

# CERTIK AUDIT REPORT FOR TRIAS



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Platform Name: Ethereum



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## Executive Summary

This report has been prepared as product of the Smart Contract Audit request by Trias. This audit was conducted to discover issues and vulnerabilities in the source code of Trias's Smart Contracts. Utilizing CertiK's Formal Verification Platform, Static Analysis and Manual Review, a comprehensive examination has been performed. The auditing process pays special attention to the following considerations.

- Testing the smart contracts against both common and uncommon attack vectors.
- Assessment of the codebase for best practice and industry standards.
- Ensuring contract logic meets the specifications and intentions of the client.
- Cross referencing contract structure and implementation against similar smart contracts produced by industry leaders.
- Thorough line by line manual review of the entire codebase by industry experts.

## Vulnerability Classification

For every issues found, CertiK categorizes them into 3 buckets based on its risk level:

- Critical: The code implementation does not match the specification, or it could result in loss of funds for contract owner or users.
- Medium: The code implementation does not match the specification at certain condition, or it could affect the security standard by lost of access control.
- Low: The code implementation is not a best practice, or use a suboptimal design pattern, which may lead to security vulnerability, but no concern found yet.

## Testing Summary

# PASS

CERTIK believes this  
smart contract passes security  
qualifications to be listed on  
digital asset exchanges.

May 10, 2019



## Type of Issues

CertiK smart label engine applied 100% covered formal verification labels on the source code, and scanned the code using our proprietary static analysis and formal verification engine to detect the follow type of issues.

Title	Description	Issues	SWC ID
Integer Overflow and Underflow	An overflow/underflow happens when an arithmetic operation reaches the maximum or minimum size of a type.	0	SWC-101
Function incorrectness	Function implementation does not meet the specification, leading to intentional or unintentional vulnerabilities.	0	
Buffer Overflow	An attacker is able to write to arbitrary storage locations of a contract if array of out bound happens	0	SWC-124
Reentrancy	A malicious contract can call back into the calling contract before the first invocation of the function is finished.	0	SWC-107
Transaction Order Dependence	A race condition vulnerability occurs when code depends on the order of the transactions submitted to it.	0	SWC-114
Timestamp Dependence	Timestamp can be influenced by minors to some degree.	0	SWC-116
Insecure Compiler Version	Using an fixed outdated compiler version or floating pragma can be problematic, if there are publicly disclosed bugs and issues that affect the current compiler version used.	0	SWC-102 SWC-103
Insecure Randomness	Block attributes are insecure to generate random numbers, as they can be influenced by minors to some degree.	0	SWC-120

tx.origin for authorization	tx.origin should not be used for authorization. Use msg.sender instead.	0	SWC-115
Delegatecall to Untrusted Callee	Calling into untrusted contracts is very dangerous, the target and arguments provided must be sanitized.	0	SWC-112
State Variable Default Visibility	Labeling the visibility explicitly makes it easier to catch incorrect assumptions about who can access the variable.	0	SWC-108
Function Default Visibility	Functions are public by default. A malicious user is able to make unauthorized or unintended state changes if a developer forgot to set the visibility.	0	SWC-100
Uninitialized variables	Uninitialized local storage variables can point to other unexpected storage variables in the contract.	0	SWC-109
Assertion Failure	The assert() function is meant to assert invariants. Properly functioning code should never reach a failing assert statement.	0	SWC-110
Deprecated Solidity Features	Several functions and operators in Solidity are deprecated and should not be used as best practice.	0	SWC-111
Unused variables	Unused variables reduce code quality	0	

## Vulnerability Details

### Critical

No issue found.

### Medium

No issue found.

### Low



No issue found.

# Formal Verification Results

## How to read

### Detail for Request 1

transferFrom to same address


Verification date	 20, Oct 2018
Verification timespan	 395.38 ms

CERTIK label location	Line 30-34 in File howtoread.sol
-----------------------	----------------------------------

CERTIK label	30	/*@CTK FAIL "transferFrom to same address"
	31	@tag assume_completion
	32	@pre from == to
	33	@post __post.allowed[from][msg.sender] ==
	34	*/

Raw code location	Line 35-41 in File howtoread.sol
-------------------	----------------------------------


Raw code	35	function transferFrom(address from, address to
		) {
	36	balances[from] = balances[from].sub(tokens
	37	allowed[from][msg.sender] = allowed[from][
	38	balances[to] = balances[to].add(tokens);
	39	emit Transfer(from, to, tokens);
	40	return true;
	41	}

Counterexample	 This code violates the specification	
Initial environment	1	Counter Example:
	2	Before Execution:
	3	Input = {
	4	from = 0x0
	5	to = 0x0
	6	tokens = 0x6c
	7	}
	8	This = 0
	52	}
	53	balance: 0x0
	54	}
	55	}
Post environment	57	After Execution:
	58	Input = {
	59	from = 0x0
	60	to = 0x0
	61	tokens = 0x6c

## Formal Verification Request 1

SafeMath sub

 10, May 2019

 23.78 ms

Line 10-16 in File TRYSimple.sol

```
10  /*@CTK "SafeMath sub"
11     @post (a < b) == __reverted
12     @post !__reverted -> __return == a - b
13     @post !__reverted -> !__has_overflow
14     @post !(__has_buf_overflow)
15     @post !(__has_assertion_failure)
16 */
```

Line 17-21 in File TRYSimple.sol


```
17  function safeSub(uint256 a, uint256 b) internal pure returns (uint256) {
18      require(b <= a, "SafeMath: subtraction overflow");
19      uint256 c = a - b;
20      return c;
21  }
```

 The code meets the specification

## Formal Verification Request 2

SafeMath add

 10, May 2019

 28.87 ms

Line 26-32 in File TRYSimple.sol

```
26  /*@CTK "SafeMath add"
27     @post (a + b < a || a + b < b) == __reverted
28     @post !__reverted -> __return == a + b
29     @post !__reverted -> !__has_overflow
30     @post !(__has_buf_overflow)
31     @post !(__has_assertion_failure)
32 */
```

Line 33-37 in File TRYSimple.sol

```
33  function safeAdd(uint256 a, uint256 b) internal pure returns (uint256) {
34      uint256 c = a + b;
35      require(c >= a, "SafeMath: addition overflow");
36      return c;
37  }
```


 The code meets the specification



## Formal Verification Request 3

If method completes, integer overflow would not happen.

 10, May 2019

 22.27 ms

Line 50 in File TRYSimple.sol

50 `//@CTK NO_OVERFLOW`

Line 55-61 in File TRYSimple.sol


```
55     constructor(uint256 _initialAmount,string _tokenName,uint8 _decimalUnits,string
        _tokenSymbol) public {
56         balances[msg.sender] = _initialAmount;
57         totalSupply = _initialAmount;
58         name = _tokenName;
59         decimals = _decimalUnits;
60         symbol = _tokenSymbol;
61     }
```

 The code meets the specification

## Formal Verification Request 4

Buffer overflow / array index out of bound would never happen.

 10, May 2019

 0.54 ms

Line 51 in File TRYSimple.sol

51 `//@CTK NO_BUF_OVERFLOW`

Line 55-61 in File TRYSimple.sol


```
55     constructor(uint256 _initialAmount,string _tokenName,uint8 _decimalUnits,string
        _tokenSymbol) public {
56         balances[msg.sender] = _initialAmount;
57         totalSupply = _initialAmount;
58         name = _tokenName;
59         decimals = _decimalUnits;
60         symbol = _tokenSymbol;
61     }
```

 The code meets the specification

## Formal Verification Request 5

Method will not encounter an assertion failure.

 10, May 2019

 0.51 ms

Line 52 in File TRYSimple.sol

52 `//@CTK NO_ASF`

Line 55-61 in File TRYSimple.sol


```
55     constructor(uint256 _initialAmount,string _tokenName,uint8 _decimalUnits,string
        _tokenSymbol) public {
56         balances[msg.sender] = _initialAmount;
57         totalSupply = _initialAmount;
58         name = _tokenName;
59         decimals = _decimalUnits;
60         symbol = _tokenSymbol;
61     }
```

✓ The code meets the specification

## Formal Verification Request 6

If method completes, integer overflow would not happen.

 10, May 2019

 6.17 ms

Line 73 in File TRYSimple.sol

73 `//@CTK NO_OVERFLOW`

Line 81-83 in File TRYSimple.sol


```
81     function balanceOf(address _owner) public constant returns (uint256 balance) {//
        constant==view
82         return balances[_owner];
83     }
```

✓ The code meets the specification

## Formal Verification Request 7

Buffer overflow / array index out of bound would never happen.

 10, May 2019

 0.45 ms

Line 74 in File TRYSimple.sol

74 `//@CTK NO_BUF_OVERFLOW`

Line 81-83 in File TRYSimple.sol


```
81     function balanceOf(address _owner) public constant returns (uint256 balance) {//
        constant==view
82         return balances[_owner];
83     }
```

✓ The code meets the specification

## Formal Verification Request 8

Method will not encounter an assertion failure.

 10, May 2019

 0.42 ms

Line 75 in File TRYSimple.sol

75 `//@CTK NO_ASF`

Line 81-83 in File TRYSimple.sol


```
81 function balanceOf(address _owner) public constant returns (uint256 balance) {//  
   constant==view  
82 return balances[_owner];  
83 }
```

 The code meets the specification

## Formal Verification Request 9

balanceOf

 10, May 2019

 0.42 ms

Line 76-80 in File TRYSimple.sol

```
76 /*@CTK "balanceOf"  
77 @post (__reverted) == (false)  
78 @post (balance) == (balances[_owner])  
79 @post (this) == (__post)  
80 */
```

Line 81-83 in File TRYSimple.sol


```
81 function balanceOf(address _owner) public constant returns (uint256 balance) {//  
   constant==view  
82 return balances[_owner];  
83 }
```

 The code meets the specification

## Formal Verification Request 10

If method completes, integer overflow would not happen.

 10, May 2019

 168.48 ms

Line 89 in File TRYSimple.sol

89 `//@CTK NO_OVERFLOW`

Line 105-116 in File TRYSimple.sol

```

105 function transfer(address _to, uint256 _value) public returns (bool success) {
106     require(_to != 0x0, 'cannot transfer to the zero address');
107     // totalSupply (2^256 - 1).
108     require(balances[msg.sender] >= _value);
109     balances[msg.sender] = safeSub(balances[msg.sender], _value);
110     // token_value
111     balances[_to] = safeAdd(balances[_to], _value);
112     // token_value
113     emit Transfer(msg.sender, _to, _value);
114     //
115     return true;
116 }


```

✓ The code meets the specification

## Formal Verification Request 11

Buffer overflow / array index out of bound would never happen.

 10, May 2019

 12.16 ms

Line 90 in File TRYSimple.sol

```
90 // @CTK_NO_BUF_OVERFLOW
```

Line 105-116 in File TRYSimple.sol

```

105 function transfer(address _to, uint256 _value) public returns (bool success) {
106     require(_to != 0x0, 'cannot transfer to the zero address');
107     // totalSupply (2^256 - 1).
108     require(balances[msg.sender] >= _value);
109     balances[msg.sender] = safeSub(balances[msg.sender], _value);
110     // token_value
111     balances[_to] = safeAdd(balances[_to], _value);
112     // token_value
113     emit Transfer(msg.sender, _to, _value);
114     //
115     return true;
116 }


```

✓ The code meets the specification

## Formal Verification Request 12

Method will not encounter an assertion failure.

 10, May 2019

 11.71 ms

Line 91 in File TRYSimple.sol

```
91 // @CTK_NO_ASF
```

Line 105-116 in File TRYSimple.sol

```

105 function transfer(address _to, uint256 _value) public returns (bool success) {
106     require(_to != 0x0, 'cannot transfer to the zero address');
107     // totalSupply (2^256 - 1).
108     require(balances[msg.sender] >= _value);
109     balances[msg.sender] = safeSub(balances[msg.sender], _value);
110     // token_value
111     balances[_to] = safeAdd(balances[_to], _value);
112     // token_value
113     emit Transfer(msg.sender, _to, _value);
114     //
115     return true;
116 }

```

✓ The code meets the specification

## Formal Verification Request 13

transfer2\_same

📅 10, May 2019

🕒 59.4 ms

Line 92-97 in File TRYSimple.sol

```

92 /*@CTK "transfer2_same"
93     @pre (__reverted) == (false)
94     @pre (_to) == (msg.sender)
95     @post (__post.balances[_to]) == (balances[_to])
96     @post (success) == (true)
97 */

```

Line 105-116 in File TRYSimple.sol

```

105 function transfer(address _to, uint256 _value) public returns (bool success) {
106     require(_to != 0x0, 'cannot transfer to the zero address');
107     // totalSupply (2^256 - 1).
108     require(balances[msg.sender] >= _value);
109     balances[msg.sender] = safeSub(balances[msg.sender], _value);
110     // token_value
111     balances[_to] = safeAdd(balances[_to], _value);
112     // token_value
113     emit Transfer(msg.sender, _to, _value);
114     //
115     return true;
116 }

```

✓ The code meets the specification

## Formal Verification Request 14

transfer2

📅 10, May 2019

🕒 177.84 ms

Line 98-104 in File TRYSimple.sol

```

98  /*@CTK "transfer2"
99      @pre (__reverted) == (false)
100      @pre (_to) != (msg.sender)
101      @post (__post.balances[_to]) == ((balances[_to]) + (_value))
102      @post (__post.balances[msg.sender]) == ((balances[msg.sender]) - (_value))
103      @post (success) == (true)
104  */

```

Line 105-116 in File TRYSimple.sol

```

105  function transfer(address _to, uint256 _value) public returns (bool success) {
106      require(_to != 0x0, 'cannot transfer to the zero address');
107      // totalSupply (2^256 - 1).
108      require(balances[msg.sender] >= _value);
109      balances[msg.sender] = safeSub(balances[msg.sender], _value);
110      // token_value
111      balances[_to] = safeAdd(balances[_to], _value);
112      // token_value
113      emit Transfer(msg.sender, _to, _value);
114      //
115      return true;
116  }

```

✓ The code meets the specification

## Formal Verification Request 15

If method completes, integer overflow would not happen.

📅 10, May 2019

🕒 162.5 ms

Line 123 in File TRYSimple.sol

```

123  //@CTK NO_OVERFLOW

```

Line 139-153 in File TRYSimple.sol

```

139  function transferFrom(address _from, address _to, uint256 _value) public returns (
140      bool success){
141      require(_to != 0x0, 'cannot transfer to the zero address');
142      require(_value > 0);
143      require(balances[_from] >= _value && allowance[_from][msg.sender] >= _value);
144
145      balances[_to] = safeAdd(balances[_to], _value);
146      // token_value
147      balances[_from] = safeSub(balances[_from], _value);
148      // _fromtoken_value
149      allowance[_from][msg.sender] = safeSub(allowance[_from][msg.sender], _value);
150      // _from_value
151      emit Transfer(_from, _to, _value);
152      return true;
153  }

```

✓ The code meets the specification

## Formal Verification Request 16

Buffer overflow / array index out of bound would never happen.

📅 10, May 2019

🕒 46.59 ms

Line 124 in File TRYSimple.sol

124 `//@CTK NO_BUF_OVERFLOW`

Line 139-153 in File TRYSimple.sol

```

139  function transferFrom(address _from, address _to, uint256 _value) public returns (
140      bool success){
141      require(_to != 0x0, 'cannot transfer to the zero address');
142      require(_value > 0);
143      require(balances[_from] >= _value && allowance[_from][msg.sender] >= _value);
144
145      balances[_to] = safeAdd(balances[_to], _value);
146      // token_value
147      balances[_from] = safeSub(balances[_from], _value);
148      // _fromtoken_value
149      allowance[_from][msg.sender] = safeSub(allowance[_from][msg.sender], _value);
150      // _from_value
151      emit Transfer(_from, _to, _value);
152      return true;
153  }

```

✅ The code meets the specification

## Formal Verification Request 17

Method will not encounter an assertion failure.

📅 10, May 2019

🕒 48.42 ms

Line 125 in File TRYSimple.sol

125 `//@CTK NO_ASF`

Line 139-153 in File TRYSimple.sol

```

139  function transferFrom(address _from, address _to, uint256 _value) public returns (
140      bool success){
141      require(_to != 0x0, 'cannot transfer to the zero address');
142      require(_value > 0);
143      require(balances[_from] >= _value && allowance[_from][msg.sender] >= _value);
144
145      balances[_to] = safeAdd(balances[_to], _value);
146      // token_value
147      balances[_from] = safeSub(balances[_from], _value);
148      // _fromtoken_value
149      allowance[_from][msg.sender] = safeSub(allowance[_from][msg.sender], _value);
150      // _from_value
151      emit Transfer(_from, _to, _value);

```

```

152     return true;
153 }


```

✓ The code meets the specification

## Formal Verification Request 18

transferFrom

 10, May 2019

 187.48 ms

Line 126-132 in File TRYSimple.sol

```

126  /*@CTK "transferFrom"
127     @pre (__reverted) == (false)
128     @pre (_from) != (_to)
129     @post (success) == (true)
130     @post (__post.balances[_to]) == ((balances[_to]) + (_value))
131     @post (__post.balances[_from]) == ((balances[_from]) - (_value))
132  */

```

Line 139-153 in File TRYSimple.sol

```

139  function transferFrom(address _from, address _to, uint256 _value) public returns (
140      bool success){
141      require(_to != 0x0, 'cannot transfer to the zero address');
142      require(_value > 0);
143      require(balances[_from] >= _value && allowance[_from][msg.sender] >= _value);
144
145      balances[_to] = safeAdd(balances[_to], _value);
146      // token_value
147      balances[_from] = safeSub(balances[_from], _value);
148      // _fromtoken_value
149      allowance[_from][msg.sender] = safeSub(allowance[_from][msg.sender], _value);
150      // _from_value
151      emit Transfer(_from, _to, _value);
152      return true;
153  }


```

✓ The code meets the specification

## Formal Verification Request 19

transferFrom\_same

 10, May 2019

 192.39 ms

Line 133-138 in File TRYSimple.sol

```

133  /*@CTK "transferFrom_same"
134     @pre (__reverted) == (false)
135     @pre (_from) == (_to)
136     @post (success) == (true)

```



```

137     @post (__post.balances[_to]) == (balances[_to])
138     */

```

Line 139-153 in File TRYSimple.sol

```

139     function transferFrom(address _from, address _to, uint256 _value) public returns (
140         bool success){
141         require(_to != 0x0, 'cannot transfer to the zero address');
142         require(_value > 0);
143         require(balances[_from] >= _value && allowance[_from][msg.sender] >= _value);
144
145         balances[_to] = safeAdd(balances[_to], _value);
146         //             token_value
147         balances[_from] = safeSub(balances[_from], _value);
148         //             _fromtoken_value
149         allowance[_from][msg.sender] = safeSub(allowance[_from][msg.sender], _value);
150         //             _from_value
151         emit Transfer(_from, _to, _value);
152         //
153         return true;
154     }

```

✓ The code meets the specification

## Formal Verification Request 20

If method completes, integer overflow would not happen.

📅 10, May 2019

🕒 11.26 ms

Line 159 in File TRYSimple.sol

```

159     //@CTK NO_OVERFLOW

```

Line 166-170 in File TRYSimple.sol

```

166     function approve(address _spender, uint256 _value) public returns (bool success){
167         allowance[msg.sender][_spender] = _value;
168         emit Approval(msg.sender, _spender, _value);
169         return true;
170     }

```

✓ The code meets the specification

## Formal Verification Request 21

Buffer overflow / array index out of bound would never happen.

📅 10, May 2019

🕒 0.46 ms

Line 160 in File TRYSimple.sol

```

160     //@CTK NO_BUF_OVERFLOW

```

Line 166-170 in File TRYSimple.sol

```

166     function approve(address _spender, uint256 _value) public returns (bool success){
167         allowance[msg.sender][_spender] = _value;
168         emit Approval(msg.sender, _spender, _value);
169         return true;
170     }


```

✓ The code meets the specification

## Formal Verification Request 22

Method will not encounter an assertion failure.

 10, May 2019

 0.45 ms

Line 161 in File TRYSimple.sol

```

161     @@CTK NO_ASF

```

Line 166-170 in File TRYSimple.sol

```

166     function approve(address _spender, uint256 _value) public returns (bool success){
167         allowance[msg.sender][_spender] = _value;
168         emit Approval(msg.sender, _spender, _value);
169         return true;
170     }


```

✓ The code meets the specification

## Formal Verification Request 23

approve

 10, May 2019

 1.55 ms

Line 162-165 in File TRYSimple.sol

```

162     /*@CTK approve
163         @post __post.allowance[msg.sender][_spender] == _value
164         @post success == true
165     */

```

Line 166-170 in File TRYSimple.sol

```

166     function approve(address _spender, uint256 _value) public returns (bool success){
167         allowance[msg.sender][_spender] = _value;
168         emit Approval(msg.sender, _spender, _value);
169         return true;
170     }


```

✓ The code meets the specification

## Formal Verification Request 24

If method completes, integer overflow would not happen.

 10, May 2019

 8.44 ms

Line 176 in File TRYSimple.sol

176 `//@CTK NO_OVERFLOW`

Line 182-184 in File TRYSimple.sol


```
182     function allowance(address _owner, address _spender) public constant returns (
        uint256 remaining){
183         return allowance[_owner][_spender];
184     }
```

 The code meets the specification

## Formal Verification Request 25

Buffer overflow / array index out of bound would never happen.

 10, May 2019

 0.45 ms

Line 177 in File TRYSimple.sol

177 `//@CTK NO_BUF_OVERFLOW`

Line 182-184 in File TRYSimple.sol


```
182     function allowance(address _owner, address _spender) public constant returns (
        uint256 remaining){
183         return allowance[_owner][_spender];
184     }
```

 The code meets the specification

## Formal Verification Request 26

Method will not encounter an assertion failure.

 10, May 2019

 0.45 ms

Line 178 in File TRYSimple.sol

178 `//@CTK NO_ASF`

Line 182-184 in File TRYSimple.sol


```
182     function allowance(address _owner, address _spender) public constant returns (
        uint256 remaining){
183         return allowance[_owner][_spender];
184     }
```

 The code meets the specification

## Formal Verification Request 27

allowance

 10, May 2019

 0.46 ms

Line 179-181 in File TRYSimple.sol

```
179  /*@CTK allowance
180     @post remaining == allowance[_owner][_spender]
181  */
```

Line 182-184 in File TRYSimple.sol

```
182  function allowance(address _owner, address _spender) public constant returns (
      uint256 remaining){
183      return allowance[_owner][_spender];
184  }
```

 The code meets the specification

## Static Analysis Results

### INSECURE\_COMPILER\_VERSION

Line 1 in File TRYSimple.sol

```
1 pragma solidity ^0.4.24;
```

 Only these compiler versions are safe to compile your code: 0.4.25

# Manual Review Notes

## Source Code SHA-256 Checksum

- **TRYSimple.sol** 98630c15e26c4417134aab9681ed66367ec4a96d29bab77da006318adbdb46b8

## Summary

CertiK team is invited by Trias team to audit the design and implementations of its to be released ERC20 based smart contract, and the source code has been analyzed under different perspectives and with different tools such as CertiK formal verification checking as well as manual reviews by smart contract experts. We have been actively interacting with Trias engineers when there was any potential loopholes or recommended design changes during the audit process, and Trias team has been actively giving us updates for the source code and feedback about the business logic.

Overall we found the Trias team is very professional, and engaged in the discussion. The **TRYSimple** contract follow good practices of a ERC20 based smart contract features. The business logic and intentions are well-defined, straight-forward, and following industrial standards.

At this point the Trias team didn't provide other repositories sources as testing and documentation reference. We highly recommend the team to have more unit tests coverage together with documentation to simulate potential use cases and walk through all the functionalities. With the final update of source code and delivery of the audit report, we conclude that the contract is not vulnerable to any classically known anti-patterns or security issues. The audit report itself is not necessarily a guarantee of correctness or trustworthiness, and we always recommend seeking multiple opinions, more test coverage and sandbox deployments before the mainnet release.

## Recommendations

Items in this section are low impact to the overall aspects of the smart contracts, thus will let client to decide whether to have those reflected in the final deployed version of source codes.

## Source Code with CertiK Labels

File TRYSimple.sol

```

1  pragma solidity ^0.4.24;
2  /**
3   * Math operations with safety checks
4   */
5  contract SafeMath {
6
7      /**
8       * @dev Subtracts two unsigned integers, reverts on overflow (i.e. if subtrahend
9        is greater than minuend).
10     */
11     /*@CTK "SafeMath sub"
12     @post (a < b) == __reverted
13     @post !__reverted -> __return == a - b
14     @post !__reverted -> !__has_overflow
15     @post !(__has_buf_overflow)
16     @post !(__has_assertion_failure)
17     */
18     function safeSub(uint256 a, uint256 b) internal pure returns (uint256) {
19         require(b <= a, "SafeMath: subtraction overflow");
20         uint256 c = a - b;
21         return c;
22     }
23
24     /**
25      * @dev Adds two unsigned integers, reverts on overflow.
26     */
27     /*@CTK "SafeMath add"
28     @post (a + b < a || a + b < b) == __reverted
29     @post !__reverted -> __return == a + b
30     @post !__reverted -> !__has_overflow
31     @post !(__has_buf_overflow)
32     @post !(__has_assertion_failure)
33     */
34     function safeAdd(uint256 a, uint256 b) internal pure returns (uint256) {
35         uint256 c = a + b;
36         require(c >= a, "SafeMath: addition overflow");
37         return c;
38     }
39 }
40 /**
41  * TRY Token by Trias
42  * As ERC20 standard
43  */
44 contract TRY is SafeMath{
45     uint256 public totalSupply;
46     string public name;
47     string public symbol;
48     uint8 public decimals;
49
50     /*@CTK NO_OVERFLOW
51     /*@CTK NO_BUF_OVERFLOW
52     /*@CTK NO_ASF

```

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```

107         // totalSupply (2^256 - 1).
108         require(balances[msg.sender] >= _value);
109         balances[msg.sender] = safeSub(balances[msg.sender], _value);
110         // token_value
111         balances[_to] = safeAdd(balances[_to], _value);
112         // token_value
113         emit Transfer(msg.sender, _to, _value);
114         //
115         return true;
116     }
117
118     /**
119     * A contract attempts to get the coins
120     * _from_to_valuetokenapprove
121     * tokentoken
122     */
123     //@CTK NO_OVERFLOW
124     //@CTK NO_BUF_OVERFLOW
125     //@CTK NO_ASF
126     /*@CTK "transferFrom"
127     @pre (__reverted) == (false)
128     @pre (_from) != (_to)
129     @post (success) == (true)
130     @post (__post.balances[_to]) == ((balances[_to]) + (_value))
131     @post (__post.balances[_from]) == ((balances[_from]) - (_value))
132     */
133     /*@CTK "transferFrom_same"
134     @pre (__reverted) == (false)
135     @pre (_from) == (_to)
136     @post (success) == (true)
137     @post (__post.balances[_to]) == (balances[_to])
138     */
139     function transferFrom(address _from, address _to, uint256 _value) public returns (
140         bool success){
141         require(_to != 0x0, 'cannot transfer to the zero address');
142         require(_value > 0);
143         require(balances[_from] >= _value && allowance[_from][msg.sender] >= _value);
144
145         balances[_to] = safeAdd(balances[_to], _value);
146         // token_value
147         balances[_from] = safeSub(balances[_from], _value);
148         // _fromtoken_value
149         allowance[_from][msg.sender] = safeSub(allowance[_from][msg.sender], _value);
150         // _from_value
151         emit Transfer(_from, _to, _value);
152         //
153         return true;
154     }
155
156     /**
157     * Allow another contract to spend some tokens in your behalf
158     * _spender_valuetoken
159     */
160     //@CTK NO_OVERFLOW
161     //@CTK NO_BUF_OVERFLOW
162     //@CTK NO_ASF
163     /*@CTK approve
164     @post __post.allowance[msg.sender][_spender] == _value

```

```
164     @post success == true
165     */
166     function approve(address _spender, uint256 _value) public returns (bool success){
167         allowance[msg.sender][_spender] = _value;
168         emit Approval(msg.sender, _spender, _value);
169         return true;
170     }
171
172     /**
173      *          _spender_ownertoken
174      *          ,          Token
175      */
176     //@CTK NO_OVERFLOW
177     //@CTK NO_BUF_OVERFLOW
178     //@CTK NO_ASF
179     /*@CTK allowance
180     @post remaining == allowance[_owner][_spender]
181     */
182     function allowance(address _owner, address _spender) public constant returns (
183         uint256 remaining){
184         return allowance[_owner][_spender];
185     }
186 }
```