in the age of Tacitus, heroic poetry emerged from the warrior spirit of the Germans. Arminius was already extolled in songs, and this poetry in turn re-enforced the warrior spirit. This martial ethos also led to inhuman behavior in the religious sphere, such as the sacrificing of prisoners and the hanging of their corpses at holy sites. All this served to give the god of warfare a prominence that in turn intensified the warrior mentality. An accord among the various domains of life resulted that was so strong that we could extrapolate from the state of one

to the others. But this reciprocal influence does not fully explain the commonalities that connect the various achievements of a nation with each other. The fact that there exists an extraordinary agreement and harmony among the economy, the warfare, the constitution, law, language, myth, religiosity, and poetry of this time also does not spring from any single fundamental function, such as the economic life or warfare, that conditions all the others. It can also not simply be derived as the product of the reciprocal influence among these various domains as they coexisted at the time. Speaking very generally: No matter which effects were produced by the force and properties of certain functions, the kinship displayed by the various life-domains within a nation stems from a common depth to which no description can do justice. For us, it is there only in the manifestations of life that arise from this depth and bring it to expression. For a nation at a given time, it is the individual that imparts to every life-manifestation in a certain cultural domain the specificity of its essence. When individuals are linked in a functional system, their activities are not exclusively determined by the latter. Rather, since the whole person is reflected in his every deed, he can impart some of his peculiarities to the system in which he participates. And because the organization of the state includes within it various communities ranging down to the family, the great sphere of national life similarly encompasses smaller systems and communities that possess their own impetus. All these productive systems intersect in specific individuals. Moreover, the state assimilates the activity of cultural systems. Prussia in the age of Frederick is the type for this kind of maximization of the intensity and scope of political efficacy. Besides the independent productive forces that continue to operate in cultural systems, they display a dynamism deriving from the state as a whole. The processes belonging to such a state everywhere combine autonomy and constraint.

Each particular sphere in this great, productive system of the nation-state has its inherent impetus and is aimed at fulfilling its own function. Its productive force encompasses both the tension and the positive energy of setting goals. All productive systems agree in this, but each nevertheless has its own structure that is dependent on the function that it fulfills. The structure of a cultural system is one in which a well-delineated, functional coherence is realized so that the latter can regulate the activities of the individual spheres.

Because such a cultural system embodies values, goals, rules, and purposes whose development is determined by the inner nature of its function, it differs from the productive system of a political organization. The latter does not manifest a developmental law inherent in its function, for it is the very nature of an organization, as such, that its goals change. It is like a machine that can be used to fulfill various tasks — quite heterogeneous problems can be solved concurrently, and very different kinds of values can be realized.

From such an analysis of the historical world into particular productive systems, we draw a conclusion that will guide us in our further attempts to solve the problem of the historical world. Efforts to define the meaning and sense of the historical world are often, as in the case of Hegel and Comte, based on establishing a common direction in the movement of universal history. It involves an operation that surveys the cooperation of many movements in an indeterminate intuition. In fact, our conclusion was that the movement of history proceeds through particular productive systems. Furthermore, we saw that the mode of inquiry directed at a goal of history is thoroughly one-sided. *The evident sense of history must first be sought in what is ever present and recurring in its structural relations, in its productive systems.* The formation of values and purposes in these structures and systems manifests inner relations that proceed from the structure of individual life to an ultimate encompassing unity. This is the sense always and everywhere possessed by history — it is based on the structure of individual existence and discloses itself in the structure of the composite, productive systems involved in the objectification of life. This regularity also determines previous development, and the future is subject to it as well. The analysis of the formation of the world of human spirit will have as its prime task to demonstrate these regularities in the structure of the historical world.

Herewith we can also dispose of the view that sees the task of history in the progression from relative values, obligations, norms, and goals to those that are unconditional. This would move us from the domain of experiential science to that of speculation. To be sure, history knows of the ways in which unconditionality is posited as a value, norm, or good. Such positings appear throughout history — sometimes as given in the will of God, sometimes as given in a rational concept of perfection, then again in a teleological world-nexus, or in a universally valid norm of action that is transcendentally grounded. But historical experience notes only

the processes of these positings that are so important for unconditionality. By itself, it knows nothing about this universal validity. When historical experience traces the course of the formation of such unconditional values, goods, or norms, it notices, about some of them, how life has produced them and that the unconditional positing itself only becomes possible by restricting the temporal horizon. From there it views the totality of life in the fullness of its historical manifestations and notices the unabated strife among these unconditional positings. The question whether subsumption under such unconditionality, which is indeed a historical factum, needs to be derived from a universal, temporally unrestricted human condition in a logically compelling manner, or whether it is to be regarded as a mere product of history, leads into ultimate profundities of transcendental philosophy that transcend the experiential sphere of history and from which even philosophy cannot snatch any sure answer. Even if this question were to be decided along the first alternative, this could not aid historians in what they select and in how they understand and discover connectedness if the content of this unconditional could not be determined. The incursion of speculation into the domain of historical experience can hardly count on success. The historian cannot forgo the attempt to understand history from itself on the basis of analyzing the various productive systems.

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Thus a nation organized as a state can be grasped as an individually determined structural unity of productive systems. The common character of nations organized as states is grounded in regularities about the mode of operation of productive systems and about their relations between each other; and because these productive systems create values and purposes, we must also consider regularities about the relation of productive systems to the production of values, to the setting of purposes, and to the meaning context of a political organization. Each of these productive systems is centered in itself in a specific way, and the inner rule of its development is derived from this. On the basis of such regularities governing all nations organized as states, there arise the individual configurations of productive systems as they interact in history and struggle for their life and legitimacy.

In each nation organized as a state, analysis distinguishes various moments. In the present context we are not concerned with the genetic history of nations. First, the individuals who belong to

this nation, and who interact with each other, exhibit commonalities in their character and in the objectifications of their life. They are conscious of these commonalities and of a solidarity based on them, and therefore a tendency to develop this solidarity is at work in them. These commonalities can be observed in single individuals, but they also permeate and color all associations within the nation. Second, analysis shows a link between the particular productive systems in each nation. The external and internal power of the state makes the nation an independently working unit within which social groups are layered on top of each other. Each of these associations is a relatively independent productive system. Third, when the cultural systems that exceed the scope of a particular nation come into contact with the other productive systems in that nation, they become modified by the commonalities shared by its people as a whole. And the power of its effect is intensified by associations that develop for the sake of a determinate function. In this way the composite structure of the nation organized as a state comes about. This structure allows for a new focal point for the whole nation, in which a value is experienced for all and through which individual action can have a common goal. The unity of this goal is objectified in literature, ethics, the legal order, and in the organs of the common will. This unity also expresses itself in the course of national development.

The various movements of a whole organized as a state and the ways in which they serve to define its national life at a given time can be elucidated in terms of a few main points. To do so I again return to the Germans in the age of Tacitus, when close links between war and the use of land, between hunting and farming, were still fundamental to Germanic life. When the spread of Germanic tribes was stemmed, the natural tendency toward settlement accelerated and Germany became an agricultural country. This relationship to the land and soil through hunting, cattle breeding, and farming produced a proximity to the earth and to what grows and lives there in the Germans of that time. Such closeness is the first decisive moment for the spiritual life of Germans in this epoch. Equally clear is the influence of the other already mentioned social factor of the time: the influence of the military ethos of the Germanic tribes on the political life, the social institutions, and the spiritual culture of the age. The goals of war permeated all parts of life. They asserted themselves in the relationship of the family to the military order, in organized bodies of a hundred men. They influenced the position of chieftains and princes. The military

ethos also produced the system of devoted followers that was so important for military and political development. The prince is surrounded by an entourage of free people as the military members of his household. Only war could support such an entourage, which was bound to the prince by the strongest loyalty: a relationship that manifests itself in its peculiarly Germanic beauty in heroic and national epic poems. War produced the military kingdom of a Marbod.⁷⁶

To these factors we must add the individuality of national spirit, whose commonalities display themselves in the results of the productive systems. The military ethos that the Germanic tribes of this time have in common with early stages of other peoples nevertheless shows a special intensity and distinctiveness. The life-value of the individual person is shifted to his martial qualities. According to Tacitus, it is as if the best of them only lived fully in war; the care of house, hearth, and fields was left to the women and those unfit for war. A peculiar trait leads these Germanic people to act from the wholeness of their being and to risk themselves fully and completely. Their action is not determined and delimited by a rational consideration of purpose; something irrational, a surplus of energy that exceeds a purpose, is to be found in their deeds. With inexhaustible, untamable passion they stake their whole person and freedom on a game of dice. They enjoy the danger of battle, and after the combat is over, they fall into a state of indolent repose. Their myths, their heroic legends, are filled with the naive, unconscious characteristic of placing the highest value and enjoyment of existence not in the serene world-view of the Greeks, not in the intellectually delimited consideration of purpose of the Romans, but in the raw exertion of power without any limit, and in the stresses and exaltations of the self as it expands. This characteristic, which finds its highest expression in the joy of battle, influenced the entire development of our political institutions and of our spiritual life.

One of the final moments involved in a specific national whole that determines its development concerns the way isolated, smaller associations are integrated into the political sphere and how this integration comes about through the relationships of domination and obedience, as well as of community, that are combined in the sovereign will of a state. Thus in Germany we see the following

⁷⁶ Marbod founded a short-lived military kingdom in Bohemia. He died in A.D. 63.

sequence: a national kingdom that comprises small communities that are still not fully differentiated in structure; then with increasing division of labor, an articulation of the professions, separation of estates and classes in a loosely linked national whole; then the development of autocracy involving an intensive and expansive state activity in territorial states, which gradually erodes the above articulation based on professions and estates into the relation between the rights of individuals and the autocratic striving for power; and finally, the advance of these states toward a constant expansion of the rights of individuals and of peoples in a representational system and toward democratic institutions, but at the same time a subordination of local sovereignty to a national empire. If we look at this overall development, we see that it is subject to a twofold influence. On the one hand, it is dependent on shifting power relationships among states; on the other hand, it is dependent on the internal factors in the development of single states that we have surveyed.

Thus it is possible to analyze the constituents of the productive system conditioning both the individual moments in the development of a nation and its overall development. The regularities pertaining to the structure of the political whole determine its overall states and the changes therein. It is as if layers of the life-patterns of this whole were sedimented on each other, so that each presupposes some prior level, as we have seen for the changes in the political organization. Each of these levels exhibits its own order in which productive systems, beginning with individuals, produce values, realize purposes, gather goods, and develop rules of action. Because the carriers and goals of these functions differ, there arises the problem of how all these functions manifest an inner link from which they derive their meaning. From here, the analysis of the logical nexus of the human sciences leads to a new task for whose solution we must appeal to the connection of the proper methods in the formation of the human sciences.

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3. *Ages and Epochs*

We have already seen that within a specific time period, individual productive systems can be analytically differentiated, that the developmental moments encompassed by them can be exhibited, that the relations among these specific systems can be linked into a structural whole, and that commonalities among the parts of a political whole can be determined. But we can also understand the other side of the historical world, the line of its temporal course

and the changes in it, by going back to productive systems as continuous wholes that are nevertheless separable into temporal phases. What primarily characterizes generations, ages, and epochs⁷⁷ is that they are general, dominant, and permeating tendencies. They involve the *concentration* of the whole culture of such a temporal span within itself, so that the values, purposes, and life-rules of the time can provide the norm for judging, evaluating, and assessing the persons and the tendencies or directions that give a specific time its character. An individual, a tendency, and a community derive their *meaning* within this whole through their inner relation to the spirit of the age. And since all individuals fit within some such time span, it follows that their meaning for history lies in this reference to their time. Those persons who advance forcefully in their time span are the leaders of their time, its representatives.

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In this sense one can speak of the spirit of a time, whether of the Middle Ages or of the Enlightenment. This entails that each such epoch finds a delimitation in a *life-horizon*. I understand by this a mode of delimitation through which the people of a time orient their life by their thinking, feeling, and willing. Such a horizon places life, life-concerns, life-experience, and thought-formation in a certain proportion that restricts and binds the sphere within which individuals can modify their cognitive, evaluative, and volitional outlooks. Shades of the inevitable are cast over the single individual.

Besides the general, dominant, and permeating tendency that gives a time its character, there exist other tendencies that oppose it. They strive to conserve the old, they observe the unfortunate consequences of the one-sidedness of the spirit of the time and turn against it. However, when something creative and new emerges that stems from another life-feeling, then amidst this very time span a movement begins that is destined to launch a new age. Before this happens, every mode of opposition to the age is nevertheless dependent on it; everything in an epoch that resists it

⁷⁷ I first proposed and used the historical concept of generations in my 1865 essay about Novalis (now in *Das Erlebnis und die Dichtung*). I employed it more extensively in the first volume of *Das Leben Schleiermachers* and then in the essay "Concerning the Study of the History of the Sciences of Man, Society and State" (1875) GS V, 31–73 [see SW 2], where the historical concept of generation was developed with other related concepts. A more adequate definition of the concepts "historical continuity," "generation," "age," "epoch" is possible only in an account of the formation of the human sciences. (D)

nevertheless has the structure of that time. The creative moment is the one that first institutes a new proportion of life, life-concerns, life-experience, and thought-formation.

The meaning-relations existing between historical forces in a time span are grounded in those relations of commonalities and productive systems that can be designated as *tendencies*, *currents*, and *movements*. Only on their basis is it possible to deal with the more difficult problem of analytically determining the structural nexus of an age or a period.

Let me illustrate this problem by considering this inner nexus for the German Enlightenment, for the task is easier if we begin the analysis of an age by focusing on a single nation.

Science had constituted itself in the seventeenth century. The discovery of an order of nature in accordance with laws and the application of causal relations to gain control of nature produced a confidence in the regular progress of conceptual cognition. The culturally developed nations cooperated in this cognitive project, and this led to the idea of a humanity united in progress. The ideal of reason governing society was formed and provided our highest powers a kind of fulfillment. These powers were united by a common goal; they worked according to the same method; they expected the further development of a collective social order from the advance of knowledge. The old edifice to whose formation a dominant church, feudal relationships, unbridled despotism, princely fancies, and priestly deceit had jointly contributed and that was constantly changing through time and in need of ever new work was now supposed to be transformed and given a purposive, bright, and symmetrical structure. This is the inner unity that linked the spiritual life of individuals, science, religion, philosophy, and art in the European system of the Enlightenment into a whole.

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This unity was achieved in different ways in specific countries. It was fashioned in an especially fortunate and stable way in Germany. Its higher spiritual life came to be marked by a general direction. Going back in time one sees in Germany, even as far back as Freidank,⁷⁸ a tendency to consciously order life by means of stable rules. To designate these rules as moral would be too one-sided and would define their scope too narrowly. The seriousness of the Northern peoples is here combined with a meditative

⁷⁸ Freidank was the presumed name of a thirteenth-century author of a didactic poem on moral and religious questions.

need for reflection, which arises from a turn to the inwardness of life that is undoubtedly connected with their political conditions. Just as in the German empire, which had become inflexible, legal clauses, privileges, and agreements limited the free movement of life, so the feeling of constraint had become stronger in individuals than the feeling of freely choosing one's own goals. The enjoyment of life was always accompanied by a sense of impropriety. Strong types snatched at enjoyment, but their conscience always displayed some scruples. Thus there is a basic trait in eighteenth-century German philosophy that unites Leibniz, Thomasius, Wolff, Lessing, Frederick the Great, Kant, and innumerable lesser figures. This is their tendency to stress obligation and duty—something fostered by the development of Lutheranism and its morality ever since Melanchthon. A sense of obligation was also encouraged by the articulation of society through the concepts of vocation and appointed office, which Luther had carried over into the modern age. And because the tendency toward the independence of the person was intensified in the Enlightenment, it became a duty to perfect oneself. Reason contains a natural law of spirit that expects the individual to realize perfection in himself and in others. This demand is a duty that is not imposed by God but can be established on the basis of the law of our own nature and rational grounds. Only subsequently may the rule of reason be referred to the ground of things. This is the theory of Wolff that goes back to Pufendorf, Leibniz, and Thomasius and forward to Kant. It permeates the entire literature of the German Enlightenment. This theory contains the unifying link that binds Germans of the Enlightenment with those of the seventeenth century and produces a uniform overall spirit in this epoch. This imponderable spirit permeating the nation is everywhere modified, but always the same. It is a determination of the value of life that underlies the living nexus of the German Enlightenment. The new schema of the progress of the soul toward a highest value is grounded in the rational character of humanity. The individual person realizes his purpose when he attains maturity on the basis of reason and establishes the rule of reason over his passions. This sovereignty of reason expresses itself as perfection. Since reason is universally valid and common to all, and the perfection of the whole by reason stands higher than the perfection of a single part—in the sense that the perfection of all individuals possesses a higher value than that of a single person—the highest obligation is the one relating the individual to the well-being of the whole. The result is a further deter-

mination of this principle as the perfection of all individuals to be achieved through the progress of the whole. This Enlightenment principle is not just a product of pure thought, and its dominance was not based on it. Rather, this principle is an abstract expression of all the values of life experienced by the people of the Enlightenment. Thus perfection, strangely enough, becomes an explicit duty for these thinkers, especially Wolff, and the striving for perfection a law that binds individuals. For Wolff and his followers, the deity becomes the object of duties that have their core in a striving for perfection. The life-experience that forms the basis of this idea can best be studied in Leibniz. It is based on the lived experience of the happiness found in development. It is in the making of progress itself that this great thinker, and then Lessing, located the highest human happiness, which can never be equaled by the content of any moment. And the fact that progress does not refer to this or that particular purpose but to the development of individual persons so as to encompass and connect everything in them, is first expressed by Leibniz on the basis of his lived experience. This experience was prepared for in every way, because individuals were repeatedly thrown back on themselves and to common cultural tasks because of the unfortunate state of our national life. Once articulated by Leibniz, this view spread its influence everywhere. These concepts of value stemming from life itself and appreciated by Leibniz then determined the task he set for his philosophy, which is to derive the meaning of life and the sense of the world from a complex of individual, existential values.

In the age of Enlightenment, there is thus a uniform continuum proceeding from the form of life to life-experience, from the relevant lived experiences to their re-presentation in concepts of value, precepts of duty, determination of ends, consciousness of the meaning of life, and of the sense of the world. Amidst a growing awareness of the age about itself, these re-presentations attain an absolute character through the use of abstract formulas and rational demonstration. Unconditional values, obligations, duties, and goods are asserted, whereas the historian recognizes their emergence from life itself.

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Just as we see amidst individual reflection about life in Germany the rudiments of its rational formation, so at the same time we see the emergence of an analogous tendency in the life of the state on the basis of the peculiar conditions of the political productive system.

With the rise of modern Europe, the activity of the state has

become increasingly influential in the various cultural domains. The organizational center of all power relations now lies in the civil service, the military, and in financial institutions. The activity of the state is becoming a driving force in cultural change. We see this in the struggle among the great states for power and expansion and in their inherent need to combine parts of land accumulated through the contingencies of war and inheritance into a uniform whole. The unity of the new states is concentrated in monarchs, their bureaucracies, and their armies, but it becomes necessary for modern states to arrive at a more stable articulation of their organs and a more intense utilization of its forces. This is only possible through a more rational management of its operations. Political progress does not come naturally; it is made. Every activity of the whole is driven by rational goals. This whole incorporates ever more cultural tasks: the educational system, the sciences, and even ecclesiastical life where it is attainable. A head of state embodies not only the unity but also the cultural direction of the entire state. The free, irrational forces involved in interpersonal loyalty are replaced by calculable and predictable forces. Thus the relation of forces that constitutes the unity of the age of Enlightenment fulfills itself in the life of the state. That which the state needs, namely, the rational ordering of life and the rational employment of nature, is accommodated by the scientific movement grounded in the seventeenth century. The sciences in turn find in the state the organ whereby all branches of life from economic activity to the rules of good taste in the arts can be rationally regulated.

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No country was as well prepared for such inner accommodation characteristic of the essence of Enlightenment as Germany. Its smaller states were dependent on cultural development, and Prussia was additionally concerned to engage intellectual and cultural forms in the service of its striving for power. Nowhere was the interchange between religious and scientific forces as well developed as here. We see lines of influence proceeding from the life of Protestant communities to the school system and the universities, which in turn generated advances in the religious thinking of the clergy and in the legal ideas of lawyers, and from there, back to the people.

Thus productive forces of quite heterogeneous origin, productive systems engaged in very different stages of their development, cooperate in the German Enlightenment. At the same time that the intellectual unity of the Enlightenment realizes itself in science, in

philosophical reflection as well as in social life, its efficacy manifests itself in all the particular domains of spiritual life. An interesting example of this for the development of the German legal system can be found in the emergence of the most perfect legislation of the time, namely, Prussian Common Law.⁷⁹ In Halle, an independent branch of natural law and a system of jurisprudence based on it were formed from the spirit of the Prussian state. Through their writings, Thomasius, Wolff, Böhmer, and many lesser lights disseminated the legal perspective of this school everywhere. This perspective was used to educate the bureaucracy, which was then able to complete the long-stagnant work of legislation in Prussia through the unity and national character of its intellectual orientation. This conception of natural law governed both the king, who ordered its institution, and the ministers and advisers who executed it. The same close interrelation existed in the religious movement of the Enlightenment. It also manifested the peculiar duality of the German Enlightenment, being at once polemical and constructive. Church history, natural law, and ecclesiastical law cooperated in German Protestantism to develop a view of primitive Christianity, which then became the force driving Böhmer, Semler, Lessing, and Pfaff⁸⁰ to produce a new ideal of religiosity and ecclesiastical order. Here too there was a circulation of ideas generated by the dissatisfaction with existing conditions and the positive power of new universal ideas. These ideas proceeded from schools and universities not dependent on the power of clerical orthodoxy but allied with the general scientific ethos, and had the effect of cultivating individual clergymen who embodied an enlightened Christianity at one with the spirit of the age in their locality, whether it be in the city or in the countryside. Never had Christian religiosity advanced the highest moral-religious ideas and the theistic impulses of Christianity as straightforwardly and consistently as in the age of the German Enlightenment. New religious values of the greatest import were cultivated in the ecclesiastical and religious life of that time. The German literature of the age was also influenced by this Enlightenment revolution in values and ends. The autocratic enlightened state influenced the nature of poetic creativity. Proceeding from France, a new prose style was formed in Germany through the efforts of cultured soci-

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⁷⁹ Preußisches Allgemeines Landrecht: the 1794 codification of the then existing common law in Prussia.

⁸⁰ Johann Friedrich Pfaff (1765–1825), German mathematician.

ety. Literary genres were prescribed rules, and these rules disciplined the great form of imaginative art from Shakespeare and Cervantes into the strict form of logically articulated poetic works. The ideal of the latter form of literature is that of the human being governed by the idea of perfection and enlightenment. Its world-view involves the belief in the teleological order of the world from nature upwards. The direct expression of this ideal and of this world-view is the didactic poem: it is also allied to the idyll and elegy. The tragic character of life is not understood: comedy, drama, and especially the novel become the highest expression of the age and receive a corresponding structure; a realism guided by optimistic ideas permeates all poetic works.

The general way in which the dominant direction of the German Enlightenment is expressed in the most diverse areas of life does not, however, determine everyone that belongs to this age, and even where it exerts an influence, there are often other forces at work as well. Opposed tendencies from the previous age assert themselves. Those forces that ally themselves with these older tendencies and ideas, but attempt to give them a new form, become especially powerful.

This is how Pietism emerged in the sphere of religion. It was the strongest among the forces in which the old assumed new forms. Pietism is akin to the Enlightenment in its increasing indifference toward external ecclesiastical forms, in its demand for tolerance, but especially because it moves beyond tradition and authority, as undermined by critique, in order to seek a simple, clear justification for faith. This justification lies in one's own relation to God and the religious experience rooted in that relation. Only those who have been converted can understand the Bible: the word of God found there is revealed to them; they are capable of making discoveries, as it were, in the domain of Christianity. The tolerance of Pietism consists in recognizing every mode of Christian faith based on conversion. Pietists must supplement their own religious experience with the conversion narratives of others. Thus we see how Pietism belongs to the great movement of individualism, because it goes beyond Lutheranism by excluding the church from the inner life of the person. At the same time, however, it stands opposed to the Enlightenment by agreeing with Luther's confidence in the religious experience stemming from contact with God. Pietism also stands in a close relation to the consummate sacred music of Johann Sebastian Bach. Although Bach was not a Pietist, the Christian hymns that accompany his portrayal of the

life of Jesus manifest an affinity with the subjective, religious inner life that came to the fore with the Pietistic movement.

A similar tendency to cling to the old asserted itself against the political movement toward enlightened autocracy. It was directed at the preservation of the empire, the privileges of rank within the particular states, and the continuation of old rights. But even this [conservative] tendency derives its higher consciousness and its grounding from the study of the literature of Enlightenment political science. The proposals of a Schlosser and Möser attempt to accommodate the new needs and spirit of the Enlightenment. Thus the political ideas of the Enlightenment surround Möser even as the already existing conditions nurture his understanding of them and his practical tendencies.

The various trends that feed the tensions and volatility of an epoch such as the German Enlightenment can only be recognized as interdependent when one discovers those moments within its basic course that make possible a shift toward the future. The very search of the Enlightenment for regularity occasioned the study of historical case material in several fields that could be seen to instantiate such regularities. Thus the archetype of a more free religiosity was found in primitive Christianity, and this re-enforced its study by Thomasius,⁸¹ Böhmer, and Semler. The rules established by the art criticism of this age were re-enforced by the close examination of the typical in ancient Greek and Roman art, and this was the perspective from which Winckelmann and Lessing allowed ancient art and the laws of artistic creativity to illuminate each other. Another moment full of import for the future lies in the realization that the detailed examination of the individual person leads to a stress on the individuality of creativity and genius.

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If we ask how amidst the flow of events that surges through Germany, constantly and unceasingly producing changes, one can nevertheless delineate such a unity, then the preliminary answer is that each productive system carries its own law within itself. Accordingly, the epochs of one productive system will be quite different from those of other productive systems. Thus music has its own rate of movement: the religious style deriving from the highest power of the Christian experience reached its pinnacle in Bach and Handel at the same time that the Enlightenment already was

⁸¹ Christian Thomasius (1655–1728), German jurist and philosopher; sought independence of philosophy from theology. His works include *Institutiones jurisprudentiae divinae* and *Fundamenta juris naturae et gentium*.

the dominant direction in Germany. And at the same time that Lessing's most perfect works were produced, the new creative movement of *Sturm und Drang* emerges to herald the beginning of the next epoch in literature. When we ask further what is the basic relation that establishes a unity among various productive systems, the answer is not a unity that could be expressed by any basic idea but rather something more like a nexus or link that establishes itself among the tendencies of life as they develop.

It is possible to delineate within the course of history, time spans in which a basic disposition of life and the highest ideas come together, reach a peak unity, only to disperse again. Each such time span exhibits a common, inner structure that determines the relations between the parts of the whole, their temporal course, and the modifications in general tendencies. We will see later what the comparative method can contribute to such a structural perspective.

The enduring efficacy of general structural relationships is what above all produces the meaning and sense of history for us. The way in which these structural relationships hold sway at every time, at every point, and determine human life, provides an initial sense of the spiritual world. Our task is to study systematically and from the ground up the regularities that exhibit the structure of a productive system in its carriers, starting with individuals and moving upwards. The extent to which these structural laws enable us to make predictions about the future can be determined only when this foundation has been laid. What is immutable and regular in historical processes is the first object of study, and conditions the answer to all questions about progress in history and about the direction in which human life is moving.

186 The structure of a specific period proves to be a nexus of single, partial systems and movements within the overall goings-on of an age. A complex whole is formed from extremely diverse and changeable moments, and this whole determines the meaning assigned to everything that is going on in this period. When the spirit of such a period is born out of pains and dissonances, every single aspect of it receives its meaning in and through it. Great historical personages are especially likely to be influenced by such situations. They create not in terms of long-term, historical considerations but by drawing their goals from the values and significance of their own age. The productive energy of a nation in a specific time derives its highest power from precisely this fact, that its people are limited by the horizon of their age. Their work is devoted to

the realization of the basic direction of their time and, accordingly, they become its representatives.

Everything in a historical period derives its meaning through the energy drawn from its overall direction. This energy is expressed in stone or on canvas, in deeds or through words. It is objectified in the constitutions and the legislation of nations. Moved by this energy, the historian grasps past ages and the philosopher attempts to interpret the sense of the world. All manifestations of the energy that determines an age are akin to each other. This engenders the task of analysis, which is to recognize a unity of value-determination and purposive direction in a multiplicity of manifestations of life. When the life-manifestations of such a tendency press onward to absolute values and determinate ends, the circle that encompasses the people of this period becomes constricting; for it also contains resistant tendencies. We saw that an age also imposes its stamp on these opposed tendencies and that the dominant direction suppresses their free development. Thus the overall productive system of an age is determined from within by the nexus of life, social atmosphere, value-formation, and goal-setting that characterizes that age. Every action that engages this nexus is historical. This nexus constitutes the horizon of the time and it ultimately determines the meaning of each part of this temporal system. The way in which ages and epochs are centered in themselves solves the problem of the sense and meaning of history.

Every age refers back to the preceding age, takes up the forces that were developed in it, and simultaneously, it already contains the stirring and the creativity that prepares for the succeeding age. Just as it arose from the insufficiency of an earlier age, so it carries within itself the limits, tensions, and suffering that prepare for the future age. Since each configuration of historical life is finite, it must contain a distribution of joyous force and constraint, of the expansion of existence and provinciality, of satisfaction and need. The peak efficacy of its basic thrust is always brief. And as we move from one time to another, there is a hunger for all kinds of satisfaction that can never be fulfilled.

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One result of our investigations about the relations between the historical ages and periods with reference to the increasing complexity in the structure of historical life is the recognition of the finitude of all historical configurations, namely, that they are burdened with existential curtailment, oppression, and unfulfilled longing. This is especially the case because power relations can never be eliminated from the coexistence of psychophysical beings.

The Enlightenment ideal of autocracy produced wars arising from diplomatic rivalry and the exploitation of subjects for the luxurious life of the courts just as much as a striving for the rational development of our powers. Similarly, every other arrangement of power-relations also encompasses a duality of effects. Finally, the sense of history can only be sought in the meaning-relation of all the productive forces that have been woven into the nexus of the ages.

THE SYSTEMATIC EXAMINATION OF PRODUCTIVE SYSTEMS AND COMMONALITIES

Since the understanding of history comes about by means of applying the systematic human sciences to it, the above account of the logical nexus of history has already treated the general features of the system of the human sciences. This is because the overall examination of the productive systems that have been articulated in history has as its goal the grounding of the essence of these productive systems. I stress the following three preliminary perspectives for this systematic examination.

The study of society depends on the analysis of the productive systems that are part of history. This analysis proceeds from the concrete to the abstract, from the scientific study of the natural articulation of the human race and its peoples to the division of the various sciences of culture and the separation of the domains of the external organization of society.⁸²

188 Each cultural system forms a nexus that is based on commonalities; because the nexus realizes a function, it has a teleological character. But there is a difficulty in conceptualizing the sciences of these cultural systems. The individuals who cooperate in such a function belong to the cultural system only through those processes by which they contribute to the realization of the function. Nevertheless, they participate in these processes with their whole being, which means that a domain based purely on the system's functional purpose can never be constructed. Rather, other aspects of human nature are also constantly at work in this domain supplementing the energies devoted to the system's functions. Here lies the basic logical problem of the science of the cultural systems,

⁸² This is treated more extensively in my *Introduction to the Human Sciences*.
(D) See SW 1, 87–136.

and we will see that various and conflicting methods have been developed to deal with this problem.

Beyond this difficulty, there is a limit pertaining to concept-formation in the human sciences. It derives from the fact that productive systems are teleological and attempt to achieve something. Concept-formation here is therefore not a simple generalization that secures what is common from a series of particular cases. The concept expresses a type and emerges through a comparative procedure. Assume that I want to define the concept of science. In the abstract, every thought-nexus that aims to make a contribution to conceptual cognition can be included. However, among the books devoted to scientific tasks, many are unproductive, many illogical and unsuccessful. They thus contradict their intention to make a cognitive contribution. Concept-formation must bring out those features by which the function of such a thought-nexus is actually realized: that is the task of a theory of science. Or when I want to define the concept of poetry, this too requires a conceptual construction that will not cover all verses. The manifold of phenomena belonging to such a domain is grouped around a central point, which constitutes the ideal case in which the function of poetry is completely realized.

This ends the examination of the general system of the human sciences. The remaining discussion of the formation of the human sciences will develop the particular methods through which this general, logical system is realized.

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PART III

PLAN FOR THE CONTINUATION OF THE FORMATION OF THE HISTORICAL WORLD IN THE HUMAN SCIENCES 189

TRANSLATED BY

RUDOLF A. MAKKREEL AND WILLIAM H. OMAN

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DRAFTS FOR A CRITIQUE OF HISTORICAL REASON

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SECTION ONE: LIVED EXPERIENCE, EXPRESSION, AND UNDERSTANDING

I. Lived Experience and Autobiography

I. THE TASK OF A CRITIQUE OF HISTORICAL REASON

The connectedness of the world of human spirit dawns in the subject and yet there is a progression of spirit that connects the particular logical processes whereby the overall meaning of this world is determined. On the one hand, this world of spirit is the creation of the apprehending subject; on the other hand, there is a progression of spirit directed at an objective knowledge of this world. Thus we confront the problem of how the formation of the world of spirit in the subject makes possible the knowledge of spiritual reality. I have already called this the task of a Critique of Historical Reason. This task can be achieved only if the particular functions that cooperate in the creation of this whole can be sorted out and if it can be shown what part each of them plays, both in the formation of the historical course in the world of spirit and in the discovery of its systematic nature. It remains to be seen how far the difficulties inherent in the mutual dependence of these truths can be solved. The real principle of conceptualization in the human sciences will be derived from experience in a gradual manner.

Understanding is a rediscovery of the I in the Thou; spirit rediscovers itself at ever higher levels of connectedness; this selfsame-ness of spirit in the I and the Thou, in each subject of a community, in each cultural system, and finally, in the totality of spirit and universal history, makes possible the cooperation of the various functions of the human sciences. The knowing subject is, here, one with its object, and this holds for all stages of its objectification. If, in this way, we can recognize the objectivity of the world of human spirit as created in the subject, then the question arises how much this can contribute to solving the problem of epistemology in general. Kant tackled this problem by starting

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with formal logic and mathematics. Formal logic, in the time of Kant, regarded the ultimate abstractions of logic—the laws and forms of thought—as the ultimate logical ground for the justification of all scientific statements. The laws and forms of thought, above all judgment, from which he derived the categories contained for Kant the conditions of conceptual cognition. To these conditions he added those that, according to him, made mathematics possible. The magnitude of his achievement lay in his complete analysis of mathematical and scientific knowledge. The question, however, is whether an epistemology of history, which he himself did not provide, is possible within the framework of his concepts.

2. REFLEXIVE AWARENESS, REALITY: TIME

I am presupposing what I have said before about life and lived experience. We must now demonstrate the reality of what is apprehended in lived experience. As we are concerned here with the objective value of the categories of the world of human spirit as they first emerge from lived experience, I shall make a preliminary remark about the sense in which the term “category” is being used here. The predicates that we attribute to objects encompass kinds or modes of apprehension. The concepts designating these modes I call categories. Each mode of apprehension contains one rule of relating experience. The categories are systematically related to each other, and the highest categories represent the highest points of view for apprehending reality. Each such category designates its own universe of predication. The formal categories are forms for making assertions about all of reality. Among the real categories are those that originate in the apprehension of the world of human spirit, even though they are also transformed to apply to the whole of reality. General predicates about a specific individual's experiential nexus already emerge from lived experience. But when they are applied to the objectifications of life in understanding and to all the subjects of the assertions of the human sciences, the scope of their validity is increased until it becomes clear that the life of spirit can everywhere be characterized in terms of productive systems, force, value, etc. Thus these general predicates attain the dignity of categories of the world of spirit.

Temporality is contained in life as its first categorial determination and the one that is fundamental for all the others. The expression “passage of life” already points to this temporality. Time is there for us by means of the gathering unity of our consciousness. Life, and the external objects encompassed by it, share the rela-

tionships of simultaneity, succession, time interval, duration, and change. It is from them that the mathematical natural sciences derived the abstract relations on which Kant based his doctrine of the phenomenal nature of time.

This [mathematical] framework of temporal relationships embraces, but does not exhaust, the lived experience of time through which the concept receives its ultimate fulfillment. Here time is experienced as the restless advance of the present, in which what is present constantly becomes past and the future present. The present is the fullness of a moment of time being filled with reality; it is reality as distinct from memory or representations of the future as found in wishes, expectations, hopes, fears, and strivings. This being filled with reality characteristic of the present occurs continually, while the content of lived experience constantly changes. The representations by which we possess the past and the future are there only for us as we live in the present. The present is always there, and nothing is there except what emerges in it. The ship of our life is carried forward on a constantly moving stream, as it were, and the present is always wherever we enter these waves with whatever we suffer, remember, and hope, that is, whenever we live in the fullness of our reality. We constantly sail into this stream, and the moment the future becomes the present, it also begins to sink into the past. The parts of fulfilled time are qualitatively different from each other; even apart from their content, they have a different character according to whether we look from the present back to the past or forward to the future. Looking back we have a series of memory images graded according to their value for our consciousness and the interest of our feelings; like a row of houses or trees receding into the distance and becoming smaller, the line of memories becomes less vivid, until the images are lost in the darkness of the horizon. And the more components, such as states of mind, outer events, means, and goals, insert themselves between the fullness of the present and a moment of the future, the greater is the number of possible outcomes and the more indefinite and nebulous the image of this future becomes. When we look back at the past, we are passive; it cannot be changed. In vain does the person already determined by it assail it with dreams of how it could have been different. But in our attitude to the future we are active and free. Here the category of reality that emerges from the present is joined by that of possibility. We feel that we have infinite possibilities. Thus the lived experience of time determines the content of our lives in all directions. This is why the doctrine that time is merely ideal makes no sense in the

human sciences. It would mean that behind life itself, with all its temporal fretting about the past, all its longings and free, active claims on the future, all its despair about the necessities stemming therefrom, all the striving, work, and purposes that stretch into the future, all the formation and development encompassed by the temporal course of life, there lies as its condition a shadowy realm of timelessness that is not lived. But it is in this life of ours that the reality known in the human sciences lies.

The antinomies that thought discovers in the lived experience of time spring from its cognitive impenetrability. Even the smallest part of the advance of time still involves the passing of time. The present never *is*; what we experience as present always contains the memory of what has just been present. Among other things, the continued efficacy of the past as a force in the present, namely, what the past means for it, imparts to what is remembered a distinctive character of presence, whereby it becomes incorporated in the present. That which forms a unity of presence in the flow of time because it has a unitary meaning is the smallest unit definable as a lived experience. Each more comprehensive unity of the parts of a life that is linked by a common meaning we also call a "lived experience," even when the parts are separated by intervening events.

A lived experience is a temporal sequence in which every state is in flux before it can become a distinct object. Indeed, because the subsequent moment always builds on the previous one, each becomes something past before it can be grasped. It then appears as a memory that has the freedom to expand. But observation destroys lived experience. Thus there is nothing more puzzling than the kind of continuum or nexus known as a piece of life-history. The only thing that remains constant about this nexus is that its form is a structural relation. And if we wanted, through a special kind of effort, to experience the stream of life itself as reflecting its bank, always seeming the same, but never really, according to Heraclitus—a case of the many and the one—then we would fall prey again to the law of life according to which every moment of life that is observed, no matter how much the flow is concentrated on, is a remembered moment and no longer a flow; *it is arrested by attention, which fixes what is essentially fluid.* Thus we cannot grasp the essence of this life. What the youth of Sais unveils is form and not life.¹ We must be aware of this if we are to grasp the categories that emerge from life itself.

¹ Dilthey refers to a poem by Schiller about a youth in the ancient Egyptian city of Sais who unveiled the statue of truth.

Because of this characteristic of real time, temporal succession cannot, strictly speaking, be experienced. The presence of the past replaces immediate experience for us. When we want to observe time, the act of observation destroys it because it fixes things by means of attentiveness; it halts the flow and rigidifies what is in the process of becoming. We experience both the changes in what-just-was and that such changes are occurring. But we do not experience the flux itself. Permanence is experienced when we return to what we have just seen or heard and find it still there. Change is experienced when particular qualities of a composite whole have become different, and when we turn to that in ourselves that experiences duration and change, namely, the reflexive awareness of our own self, it is no different; nor is it with introspection. . . .

The course of a life consists of parts, of lived experiences that are inwardly connected with each other. Each lived experience relates to a self of which it is a part; it is structurally linked with other parts to form a nexus. Everything having to do with spirit manifests this connectedness of a nexus. Interconnectedness is thus a category that stems from life itself. We apprehend the connectedness of a nexus through the unity of consciousness, which is the condition of all apprehension. But it is clear that the existence of a nexus or connectedness is not merely the product of a manifold of experiences being presented to a unitary consciousness. It is only because life itself is a structural nexus in which lived experiences stand in experienceable relations that the connectedness of life is given to us. This connectedness is apprehended in terms of a more comprehensive category that is a form of predication applicable to all of reality—the relation of whole and parts.²

The life of spirit manifests itself on the base of what is physical and represents the highest evolutionary stage on earth. The conditions under which the life of spirit emerges are developed by natural science in that it discovers a lawful order in physical phenomena. The human body appears among other phenomenally given bodies, but it has a special relation to lived experience that cannot be further specified. With lived experience we move from the world of physical phenomena into the realm of spiritual reality, which is the subject matter of the human sciences and of reflection on them. . . .³ The cognitive value of this realm is fully independent of the study of their physical conditions.

Knowledge of the world of human spirit comes about through

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² The rest is undecipherable. (H)

³ Some undecipherable words follow. (H)

the cooperation between lived experience, the understanding of other persons, the historical comprehension of commonalities as subjects of historical efficacy, and finally, objective spirit. Lived experience stands as their ultimate presupposition, and thus we ask what function it fulfills.

Lived experience encompasses elementary operations of thought. I have designated this as its intellectuality. These operations occur when consciousness is intensified. A change in a mental state of affairs leads to the consciousness of difference. In that which changes, an isolated state is apprehended. Experiencing is followed by judgments that objectify what has been experienced. It is unnecessary to explicate how we obtain our familiarity with every human situation solely from lived experience. A feeling that we have not experienced ourselves we cannot find again in someone else. It is decisive for the development of the human sciences that the subject whose bodily limits contain the possibility of lived experiences be described in terms of general predicates and attributes derived from lived experience that can also serve as the point of departure for the categories of the human sciences. We saw that the formal categories spring from the elementary operations of thought. They are concepts that re-present what can be apprehended through these operations of thought. Such concepts are unity, plurality, identity, difference, degree, and relation. They are attributes of the whole of reality. The real categories . . .

3. THE LIFE-NEXUS

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A new trait of life becomes visible at this point; it is conditioned by the character of its temporality as already explicated, but goes beyond it. We approach life, our own as well as that of others, through understanding. This attitude of understanding demands distinctive categories that are foreign to the cognition of nature as such. If the scientific cognition of nature makes use of the concept of purpose for the stages in the organic world that precede human life, it borrows this category from human life.

The *formal categories* are abstract expressions for the logical operations of distinguishing, identifying, apprehending degrees of difference, connecting, and separating. They provide, as it were, a higher degree of awareness or discernment, which merely ascertains; no a priori construction is involved. They already appear in primary or elementary thought and then validate themselves as the same, but at a higher level, in discursive thought, which is tied to

signs. They are thus the formal conditions for understanding as well as for conceptual cognition, for the human sciences as well as for the natural sciences.

The *real categories*, by contrast, are nowhere the same in the human sciences and in the natural sciences. I shall not enter into the problems concerning the origin of these categories. Here only their validity is at issue. No real category can claim the validity it has in the natural sciences for the human sciences as well. If the abstract procedure expressed in a natural science category is transferred to the human sciences, then the natural sciences transgress their limits. This is just as objectionable as when natural science imports a spiritual nexus into nature, which is what led to the philosophy of nature of Schelling and Hegel. In the historical world there is no natural science causality, for a cause, in this sense, implies that it produces effects that are necessitated in accordance with laws; history only knows of relationships of agency and suffering, action and reaction.

No matter how natural science in the future may rethink the concept of substances as carriers of what happens or that of forces as bringing it about and transform them into new concepts, all such conceptualizations of the natural sciences are irrelevant to the human sciences. The subjects of historical assertions—ranging from the individual life-course to that of humanity—designate merely a special kind of nexus that has been delimited. And although the formal category of the relation between whole and part is common to any nexus—whether it pertains to space, time, organized beings, or history—it first acquires its own meaning in the realm of the human sciences from the nature of life and the process of understanding appropriate to it, namely, that of a nexus in which the parts are interconnected. Organic life must, according to the evolutionary character of reality as given in our experience, be viewed as an intermediary link between inorganic nature and the historical world and thus as a preliminary stage of the latter.

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What, then, is this distinctive sense in which the parts of the life of mankind are linked into a whole? What are the categories through which we come to understand and master this whole?

Let us consider autobiographies, which are the most direct expression of reflection about life. Augustine, Rousseau, and Goethe exhibit its typical forms. How, then, did these writers understand the nexus of the various parts of their own life-course? Augustine is fully devoted to the connectedness of his existence with God.

His text is, at one and the same time, religious meditation, prayer, and narrative. His narrative has its goal in the event of his conversion, and every earlier occurrence is only a way station on the road to this goal in which the design of providence for this human being is fulfilled. No sensual enjoyment, no philosophical joy, no rhetorical pleasure in eloquence, and no life-relationship have any intrinsic value for him. In all of these, he feels a positive life-value strangely mixed with a longing for a transcendent relationship; they are all transitory, and only in the conversion does an eternal relation, untainted by suffering, come into being. Thus the understanding of his life consists in relating its parts to the realization of an absolute value, an unconditional highest good. When looking back, he sees the meaning of every earlier life-moment in terms of this relation: He does not find development in his life, but preparation for the renunciation of all that is transitory.

As for Rousseau, the way he related himself to his life in the *Confessions* can only be comprehended through the same categories of meaning, value, sense, and purpose. All of France swarmed with rumors about his marriage and his past. In dreadful loneliness he considered the incessant efforts of his enemies against him, making him misanthropic to the point of persecution mania. When he looked back in memory, he saw himself driven from his strict Calvinistic home, struggling upwards from a life of ignoble adventure toward the actualization of the greatness that lay dormant in him, soiled on the way by the dirt of the streets, forced to put up with bad food of all descriptions, and impotent in the face of the domination of the elegant world and the leading intellectuals around him. But whatever he had done and suffered and whatever was corrupt in him, he saw himself—and this, after all, was the ideal of his age—as a noble, high-minded soul whose feelings were allied with humanity. This he wanted to show the world; he wanted to justify his spiritual existence by showing it fully as it was. Here again the external events of a life-course are interpreted. A nexus is sought that is not merely one of cause and effect. To describe it we can only find such words as “value,” “purpose,” “sense,” and “meaning.” When we look more closely, we see that the interpretation consists of a distinctive interrelation of these categories reflecting his own concerns. Rousseau wanted, above all, to have the legitimacy of his individual existence recognized. This contains a new intuitive insight into the infinite possibilities of actualizing life-values. It is on the basis of this insight that the constellation of categories used by him to understand life took shape.

And now we turn to Goethe: in *Dichtung und Wahrheit* a human being looks at his own existence from the standpoint of universal history. Throughout he sees himself in the context of the literary movement of his age and manifests a calm, proud sense of his place within it. Thus to the old man looking back, every moment of his existence is doubly significant, both as enjoyed fullness of life and as a productive force affecting the whole of his life. Whether in Leipzig, Strasbourg, or Frankfurt, he feels each present as filled and determined by the past and as aiming to shape the future, that is, as development. Here we can see more deeply into the relations between the categories as the instruments of understanding life. The sense of life lies in giving shape to things and in development; on its basis the meaning of the moments of life is determined in a distinctive way; it is both the experienced, intrinsic, value of the moment and its productive force.

Each life has its own sense. It consists in a meaning-context in which every remembered present possesses an intrinsic value, and yet, through the nexus of memory, it is also related to the sense of the whole. This sense of individual human existence is unique and cannot be fathomed by conceptual cognition; yet, in its way, like a Leibnizian monad, it represents the historical universe.

4. AUTOBIOGRAPHY

In autobiography we encounter the highest and most instructive form of the understanding of life. Here a life-course stands as an external phenomenon from which understanding seeks to discover what produced it within a particular environment. The person who understands it is the same as the one who created it. This results in a particular intimacy of understanding. The same person who seeks the overall coherence of the story of his life has already produced a life-nexus according to various perspectives, namely, in the ways he has felt the values of his life, actualized its purposes, worked out a life plan, either genetically when looking back or prospectively when looking forward to a highest good. These various ways of producing a life-nexus must now be articulated as a life-history. The person's memory has highlighted and accentuated those life-moments that were experienced as significant; others have been allowed to sink into forgetfulness. Momentary mistakes about the meaning of his life are corrected by the future. Thus the initial tasks involved in apprehending and explicating a historical nexus are already half solved by life itself. The constituents of this

nexus can be found in conceptions of lived experience in which present and past events are held together by a common meaning. Among these lived experiences, those that have a special worth, both for themselves and for the overall life-nexus, have been preserved by memory and raised from the endless stream of forgotten events. A coherence is formed within life itself, albeit from different standpoints and with constant shifts. The work of historical narrative is already half done by life itself. Lived experiences provide its constituents; from the infinite plurality of them, a selection of what is worth narrating has been prepared. And between these parts a connection is seen, which, to be sure, neither is, nor is intended to be, a simple copy of the actual passage of a life of so many years, but which, because understanding is involved, expresses what an individual life knows about its own connectedness.

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Here we approach the roots of all historical comprehension. Autobiography is merely the literary expression of the self-reflection of human beings on their life-course. Such self-reflection renews itself to some extent in every individual. It is always there and expresses itself in ever new forms. It is found in the verses of Solon as well as in the introspection of Stoic philosophers, in the meditations of the saints and in the modern philosophy of life. It alone makes historical insight possible. The power and scope of our own lives and the energy with which we reflect on them provide the basis of historical vision. Self-reflection alone enables us to give a second life to the bloodless shadows of the past. In combination with a boundless need to surrender to, and lose oneself in, the existence of others, it makes the great historian.

What is it, then, that constitutes a connectedness in the examination of one's own life-course, and links the parts into a whole in which life attains understanding? The understanding of life requires, in addition to the general categories of thought, those of value, purpose, and meaning. Broad concepts such as that of the shaping and development of human life are subsumed under these. Differences among these three categories are determined first of all by the temporal standpoint from which the passage of a life is apprehended.

When we look back through memory, we see the nexus of the past parts of a life-course in terms of the category of meaning. When we live in the present, the positive or negative value of the realities that fill it are experienced through feeling. And when we face the future, the category of purpose arises through a projective attitude. We interpret life as the actualization of some overriding

purpose to which all particular purposes are subordinated, that is, as the realization of a highest good. None of these categories can be subordinated to the others, because each of them makes the whole of life accessible to the understanding from a different perspective. In this sense they are incommensurable.

And yet we can differentiate the way they are related to the understanding of a life-course. The intrinsic values experienced in, and only in, the lived experience of the present are accessible to experience in a primordial way, but they stand juxtaposed to each other without any connection. For each of them arises in the concern of a subject for an object accessible to it in the present. (By contrast, when we set ourselves a purpose, we relate ourselves to the representation of an object that is to be brought about.) Thus the intrinsic values of the experienced present stand juxtaposed and unconnected; they can only be assessed when they are compared with each other. Anything else described as valuable must be referred back to intrinsic values. When we ascribe an objective value to something, this means merely that various values can be experienced in relation to it. When we ascribe an instrumental value to an object, we merely designate it as capable of bringing about some value at a subsequent point of time. All these are purely logical relations into which a value, experienced in the present, can enter. From the point of view of value, life thus appears as an infinite multiplicity of positive and negative existential values. It is like a chaos of harmonies and dissonances. Each of them is like a chord that fills a present, but they have no musical relation to each other. The category of purpose, or of the good, which considers life as it is directed toward the future, presupposes that of value. But this category too cannot bring out the connectedness of the life-nexus, for the relations of purposes to each other are only those of possibility, choice, and subordination. Only the category of meaning overcomes the mere juxtaposition or subordination of the parts of life to each other. As history is memory and as the category of meaning belongs to memory, this is the most distinctive category of historical thought. It will be especially important to explicate its gradual development.

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SUPPLEMENT TO 3: THE LIFE-NEXUS

It is here that, together with the categories of agency and suffering, the category of productive force arises. Agency and suffering are, as we saw, the basis of the principle of causality in the natural

sciences. The principle of causality receives its strict formulation in mechanics.⁴ In the natural sciences, force is a hypothetical concept. If its validity is assumed there, it is determined by the principle of causality. In the human sciences, productive force is the categorial expression of something that can be experienced. It arises when we turn toward the future and does so in different ways: in dreams of future happiness, in the play of the imagination with possibilities, in indecision, and in fear. But then we bring such leisurely expansion of our existence to a distinct focal point, and amidst such possibilities we decide to actualize one of them. The representation of a purpose that then emerges contains something new that did not yet exist in the sphere of reality and now must enter it. What is involved here—quite independent of any theory of the will—is a straining, which a psychologist may interpret physiologically, a directedness at a goal, or the emergence of an *intention to actualize something* that was not already part of reality, selecting among possibilities and intending to actualize one of them⁵ . . . choosing the means for bringing it about and finally actually bringing it about. Insofar as the life-nexus generates such sequences, we call it a productive force.

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This category of productive force is critical for the human sciences. Wherever these sciences reach, they deal with the connectedness of some whole. We take it for granted that it can be described in terms of stable states; but insofar as historians seek to understand and express change, they must do so through concepts that express energy, directions of movement, and shifts of historical forces. The more that historical concepts take on this character of productive force, the better will they express the nature of their objects. Whatever it is in a concept that serves to fix an object and give it a timeless validity belongs merely to its logical form. This is why it is important to form concepts that express the freedom of life and history. Hobbes frequently says that life is continuous movement. Leibniz and Wolff assert that happiness, for both the individual and the community, lies in the consciousness of progressive movement.

All these categories of life and history are forms of judgment that become generally applicable to the domain of the human sciences—if not always in judgments about what can be experienced, then through development with other functions. They originate

⁴ See *Introduction to the Human Sciences* (D), SW 1, 232–34.

⁵ The next words are undecipherable. (H)

from lived experience itself. They are not the kinds of form that are imposed on it, but the structural forms of life itself in its temporal flow come to expression in them based on the formal operations grounded in the unity of consciousness. What, then, is the subject of these categories of the sphere of lived experience? It is primarily the passage of a life that takes place in a human body and that, as a self, with its intentions and their being restrained by pressure from the external world, is distinguished from what is outside, impossible to experience, and strange. But it is more closely defined by the predication already explicated; and so all our judgments about the sphere of lived experience insofar as they refer to a life-course and express its predicates are at first merely predication about this specific life-course. They achieve the character of commonality and generality by having objective spirit as their background and insight into other persons as their constant correlate.

The understanding of one's own life-course takes place through a final group of categories that differs essentially from the previous group, which still had some affinities with the categories of the knowledge of nature. Now we are confronted with categories that have nothing in the natural sciences to compare them with.⁶

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The comprehension and interpretation of one's own life goes through a long series of stages; its most complete explication is autobiography. Here the self apprehends its own life-course in such a way that it brings to consciousness the human substrates and the historical relations with which it is interwoven. Autobiography can thus gradually expand to become a historical portrait. The only thing that limits autobiography, but this is at the same time the source of its special meaning, is the fact that it is carried by lived experience and makes its own self and its relation to the world understandable from this deep level. Reflection of human beings about themselves remains the point of reference and basis [for such understanding].

⁶ For instance, the categories of meaning and value. The discussion of categories is taken up in "The Categories of Life" below, 248–64.

II. The Understanding of Other Persons and Their Manifestations of Life

The method pervading the human sciences is that of understanding and interpretation. All the functions and truths of the human sciences are gathered in understanding. At every point it is understanding that opens up a world.

On the basis of lived experience and self-understanding and their constant interaction, there emerges the understanding of other persons and their manifestations of life. Here too we are not dealing with logical construction or psychological analysis but with analysis of interest for a theory of knowledge. Our task is to establish what the understanding of others can contribute to historical knowledge.

I. MANIFESTATIONS OF LIFE

The givens of history are always manifestations of life. They appear in the world of the senses, but express something spiritual, which they make it possible for us to cognize. By manifestations of life I mean not only these expressions that intend something or are meant to mean something but also those that without any such intent to express spirit nevertheless make it understandable.

Understanding will differ in kind and scope in relation to different classes of manifestations of life.

The first of these classes consists of concepts, judgments, and larger thought-formations. As constituents of science, they have been detached from the lived experience in which they arose, and they possess the common basic trait of having been adapted to logical norms. This gives them a selfsameness independent of their position in the context of thought. A judgment asserts the validity of what is thought independently of changes in the way it arose, whether the difference be that of the time or the people involved. This is also the meaning of the principle of identity. Thus a judgment is the same for the person who formulates it and the one who understands it; it is, as it were, transported unchanged from the possession of the speaker to that of the one who understands it. This defines what characterizes the understanding of every logically perfect system of thought. Here understanding is directed at the mere logical content, which remains identical in every context, and is more complete than in relation to any other manifestation

of life. At the same time, however, such understanding does not disclose how the logical content that has been thought is related to the dark background and the fullness of psychic life. There is no indication of the peculiarities of the life from which it arose, and it follows from its specific character that it does not set up any expectation to go back to any psychic nexus.

Actions form another class of manifestations of life. An action does not derive from the intention to communicate. But in accordance with the relation in which an action stands to a purpose, this is given in it. There is a regular relation of concern between an action and what it expresses of the human spirit that allows us to make probable assumptions about it. However, it is always necessary to distinguish the situationally conditioned state of mind that produced the action and whose expression it is from the life-nexus itself in which the state of mind is grounded. Through the power of a decisive motive, a deed moves from the fullness of life into one-sidedness. However much we may have deliberated before acting, the deed expresses only a part of our being. Possibilities that resided in this being are annihilated by the deed. So action too detaches itself from the background of the life-nexus. Apart from the elucidation of how a situation, a purpose, means, and a life-nexus intersect in an action, it allows no inclusive determination of the inner life from which it arose.

It is quite different with the expression of lived experience. A special relation exists between it, the life from which it stems, and the understanding that it brings about. An expression of lived experience can contain more of the nexus of psychic life than any introspection can catch sight of. It draws from depths not illuminated by consciousness. But at the same time, it is characteristic of the expression of lived experience that its relation to the spiritual or human content expressed in it can only be made available to understanding within limits. Such expressions are not to be judged as true or false but as truthful or untruthful. For here dissimulation, lying, and deception sever the relation between the expression and the spiritual meaning expressed.

An important distinction begins to emerge here, and on its basis we can assert the highest significance for expressions of lived experience in the human sciences. What stems from daily life is subject to the power of its interests. The interpretation of what constantly falls into oblivion is also determined by the moment. There is something frightful in the realization that in the struggle of practical interests, every expression can deceive and that its interpreta-

tion can alter with a change in our standpoint. But when in a great work a spiritual content is liberated from its creator, whether it be a poet, artist, or writer, we enter a realm where deception ends. No truly great work of art can, according to the relations that apply here and that will be developed later, want to put forward a spiritual content that misrepresents its author; indeed, it does not want to say anything about its author. Truthful in itself, it stands—fixed, visible, and abiding—and it is this that makes possible a methodically reliable understanding of such works. Thus there arises in the confines between knowing and doing a sphere in which life discloses itself at a depth inaccessible to observation, reflection, and theory.⁷

2. ELEMENTARY FORMS OF UNDERSTANDING

Understanding comes about, first of all, through the interests of practical life where persons rely on interchange and communication. They must make themselves understandable to each other. One person must know what the other wants. This is how the elementary forms of understanding originate. They are like the letters of the alphabet that combine to make higher forms of understanding possible. By such an elementary form, I mean the interpretation of a single manifestation of life. Logically it can be explicated as an inference by analogy. Such an inference is mediated by a regular relation between a manifestation of life and what is expressed in it. In each of the three classes, individual life-manifestations can be interpreted in this way. A series of letters combined into words that form a sentence express a proposition. A facial look signifies pleasure or pain for us. The tapestry of human action consists of elementary acts, such as the lifting of an object, the swing of a hammer, the cutting of wood with a saw, that indicate the presence of certain purposes. In such elementary understanding we do not go back to the overall nexus of life that forms the enduring subject of life-manifestations. Nor are we aware of any inference from which this nexus might result.

The fundamental relationship on which the process of elementary understanding depends is that of an expression to what is expressed in it. Elementary understanding is not an inference from

⁷ Dilthey comments in the margin: Here material from the *Poetics* on life-manifestation and expression is to be used. (H) See discussions of objectifications and expressions at SW 5, 228–29.

an effect to a cause. Nor must we conceive it more cautiously as a procedure that goes back from a given effect to some part of the nexus of life that made the effect possible. To be certain, the latter relation is implicit in the circumstances themselves, and thus the transition from one to the other is, as it were, always at hand—but it need not take place.

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What is thus interrelated is linked in a distinctive way. The relationship between manifestations of life and spirit governing all understanding asserts itself here in its most elementary form, that is, understanding tends to focus on the expressed spiritual or meaning content, and yet the sensorially given manifestations or expressions are not submerged in this content. That gesture and fright are not juxtaposed, but a unity, is based on the fundamental relation of expression to spiritual content. To this must be added the generic character of all elementary forms of understanding, to which we now turn.

3. OBJECTIVE SPIRIT AND ELEMENTARY UNDERSTANDING

I have indicated the importance of objective spirit for the possibility of conceptual cognition in the human sciences. By this I mean the manifold forms in which a commonality existing among individuals has objectified itself in the world of the senses. In this objective spirit, the past is a continuously enduring present for us. Its scope extends from lifestyles and forms of social intercourse to the system of purposes that society has created for itself. It also encompasses custom, law, state, religion, art, the sciences, and philosophy. For even the work of a genius will reflect a common stock of ideas, attitudes, and ideals characteristic of an age and a region. From earliest childhood, the self is nurtured by this world of objective spirit. It is also the medium in which the understanding of other persons and their life-manifestations takes place. For everything in which spirit has objectified itself contains something that is common to the I and the Thou. Every square planted with trees, every room in which chairs are arranged, is understandable to us from childhood because human tendencies to set goals, produce order, and define values in common have assigned a place to every square and every object in the room. The child grows up within the order and ethos of the family that it shares with the other members, and in this context it accepts the way the mother regulates things. Before the child learns to speak, it is already wholly immersed in the medium of commonalities. The child only

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learns to understand the gestures and facial expressions, movements and exclamations, words and sentences, because it constantly encounters them as the same and in the same relation to what they mean and express. Thus the individual becomes oriented in the world of objective spirit.

This leads to an important result for the process of understanding. Individuals do not usually apprehend manifestations of life in isolation, but as filled with a knowledge about commonalities and as encompassing a relation to something inner.

Locating the individual manifestation of life within a common context is facilitated by the fact that objective spirit possesses an articulated order. It encompasses particular homogeneous systems like law or religion, which have a stable and regular structure. Thus in civil law, the imperatives enunciated in legal clauses in order to secure the highest possible degree of perfection in the conduct of human affairs are related to judicial procedures, law courts, and other institutions to execute its decisions. Within such a context many typical differences emerge. Thus the particular manifestations of life that confront the understanding subject can be considered as belonging to a sphere of commonality, to a type. The commonality sets up a relation between manifestations of life and spirit such that as soon as we locate the manifestation in a common context, a spiritual meaning attaches to it. A sentence is intelligible by virtue of the commonality that exists within a linguistic community about the meaning of words and of forms of inflection and about the sense of syntactical structure. The code of conduct that has been established in a specific cultural sphere makes it possible to choose from a range of greetings and gestures to communicate a definite stance toward other persons and to have it understood as such. In many countries the crafts have developed a specific procedure and special instruments for achieving an end. This means that when a *(craftsman)* uses a hammer or saw, his purpose is intelligible to us. In this sphere the relation between a manifestation of life and human spirit is everywhere established by a common order. This illuminates why this relation is present in the apprehension of a particular manifestation of life and why, without conscious inference based on the relationship of expression and what is expressed, both parts of the process of understanding are fused into a unity.

If we seek a logical construction for elementary understanding, then we find that the link between expression and what is expressed in the individual instance is inferred from the common-

ality of the link. On the basis of this commonality, we can say of the manifestation of life that it expresses something about human spirit. Here we have an inference from analogy in which a predicate is assigned to a subject with probability on the basis of a finite series of cases involved in a common situation.

Our proposed theory of the difference between elementary and higher forms of understanding justifies the traditional distinction between pragmatic and historical interpretation by basing the difference on the relationship within understanding itself between elementary and composite forms.

4. THE HIGHER FORMS OF UNDERSTANDING

The transition from elementary to higher forms of understanding is already incipient in the former. The greater the inherent distance between a given manifestation of life and the one who seeks to understand it, the more frequently uncertainties will arise. Then an attempt is made to overcome them. A first transition to higher forms of understanding occurs when understanding departs from the normal connection between an expression and the meaning content expressed in it. When the result of understanding presents an inner difficulty or something contradictory to what is otherwise familiar, we are forced to reconsider. We recall other cases in which the normal relation between the manifestation of life and its inner content does not exist. Such a divergence already occurs when we withdraw our inner states, ideas, or intentions from the view of unwanted spectators by means of an impenetrable pose or by silence. Here the mere absence of a visible manifestation is falsely interpreted by the observer. But not infrequently we should expect that there is also an intention to deceive us. Then facial expressions, gestures, and words contradict the inner state of affairs. Thus in various ways, the task arises of considering other manifestations of life or of going back to the overall nexus of life in order to resolve our doubts.

Interactions in practical life also establish their own demands on our ability to make judgments about the character and capacities of particular human beings. We constantly rely on the interpretations of specific gestures, facial expressions, actions, or combinations of them; they occur in inferences from analogy, but our understanding pushes us further. Trade and commerce, social life, occupation, and family point to the need to gain insight into the inner nature of the people around us so that we can make sure

how far we can count on them. Here the relation between an expression and what is expressed goes over into that between the multiple manifestations of another person and the inner nexus that underlies them. This leads us to also take changing circumstances into account. What we have here is an inductive inference from particular manifestations of life to the overall nexus of life. It presupposes a knowledge of psychic life and its relation to milieu and circumstances. Because the series of available manifestations of life are limited and because the underlying nexus is indeterminate, only probable results can be expected. If we infer how a life-unit that we have understood will act in new circumstances, the deductive inference from an inductively arrived at insight into a psychic nexus can only produce expectations and possibilities. When we proceed from a psychic nexus that is itself merely probable and add new circumstances to consider how it would react to them, we can only generate an expectation, not a certainty. As we shall soon see, the presupposed knowledge of psychic life is always capable of further development; but it will also turn out that it can never attain certainty.

But not all higher forms of understanding are based on the fundamental relationship between what has been produced and productivity. We already saw that such an assumption is not correct for elementary forms of understanding; but a very important portion of the higher forms is also based on the relation between expression and what is expressed. In many cases, the understanding of human creations is directed merely at the nexus in which the successively apprehended parts of a work form a whole. Indeed, if understanding is to generate the greatest possible yield for our knowledge of the world of human spirit, it is most important that this form of understanding should be appreciated in its own right. When a play is performed, it is not only the naive spectator who is completely absorbed in the plot without thinking of the author; even those with literary training can be completely spell-bound by what happens on the stage. Their understanding is directed toward the nexus of the plot, the characters, and the interweaving of those moments that determine the turn of fate. Only then will they enjoy the full reality of the extract of life that is presented. The process of understanding and re-experiencing will then come to fruition as intended by the poet. The whole realm of such understanding of human creations is dominated by the relationship between expressions and the world of human spirit expressed in them. Only when the spectator notices that what he has

just absorbed as a fragment of reality arose as an artistically planned creation in the mind of the poet does his understanding, initially governed by this relation between a complex of manifestations of life and what is expressed in them, pass over into an understanding dominated by the relation between creation and creator.

The common characteristic of the forms of higher understanding discussed so far is that they take given manifestations and arrive at an understanding of the nexus of a whole through an inductive inference. The basic relationship defining the move from external givens to what inheres in them is either, in the first instance, that of expression to what is expressed or, predominantly, that of what has been produced to productivity. The procedure is based on elementary understanding that makes available, as it were, the elements for reconstruction. But higher understanding differs from elementary understanding by a further trait, which first makes its nature fully visible.

Understanding always has something individual as its object. In its higher forms it proceeds on the basis of an inductive gathering of what is given in a work or a life to infer the overall connectedness or unity of a work or person—a life-relationship. The analysis of lived experience and of self-understanding has shown that the individual is an intrinsic value in the world of human spirit; indeed it is the only intrinsic value that we can establish indubitably. Thus we are concerned with the individual, not merely as an example of the human in general but as an individual whole. Independently of the practical interest that constantly forces us to take other people into account, be they noble or wicked, vulgar or foolish, this concern occupies a considerable place in our lives. The mystery of the person lures us for its own sake into ever new and deeper attempts at understanding. In such understanding the realm of individuals, encompassing human beings and their creations, opens up. Here lies the most distinctive contribution of understanding for the human sciences. Together, objective spirit and the productive force of the individual define the world of human spirit. History is based on the understanding of both.

However, we understand individuals by means of their affinities, their commonalities. This process presupposes the connection between the universally human and individuation. On the basis of what is universal, we can see individuation extended to the manifoldness of human existence, and thereby we constantly solve the practical task of living through the advance to individuation from within, as it were. The material for solving this task is formed by

the particular givens gathered by induction. Each such given has an individual character and is apprehended as such; it therefore contains a moment that makes it possible to grasp the individual articulation of the whole. But the presupposition on which this procedure is based assumes ever more developed forms as we become absorbed in the particular and compare it with other particulars; thus the business of understanding takes us into ever greater depths of the world of spirit. Just as objective spirit contains within itself an order that is articulated in terms of types, humanity also encompasses a kind of ordering system that leads from the regularity and structure of the universally human to the types by which understanding grasps individuals. If we assume that individuals are not distinguished qualitatively but by means of the relative emphasis of particular moments—however one may express this psychologically—then this is the inner principle of individuation. And if it were possible, in the act of understanding, to activate both the external principle of individuation, whereby circumstances produce changes in psychic life and its state, and the inner principle of individuation, whereby different accentuations of structural moments produce variations, then the understanding of human beings and of poetic and literary works would be a way of gaining access to the greatest mystery of life. In fact, this is the case. To acknowledge this we must attend to what cannot be made accessible through logical formulas—here only a schematic and symbolic explication can be provided.

5. TRANSPOSITION, RE-CREATING, AND RE-EXPERIENCING

The position that higher understanding adopts toward its object is defined by its task of discovering a vital connectedness in what is given.²¹⁴ This is only possible if the connectedness that exists in one's own lived experience and has been experienced in innumerable cases is always available to accompany the possibilities inherent in the object. This disposition involved in the task of understanding we call "transposition," and this can occur in relation to a human being or a work. Then every line of a poem is transformed back into life through the inner nexus of the lived experience from which the poem arose. Through elementary operations of understanding, physically presented words evoke possibilities that lie within the psyche. It goes back to some of the accustomed paths in which it enjoyed and suffered, desired and acted, in similar situations. But in the past and in our dreams of the future, innumerable

roads are still open; from the words we read there emerge innumerable trains of thought. When the poem indicates the external situation, it is more likely that the poet's words will evoke the appropriate mood. Here too what has been mentioned before is the case, namely, that expressions of lived experience may contain more than the poet or artist is conscious of and therefore may recall more. If the perspective of understanding requires the presence of the experience of one's own psychic nexus, this can also be described as the *transfer* of one's self into a given complex of manifestations of life.

On the basis of this transfer or transposition there arises the highest form of understanding in which the totality of psychic life is active—re-creating or re-experiencing. Understanding as such is an operation running inverse to the course of production. But a fully sympathetic reliving requires that understanding go forward with the line of the events themselves. It must advance continually with the course of life itself. Thus the process of transposing oneself or transposition expands to make re-experiencing a creation along the line of the events. This allows us to move forward with contemporary history, with an occurrence in a distant land, or with something going on in the psyche of someone close to us. Re-experiencing attains its fulfillment when an event has been processed by the consciousness of a poet, artist, or historian and lies before us in a fixed and permanent work.

A lyrical poem makes possible, through the sequence of its verses, the re-experiencing of a nexus of lived experience—not the real one that stimulated the poet, but the one that, on its basis, the poet places in the mouth of an ideal person. The sequence of scenes in a play allows us to re-experience fragments from the life-course of the portrayed persons. The tale of the novelist or the narrative of the historian that follows the historical course of events produces an act of re-experiencing in us. The triumph of re-experiencing is that it completes the fragments of a course of events in such a way that we believe them to possess a continuity.

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What, then, is involved in such re-experiencing? Here we are only interested in what the process achieves; we will not give a psychological explanation of it. Thus we will not discuss the relationship of this concept to those of sympathy and empathy, though their connectedness is clear insofar as sympathy strengthens the energy of re-experiencing. We will focus on the significance of re-experiencing for our appropriation of the world of human spirit. It displays two modes: [1] every lively presentification of a milieu

and external situation stimulates a re-experiencing in us, and [2] the imagination can increase or diminish the intensity of the attitudes, powers, feelings, strivings, and thought-tendencies that characterize our own life-nexus in order to re-create the psychic life of any other person. When the curtain goes up and Richard appears, sensitive spectators attending to his words, facial expressions, and movements can re-experience something that lies outside any possibility in their real life. The fantastic forest in *As You Like It* transposes us into a mood that allows us to re-create all its eccentricities.

Such re-experiencing plays a significant part in the acquisition of the cultural achievements that we owe to the historian and the poet. Each person's life-course becomes increasingly determined in ways that limit its inherent possibilities. The shaping of character determines all further development. In short, each person, whether he considers the fixed limits of his situation or the form of his acquired life-nexus, finds that the range of new perspectives on life and of inner transformations of personal existence is restricted. But understanding opens up a wide realm of possibilities that are not available within the limitations of a person's real life. The possibility of experiencing religious states in my own life is narrowly delimited for me, as for most of my contemporaries. But when I survey the letters and writings of Luther, the reports of his contemporaries, the records of religious disputes and councils, and those of his dealings with officials, I experience a religious process of an eruptive power and intensity commensurate with issues of life and death, which is beyond the possibility of direct experience for a present-day human being. But I can re-experience it. I transpose myself into circumstances in which everything supports such an extraordinary development of religious emotional life.

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In monasteries I see a technique of communicating with the invisible world that gives monks a constant orientation toward transcendent matters; theological controversies here become questions of inner life. I note how what is thus created in the monasteries is spread through innumerable channels—sermons, confessions, teachings, and writings—to the laity; and then I note how councils and religious movements have spread the doctrine of the invisible church and universal priesthood everywhere and how it comes to be related to the liberation of personality in secular life. Consequently, what has been achieved by intense struggles in lonely cells asserts itself despite the church's opposition. Christianity as a productive force for shaping life even in its family, professional, and

political relations has become a power that accommodates the spirit of the age in large cities and wherever culture flourishes, as in the Nuremberg of Hans Sachs⁸ or Dürer.⁹ As Luther strides at the head of this movement, we can experience his development on the basis of a connectedness that proceeds from the universally human through the religious sphere to its historical setting and, finally, his individuality. Thus this process opens up for us a religious world both in him and in his companions of the early stages of the Reformation, which serves to widen our horizon of the possibilities of human existence. Only in this way do these possibilities become accessible to us. Thus human beings who are determined from within can experience many other kinds of existence through the imagination. Confined by circumstances, they can nevertheless glimpse exotic beauties of the world and regions of life beyond their reach. Put generally: Human beings bound and limited by the reality of life are liberated not only by art—as has often been claimed—but also by the understanding of the historical. This effect of history, which its most recent detractors have not noticed, is widened and deepened at more advanced levels of historical consciousness.

6. EXEGESIS OR INTERPRETATION

Re-creating and re-experiencing what is foreign and from the past shows clearly how understanding is based on a special, personal kind of genius. But because understanding is a significant and permanent task that grounds the science of history, personal genius becomes a technique that emerges with the development of historical consciousness. It requires that permanently fixed manifestations of life be available so that understanding can always return to them. The rule-guided understanding of permanently fixed manifestations of life we call “exegesis” or “interpretation.” Since it is only in language that the life of mind and spirit finds its complete and exhaustive expression—one that makes objective comprehension possible—exegesis culminates in the interpretation of

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⁸ Hans Sachs (1494–1576), German poet, shoemaker by trade; composed over six thousand narratives, songs, fables, and allegories; a supporter of Luther, he wrote the verse allegory *Die Wittembergische Nachtigalle* to further the Reformation; leader of the Meistersingers in Nuremberg.

⁹ Albrecht Dürer (1471–1528), German Renaissance painter and engraver, also active in Nuremberg.

the written records of human existence. This art is the basis of philology. The science of this art is hermeneutics.

The interpretation of surviving remnants is intimately and necessarily connected with criticism. This results from difficulties presented by exegesis and leads to the purification of texts and the rejection of documents, works, and traditions. Interpretation and criticism have developed ever new means over the course of history, just as science has constantly refined its experiments. The transmission of these means from one generation of philologists and historians to another rests predominantly on personal contact with the great virtuosi and the tradition of their achievements. Nothing in the sphere of the sciences appears so personally conditioned and based on personal contact as this philological art. Its codification in terms of hermeneutical rules was characteristic of a stage in history when attempts were made to introduce rules in all areas; this hermeneutical codification corresponded to theories of artistic creation that considered it as a production according to rules. In the great period when historical consciousness dawned in Germany, Friedrich Schlegel, Schleiermacher, and Boeckh replaced this hermeneutical codification with an idealistic theory that based a new, deeper kind of understanding on a conception of spiritual creation; Fichte had made this possible, and Schlegel intended to establish it in his projected science of critique. This new intuitive insight into creation provided the basis for Schleiermacher's bold assertion that one should understand an author better than he understood himself. There is a truth embedded in this paradox that can be grounded psychologically.

Today hermeneutics enters a context that assigns the human sciences a new, important task. It has always defended the reliability of understanding against historical skepticism and subjective arbitrariness: first when it attacked allegorical exegesis, then when it justified the great Protestant doctrine of the intelligibility of the biblical texts by themselves against the skepticism of the Council of Trent, and then again when it provided the theoretical foundations for the confidence of Schlegel, Schleiermacher, and Boeckh in the progress of the philological and historical sciences over against all doubts. Now hermeneutics must define its task relative to the epistemological task of demonstrating that it is possible to know the nexus of the historical world and to find the means for bringing it about. The fundamental meaning of understanding has been clarified, and now we must determine the attainable degree of universal validity in understanding from its logical forms upwards.

We found the point of departure for establishing how much the assertions of the human sciences correspond to reality in the nature of experiencing, which is a reflexive awareness of reality.

When experiencing is raised to attentive consciousness in elementary operations of thought, they merely note relationships contained in lived experience. Discursive thought re-presents what inheres in experiencing. Understanding rests primarily on the relation, inherent in every lived experience that can be characterized as understanding, of an expression to what is expressed in it. This relation can be experienced in its distinctiveness. And because we can only overstep the narrow sphere of experiencing by interpreting manifestations of life, understanding assumes a central role in the formation of the human sciences. But it has also become evident that understanding cannot be conceived simply as a logical operation; transposition, re-creation, and re-experiencing point to the overall nature of psychic life at work in the process of understanding. In this respect it is connected with experiencing itself, which, after all, is merely a reflexive awareness of the whole psychic reality in a given situation. There is something irrational in all understanding, just as life itself is irrational; it cannot be represented in a logical formula. The ultimate, although quite subjective, sureness residing in this re-experiencing cannot be replaced by any cognitively tested inferences that explicate the process of understanding. These are the limits placed on the logical treatment of understanding by its very nature.

We note that the laws and forms of logic are clearly valid in every part of science, and that its methods manifest extensive affinities in accordance with the cognitive stance toward reality. But understanding introduces procedures that have no analogy in the methods of the natural sciences. These procedures of understanding are based on the relation between manifestations of life and something inner expressed in them.

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From the thought procedure involved in understanding we must distinguish the preliminary grammatical and historical work that merely serves to place us over against some fixed product of the past or of a distant origin, or using a foreign language in the position of a reader from the author's own time and environment.

In the elementary forms of understanding, we infer from a number of cases in which a series of similar manifestations express a meaning with a corresponding affinity that the same relation will hold in other similar cases. From the recurrence of the same meaning of a word, a gesture, a public act, we infer this meaning in a

new instance. One notes immediately, however, how little this inference schema achieves by itself. In reality, as we have seen, manifestations of life are at the same time re-presentations of something universal; we draw an inference when we can classify them as a type of gesture or act or as part of a sphere of usage. The inference from particular to particular contains a reference to something common, which is re-presented in every case. This relationship becomes even clearer when, instead of inferring a new instance from the relationship between a series of particular, similar manifestations and the psychic life whose expression it is, ever more complex individual states of affairs become the object of an inference by analogy. Thus from the regular connection between definite properties in a complex character we infer that with the existence of this combination in a new instance, an as yet unobserved trait will not be lacking. On the basis of the same kind of inference, we assign a mystical writing that has been newly discovered, or needs to be chronologically reclassified, to a particular sphere of mysticism at a particular time. With this kind of inference there is the tendency to derive the way the particular parts are connected in such a structure from individual cases and thus to ground new instances more thoroughly. Thus in fact the inference by analogy goes over into an inductive inference that can be applied to a new instance. The distinction between these two forms of inference has only a relative validity in the process of understanding. As a result, we are only justified in a somewhat limited degree of expectation about a new case—a degree about which no universal rule can be given, but only an assessment based on varying circumstances. It is the task of a logic of the human sciences to find the rules for such an assessment.¹⁰

The process of understanding based on this is to be conceived as inductive. This induction is of the kind in which an incomplete series of cases is used not to infer a universal law but a structure or ordering system that gathers the cases as parts of a whole. The natural sciences and the human sciences share this type of induction. Kepler discovered the elliptical orbit of the planet Mars by such an induction. And just as he inferred a simple mathematical regularity from observations and calculations by means of a geometrical intuition, so all efforts to attain understanding or intelligibility must try to gather words into a sense and the sense of the parts of a whole into the structure of the latter. What is given here

¹⁰ There seems to be a gap in the manuscript here. (H)

is a sequence of words. Each of these words is determinate-indeterminate. It encompasses a range of meanings. The means of syntactically relating these words to each other are, also, ambiguous, within fixed limits; sense emerges when the indeterminate is determined by a construction. In the same way, the compositional value of a whole made up of sentences is ambiguous within limits and must be defined on the basis of the whole. This process of determining determinate-indeterminate particulars . . .

Addenda

I. MUSICAL UNDERSTANDING

In lived experience we grasp the self neither in the form of its full course nor in the depths of what it encompasses. For the scope of conscious life rises like a small island from inaccessible depths. But an expression can tap these very depths. It is creative. Thus in understanding, life itself can become accessible through the re-creation of creation. To be sure, we have merely a work before us, one that in order to endure must be fixed in some part of space, whether in notes, in letters, in a phonogram, or originally in a remembrance. What is fixed in this way is an ideal explication of a process, of a musical or poetic nexus of lived experience. And what do we observe here? Parts of a whole that develop and move forward in time. In each part there is operative what we call a tendency. Tone follows upon tone and aligns itself with it according to the laws of our tonal system. This system leaves open infinite possibilities, but in the direction of one of these possibilities, tones proceed in such a way that earlier ones are conditioned by subsequent ones. The ascending parts of a melody may be synchronous and an earlier part may condition those that follow. But the final melody of an ascending progression of notes in a work by Handel at the same time grounds the first of them. Similarly, a descending line strives for resolution: it is conditioned by this endpoint and yet it also conditions it. Everywhere free possibility. Nowhere in this conditioning is there necessity. There is something like a mutual consent between figures that attract and then repel each other. It would be presumptuous to think that we could in any way know why a second phrase follows upon the first, just in the way it does with such a new harmonic nuance or is transformed in such a variation or embellished with this figure. There is

a having-to-be-thus in this sequence—it involves not necessity but rather the actualization of an aesthetic value. We should not think that what follows at a certain point could not have gone differently. We see here a tendency inherent in creation toward what reflection calls the beautiful or sublime.

Let us look further. [Musical] understanding depends on being able to retain in memory what has just passed so that it can enter into the intuition of what follows.

The object of the historical study of music is not some mental or psychic process behind the composition, but something objective, namely, the tonal nexus that appears in the imagination as expression. Its task is to find through comparison—for it is a comparative discipline—the tonal means for individual musical effects.

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But there is a wider sense in which music too is the expression of lived experience. Here “lived experience” designates every kind of linking of specific experiences in the present and in memory; analogously, “expression” designates an imaginative process in which lived experience illuminates the historically evolved world of tones, in which all the ways of being expressive have been connected in the historical continuity of the tradition. There is, then, no rhythmical form or melody in this imaginative creation that does not speak of what has been experienced, and yet everything is more than expression. For this musical world with its infinite possibilities of tonal beauties and of meaning is always there, always advancing in history, capable of endless development. And it is in this world that the musician lives, not in his feelings.

No musical history could say anything about the way in which lived experience becomes music. The highest achievement of music is that what proceeds dimly, indeterminately, in a musical soul, and often imperceptibly to itself, unintentionally finds a crystal-clear expression in a musical form. There is no duality of lived experience and music, no double world, no carryover from the one to the other. Genius is simply living in the tonal sphere as if it alone existed; all fate and suffering is forgotten in this tonal world, but in such a way that they are all still there. Also there is no determinate path from lived experience to music. The composer living in his music—whether through memories, fluttering images, or dissipated indeterminate moods that permeate the very delights of his creative process—may take as his point of departure either a rhythmic invention or a harmonic sequence or then again a lived experience. Of all the arts, music is most strictly bound by technical rules and the most free in mental movement.

In this back and forth we can locate everything creative and at

the same time the never fully penetrable mystery how tonal sequences and rhythms mean something other than what they are themselves. This is not a psychological relationship between mental states and their representation in the imagination. Those who look for that seek a will-o'-the-wisp. Rather, it is a relationship of an objective musical work and its parts as an imaginative creation to what it means in terms of its every melodic line; that is, what it says to the listener about a mental complex consisting of relations between rhythm, melody, and harmonic progression and the impression of something mental that speaks through all this. Not psychological, but musical relationships form the object of the study of musical genius, works, and theory. The artist can proceed in innumerable ways, but the relation between a musical work and what it expresses to the listener and says to him is determinate, graspable, and representable. We speak of the interpretation of a musical work given by a conductor or performing artist, but every relationship to a musical work is interpretive and deals with something objective. What is psychologically operative in the artist can proceed from music to lived experience or from it to music or both in alternating fashion, and what has its basis in the psyche need not be, indeed usually is not, experienceable by the artist as such. It moves imperceptibly in the obscurity of the psyche, and the dynamic relationship that existed in these depths is first expressed in the work. It is only from the work that we can discern it. That is the very value of music: It expresses and makes objective for us the mental life of the artist. This complex assemblage of quality, temporal sequence, dynamic form, and content is analyzed in the musical work and brought to distinct consciousness as a relationship of rhythm, tonal progression, and harmony—a relationship of tonal beauty and expression.

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What is primary is the tonal world with its possibilities of expression and beauty as developed in the history of music. This is appropriated by musicians from childhood on and is always there for them. Everything they confront is transformed into this tonal world and rises from the depths of the psyche in order to express what was there. Fate, suffering, and happiness exist for composers above all in their melodies. Here memory again asserts its power in producing meaning. The difficulties of life are too strong to allow the imagination a free rein. But the resonance of the past and our reveries about it provide the airy material, removed from earthly gravity, from which the light shapes of music are composed.

There are aspects of life that can be expressed as rhythm, melody, and harmony, as forms of flow and of the rise and fall of a

mood; what is uninterrupted and constant, the profundity of psychic life that comes to rest in harmony.

The available foundations of musical history should be supplemented by a theory of musical meaning. Such a theory is the intermediary that connects the other theoretical parts of musicology with creation and further backwards with the life of the artist and the development of musical schools. A theory of musical meaning is such an intermediary relational system and the entry point into the real mysteries of the musical imagination.

Let me give some examples. In the finale of the first act of *Don Giovanni*, we hear rhythms not only of a different tempo but also of a different measure. This has the effect that very disparate aspects of human life such as delight in dance [and anger] seem to be combined, so that the manifold nature of the world can be expressed. This is the very effect of music that relies on the possibility of allowing various simultaneously coexisting persons or musical subjects such as choruses, etc. to affect us, whereas poetry is restricted to dialogue, etc. This is the basis for the so-called metaphysical nature of music. Or consider an aria of Handel in which a tonal sequence that is simple in all respects is repeated in an ascending order. Thus a surveyable whole arises in memory; this kind of crescendo becomes an expression of productive force. In the final analysis, it depends on the capacity of memory to survey a temporal sequence due to its simplicity. Or consider a chorale that was developed on the basis of a folk song. The simple song pattern that expresses the course of a feeling very clearly comes to stand under new conditions. The slow, steady progression of tones and the harmonic sequence that is carried by the bass notes of the organ now allow for the emergence of a relation to a sublime object that rises above the fluctuation of feeling in its very midst. What is made expressible in this way is something like religious communion, the relation to the supersensible from within time, the relation of the finite to the infinite. Or consider the conversation of the trembling soul with its savior in a Bach cantata. On the one hand, restless, rapid, high-pitched notes, leaping across considerable intervals into the coloratura range, signify a psychic type; on the other hand, a slow progression of low and restful notes, the majority of which fall within a small range, together with schemata of a soothing tonality, signifies the redeemer type. No one can doubt such meanings.¹¹

¹¹ Several unintelligible words follow. (H)

Musical meaning develops in two opposed directions. On the one hand, as expressing a poetic series of words with a determinate object, musical meaning goes in the direction of an interpretation of something that has been objectively established by conditions. [On the other hand,] instrumental music has no determinate object, but one that is infinite, i.e., indeterminate. Such an object is provided only by life itself. Thus in its highest forms, instrumental music has life itself as its object. A musical genius such as Bach is inspired by each sound in nature, by each gesture, even by indeterminate noises, to create corresponding musical forms—moving themes, as it were, that have the attribute of speaking about life in general terms. Here we see that program music is the death of true instrumental music.

2. LIVED EXPERIENCE AND UNDERSTANDING¹²

It follows from this account that various kinds of comprehension—explication, reproduction, and representation through discursive functions—combine to form a method aimed at grasping and exhausting lived experience. Since lived experience is unfathomable and no thought can go behind it, since cognition itself only comes about in relation to it, since consciousness of lived experience must constantly probe it, the task of comprehending lived experience is infinite, not just in the sense that it demands ever more scientific accomplishment but in the sense that it is insoluble by its very nature. Then understanding comes into the picture. It has an equally original task even though methodically it must presuppose lived experience. Lived experience and understanding constitute two aspects of the logical process that reinforce each other.

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3. METHODS OF UNDERSTANDING

To a human being caught up in daily life, the past seems at first the more foreign and indifferent the more distant it is. Its remains lie there as something whose connection to us has been broken. Here the procedure of understanding that the researcher has constantly practiced in life itself claims its place.

1. Description of this procedure. We experience ourselves, but we do not understand ourselves. Everything about ourselves is

¹² We have kept this section where Bernard Groethuysen, the editor of GS VII, placed it, but it fits more appropriately at the end of page 151 above.

self-evident; however, we have no external standard by which to measure ourselves. Only what we measure by the measure of ourselves obtains determinate dimensions and boundaries. Can the self measure itself by others? And how do we understand that which is unfamiliar or alien?

The more gifted someone is, the more possibilities there are in him. They have asserted themselves in the course of his life and are still present in his memory. The longer a life lasts, the more encompassing these remembered possibilities. Thus we speak of the all-encompassing understanding of old age and the genius of understanding.

2. [There is a] form of understanding [that applies] induction to partially determined details to infer a connection that determines a whole.

4.¹³ THE LIMITS OF UNDERSTANDING

The limits of understanding lie also in the modes of givenness. A literary work forms an inner nexus; although this nexus is not itself temporal, we can only apprehend it in the sequential process of reading or hearing it in time. When I read a drama, it is as with life itself. As I move forward, the past loses its clarity and determinacy: scenes become obscured. My main thesis is that only when I cling to the nexus do I attain a unified overview of the scenes, but this gives me merely a skeleton. I can approximate an intuition of the whole by incorporating it in my memory so that all the moments of the nexus are included. Understanding thus becomes an intellectual process demanding the greatest effort, one that can never be fully realized.

When life has passed by, nothing remains but the memory of it; this memory is also linked to the continued life of individuals and is accordingly fleeting. . . .¹⁴

The comprehension of these remnants of the past everywhere

¹³ In GS VII, this is section 5 and follows section 4 from GS VII 225–26, entitled “Hermeneutics.” Research has shown, however, that the original section 4 should not have been added by Groethuysen, the editor. It is merely a series of notes Dilthey excerpted from Schleiermacher and therefore has been omitted in this edition. See “Ein Schleiermacher-Exzerpt in Diltheys Fragmenten zum *Aufbau*” in *Dilthey-Jahrbuch für Philosophie und Geschichte der Geisteswissenschaften*, ed. Fritjof Rodi, vol. 12 (1999–2000) (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2000), pp. 271–72.

¹⁴ Several unreadable lines follow. (H)

involves understanding. Only the modes of understanding differ. Common to all modes of understanding is the move beyond the apprehension of indeterminate-determinate parts to attempt to grasp the sense of the whole, and from this in turn to seek to more firmly determine the parts. Its failure occurs when individual parts resist being understood in this way. And this requires a new determination of the sense, which also does justice to these parts. And this effort goes on until all the sense inherent in the manifestations of life is exhausted. What is most distinctive of understanding is that it does not operate with something univocally determinable as in our cognition of nature, such as the representational image that is regarded as fundamental [to] external reality. The representation is basic for our cognition of nature as a fixed magnitude that appears in intuition. The object is constructed from representations as something persistent that can explain the changes of representations.

The operations of understanding are essentially relational in that the external refers to the internal, the whole to the parts. We have here something determinate-indeterminate, an attempt at determination, a process that will never come to an end, an interchange between part and whole.

III. The Categories of Life

LIFE

Let us consider the human world. It is also the proper sphere of poets and writers. The events they portray happen there. The characteristics by which they lend significance to events are taken from this human world. How poets are able to superimpose a new reality over life that can disturb us, expand, and uplift our soul like life itself is a great mystery that can be solved only if the relations of this human world and its basic features to literature are made clear. Only then can we develop a theory that will convert the history of literature into a historical science.

Life is the nexus of interactions between persons as conditioned by the external world but considered independently of changes in time and place. In the human sciences, I confine the term "life" to the human world. Its meaning is defined here by the domain in which it is used and is not subject to misunderstanding. Life consists in the interactions of life-units. The psychophysical life-course, which from our perspective begins and ends in time, constitutes something that has an identity for the outside observer because of the selfsameness of the body in which the process takes place. At the same time, however, this life-course is characterized by the noteworthy state of affairs that each of its parts is connected in consciousness with other parts of a lived experience that is marked by the continuity, connectedness, and selfsameness of what elapses. Likewise the expression "interaction" in the human sciences does not signify the kind of relationship that thought ascertains in nature, which would make it an aspect of causality; the causality we can detect in nature always implies *causa aequat effectum* [cause equals effect]; instead, interaction designates a lived experience that can be expressed in terms of the relationship of impulse and resistance, pressure, the awareness of being furthered, joy about other persons, etc. Of course, impulse here does not signify a spontaneous force or causality as postulated by some explanatory psychological theories. It merely designates a state of affairs capable of being experienced, which is in some way rooted in the life-unit. Impulse is the lived experience of the intention to execute movements directed at an external effect. This is how lived experiences that are generally expressed as interactions among different persons emerge.

Life is the nexus in which these interactions occur as conditioned by the system of natural objects according to the law of causality, which also encompasses that aspect of the psychic process that relates to bodies. This kind of life is always and everywhere spatially and temporally determined—localized, so to speak, in the spatiotemporal affairs of life-units. However, if we focus on what occurs everywhere and always in the sphere of the human world, and as such makes possible spatially and temporally determined events—not by abstracting from the latter but in an intuition that leads from this whole with those traits that are always and everywhere the same to those that are differentiated in space and time—then a concept of life emerges that contains the foundation for all its individual forms and systems available for us to experience, understand, express, and compare.

Then and only then does a general trait of life begin to fill us with wonder—we only experience this in the human world, not in nature, not even in the natural objects that we designate as being alive or as organic forms of life.

LIVED EXPERIENCE

1

Life is intimately related to temporal fulfillment. Its whole character, both its inherent corruptibility and its capacity to form a nexus in which it has a unity or self, is determined by time.

Life exists in time in the relationship of parts to a whole, that is, as their nexus or connectedness.

That which is re-experienced in understanding is given in the same connectedness.

Life and what is re-experienced manifest a special relationship of parts to a whole, which is that of the meaning of parts for the whole. We see this most clearly in memory. In every life-concern in which our total being adopts a posture to itself or to others, we see again and again that parts have a significance for the whole. I look at a landscape and apprehend it. We should not assume that this is merely a relation of apprehension rather than a life-concern. Accordingly, we may not label the momentary lived experience that directly refers to the landscape an “image.” I prefer the term “impression.” Basically nothing but impressions are given to me. [There is] no self distinct from them nor something that they are the impression of. The latter I only add through a constructive act.

AN OBSERVATION

I would like to insist that meaning be linked with the totality of the apprehending subject. I could make the term "meaning" so universal that it applies to every relation between parts and wholes that is presented to the subject, so that the object of the thought process, or rather the relation of parts in objective thought and in purposive action, is also included and therefore even the general representation that construes particular images. But then meaning betokens nothing more than belonging to a whole, and the mystery of life how a whole can possess an organic or psychic reality is simply eliminated, etc.

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Viewed psychologically, the present is a passage of time whose extension we comprehend as a unity. We include in the present whatever becomes indistinguishable in its continuum. The present is a moment of life of which we are able to have a lived experience. But we also call what is structurally connected in memory a lived experience, even if the experiencing took place at different times.

The principle of lived experience is that everything that is there for us is so only as a given in the present. Even when a lived experience is past, it is only there for us as given in a present experience. The principle of consciousness is more general (and more inclusive), for it also encompasses the nonreal.

The next attribute of lived experience is its qualitative being—it has a reality that cannot be defined by reflexive awareness, for it also extends into what is not possessed distinctly (can one say "possessed" here?). The lived experience of something external, of the outer world, is there for me in a manner similar to what is not apprehended but can only be inferred. (I maintain that my lived experience also includes what is not distinct and needs to be explicated.)

It is a fact that a part of what is encompassed in my intuition (in the broadest sense of the word) can be brought into focus and apperceived through its significance. This can then be distinguished from those mental processes that have not been apperceived. This is what we call the self, and there exists the double relation of what I am and what I have.

The next thing to demonstrate is that lived experience also en-

compasses a real structural nexus of life, which is localized spatiotemporally and extends outward from the present, etc.; this contains a [further] structural nexus according to which an inherent purposiveness exerts a continued efficacy.

When we remember lived experiences, we can distinguish the manner in which they continue to have a (dynamic) efficacy in the present from lived experiences that are completely past. In the first case, feeling as such re-emerges; in the other, we have representations of feelings, etc. Only on the basis of the present can there be a feeling about these representations of feelings.

Living through an experience¹⁵ and lived experience¹⁶ are not distinct from each other; they are two ways of expressing the same thing.

From lived experience we then distinguish judgments that are given in apperception: I am sad, I witness a death, or I am notified about one. This brings with it the double direction of statements that express a given reality.

DURATION APPREHENDED IN UNDERSTANDING

In introspection that is directed at our own experiencing, we cannot apprehend the forward movement of the psychic process, for every act of fixation arrests that on which it focuses and gives it a certain duration. But here also the relationship of experiencing, expression, and understanding makes possible a solution. We grasp the expression of an action and we re-experience it.

The advance of time leaves ever more of the past behind and pushes forward into the future. The great problem, whether a psychic process is a mere passive occurrence of something . . . or an activity is solved when we see the process being expressed in such a way that a directedness comes to expression in what is apprehended. Even advancing in time and the psychic accumulation of the past do not suffice. I must seek out an expression that can occur in time and is not distorted from without. Instrumental music is one such expression. However it may have originated, it presents a sequence in which the creator can survey its temporal nexus from one formation to another. Here we see a tendency that is directed, an action reaching out for fulfillment, an advance of psychic activity itself, a being conditioned by the past and yet the

¹⁵ *Erleben*.

¹⁶ *Erlebnis*.

containment of various possibilities, an explication that is at the same time creative.

MEANING

A new trait of life becomes visible that is temporally conditioned but is something new that surpasses time. Life is understood in its own essence through categories that are alien to the cognition of the natural world. Here again it is decisive that these categories are not applied to life *a priori* as from the outside, but that they lie in the very nature of life. The attitude that gains abstract expression in them provides the sole point of access to the understanding of life. For life itself exists only in such determinate ways of relating a whole to its parts. And if we focus on these relations abstractly, as categories, then it is part of this very method that the number of such categories cannot be delimited and that their relationship cannot be reduced to a logical form. Meaning, value, purpose, development, and ideal are categories of this kind. Because the connectedness of the course of life can only be apprehended through the category of the meaning of the individual parts of life in relation to an understanding of the whole, and because every facet of human life can only be understood in the same way, all other categories depend on it. Meaning is the all-inclusive category in which life can be apprehended.

Mutability belongs just as much to the objects we construct in cognizing the natural world as to life, which has a reflexive awareness of itself in its determinations. Only in life, however, does the present encompass the representation of the past in memory and the representation of the future through the imaginative consideration of its possibilities and through activity that frames purposes for itself in light of these possibilities. Thus the present is filled with the past and carries the future within itself. This is the sense of the word "development" in the human sciences. It does not mean that we can apply to the life of the individual, the nation, or humanity the concept of a purpose to be realized; this would be a way of looking at the object from the outside and could just as well be rejected. This concept of development merely designates a relationship that inheres in life. With this concept of development we are simultaneously given the concept of something taking shape. Taking shape is a general property of life. If we look more deeply into life, we find something taking shape even in the most impoverished souls. We see it most clearly in great men who have

a historical destiny; but no life is so meager that its course lacks all shape. Wherever structure and the acquired psychic nexus based on it produce a constancy of life in which change and transitoriness can appear, there a temporary life-course becomes a mode of shaping. But this concept of something taking shape can only come about when we apprehend life in terms of the category of meaning.

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The category of meaning designates the relationship of parts of life to the whole as rooted in the nature of life. We only possess this connectedness through memory by which we can survey a life span that has elapsed. Thus meaning establishes itself as the form of life-comprehension. We grasp the meaning of a moment of the past. It is meaningful insofar as an act or some external event committing us to the future took place; or insofar as a plan to guide us into the future was adopted; or insofar as such a plan was carried out. Or it is meaningful for communal life insofar as an individual's engagement with it at the same time allows his distinctive being to contribute to the shaping of humanity. In all of these and other cases, the individual moment has meaning through its connection with the whole, through the relation of past and future, of individual existence and humanity. But what is the distinctive nature of this relation of part to whole within life?

It is a relation that is never completely consummated. For that one would have to wait until life runs its course, and only in the hour of death could one survey the whole to ascertain the relation between whole and parts. Similarly, one would have to wait for the end of history to possess material sufficiently complete to determine its meaning. On the other hand, the whole is only there for us insofar as we can understand it from the parts. Understanding always hovers between these two modes of consideration. Our comprehension of the meaning of life is continually changing. Every life-plan expresses a certain take on the meaning of life. What we set as our future goal conditions how we determine the meaning of the past, and any realized shape of life receives its measure from the way we assess the meaning of what is remembered. Just as words have a meaning by which they designate something, and sentences have a sense that we construe, so we can construe the connectedness of life from the determinate-indeterminate meaning of its parts.

Meaning is the special relation that the parts have to the whole within life. We recognize this meaning, as we do that of the words in a sentence, by virtue of memories and future possibilities. The

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essence of meaning relations lies in the shaping of a life-course over time on the basis of life-structure as conditioned by a milieu.

And what is it in the contemplation of one's own life-course that constitutes the connectedness of individual parts into a whole and makes life intelligible? A lived experience is a unit whose parts are connected by a common meaning. The storyteller exerts his influence by highlighting the meaningful moments of a life-course. The historian designates human beings as meaningful or important¹⁷ and turning points in their lives as significant;¹⁸ he recognizes the meaning¹⁹ of a work or of an individual by its determinate effect on human destiny in general. The parts of a life-course have a determinate meaning for the whole. In a word, the category of meaning obviously retains an especially close connection to understanding. We must now seek to grasp this connection.

Every manifestation of life has a meaning to the extent that, as a sign, it expresses something, and as an expression, it refers to something that pertains to life. Life itself does not mean anything else. There is no division within life that would be sufficient grounds for saying that it means something beyond itself.

Now if we use concepts to highlight something in life, then these serve first of all to describe life's singularity. These general concepts, therefore, serve to express the intelligibility of life. Here there is only a loose relationship in progressing from what is presupposed to what comes next: what is new does not follow formally from the presupposition. But understanding advances from a characteristic already grasped to a new one that can be understood on its basis. This inner relationship consists in the possibility of re-creating or re-experiencing. This is the general method as soon as understanding leaves the sphere of words and their sense and does not look for the sense of signs but for the much deeper sense of a manifestation of life. This method was first anticipated by Fichte. Life is like a melody in which the notes do not express realities embedded in life. The melody lies in life itself.

1. The simplest case in which meaning arises is the understanding of a sentence. Each individual word has a meaning, and we derive the sense of the sentence by combining them. We proceed so that the intelligibility of the sentence comes from the meaning of individual words. To be sure, there is a reciprocity between

¹⁷ *bedeutend*.

¹⁸ *bedeutsam*.

¹⁹ *Bedeutung*.

whole and parts by virtue of which the indeterminacy of sense, namely, the possibilities of sense, *(are established)* in relation to individual words.

2. The same relationship exists between the parts and the whole of a life-course, and here also the understanding of the whole, the sense of life, [arises] from the meaning . . .

3. With reference to a life-course, this relationship of meaning and sense is as follows: The particular events that constitute the life-course as it unfolds in the sensible world have a relationship to something that they mean, like the words of a sentence. Through this relationship, each particular lived experience is gathered together for its meaning on the basis of some whole. As the words in a sentence are connected into its intelligibility, so the togetherness of these lived experiences produces the meaning of a life-course. It is the same with history.

4. This concept of meaning [associated with a life-course or a history] has emerged only with reference to the procedure of understanding. It involves merely a relation of something outer, given in sense, to something inner of which it is the expression. But it is essentially different from a grammatical relation. When the parts of life express something inner, this is not just a mode of verbal signification, etc.

5. Accordingly, the words "meaning," "intelligibility," "sense of a life-course," or "history" do nothing more than indicate the relation inherent in understanding between events and the inner nexus by which they are understood.

6. What we are seeking is the type of connectedness that is proper to life itself—a connectedness rooted in particular life-events. For any event to contribute to this connectedness, it must possess something of the meaning of life; otherwise, this meaning could not arise from the nexus of events. Just as the natural sciences have their universal schematism in concepts that explicate the causality prevailing in the physical world, and a distinctive methodology for attaining conceptual cognition of it, so the categories of life disclose to us their relations to one another, their schematism, and the methods to grasp them. With the former, however, we are dealing with an abstract system whose logical nature is completely transparent. With the latter, we expect to understand the connectedness of life itself although it can never be entirely accessible to conceptual cognition.

We understand life only in a continual approximation. It is inherent to the nature of understanding *(and)* of life that they show

us entirely different aspects at the different points in which their temporal flow is apprehended. The category of meaning first manifests itself in memory (whenever we remember). Every present is filled with reality, to which we assign a positive or a negative value. And as we face the future, the categories of purpose, ideal, and giving shape to life arise. It is the mystery of life that it realizes some principal purpose to which all individual purposes are subordinated. Life realizes a highest good; it should be determined by ideals, and it exhibits a process of shaping. Each of these concepts includes within its perspective the whole of life. Therefore each has the character of a category through which the whole of life is understood. None of these categories can be subordinated to any other, since each discloses the whole of life to understanding from a different perspective. They are thus incapable of being compared to one another. Nevertheless, one distinction becomes evident. Our experience of the present discloses a plurality of distinctive values that cannot be united and are at best comparable. From this value-perspective, life appears as an infinite source of existential value, both negative and positive, and of distinctive values. Life is a chaos, full of harmonies and dissonances — but the dissonances cannot be resolved into harmonies. To the extent that a tonal formation fills the present, it possesses no musical relationship to an earlier or later one. And the means-end relation between productive values and intrinsic values posits only causal relationships, whose mechanical character does not reach into the depths of life.

The categories that apprehend life under the perspective of the future presuppose the categories of value; they differentiate into the various possibilities of forging ahead into the future.

The connectedness implicit in life obtains its explication only in the relation of the meaning of events of life to the understanding and the sense of the whole of life. Only in this region can the category supersede mere coordination and subordination. In this way the categorial attitudes of value and purpose as distinct facets of the understanding of life are assimilated into a total intelligibility.

MEANING AND STRUCTURE

1. The connectedness of lived experience in its concrete reality lies in the category of meaning. This is the unity that gathers the

sequence of what has been experienced or re-experienced into memory. Its meaning does not consist in a unifying point that lies outside lived experience, but is contained in these lived experiences and constitutes their connectedness.

This connectedness is, consequently, the peculiar mode of relation or category inherent in the nature of everything that can be experienced.

Where the meaning of life as experienced by an individual, whether it be I or another person or a nation, may be located is not unequivocally determined by the fact that there is such a meaning. But that it exists is always certain to the one remembering it as a relation of what can be experienced. Only in the final moment of a life can its meaning be fully appreciated, and thus, strictly speaking, it can appear only for a moment at the end of life or reappear in someone who re-experiences this life.

Luther's life thus acquires its meaning as the connectedness of all the concrete events involved in the conception and development of a new religiosity. This religiosity then forms a phase in the more inclusive concrete nexus of what precedes and follows. Meaning is now viewed historically. One can also, however, seek this meaning in the positive values of life, etc. Then it exists in relation to subjective feeling.

2. Here it becomes evident that meaning does not coincide either with values or with their connectedness in a life.

3. While meaning is the category for the unanalyzed life-nexus, the category of structure first appears from an analysis of life where what is alive in it recurs. Analysis in this sense seeks exclusively for what is inherent in this recurrent element. It finds nothing more than such inherence. What inheres has been singled out, and its conceptualization is only valid when it is connected with a consciousness of the life-nexus in which it is contained.

How far can this analysis go? The atomistic psychology of the natural sciences was followed by the Brentano school, which is a kind of psychological scholasticism, for it creates abstract entities such as kinds of attitude, object, content, from which it wants to compose life. Husserl is an extreme instance of this.

In contrast to this [we start with] the whole of life. Structure: the connectedness of this whole as conditioned by real relations of concern about the external world. An attitude is only one such relation of concern. Feeling or will are merely concepts that direct us to re-create corresponding aspects of life.

MEANING, SIGNIFICANCE, VALUE

1. Every aspect of the objective world that relates to life in interpretation and that displays itself in the overall objectification of life as a life-manifestation is a whole that has parts. It in turn is a part of some whole because it belongs to the nexus of reality, which is everywhere articulated into parts that again belong to a larger nexus of reality. Thus it is important in this dual reference as a member of a larger whole. This is the mark that life gives to everything that is experienced and re-experienced, for lived experience involves taking a stance, an attitudinal position to everything that manifests itself in a particular life-relationship, whether it concerns economic existence, friendship, or an invisible world. It is a productive nexus that is conditioned by this stance, this inner position. Life involves relations to things about which it adopts a stance, an attitude. Examples of such relations are being estranged, withdrawing from a life-relationship, being selective, love, retreating into oneself, longing for something, opposition, needing something, postulating it, veneration, stability of form, formlessness, the contradiction between life and objectivity, the powerlessness of life over against what is objective, the will to overcome what is unbearable in existing objectifications so that life can again enjoy itself, ideal, memory, separation, and unification.

The life-nexus contains its own suffering about its finitude, its own tendency to overcome it and to strive for realization and objectification, the negation of existing limits and their overcoming, separation, and connection.

Predicates derived from life itself are unholiness, poverty, the beauty of life, freedom, mode of life, nexus, development, inner logic, inner dialectic.

Oppositions between a this-worldly and an otherworldly stance, transcendence and immanence, reconciliation.

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2. The resulting relations of concern serve to establish the significance of the singular aspects of life. Significance is the determinateness of meaning of a part for a whole that comes about on the basis of a productive nexus or system. In the conduct of life within a productive nexus, significance manifests itself as a relationship of its constituents that extends further than the lived experience of being productive. Significance connects these constituents in an order that is independent of productivity. Productivity constitutes everything that happens in life. But the observer sees only what has been produced because the productivity of the self

is not cognizable. Attitudinal position and stance, however, go deeper in positing the mode of productivity of life itself. All concepts that have been developed here are *life-concepts* inherent in life. They obtain a new context in every life-unit, in every period. Each of them imparts its own coloring to everything that is there for life. Spatial relationships such as breadth, width, height, and depth are accentuated by our attitudinal position; the same holds for time. . . .

3. A nexus is produced in anthropological reflection, in art, in history, and in philosophy according to these relationships in which we always merely make conscious what inheres in life.

Anthropological reflection is first. Its nexus is based on productive systems such as of the passions, etc.; it projects their types and expresses the significance of these systems for the whole of life.

Since the consideration of one's own life works in conjunction with that of other persons, lived experience and understanding of one's self, understanding of other persons, and human acquaintance, generalizations arise in which value, meaning, and the purpose of life are expressed in a new way. They form a sphere of their own that lies between life itself and the art of universal historical narrative. It is a literature of almost boundless scope. Here the question arises how historical categories mediate its mode of understanding.

If our study of the human being is limited to the science of psychology as it has evolved today, then it cannot do justice to the historical course of this study, which has approached the human being from quite divergent angles. The most extreme opposition existing in this domain, however, is between what I once designated as psychology with content—it may also be called concrete psychology or anthropology—and the actual science of psychology. Anthropology is closely involved in questions about the meaning and the value of life, because it stands so close to concrete life. It has attempted to distinguish in life-courses of a certain type, stages in which the significance of life is fulfilled according to a specific type.

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The neo-Platonic type, the mystical type of the Middle Ages, and the stages in Spinoza [are examples of these].

A fulfillment of the meaning of life occurs in these schemata.

Poetry is rooted in the event as a productive nexus of life. Every kind of literature is somehow connected with an event that has been experienced or that is to be understood. It shapes the event by raising its parts to significance in the imagination according to

its characteristic of freely creating form. Everything that was said earlier about the conduct of life constitutes literature, and it gives forceful expression to this concern about life itself. Each thing receives a coloring that stems from its relation to the conduct of life—even such spatial terms as wide, high, and far. Past and present are not mere determinations of reality, but through his re-experiencing, the poet revives the concern about life that receded in the course of intellectual development and practical interests.

4. Significance, which appropriates a fact as a meaning-constituent determined by a whole, manifests a life-concern and not an intellectual relationship, and does not project reason or thought into this part of the overall event. Significance is derived from life itself. If we designate as the sense of a life-whole the connectedness resulting from the meaning of the parts, then the poetic work expresses the sense of life by means of freely creating a meaning context. The event becomes a symbol of life.

Starting with anthropological reflection, everything involves the illumination and explication of life itself; it is the same with poetry. What is hidden in the depths of life and is not accessible to observation and reasoning, poetry is able to mine. Thus poets and writers create the impression of being inspired.

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The limitation of poetry is that no method is at hand here for understanding life. Its phenomena are not arranged into a system. Its strength lies in the direct relation of concern between some event and life, whereby a poem becomes an immediate expression of the event and the free creation that takes the significance that has been seen and expresses it intuitively in the events themselves.

History is the domain of life apprehended both as its objectification in the sequence of time and as its formation in accordance with temporal and productive relationships. History is a whole that is never possible to complete. On the basis of what is contained in the sources and of what has happened, the historian shapes a sequence, a productive system. And he is obliged to raise the reality of this sequence to consciousness.

Here the meaning of the part is determined by its relationship to the whole, but in respect to this whole as the objectification of life, it is understood on the basis of some relation of concern.

VALUES

A realm of values extends far and wide as a fact of our spiritual life. That fact itself designates a relation of our own life to objects

whose very character is expressed in the determination of the value of these objects. This means that value is not primarily a product of concept-formation in the service of objective thought. It can become conceptual insofar as, on the one hand, such a product represents an attitudinal position and as, on the other hand, it enters into objective relations. It is the same with the assessment of values. This belongs in like manner to an attitude that is independent of objective apprehension. The term "feeling of value" in this sense must be given a new interpretation. Value is the abstract expression for the designated attitude. Now as a rule, values are derived psychologically. This corresponds to the general procedure of deduction from psychology. But this method is questionable, because then what counts as a value and the deductive relationships among values will become dependent on the psychological starting point. And the transcendental deduction that opposes unconditional values to conditioned ones is unsuccessful for the same reason. Here also the procedure must be reversed. It is proper to begin with expressions that contain all kinds of valuations and to master all of them. Only then can one inquire into the attitudinal position involved.

The changing images of life itself give fleeting indications of positive and negative attitudes, pleasure, delight, approval, and satisfaction; then objects constructed to last become the carriers of the memory-content of these feelings, and they re-present multiple possibilities of states of mind. Thought frees this complex of such possibilities of affecting the mind from the object itself and refers them to these states of mind; this is how we come to intuit and conceptualize value. Because value always contains this special relation to a subject capable of being affected, which is distinct from the properties that characterize the reality of the object, it assumes a special status by contrast to these properties. The manifold ways that an object can affect the mind grows with life itself. This involves a pattern whereby memory tends more and more to dominate a present affection. This is how value makes itself increasingly independent of every sudden appearance and disappearance of affection. This concept of value can even encompass a complex of past possibilities associated with objects that persist over time. And on the basis of the practical relationship in which the will assesses values relative to some purpose, the comparative estimation of values comes about. With this, value attains a relation to the future as a good or an end. Value thereby attains a new conceptual independence: its moments can be placed within a hierarchically ordered set of overall assessments. Even when freed

from the relation to the will, its moments continue to subsist in this new independence. This is the contribution of lived experience to the gradual development of the concept of value. Once again I am only isolating this function as an analytic procedure, not as a temporal stage.

In reflection, when the "I" becomes absorbed in itself, the further possibility arises that the "I" will become an object to itself. As such, it supports the possibility of enjoying itself and of providing others with an object of enjoyment. In the latter aspect, it is no different from objects to which the possibility of being enjoyed attaches, except that they themselves cannot enjoy what they are and what they achieve. But when the being that can be affected in multiple ways becomes its own object and capable of a feeling of self that encompasses everything it produces and what it enjoys in producing, then a distinctive concept of the intrinsic value of the person emerges. This concept of intrinsic value is denied to all beings that seem to us incapable of such enjoyment of self. The Renaissance developed the concept of the monad for this. In a monad, a thing, its enjoyment, value, and perfection, are unified. And Leibniz infused German philosophy and literature with this concept and with the strong feeling that it carries within itself.

²⁴³ Understanding the value of another individual contributes something else to the development of the concept of value. Of primary importance in what is experienced in our own life is the productive force with which another individual affects us. But as understanding reconstructs this other individual, our concept of and insight into value become increasingly emancipated from the way our feelings are affected. For these are not only re-created, they are referred to another subject. The result of this, then, is that we apprehend with much greater clarity the relations between the possibilities of producing an effect and the feeling of self of the subject that lives in these possibilities. The intrinsic value of the person now manifests itself fully in external objectivity and calmly discloses itself in all its objective relations to the world around this person. Only *one* barrier still remains that will only be overcome by historical distance. At first, understanding is still mixed with comparison with our self, self-satisfaction, envy, jealousy, and suffering due to the productive force of the other; we lack the standard for evaluation that a survey of the past offers.

Value involves an objective mode of signification by means of a concept. In it life is extinguished. However, it has not lost its reference to life.

As soon as the concept of value is formed, however, it becomes a *productive force* by virtue of its reference to life, because it gathers together that which in life is piecemeal, obscure, and ephemeral. If values are disclosed in history, and evaluative attitudes in documents that are expressions of life, then through re-experiencing, their original reference to life can be recovered.

Whole and Parts

Life as it elapses in time or as spatially distributed is categorially articulated in terms of the relationship of whole to parts. History, as the fulfillment of life in what occurs sequentially and simultaneously, is then, categorially speaking, a further articulation of this relation of parts to the whole. This part-whole relation is not like the configuration of objects that someone would see when entering a room. These objects belong together only by reference to the life of a person who owns them. Otherwise they could as well be dispersed. No inherent relationship to each other links them together. How different this is in a historical process! From the viewpoint of the natural sciences, every totality is an indifferent sum of masses in motion. Movement and mass and their relation according to laws are never changing in the course of time. By contrast, in every configuration of life, there is an inner relation of a part to whole, and therefore this configuration is never indifferent. . . .

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This belonging together manifests itself in quite diverse life-concerns and in a different way in each one.

Development, Essence, and Other Categories

Here two new categories emerge. Life and the life-course constitute a nexus. Through the acquisition of new lived experiences on the basis of older ones, what I call the "acquired psychic nexus" is created. [There are several] forms of such a nexus. As a consequence, duration and systematic continuity exist amidst change. I designate this state of affairs, verifiable in all human life, by the category of essence. Essence has constant change as its other side. Implicit in this is that any change incorporating outside influences into a unitary life-nexus is at the same time defined by this nexus. This is the way the character of each life-course develops. Once

this has been impartially apprehended, we can abandon all theoretical tenets about progressive development through stages.

How does the life-course generally proceed? It is always limited by being the determinateness of an individual existence marked by singular states. [This goes beyond] being spatially bounded. [Our concept of limit] is rooted in spirit. Singular existence is individuality. This mode of delimitation from within produces suffering and the striving to overcome it. This is the tragedy of finitude and the incentive also to transcend it. From without, limitation manifests itself as the pressure of the world on the subject. It can become so forceful through the power of circumstances and the nature of the mind that it impedes progress. In most cases, however, the nature of finitude in life also produces the effect of overcoming the pressure of the new life-situation and of other relationships to human beings. As every new situation bears the same characteristic of finitude, the same will to power stemming from the state of being conditioned, and the same will to inner freedom that is caused by inner bounds also arise in it. Nevertheless, everything is held together by these bounds and by the inner productive force that results from the determinateness of individual existence and the consequent durability of the acquired nexus. In all this the same essence is active throughout the course [of a life]: always the same delimitation of possibilities and yet the freedom to choose among them, and accordingly the good feeling of being able to move forward and to fulfill new possibilities of one's own existence. This nexus that is determined from within the course of a life and that determines the ceaseless progression of changes I call "development."²⁴⁵

This concept is entirely different from speculative fantasies about a progression to higher and higher stages. To be sure, development does involve an increase of distinctiveness and of differentiation, etc. in the subject. But it is possible for a life-course to remain bound to the natural background of vegetative growth, maturity, and decay occurring between birth and death without fulfilling any higher meaning, just as in the lower realms of life. It can also begin to decline early or continue to progress until the end.

I. THE SCIENTIFIC CHARACTER OF BIOGRAPHY

The opinions of historians are divided about the scientific character of biography. The question of whether to classify it as a part of historical science or whether to give it a special, independent place in the system of the human sciences next to historical science is, in the last analysis, a question of terminology. The answer to it depends upon the definition that one assigns to the expression "historical science." At the outset of every discussion about biography, the methodological and epistemological issue arises whether biography is possible as a universally valid solution to a scientific problem. I take as my starting point that the object of history is given to us in the totality of the objectifications of life. Embedded in the content of nature we find manifestations of human spirit, from evanescent gestures and fleeting words to immortal poetic works, the order that we have assigned to nature and to ourselves, and the legal systems and constitutions under which we live. They constitute the outer reality of human spirit. The documents on which a biography is principally based consist of the traces left for us by what a personality has done and expressed. Letters and reports about a person naturally hold a unique place among them.

The task of the biographer is to use such documents to understand the productive nexus through which an individual is determined by his milieu and reacts to it. All of history is about comprehending productive systems. The historian penetrates more deeply into the structure of the historical world by differentiating specific productive systems and studying their life. Religion, art, the state, and political and religious organizations form such systems, permeating history at every point. The most basic of such systems is the life-course of an individual in the milieu by which it is influenced and on which it acts in return. This relationship already appears in the individual's memory: a life-course, its conditions and its effects. Here we have the fundamental cell of history. For here specific historical categories arise. If life as sequential is held together by the consciousness of selfsameness, then all moments of life have their basis in this category of selfsameness. The discrete is related to the continuous. As we traverse the thread of memories from the small childhood figure, living for the moment, to the adult who asserts his firm, stable, inner life against the

world, we refer the series of influences and reactions to something that is shaping itself and therefore develops as something determined from within. External processes that exert an influence on this self have a practical value for it. The individual states of this self as well as the influences on it have a meaning in their relationship to a life-course and to what is shaped within it.

The literary expression of an individual's reflection on his life-course is autobiography. When this reflection is carried beyond one's own life-course to understanding another's life, biography originates as the literary form of understanding other lives.

Every life can be described, the insignificant as well as the powerful, the everyday as well as the out of the ordinary. Interest in doing so can stem from a variety of perspectives. A family retains its memories. Theorists of criminal law want to record the life of a thief, psychopathologists the life of an abnormal person. Everything human becomes a document for us that actualizes one of the infinite possibilities of our existence. But the historical individual whose life has produced lasting effects is worthy in a superior sense to live on in biography as a work of art. And among these, the ones who will especially attract the attention of biographers to themselves are those whose actions issue from depths of human existence that are especially difficult to understand and that therefore grant a deeper insight into human life and its individual configurations.

How can anyone deny that biography is especially significant for understanding the great nexus of the historical world? After all, it is the very relationship between the depths of human nature and the universal nexus of the full scope of historical life that is at work at every point of history. This is the most basic connection between life itself and history.

Our problem becomes even more pressing: Is biography possible?

248 The life-course of a historical (personality) is a productive nexus in which the individual receives influences from the historical world, is molded by them, and then, in turn, exerts an influence on the historical world. It is the same sphere of the world that influences the individual and receives lasting influences from him in turn. The possibility of scientific biography rests on this very point, that the individual does not face a limitless play of forces in the historical world: he dwells in the sphere of the state, religion, or science—in brief, in a distinctive life-system or in a constellation of them. The inner structure of such a constellation draws the

individual into it, shapes him, and determines the direction of his productivity. Historical achievements stem from the possibilities inherent in the inner structure of a historical moment.

If one surveys Schleiermacher's life, his biography seems to fragment into a diverse set of activities. Closer study shows, however, that what is imposing about his personality is the inner coherence that ties together his influence on religion, philosophy, and criticism and his contributions to the reinterpretation of Plato and the apostle Paul, and to both church and state. It also indicates a unique power of lived experience and understanding, a serenely held reflective attitude that accompanies him in the midst of his life and work and allows him to objectify them. On the basis of the steady stewardship of a higher consciousness, his soul is able to raise itself above fortune, suffering, and the way of the world. . . .

2. BIOGRAPHY AS A WORK OF ART

Autobiography is an understanding of oneself. Its object is life as the life-course of an individual. Here lived experience is the constant and direct basis for understanding and determining the sense of this individual life. Lived experience possesses the individual parts of an acquired psychic nexus as a constantly advancing present that articulates a whole. What is new can be experienced as efficacious and related back to remembered active constituents [to form] a productive nexus. But this nexus does not manifest itself as a completed system of effects. Rather, in each action starting in the present, there is the consciousness of aiming at ends. They form a productive nexus in which desires also incorporate purposes.

The productive nexus [of a life-course] is experienced first of all as the fulfillment of ends—at least this is the case for what usually exists in the foreground of consciousness. Objects, changes, and lived experiences are incorporated in this productive nexus as means. The ends produce a life-plan, which is a nexus that relates purposes to each other and to means. When we make plans in the present, this presupposes a value-consciousness able to complete the present with the pleasures, illusions, etc. of the past. This is the way the categorial approach leads up to the category of meaning as formed on the basis of the past. Meaning involves the relation of a single, external occurrence to something inner that inheres in a connectedness among occurrences. *This nexus is not measured by any final stage reached [in life] but is oriented around a central*

point to which everything external relates as to something inner. What is external is an infinite series of effects that contain a sense. Only this sense (creates unity).

Understanding takes place with reference to all external givens [of a life]. These are available till the point of death, although we are limited by what has been preserved. Here lies the advantage of biography over autobiography.

Biography can apply understanding to manifestations that indicate plans or an awareness of meaning. Letters can show what this individual finds to be of value in his situation; or they can indicate what he finds meaningful in particular parts of his past. A nexus develops, leading to an understanding — a talent gains ground and becomes conscious of itself. Circumstances, errors, passions, may sidetrack it, or a favorable environment may strengthen its creative power. Challenges from without impose themselves and lead it beyond itself for better or worse, etc. Here we have the abiding advantage that a single life-course preserves in material form the reference of what is publicly available of a life to its inner meaning; the evidence itself expresses this relation, like the well-known confession of Goethe.²⁰ And the observer already possesses a consciousness of historical influence and limits.

Letters disclose momentary states of mind, but they are also influenced by being directed to a recipient. They manifest life-relationships, but each life-relationship is only seen from one side. However, when a life has become complete or a part of history and can be assessed for its meaning, this is only possible if its connection with the past, with what influences it in its surroundings and with how they affect its future, can be established through the interpretation of the available documents. These documents show the individual to be a point of intersection that both experiences force and exerts it. Yet the meaning of an individual life in a historical context can be determined only if we can solve the problem of locating some general nexus independent of this individual. . . .

Biography as a work of art, therefore, cannot solve its task without proceeding to the history of the period.

With that, however, the perspective changes. The interpretation of individuals has its limits in the fact that the way in which they are centered in themselves is also the way that biographers focus on them. For biography to be a work of art, one has to locate the perspective from which the horizon of history in general opens up

²⁰ See my essay, "Goethe and the Poetic Imagination" (D), SW 5, 282f.

but for which the individual still remains the center of a productive or meaning system; no biography can perform this task with more than partial success. On the one hand, it must display an objective context with the diversity of its forces, their determination in history, and the values of these determinations—a consciousness of unboundedness that extends in every direction—must always be present; on the other hand, the centrality of the individual as a point of reference must be retained. From this it follows that the art form of biography can be applied only to historical personalities. For they alone have the productive force to become such a central point of intersection.

The difficulty of working out, as it were, this twofold perspective of the biographer can never be completely overcome.

The standing of biography within historical scholarship has risen extraordinarily. It was heralded by the novel. Carlyle is perhaps the first to have grasped the full significance of biography. It is due to this that the greatest problem to emerge after the development of the Historical School through Ranke lies in the relationship between life in all its diverse aspects and historiography. History ought to preserve this relationship as a whole. In the end, all the foregoing questions about the value of history have their solution in this, that human beings recognize themselves in history. We do not grasp human nature through introspection. This was Nietzsche's colossal delusion. Therefore, he also could not grasp the significance of history.

The more encompassing problem of history is implicit in Hegel. From one side, this problem was raised through the study of the relatively ahistorical life of primitive peoples, for there we encounter the uniform recurrence of the same life content. This is like the natural foundation of all history. When prominent human personalities evoked an entirely new kind of study, this made the limits of humanity visible from the other side. Between them both lay the study of customs. The starting points were Carlyle's biography, Jacob Burkhardt's grasp of a specific cultural whole from its very foundations, Macaulay's portrayals of customs, and Jacob and Wilhelm Grimm. This is the foundation on which biography as a work of art obtains a new meaning and a new content.

The limit of biography lies in the fact that general movements find their point of transition in individuals. In order to understand individuals, we must investigate new foundations for understanding that are outside the individual. As such, biography does not have the potential of defining itself as a scientific work of art. We

must turn to new categories, configurations, and forms of life that do not appear in individual life. Individuals are only the points of intersection for cultural systems and social organizations with which their existence is interwoven; how can the cultural and social be understood on the basis of the individual?

SECTION TWO: CONCEPTUAL COGNITION OF THE NEXUS OF UNIVERSAL HISTORY

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Introduction

I. HISTORY

We now move beyond the stable relations of autobiography. Leaving the stream of a life-course behind, we become caught up in an infinite ocean.

1. The different perspectives of value, meaning, and purpose persist, but their mode of combination changes.
2. The subject in whom and for whom the meaning of life is realized has become questionable. Does happiness exist only for individuals (Lotze)?
3. If we take an individual or a person, etc., as subject, this generates a distinctive perspective in terms of which meaning, sense, etc. are apprehended. Simmel [has written] on this question. Divergent truths [are often] falsely reconciled. But these divergent perspectives can attain objectivity in universal history by means of the systematic sciences.

[How does] history [make] intuitable what is inner and outer, what is simultaneous and successive? Consider also the problem of narrating or exhibiting the temporal course of a series that is as such infinitely divisible. Lived experience without really having a lived experience . . .

History liberates us by elevating us beyond the limits of the meaning-perspective arising from our own life-course. At the same time, meaning becomes less certain. Reflecting upon life makes us profound; history sets us free.

To navigate this wide ocean, we take with us the orientational tools that we have acquired from lived experience, understanding, autobiography, and the art of biography. They are the historical categories that have emerged from reflection on life to become the intellectual means for apprehending it. The category of wholeness is already given in understanding. The passage of time in the course of a life involves the relationship of parts to a whole. Biography generates the category of a qualitatively distinct individual existence. Because an individual life is conditioned from without and reacts outwardly, the categories of agency and suffering come with it. Every distinct individual life is a productive force in history and

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at the same time interacts with other productive forces. Individual human existence runs its course in a life span, with many moments in which suffering and pressure are experienced as constraints leading it to advance to another more suitable state. Individual human existence finds happiness in this kind of advance—perhaps its happiness inheres in such an advancing, thereby both conserving and changing itself in every situation. The law operative in individual life regulates these changes so that what has been acquired at every point determines the future from within. Accordingly, the historical categories of essence and development emerge from individual life. Here essence only denotes something that endures through change, and development only the form of a process determined by the law of an expanding acquired nexus. Lived experience and comprehension of individual human beings do not disclose development as a kind of progress.

2. THE NEW TASK

When we look backwards, we see an inner coherence among those categories that are characteristic of the human sciences.¹

The relations of the categories to one another constitute a nexus through which we arrive at an understanding of qualitatively determinate particular life, i.e., the individual. We now grasp the coherence in these relations in which understanding comprehends the meaning of a given reality, i.e., a qualitatively determinate individual life. The latter manifests a relationship of whole to parts all throughout, from expression back to the subject of all expressions. This whole-part relationship is a nexus, that is, a structure, from which essence and development can be derived. And by applying this relation that exists in every individual being to all its expressions, understanding of this individual arises by way of the categories of value, meaning, and purpose. In this understanding the individual is reconstructed as a kind of system of human spirit by means of the concepts already indicated. . . .

¹ See my *Jugendgeschichte Hegels*, GS IV, 139. (D)

I. FUNDAMENTAL RELATIONSHIP: THE STRUCTURE
OF HISTORICAL FORMATIONS

When we confront historical formations, we empirically discover in them a unity and connectedness in virtue of which they become objects for us of a more encompassing order. Each formation acts in the historical nexus through an inherent productive force; it has its own essence in which a development takes place exhibiting a new law that extends beyond individual development. Thus new tasks arise:

How is it possible to delineate development through concepts?

The circle of concept formation.

What further articulation do the categories and concepts of individual existence undergo?

How is objective conceptual cognition possible here?

TURNING TO WORLD HISTORY

The first problem to present itself for those turning to history is the relationship of life and history. The path we have been following leads there. At every point of the spatiotemporal expanse of history, there is some living and productive psyche endowed with formative powers and sensitive to every influence. Each document of major importance is the expression of such a psyche. The fact that documents of this kind are so rare for any period of time results from the way historical memory selects from the welter of written records. History lets everything that does not have meaning turn to dust and ashes. Here we must again consider the category of meaning. Basically everything has meaning if, as the expression of any human heart with a pulse beat, it *(allows us to see)* whatever had the *possibility* of being a lived experience at some point of time. It is important to investigate how the psyche itself is always bound to determinate possibilities under certain temporal and spatial conditions—one instance, so to speak, among the limitless possibilities that the historical process brings about.

Looking at historians, we see that all of them possess a relationship to the great fund of human memory through the notion of representing or portraying an age by means of certain people. Ma-

caulay and other English historians approach this problem more closely.

The point of departure of the human sciences is lived experience, which provides a structural nexus. Such a life-nexus is present whenever the human sciences re-present life. It is there when I hear a story or read about a historical deed, or when I think about a system of political economics either in terms of labor or value, or about the juridical system of a statute, or the political system of a constitution. Some life-nexus always inheres in these systems and produces their understanding. Re-presentations recall the life-nexus; and similarly the temporal flow that permeates all human reality is always operative when reality is apprehended. It is the same temporal flow in the historical world and in myself as I observe it. And the human mind has the capacity to contract this flux and speed it up while finding the standard of duration in the life-course itself. Thus the playwright presents what took years to happen in an ideal temporal order of a few hours.

THE HISTORICAL WORLD AND MEANING

The historical categories of value and purpose grow out of lived experience. However, the experiencing subject looking back already finds meaning in the process of understanding and relates the categorial form of nexus to itself.

To the extent that a nexus appears in history, we simply (apply) the concept of meaning. It must be applied to the entire scope of reality. History is everywhere that life has been and is becoming intelligible. And where there is history, we find meaning in its manifold forms. Meaning is present when individuals re-present something more encompassing by gathering it within themselves, endowing it, as it were, with a singular, bounded visibility. Meaning is also present when a nexus is transformed by an event, person, or a community. In history there is never merely an aggregate as the sum of the consequences.

VALUE AND HISTORY

1. Similarly, values in the historical world continue to be related to the way the affections light up, shine, and fade. No value here

is real that is not connected with such fluctuations of mental life. A confusing and endless manifold arises here, an infinite horizon, like when we behold a strange city as its evening lights become visible, burn brightly, and fade into the distance. This play of lights belongs to a world of objects completely alien to us—even disassociated from us in time and space. In this way, the concept of intuition and the concept of value can be cultivated in a historical sense. The life of particular individuals has been summed up, and their distinctive worth can be fully surveyed. The result is a new assessment of values that has nothing at all to do with practical conduct. We now obtain the standard for the highest distinctive values accessible to us. The lines of gradation start from the average person, and the farther back one sees into the past, the more remote and objective they are. The effect of historical distance is exactly the same as that of distancing the person in a work of art. The very possibility of comparing our particular fate and value with what is historical diminishes.

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2. In this manifold of historical values, the first thing apparent is the distinction between matters that are only valuable through their utility and intrinsic values that are linked with a consciousness of self-worth. The latter values provide the material for the historical world. They are like the notes from which the melodic web of the spiritual universe is composed. Each intrinsic or distinctive value claims a determinate place in this web through the relationship it has to others. Each value can be defined as a note according to loudness, pitch, and length, but individually it is something unique and indefinable, not only due to the relationship in which it exists, but in its very essence.

Life is the fullness, the diversity, and the reciprocal interaction of everything uniform experienced by these individuals. The basic material of life is one with history, and history consists of all modes of life in the most diverse relationships. History is merely life apprehended from the perspective of the whole of humanity conceived as interconnected.

These individuals, who as intrinsic values constitute life and history with their purposes and their meaning, are, before all else, productive forces. Once these value-laden forces are referred to the use-value of things, they also realize purposes. Accordingly, the historical world is filled with purposes—considered purely as a manifold of forces, it is a world suffused with purposes.

Purposes also undergo a development from the point where a subject considers the future, weighs values, and makes decisions

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about goods. Once a purpose has established itself in the household of human spirit, it emancipates itself from the process by which the subject projects it. Purposes become independently productive forces within this new sphere. The first thing to be noted is that they are efficacious without being conscious and that their efficacy is sweeping. When passions and states of mind are at work in the historical world, they remain closely tied to the inner life of the person. This is not the case with purposes.

LIVED EXPERIENCE, UNDERSTANDING, AND PRODUCTIVE NEXUS

The first insight generated by lived experience and understanding is that they are about connectedness. We understand only connectedness. Understanding and connectedness or nexus correspond to one another.

The relevant connectedness is that of a productive nexus. Everything in the psychic life-unit, in history, and in cultural systems and organizations is in a constant state of change; and these changes are produced by something active. Such a productive relationship can exist either in an individual by means of its structure or in more complex sets of circumstances. That a productive nexus or system can display an immanent teleology does not change anything, for this is only one of its forms.

The relationship between parts and wholes² is found everywhere in history and society, and it more closely determines the modes of productivity of the historical world. Thus we encounter initial constituents whose parts lack independence in that they cannot function without reference to the whole.

Organic bodies are also wholes in this sense, whose parts do not function independently, but only in relationship to the whole that constitutes their essence. However, human psychophysical life-units are wholes in a special sense. To be sure, every given is singular, whether it is organic, inorganic, or spiritual. The fact that we grasp the psychophysical process through thought and reflection would add to it a distinctive trait, but it still would not indicate completely what characterizes its connectedness. The psychic nexus is structural. It is a productive system in which what is productive endures as a psychic fact and is referred to its product. This productive system extends to the relations between thinking about and apprehending the given, between apprehending it and assign-

² See above, GS VII, 243f. [this volume, 263]. (H)

ing it value, between assigning value and positing goals. Within each one of these spheres, the reference to the sphere that constitutes it contains special relations of the same kind. This whole system of relations functions teleologically in creating values and realizing goods and purposes. Among values, the intrinsic value of the person plays a special role. Its distinctive characteristic is that the life-unit takes pleasure in certain attributes to which its feeling of self adheres. Because these attributes are linked to an individual nucleus that is part of a personal life-nexus, this intrinsic value is individual. Intrinsic value always refers to the particular nexus of a singular person, by virtue of which, therefore, it is what it is, and feels and enjoys itself as that. The assessment of others heightens this relationship. Each individual is centered in itself. On the other hand, each community also develops values, and every historical movement aims at the same effect. Thus in any historical and social situation, intrinsic value and a sense of distinctive modes of existence make it possible to assign meaning to particular psychic processes, while, on the other hand, the psychophysical unit can gain a meaning for the whole, especially in purposive systems. It is this meaning-nexus that is apprehended by the historian. It is not in turn evaluated, but rather is recognized as reality. But as such a reality it constitutes the way significance, the interests of the individual, and the nexus of significant moments relate to each other; in short, it articulates them in the temporal process.³

That which is enjoyed as the value of the person in its feeling of self is . . .

THE HISTORICAL NEXUS

Hegel posed the problem of finding a system of concepts that would make us conscious of the historical nexus. [He explicated] such a system for metaphysics, philosophy of nature, and the human sciences. They are the ideal stages of spirit in which the self finds itself as spirit, objectifies itself in the external world, and recognizes itself as absolute spirit.

With this Hegel intellectualized history. Not only is history recognized in concepts, but they constitute its essence, i.e., adequate cognition of history is made dependent on concepts. Spirit and history are revealed at last. They hold no more mystery.

An actual historian's attitude toward history is totally different.

³ See *Introduction to the Human Sciences* (D), SW 1, 58.

259 However, descriptions of the manifold details of historical phenomena are equally unable to exhaust the nature of history. If we had only such descriptions, then we would lack conceptual cognition of history. Individuals *qua* individuals remain separate from each other. They do not allow us to grasp the most profound essence of history, which is to objectify the spirit of community.

The understanding of a historical product as the expression of something inner does not provide a logical identity, but a peculiar relation of a selfsameness in different individuals. Individuals do not understand one another through their identity; only concepts can be identical and interchangeable. Individuals understand each other because any individual has the possibilities, within certain limits, to re-experience from the expressions and effects produced by a very different individual the inner states and processes belonging to his inner life. Moreover, individuals have possibilities in themselves that extend beyond those that can be realized in their own lives. We all live in the acquired habitual routines of our own being. But there is also a consciousness of freedom that is rooted in the many possibilities of life inherent in memory and in willing the future. Because of this and the possibility that vitality can never be fixed, our imagination is able to surpass whatever we can experience and actualize by ourselves.

HISTORICAL SKEPTICISM

I. Something of which understanding is not possible cannot have meaning or value. A tree can never have meaning.

Simmel's theory of history, that it is necessary to give it form, since we cannot sift through all its parts, is in error, because we can represent a very great number of parts through a comprehensive survey.

In what I select from a history of world changes, I never encounter a moment that . . . In this respect the history of natural objects is different from human history.

The principal argument of the historical skeptic is always that any productive nexus that operates in terms of motives is doubtful; this is because the individual has only a very dubious cognizance of his own motives, and others have even less insight into them. One can only establish to a limited extent what self-interest, ambition, the need for power, and vanity contribute to decisive actions. Even utterances about them, whether verbal or in letters, remain open to question. Here precisely, however, lies the proper

field of what those cognizant about human beings and men of the world regard as true history. The French, in particular, like to prove their perspicacity, their superiority over things and people, by ascribing petty and selfish motives to great achievements. They are used to this from the pragmatic method, which investigates the relation between motive, act, and effect when they are not applying political theories or assessing military-political forces. This, then, leads to the prying into motives and the need to belittle often found in memoirs. The perspicacity of the French about personal motives, money, and social position is incomprehensible to Germans, who tend to be rather naive about personal goals and more conscientious about the matter at hand.

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The nature of pragmatic historiography is to search for a productive system, but within the boundaries of a nexus of motive, act, and historical influence. The so-called moralism of Schlosser is a typical example. He is a pragmatic historian, with an admixture of the French tendency to belittle, but basing it on moral judgment.

2. Historical skepticism can be overcome only if our methods are not expected to ascertain motives.

3. Historical skepticism is overcome only when psychological subtlety is replaced by the understanding of the products of the human spirit. They lie there before us as an objectification in the external world, and therefore can become the object of rule-guided understanding.

4. These objectifications fall into three classes. Understanding reaches the highest level of reliability in interpreting the domain of the sciences. [Here there is] interchangeability.

Second in rank are the results of wisdom about life found in religion, art, and philosophy. In part these express one's own life-nexus and in part they present a larger life-nexus.

The domain of action and purpose constitutes the third and most difficult case. The relation between setting purposes, ascertaining means, and acting is rational and transparent, but it is quite different concerning the motives that determine what purposes are chosen. Actions that have a general import and become historical are not accompanied by an awareness of motives. They certainly do have clear connections to the material necessities embodied in purposive systems and in external organizations; motives, however, are completely irrelevant to what happens there, which merely depends on representations of purposes and possible means. Thus the systematic human sciences referring to the practical world constitute the foundation of a secure understanding of it.

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At this point the method of understanding becomes more complex by incorporating comparison, etc.

*THE POSSIBILITY OF OBJECTIVE CONCEPTUAL COGNITION
IN THE HUMAN SCIENCES*

The problem of how objective conceptual cognition is possible in the human sciences reverts to the question of how to attain it in history. How is history possible? This question presupposes a conception of history. We saw that the concept of history is dependent on the concept of life. Historical life is a part of life overall. Life, however, is what is given in lived experience and understanding. In this sense, life thus extends over the whole range of objective spirit insofar as it is accessible through lived experience. Life is the basic fact that must form the starting point of philosophy. Life is that with which we are acquainted from within and behind which we cannot go. We cannot bring life before the tribunal of reason. Life is historical to the degree that it is apprehended as advancing in time and as an emerging productive nexus. Life as history is possible because this process is re-created in memory, not as the reproduction of particulars, but as the re-creation of the nexus itself and its stages. What memory contributes to the comprehension of a life-course is brought about in history by the way in which the manifestations of life encompassed by objective spirit are linked in this advance and through the exertion of influence. That is history.

The first condition for the formation of the historical world is the purification of the confused and corrupted recollections of the human race about itself through a critique that is correlated with interpretation. The fundamental historical science, therefore, is philology, in its formal sense, which encompasses the scientific study of the languages in which tradition has been deposited, the gathering of the legacy left behind by the human past, the removal of errors from it, and the chronological ordering and linking that brings out the inherent relatedness of these documents. Philology in this sense is not the handmaiden of history, but designates the initial scope of its procedures.

²⁶² Historical objectivity is only possible if, among the diverse viewpoints from which the overall nexus can be projected and its requisite parts distinguished, there is one standpoint that grasps this nexus as it happened.

First of all I will introduce the concept of meaning. The nexus of history is that of life itself insofar as life produces connectedness under the conditions of its natural environment. A part that

belongs to the nexus of the whole has a meaning relative to this whole to the extent that it realizes a relationship already inherent in life. For the relation of the whole to the part does not entail that the part has a meaning for the whole. Here we come upon what seems to be an insoluble riddle. We must form the whole from the parts, and yet it is the whole that imparts meaning and that accordingly assigns the part its place.

We have already seen that what sets historical inquiry in motion is precisely the interdependence of the determinations that pertain to some whole and its parts. History is expected to teach what life is. And yet history is dependent on life, for history is life coursing through time and finds its content there.

There would be a simple escape from this circle if unconditioned norms, purposes, or values set the standard for contemplating and apprehending history.

History itself produces values whose validity derives from explicating the relationships contained in life. One such is the obligation that is based on a contract or the recognition of the worth and value of every individual regarded as a human being. These are universally valid truths because they provide the possibility of regulating life at every point of the historical world.

2. THE STRUCTURE OF EVERY HISTORICAL NEXUS OR SYSTEM

The problem of history is how is it possible, in a nexus where each self is separated from the other and where there is merely a mutual exertion of forces, for there to emerge from these individuals a subject that acts and suffers like a self? Cultural systems, tendencies, movements, and organizations are such commonalities, coherent wholes in which particulars cooperate in various ways as parts.

1. The nature of this cooperation and its various kinds . . . Their first distinctive feature is that individuals do not enter fully into any of these networks, but with only a part of themselves.

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2. Each of them is distinct. . . . The historical nexus or system that is produced through human cooperation differs from the nexus of the self by the way in which space and time are manifested. Historical systems have space to expand; ever more persons can be assimilated in systems of ever-widening scope. Because such systems can leap over intervening spaces, individuals who are connected in this way can be a long distance from each other. Bridging intervening spaces, so to speak, individuals can form a system.⁴

Likewise, historical systems extend through long periods of

⁴ Here Dilthey makes a parenthetical reference to his theory of structure. (H)

time, and each such system has much, indeed unlimited, time at its disposal. The formative power inherent in time affects historical systems imperturbably, but powerfully.

3. A historical system in which individuals, who have become parts of it, cooperate is comparable to a psychic nexus. Here too individuals are not given as substances but [as] parts [that] work together in accordance with their own distinctive law. And by contrast to the inorganic world, this historical system is not merely given from without and therefore ultimately mysterious, but it is experienced in some way. The manner in which it can be experienced varies considerably. It can produce a consciousness of sharing the same basic attitude with other persons, of having the same purpose in common, and of being subordinated to a common mode of control; the same consciousness in which individuals correspond with one another is always there. Thus some of the same categories that are valid for every psychic nexus recur; for instance, the whole-part relationship. This is the first determination of the way in which psychic systems present themselves as historical. At the same time, we must note a difference that emerges in this relationship.

Every system of this kind has a structure according to which its parts form a whole. Yet this structure is different in kind from psychic structure. Also there are differences here among historical systems that must be noted.

This provides the justification for the critique of historical reason to transfer the concept of structure to these products.

Each individual is a single productive force. How do specific homogeneous aspects shared by different individuals cooperate to become a total force? This relationship presupposes that some kind of nexus is constitutive for these homogeneous aspects in individuals. (See my *Introduction to the Human Sciences*.)

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4. Insofar as the homogeneous parts draw on those aspects of the life of individual persons that are aimed at realizing something in the future, the historical system will also realize something that lies in the future. The category of purpose can be transferred from the single person to a system of this kind, but in a very different, transformed sense.

5. It is still more difficult [to define] in what sense a historical system generates value.

6. Every nexus that is formed in time involves memory of its developmental course. Being sequential is the fundamental quality of every historical system, and the psychic process involves memory of its stages to some degree. The category of meaning . . .

3. THE SUBJECTS OF HISTORICAL ASSERTIONS

New subjects assume a singular existence. In what sense are such subjects to be taken? Where lies the critical justification to treat them as the carriers of assertions?

THE EMERGENCE OF THE CONSCIOUSNESS OF SYSTEM AND COMMUNITY THROUGH HISTORY

When community becomes the subject, then the task is to ascertain what one sees that is new from this perspective on the human world. The first thing to ask is, How does such a community become a subject that can act like an individual?

The past, present cooperation, and the future have to be considered as contributing to this.

Here we see how history, the uses of which are so much discussed, serves the communal life of humanity as the consciousness that communities have of their life-history and as the memory of their life span. When we study the history of communities, we should ponder the fact that conversely such history as the memory of humanity serves to produce community. In turn, communal consciousness creates tribal heroes, founders of states and religions on the basis of a feeling of unity. This is how great the power of our relationship to the past is and how strong the capacity to transfer the unity of our own life-course to the cooperative life of individuals in communal forms.

4. RACE, PEOPLE, ETC. AS CONCRETE-HISTORICAL SUBJECTS⁵ 265

[. . .]

5. CULTURAL SYSTEMS

The circle involved in defining cultural systems.

Where lies their unity?

What mode of connectedness lies in these systems?

What is the relationship between cultural systems and organizations?

They can only be separated by means of abstraction.

THE HERMENEUTICS OF SYSTEMATIC ORGANIZATION

Organizations, no less than singular works, require a rigorous, rule-guided interpretation. Such interpretation is not about ex-

⁵ This is the first of several headings without any accompanying notes.

plaining the genesis of such organizations or about deriving the causes that produced them. There has been much academic debate about whether their explanation is rational, psychological, or historical. To the extent that any of these are possible, they presuppose the hermeneutics of particular organizations and the comparison of kindred organizations. [The nature of explanation remains for us] a transcendent question.

A hermeneutics is possible here because a relation exists between a people and a state, between believers and a church, between the life of science and a university, that allows a common spirit and a uniform way of life to find a structural nexus in which they are expressed. Thus there exists here a relationship of parts to whole in which the parts receive meaning from the whole and the whole receives its sense from the parts; these categories of interpretation have their correlate in the structural nexus of the organization by which it realizes a purpose teleologically.

What, however, is specific about the structure of organization and the categories of their intelligibility? The mere existence of an organization as such has no value. In a structural nexus, "function" and "contribution" take the place of "purpose."

6. ECONOMIC LIFE

[. . .]

7. THE LEGAL SYSTEM AND ITS ORGANIZATION IN THE COMMUNITY

[. . .]

8. THE ARTICULATION OF SOCIETY

[. . .]

9. CUSTOM, ETHOS, AND THE IDEALS OF LIFE

[. . .]

10. RELIGION AND ITS ORGANIZATION

[. . .]

RELIGIOSITY

Among the lived experiences that are important for the objectification and organization of the human spirit, religiosity is especially central. History shows this, but it is also obvious from anthropological reflection. Here we are at the root where the lived experience and understanding of poets, artists, religious persons, and philosophers come together. In all of them something . . . emerges from the experience of life itself, that extends beyond it. The moment that leads beyond life is always embedded in life itself. The

peculiar trait of religiosity is that life as experienced enters into a relation with the invisible. The invisible exerts its influence in life itself, over it, and within it. This relation stems from the heightened way in which great religious individuals experience life. Religious genius is not to be found in the dreams of sentimental souls about otherworldliness; rather, life itself experienced according to its true nature — full of hardship and a singular blend of suffering and happiness throughout — points to something strange and unfamiliar, as if it were coming from invisible sources, something *(pressing in)* on life from outside, yet coming from its own depths. There is no artistic embellishment to ease the pressure of life and of reality that impinges on every mode of existence for these wholly nonartistic natures. Death accompanies every moment of Calvin's life like a shadow. Behind the Protestant faith in salvation through divine election there always lurks the terrible thought occasioned by the gratuitous damnation of other souls. By also making themselves the instruments of God, active natures attain an inner peace. The more contemplative and peaceful types in the age of the Reformation, however, sought another path. And the more resolutely human beings live in their own essence and have liberated themselves from worldly drives and social entanglements, the more they become frightened by the shallowness in each of us. They feel more lonely and separated from other human beings. Because they would like to overcome their isolation from others, they transport themselves toward the invisible and into the fundamental nature of life itself, uniting with other souls through love and understanding.

The decisive thing is always that in the religious genius there be no evasion, no yielding to the superficiality of being caught up in life, nor to the everyday forgetfulness of past and future. There may be no flight of the imagination and no satisfaction in the secular exercise of power, which betoken the forgetfulness of death and of the salvation of the soul.

1. Because religious objects are always presupposed by lived experience, religion [exists] in a network of tradition. . . . 267

2. When this network of tradition is ruptured, then lived experience and understanding must preserve the meaning of life, the tendency of purposes toward the invisible, and the supplementation of values [found in religion].

Religion arises from communion with the invisible. But the forms of religiosity do not originate from this by itself. Rather, this communion accompanies the person in shaping a satisfying unity (bliss), and this is the prime reality, i.e., the aspects of this shaping that is lived through in religious experience. These experiences are not

just doctrinal nor just emotional, but arise in persons who fulfill the task of life in a particular way. Consequently, attempts to adopt goals, illusions about the values inherent in them, finding new values, and establishing the meaning of life-relationships are always involved in a determinate form of a religion.

Conceptual cognition of religion is quite difficult therefore, because all the forms of expression and the enduring products in which it makes itself available for study, such as dogma, faith, superstition, religious art, and religious world-views, must first be interpreted to grasp the psychic operations that underlie them.

1. Anything that objectively contains life and its correlate, the world, can be an object that is assigned a religious value.

2. The assignment of religious value is never a primary act, however. Religious value is not a fully independent kind of value like a life-value, etc. Instead, it presupposes experiences within the evaluation of life, which, on the basis of a certain emotional tonality or coloring, accentuate the pressure of the surrounding world (Pascal), the impossibility of overcoming it, the unreality, fragility, corruptibility, and nonintelligibility of the world; in a positive way, on the other hand, they accentuate a need for world stability and the possibility of trust and peace. All this does not yet constitute a religious frame of mind. For a frame of mind is only religious when it turns to the invisible for the means to constitute its mental world rooted in these feelings. This is how the concept of *religious need* originates, which is really the need that finds satisfaction in religion. Whenever this need does not precede religion or is not a constitutive moment in religious life, religion is merely tradition and custom. And every religious being possesses the power to use these original conceptions in some manner in the mental disposition that influences the evaluation of life.

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11. ART

[. . .]

12. THE SCIENCES

[. . .]

13. WORLD-VIEW AND PHILOSOPHY

[. . .]

THE INTERPRETATION OF PHILOSOPHICAL SYSTEMS

1. The simplest case is when there is a main or master text. The problem lies in the relationship between its systematic explication,

its sense on the basis of the meaning of the parts, and the distinctive value of its truths, etc. Developmental history can help here.

2. Plato and Leibniz. Because the parts of their writings are not all adapted to the whole, a grasp of their sense and their meaning-relationship to the whole requires a developmental history that makes it possible to assess the meaning of particular texts for the whole.

THE HUMAN SCIENCES AND A PHILOSOPHY OF LIFE

I

1. The intellect and the drives display a striving that is intrinsic to psychic life. The activation of this striving is pleasurable.

2. The structure of psychic life operates teleologically, i.e., as a striving toward further development.

3. A lasting satisfaction that is independent of individual life can only arise when there is a coincidence between individual striving and greater objective forces.

4. This life-nexus is governed by the demands of integrity and morality. It consists in the fact that the recognition of a mutual sense of obligation makes itself conscious as an ought. Transcendental investigations about an a priori ought are fruitless.

II

Today philosophical thought hungers and thirsts for life. It wants to return to a heightened joy of living, to art, etc.

THE RELATION OF THE HISTORY OF METAPHYSICS AND RELIGION TO CULTURE

Comparative Science of Culture

1. A culture has its essential trait in the fact that, supported by given organizations, it arrives at a sustained peak in which individual systems are connected in a harmonious structure, which then disintegrates because of relationships that need to be investigated.

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When this harmonious structure reaches its apex, content and form are inseparable. Life-concepts such as obligation and official function, the artistic portrayal of life through proportion, light, and shadow, the appreciation of tonal order in melody and in harmony, and the tragic relation of character, action, guilt, and fate

all involve such formed life contents. A theory of this kind of formation [is needed].

The contents of a culture, i.e., its realities or qualities, are grasped in life itself according to their meaning. This grasp achieves expression in art, etc. What is this relation?

2. At the height of a culture, from which one always must begin (this is the most important perspective for a method), a conscious attitude arises in which the value, meaning, and a sense of life attain a determinate expression on the basis of the structural relation of the elements of the culture. All this finds its expression as anthropological reflection generates poetry, religion, and philosophy. Each of them serves to interrelate our feeling of the present with memory and the future. It finds a sense in memory, explicates the feeling of life as the feeling of values in the present, and produces an ideal (the good). The limitation of every culture is such that at its height it already demands a [better] future.

14. THE SYSTEM OF ORGANIZATIONS IN THE STATE

[. . .]

15. NATIONS AS THE CARRIERS OF POWER, CULTURE, ETC.

[. . .]

16. HUMANITY AND UNIVERSAL HISTORY

[. . .]

THE INTERACTION OF NATIONS. MOVEMENTS. AGES

REVOLUTION

Changes occurring in the historical world can be differentiated according to basic types. They can be conceived as occurring in a narrow sphere within a cultural system, or simultaneously in a cultural system and the organization of a particular nation, or in a more encompassing whole, and in different aspects of its life. They can also be noted insofar as the time span that they occupy is great or small. These various distinctions are conditioned by the nature of the movement that we apprehend. Revolutions spread in spheres of varying circumference, and they take different lengths of time to be achieved.

We must take into account the various kinds of such concerted change in order to make their spatial and temporal scope intelligible.

Again it becomes evident that the delineation of a revolution is possible only because a *unity of meaning* connects a series of changes. For as such, all changes are causally connected with each other in the same way. Causally, the grounding of the German Empire and the French Revolution are not demarcated from what happened before and after in the corresponding spheres. Again, merely on the basis of contents and their purely material relations, such a demarcation is not possible.

I will proceed from systems of change that can readily be designated as revolutions. Their common characteristic is that a movement that has been suppressed for a long time suddenly shatters the given lawful order and extends itself over a wide domain according to its inherent force.

And here we highlight those revolutions in which the interests that have been suppressed are joined with a set of ideas that have been accumulating a long time and through which these revolutions receive a distinctive kind of meaning. Their effects reach, of course, as far as the interests that have been related and linked, but beyond that they serve as the realization of many ideas and ideals. This is certainly true of the immensely important Reformation and French Revolution. The ideas that were realized in them had a widespread effect wherever related interests lay dormant. For this reason, their meaning is not exhausted by their objective results within the orbit of interests from which they arose.

In both cases the outbreak is preceded by a slowly developing set of ideas, on the one hand, and a long period of restraints within an organization, on the other. The power of this organization suppresses the tendencies to change contained within it. In the first instance, it is the organization of the church; in the second, that of the state.

When a revolution first breaks out in a culturally developed context, it is located in a determinate system and seizes its participants completely, so that all other interests retreat. . . .

SPIRIT AS THE PRODUCT OF INTERIORIZATION AND ITS OBJECTIFICATION IN HISTORY

1. Hegel's error [consists] in having constructed the stages of spirit immanently, whereas in fact they result from the way that

spirit and the historical situation work together. Spirit in its ideational interiorization is already the product of the lawful dynamics of the social world.

2. From this stems the close kinship of the two.
3. Objectification is the other great problem of history as a science. Objectification occurs

- A. in expression as art and literature;
- B. in intellectual re-presentation;
- C. in the organizations where change is made permanent and achieves a regulated, ordered, continuous, incessant productivity;
- D. in the law. The law represents the sum total of enforceable rules by which outward actions are regulated. Accordingly, it objectifies in itself the conceptualization (1) of the values on which a society depends and their relative importance in criminal law, etc., and (2) its standard form, as conditioned by socio-economic life, etc.;
- E. in the educational system. This mode of objectification [assumes] a special place. Here educators and the educational system use a given ideal of life to bring about a state of mind in the young. It does not involve actions, but a *habitus* which is to persist when the education has been completed. The ideal of a given time and of a people lives in the profession of its educators. This ideal is not capable of being explicated rationally. It is only realized through the educator's art; and
- F. in ecclesiastical organizations. Whatever has been developed in communion with the invisible is objectified, i.e., religious experience and the dogmas and forms of religious communion that arise from it.

To summarize: Historical research has to explicate, therefore, (1) the process of the interiorization of a given historical world on the basis of a prior phase and (2) its exteriorization.

THE DRIVING FORCE IN HISTORY

We encounter this problem first in Hegel's earliest period, but the psychological foundation and development are lacking. The driving force in history is always something unsatisfactory in a cultural situation. Thus the urge to go beyond it arises.

Universal-historical understanding presupposes autobiography, biography, and the history of nations, cultural systems, and organizations. Each of these histories has its own center to which the processes are related and consequently the values, purposes, and significance that result from this relationship.

The possibility of approximating objective universal history depends upon the relations of these moments to one another.

This must be shown first of all from the history of historiography, through which history attains conscious reflection upon itself.

Thucydides [makes] the first stab at universal-historical understanding. He regards his object as a productive system in which the art of war, internal and external statecraft, culture, politics, and constitutional disputes work together to determine power in Greece. This corresponds to Eduard Meyer's⁶ interpretation, which, viewing Thucydides as his ideal, retrospectively constructs the series of causes that have determined this final state. The principle of selection and of formative (direction) lies in the final state, and the speeches provide the essential form of motivation at the decisively important points, just as monologues do in a great drama. Diplomatic missions can also be treated this way.

The next stage of universal-historical understanding is represented by Polybius. Here thought about political organization is combined with Thucydidean pragmatism. The meaning of historical moments is determined by how they relate to the political organization of Rome and how they contribute to the attainment of its world dominance. Seldom has a historian been able to give so tight a unity of meaning to such a universal subject matter.

One should not simply extract the universal-historical theory of the Middle Ages from Otto von Freising.⁷ Dante's interpretation already goes further when he makes us see its connection with Thomas Aquinas. The foundation is the relationship already established both in theology and in philosophy between God and the purposive system of the world. This is the first time that a principle of a universal-historical nexus is explicitly posited, and it

⁶ Eduard Meyer (1855–1930), German historian; author of *Geschichte des Altertums*, *Ägyptische Chronologie*, *Cäsars Monarchie*, and *Ursprung und Anfänge des Christentums*, among others.

⁷ Otto von Freising (c. 1111–58), German bishop, grandson of Emperor Henry IV, and historian; author of *Historia de duabus civitatibus*, a philosophical interpretation of world history.

is grasped as a meaningful or purposive system. The Aristotelian doctrine about the state as well as doctrines about the Roman Empire and the kingdom of God are integrated into this more complete and systematic universal nexus.

273 With this, universal-historical thought once again enters a higher state. [But it is] unfortunate that this theory is founded on a religious metaphysics and that the cultural systems are subordinated to the organizations of the two kingdoms.

A more wide-ranging summation of historical thinking emerges through the gradual development of (a) the theory of constitutions and the internal relationship between a constitution and organizational power (Machiavelli, Guicciardini); (b) the study of purposive systems (their increasing differentiation and the natural system), culture, first as the blossoming of the arts and literature, then as the course of religious development, and finally as the progress of the sciences and of solidarity; and lastly (c) the development of nations as the carriers of history and their relations to one another (the Historical School).

An even higher level summation of historical thinking will require a grasp of how these moments that have been singled out analytically and developed theoretically relate to each other.

The productive nexus of the coexistence and succession of human events is not the nexus of universal history. Let us consider an example. In the productive nexus of coexistence and succession, neither the number nor the goodness of Luther's or Schiller's children can be overlooked; and were we to evaluate facts like this for each of their lives, then they would have to be acknowledged to have considerable worth.

ADDENDA TO THE HISTORY OF HISTORIOGRAPHY (TO BE INSERTED AT SPECIFIC POINTS)

1. The idea of progress originates in the historical experience of scientific progress and of dominance over nature. This experience must have occurred for the first time in the age of great discoveries. At one stroke the relationship to antiquity was overturned. We advanced beyond antiquity, dwarfing, it seemed, all its knowledge. Forms gave way to laws, etc. This historical experience reached philosophic awareness in Bacon. From the historical standpoint, the thinkers of antiquity looked like humanity's immature children, and contemporaries now become the real adults who broaden experience, overcome prejudices, and transform gen-

eralizations into laws. The effect of this in different countries . . . Leibniz . . .

To what extent does this consciousness of scientific progress seem to have been assimilated into the general life of the times? How much does it alter historical consciousness? Bridges relating us to the past are destroyed. Descartes: "Here is my library."⁸

2. Religious enlightenment represents a further historical experience of progress, in that the dissolution of the old faith was not just a negative experience. Rather, a new positive meaning came to be attached to faith, which represented a development of Christianity.

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The first thinker in which this broadening of historical consciousness occurred is Leibniz. His introduction to the *Theodicy* documents this. We find more evidence for this in his correspondence with Bossuet and with other Catholic intellectuals. Leibniz declares every resort to the Bible or to Catholic dogma as unsuccessful. As I have shown, the dissolution of the religious dogma of justification corresponds to this. [Also] Lessing.

In addition to progress in the cultural system of the knowledge of nature, Leibniz also exposes progress in the cultural system of religiosity. It is impossible to see into Leibniz's soul. He never reckoned with his own depths. He lived in the law-governed objective complex of the world. He would have judged his attempts to ground dogmas as mere possibilities. What he experienced religiously within himself was a new experience linked with the Enlightenment.

Here, however, we arrive at a limit of the times. A free spirit who was involved with the tiny states of Hanover and Brandenburg could not possibly find there, compared with antiquity and the remnants of the Roman world-empire before his eyes, the attainment of a higher stage of development.

Leibniz's feeling of life, as manifested repeatedly both in random remarks and in his system, was that to live means to be active, to make progress. Happiness is the feeling of making progress. Hobbes, whom he had studied so thoroughly, had enunciated the same principle. It, together with a heightened consciousness of a complex, law-governed world, greatly influenced Leibniz. His mode of being was to link the two. His consciousness of himself

⁸ When someone asked Descartes to show him his library, Descartes took him to the rear of his dwelling, showed him a calf being dissected, and said: "Voilà ma bibliothèque." See Adrien Baillet, *La vie de Monsieur Descartes* (Paris: Daniel Horthemels, 1691; Reprint, New York: Garland, 1987), 2:273.

was of progress and development. But the world itself, this totality of monadological developments remained for him something removed from the course of time—a law-governed system in accordance with the metaphysics of the day.

3. Two events broke the barriers that long prevented the concept of a development that encompasses all domains from crossing the portals of historical consciousness. These were the North American war of independence and, two decades later, the French Revolution. By realizing ideas in a new, most important domain of spirit made up of economics, law, and politics, progress over the entire past was achieved. Human beings became conscious of their inner productive forces. Natural law was realized in America, and the quintessence of modern ideas was realized in the French Revolution. It was demonstrated that the transference from higher ideas to the greater forms of life has no limits.

²⁷⁵ Schlözer,⁹ with his contempt of the midget city-states of Greece . . .

17. THE NATURE OF SYSTEM. THE GOAL OF THIS BOOK

THE RELATIONSHIP OF THE NATURAL AND THE HUMAN SCIENCES

By gathering these determinations of the human sciences, we can see the basic difference between the natural sciences and the human sciences according to their method, their power, and their limits. The natural sciences consist throughout of assertions that are exact and well-established, and that are related to each other in ways to project the whole physical world. Progress in the principles of the natural sciences consists in expanding either the scope of this world or the universality of our conceptual cognition of it. It never lies, however, in correcting the foundation of truths gained at the outset by subsequent truths. Rather, initial truths are the least hypothetical because they are the most direct expressions of the facts. The more that universality expands, the more powerful the hypothetical element in it. The principles of the natural sciences always express a state of affairs.

The natural sciences find their antecedent basis in optical images that arise in the senses, and as such are clear and distinct, and in the logically verifiable construction of universal representations

⁹ August Ludwig von Schlözer (1735–1809), historian in Göttingen. See SW 4, 307.

from such images. The expression of a universal representation in thought is an object. At this point we recognize how closely related the universal representation and the object of thought are. Those who investigate nature take the reality of the object as it is given in resistance, etc., without further evidence. If they raise themselves to critical consciousness, then the object is designated as a phenomenon with reference to its sensible presence, and every further derivative retains this phenomenal character.

Thus the natural task of those who investigate nature is not the apprehension of laws. Rather, (a) they must express some limited state of affairs such as the orbit of Mars; (b) this very task leads them to solve it analytically by apprehending the lawfulness of homogeneous phenomena; (c) finally, a synthesis must be attained.

The human sciences, by contrast . . .

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*THE CONTRIBUTION OF THE STUDY OF THE HUMAN SCIENCES
AND THEIR THEORY TO CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS*

We are no longer approaching life through a system; rather, we start by analyzing life. This problem has as its reality the total extent of the socio-historical world with the full intensity of anthropological knowledge.

This problem can be juxtaposed with the conceptual cognition of the natural sciences. It (the relationship of the natural sciences and the human sciences) is neither about different realities nor about different methods.

The philosophical question that arises from both together is, What life-attitude capable of being realized in the present do we draw from this way of apprehending the truth of life?

The answer depends upon taking the natural and the human sciences together. My book, therefore, cannot refrain from doing this if it expects to produce solutions to present-day problems. But that only obliges me to discuss this in general terms. This has nothing to do with producing a system.

Every system presupposes the completeness and objectivity of logical and epistemological considerations. If only a permutterational procedure remains possible, as for Leibniz, then system is merely hypothetical.

All of the most recent systems offer merely the scholastic proof that a thinker has moved beyond his lived experience to achieve a pleasing totality of considerations. Such systems no longer exert any influence on life.

*A Second Projection of a Continuation of the Formation of
the Historical World in the Human Sciences*

I. THE PROBLEM OF HISTORY

THE HUMAN BEING AS HISTORICAL

A. *The meaning of the theory of the human sciences* is first of all to assist us with what we have to do in the world, with what we are able to make of ourselves, and with what we can do with the world and it with us.

The answer to these questions presupposes both sciences, i.e., natural science creates one world through its categories and human science another. It is impossible for the human spirit to persist in its duality. Philosophical systems attempt to overcome it in vain! In essence [they embody two alternatives]: The first is to construct nature as has been done since the time of Descartes and to determine the essence of the human spirit from it. Then human spirit can only be a functional system or a law-governed nexus of parts. In both instances a false separation obtains between the content and the form of the human spirit. Its contents are the accidental aspects that permeate it. Spirit is essentially historical, however, i.e., it is filled with the memory of the entire human race that lives on in an abbreviated form. Spirit has the capacity to be filled with this memory because it was able to produce it from out of itself.
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The second alternative is to start from ourselves, and ever since Kant, from an ego, etc. Here we also fail to find the historical "human" being. . . .

These philosophical systems are of no use. What we need is to grasp the inner relation of these two worlds in ourselves, how we adopt changing views on the world. Sometimes we feel ourselves to be part of nature—mysterious, instinctive, earthbound; sometimes . . .

The problem of history is the following: How can understanding apprehend historical phenomena? How can the intellect take command of this sphere of objects? The relationship is entirely different from the conceptual cognition of nature—it involves reflexive awareness. The great historical forms of human spirit have an abbreviated spiritual presence in us.

B. *How is historical knowledge possible?*

1. Understanding. The transposition from the subject into the object required by understanding ought not to be conceived simply as attributing inner life to what is given on the basis of similarity.

2. The fundamental problem is (a) what has a spiritual presence in us is like the abbreviation of contents . . . that have their full reality in history itself; there they possess their proper magnitude; however, the problem goes deeper, and (b) no matter what their genesis, historical and social categories are at work in the life of the subject, i.e., reciprocal obligation, duty, law, and organization. These categories have contents that alone give them existence. The requirement that forms not be separated from contents is fulfilled here. This completely false juxtaposition has been overcome. These categories, forms, concepts are realized in the objective world of history at large.

Starting point: The historical world is always there, and the individual does not merely contemplate it from without but is intertwined with it.¹⁰ It is impossible to sever these relations between the individual and history. To do so would leave merely an incomprehensible condition from which to derive the historical process, that is, a conjunction of conditions with what is given at all times while abstracting from the actual course of history. It is the same irresolvable problem as examining the possibility of conceptual cognition prior to or independently of cognizing as such. We are historical beings before being observers of history, and only because we are the former do we become the latter.

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Objective spirit: All the human sciences rely on the study of history from what has already run its course up to what exists in the present as the limit of what is available in our experience about humanity. This includes what has been experienced, understood, and what it has been possible to raise to consciousness from the past. In all this we are seeking for human beings; psychology too is only a search for the human being in lived experience and understanding, in the expressions and effects that have been produced by them. For this reason I have designated the basic task of all reflection about the human sciences as a critique of historical reason.¹¹ The problem that needs to be solved for historical reason was not fully addressed by the Kantian critique of reason. Kant initially specified the problem of critique with reference to Aristotle, i.e., conceptual cognition is fulfilled in a judgment. . . .

¹⁰ See the main principles of the *Introduction to the Human Sciences*. (D)

¹¹ See also above, GS VII, 117 [this volume, 139]. (H)

We must leave the pure and refined air of Kant's critique of pure reason to do justice to the completely different nature of historical objects. The following questions emerge: I experience my own states myself and I am interwoven in the interactions of society as the point of intersection of the different social systems. These systems derive from the very same human nature that I experience in myself and understand in others.¹² The language in which I think originated in time and my concepts developed temporally as well. Thus, as far as I can plumb my own depths, I am a historical being. The first significant result for solving the problem of the conceptual cognition of history emerges here: The primary condition for the possibility of historical science is contained in the fact that I am myself a historical being and that the one who investigates history is the same as the one who makes history. Universally valid synthetic historical judgments are possible. The principles of historical science cannot be formulated in abstract propositions expressing equivalences. For they must, in accordance with the nature of their object, be based on relationships grounded in lived experience. Lived experience contains the totality of our being. It is this that we re-create in understanding. Here we first find the principle of the mutual affinity of individuals.

Human beings recognize themselves only in history, not through introspection. Basically, we all search for the human being in history; but more broadly, we look to history for what makes us human and religious, etc. We want to know what "the human" is. If there were a science of the human being, it would be anthropology, which aims at understanding the totality of lived experiences according to their structural nexus. The individual never realizes more than a possibility of his or her development, which could always have taken a different direction from what was decided upon. The human being is there for us only under the condition of realized possibilities. In cultural systems too we search for a structure that has been determined anthropologically and in which some x is realized. We call this an "essence," but that is only a term for a procedure that forms a conceptual nexus in this domain. We do not exhaust all possibilities of human nature by this either.

¹² See *Introduction to the Human Sciences* (D), SW 1, 87–91.

The horizon widens. Even if the historian has before him a limited subject matter, a thousand threads lead on and on into the boundlessness of all the memories of the human race. Historiography begins retracing its steps from the present and from one's particular homeland by an exposition of what still survives in human memory in the proper sense. Alternatively, annals record what has just occurred as the years progress. As history advances, the horizon goes beyond one's own state, and more and more of the past appears in the underworld of memory. After life itself vanishes, only expressions remain: direct expressions in which souls have expressed what they were and also narratives describing the actions and circumstances of individuals, communities, and states. And the historian stands amidst the ruins of the remnants of things past, of what souls manifested in deeds, words, sounds, and images—souls who have long ceased to exist. How should the historian conjure up their spirits? His whole effort to recall them is an interpretation of the remnants that have been left behind. Imagine someone who lacks any memory of his own past but is always thinking or acting only on the basis of how this past influenced him without being conscious of any of its parts. This would be the state of nations, communities, and of humanity itself if it were not possible to complete the remains, interpret expressions, and place the narration of isolated deeds back into the nexus from which they arose. All this is interpretation, a hermeneutical art.

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The problem is, What form does interpretation adopt when it is wholly freed from individual existence and when we affirm propositions about subjects that in some sense or other are systems of persons, i.e., cultural systems, nations, or states?

When we do not find our measure in the life-unity of the person, then our first concern becomes a method of finding stable demarcations within the unbounded interchange between individual existence. It is like drawing lines and sketching figures that can endure within a never-ending current. It seems impossible to establish a comprehensible relationship between this reality and the intellect; for the concept separates out what is linked in the flow of life and re-presents something that is universally and eternally valid apart from the person who formulates it. But the stream of life is unique throughout; each wave in it rises and disappears. This difficulty has been the distinctive problem of historical method since Hegel first juxtaposed the Enlightenment ideal of intellectual cognition to the essence of the human-historical world. This problem can be solved without renouncing concepts and taking refuge

in intuition; however, we will need to transform our historical and psychological concepts. Fichte had the intuitive genius to form such concepts for psychic life and spirit in general. Among these, the concept of energy took the place of substance; the activities that emerge in spirit exist both in relation to previous activities and in contrast to those that occur simultaneously; and thus a progression occurs whereby what differentiates itself in time can be unified in a productive energy. But Fichte contributed merely a schema of psychic dynamism; its application remained wedded to Kantian concepts instead of to reality. Neither Herbart nor Hegel reached the open air of the actual historical world. Nevertheless, it was the beginning of a total revolution of our overall conception of the historical world closely related to the birth of modern historiography. This link was exhibited most prominently through Romanticism with Niebuhr and then later through Hegel with Ranke. We must liberate ourselves, however, from the conceptual chaos of that era produced by its antithesis of historical reality and conceptual cognition in accordance with the principle of identity. Instead, we will focus on the nature of historical concepts themselves. Assertions using historical concepts are logically independent from the subject in which they originate *(and)* from the moment in which they are formed; accordingly, their validity is independent of psychological place and time. Their content, however, is a happening, some kind of passage. The assertion is independent of time, but what is asserted is a temporal passage. To be sure, not all historical concepts have been formed properly according to this viewpoint; only insofar as they are properly formed should they occupy a place in our conception of the historical world. At the same time, however, available concepts must be transformed in many ways so that what is changeable and dynamic in them is brought out.

At root the problem is similar to the way higher mathematics seeks to rule over changes in nature. No part of history, an age, for instance, can be grasped by concepts that express something fixed in it, e.g., a system that relates fixed qualities. In the age of Enlightenment,¹³ such concepts were “autocracy” for the state and “enlightenment” for spiritual life. These concepts do not grasp the distinctive nature of the age at all, which really involves a system of relations whose parts are dynamic and whose interactions ex-

¹³ See above, GS VII, 178–87 [this volume, 197–208] (H).

hibit constant qualitative changes. In fact, the very relations themselves change because they depend on interacting forces, meaning that each of them contains within it a rule of change. Applying this to the period of the Enlightenment, the social order that existed until the end of the sixteenth and the beginning of the seventeenth centuries becomes untenable, because conflicts between the special interests of aristocracy, the estates, government, and then of the provinces between themselves and in relation to the whole did not allow a stable unity of political will, a general concern for the whole, and a steady pursuit of the ends of a state to arise in Germany. The same political insufficiencies were evident in England, France, and Italy at other times. They created unbearable conditions in foreign relations because the striving after power between these competing states manifested itself in a different way than in any earlier era. These states arose side by side, their overall form depending primarily on inheritance and war. They were not yet united by a coherent literature or by a common language deriving from it. Dante was the first to achieve this for the Italians. With it arose the striving for national unity, but this met with no possibility of being satisfied in the politics of conflict of tyrants and republics given the distribution of powers. In England things proceeded differently because there was a unified literature . . . also in France. What was decisive for Germany was that great states such as the Spanish world monarchy and the power of France exerted a terrible pressure on a country that was the last to acknowledge the mission uniting itself. . . .

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The question now is, How can such a nexus or system that is not as such produced by one mind, nor directly experienced, nor capable of being traced back to the lived experience of one person be formed by the historian from its expressions and from assertions about them? This presupposes that logical subjects can be constituted that are not psychological. There must be a means of delimiting such subjects and a justification for apprehending them as units or as a nexus.

We seek something soul-like. This is where we have arrived after a long development of historiography. And here the great problem arises; certainly all interaction is between psychic life-units, but how do we find souls where the individual soul no longer rules? The most fundamental starting point is life and what proceeds from it, the achievement of vitality, which is like the melody of psychic life in dissolving the rigidity of rules.

We see a first transition in the eighteenth century from the life of the soul to psychology.

2. NATIONS

NATIONAL HISTORY

Here the subject who experiences a unity, a meaning of outer events—as significant or valuable for something inner—or a purpose is not there in the same manner as the individual; and the subject who experiences is not the same as the one who observes. Rather, the individual stands over against the people as a spectator even when he belongs to it. Thereby understanding, through its own categories, is transformed.

The question is how to delimit the reality of a subject like a people or a nation. This is a question that is totally different from how the subject is experienced by itself, and can be explained only to the extent that *the concepts themselves and their delimitations are historically relative*. The unity of the subject “people” is quite variable according to the elements that constitute it. When did German national unity first develop, as it was then politically constituted under Ludwig, the German?¹⁴ In the Middle Ages, unity of language was only relative due to the various dialects of different regions. By the term “nation” we understand a stable socio-economic and political combination of parts.

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What is in question is the relation of the unity of the subject that is based on real elements to the consciousness of belonging together, national consciousness, and national feeling as the basis for the unity of a [higher] subject.¹⁵

This consciousness of belonging together depends on the same elements that become evident in the individual's consciousness of himself.

Some lived experiences are felt to concern or affect everyone. This is also the case within a purposive system, e.g., a religious organization. This communal feeling, however, exists only in a specific class of lived experiences. In a nation, all kinds of common experiences refer explicitly to the national community. This

¹⁴ Louis II (c. 804–76), grandson of Charlemagne. The Treaty of Verdun (843) allowed him to become king of all Germany east of the Rhine; commonly regarded as founder of the German kingdom.

¹⁵ Dilthey notes in the margin of his manuscript: See Lamprecht, *Einleitung zur deutschen Geschichte*, Lazarus, *Völkerpsychologie*, Lindner und Wundt. (H)

community refers to all the facets of life of the individuals who belong to it. The result is that with every intense experience, the community undergoes a change of values. The same consciousness of belonging together also manifests itself in the recognition of purposes that belong to this nation-system. All these individuals who pursue their own purposes, each for themselves, often in competition with others, or with the purposes of the family or of other groups, find at the same time a domain with its own ends in the nation. In this domain they act as a single subject. By being conscious of belonging together, they fulfill the purpose that the nation-system prescribes for them. Indeed, this whole produces a consciousness of what is the highest good for it at that time. This takes place under the influence of a communal mood or under the leadership of a great man, as in Luther's or Bismarck's day. Then setting a common purpose produces the feeling of solidarity. Outer events, destinies, and acts are measured by the purpose that is central to the life of the nation at the time. Since no nation takes its own death into account, plans and purposes have a completely different role here than in the individual's life. They continually have only a temporal and relative relationship to the inner disposition of the nation, which is capable of unlimited possibilities.

Yet every national configuration is also transitory. The replacement of a determinate trajectory by its opposite is possible at any time because of a consciousness of insufficiencies.

Thus the concept of "development" at the national level also obtains a much more encompassing, though less determinate, sense. The lawlike order that anthropology associates with the relation of passion, illusion, reason, idea, or self-control disappears completely. Each generation forgets the experiences of the one before it.

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These facts suffice to draw at least *one* crucial consequence. Philosophers mull over the question whether the end of every individual person lies in himself and whether the value of life will always be realized in the individual person. This way of stating the question transgresses the limits of all experience and passes over into an empty metaphysics of history; neither that contention nor its opposite, that there is a definable developmental goal for all nations and humanity, has any scientific merit. This is precisely my reason for rejecting the philosophy of history. Communal lived experiences of a nation, communal goals, and memories are real. They constitute a purposive demeanor of individuals, etc., in which

they are determined by a mode of solidarity. It is a truism that all this transpires in individuals. It is equally obvious that only individuals can take satisfaction in realized goals and have the consciousness of the commonality of a lived experience; only they can support and be filled with common memories. Yet it does not follow from this that what happens in individuals occurs solely for their satisfaction. Rather, an individual desires national purposes as his own, experiences national experiences as his, recognizes memories of such experiences as belonging to him by being filled and sustained by them. We cannot go behind this reality, which consists precisely in the consciousness of value, meaning, purpose, and good by problematic psychological reasoning. We are no more privy to the reality of how we happen to discover the meaning of life in shared experiences than to how our life-course brings about meaning. To be taken up with endless conjectures about this constitutes one of the many ways that explanatory psychology transgresses human limits. These transgressions are comparable to efforts to derive hypotheses from the paucity of one's own religious experience and reduce it to a mode of self-interest and self-indulgence instead of describing religious experience as manifested in history.

²⁸⁵ Equally unacceptable transgressions occur whenever we form positive hypotheses relating individual consciousness to some supposed higher, real unity, whether this unity is defined in terms of the psychology of a people or some other transcendent way. These hypotheses are every bit as inadmissible as those that assert that a divinity is really active within individual consciousness.

The inference that there is a superempirical subject, manifesting itself in individual consciousness, based on the facts of a consciousness of solidarity and a universal validity of thought and obligation, indicates the turning point from Kantian speculation to the transcendental constructive method. The latter takes the facts of connectedness and togetherness, of the interchangeability of the location of concepts, and of attachments based on obligation and grounds them in a real nexus, which explains the foregoing relations. The creation of this transcendental method spells the death of history, because it excludes the use of fruitful, historical concepts to delve into the aforementioned relations. It is an equally unacceptable transgression to ground historical kinds of belonging together in subjects that are real in some sense, over and above the subjects of individual psychology, instead of making them logical subjects that support predicates. Herbart, the first person to con-

ceive of investigating law-governed relationships in communities that were distinct from those in the individual psyche, was far from assuming such a real subject.

OF GERMAN SPIRIT

1. Politically, [German spirit] is connected with the Middle Ages through Luther. Duties of office, calling, and occupational hierarchies in the city and in the country . . . compare with Frederick the Great and contrast with France and Italy and their Roman notion of governance: the polis and the dominant citizens as a governing body.

2. Especially in Protestant Germany, there developed a consciousness of calling, obligation, and objective mission. Every official, whether working for an industrial enterprise or for the railways, carried out an objectively defined duty. This was the beginning of administrative hierarchy. The cities also fit into this system. Herein resides the true power of the German spirit. Here too Luther is a carrier of tradition.

Contrast: corporate bodies associated with communes, parliaments as independent entities, financiers and their functionaries, but all under the concept of royal sovereignty.

3. [Germanic] art on the basis of productive force rather than beauty; the coherence and self-sufficiency of artistic forms; music that plumbs the depths; thinking on the basis of totality.

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Contrast with the rational spirit of the French. It finds brilliant expression in the fifteenth century, while in Germany the bourgeois life-philosophy is unable to assert itself. Major counter tendencies, among which Jansenism most closely approximates the German spirit. . . .

4. From Luther and Zwingli . . . a line to the attainment of a unified personality. (Diderot as a French type.) The formation of our spiritual life today still leads back to Lutheranism.

3. AGES

The problem we confront now is what order of categories makes possible the conceptual cognition of a large historical span? Which concepts emerge in these new objects, and to what extent do such concepts as value, meaning, and purpose, which have been developed for individuals, have a directive function here? In a word, how can we approximate objective cognition in this broadened

domain where the subjects of judgments are no longer individual persons?

1. These newly emerging subjects of propositions express a reality. The method of their delineation on the basis of the human sciences. . . . Other kinds of subjects: movements, ages.

2. The concept of structure; the structure of a historical epoch, for example, the Germans before the migration of nations.¹⁶

I am searching for access to the complex phenomenon of the German Enlightenment. . . .

No age is easy to grasp. The method is always to create concepts that exhibit the distinctive nature of the times. Each such concept should span a whole series of facts, and none of them may be in conflict with it. If such concepts encompass the totality of an age, we call them historical categories. They are related to one another within the narrow scope of this time as the universal categories of life relate to life always and everywhere. They constitute a system that expresses the life-nexus itself. They are the product of intuition.

One of the most difficult problems is to understand the ways in which the moods of a nation condition and supplement each other. In the sixteenth century, for example, we find realism, satire, the grotesque, and intensity of the imagination, and in the seventeenth century, realism, the tragic sense of life, criticism, and satire.

Whenever we speak of history, the presupposition of understanding is that historical moments have a meaning and the historical process a sense. According to this presupposition, even if the purpose of an individual's life lies in his own existence, there is at the same time in history a progression of individual happiness and the extension of happiness to many individuals. This is on the whole the conception of modern English historians. But this conception points beyond itself. If the enhancement of individual life from generation to generation is also conceived as the mechanical effect, as it were, of an accumulation of values, this posits a productivity that is disposed toward enhancement. And then there is in history an active relationship according to which its course makes sense; such "sense" indicates solely the presupposition under which the

¹⁶ See above, GS VII, 174f. [this volume, 195–96]. (H)

historical process can be understood but no affirmation about a productive force that can be distinguished from the efficacy of history itself and which could confer on the singular parts of the process their meaning as something immanent to this process.

Here lies merely the condition under which history can be understood, and its product and result is universal history. But universal history does not involve a further presupposition of some underlying agency in history as its immanent and real condition, which can then be explicated in a philosophy of history as providence or immanent purpose or historical formative force.

5. THE NEXUS OF UNIVERSAL HISTORY

A. THE PATH FROM FACTICITY TO THE IDEAL BY WHICH WHAT HAPPENS OBTAINS COHERENCE

Each age exhibits a distinctive structure. The Middle Ages . . . involve a system of kindred ideas prevailing in various spheres. The ideas of loyalty in feudalism and of the imitation of Christ as obedience: their central content is the superiority of spirit over nature on the basis of the fact of self-denial. In science there is the idea of a teleological hierarchy. But it must be acknowledged that the background of these ideas is a kind of a raw power that cannot be overcome by this higher world.

And this is always the case. The facticity of race, of space, and of power-relations provides a matrix that can never be spiritualized. It is Hegel's dream that each age re-presents a stage in the development of reason. But to portray an age presupposes a clear awareness of the just mentioned facticity.

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There is an inner nexus that leads from the conditioning relations, the facticities, and the strife of powers to the development of ideals, etc.

1. Every given situation in the infinite series conditions a change because the needs that provoke available energies into activity can never be satisfied; a hunger for every sort of satisfaction can never be sated.

2. Each configuration of historical life is finite and contains, accordingly, a distribution of joyous forces and constraints, an expansiveness of existence as well as a constrictedness of life, satisfaction, and privation. This then provokes tensions and new distributions among forces; thus actions constantly arise.

In summary, only at very few points of historical life is there any temporary repose. Its causes vary: equilibrium, countervailing productive forces, etc. History is movement.

3. There is also a happiness in making progress; tension is alleviated and ideals are realized, etc.

Between dead factual necessities and the loftiest spiritual life there lies the continual further development of organizations, institutions, and the regulated application of force. The intellect creates mechanisms, as it were, that are used to satisfy needs. It continually perfects them. The purpose set by the intellect produces these mechanisms. Railroads are as much examples of such mechanisms as armies, and factories as much as the improvements of constitutions. They constitute the proper domain of an intellect that seeks the means to attain ends and calculates effects causally.

And here a combination manifests itself that quite properly reveals the nature of history. Its ground is irrational facticity, from which stems, on the one hand, the distribution of tension and mechanisms and, on the other hand, the differentiation of nations, mores, thought, and individuals on which the proper spiritual history is then based.

B. REALITY, VALUES, AND CULTURE

Events are meaningful to the extent that they are referred to a nexus or system for which they are that. If I form a concept of "value-system," which being superindividual is transcendentally grounded—for every determination that has its basis in something superindividual is "transcendental"—then the question is merely whether the procedure is possible, even if mere formal unconditional points of reference for the empirical were intended. If one eliminates the foundation provided by transcendental philosophy, then there is no method to establish unconditional norms, values, or purposes. Then there will only be norms, values, and purposes that claim unconditional validity but are saddled with relativity due to their origin.

We do indeed measure meaning by some real or ideal system relative to which a human being or event acquires this characteristic. If I focus on this characteristic in a productive system, as Eduard Meyer does, and assess it relative to the present, then I first must have a standard that determines what has meaning in the present, since otherwise everything would be meaningful that had

a causal impact on the infinite series of actual states. And one thing at least is clear: I find those aspects of the present meaningful that can bear fruit for the future, or for my action in relation to it, and for the progress of society toward it.

And from a practical standpoint, I see most clearly that I must begin from universally valid judgments about what is to be realized, if I expect to regulate the future. The present does not contain states, but processes and productive systems that go over into the future of something capable of being produced. Bismarck's statement that his religion and his state put him in a position in which service to the state was more important than all other cultural tasks had a universal validity for him because it was based on religion. From this it follows that we have to assume this same relationship retrospectively. Universal norms, values, and purposes develop in an age, and it is with reference to them that the meaning of actions is to be grasped at first. We can then distinguish whether these have been established within limits or unconditionally. It appears that even within a single nation, there will be conflicts about values.

In this way we arrive, at a deeper level, at the proposition that the development of these ideas moves in antitheses (Kant, Hegel) that are embodied in the course of the formation of institutions, etc., are then formulated and allowed to interact to make ever broader and freer positions possible. At first there are no values that are valid for all nations. In the Roman Empire, an aristocratic comprehension of mankind emerged as the vehicle of *humanitas*. In Christianity, humanity is similarly the subject of value. A transformation [occurred] in the Enlightenment. History itself is the productive force in generating value-determinations, ideals, and purposes by which the meaning of human beings and events is appraised.

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In this generative process, [there can be] a twofold reference either to an epoch or to the progress of humanity.

C. THE PROBLEM OF VALUE IN HISTORY

It is said that this leads merely to a consciousness of relativity in history. Without a doubt, every historical phenomenon is relative, since it is finite. But the relation of the finite to the absolute already contains [the relation]. . . .

To put it another way: Does what has been expressed in histori-

cal categories exist only as a moment of the historical process? Or again: Does what is valuable, etc., exist in history only to the extent that it arises, acts, and perishes in this nexus?

Can values be established independently from the historical process itself?

The ultimate problem for a critique of historical reason as sketched here must now be faced. Everywhere in history there is already formation and selectivity in the search for an inner nexus. Everywhere there is a progression according to the relations of finitude, pain, force, antithesis, and accumulation that connect one part of history to the others. Productive force, value, meaning, and purpose are the joints that underpin the historical nexus. But do we find the last word of the historian in the way that nexus, value, meaning, and purpose are given in experience?

The following propositions determine the path I have chosen:

1. The concept of value arises from life.
2. The measure for every judgment, etc., is given in the relative concepts of value, meaning, and purpose of a nation and epoch.
3. The task is to describe how these concepts have expanded into something absolute.
4. In summary, this means the full acknowledgment that even values and norms that present themselves as unconditional are immanent in historical consciousness.

6. CONCLUSION OF THIS WORK

The historical consciousness of the finitude of every historical phenomenon and of every human or social state, and of the relativity of every kind of faith, is the final step toward the liberation of 291 human beings. With historical consciousness human beings attain the sovereignty to enjoy every experience to the full, to surrender themselves to it completely and unencumbered, as if there were no system of philosophy or faith that could bind them. Life is freed from conceptual cognition, and spirit rises above all the cobwebs of dogmatic thought. When everything beautiful, everything holy, every sacrifice is re-experienced and interpreted, they open up perspectives that disclose a reality. And in the same way we accept what is evil, frightful, and ugly as having a place in the world, as containing some reality that must be justified in the world system and cannot be wished away. Over against relativity, the continuity of creative force asserts itself as the core historical fact.

Lived experience, understanding, poetry, and history give rise to a view of life that is always there in and with them. Reflection merely raises it to analytical clarity and distinctness. The teleological consideration of the world and of life is recognized as a metaphysics that is based on a one-sided, partial, but not contingent view of life. The doctrine of an objective value of life is a metaphysics that surpasses what can be experienced. We do experience, however, a connectedness of life and of history in which every part has a meaning. Like the letters of a word, life and history have a sense. There are syntactical moments of life and history that are like particles or conjugations, and they have a meaning, which is sought by every kind of human being. Previously, life used to be conceived on the basis of the world. But the only route possible is to proceed from the interpretation of life to the world. And life is there only in lived experience, understanding, and historical comprehension. We do not transport any sense of the world into life. We are open to the possibility that sense and meaning arise first in human beings and their history. It arises, however, in historical rather than isolated human beings. For human beings are historical beings.

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PART IV

APPENDIX

TRANSLATED BY

RUDOLF A. MAKKREEL AND WILLIAM H. OMAN

I. SUPPLEMENTS TO THE STUDIES ON THE FOUNDATION OF THE HUMAN SCIENCES

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ON THE THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE

i. The Task

The purpose of the following analysis of logical operations is delimited by the task of the foundation of the human sciences. The analysis intends to answer the question whether objectively necessary knowledge in the defined sense is possible. All conceptual cognition of reality is based upon consciousness of the reality of self-perception and on the attribution of reality to the objects that appear in sense perception. But since the sequence of (sense) perceptions straight away forces us to distinguish particular images from the objects to which they are related, it becomes necessary to add the condition that they are subject to construal. A naive faith in the senses is already obliged to factor in the relation of images to the sense organs and to a condition that limits perception to these images. This makes comprehensible the necessity involved in relations between images, and enables us to construct how they succeed each other and coexist. Physics and physiology then take this condition, which is independent of us, to construct a law-governed order of phenomena that derives from the succession and coexistence of images. The natural sciences, like the historical sciences, make two presuppositions. They insist on a moment of givenness intrinsic to all sense perceptions because they assume there to be a condition that is independent of the experiences of any single empirical consciousness. They also presuppose that insofar as our thought proceeds according to the forms and rules that bind the consciousness of evidence, it will lead to a knowledge that will enable us to recognize the lawful character of what is independent of us. As long as natural scientists or historians adopt this standpoint and do not advance to any critical interpretation of knowledge as a system of propositions about the contents immanent to consciousness and their relations, two questions arise. Can the presupposition of something transcending the empirical subject be justified? And if so, what is the basis for the fact

that the operations of our thought are able to grasp this reality independent of us? This second question also arises in the same way in relation to the operations of thought that connect self-perceptions to form conceptual cognitions. The following analysis of the lawfulness of our thinking will attempt to solve this problem.²⁹⁶ The method by which I seek to solve it is that of comparing thought-processes in the different areas of the conceptual cognition of reality, the determinations of value, and the establishment of rules. The primary logical operations that appear in these different areas of knowledge prove to be the same ones that are also operative when sense perceptions come about. They lie beyond the reach of discursive thought. These primary logical operations presuppose the referential nature of thought, but their special quality is merely to raise the relationships of the given to consciousness. The forms and laws of discursive thought can then be derived from them. The problem of how conceptual cognition of reality is possible through the medium of thought is thereby related back to the different and primary problem about our justification for deriving the characteristic of givenness in our conceptual cognition of reality from a condition that is distinct from the individual subject of perception and of thought.

2

The three kinds of mental attitude related to the sphere of conceptual cognition, the sphere of feeling and instinct, and the volitional sphere correspond to different classes of knowledge.

First, let us make use of a result of the phenomenology of knowledge. There are three different attitudes of psychic life that are the basis of the system of conceptual cognition of reality, the system of our value-assessments, and that of establishing rules. All three attitudes have their direct expression in language.¹ Thus a felt or emotional attitude is expressed in an exclamatory sentence and a volitional attitude in an imperative. Further, it is also self-evident that the attitude involved in feeling and in volition no less than that in objective perception can become the object of a judgment that has this state as its object. This occurs when the state is related to the subject in which it takes place. Thus a judgment arises in which a

¹ Reference in the margin to Christoph Sigwart (1830–1904), German philosopher and logician, and to Karl Otto Erdmann's *Logik*, p. 276, about subjectively valid judgments. (H)

self-perception is objectified. And this is the case no matter whether the self-perception is related to a state of the intellectual, emotional, or volitional sphere. Now the proposition that I will act according to my convictions is not a judgment. But the state of such an inner volitional determination can attain expression in a judgment of inner perception. It is another matter, however, when the process as such does not become an object for a perceptual judgment, but when what is distinctive in a felt or volitional attitude finds its way into speech. Here universally valid knowledge is possible only if the *(references contained)* in both felt and volitional attitudes are expressed universally and are traced back to legitimate grounds. For the single felt state adheres to the individuality of the subject, whose judgment has no validity for others. It is not transferable. The content of a decision or a command is likewise nontransferable. The person to whom a command applies neither ought to nor can renew this content in himself; rather, the volitional relationship of two persons contained in the command just makes it possible for the command to be followed. Only when the relationships contained in the felt and volitional attitudes are expressed universally can they become objects of universally valid knowledge. In the volitional sphere, knowledge divides into two classes in accordance with the special nature of willing. To will is either to set a purpose by which the subject determines itself or it is directed toward the determination of others. Thus on the one hand, the concept of purpose or good arises, and, on the other, the concept of a regulation, rule, or norm. Just as a felt attitude determines and exerts an influence on willing, the establishing of values is presupposed by the setting of purposes. We do not mean this in the sense that values as such are transformed into purposes or goods in the volitional sphere. Rather, the nature of willing asserts itself independently in the formation of the theory of goods. A value is for me that which I have experienced through feeling or can re-experience as valuable. A good, in the strict sense, is only that which my will can posit as a purpose, and it must be attainable. The purposiveness contained in a good must be consistent with other more important purposes for me in the nexus of life. Therefore, willing has as its relatively independent content the positing of a purpose or good and of a rule or norm. When the individual and nontransferable relation posited in a feeling or in willing is raised to universality, then assertions become possible that have as their object the nature of the attitude involved in feeling, setting a purpose, or a rule. They do not signify that some-

thing takes place, and they assert neither the reality of the process in which something is felt or willed, nor the existence of values or value-relationships, of purposes or prescriptions. These assertions express the relation between values that is rooted in an evaluation, the hierarchy of goods that is determined by the setting of a purpose, and the obligation that is posited in a rule or a norm. Whenever the universal validity of a value is formulated or values are assessed relative to each other, such assertions emerge or they express how a sphere of subjects is constrained by a universally describable mode of operation.

298 The following basic forms of assertion and of knowledge emerge. [Firstly,] the conceptual cognition of what is the case or cognition as such, if the term is taken in its original sense, always has the given as its object and seeks to ascertain reality and its properties. Even though there is a deep-seated distinction between logical and mathematical sciences and those that have nature or the human socio-historical world as their object, they all derive from the attitude involved in the conceptual cognition of what is the case; even in their most abstract development, each science is a system of means for the cognition of reality. The categorial relations that are distinctive of the system of the conceptual cognition of what is the case are reality, thing, qualities, states, action, and being acted on. This cognition of what is the case constitutes the foundation for all value-determinations. [Secondly,] both the determination of life-values and the evaluation of external states of affairs refer to realities that constitute the substratum for establishing values. In the case of life-values, it is the reality given in self-perception, and in the case of evaluation, it is the reality posited in external perception. But the appraisal of value as such is not an assertion about an occurrence; it is not discharged through categories of cognizing of what is the case: here a new attitude of the subject located in feeling emerges; this first makes possible the relations of value and appraisal or the gradation of values. These relations must be objectified to enable value judgments to come about. What is predicated as such a relation has reality as its substratum, although it is given only in a felt attitude. [Thirdly, we find that] the same is true for knowledge about purposes whose validity depends on the system of values. Such a system influences how questions about the hierarchy of purposes or goods and of the highest good are decided. The validity of an assertion in this domain requires that these relations be articulated into an objectively valid system of purposes. That which is required of such a universal system of

purposes can be expressed in a rule. Once again, I underline the connection that exists between the setting of a purpose in willing and rule-giving. Every satisfaction is already related to the state that brings it about as universal to particular. When willing introduces a change as its goal, then this change stands as a particular to the universal of a desired satisfaction. Accordingly, the will to satisfaction can also be regarded as the positing of a rule that covers individual possible changes leading to satisfaction. Thus the rule is the form of valid knowledge in which the nature of volition is expressed.

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This also answers the question to what extent we can designate regulations, rules, and norms as knowledge.² In ordinary life we say that we knew or did not know about a rule or regulation. This expresses only cognizance of the fact, however, that I am acquainted with a grammatical rule or that I am cognizant of the relationship between an authority, the issuing of a regulation, and its content. But if the system in which rules or regulations acquire their validity from valid presuppositions within a purposive domain is transparent to me, then norms, rules, or even legal regulations are raised to objectively necessary and universally valid knowledge. Here a rationally grounded obligation finds expression. The striving for such a system, in which legal regulations would be raised to the level of knowledge and would thus be secured by reason, has produced natural law. A regulation, rule, or norm cannot be taken to be a judgment in the narrower sense. For it does not assert that a regulation exists, but that it is valid. The obligation that attaches to a content that has been commanded is not a predicate. If I take the proposition in this sense, then I negate what is meant to be expressed in it, namely, being bound by a regulation, rule, or norm.³

The difference of attitude in these three domains of knowledge can also be expressed as follows: conceptual cognition of life-values as well as of the use-values of outer things is inseparable from their aftereffect on feeling and produces changes in how value is established. Theory is, so to speak, only an intermediary between the first value-assignations of naive empirical consciousness and those of a life-attitude that has been illuminated by self-reflection. It proceeds by means of appraisals that are rooted in felt attitudes. Likewise, in the domain of willing, theory strives for

² See Sigwart. (D)

³ Our thinking can be correct without there being a judgment. (D)

an advance from positive precepts of ethics, law, and religiosity toward a valid system. The final goal of theory in this domain is again only a universally valid system of general value-assessments, purposes, and rules.

3

- Let us consider the operations of thought in these three domains.
- 300 The description of the processes that lead to objectively necessary knowledge resulted in the advance in each of these domains. The beginning is to be found in what is singular and contingent in particular lived experiences; in each case, reflection, doubt, and conflict lead us to strive for objectively necessary knowledge. We seek for objective reality, an unconditioned standard of assessment, a highest good, and an unconditionally valid norm of action. This tendency toward the unconditioned, which, for Kant, was the distinctive trait of theoretical reason, asserts itself in all three spheres of knowledge. This means that thought advances from relation to relation without ever, as far as we can see, attaining its goal. The will to know, the purposive system of knowledge, the striving to capture the ideal of the true, the valuable, and the good in valid knowledge have as their basic counterpart processes that generate valid knowledge step by step on the way to this goal. The system and the laws of thought are dependent on this universal characteristic of the cognitive process.

4

The most universal quality of thought that recurs in every domain of its activity can be designated by the expressions "synthesis," "connecting," and "relating." All these terms express an operation through which a manifold is gathered into a unity. Connection or synthesis is meant to designate all ways of relating contents to each other; accordingly, separation or negation falls under this concept of a synthetic function as much as connection in the narrower sense. Thus the expression "relating" most closely approximates what needs to be said.

The activity of relating encompasses distinctive operations.⁴ To-

⁴ In the margin, Dilthey refers to Eduard von Hartmann's *Kategorienlehre* and to Sigwart. (H)

gether we designate the operations involved in making distinctions, finding similarities, and apprehending degrees of difference as aspects of comparison. It gives rise to our consciousness of the given manifold. Only then do the operations of separating and connecting become possible. I apprehend the notes of a melody as different from one another. They are thus separable and can then be united again in melody. We can isolate what the different senses give of a thing, such as color, odor, and taste, and then reconnect them again. This always brings with it a change in attentiveness both in terms of direction and intensity. And it also provides the basis for the transition to the process of abstraction by means of the already given elementary processes. As we survey a series of things, qualities, and processes, our attention can be directed to that which unites them and we abstract from that which differentiates them from each other.

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These operations of comparing, connecting, and separating are contained both in the consciousness of the identity of an object and in the formation of abstract representations. I renew the perceptual image of a painting as often as my eye returns to it. As I do this, I am conscious that for me the perceptual acts themselves are distinct from each other; but at the same time I experience that their content remains the same. Thus I grasp the object as being the same. I bring to consciousness its identity and the difference of my acts of apprehension. And however different the processes in which abstract representations arise may be, they always contain the same operations of differentiating and of finding resemblances, of separating, and of connecting.⁵ These operations then make it possible to grasp relations in particular empirically givens. We experience a span of time, and we grasp a spatial distance. These operations are contained in every kind of knowledge. Value-assessment occurs by means of the operations of finding similarities or dissimilarities and by discerning gradations. The same is true for the preferences of volitional acts. These operations are common to all discursive thought. By discursive thought we mean thought that is tied to language or to some other corresponding system of signs such as that of number. Even the perceptual or representational formations to which thought refers can be traced back to these operations as their condition. This asserts nothing, of course, about the way that sense perception, consciousness of objects, or abstract representations come about. It is the task of psychology to investigate the nature of such [genetic] processes.

⁵ In the margin, Dilthey refers to Erdmann's *Logik*. (H)

From the standpoint of logic and the theory of knowledge, it only matters that the processes that supply the spatial and temporal series of impressions and inner states are connected into higher formations so that they can be conceived as produced by their specified functions. Whatever processes may be involved, they are equivalent to the functions of the logical operations mentioned earlier. This and nothing else is the sense of the theory of unconscious inferences by which our perceptual images arise. The proof of this lies in the fact that sense perceptions, especially illusions of the senses, are capable of being explained as conditioned by these primary logical operations.

It is further self-evident that the processes of association and reproduction are to be included as means that work together to call up and thus make possible the emergence of logical functions.
 302 To this we add the epistemological presupposition that memory-images can have only a representative function relative to perceptions. Although attentiveness intensifies consciousness and shifts the way it is apportioned, it introduces no change in the apprehended facts themselves.

Finally, the logical functions designated as the primary logical operations that appear in each of the main mental attitudes fall under categories posited by such attitudes. These categories express relations between the contents of such attitudes. Together with the elementary formal functions of thought, they condition the development of representations that lie at the basis of discursive thought. They express the relational forms within an attitude that constitute⁶ the objectively necessary congruity of its contents. Reality, value, and purpose are the basic categories that emerge from these three kinds of functions.

Categories can be divided into two classes: those that are abstracted from the formal functions of thought, namely, difference, similarity, sameness, degree, identity, unity, plurality, totality, and those that express the objectively necessary congruity of contents that have been posited within psychic attitudes. Reality, thinghood, causality, value, purpose, and means are categories of this kind. Other categories can be added as the network of knowledge expands — they can be formal or objective in accordance with their proper place. We can neither delimit a determinate number of categories nor bring their mutual relations into a definitive order.

⁶ Reading *konstituiert* for *konstruiert*.

5

The elementary formal logic operations are not about contents, objects, and processes but about relations. This is what makes them functions of thought. From the critical perspective of their truth-value, however, they disclose an affinity with perceptions. I place two shades of gray side by side. The perception of each of these two shades, the immediate givenness of what is contained in such perceiving, the way apprehension is constrained by this given—all this comes back as such when I apprehend the difference between these two shades of gray. In terms of its truth-value, thinking of a distinction re-presents a perception of the second degree, as I indicated earlier. Both perceptions provide the conditions according to which it becomes possible to note a distinction. When notes follow one another in intervals, then the conditions are fulfilled for bringing about the function of consciousness, which is to separate them from each other. When qualities of different provenance are united in the object, then the conditions are also fulfilled to separate them and to single them out from the total representation of the object. And although the activity of consciousness of separating and reuniting possesses a greater formal freedom, its content is still determined by an objective necessity. When an aggregate of impressions is set loose from its background and set in motion in space, it can even separate itself from its background. I merely raise to consciousness what in fact occurs here when I assert the separateness of these impressions from the background of objects. I derive further qualities of thought from the task inherent in the purposive system of thought—producing objectively valid knowledge—and from the ways in which processes directed at this goal are continually underway. These qualities of thought are the conditions for the solution of the problem. The goal of thought is to move from the conditioned nature of every given and the relativity that comes with it toward objectively necessary knowledge. From this it follows that relations must constantly be expanded to include new constituent parts.

FIRST DRAFT OF THIRD STUDY

The Task

I begin with a set of sciences available for experience and then seek their essence and grounding. History, political-economy, jurisprudence, the sciences of government and religion, the study of literature, poetry, art, and philosophy, stand in close relations to each other: for they all approach experiential reality by focusing on lived experiences, feelings, strivings, volitional acts, processes of representation, imagination, and thought. They seek to grasp these activities and to submit them to conceptual cognition. And as these lived experiences are interrelated, we find it necessary to grasp these relations. My starting point is this factually existing continuum that has emerged among these experiential sciences. *This nexus constitutes the factual given for the logician and the epistemologist.* It may be the case that they find themselves required to replace this nexus with another modern grouping. This raises the question of the justification for preferring other possible groupings. But this question can only be considered on the basis of the actually existing nexus. The expression "human sciences" should not designate anything but this factual nexus. This involves no assumption about the way in which the nexus is given. And if psychology stands in a relation to these sciences whereby, on the one hand, it grounds them, and, on the other, it uses their data, then this should initially *(be considered)* only as a fact, and the question whether it truly belongs to these sciences remains open.

The human sciences form an epistemic nexus that attempts to bring to objective conceptual cognition all attainable lived experiences that constitute the human sociohistorical world as present, remembered, and understood. Individual scholars work to achieve this; they contend with extraordinary difficulties, but the success of their work increases their assurance that from partly obliterated traces, lived experiences can be retrieved and their course apprehended so that finally, the full scope of the human world will be cognized and the domain of reality can be manifested in this system.

This leads to questions about further inquiry. To what extent is the confidence in progressively objective conceptual cognition that binds all who work together in the human sciences justified? The very work that is produced in the workshop of the human sciences must be raised to reflection upon itself. We must find the forms and categories of conceptual cognition in the human sciences, establish the relationships on which their epistemic validity is based, and raise the methods of cognitive procedures to logical awareness. This will increase the reliability and the range of applicability of the human sciences.

These problems are also dealt with in the context of philosophical systems, i.e., implicitly in general logic and epistemology; then, however, in particular applications of universal theories to the objects of the human sciences. But here in our foundation of the human sciences, these problems must constitute the exclusive subject matter.

This restriction yields noteworthy advantages. For one, logico-epistemological reflection on the human sciences can be placed in an appropriate relation to historical reflection on them. Reflection can be restricted to those propositions that are absolutely required for the foundation of the human sciences. Thus many disputed questions that a philosophical system must deal with, but which present major difficulties, can be excluded as lying beyond our task. The continuum that extends from the first fundamental propositions to the methodology [of the human sciences] can be better articulated. A final advantage, whose worth each may assess from his own standpoint, is that these inquiries stay free of a particular problematic involved in undertaking a philosophical system, namely, the problem of the relativity everywhere of historical, religious, and philosophical as well as social and political phenomena. This problem exists for every modern human being, but especially for those who investigate the sociohistorical world.

It lies in the nature of the situation that a considerable portion of the propositions providing the initial foundation can only be demonstrated generally for the entire field of cognition. The problem of objective conceptual cognition, the determination of the sense that this term and the terms that correspond to it, "being," "reality," and "objectivity," alone can have, if they are to have their fulfillment in given cognitive experiences, can only be given a general treatment. The same is true for the theory of lived experience, the nexus leading from empirical consciousness to the thesis of consciousness, theories of logical forms and laws, and other parts of the foundation of the human sciences.

The investigator in the field of the human sciences must also make the revolutionary move, which starts with an empirical consciousness that assumes the reality of the psychic subject, things, and other persons and leads by means of experience and the experiential sciences to the critical insight, that these three modes of reality, in relation to which life runs its course, are there only as a correlation between consciousness and its contents. And just as general as this nexus, in which the presuppositions of empirical consciousness are fully superseded, are the propositions that positively establish the extent to which knowledge of the psychic nexus in lived experiences, which one may designate as the psychic subject, is based on outer things and on other persons. This inquiry likewise includes the universal theory of the forms, laws, and categories of thought.

Only on the basis of this universal foundation can we solve the special problem of the human sciences, which is how awareness of the reality of human spirit and the conceptual cognition of its totality emerges from present and remembered lived experiences and from those that convey in them the understanding of other lived experiences, present or past. For this insight, which results from the development of conceptual cognition in the human sciences, lies at the basis of all reflection on these sciences: this reality and its coherence is formed by the human spirit on the basis of its lived experiences using the medium of thought in accordance with categories that articulate the relations of the given in it; this reality is the creation of spirit. In the human sciences too, objective conceptual cognition does not signify the replication, so to speak, of a reality existing outside of them. The cognitive process here remains bound by its means of intuition, understanding, and conceptual thought. The human sciences have never even wanted to achieve such a replica, and the further they advance, the less they want to. "Rather, they refer what happens and what has happened—the unique, the contingent, the momentary—to a system of value and meaning. As it progresses, conceptual cognition seeks to penetrate this system ever more deeply. It becomes ever more objective in its grasp, without ever being able to surpass its own essence, namely, it can experience what is only through re-feeling and re-construing, through connecting and separating, through abstract systems and a nexus of concepts."⁷

The system of jurisprudence is distinct from the sum of lived

⁷ See GS VII, 3 above [this volume, 23–24] (D).

experiences involved in legal transactions or court proceedings and judgments. The same distinction exists between the complex of lived experiences involved in communion with the invisible, which is not subject to determination by mechanical intervention, and insight into the concepts that constitute the essence of religious communion, religious experience, and religious assertions. The forms in which [human spirit] is actualized and the cultural systems in which the purposive systems of the sociohistorical world are realized consist of lived experiences and the relations between them. But the conceptual order whereby these lived experiences are raised to conceptual cognition first emerges from the work of the human spirit, forming a second spiritual world, which is indeed based on the first but can be created only by means of understanding, judgment, and conceptual thought proper to human spirit.

The history of the human sciences shows, and logico-epistemological reflection elucidates, how a historical narrative of a unique occurrence can no more be or seek to be a *copy* of past events than jurisprudence or religious theory: the narrative too is a new creation of the human spirit grounded in the conditions of conceptual cognition. The more deeply history penetrates the nexus of what happens, the more clearly this distinctive character discloses itself. For this is the decisive thing in grasping connectedness in history: its nexus can neither be read off from the remnants of historical events that have been handed down, nor may ideas from the so-called philosophy of history be projected into what is handed down by tradition in order to constitute it. The historical events themselves, as they are handed down and gathered both concurrently and successively, never as such provide the means and material to derive a connecting causal system or the formative laws that permeate them, or a sense of the progress and development that may be achieved in them. Only on the basis of analytic sciences of the specific purposive systems that pervade history as *cultural systems*, and further, on the basis of analytic knowledge of the internal structure of organizations that have been formed in history as provided by political science, is gradual insight into the nexus of history achieved. Only in this way can we resolve the question whether laws of formation or development can be obtained from the coexistence and succession of events. Historical reliability does not lie, as one might think, in transcribing events according to their coexistence and succession. There will always be much that is in doubt in such a transcription. Historical re-

liability is even less to be sought by laying hold of the personal individual forces that are active in history. Only if we start from the framework gained through the systematic human sciences within which these forces have been formed and on which they exert their influence do we begin to have some insight into their development and some standard for their value. And therefore, that which is most secure and most important for inquiry in the human sciences is the conceptual cognition of the major cultural forms and their external organization, their development, their reciprocal productivity within an age, the structure of society as it exists within a specifiable period, and the phases in society that gradually lead to changes in it.

Therefore a single nexus is actualized in the study of sociohistorical reality. It is the same reality of the world of human spirit that is manifested from different perspectives either as universal history or as the totality of the systematic human sciences. To understand this reality, to grasp its connectedness in thought, an always present awareness of the conceptual cognition of the systematic human sciences is required when the universal historical perspective is being formed; and when its understanding is directed at the systematic conceptual cognition of a cultural system or of a social organization, it requires the presence of universal-historical knowledge. This entails that the most fundamental question concerning the possibility of objective conceptual cognition in the human sciences is to grasp how the coexistence and succession of historical events can become accessible to the cognitive experiences of the individual through memory, understanding, and historical critique, and how, the [structural] nexus of this coexistence and succession of the events can be given. The solution to this question presupposes the theory of the structural psychic nexus as it is realized in the psychophysical life-unit while at the same time connecting with other psychophysical life-units.

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Inherent in the human sciences is a connectedness that realizes the productive intention of an *objective conceptual cognition* of the world of human spirit. It extends from the lived experiences of individuals beginning to reflect on history, poetry, and religious doctrine while still enclosed within their individuality, to the objective grasp of the sociohistorical world in universal history and in the systematic human sciences. The foundation of the human sciences must begin from the nexus of conceptual cognition immanent in them. Their fundamental problem is to determine what sense the concepts "objective conceptual cognition," "what is the

case," "reality," and "being" have in this system of the human sciences. And since conceptual, systematic cognition is inherent to every part of the human sciences, sometimes as task, sometimes as presupposition, the question is how the objectivity of concepts can be achieved on the basis of which the nexus of historical experiences in their coexistence and succession can then be established. There fore the foundation of the human sciences is first and foremost an interpretation of the concepts that are constitutive of the overall world of human spirit that has been discovered in the human sciences. We give the name "understanding" to the process in which we recognize something inner from signs that are outwardly given. It attains its highest perfection both in exhausting the content to be understood and in reaching universal validity in knowing it through exegesis or interpretation. By the expression "interpretation" we indicate the technical understanding of lasting fixed manifestations of life. Concepts are also such fixed manifestations of life, and by the interpretation of concepts, we ought accordingly to understand a universally valid knowledge of what is intended by the concept and by the linguistic expression corresponding to it. The method of interpretation of the concept consists of a composite procedure. The fulfillment of lived experiences represented by the concept, and the establishment of the set of characteristics that are common to these lived experiences, constitute one side of the procedure. But since the concept has its place in science, we must be able to substitute its interpretation whenever the concept appears there. Interpretation only attains its goal when in each context in which a concept appears, its interpretation corresponds to that context. Indeed, even a word is only understood and univocally determined when what is meant by it is rediscovered in every context that contains it. The foundation of the human sciences can at first be nothing but such an interpretation, for a universal philosophical foundation that posits more comprehensive and higher goals has not yet been attained. A universally acknowledged theory of science does not exist. After all, the theory of knowledge is one of the most recent sciences; Kant was the first to see its problem in its general character. And since Fichte's premature attempt to gather Kant's analyses into a complete system, further efforts have always led to new difficulties and brought new tasks into view. Attempts at a solution are just as irreconcilably opposed to each other today as they were long ago in the field of metaphysics.

By defining and explicating the concepts that constitute the over-

all context of the human sciences and the categories by which the world of human spirit is thought, we provide the basis for the work of the human sciences to reflect upon itself. Then it will also become evident that the concepts that are proper to the human sciences and constitute their interrelations are grounded in describable lived experiences and, ultimately, in the mode of experiencing that characterizes this domain.

On the basis of this investigation, it must then be possible to show that the reservations that have been made against the objective cognitive value of the human sciences can be dissolved. The most important of these reservations can already be resolved by the correct interpretation of the concepts that constitute the system of the human sciences.

SECOND DRAFT OF THIRD STUDY

First Chapter The Task

The division of the sciences into those pertaining to nature and those of the human spirit can only be grounded in the course of inquiry itself. Here at the beginning of the inquiry it must suffice to point to the affinity that exists among the group of disciplines that we have designated as the human sciences. These human sciences include history, political economy, jurisprudence, the sciences of government and religion, the studies of literature, poetry, art, and philosophical world-views. Let us begin with something simple in order to delve into the nature of their affinity. Lived experience, understanding the lived experiences of others, and the judgments and concepts that express the states of affairs that were experienced and understood are closely related to each other. Lived experience grounds the other two types of knowledge. All understanding of the expression of another's lived experience occurs only on the basis of one's own lived experience. The states of affairs given in lived experience and understanding can then be represented in judgments and concepts. Because judgments and concepts are based on lived experience and understanding, a network of knowledge develops in which lived experience, understanding, and their re-presentation are linked reciprocally. The same is true of all the disciplines that have here been gathered as the human sciences. They are all rooted in this network. However, they also

involve states of affairs that cannot be experienced or understood, namely, physical facts. History describes the tumult and the uproar of battles, the position of enemy armies, the effects of their artillery, and the influence of the terrain on the outcome. Here, as throughout the course of history, physical processes, the necessities inherent in them, and the effects that result from them constitute an important part of the historical narrative. But they belong to history only to the extent that they determine the development of individuals or associations of individuals, or as they come into play in deliberating the means for bringing about the goals of individuals or of communities, or influence the outcome of actions. In short, those physical processes must be connected in some way to what we can experience and understand. The same relationship can be shown in the systematic human sciences. The extent to which land is populated depends on the relationship between the work required to cultivate it and the yield it provides. The differences in soil quality on which this relationship depends is of interest to economists only insofar as it is linked to need, labor, and satisfaction, or to what is known about those things in lived experience, in understanding lived experiences, or in judgments and concepts about them.

Let us go further. All the systematic human sciences are based on the relation that exists between what has been experienced and understood and the concepts that express it. What has been experienced and understood is re-presented in concepts that find their fulfillment in the content of lived experience and understanding. The essence of the latter can thus attain re-presentation in a conceptual system. This leads us to a related point: what is given in this manner in lived experience and understanding exhibits certain qualities that are common to it throughout and distinguish it from what cannot be so experienced and understood, namely, from physical facts. Every value and every purpose of life is contained in our lived experience and in what we understand.⁸ The consciousness of the value of our existence is based on our experience of life's fullness, on a deeply felt awareness of the richness of the reality of life, and on making the most of what we have within us. Value is assigned to anything that lies outside the experiencing subject only to the extent that a re-experiencing mode of understanding can grasp it as a carrier of such an inner world or as a

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⁸ A reference to *Introduction to the Human Sciences* [SW 1, 58] is found in the margin. (H)

source that can affect the feelings of psychophysical life-units. Whatever is capable of being experienced and understood as it pertains to the domain of the human sciences is characterized by the fact that it exhibits values together with the meaning of persons and events.

One final quality of the human sciences that links them to one another and differentiates them from the natural sciences must still be brought into focus. The whole fabric of the world to which they are connected, the sociohistorical world, consists of psychophysical life-units whose lived experiences are capable of being experienced and understood. They are the carriers and constituents of every structure found in present or past societies. And when these facts are taken in conjunction with the ones concerning the value of psychophysical life-units and what happens between them, then the twofold direction of research in the human sciences results. "The apprehension of what is singular and individual is for them as much a final end as the explication of abstract uniformities."⁹

These are the essential characteristics that can be established prior to our investigation itself merely by analyzing the historical development of the human sciences. These characteristics suffice to redescribe the affinities among the individual disciplines that are generally agreed to count as human sciences in terms of their fundamental connectedness and their common differences from the natural sciences. Thus there is sufficient justification to make such a group of sciences the basis of the forthcoming investigation. A definitive determination of the concept of the human sciences will only be possible in the course of our investigation. It will require principles whose proof involves considerable difficulties and which can only be grounded by a whole series of other truths. Among these principles, the most important is that in experiencing and understanding a nexus or connective structure is given with the lived experiences themselves. This opens up an insight into an essential characteristic of the conceptual cognition of the human sciences, by which their previously disclosed qualities can be united into one final, comprehensive formula. And not only can the essence of the human sciences be definitively established on the basis of this principle, but their scope can also be broadened and the analysis of their parts determined. For if this principle can be demonstrated, then it makes possible a descriptive and analytic psy-

⁹ *Introduction to the Human Sciences* (D), SW 1, 78.

chology that completes the group of human sciences and gives them systematic unity.

As the course of this investigation goes further, therefore, the essence and scope of the human sciences can be determined by analyzing the conceptual cognition of the human sciences. This conceptual determination will be confirmed through agreement with the actual ways in which particular sciences cooperate and through the fruitfulness of the assertions that can be made about this complex.

The human sciences aim at objective conceptual cognition of their object. All human scientists are joined together in this effort, and their labors converge in this direction. They establish facts; they seek to re-experience what has happened by understanding the fullness of the meaning inherent in it; they apprehend the nexus that exists in an event and analyze it; and, on the basis of this analysis, they separate systems of partial contents by a method of abstraction and bring it to conceptual cognition. This in turn leads to new means to grasp what has happened in more depth. Whether they endeavor to fathom the singular or to cognize the universal; whether they investigate connectedness in psychic life, in history, or in society, or want to recognize a lawlike order; whether they are, like Herder or Lotze, more struck by the values that are realized in the history of our species, and by the meaning that joins the parts of this history into a significant whole; or whether they, like Hume or Buckle,¹⁰ investigate the causal nexus of events and the uniformities in them, it is always the case that the impetus of their efforts is directed at objective conceptual cognition just as in the natural sciences. And the history of the human sciences shows how their actual developmental course constantly brings with it a more penetrating awareness of history, cultural systems, and psychic life. The reliability with which scholars accomplish their task in the human sciences is based especially on this. At the same time, however, they begin to reflect about what they do. This extends from the technical aspects of their work to the consciousness of the nature of the knowledge that is produced by it. The beginnings of such a consciousness we find in Thucydides; and we discover it later, in a more developed state, in Polybius, who lived amidst epistemological debates.

In modern times, such reflection asserts itself at the most diver-

¹⁰ See Dilthey's review of H. T. Buckle's *History of Civilization in England*, SW 4, 261–69.

gent places in the human sciences. Theological investigations into hermeneutics and historical inquiries into criticism deal with the procedures involved in understanding and in establishing facts on the basis of the remnants of tradition. Natural law jurists and legal scholars inquire into the methods by which law and jurisprudence can be scientifically founded. Vico relates his historico-religious and historico-legal researches to the ultimate depths of human cognition. Hume's historical work has a close link with his inquiries into human beings, their capacities for cognition, and the immanent necessity and scientific lawfulness of human events. Controversies between historians and philosophers of history stirred the eighteenth century. The conflict between the natural system of human sciences and the Historical School took up the first decades of the nineteenth century. And beginning with Comte, in whose writings the notion of the historical plays a major role, to Buckle, and finally, to the most recent disputes about the goal and the methods of history, we find ever more self-reflection in the human sciences. The task that arises in this historical continuum is to consider the legitimacy of knowledge in the human sciences and to raise the logical constitution, the procedures, and methods of this knowledge to philosophical consciousness. The philosophical foundation of the system of the human sciences would then be included in this task. And just as the problem that has been posed by this work [of philosophical consciousness] has come from the human sciences, so the direction of their work is predelineated by the actual might of progress that everywhere determines them. This direction is evident at every point in their work; it functions in every procedure used by these sciences, and it links all procedures to each other. Objective conceptual cognition of society, of history, and of man is their goal throughout, and everywhere they presuppose the possibility of such cognition.

This presupposition is founded not only on confirmation that comes with advances in objective conceptual cognition but likewise on the properties of knowledge that characterize [the practice of] the human sciences. Human scientists are imbued with these properties, even when they themselves do not reflect on them. These properties of knowing manifest themselves through the practical manipulation of the working tools that are provided by lived experience, understanding, and the re-presentation of what was experienced and understood in judgments and concepts. It is important to demonstrate this in particular cases. Such a demonstration does not have as its object the establishment of the human

sciences through their philosophical foundation (this will not be the object of inquiry until much later). It is related for the time being only to the manner in which these presuppositions are at work in research in the human sciences.

Lived experience is always certain of itself. Whereas in the natural sciences, the research destroys the presupposed reality of the sensible qualities of the things with which they start, in the work of historians, jurists, or artists, a doubt never arises as to the reality of what has been given in lived experience. Equally indubitable for them is the possibility of understanding what has been meant, expressed, or asserted in some mode of expression or in some statement. To be sure, they find that understanding proves itself to be limited in many cases. The human scientist learns that it requires much practice and foresight in order to make understanding reliable within its limits. On the basis of his own needs, he develops the technique of hermeneutics and its scientific discipline, thereby making understanding rule-guided. He becomes conscious of its procedures and their legitimacy, and technically refines the safeguards, precautionary measures, and procedures that ensure that reality is grasped through this approach. And in the course of his work, he discovers how lived experience and understanding reciprocally corroborate each other. From the psychological standpoint, lived experience and understanding are always distinct. They belong to the region of the self and of the other. Procedurally, they always exclude each other, but a structural connectedness exists between them so that the re-experiencing of the other is only made possible by a reference back to the lived experiences of one's own self. The relationship that arises here, therefore, is that whatever I understand in another, I can find in myself as lived experience; and whatever I experience, I can rediscover through understanding in another person. By moving continually between lived experience and understanding, the human scientist ensures reliability about the content, which can be thus "transposed," so to speak, from one mode of experience into the other. At the same time, he is certain of the existence of other persons. This assurance is based on the presupposition that the senses give us something that exists independently of us, and that the procedures by which we distinguish the individual person within this [reality] are valid. Later we must show the basis for the fact that our natural thought accepts the reality of something independent from us and unerringly clings to it.

What is experienced and understood is conceived by human sci-

entists as adequately explicable in judgments and concepts. Here too consciousness of reliability results from praxis and its constant adjustments.

It is especially important to examine the foundation for this conviction [about explicability] that is common to all scientists. On this point, in particular, critical consciousness encounters an extraordinary difficulty. The system of the human sciences originates from the specific givens provided by history and society. The system is formed in thought from materials that have been experienced and understood. It is realized in categories that belong to human spirit, i.e., it is a creation of spirit. The human sciences do not fashion a copy of the singular complex given to them in remnants of the past and fragments of the present. All their conceptual cognition requires universal concepts. The system of jurisprudence is distinct from the sum of lived experiences involved in legal transactions or in legal decisions. The same distinction exists between the complex of lived experiences in which communion with what is invisible and not determinable by any mere mechanical intervention takes place and the concepts that either express the essence of religious communion, religious experience, and religious assertions or determine the forms in which religious communion is realized. Similarly, every other science of a cultural system is founded on what has been experienced or understood, but this is made cognitive through the medium of judgment and conceptual thought characteristic of spirit. Even history is not a copy of the events that have been handed down to us: it also is a new spiritual creation grounded in cognitive conditions. Historical events themselves, as they are handed down, gathered concurrently and successively as such, never provide the means for deriving a connecting causal nexus or for grasping the formative laws that govern them. Concepts and universal judgments serve as intermediaries between the events and the conception of them as a nexus. These concepts and judgments are first developed in the practice of life. The gradual advancement of insight into the historical nexus depends also on the development of analytic sciences of particular purposive systems that permeate history as cultural systems. It furthermore depends on analytical knowledge about organizations that have been formed in history, i.e., on a discipline that may be designated as political science. Not only are historical understanding and the systematic human sciences based on inferences from the facts of the sociohistorical world, but they also presuppose certain insights about the course of psychic life.

Everywhere we grasp the nexus of history through concepts and general judgments. They are first developed in the experiences of practical life; as their connectedness and their legitimacy continue to increase, the systematic human sciences and psychology emerge. Keeping pace with this development, the connectedness of historical processes gains in scope and is recognized more deeply. Indeed, even the characterization of historical persons and the portrayal of historical events depend on this development, for these require concepts as well, and their validity and usefulness must be secured in thought.

The reliability of the historian, the jurist, and the religious scholar in adequately re-presenting in thought what has been given them is based on this continual interaction of judgments and concepts with what is re-presented in them as experienced and understood. The interchangeability of what is given with what is thought is demonstrated to them every hour that their work advances based on this assumption. What has been experienced and understood constantly leads to concepts that again find their fulfillment in lived experience and understanding. By comparing, isolating, and abstracting from what has been experienced and understood to be the basic feature of religiosity, the religious scholar defines what is common as a communion with the invisible, the experiences arising from it, and the dogmas and life-praxis that are grounded in it; and any concept for all this finds fulfillment again in what has been experienced and understood.

It is the same spiritual reality that from one perspective is explicated in the judgments describing events in society and history and from another perspective is cognized as the complex of the systematic human sciences. Universal history becomes a science in the presence of the conceptual cognition of the systematic human sciences and . . .

*Second Chapter
(How Is Conceptual Cognition in the Human Sciences Possible?)*

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I

That which constitutes or grounds the human sciences derives from lived experiences, their expression, the understanding of expressions for lived experiences and concepts that refer to lived ex-

perience. We are dealing here with distinctions, but not with different contents. Rather, everything to the extent that it appears in consciousness is primarily lived experience; this is true for expressions and for their understanding just as much as for concepts. But insofar as a structural relation develops between lived experience and its expression and between understanding and expression, a distinctive formation belonging to the sphere of the human sciences arises. The expression can again be a concept. But if I extricate myself from the above mentioned structural relation and adopt the other relation of objective apprehension, according to which cognition occurs through a relation of concepts that have their fulfillment in lived experience and understanding, then I assume a conceptual attitude that has its distinctive relations to lived experience and understanding. These relations involve the creation of concepts by abstraction from lived experience and understanding and then the fulfillment of concepts through them. Concepts are created by judgments, and therefore, the same relationship that exists between lived experience, understanding, and concept also exists between concept and judgment.

The basis for all the constituents manifested in the human sciences are and remain lived experiences. For every understanding of the expression of another's lived experiences takes place on the basis of one's own, and every judgment and every concept is only created on the basis of lived experiences and understandings.

Conclusion: the human sciences are founded on the knowledge of lived experiences.

2

The human sciences and their logico-epistemological foundation presuppose throughout a knowledge of lived experiences. The condition for this is contained in experiencing as such: reflexive awareness. Reflexive awareness only asserts that something is in consciousness. The ambiguity of the word "something" raises the terminological question whether it can be distinguished as content. These conscious states of affairs constitute the ultimate foundation of the human sciences. The question whether that which appears in us as a conscious state of affairs (lived experience) has a different mode of reality behind it as its condition lies beyond the compass of what can be known reliably in the human sciences. We can explicate this problem by means of Kant's theory of time. From the critical standpoint, it does not touch upon the problem of the

reality of time. That a temporal process appears in consciousness is indeed real. All relationships of expectation and fulfillment, of desire and satisfaction, encompass temporal succession. Real life, as we know it, is in time. Kant's problem concerns only conditions for states of affairs that appear in consciousness, and these lie beyond the reliable knowledge of the human sciences.

If we want to hold a lived experience in our attention, then an act of gathering is also required. Accordingly, this is a condition for every distinct consciousness of an experienced state of affairs; thus all apprehension of lived experiences as the foundation for psychological knowledge presupposes the operations of apprehension. That such apprehension only relates what is already related in lived experience is the condition for the objectivity of all psychological apprehension. Thus psychology already refers back at its point of entry to the logico-epistemological.

We now want to show in what sense the knowledge of lived experiences can be attributed with reality and objectivity. But we must immediately add, of course, that what is directly experienceable for the purpose of establishing a science is only very limited. There is infinitely more contained in the domain of expressions of lived experiences and of the concepts about them that exceeds the boundaries of what is accessible to deliberate psychological observation. We will see how knowledge of the structural nexus can be only partially and incompletely based on such lived experiences and how it is embodied in such expressions and concepts as originate from the involuntary and unobserved psychic process. For deliberate attention to these operations changes and banishes the energy, indeed, even the direction, of the operations themselves. We are dependent on interpretation of the creations of the human spirit as a means of saying what there may be in lived experience. . . .

A significant supplement to lived experience, through which the richness and scope of psychic life is first elevated to knowledge, lies in the fact that something inner attains expression in something outer and can then be understood retrospectively from it.

The outer expresses the inner either by arbitrary convention or by a natural lawlike expressive relation.

In both cases we have an external sign for a state-of-affairs.

The first relationship also exists where a sign as the presence of a fact merely signifies the presence of another external fact. Here too understanding really takes place; namely, through the sign, knowledge about a state of affairs contained in consciousness A is turned into knowledge in consciousness B on the basis of arbitrary

agreement. The fact that a train approaches the station and the fact that a signal is given are two external facts, but agreement about their connectedness places a communicating consciousness in an inner relation to an understanding consciousness, and it is just this that allows one external process to become the sign for another. It is different with those signs that are the natural expression of something inner and therefore manifest it.

We must also distinguish the relationship of something inner to actions that change the state of affairs or give rise to lasting institutions. Actions and their lasting external effects continually help us to reconstruct the inner reality from which they have emerged. Prussian Common Law originated as a means of governing the life of a specific era by specific laws, but scholars dealing with the age of Frederick employ it for the purpose of understanding the spirit of this period. From legal rules, the scholar works back to the intention of the legislator, and from this to its spiritual conditions. Thus we understand the evaluations of life-relationships, the goals, and the sense of obligation that coexist at a specific time and place as an inner reality that we find expressed in institutions as their outer manifestation. It speaks to us unintentionally: deeds occurred in the stress and strain of wanting to bring something about, not out of the desire to communicate something to contemporaries or successors. They are there as signs of an inner reality that once existed, as the remaining vestiges of it.

Quite different is the sphere of expression that emerges from the need in some way to express something inward and in some way to set it down for oneself or to communicate it to others. This is the proper province of understanding and of its technical application in interpretation. Whether it be the replicas that still provide us with a glimmer of the Zeus of Phidias or of Dürer's *Apocalypse* or of the *Ninth Symphony*, a drama or a philosophical system, a poem by Goethe or the main mathematical and scientific work of Newton—indeed, whether it be a single creation or a network of concepts that expresses some state of affairs—there is always something external that came about as the expression of something inner and raises the latter to the level of understanding.
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The result of this relation is that here the inner goes over into the outer quite differently than in human actions. Every action is governed by specific conditions whose relationship to the living totality of the acting person produces its sense of purpose, its energy, its means, and if it is of longer duration, its adaptation to circumstances. What we can infer from action about inner life is

thus limited. Actions are conceived contextually. Memoranda, decisions, speeches, in short, every type of utterance that advances the course of action, come about not from the need to manifest something but from the will to produce or influence; they are part of political action. Accordingly, we witness a manifold of volitional results that correspond to each other. Together they produce a nexus of life. The more situations they reflect, the richer the understanding of the inner life from which they arose. Nevertheless, they are always only excerpts and glimpses that show parts of a landscape, and we never survey their essential articulation.

Now let us consider the totality of what Goethe published in art, literature, and science, and what is to be found in his unpublished writings. How different is the relation here between expression and inner life! The task of understanding this inner life can here be solved, in a certain sense, better than Goethe understood himself. Subsequently, we will offer a detailed account of the procedure by which this occurs. At this point it is a question of drawing the consequences for our problem that concerns supplementing the direct apprehension of lived experiences in the observed subject by inner experiences or by observations of human subjects in experimental situations.

First, whatever can be apprehended in lived experience is completed in scope by observation or memory. What can we possibly know by observation and memory, or even by experiment, about the process of judgment? We must analyze its expression in propositions in order to grasp it.

Second, even when lived experience can be grasped, its full import comes only through understanding. If all we had were the personal testimonies of poets about their creativity because all their works were lost, how little these testimonies would tell us! We must analyze their works in order to penetrate the core of the creative process, to grasp it in its entirety.

Third, we grasp uniformities of psychic life by linking observation, memory, experiment, and understanding. (See the "First Study" [this volume, 23–44].)

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Fourth, the comprehension of the structure of the psychic life depends above all on the interpretation of the works in which the psychic nexus attains complete expression. Here the most encompassing expression, language itself, provides the most fruitful disclosures. (See Husserl's concept of pure grammar. What expressions can teach us about structural relations: joy about something, desire for something, knowledge of something.)

I have maintained that under certain circumstances, structural relations, although minimally noticeable, can nevertheless be apprehended in memory without being directly observed. The most important means for apprehending them, however, lies in expressing them, as can be ascertained in the products of language. I take in the structural course of the life of feeling from its initial stirrings, by proceeding through the parts of a felt sequence till a consciousness of its fullness is reached. I note the realization of a concept on the basis of intuitions. Or I grasp the connection between a feeling and its object or the progression from feeling to desire. Everywhere here . . .

Supplements to and Continuation of First Chapter

I

Through the continual exchange of what has been experienced and understood with what has been expressed in judgments and concepts, the conviction that the former is adequately re-presented in the latter receives constant reenforcement.

In empirical consciousness, the subject is certain of its own reality and of the actual existence of external things and other persons. Life proceeds in terms of the relations of these constituents of life. The feeling of being alive, of existing, is based on their reality. The self is affected by the outer world and exerts its reciprocal effect on things and people. Experience arises on the basis of empirical consciousness. Its objects are the psychic nexus, external things, and persons who are given to us from without. Experience presupposes both the reality of these things and of the relations between them; they are the constituents of empirical consciousness. The human sciences, just as much as the natural sciences, develop on the basis of empirical consciousness and embody the conviction that the constituents of empirical consciousness are real. But philosophy generates a critique of these presuppositions. Critique is as old as the study of philosophy itself and accompanies the entire development of the sciences of experience. This critique is joined by one originating from within the natural sciences, which undermines the conviction that sense qualities have objective reality. Thus the natural sciences generate a split between the given sense world as phenomenal and a supplementary order of hypothetical law-governed entities needed for the explanation

of the former. The presupposition of objects independent of a subject still remains in effect, but they are now found in the supplementary order of law-governed entities. By contrast, the human sciences remain wholly and entirely on the level of empirical consciousness. No phase develops from the experiences proper to these sciences that leads to doubt about the reality of the three constituents of life and the validity of knowing them. The human sciences also need the presupposition of the reality of a world that is independent of the self. They must assume some type of representation of it through sense perceptions; but because they proceed from there. . . .

2

From the outset I have focused on the fact that the expression ⟨“spiritual or human sciences”⟩¹¹ is not entirely suitable. But every other term that has been employed for this group of sciences leads to considerable difficulties. This includes the recent and often used designation “cultural sciences.”¹² This term contains an unprovable, and indeed, one-sided determination about a sense and a goal of history. This is an altogether too friendly and benevolent concept of the human essence, in which the dark instincts of suppression and destruction play a very considerable role.

¹¹ *Geisteswissenschaften*.

¹² *Kulturwissenschaften*.

II. ADDITIONS TO THE FORMATION OF THE HISTORICAL WORLD

I. THE LOGICAL SYSTEM IN THE HUMAN SCIENCES

I begin the formation of the historical world in the human sciences from an epistemological perspective. The first question concerns the logical system that exists here. For without the analysis of the logical relations that exist in the human sciences, how could we possibly attain an understanding of the operations whose cooperation produces the formation of the historical world? They presuppose the logical operations that jointly produce all knowledge. An indubitable solution to this problem is made possible by descriptive-analytic psychology and its theory of structure.

Psychic Structure

I

The course of psychic life consists of processes. Each one begins and changes in time; even when I make a cross section somewhere in the sequence of a life-course and seem to come upon a psychic state, it is only the fixation of a determinate phase of consciousness through attentiveness that creates the illusion of permanence. Who is not familiar with the irregularity and apparent fortuitousness of the flow of psychic life? A harmonic arrangement of notes produces a feeling of pleasure; then a visual perception imposes itself onto this calm, aesthetic enjoyment, and revives certain memories that produce a desire; this desire is then suppressed on grounds of a judgment based on a fear of the consequences of satisfaction. Such restless change continues as the most divergent kinds of processes relieve one another—generated from within, conditioned from without. In the search for uniformities in all this motley change, I find two types. If I isolate particular activities like association, fusion, reproduction, and appreciation from the nexus of processes, then I can inductively establish uniformities. Thus rules of dependence can be established according to which the reproduction of our representations is determined by the interest

and attention with which impressions have been assimilated and their representations reproduced, by the complexity of these representations and the frequency of their recurrence. Such uniformities correspond to the laws of change in the outer world of nature. They permit the course of psychic life to be explained through hypotheses. From such inferred regularities of explanatory psychology, I distinguish those regularities that I call the structure of the psychic nexus. This nexus contains within itself a stable system of relations between its elements. It is comparable to the anatomical structure of a body. It consists of a regular arrangement of the constituents of the psychic nexus. The relations in this system are those of parts in and to a whole. They are experienceable in a sense that I will presently define in more detail. Such structural relations can exist between lived experiences that are far apart. Thus a resolution wherein I predelineate a life-plan for myself can be linked structurally with a long series of actions that emerge thereafter over many years and in wide intervals. The attribute of structure is of the highest importance. Because life proceeds in temporal processes, each of which fades into the past, formation and development are possible in it only because the corruptibility of each process is overcome by a nexus that closely connects what is temporally separated, and thus makes possible that the past is conserved and what is fleeting becomes consolidated in ever more stable forms. The whole of a life-course is a structural nexus of lived experiences that, however remote they may be from each other in time, are articulated from within and connected as a unity.

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2

Let us analyze structure.

Every lived experience contains within it a structural relation of its parts. It always involves a relation of attitude to a content. The distinction between attitude and content is justified by the fact that attitude does not control content, and content does not control attitude. They are independent variables. I perceive a color, make a judgment about it, take pleasure in it, and want to produce it; here the same content is subjected to different attitudes. At the same time, each of these attitudes can be related to various colors and also to different objects. That which can be separated in this way is linked in lived experience as a structural unity. In a judgment there is thinking about something and something is as-

serted about an object; in a feeling, what I feel pleasure or displeasure about is related to this felt attitude; and in the lived experience of willing, the representation of an object is that at whose realization the volitional attitude is directed. Whatever is conjectured or asserted, felt, wished or willed—whether it be a word or a determinate content—is always there solely in an attitude, and the attitude only exists as an attitude toward contents.

Just as the manifold of contents is limitless—it is after all composed of all the varied objects in this world to which we are related in our attitudes—there is also a manifoldness of attitudes. Each attitude is subject to an indeterminate number of modifications and nuances. They stand in relationships of greater and lesser
326 distance. The objective apprehension of a machine, the feeling about the death of a loved one, and the will to actualize a purpose are different not only relative to their object but also in their attitude toward it; and they are expressed as different: conceptualizing the various relations between content and attitude that occur in these cases merely makes distinct what is inherent in lived experience. In lived experience itself there is no interest in establishing distinctions and relations concerning what it contains; lived experience takes place without that kind of reflection. However, for what is contained in lived experience to become conscious, one needs merely to distinguish and relate on the basis of some interest. These activities simply make clear, as we shall see later, what was already contained in lived experience. It will be shown that difference, degree of affinity, and relation are not natural qualities of objects. They are formal categories in which operations that precede discursive thought and that form its basis are conceptually explicated, although these operations as such merely ascertain what is contained in sense apprehension and lived experience. Inner experience is completed by being expressed in language. The lived experience of such attitudes is expressed by various linguistic designations. I notice something; I make a judgment about it; I find pleasure in it; I want something. In these and a hundred similar word combinations, we express lived experiences without reflecting on the inner relation that attains expression in it. However, when someone uses these expressions, I understand immediately what is going on in him, and I can better attain consciousness of the attitude inherent in lived experience through the fixed expression than through the lived experience itself. I merely distinguish and relate what was meant by the expression and, accordingly, what was present in lived experience. Poetic verses and the narratives of historians, available from earliest times and prior to all

psychological reflection, depict, whether in word or song, lived experiences in their characteristic peculiarities. They allow something objective to be seen; they bring out the attitude toward the object; they explicate their relations; they teach us to distinguish them. As much as they arise from intense experiencing, they can also express it.

Distinguishing determinate types among varying attitudes toward the factual world will never be done in such a way as to reach total agreement. One must be clear about what sense such differentiation can have in a theory of structure. It differentiates types of relations and changing attitudes. It has nothing to do, therefore, with classifying psychic life in terms of faculties, powers, or functions. It neither asserts nor disputes such faculties. Similarly, the concept of attitude is applied only in this sense of types of relations that appear regularly in each psychic nexus. Indeed, it does not even exclude the assumption that the psychic life of humanity or of the individual starts at a more simple level from which an abundance of structural relations emerges. Such a differentiation of attitudes merely signifies a pattern of overlapping attitudinal nuances in accordance with certain typical, basic stances. It has been shown that we can experience different attitudes to contents and that they can be re-experienced in the understanding of expressions. With these distinctions comes an awareness of distance; we know of their more proximate or more remote relations. Philosophical reflection on this has always distinguished certain basic stances. This has led to the positing of faculties, functions, and the *a priori* division of the basic attitudes of the soul as well as the familiar disputes about them. But since, in fact, the constituent parts of the series of attitudes overlap each other, I dare merely attempt the selection of certain types, and I offer the following reasons for my scheme. Objective apprehension, on the one hand, and feeling or willing, on the other, are only akin in that they are attitudes. If the apprehension of an object and the judgment about it differ despite what mediates between the two, they are nevertheless united by the fact that all objective apprehension has to do exclusively with contents and their relations as contained in the given and as explicated in discursive thought. And throughout the range of judgments about reality, whenever one also considers the relation of the particular judgment to the totality of thought, the assertion of validity is simply a transformation of the certainty about reality that belongs to the empirical consciousness of sense perception and to lived experience. And although feeling and willing tend to coexist in a productive nexus of

transitions, e.g., from the feeling that a situation is unbearable to the decision to change it, there is also a realm of feelings such as aesthetic ones that, even when they are powerful and not subjected to inhibitions, do not lead to action. Since the issue here is the foundation of the human sciences, the justification for differentiating between types of objective apprehension, types of feeling, and types of willing lies in the fact that the division of reality, values, and ends pervades the whole domain of human spirit. It is
 328 possible that re-presentation and expression manifest differences in lived experiences that do not possess the same distinctness in self-observation.

3

The various types of relation exert an influence on each other; one gives rise to the other. Images offered by the senses or thoughts about them arouse feelings of satisfaction, or the expansion and fulfillment of our being, and these bring about the striving and the resolve of the will to preserve a state of mind. This mode of influence, which leads from objective apprehension to feeling and from there to willing and acting, falls within the scope of inner experience, and thus a knowledge of the structural nexus comes about. This very efficacy is experienced; if it were not experienced, then it would not find as direct and as powerful an expression in poetry and history. What is given is not a regular sequence of particular states and some inferred causal nexus but the power of exerting influence, the irresistibility with which an object that has been apprehended sets all the feelings in tempestuous motion; the irresistibility with which someone, defying all reason, is bewitched, as it were, and compelled to seize the object of these feelings. The abysses of human life, which disclose themselves in these compulsions, and the modes of being spellbound or enslaved are the object of the religious teachings of Buddha, Paul, and Augustine, as well as of the literary works of the great tragedians, regardless of their different world-views. Their forceful expression can only be created from the depths of lived experience. That is, our knowledge of the efficacy and productivity that makes the real life-system accessible to us does not derive from logical inferences. Our experience of particular [psychic] contexts or systems is only piecemeal, but through memory and reflection about them they are connected into one structural nexus. In one stroke we survey the connectedness of memories from our earlier life. How clearly a lyrical poem can show the advance from a represented situation to

a sequence of feelings, which often occasion striving or action! Or in the productive system based on the typical patterns of speech, the exposition of a state of affairs gives rise to a world of feelings in us and leads us from there to a practical stance. In this way, the meaning of the relationships of lived experience, expression, and understanding is increasingly disclosed to us. What appears in lived experience without reflection is elicited, so to speak, from the depths of psychic life in expression. For expression wells up directly from the psyche without reflection, and its stability allows it to stand the test of understanding. Thus expression contains more of lived experience than introspection can.¹³

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4

Another system that relates lived experiences is incorporated in this structural nexus, one that appears among the typical attitudes but possesses an analogous characteristic everywhere in them. It manifests the hierarchy in which the particular manifold givens that are conditioned by the outer world are made to adapt to the goals of human spirit. It involves a hierarchy, because in it the given is retained, although in a higher form of consciousness. The contingent becomes a constituent of a system that is independent of contingency, of impulses from the outside, and of associations from within. The particular becomes a part of a whole or an instance of a universal; the ephemeral is raised to the level of an enduring configuration; the image is submerged in the object and in the concept, feeling in value. Similarly, from the volitional experience of obligation, the norm arises, and obscure strivings are clarified in a purpose. The flow of life, in which everything disappears into the past, is overcome by memory, and the contingency of the event is overcome by the system of thought.

A third type of structural relationship is important for the progression of human spirit toward the stable and the necessary. We have already explained how lived experience, expression, and understanding are structurally related. Expression adds stability to lived experience. Something created from its content comes to stand over against the lived experience as external, independent, and enduring. All attitudes allow of expression: thus expression seizes the stuff of reality in order to find in it a medium for understanding; feeling manifests itself in countenance and gesture, and it

¹³ For the intelligibility of what follows, I have taken some central materials from the "First Study" in Part I. But their justification can only be found there. (D)

finds symbols in words and tones; the will attains fixed expression in precepts and laws. The human spirit objectifies itself in these ways. Although such objectifications are outside of it, they are its creations. The relationship of expression and understanding expands the existence of spirit immeasurably in the reciprocal communication of individuals that produces the human community.

The teleological character of the structural nexus is evident throughout. Its purposiveness is immanent and subjective. It does 330 not realize a purpose prescribed by nature or God; nor does the structural nexus produce a determinate goal; it involves only goal-directedness. This purposiveness is not hypothetical; rather, it is experienced. Impressions of reality and thought about them produce pressure, pain, dissatisfaction, and disapproval and arouse resistance; by contrast, the expansion of existence, joy, and sympathy determine the will to stand firm and to gain strength. Thus the nexus of processes already manifests a goal-directedness that moves forward as a striving inherent in the psychic nexus to bring about a more suitable state—that is, more suitable solely from the viewpoint of this individual psychic nexus—not in an objective sense. Psychic structure is purposive because it possesses the tendency to produce, to preserve, and to augment life-values and to exclude whatever is indifferent or inimical. However, every life-experience teaches how a definite direction within this goal-directedness first appears in the development of the individual. The satisfaction of a desire, the expansion of existence, peace and security of mind, perfection, and duty—these are merely instances of the infinite variety of individual direction. And we see the very same purposiveness at work in the progression of the forms of apprehension leading to an ever more appropriate grasp of the given and an ever more rigorous classification of particular objects in a logical system.

Now let us look beyond the context of the present into the stance of human spirit toward its past and its future. The structural nexus is not simply pointed backwards into our memory and its unchangeableness; it presses unremittingly—and this is its most dominant characteristic—from out of the past and the present, reckoning with the future, playing with images, but also striving. The lived experience that involves such striving simultaneously encompasses constraint and freedom—never inferentially, but in a lived way. It is determined by the present and the past, by the way life shapes and patterns itself with reference to the sphere of possibilities. Every forward-directed striving involves this. And since laws not grounded in our nature are powerless against this striv-

ing, and since our nature is subject to the law of structure, the question arises how our ideals are grounded in this structural nexus and *⟨Thow they⟩* come about.

At first the theory of structure creates the following problem for the logic of the human sciences: How are life and re-experiencing related to conceptual thought? Life and re-experiencing form the groundwork and constant background for logical operations; nevertheless, passions, sacrifice, and the surrender of the self to objectivity are impenetrable to the intellect. Lived experience can never be fully resolved into concepts, but its dark, deep tonality accompanies, even if merely marginally, all conceptual thought in the human sciences. By contrast, the stages of consciousness are the technique of structure, so to speak, whereby throughout its various formations, human spirit attains sovereignty over itself and the world. The stages are the same in the psychic nexus and in the sphere of objective apprehension directed at the former. Here thought has insight into its object, and intellectualism finds the source of its productive force. With the Enlightenment, intellectualism leaves behind what is impenetrable about lived experience as the dregs of life, and then, in Hegel, it undertakes to resolve what is living into concepts and to re-create a conceptual system by new means. But this intellectualism always provokes the reaction of those who live intensely and sense life's productive force with incomprehensible immediacy—consider Rousseau's opposition to the Enlightenment, and that of Schelling and Feuerbach to Hegel. We will continue to take note of this problem of the relation of life to logical thought. It will become more evident when we proceed to the structural system inherent in *objective apprehension* and from there to the way this attitude is specified in the natural and in the human sciences.

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2. FRAGMENTS TOWARD A THEORY OF STRUCTURE

Psychic Life

Psychic life is something unfathomable. Whoever is concerned with the human sciences simply must, at some point, have strained to plumb this inexhaustible source. A science and certainly a *single* science of psychic life with its ever new scope and boundlessness does not exist. Conceptual cognition has several approaches available to it. The approach that stands closest to psychic life is anthropology, because it aims to penetrate the concrete nexus of mental life itself,

antecedent to the interpretation of the creations of human spirit or history. Only ideal re-presentation can render such a nexus harmonious. Every real explication will contain within it some contradictory aspect due to the awareness of singularity and the suffering caused by its limits; it will also contain satire, humor, or tragedy. Anthropology always gives just an artist's glimpse into psychic life; it invites artistic delineation that catches sight of individuals, periods, nations.

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Structure

Nothing is more delicate or more short-lived than the core moment of psychic life when it attains a state of equilibrium and harmony in which wishes are stilled and the beauty of the soul becomes a reality. All desire seems fulfilled then, the will is silenced. It is a point of rest in the instability of life. The otherwise animated psyche now presents a crystal clear and bright surface. But only for a moment, and then this harmony between the external world and the life of feeling is gone. Again there is desire for what is not, and whether it be in conceptual cognition or in overt action, the tension of willing occurs again. Here is the proper seat of the vitality of the psychic life.

External World

The external world expresses itself in life as pressure through the relation of impulse to resistance. Its reality lies only in this life-relationship. Its reality signifies nothing else but these relations to psychic structure within the human sciences. Consequently, it involves nothing transcendent over against consciousness.

A very different world of categories pertains to the natural science conception of external objects: hypotheses, etc.

And here it also is the case that in the given itself, only a law-governed order can have objective validity.

3. THE EPISTEMOLOGICAL PROBLEM

The Epistemological Problem of the Human Sciences

On the basis of the logic of the human sciences, we can now tackle the epistemological problem. The analysis of logical structure must

be presupposed by the consideration of the cognitive value of logical forms and methods. For this analysis leads to the insight that the forms and laws of thought inhere in the basic relationships of the given and of the attitude of logical thought to them. Similarly, the presuppositions of empirical consciousness can also be tested for their validity by examining the operations in which the knowledge of the human sciences is realized, beginning with lived experience and understanding, for their capacity to produce results capable of confirmation. It is a procedure that takes the opposite path from Kant in solving the epistemological problem. It does not begin by grounding conceptual cognition on the model of formal logic and mathematics. Formal logic in Kant's day found the logical foundation for the legitimacy of all scientific propositions in the ultimate abstractions of the laws and forms of thought. Kant's epistemology deduces from this fundamental relation the claim that the laws and forms of thought, especially judgment, contain the conditions for conceptual cognition. He supplemented these conditions with mathematical conditions. And in opposition to Leibniz, he insisted on separating the conditions of geometry as an intuitive science from those of logic.

By contrast to this, I attempt to take hold of the problem of conceptual cognition where it is the simplest, namely, where objects are given rather than constructed on the basis of particular conditionally given images, and above all where connectedness is given, as in lived experience. And at this point I ask, How much is contributed by the operation of lived experience and understanding and how much by the concept-formation based on it? Only then can we ascertain how, under the conditions of conceptual cognition in mathematics and in the natural sciences, new and more complex tasks lead to further presuppositions.

Accordingly, the issue is the gradual resolution of the epistemological problem of the human sciences, step by step through the determination of the scope . . .

Kant and Fichte

How does Fichte mark the beginning of something new? He does so because he starts with the intellectual intuition of the ego, not as a substance nor as a being nor as a givenness. By means of this intuition, i.e., an intense preoccupation of the ego in itself as living, he discerns its activity and energy, and accordingly explicates

dynamic concepts such as opposition and realization. With this, his starting point is related to the Historical School and to Goethe's poetry, which sees life everywhere in the capacity of the self to react and to develop.

The evidence for this is that all of Fichte's polemics against Spinoza, Schelling, etc. have this thrust; in the second period he becomes even more explicit about this.

Overcoming the Transcendence of Subjectivity

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The *epistemological epoch* finds its coherence in the attempt to develop conceptual cognition as a systematic whole in such a way that analysis separates the *a priori* from the given as a thing in itself, etc.; and it ends in the collapse of this system-building and of the kind of cognition that is at home with transcendence everywhere, the transcendence of subjectivity and the transcendence of objects. Earlier I attempted to overcome the latter, and now I have to deal with overcoming the transcendence of subjectivity on the basis of my essays in psychology.

We know of no carrier of life accessible to either ordinary or lived experience. Such a carrier would transcend life as such. It would belong to the class of concepts such as "soul" or "object" that transcends consciousness. Here metaphysics has been superseded by an epistemology and a psychology in which a new type of transcendence is present. I would argue that the metaphysics of the object and of the cosmos has been superseded by a metaphysics of subjectivity, and that the one is as untenable as the other. The earlier metaphysics of the object is based on the prevalence of the concept of space. It is abstracted from time, and timeless metaphysical predicates are, so to speak, imposed on a spatial system. This is a product of life itself and starts at primitive levels. The momentary, the continually changing, that which falls prey to time, also characteristic of images, disappears in this metaphysical world picture.

This same relation is even more strongly evident in the metaphysics of subjectivity. The ego and the soul are timeless entities that have been added to experience. However, we know of nothing more than what happens and have no right to supplement it with a carrier, because this would transpose the concept of substance onto the world of lived experience.

All the external objects, the swords, crowns, gold, and plough-

shares described by the historian, are merely constituents of lived experience. When I recall the historical events of the war with France that I experienced, then these public events become constituents of lived experiences. As such, they belong to life itself and are in no way mere optical phenomena. Their reality is that of a life-concern that takes the impulse and resistance relationship as the pressure of something independent, that is, as a constraint on a willing subject. These relations of lived experience are expressed as my consciousness of the reality of events that affected me; and secondarily, nothing more than this is meant when I, as a historian of my own or of an earlier time, attach reality to the facts available to the senses.

4. THE ENLIGHTENMENT AS AN EXAMPLE

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The Structure of the Age of Enlightenment

The epoch preceding Leibniz confronted the dawning age of Enlightenment with the developing sovereignty of individual German states, the diminution of ecclesiastical power, the rise of scientific culture, and as the arts had reached their nadir, the increasing attempt to express religious experience in music.

How did the structure of the new age unfold from this? What were its value, its importance, and its decisive purposes? How evident it becomes that the epochs of higher culture do not manifest parallel progress in all areas. One cannot even claim that political and scientific life, religion, and the arts are dominated by the same spirit. Not once is there a unified direction in any of these areas; rather, antagonisms exist everywhere.

Yet in all the major phenomena of the epoch, the same level-headed and realistic human spirit predominates, oriented toward the purposes of the world and filled by its reality. This realism is the product of an immense reaction that occurred when all of the major illusions of the Middle Ages had evaporated, and it is nurtured by science. If one accepts this realism in the full seriousness with which it involves belief in reality, then it is contained everywhere in the most characteristic phenomena of the German spirit. Thus invisible threads of a spiritual nature permeate every domain. Economic life, social stratification, and political existence are linked in reciprocal ways to form a coherent whole.

The productive forces that determine this whole lie in the age of

Enlightenment itself. For ideal religious factors no longer exert a decisive influence, and scientific factors are on the rise.

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1. The general character of this manifold [age] . . . beginning with Leibniz up until Frederick's death finds its initial delineation in the gradual dissolution of ecclesiastical faith and in the rise of scientific spirit. Dogmatic ecclesiastical faith, although rooted both in the lived experience of being in communion with God and in [other] religious experiences, had turned into reified concepts. Forms of transition arise influenced by the critical challenge to the justification of this ecclesiastical tradition by deriving its vital source from lived experience and its authority and justification from the Bible. Therefore we see the emergence of corresponding sects as well as Pietism and Catholic mysticism. For its part, science in its advance produces a consciousness of the system of nature as a spatial system and as a dynamic nexus according to laws and as an ordering of organisms that is teleologically articulated. The realm of human historical spirit is not yet conceived from a comprehensive standpoint but is merely accounted for dogmatically, relative to the particular tasks of life.

2. It is in this connection that German intellectual life assumes its distinctive place. As states struggle with each other and thereby develop themselves, the European spirit begins to prosper in the interactions of nations with each other. From this a culture arises in which, on the basis of the fundamental opposition between conserving what is old and scientific progress, an infinite variety of directions emerge in religion, the state, and the social order. Germany was the last to join this advance in politics and in culture.

The opposition between Catholicism and Protestantism [was] related to this general antithesis.

3. As far as the scientific movement extends, it requires theoretical justification of every belief, of every determination of value and of every purpose. It lies in the nature of the Enlightenment to apply this consequence from the scientific method to every part of life. It encompasses the whole of life with this intellectual method. It regulates life through the intellect. Its self-assuredness rests on the results of science. Thus it separates itself from the entire past, including its faith, tradition, revelations, and supernatural interventions. It finitizes everything and pushes divine influence further and further into the background. . . .

At the same time, [we witness] the progress and the solidarity of humanity. Thought becomes the basis for enthusiasm and the ideal of the future. They are the product of ideas. *This is the new form that is typical for Lessing, Frederick, and Kant.*

This world-view finds its limit in the fact that the infinite is pushed from life into the beyond. In life infinity exists merely as an emotional power that is dark and limitless. Thus it becomes the endless development of the individual and humanity. The world is emptied of gods; for progress too points toward the unending. Accordingly, consciousness governs the fullness of life in manifold forms, either as lived experience of faith, or as the mystical depth in every life-relationship, or as inwardness in nature; at the same time, philosophical cognition rooted in the intellect cannot hold its own against criticism. But above all, life and its reflection in art does not want to be subordinated to the spell of rules: it wants to be lived on the basis of its own productive force and from the totality of its nature.

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4. In Germany, Protestant and Catholic culture move apart. The extraordinary energy of the Protestant spirit is responsible for the fact that the main impetus of the German Enlightenment remains determined by the schema of the Christian world-view. From this religious spirit there proceeds a continuous development that links the people, the clergy, the universities, and the ecclesiastical leadership, allowing the Christian world-view to remain dominant in the midst of scientific progress. What survives the relaxation of dogmas is the teleological system of the universe in which man is classified as a teleologically conditioned being; and the critical perspective on the Bible that goes back to early Christianity points there as well. As man is assumed to have his divinely determined place, the doctrine of immortality is linked with it. This system includes Melanchthon, Leibniz, Wolff, the universal literature [of the age] and Kant.

Thus we see that the German Enlightenment is supported by a definite conception of the meaning of life. *Finding a meaning of life in life itself and in reflection on it* is conditioned by this overall historical process and in turn conditions it.

5. To the extent that the Enlightenment looks back on the past, its parts must seem to be stages in a progression to what has been attained at present. What has been attained is the correctness of cognition through science, taste in the arts and in life, etc. These all have antecedent stages. Taste is carried over from one era to another. The civilized state is the product. . . . The feeling of human worth. Here for the first time, history as a whole is illuminated by science.

Again it is an intuition of the meaning of life that emerges as one of the highest perspectives of historical understanding. It derives everything from the overall system of the Enlightenment and

338 relates it back to it. Such a depletion of the past of its own peculiar value represents a limited standpoint, which cannot do justice to the re-experiencing of history in its natural energy. We find individual scholarship opposing the Enlightenment: first and foremost, the theological standpoints brought to bear by Bossuet resisted it. Hamann, and Herder in his early writing on history, attacked Schröter, Spittler,¹⁴ and Lessing. This was in fact the starting point for Herder's discovery that values are immanent in history, and with that he overcame the transitoriness of this standpoint.

6. And as the ideas of this world-view are applied to the future, they locate all creativity, all shaping of the self, and all action on the world there. And through the Enlightenment, the ideas of progress and of communal action forge ahead into this future more powerfully. Advances in value-development, as they exist in the present, must be fulfilled. This is what happiness consists of. Accordingly, the concepts of purpose and ideal arise, and every creative act is constrained by rules or norms set by the intellect. Every action contains the duty to fulfill some purpose. Perfection somehow signifies movement toward some purpose and the duty to realize it. This is the core of every future-oriented activity.

Political Life in the Age of Enlightenment

It is common to modern nations that they advance to unified states from contingent political structures. This happened in France and England through the uniting of such structures into states whose parts possessed a common inner life in a common language and literature. It took place in Germany and Italy through the development of the autonomy of several states on the same linguistic and literary base. This was connected with a deep tension in the consciousness of these two nations. Even where there was a patriotic identification with the state, there was the tendency to undermine whatever was uniting the nation. What united the nation superficially was law. What supported and developed an inner consciousness of its communal nature was its language, literature, science, and art. Religion was a source of fragmentation. No one recognized at the time of the Enlightenment that the Prussian state had the vocation of unifying the nation

¹⁴ Ludwig Timotheus (Baron of) Spittler (1752–1810), professor of history and church history in Göttingen, coworker at the “federation of the German Freimaurer”; author of *Grundriß der Geschichte der europäischen Staaten*.

politically. This marks a peculiarity about the political character of this period. On the other hand, however, this state still cultivated a kind of nationalistic fervor in its political struggles with Austria and France. This was shown by Gleim,¹⁵ Lessing, etc. And when the military state strove to become a cultural state, whose great manifestations were the academies, the University of Halle, and Prussian Common Law, i.e., state institutions that embodied a new culture, a moment of universal progress could be located. The feeling of such progress was always there. The relations to the German spirit were always felt. Here we see the beginnings of an advance in Prussia from military state to bearer of cultural ideas, which was then carried further by grounding the University of Berlin, by Hegel, etc. However, at the same time, this generated a deep conflict. On the one hand, this culture was German in a general sense. The language, poetry, and science could not be otherwise. The bureaucracy assimilated this general perspective—a first phase of national reflection that was initially not self-conscious. But the military nobility felt that the bureaucracy was a body alien to it. Even more curious was the spread of literature due to the triumph of Prussian heroism in the Seven-Year War. Patriotic Prussian poets were internally divided. From the life of the nation that lacked political unity there arose an ideal of free humanity in Kleist, in Lessing, etc. that contradicted the enthusiasm for the harsh military heroism of the time, its brutal discipline, its unrelenting severity, and its enjoyment of battle.

Wars between the new states caused their unity to become more concentrated. They tended toward autocracy and needed to develop armies, finances, and administration. Here we see a new structure of political life. Political life does not grow, it is made. It is pervaded through and through by rational purposiveness. Finance, international politics, etc. function everywhere in the same mode. The states incorporate ever more rational purposes: the educational system, science, and control over the churches. The princes are the first representatives of rational unity. Thus autocracy increases.

In all this lies the preparation for the sovereignty of rationality in Europe, which precedes the foundation of science itself. The free and irrational forces of loyalty, etc., are replaced by a calcul-

¹⁵ Johann Wilhelm Ludwig Gleim (1719–1803), leading member of the group of Anacreontic poets at Halle. Rejecting both Baroque and Enlightenment attitudes, he wrote in a decorative, unpretentious, unidealized manner.

able coercion by the military system, etc., that is guaranteed to be effective.

Germany occupies a special place in this context. Through the power of the monarchy, Prussia has to fashion a unity from heterogeneous provinces. Armies and navies [are a] fundamental problem everywhere, but in Prussia there is the additional problem that the bureaucracy is the primary carrier of the communal spirit.

340 There is a further contrast in the development of the nations. In England the aristocracy rules. Their political function is all of a piece with the absorption of the landed property, cooperation with the rise of commerce, and the constitution of the cities. Therefore *no bureaucracy* develops. Education, property, and political significance are united in the aristocracy. And then a hierarchy comes into existence by which the aristocracy obtains overall control through Parliament. The new forces—commerce and industry—are incorporated into this system by development.

France has been building cities since the Celts and the Romans. Its life pulsates in the families that hold sway in the cities, in their local and larger districts. Education, ownership, and political authority overlap in these families. This political authority is separated from the rule of the monarch. The monarchy is weak and deficient in leadership.

France is internally divided, first, by its relationship to the church, and second, by financial difficulties.

In Germany, Prussia is a model of development.

The modern state facilitates the free movement of property through the introduction of Roman law. This is the highest achievement of the Renaissance.

France's power over Germany has diminished. She did not succeed in conquering Holland nor in advancing beyond the Rhine. . . . It was unable to hold back the growing power of Austria in the east. Yet advancements in political life did occur, and a stronger sense of self was connected with them.

The eighteenth century brought something to fruition in German politics, however, whose significance remained unnoticed by the actors on this stage and by those on the sidelines. This was the dissolution of the *Reich*. To the degree that a selection, so to speak, occurred in the contest between the rising rulers, a dualism of two growing superpowers emerged as potential hegemonic factors in Germany.

At first, Prussia was still in competition with Saxony, Bavaria, and Hanover. Then Frederick the Great established Prussia's supe-

riority as a great power. "On the other side, the Catholic imperial state of Austria, which with the definitive conquest of Hungary perpetually keeps one head of the Double Eagle pointed eastward to the Hungaro/Slavic regions, the possession of which generates a major task that is not German but European. At the same time, however, it also asserts its historical position in the middle and southern German system of states. From the conflicts which emerged from this, the one with Prussia was what decided the destiny of both states."¹⁶

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Here we see a relation between purpose and meaning in history as remarkable as it is important—a relation already evidenced in the life of individuals. States and princes pursue their ends in ways that are limited by the horizon of their times. They act for themselves, not for some larger whole or for history. But the meaning of what they do does not become visible in the nexus of history until a later time. It extends far beyond the ends that were set. There is nothing mystical in this. One does not need to invoke providence nor a purpose pursued by history itself. With the advance of time, the effects of purposive action become visible in more comprehensive contexts. Thereby they manifest themselves as parts of a system, which then may later appear in an even more encompassing one. What we see is always merely a restricted relationship of historical parts to the whole that has elapsed so far. The decisive point, however, is that what we see is real meaning, even if it is a limited one. It cannot be superseded by a subsequent context. Therefore the historian sees truthfully.

The Music of the Enlightenment

If we move from the life of the state in the Enlightenment to enter the freer realm of German cultural life with its various hills, peaceful valleys, and babbling brooks where we freely yield to our own lived experience and imagery, then the first and decisive thing is a self-examination of German spirit by way of recapitulating the past, a disclosive profundity that relates the previous religious epoch with something that survives it in the present. Soon thereafter, we find in the works of Gluck the musical prophecy of future drama as well as a recapitulation of our understanding of antiq-

¹⁶ Bernhard Erdmannsdörffer (1833–1901), *Deutsche Geschichte vom Westfälischen Frieden bis zum Regierungsantritt Friedrichs des Großen, 1648–1740*, II (Berlin: G. Grote, 1892–93), p. 150.

uity going back to Corneille and Racine. The search for the musical form of ancient drama [discloses] the basic characteristics of the new musical drama. And then [there are] the developments in Austria. All this in the midst of a wealth of songs, plays, and hymns.

It was in music that German culture first found its own voice. At a time when the German language was still incapable of expressing the ultimate depths of psychic life, music became the language of the German mind and heart. It replaced the music of Italian passion. In a succession of artists whose only analogue can be found in [the history of] Greek sculpture, there emerges a distinctive mode of expressing hovering moods, the tensions of psychic life, and the harmonious confluence of different voices in the world. This is achieved in those symphonies by Haydn that leave behind the determinacy of optical images or the strictures of words.

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Pietism

Among the movements in which traditional forces asserted themselves, German Pietism was dominant. It is only a part of the European-American movement of Christian religiosity. It simultaneously opposed Protestant state religions and the new wave of secular life, which no official church was able to resist. Its ultimate goal was the struggle against the confinement of religious energies and of every religious exaltation due to links with culture, state, organized religion, and science. Religious experience, and what it reveals, is to be liberated from all that. Its self-certainty should be grounded solely on the evidence of experience. This is the general characteristic of the religious movement that encompasses the movement in the Netherlands that began in the first half of the seventeenth century, the German Pietists and the Moravians, Methodists and Irvingites,¹⁷ the Baptists and the Quakers. It started in the Netherlands, where in keeping with the Calvinist ethos, it strove to establish a discipline against secular life in the morality of the convert by means of conventicles.¹⁸

¹⁷ Irvingites were followers of Edward Irving (1792–1834), a Scottish clergyman who believed in pentecostal phenomena.

¹⁸ Dilthey refers to Ernst Troeltsch (1865–1923), German scholar and professor of theology at Heidelberg and of philosophy at Berlin.

Voetius¹⁹ attacked the rationalist philosophy that just then manifested itself in Descartes.²⁰ Thus the inception of rationalist philosophy coincides completely with the beginning of Pietism. They confront each other in the Netherlands. (In 1643 Descartes's letter to Voetius, his triumphant polemical treatise, appears.) But Coccejus,²¹ Lodensteyn,²² and Labadie²³ promoted the liberation of religious experience and imagination by biblical faith and scholarship. Therefore we must also investigate to what extent Voetius is influenced by Descartes in opposing him and has a critical awareness of his grounding. The same [ought to be done] with the three last-named individuals. Ritschl²⁴ provides relevant material but does not focus on this question.

The same problem arises in connection with the German Pietists. Both postulate the same relationship of intimate acquaintance with God as the presupposition of knowledge of the invisible world. Only the convert can know anything about the invisible world. He alone understands the Bible, which reveals the divine word to him as supernaturally communicated. The convert becomes capable of making so-called discoveries there. The providential and the miraculous did not end with apostolic times. Wherever we find providential guidance and conversion, there we see direct acts of divine influence, and therefore miracles. They are connected to the Bible, but not to Protestantism. Their testimonials are all authentic scriptures of the Christian religion. The true Christ lives amid a cloud of witnesses. From there it also follows that he must seek out the true believers beyond the visible church, which consists of both believers and unbelievers.

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It belongs to the nature of religious experience that it wants to

¹⁹ Gisbertus Voetius, Latin name for Gijsbert Voet (1589–1676), Dutch theologian at the University of Utrecht; a Calvinist who opposed Cartesianism and Cocceianism.

²⁰ The question is whether Voetius already asserts the principle of lived experience and experiential evidence over against rationality. (D)

²¹ Coccejus, Latin name for Johannes Koch (1603–69), German theologian; taught at Bremen and Leiden, where he expounded covenant theology.

²² Jodocus van Lodensteyn (1620–77); encouraged high standards of individual conduct.

²³ Jean de Labadie (1610–74), French religious reformer; Jesuit who converted to Calvinism. After being excommunicated by the Calvinists in 1670, Labadie took a separatist group of Pietists to Germany.

²⁴ Albrecht Ritschl (1822–89). Dilthey is undoubtedly referring to Ritschl's *Geschichte des Pietismus in der reformirten Kirche* (Bonn: A. Marcus, 1880).

be supplemented by an understanding of stories about the conversions and devoutness of others. It is broadened and strengthened by this. This leads to conventicles, propaganda, and the mentality of the Moravian brethren.

A parallelism [emerges] between the Enlightenment and Pietism. Secular tolerance finds its counterpart in religious tolerance, which recognizes every true Christian faith based on conversion. The Enlightenment attack on the magical power of the sacraments has its counterpart in their religious interpretation. Similarly, the natural law theory that every rational person has equal rights has its parallel in the way the equal religious worth of converts serves to overcome the division of civil classes through religious communion. The teleology of the Enlightenment has its parallel in a Pietistic system of signs that prayers have been answered. The propaganda of Pietism is countered by Enlightenment propaganda.

The similarities reach deeper, however. For the Pietists, the ecclesiastical context is incapable of rehabilitating faith. The justification of faith cannot come from the church. The individual must seek to justify himself before God through his own lived experience of repentance and conversion. The true faith is the one that is experienced in this way. Such faith is based on the inwardness of lived experience in the person as creatively brought out by the Reformers. Therefore, Pietism is a pure response of genuine Protestantism. . . . But it surpasses Protestantism as the general movement of individualism by distancing the church still further from the religious process. Its greatness lies in the fact that it develops and furthers the inwardness of the first Protestant movement, and here lies its kinship with the Enlightenment as well. Pietism represents a possible religious world-view that shares the same historical soil as the Enlightenment.

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One must distinguish Pietism completely from the spiritualistic developments of the Reformation. It arose from the same great movement as the latter; their sects and writers share a spiritual affinity and a historical context. But two aspects set them apart. The faith of Pietism is not merely developed from the Bible but remains bound by it. Pietism is Bible Christianity. Its relation to the Bible extends from the plain Bible reader,²⁵ who seeks there the strength to convert as well as encouragement and assurance in the faith, who turns to the Bible in decisive life-situations, and who, under its influence, fashions new experiences and discovers his

²⁵ Reading *Lehrer* as *Leser*, as below.

own experiences there, to the theologian who undertakes to discover the true system of Christology from the Bible. These two kinds of Bible reader are mutually related. Confessional writings are the teachings that come from life. In Christ and in the writings of the Apostles, life itself comes to us and speaks to us.

The other aspect that separates Pietism from the Puritans or from Jakob Böhme lies in the fact that religiosity, as it arises in the individual person, remains a personal cause. Pietism seeks to propagate a stable Christian life and discipline in the midst of a secularized milieu.

But any new form of regulating life is alien to its essential notion of withdrawing from the world. Wherever such a tendency appears, we no longer have before us the pure phenomenon of Pietism. This is connected with that aspect of Pietism that stands in sharp opposition to the Enlightenment as well as to valuable developments of Protestant churches. Pietism is an eccentrically stubborn form of religiosity. It severs all the connecting threads between religion and culture. It solves the problem of the existence of Christianity in the world by requiring estrangement from it, from science, from political progress, from art, and from the beauty of things.

At this point, we need some terminological refinement. As far as the aforementioned traits are concerned, in the Netherlands, in Germany, and with the Methodists, etc. we are dealing with a unified movement that bears the same characteristics, and we can designate them in broad linguistic usage as Pietism. It survives especially in Germany in the state religion itself; for it transforms the latter (cf. Troeltsch) to the degree that the ecclesiastical orthodoxy finds in Pietism a source of life, productive force, and energy. It creates the conventicle, close-knit circles within the state religion itself like the one in which Bismarck gained his positive relation to Christianity. There are sects like the Moravians and, outside of Germany, the Methodists, etc. But Pietism could not assert its independent energy, because it wanted a Christianity disconnected from the cultural world.

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5. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT

Let us not overlook attempts to cognize the common stages in the development of nations by means of a series of concepts. Beginning with Hegel, the most noteworthy of them find the rule of

development in the progress from dependence to free self-determination. Without a doubt, the inner dependence of the individual is the lowest level of individual differentiation. This is a fact that is consistently demonstrable in the most ancient stages of historical life available to us. The state of the Germans in the time of Tacitus offers an excellent example. At that time, the influence of the Romans, their individualistic way of shaping life, the consequent dissolution of their national ideal and ethos, and their rational utilization of individual existence was not yet exerting an influence on Germanic society. No reflection on life and its goals led the individual beyond that which was regulated by custom, mores, the spirit of community. The individual was absorbed by his ethnic community. Its power and fortune were his as well, precisely because he was also an active constituent of the community recognized for his value. Its customs, mores, ideas of life, and ideals determined the psychic constitution of every individual. Thus ethnic communities are permeated by a general will. They find and realize such a general will in assemblies of fellow citizens according to a simple constitutional arrangement determined by the rule of custom. One could compare them to powerful organisms that act from an obscure, although unified will. By rediscovering this situation everywhere in the earliest stages, we can find we possess a secure starting point. Beginning here, Hegel defines the course of world history as development toward freedom. This encompasses the gradual process of becoming independent and the individual development of the person, the determination of the individual through reason, in which inner freedom is actualized, and the realization of freedom in the political form of society. It is clear, however, that this way of defining the course of history is conditioned by a presupposition about the highest value that it will be able to realize. The present situation does not indicate the limits of our historical apprehension; for it is filled with a striving and efficacy that extends far into the future. In this borderline area of our historical knowledge, where we see major tendencies exerting influence far into the future, conceptions come about that draw a line from the past into the entire future, based on ideas of values whose realization is assumed to be the objective of history.

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But are there not other general developments that pervade the whole of history and are able to claim an independent meaning for themselves apart from progress toward free subjectivity?

The progress of the sciences runs through the whole of history. This progress is constant, uninterrupted, and unceasing; for it is

dependent on the fact that concepts are capable of being fully transmitted from one person to another and from one age to another. Within the overall domain of understanding the manifestations of life, here alone does such a transmission occur. In science there is a general regularity in the course of human change. And in the meaning-continuum of change, it occupies a preeminent place. According to another law-governed relationship, first established by Bacon, conceptual cognition of the causal nexus in terms of laws makes it possible both to predict the future and to produce intentional effects by using the law-governedness of the causal system.

This is connected with a second aspect of regular progressive change. Man clings to his roots at first; he is subject to the conditions of natural movement and of face-to-face communication in space, and of the corruptibility of events in time. Then a general process begins to pervade the whole of history in which scientific progress gradually overcomes these barriers and a universal, international framework is established. Again, another development occurs on the basis of a regularity that prevails in the domain of understanding. The objectification of the human spirit in life-manifestations is continually on the rise in the course of time. Therefore, the material for historical understanding grows unremittingly, and ever more comprehensive contexts become cognizable. Thus progress in historical cognition occurs to a certain extent, regardless of fluctuations in the energy and aims of understanding.

Let me underscore one more aspect from the many that are available. As the freedom and individual configuration of subjectivity is augmented in the course of history, there is at the same time a growth in the thoroughness with which knowledge is grounded philosophically. This leads to a constant increase in the sureness with which human beings orient themselves in philosophical self-reflection. The human trait of seeking stability in oneself when surrounded by nothing but uncertainties is similarly satisfied ever more strongly, despite the increasing freedom of the human subject. In the midst of changing seasons and the storms of change around us, we seek solid walls to protect us, even if they set limits on us. And the increasing justification offered by the philosophy of self-reflection is an incessant tendency of the human race stemming from the nature of our essence.

GLOSSARY

GERMAN EXPRESSIONS

abbilden: reproducing, imaging
Abfolge: succession
Ablauf: sequence that elapses
Abstufung: gradation, hierarchy
allgemeingültig: universally valid
Anordnung: pattern, procedure
Anschauung: intuition
Aufbau: formation, development, structure
Auffassung: apprehension, conception, comprehension
Auflösung: solution, resolution, dissolution, overcoming
aufklären: explicate
Ausdruck: expression
Auslegung: interpretation, exegesis
Aussage: assertion
Äusserung: manifestation

Bedeutung: meaning
Bedeutungsbezug: meaning reference or concern
Begebenheit: givenness, event
begreifen: conceptual comprehension
Besinnung: reflection, reflective awareness
Bestandteile: constituents, component parts
bestimmt-unbestimmt: determinate-indeterminate
Bewußtheit: awareness
Bewußt-Sein: being-conscious
Bewußtseinslagen: states of consciousness
Bezeichnung: signification
Beziehung: relation, reference
Bezug: reference, relation of concern
Bezug des Lebens: life-concern
Bild: image, representation
Bildung: formation, education
Bindung: obligation, constraint

darstellbar: explicable
darstellen: explicate, present, narrate, represent

- Denkformen:* logical forms
Denkgesetze: logical laws
Denkleistung: logical function, operation
Denkzusammenhang: nexus of thought, logical system, cognitive system
Deutung: interpretation
- eigentümlich:* distinctive
Eigenwert: distinctive value, inherent value
Einheiten: units, constituents
einheitlich: coherent
Einzeldasein: singular existence
Einwirkung: influence
Enthaltensein: inherence
Entstehung: emergence, rise, genesis
Entwicklung: development
Epoche: epoch
Ereignis: occurrence
Erfahrung: experience
erfassen: grasp, comprehend
ergänzen: complete
erkennen: cognize
Erkennen: cognition, cognitive process
Erkenntnis: conceptual cognition, cognition
erkenntnistheoretisch: epistemological
Erkenntniszusammenhang: epistemic nexus
erklärend: explanatory
Erklärung: explanation
erleben: experiencing, living through an experience
Erlebnis: lived experience
Erlebniseinheit: lived unit of experience
erwirken: produce
Erwirken: being productive, productivity
Erwirkte: what has been produced
erworbener seelischer Zusammenhang: acquired psychic nexus
Exegese: exegesis
- Faktizität:* facticity
fest: stable, tight
Festigkeit: stability
Fortgezogenwerden: being-pulled-along
Fortrücken: advance
Fortschreiten: course
Fortwirken: continued efficacy
für-mich-da-sein: being-there-for-me

- Gebiet:* domain
Gebilde: formations
Gefühlslage: state of feeling
Gefüge: network, structure
Gegebenheit: givenness
Gegensetzung: counterposing
Gegenständliche: what is objective, objective world, the domain of the objective
gegenständliches Auffassen: objective apprehension
Gegenwart: present
Gegenwärtige: what is present
Gehalt: meaning, content
Geisteswissenschaften: human sciences (including the humanities and the social sciences)
Geistiges: spiritual or human content, spiritual meaning
Gemeingefühl: feeling of community
Gemeinsames: common to, common context, something common
Gemeinsamkeit: commonality, common perspective, common stock
Gemüt: emotional state of mind
Geschehnis: what happens, event, happening
Geschichtlichkeit: historicity
gesetzlich: law-governed
gesetzmäßig: law-governed
Gesetzmäßigkeit: lawlike order, lawfulness or regularity
Gestalt: gestalt, configuration
Gestaltung: taking or giving shape, mode of shaping
gewahren: noticing
Gewißheit: certainty
Gleichheit: equivalent, identity
gleichsetzen: equating
Glied: constituent part
Grund: foundation
Grundzug: basic trait
- Handlung:* activity, action
herausheben: lift into prominence
Hermeneutik: hermeneutics
hineintragen: project, transport
hineinverlegen: project
hineinversetzen: transpose
Historik: theory of history
- Individualität:* individuality
Inhaltlichkeit: content

Innerlichkeit: subjectivity

Innesein: reflexive awareness

Innewerden: reflexive awareness

Kausalzusammenhang: causal system

Kenntnis: familiarity

konstruierbar: construed constructively

konstruieren: construct, make intelligible, construe

Kraft: productive force, force, power

Kultursysteme: cultural systems

Kulturwissenschaften: cultural sciences

kunstmäßig: rule-guided, technical, skillful

Lage: situation, circumstance

Lagegefühl: feeling of one's own state

Landrecht: Prussian Common Law

Lebensäußerung: manifestation of life

Lebensbezug: life-concern

Lebenseinheit: psychophysical life-unit

Lebensverhältnis: life-relationship

Lebenszusammenhang: life-nexus, nexus of life, vital connectedness

Leistung: function, functioning, contribution, operation

Menschheit: human life

Mitleben: sympathetic reliving

nachbilden: re-create

nacherleben: re-experience

nachfühlen: re-feeling, recapturing feeling

nebeneinander: concurrently

Ordnungen: institutions

Regelgebung: establishing of rules, codification, rule-giving

Repräsentant: representative

Repräsentation: re-presentation or sign

Richtung: direction, tendency, aim

Sachverhalt: what is given, state of affairs, existence

Seelenleben: psychic life

Selbigkeit: selfsameness

Selbstbesinnung: self-reflection

Selbstgefühl: self-feeling

seltsam: strange

Setzung: positing

Sicherheit: reliability, assurance, certainty

Sicherung: assurance

sichhineinersetzen: transposing oneself

Sinn: sense, meaning

Sosein-Müssen: having-to-be-thus

Stellung: posture, stance

Stellungsnahme: taking a stance

Struktureinheit: structural unit, structural unity

strukturelle Einheit: structural unit

Strukturgefüge: structural articulation

Strukturzusammenhang: structural system

Stufe: stage

Tatbestand: state of affairs

Tatsächliches: the factual

Totalvorstellung: total representation

Tun und Leiden: acting and suffering, agency and suffering

übertragen: transfer

Umwelt: surrounding

Untergrund: subsoil

Unterschied: difference

Veräußerlichung: externalization

Vergegenwärtigung: presentification

Verhalten: attitude, relation, approach, attitudinal position, conduct

Verhältnis: relationship, proportion, ratio

Verhaltungsweise: kind of attitude

Verkehr: communion

Verlauf: course, sequence, process

Vernunft: reason

Verstand: intellect, understanding

Verständnis: intelligibility, understanding, implicit understanding

Verstehen: understanding

vertreten: to be representative of

Vertretung: being representative, representing

Verwebung: network

Volk: people

Volksgemeinschaft: ethnic community

Vollendung: completion

Vollzug: fulfilment

Vorschrift: precept

Vorstellung: representation, image

Wahrheit: truth

Wahrnehmung: perception

Wechselwirkung: reciprocal influence, interaction, reciprocal action

- Weltanschauung*: world-view
Wertabschätzung: appraisal of value
Wertbestimmung: determination of value, value-assessment
Wertgebung: establishing of values, value-assignation
Willenszusammenhang: nexus of will
willentliches Verhalten: volitional attitude
wirken: doing, acting
Wirken: efficacy
Wirken und Leiden: agency and suffering
Wirkende: what produces, productivity
Wirklichkeit: what is the case, reality, what is real
wirksam: operative, active
Wirksamkeit: efficacy
Wirkung: influence, effect, being produced
Wirkungsverlauf: productive sequence
Wirkungszusammenhang: productive nexus or system
Wissen: knowledge
wissenschaftstheoretisch: theoretical and scientific
wollen: willing
- Zeitalter*: age, period
Zeitgeist: spirit of an age
Zeitlichkeit: temporality
Zeitverlauf: passage of time
zurechtlegen: account for
zusammenfassen: comprehend
zusammenfassend: gathering
Zusammenfassung: synthetic comprehension, grasping together
Zusammengehörigkeit: solidarity, congruity
Zusammenhang: connectedness, continuum, coherence, system, togetherness, nexus, context, network
Zusammenhang des Seelenlebens: psychic nexus
zusammennehmen: gathering together
Zuständlichkeit: state of being
Zweck: purpose
Zweckmäßigkeit: purposiveness
Zwecksetzung: purposiveness
Zweckzusammenhang: purposive system

ENGLISH EXPRESSIONS

- account for: *zurechtlegen*
acquired psychic nexus: *erworbener seelischer Zusammenhang*
acting: *wirken*
acting and suffering: *Tun und Leiden*

action: *Handlung*
active: *wirksam*
activity: *Handlung*
advance: *Fortriücken*
age: *Zeitalter*
agency and suffering: *Wirken und Leiden, Tun und Leiden*
aim: *Richtung*
appraisal of value: *Wertabschätzung*
apprehension: *Auffassung*
approach: *Verhalten*
assertion: *Aussage*
assurance: *Sicherheit, Sicherung*
attitude: *Verhalten*
attitudinal position: *Verhalten*
awareness: *Bewußtheit*

basic trait: *Grundzug*
being-conscious: *Bewußt-Sein*
being produced: *Wirkung*
being productive: *Erwirken*
being-pulled-along: *Fortgezogenwerden*
being representative: *Vertretung*
being-there-for-me: *für-mich-da-sein*

causal system: *Kausalzusammenhang*
certainty: *Gewißheit, Sicherheit*
circumstance: *Lage*
codification: *Regelgebung*
cognition: *Erkenntnis, das Erkennen*
cognitive process: *das Erkennen*
cognitive system: *Denkkzusammenhang*
cognize: *erkennen*
coherence: *Zusammenhang*
coherent: *einheitlich*
common context: *Gemeinsames*
common perspective: *Gemeinsamkeit*
common stock: *Gemeinsamkeit*
common to: *Gemeinsames*
commonality: *Gemeinsamkeit*
communion: *Verkehr*
complete: *ergänzen*
completion: *Vollendung*
component parts: *Bestandteile*
comprehend: *erfassen, zusammenfassen*
comprehension: *Auffassung*
conception: *Auffassung*

conceptual cognition: *Erkenntnis*
 conceptual comprehension: *begreifen*
 concurrently: *Nebeneinander*
 conduct: *Verhalten*
 configuration: *Gestalt*
 congruity: *Zusammengehörigkeit*
 connectedness: *Zusammenhang*
 constituent part: *Glied*
 constituents: *Bestandteile, Einheiten*
 constraint: *Bindung*
 construct: *konstruieren*
 construe: *konstruieren*
 construed constructively: *konstruierbar*
 content: *Gehalt, Inhaltlichkeit*
 context: *Zusammenhang*
 continued efficacy: *Fortwirken*
 continuum: *Zusammenhang*
 contribution: *Leistung*
 counterposing: *Gegensetzung*
 course: *Fortschreiten, Verlauf*
 cultural sciences: *Kulturwissenschaften*
 cultural systems: *Kultursysteme*

determinate-indeterminate: *bestimmt-unbestimmt*
 determination of value: *Wertbestimmung*
 development: *Aufbau, Entwicklung*
 difference: *Unterschied*
 direction: *Richtung*
 dissolution: *Auflösung*
 distinctive: *eigentümlich*
 distinctive value: *Eigenwert*
 doing: *wirken*
 domain: *Gebiet*
 domain of the objective: *Gegenständliche*

education: *Bildung*
 effect: *Wirkung*
 efficacy: *Wirken, Wirksamkeit*
 emergence: *Entstehung*
 emotional state of mind: *Gemüt*
 epistemic nexus: *Erkenntniszusammenhang*
 epistemological: *erkenntnistheoretisch*
 epoch: *Epoche*
 equating: *gleichsetzen*
 equivalent: *Gleichheit*

establishing of rules: *Regelgebung*
 establishing of values: *Wertgebung*
 ethnic community: *Volksgemeinschaft*
 event: *Begebenheit, Geschehnis*
 exegesis: *Auslegung, Exegese*
 existence: *Sachverhalt*
 experience: *Erfahrung*
 experiencing: *erleben*
 explanation: *Erklärung*
 explanatory: *erklärend*
 explicable: *darstellbar*
 explicate: *aufklären, darstellen*
 expression: *Ausdruck*
 externalization: *Veräußerlichung*

facticity: *Faktizität*
 the factual: *Tatsächliches*
 familiarity: *Kenntnis*
 feeling of community: *Gemeingefühl*
 feeling of one's own state: *Lagegefühl*
 force: *Kraft*
 formation: *Aufbau, Bildung*
 formations: *Gebilde*
 foundation: *Grund*
 fulfillment: *Vollzug*
 function: *Leistung*
 functioning: *Leistung*

gathering: *zusammenfassend*
 gathering together: *zusammennehmen*
 genesis: *Entstehung*
 gestalt: *Gestalt*
 givenness: *Begebenheit, Gegebenheit*
 gradation: *Abstufung*
 grasp: *erfassen*
 grasping together: *Zusammenfassung*

happening: *Geschehnis*
 having-to-be-thus: *Sosein-Müssen*
 hermeneutics: *Hermeneutik*
 hierarchy: *Abstufung*
 historicity: *Geschichtlichkeit*
 human life: *Menschheit*
 human sciences (including the humanities and the social sciences):
Geisteswissenschaften

identity: *Gleichheit*
 image: *Bild, Vorstellung*
 imaging: *abbilden*
 implicit understanding: *Verständnis*
 individuality: *Individualität*
 influence: *Einwirkung, Wirkung*
 inherence: *Enthaltensein*
 inherent value: *Eigenwert*
 institutions: *Ordnungen*
 intellect: *Verstand*
 intelligibility: *Verständnis*
 interaction: *Wechselwirkung*
 interpretation: *Auslegung, Deutung*
 intuition: *Anschauung*

kind of attitude: *Verhaltungsweise*
 knowledge: *Wissen*

lawfulness: *Gesetzmäßigkeit*
 law-governed: *gesetzlich, gesetzmäßig*
 lawlike order: *Gesetzmäßigkeit*
 life-concern: *Bezug des Lebens, Lebensbezug*
 life-nexus: *Lebenszusammenhang*
 life-relationship: *Lebensverhältnis*
 lift into prominence: *herausheben*
 lived experience: *Erlebnis*
 lived unit of experience: *Erlebniseinheit*
 living through an experience: *erleben*
 logical forms: *Denkformen*
 logical function: *Denkleistung*
 logical laws: *Denkgesetze*
 logical operation: *Denkleistung*
 logical system: *Denkzusammenhang*

make intelligible: *konstruieren*
 manifestation: *Äusserung*
 manifestation of life: *Lebensäußerung*
 meaning: *Bedeutung, Gehalt, Sinn*
 meaning reference or concern: *Bedeutungsbezug*
 mode of shaping: *Gestaltung*

narrate: *darstellen*
 network: *Gefüge, Verwebung, Zusammenhang*
 nexus: *Zusammenhang*
 nexus of life: *Lebenszusammenhang*
 nexus of thought: *Denkzusammenhang*

nexus of will: *Willenszusammenhang*
noticing: *gewahren*

objective apprehension: *gegenständliches Auffassen*
objective world: *Gegenständliche*
obligation: *Bindung*
occurrence: *Ereignis*
operation: *Leistung, wirksam*
overcoming: *Auflösung*

passage of time: *Zeitverlauf*
pattern: *Anordnung*
people: *Volk*
perception: *Wahrnehmung*
period: *Zeitalter*
positing: *Setzung*
posture: *Stellung*
power: *Kraft*
precept: *Vorschrift*
present: *darstellen, Gegenwart*
presentification: *Vergegenwärtigung*
procedure: *Anordnung*
process: *Verlauf*
produce: *erwirken*
productive force: *Kraft*
productive nexus or system: *Wirkungszusammenhang*
productive sequence: *Wirkungsverlauf*
productivity: *Erwirken, Wirkende*
project: *hineintragen, hineinverlegen*
proportion: *Verhältnis*
Prussian Common Law: *Landrecht*
psychic life: *Seelenleben*
psychic nexus: *Zusammenhang des Seelenlebens*
psychophysical life-unit: *Lebenseinheit*
purpose: *Zweck*
purposive system: *Zweckzusammenhang*
purposiveness: *Zweckmäßigkeit, Zwecksetzung*

ratio: *Verhältnis*
reality: *Wirklichkeit*
reason: *Vernunft*
recapturing feeling: *nachfühlen*
reciprocal action: *Wechselwirkung*
reciprocal influence: *Wechselwirkung*
re-create: *nachbilden*
re-experience: *nacherleben*

- re-feeling: *nachfühlen*
 reference: *Bezug, Beziehung*
 reflection: *Besinnung*
 reflective awareness: *Besinnung*
 reflexive awareness: *Innesein, Innewerden*
 regularity: *Gesetzmäßigkeit*
 relation of concern: *Bezug*
 relation: *Beziehung, Verhalten*
 relationship: *Verhältnis*
 reliability: *Sicherheit*
 represent: *darstellen*
 re-presentation: *Repräsentation*
 representation: *Bild, Vorstellung*
 representative: *Repräsentant*
 representing: *Vertretung*
 reproducing: *abbilden*
 resolution: *Auflösung*
 rise: *Entstehung*
 rule-giving: *Regelgebung*
 rule-guided: *kunstmäßig*
- self-feeling: *Selbstgefühl*
 self-reflection: *Selbstbesinnung*
 selfsameness: *Selbigkeit*
 sense: *Sinn*
 sensory intuitive given: *das sinnlich Anschauliche*
 sequence: *Verlauf*
 sequence that elapses: *Ablauf*
 sign: *Repräsentation*
 signification: *Bezeichnung*
 singular existence: *Einzeldasein*
 situation: *Lage*
 skillful: *kunstmäßig*
 solidarity: *Zusammengehörigkeit*
 solution: *Auflösung*
 something common: *Gemeinsames*
 spirit of an age: *Zeitgeist*
 spiritual meaning: *Geistiges*
 spiritual or human content: *Geistiges*
 stability: *Festigkeit*
 stable: *fest*
 stage: *Stufe*
 stance: *Stellung*
 state of affairs: *Sachverhalt, Tatbestand*
 state of being: *Zuständlichkeit*
 state of feeling: *Gefühlslage*

states of consciousness: *Bewußtseinslagen*
 strange: *seltsam*
 structural articulation: *Strukturgefüge*
 structural system: *Strukturzusammenhang*
 structural unit: *Struktureinheit, strukturelle Einheit*
 structural unity: *Struktureinheit*
 structure: *Aufbau, Gefüge*
 subjectivity: *Innerlichkeit*
 subsoil: *Untergrund*
 succession: *Abfolge*
 surrounding: *Umwelt*
 sympathetic reliving: *Mitleben*
 synthetic comprehension: *Zusammenfassung*
 system: *Zusammenhang*

taking a stance: *Stellungsnahme*
 taking or giving shape: *Gestaltung*
 technical: *kunstmäßig*
 temporality: *Zeitlichkeit*
 tendency: *Richtung*
 theoretical and scientific: *wissenschaftstheoretisch*
 theory of history: *Historik*
 tight: *fest*
 to be representative of: *vertreten*
 togetherness: *Zusammenhang*
 total representation: *Totalvorstellung*
 transfer: *übertragen*
 transport: *hineinragen*
 transpose: *hineinversetzen*
 transposing oneself: *sichhineinversetzen*
 truth: *Wahrheit*

understanding: *Verständnis, Verstand, Verstehen*
 units: *Einheiten*
 universally valid: *allgemeingültig*

value-assessment: *Wertbestimmung*
 value-assignation: *Wertgebung*
 vital connectedness: *Lebenszusammenhang*
 volitional attitude: *willentliches Verhalten*

what happens: *Geschehnis*
 what has been produced: *Erwirkte*
 what is given: *Sachverhalt*
 what is objective: *Gegenständliche*
 what is present: *Gegenwärtige*

what is real: *Wirklichkeit*

what is the case: *Wirklichkeit*

what produces: *Wirkende*

willing: *wollen*

world-view: *Weltanschauung*

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