


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## Problem 1

Fiat-Shamir signature scheme 
$$pk = y \in \mathcal{Y}, sk = (x, y) \in \mathcal{R}$$



t from prover is used to generate c, If the simulator has an legal pair (t, c, z) it can hash any message  $c_i = H(m_i)$  by itself. The  $(t, c_i, z_i)$  can be accepted. It is insecure. so the probability of obtaining secret key  $\alpha$  is not negligible.

## Problem 2

$$((x_{1},x_{2},..,x_{n}),(y_{1},y_{2},..,y_{n})) \in ((\mathcal{X} \cup \bot)^{n} \times \mathcal{Y}^{n}) : |i \in \{1,...,n\} : (x_{i},y_{i}) \in \mathcal{R}| \geq k$$

$$\boxed{\text{Prover } P(x,y)} \qquad \boxed{\text{Verifier } V(y)}$$

$$\text{each } j \in J, c_{j} \xleftarrow{R} \mathbb{Z}_{q}, (t_{j},z_{j}) \leftarrow Sim(y_{j},c_{j})$$

$$\text{each } i \in I, \alpha_{t_{i}} \xleftarrow{R} \mathcal{Z}_{q}, u_{t_{i}} \leftarrow g^{t_{i}}$$

$$\text{polynomial } f \in \mathcal{Z}_{q}[\omega] \text{ degree } \leq (n-k)$$


$$\text{s.t. } f(0) = c, f(j) = c_{j}$$

$$\text{for } i \in I, c_{i} \leftarrow f(i), \alpha_{z_{i}} \leftarrow \alpha_{t_{i}} \alpha c_{i}$$


$$\text{chk } f \text{ poly. degree } \leq n-k$$

$$\ell = 1, ..., n, c_{\ell} \leftarrow f(\ell), g^{\alpha_{\ell}} \stackrel{?}{=} u_{t_{\ell}} u_{c_{\ell}}$$

## Problem 3



## RSA Full Domain Hash



Fiat-Shamir heuristic GQ signature doesn't need the involvement of d, thus no need of computing it. The Fiat-Shamir heuristic GQ signature is more efficient than RSA-FDH signature.