

A Comparative Semantic Analysis of *Again* and *Yana* in Uzbek

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Abstract

The so-called decomposition adverb *again* has been a topic for many researches. Especially, the ambiguity of *again* has been studied by many linguists such as Stechow (1995, 1996), Fabricius – Hansen (1983, 1995, 2001) Beck (2005, 2006), Beck & Gergel (2015), Patel-Grosz & Beck (2019), among others. This paper investigates the semantic properties of the decomposition adverb *yana* ‘again’ in Uzbek in comparison with English *again*, and provide an analysis. Discussing the semantic properties of *yana*, I show that Uzbek fits into the generalization suggested by Beck (2005) (inspired by Beck and Snyder (2001)) that the restitutive interpretation of *again* is available only in languages where a resultative construction is available. And it is proposed that the ambiguity of the construction of *yana* should be accounted for with a lexical approach rather than a structural approach.

1. Introduction

A sentence with the adverb *again*¹ is ambiguous between two readings: a repetitive reading, which is ‘the whole event has happened before’ and a restitutive reading, which is ‘the result state of an event is repeated’. One example is shown in (1):

- (1) Mary opened the door again.

¹ The italicized *again*, *yana* are actual lexical items. The interpretation of (non-English) lexical items is given in the single quotation ‘again’.

- a. Mary opened the door, and that had happened before. (repetitive)
 - b. Mary opened the door, and the door had been open before. (restitutive)
- (Beck 2005)

Sentence (1) has a repetitive reading such as ‘Mary opened the door, and the action of Mary’s opening the door had happened before’. Another reading is a restitutive interpretation such as ‘Mary opened the door and the door had been open before’. These interpretations can be distinguished by what is repeated: the whole event of opening the door as in (1a) or the result state of the door’s being open as in (1b).

Another example showing the ambiguity of *again* is presented below:

(2) Leo jumped up again.

- a. Leo jumped up and he had done it before. (repetitive)

The bell rang, and Leo jumped up. [...]

A knock came on the door, and he jumped up again.

- b. Leo jumped up and he had been up before. (restitutive/counterdirectional)

Leo slowly sat down in his favourite armchair.

A knock came on the door, and he jumped up again.

(Beck & Gergel 2015)

The sentence (2) has two different interpretations, such as Leo jumped up and he had done it before, with the presented context in (2a), and second meaning such as Leo jumped up and he had been up before’, which is appropriate with the context given in (2b).

In Uzbek, English *again* can be translated into the adverb *yana*, as shown in (3):

(3) Suresh eshikni *yana* ochdi.

Suresh door *again* opened

‘Suresh opened the door again.’

Yana is ambiguous like its English counterpart *again*. The sentence in (3) allows two interpretations. It has a repetitive meaning such as Suresh opened the door and it happened before; the action of opening the door was done by Suresh two times. Also, it has a restitutive meaning such as Suresh opened the door and the door had been open before; the state of the door being open is repeated.

There have been two main views on the ambiguity of *again*. One says that the ambiguity of *again* comes from the syntax and is derived from different scope positions. The other says that the ambiguity of *again* is lexical and there are two *again*s in a language. Beck (2005) did a crosslinguistical research on the ambiguity of ‘again’ in 18 languages and claimed that the restitutive reading of ‘again’ is allowed only in languages where the resultative construction is available. Here in this paper we will refer to it as Beck’s (2005) Generalization, as shown below:

(4) Beck’s generalization:

The restitutive interpretation of ‘again’ is allowed only in languages which have the resultative construction.

Beck & Snyder (2001) pointed out that if a motion verb added with a goal PP becomes an accomplishment predicate in a language, then this language allows a resultative state. Later, Beck (2005), inspired by Beck & Snyder (2001), claim that this phenomenon is related to Stechow’s Principle (R) (for further explanation refer to Section 2.1.). She states that if a language allows Principle (R), then it has a resultative state, which indicates the possibility of a restitutive reading in a language. Based on this, Beck (2005) divided the languages into (+R), languages which allow a restitutive reading and (–R) languages which block restitutive reading with *again*.

The semantics of ‘again’ has been investigated in many languages crosslinguistically. For instance, Beck (2005) provided a crosslinguistic research, and Patel–Grosz & Beck (2019) provided an analysis in Kutchi Gujarati. Korean *tasi* ‘again’ was analyzed in the works of Oh (2009, 2015) However, the case of Uzbek has never been investigated previously. The purpose of this paper is to investigate the semantic properties of a decomposition adverb in Uzbek in comparison with English *again* and to provide an analysis.

More specifically, I will have the following questions in mind:

- What are the exact semantic properties of the Uzbek adverbs corresponding to *again*?

- How does the ambiguity arise?
- Is the ambiguity affected by the surface position of the adverb as in English?
- Does Uzbek fit into the generalization suggested by Beck (2005) (inspired by Beck & Snyder (2001)) that the restitutive interpretation is available only in languages where a resultative construction is available?

This paper organized as follows: Section 2 discusses the previous analyses on *again*. In Section 3, the basic data of *yana* will be presented and discussed. Furthermore, Section 4 presents an analysis of *yana*. Section 5 finally provides a conclusion.

2. Previous analyses of ‘Again’

The analyses of the ambiguity of ‘again’ can be divided into two main approaches. Some scholars claim that the ambiguity of ‘again’ comes from the sentence structure and ‘again’ always means repetition, while some others argue that the ambiguity comes from lexical meanings. These main approaches on the ambiguity of ‘again’ are still debated among scholars. In the following section I will introduce these approaches more in detail.

2.1 Structural Theory

The structural theory has been discussed by scholars such as Mc Cawley (1968), Stechow (1995, 1996), Beck (2005, 2005, 2019) and others. In this paper I will present the structural analysis of ‘again’ from Stechow’s (1995, 1996) perspective.

According to the structural theory, there is one ‘again’ in the language with repetitive meaning and the two readings of the sentence of *again* are derived with different sentence structures. Stechow (1995, 1996) suggested a structural theory with scope interaction, explaining if ‘again’ takes scope over the verb phrase, a repetitive reading is available and if ‘again’ takes scope over the result state (small clause), a restitutive reading is available.

(5) Sally hammered the metal flat again. (Beck 2005)

a. Sally hammered the metal flat, and that had happened before. (repetitive)

- b. Sally hammered the metal flat, and the metal had been flat before. (restitutive)

This sentence has two readings, one reading is a repetitive reading in (5a), meaning that Sally hammered the metal flat and the action of hammering the metal flat was done by Sally before. The other reading is a restitutive meaning in (5b) meaning that Sally hammered the metal flat and the metal had been flat before, meaning the result state of metal's being flat is repeated.

Before going to the detailed explanation of the sentence in (5), we should first consider his analysis of the resultative construction (the result state in a restitutive reading).

- (6) Sally hammered the metal flat.

In this sentence, the verb *hammer* requires an argument of <e> type but comes across with a small clause *the metal flat*, which blocks the composition. To deal with this problem Stechow (1995) proposes a special principle of interpretation which allows the combination of a verb and a small clause to be composed together:

- (7) Principle (R) (Stechow 1995)

If $\alpha = [\text{v}\gamma \text{ }_{\text{sc}}\beta]$ and β' is of type <i,t> and γ' is of type <e,...<e,<i,t>>> (an n-place predicate), then $\alpha' = \lambda x_1 \dots \lambda x_n \lambda e. \gamma'_e(x_1) \dots (x_n) \ \& \ \exists e' [\text{BECOME}_e(\beta') \ \& \ \text{CAUSE}(e')(e)]$

In his Principle (R), Stechow (1995) assumes the standard component of BECOME from Dowty (1979) and CAUSE from Lewis (1973).

- (8) CAUSE-BECOME component:

- a. $[[\text{BECOME}]] (P)(e)$ iff e is the smallest event such that P is not true of the prestate of e but P is true of the result state of e.
- b. $[[\text{CAUSE}]] (e')(e)$ iff e' occurred, e occurred and if e hadn't

occurred then e' wouldn't have occurred.

With applying Principle (R), a sentence can have an interpretation such as 'there is an event of e which CAUSED a^1 (prestate of an event of e) to BECOME) a^2 (the result of an event e)'.

(9) a. Sally hammered the metal flat.

b. [[the metal] [1[_{VP} Sally [_V t1 [_V hammered [_{SC} PRO1 flat]]]]]

And when Principle (R) applies to Sentence (9), it will have the LF structure shown in (10), where there is an event of Sally's hammering the metal, and there is another event, which is from the small clause, *the metals being flat*. Here, the object NP *the metal* binds the PRO subject of the small clause (9b), and the resultative construction functions as an accomplishment predicate (Dowty 1979). The event of Sally's hammering the metal CAUSED the metal to BECOME flat.

(10) a. [_Vhammered [_{SC}PRO1 flat]]→

$\lambda x \lambda y \lambda e. \text{hammer}_e(x)(y) \& \exists e' [\text{BECOME}_{e'}(\lambda e''. \text{flat}_{e''}(x1)) \& \text{CAUSE}(e')(e)]$

b. [[the metal] [1[_{VP}Sally[_Vt1[_V hammered [_{SC}PRO1flat]]]]] →

$\lambda e. \text{hammer}_e(\text{the_metal})(S) \& \exists e' [\text{BECOME}_{e'}(\lambda e''. \text{flat}_{e''}(\text{the_metal})) \& \text{CAUSE}(e')(e)]$

'Sally's hammering the metal caused it to become flat.'

Given this analysis of the resultative construction, now we can consider the structure of the sentence of *again*.

(11) Sally hammered the metal flat again. (=5)

a. Sally hammered the metal flat, and that had happened before. (repetitive)

b. Sally hammered the metal flat, and the metal had been flat before. (restitutive)

As it was mentioned previously, the sentence in (11) is ambiguous. Let's see one by one how the two different readings are derived. Firstly, the repetitive reading is derived when *again* modifies the whole VP as it is given in (12a). (12a) has an interpretation in (12b), meaning that one more time there was an event of Sally's hammering the metal and it CAUSED the metal to BECOME flat.

- (12) a. $[_{VP} [the\ metal] [1[_{VP}[_{VP}\ Sally\ [_V\ t_1\ [_V\ hammered\ [_{SC}\ PRO_1\ flat]]]]\ again]]]$
 b. $\lambda e''.again_{e''}(\lambda e.hammer_e(t_m)(S) \ \& \ \exists e'[BECOME_{e'}(\lambda e'''.flat_{e'''}(t_m)) \ \& \ CAUSE(e')(e)])$
 c. Once more, Sally's hammering the metal caused it to become flat.

The restitutive reading in (11b) is derived when the result state (small clause) is modified by *again* as it is shown in (13a). This has an interpretation in (13b), meaning that there was an event of Sally's hammering the metal, which CAUSED the metal to BECOME flat one more time.

- (13)a. $[_{VP} [the\ metal] [1[_{VP}\ Sally\ [_V\ t_1\ [_V\ hammered\ [_{SC}\ [_{SC}\ PRO_1\ flat]again]]]]]]]$
 b. $\lambda e.hammer_e(t_m)(S) \ \& \ \exists e'[BECOME_{e'}(\lambda e''.again_{e''}(\lambda e'''.flat_{e'''}(t_m)) \ \& \ CAUSE(e')(e))]$
 c. Sally's hammering the metal caused it to become once more flat.

2.2. Lexical Theory

A lexical theory of 'again' assumes that *again* has two different interpretations in a language; one is repetitive 'again' and the other is restitutive 'again' (Fabricius-Hansen 1983, 1995, 2001). According to Fabricius-Hansen's (1983, 1995, 2001) lexical theory, if there is a counterdirectional event for one event², then a sentence adjoined with 'again' has a restitutive reading.

Beck (2005) explains the theory of Fabricius-Hansen as follows: counterdirectional 'again'

² If an event has an opposing event, this is called as counterdirectional event. For example, the counterdirectional event of the event 'door's being open' is 'door's being closed' event.

applies to a predicate of events P and an event; it presupposes that there is a preceding event of which the counterdirectional predicate P_c of P is true, and the result state res_{P_c} of which is the starting point, or prestate³ pre_P , for the new event, as shown below:

$$(14) \quad a. \text{'repetitive' } again: [[again1]](P)(e)=1 \text{ iff } P(e) \ \& \ \exists e'[e' < e \ \& \ P(e')] \\ =0 \text{ iff } \sim P(e) \ \& \ \exists e'[e' < e \ \& \ P(e')] \\ \text{undefined otherwise.}$$

$$b. \text{'restitutive' } again: [[again2]](P)(e)=1 \text{ iff } P(e) \ \& \ \exists e'[e' < e \ \& \\ P_c(e') \ \& \ res_{P_c}(e')=pre_P(e)] \\ =0 \text{ iff } \sim P(e) \ \& \ \exists e'[e' < e \ \& \\ P_c(e') \ \& \ res_{P_c}(e')=pre_P(e)] \\ \text{undefined otherwise.} \quad \quad \quad (\text{recited from Beck 2005})$$

The interpretation of a repetitive ‘repetitive’ *again* in (14a) is ‘there is an event of e and there is another event of e' which happened before the event of e ’. The event of e is the same as the event of e' . If this interpretation is suitable for a sentence with *again* then the sentence has a repetitive reading. Otherwise, it is undefined.

A sentence with the restitutive ‘restitutive’ *again* (14b) can be explained as follows: There are two events an event e and another event e' , which is happened before the event e . And the possible result state of the counterdirectional event is equal to the prestate of the event e . If a sentence with *again* can have such kind of interpretation then it has a restitutive reading.

The following example is provided by Beck (2005) to show how this lexical theory explains the restitutive reading.

(15) The temperature was falling all morning. Now it is rising again.

³ Prestate event is a preceding state of an event. For example, the prestate event of the ‘door’s being open’ is ‘door’s being closed’ event.

predicate P:	$\lambda e.\text{rise}_e(\text{the_temp})$	
counterdirectional predicate P_c :	$\lambda e.\text{fall}_e(\text{the_temp})$	
possible prestates of P, prep :	$\lambda s.\text{low}_s(\text{the_temp})$	
possible result states of P, resp :	$\lambda s.\text{high}_s(\text{the_temp})$	(Beck 2005)

In the example, there is an event of P which is the temperature rising event and this event of P has a counterdirectional event of P_c , the temperature falling event. The possible prestate of the event of P is the temperature being low and the possible result state of the event of P_c , the temperature's being high is equal to prestate of the event of P. Another example is shown in the following:

- (16) a. John opened the door again. (Beck 2005)
- b. $\lambda e.\text{open}_e(\text{the_door})(J) \ \& \ \exists e' [e' < e \ \& \ \text{close}_{e'}(\text{the_door})(J) \ \& \ \text{res}_{P_c}(e') = \text{prep}(e)]$
- c. predicate P: $\lambda e.\text{open}_e(\text{the_door})(J)$
- counterdirectional predicate P_c : $\lambda e.\text{close}_e(\text{the_door})(J)$
- possible prestates of P, prep : $\lambda s.\text{closed}_s(\text{the_door})$
- possible result states of P, resp : $\lambda s.\text{open}_s(\text{the_door})$

Like the example in (15), for (16) there is an event of opening the door and there is a counterdirectional event which is the door being closed and the possible prestate of the event of opening the door is the same as the result state of the closing event.

Fabricius-Hansen (2000) explained this theory with the example of *wieder* in (17):

- (17) Arnim hat ein Haus im Tessin, das er vor Jahren
Arnim has a house in Tessin, that he some years ago
Gekauft hatte, schon wieder verkauft.
bought had, already again sold

‘Arnim has already sold a house in Tessin (again) which he had bought a couple of years ago.’

(Fabricius-Hansen(2000))




Fig. 1

Fig.1 shows that there is an event which is Arnim’s selling the house ($\neg\text{POSSESS}(a, h)$) and there is another event e' , which is Arnim’s buying the house ($\text{POSSESS}(a, h)$) and happened before the event e . And the result state of event e' ($\text{POSSESS}(a, h)$) is identical with the prestate of the event e , since Arnim owned the house before selling it.

3. Semantic Properties of Yana

As it was mentioned earlier, *yana* is ambiguous and has two interpretations such as repetitive and restitutive, as repeated below:

(18) a. Suresh eshik-ni *yana* och-di. (=4)

Suresh door-ACC *again* open-ed

‘Suresh opened the door again.’

b. Mary opened the door, and that had happened before. (repetitive)

c. Mary opened the door, and the door had been open before. (restitutive)

According to the crosslinguistic research by Beck (2005), not all languages allow a restitutive reading with the adverb ‘again’. To check whether a language allows a restitutive reading or not, Beck (2005) performed a crosslinguistical survey. However, Uzbek language was not among the languages which were discussed in Beck (2005). In this section, I will investigate the semantic properties of *yana* more in detail in comparison with English *again*.

3.1. *Yana* with different types of predicates

It is known only accomplishment/achievement types of predicates allow a restitutive reading with *again*, as shown below:

(19) Mary opened the door again. (=1)

- a. Mary opened the door and it had happened before.
- b. Mary opened the door and the door had been open before.

The Uzbek counterpart of the sentence in (19), is given in (20a). Just like (19), the sentence in (20a) allows a restitutive reading in the context (20b).

(20) a. Salli *yana* eshik-ni ochdi.

Sally again door-Acc. opened.

‘Sally opened the door again.’

- b. Sally built a wardrobe. The last thing she made was the door. She set it on its hinges and it looked fine. But when she closed the door, it didn’t quite fit. So she *opened it again* and took it off to sand the edges. (Only restitutive reading is available with this context)

(adopted from Beck (2005))

Observing the sentence in (20a) with the given context in (20b) we can say *yana* allows the ambiguity

when it occurs with an accomplishment predicate, just like English. It should be noted that not every predicate allows the ambiguity with *again* in English as shown in (21), but accomplishment/achievement type predicates only.

(21) a. Sally slept/walked in the park again. (Beck 2005)

b. Sally slept/walked in the park, and she had done that before. (repetitive)

c. #Sally slept/walked in the park, and she had been there before. (restitutive)

Sentence (21a) does not have a restitutive reading as the verbs *walk* and *sleep* are activity predicates, not achievement/accomplishment predicates.

It seems this pattern is also shared in the Uzbek language; not all predicates allow the ambiguous reading, as shown in (22). The sentence in (22a) which is the counterpart of (21a) is unambiguous and has only one reading which is repetitive, (22b).

(22) a. Salli *yana* park-da uxladi/yurdi.

Sally again park-in slept/walked.

‘Sally slept/walked in the park again.’

b. Sally slept/walked in the park, and she had done that before. (repetitive)

c. #Sally slept/walked in the park, and she had been there before. (restitutive)

As it was just presented above, activity predicates do not allow ambiguity with the adverb *again*. However, when an activity verb is joined with a directional Preposition Phrase (PP) in a sentence, it becomes an accomplishment predicate and has a result state available as shown in (23):

(23) Paul walked to the summit.

The sentence has a result involving interpretation such as ‘Paul’s walking caused him to be at the summit’.

Now, let’s see how we can check whether ‘an activity verb + goal (directional) PP Construction’, which is called as goal PPC, acts as an accomplishment predicate or not in a language. It is widely known that accomplishment predicates can be modified by *in*-phrase in English, since they are telic. Therefore, we can assume that if ‘an activity verb + goal (directional) PP Construction’ can be modified by *in*-phrase, it can act as accomplishment predicate in a language.

The sentence in (24a) is ungrammatical because ‘walk’ is an activity verb and cannot be modified by *in*-phrases. However, when we add a directional/locative PP to the activity verb, the sentence becomes grammatical with the modification of *in*-phrase as it is shown in (24b). In English, ‘activity verb + directional (goal) PP’ acts as an accomplishment predicate and involves a result state. However, as pointed out by Beck (2005), this varies crosslinguistically (please refer to Beck (2005)).

(24) a. * Paul walked in an hour.

b. Paul walked to the summit in an hour. (Beck 2005)

It seems that this observed pattern is also shared in Uzbek. As shown in (25), an activity verb *yurdi* which means ‘walked’, cannot be modified by ‘*in*’-phrase in the Uzbek language either. However, when we add a goal PP such as *sammitga*, ‘to the summit’, the sentence becomes possible with the *in*-phrase, shown in (26).

(25) *Paul bir soat-da yur-di.

Paul one hour-in walk-ed.

‘*Paul walked in an hour.’

(26) Paul bir soat-da sammit-ga bor-di.

Paul one hour-in summit-to (Prep.) walk-ed.

‘Paul walked to the summit in an hour.’

The available meaning of this sentence is ‘It took one hour to go to summit and at the end of this hour Paul was at the summit’.

Another point observed by Aske (1989) is that the effect of goal PPC is related with the directional preposition ‘to’, which gives an effect to an activity verb to be an accomplishment predicate. Aske (1989) stated that verb of motion combined with a purely locative PP gives rise to a directional/locative ambiguity in English, but can only be locative in some languages such as Spanish. The following sentence (27a) is grammatical in English as ‘swim + under the bridge’ an accomplishment predicate and can be modified by *in*-phrase, but it is ungrammatical in Spanish (27b).

(27) a. John swam under the bridge in an hour. (Beck 2005)

b. Juan nadó debajo del puente (*en una hora).

‘Juan swam under the bridge (in an hour)’

The phenomenon that the directional preposition ‘to’ gives an effect to a verb to be an accomplishment verb is also shared with the Uzbek language as the particle ‘-ga’ in Uzbek language (which is correspondent to the preposition ‘to’) also has directional/locative meaning. But it seems that this does not work with all prepositions in Uzbek, as we see in (29). The sentence in (28) is grammatical without *in*-phrase but cannot be modified with *in*-phrase as shown in (29). The unavailability of the sentence in (29) with *in*-phrase clearly shows that in Uzbek a preposition *ostida* ‘under’ does not have a directional meaning and an activity verb adjoined with *ostida* ‘under’ is not an accomplishment predicate. I suggest that the problem is in the meaning of the preposition in the Uzbek language because *ostida* which is ‘under’ has locative meaning only and it seems in Uzbek language a locative preposition is not able to make an accomplishment predicate with an activity verb like Spanish.

(28) Jon koprik *ostida* suzdi.

John bridge under swam.

‘John swam under the bridge.’

(29) ?Huan koprik *ostida* bir soat-da suz-di.

Huan bridge under one hour-in swam.

‘Juan swam under the bridge in an hour.’

Now, let’s see how a restitutive reading is derived in a goal PP construction with a context. The Uzbek counterpart of the English sentence in (30a) is checked with the context in (30b), which allows a restitutive reading only:

(30)

a. *Suresh walked to the village again*

b. Suresh was born in a tiny village on a mountain top in Nepal. It is accessible only by a footpath through the mountains. He left the village for the first time when he was ten and went to school in the city for twelve years without going home. He *walked to the village again* when he was 22.

(Beck 2005)

c. Suresh *yana* qishloq-qa bor-di.

Suresh again village-Dat. walk-ed.

‘Suresh walked to the village again.’

Sentence (30c) perfectly fits with the context given in (30b), which proves the possibility of a restitutive reading in goal PPC with *yana* in Uzbek. All the example data in Uzbek presented in this paper were tested by native speakers. Anonymous judgments were collected from 7 native speakers of Uzbek and no mixed judgements were observed.

This section showed that English and Uzbek shares the same pattern mostly in the case of type of predicates allowing a restitutive reading with goal PP constructions, accomplishment/achievement type of predicates and blocking with the activity ones. A little difference were observed in the case of goal PP Constructions, as in English ‘activity + goal PP’ accomplishment predicates can be obtained by directional and locative prepositions, while in Uzbek it is possible with directional prepositions only.

3.2. *Yana* in different syntactic positions

Again may occur in various positions in a sentence as shown in (31).

(31) a. Mary opened the door *again*.

b. Mary *again* opened the door.

c. *Again* Mary opened the door.

(Pederson (2015))

Now let's consider the interpretations of the sentences given above. The sentence in (31a), where *again* comes after the direct object, has two interpretations: a repetitive and a restitutive reading. On the other hand, when *again* precedes the verb and follows the subject, it allows a repetitive reading only, as shown in (31b). Moreover 'again' can come in a sentence initial position, as in (31c), and when it appears in this position, like (31b), it blocks a restitutive reading and allows a repetitive reading only.

Yana also can appear in different positions in a sentence, as it is shown below.

(32) a. Meri eshik-ni *yana* och-di.

b. Meri *yana* eshik-ni ochdi.

c. *Yana*, Meri eshik-ni ochdi.

'Mary opened the door again'

Here let's see whether the interpretation of *again* is affected by different syntactic positions as in English. It is observed that *yana* does not have a different interpretation depending on the position in a sentence. All sentences in (32) have a repetitive reading such as 'Mary opened the door and it had happened before', and a restitutive reading such as 'Mary opened the door and the state of the door's being open had happened before'.

The observed data for the different syntactic positions of *yana* in Uzbek and *again* in English show

that they do not have the same properties related to the syntactic locations in a sentence.

3.3. Does Uzbek fit into Beck's (2005) Generalization?

According to Beck's generalization, if a language has the resultative construction, it allows the result state. Based on this, Beck (2005) divided the languages into (+ R) and (-R). (+ R) languages allow the CAUSE and BECOME component to turn an event into an accomplishment predicate when the result state is added. On the other hand, (-R) languages do not allow the result state. Related to the Principle (R), Stechow (1995) and Beck (2005) said the availability of this interpretation principle may vary in different languages. The goal PPCs act as accomplishment predicates in (+ R) languages, while in (- R) languages goal PPs are not accomplishment predicates. The observed crosslinguistic pattern is presented below:

(33)

language	(R)- parameter	Goal + Temporal in PP
English	+	ok
German	+	ok
Japanese	(+)	ok
Korean	+	ok
French	-	-
Hebrew	-	-
Spanish	-	-

In the table (33) the languages with (+) and Ok allows a restitutive 'again' in a sentence.

The question which arises here is: Does Uzbek fit into this crosslinguistic pattern? And given that we have already observed that *yana* in Uzbek allows ambiguity, it is expected that Uzbek allows the resultative construction. This prediction is born out considering the following example:

(34) Salli metal-ni tekis bolgala-di

Sally metal-Acc. flat hammer-ed

‘Sally hammered the metal flat.’

This Uzbek sentence is the counterpart of ‘Sally hammered the metal flat’, and means ‘Sally’s hammering the metal caused the metal to become flat’.

Considering that this sentence also allows a resultative state just like English one, we can conclude that the Uzbek language fits into Beck’s generalization, since it allows the resultative state and has a restitutive reading of ‘again’.

4. The Analysis

The observed facts about the Uzbek adverb *yana* are:

- *Yana* allows ambiguity like *again* in English,
- The sentence of *yana* is ambiguous when it contains an achievement/accomplishment predicate.
- *Yana* sustains its ambiguity in different syntactic positions.
- Uzbek, as a (+R) language, follows Beck’s Generalization.

Now, taking into consideration all the properties given above, the question is how the ambiguity of *yana* in Uzbek can be explained. Firstly, I will apply a structural theory (Stechow 1995, 1996, Beck 2005) to *yana* considering that Uzbek language is a (+R) language. According to the structural theory, the ambiguity of ‘again’ lies in different sentence structures. When ‘again’ modifies the whole VP, the repetitive reading is obtained, and when ‘again’ modifies the result state only, the restitutive reading is derived. Stechow (1995) suggested this accounts for the word order effect in German, saying when *wieder* precedes the object only the repetitive reading is possible.

(35) Ali Baba Sesam wieder offnete. (restitutive/repetitive) (Stechow 1996)

Subj Obj again opened

(36) All Baba wieder Sesam offnete. (only repetitive) (Stechow 1996)

Subj again Obj opened

Stechow (1995,1996) claimed that the sentence in (35) has the LF in (37) with two possible positions of *wieder*, which gives an interpretation of either repetitive or restitutive reading.

(37) SpecAgrO **again** [_{VP}Ali Baba **again**[_{SC} Sesame open] CAUSE] (Stechow 1996)

Meanwhile, the sentence in (36) has the following structure with one available position of ‘again’, and only the repetitive reading is derived.

(38) **again** [_{AgO-P} SpecAgrO [_{VP} Ali Baba [_{SC} Sesame open] CAUSE] (Stechow 1996)

Based on the structural account of German case, it is expected that *yana* should have the following structures:

(39) a. Ali Bobo sim-sim-ni *yana* och-di

Subj. Obj. again opened

b. SpecAgrO **yana** [_{VP}Ali Baba **yana**[_{SC} Sesame open] CAUSE] (adopted from Stechow(1996))

(40) a. Ali Bobo *yana* sim-simni ochdi.

Subj again Obj. opened.

b. **yana** [_{AgO-P} SpecAgrO [_{VP} Ali Baba [_{SC} Sesame open] CAUSE] (adopted from Stechow (1996))

However, the property of *yana* in Uzbek are different from the case of German and English, as *yana* maintains its ambiguity regardless of the change of the position in a sentence. When German *wieder*

changes its position as in (36), it blocks a restitutive reading, and has the LF given in (38). As we already observed earlier, *yana* ‘again’ did not change its meaning by changing its surface position. Therefore, a sentence with *yana* cannot have the LF given in (40) only. The sentence in (40a) has a repetitive reading and also a restitutive reading. Therefore, we can say that the structural approach cannot capture all the features of *yana* as it allows both readings; The structural approach is insufficient to explain the twofold readings of *yana* in Uzbek, and therefore a substitute solution will be needed.

As an alternative account, I suggest that a lexical approach applies to the case of *yana*. Specifically, I implement Fabricius–Hansen's (2001) lexical analysis of ‘again’ to account for the semantic behavior of *yana*. According to the lexical theory of Fabricius–Hansen, there are two lexical denotations for ‘again’, one with restitutive reading and another with repetitive reading. Fabricius–Hansen claimed that the existence of a restitutive reading can be proved by the existence of a reversal event to an event. Adopting the lexical approach, I propose that *yana* has two different interpretation and following denotations:

(41) a. 'repetitive' *yana*: $[[yana_{rep}]](P)(e) = 1$ iff $P(e) \ \&$

$$\exists e'[e' < e \ \& \ P(e')]$$

$$= 0 \text{ iff } \sim P(e) \ \& \ \exists e'[e' < e \ \& \ P(e')]$$

undefined otherwise.

b. 'restitutive' *yana*: $[[yana_{restit.}]](P)(e) = 1$ iff $P(e) \ \& \ \exists e'[e' < e \ \&$

$$P(e') \ \& \ resP(e') = preP(e)]$$

$$= 0 \text{ iff } \sim P(e) \ \& \ \exists e'[e' < e \ \&$$

$$P(e') \ \& \ resP(e') = preP(e)]$$

undefined otherwise.

(adopted from Fabricius–Hansen (1983))

Firstly, let's consider the restitutive reading of *yana* with accomplishment/achievement predicates. An example is presented below:

(42) a. Suresh eshik–ni yana och–di.

Suresh door-ACC. again open-ed

‘Suresh opened the door again.’

b. $\lambda e. \text{open } e \text{ (the_door)(S)} \ \& \ \exists e' [e' < e \ \& \ \text{close } e' \text{ (the_door)(S)} \ \& \ \text{res } P_c(e') = \text{pre } P(e)]$

Sentence (42) has an interpretation such as there is an event of P , which is the door's being open and there is another counterdirectional event of P_c , the door's being closed and the possible prestate of the event of P is equal to the possible result state of the event of P_c .

A repetitive meaning of sentence (42a) is: There is an event e and there is another event e' . The event e' happened before the event e , and the event e is the same as the event e' . The repetitive meaning has the following denotation:

(43) $\lambda e. \text{open } e \text{ (the_door)(S)} \ \& \ \exists e' [e' < e \ \& \ e(\text{open (the_door)}e')]$

With proposed lexical denotations of *yana* in (41), the two readings of the sentence in (44a) one derived as in (44b) – (44c).

(44) a. Suresh eshik-ni yana och-di.

Suresh door-ACC. again open-ed

‘Suresh opened the door again.’

b. repetitive reading: $[[[VP[VP \text{ open the door (S)}] \text{yana}_{\text{rep}} e']]] =$

$\lambda e: e' < e \ \& \ \text{open (the_door)(S)}(e'). \text{open (the_door)(S)}(e)$

c. restitutive reading: $[[[VP[VP \text{ open the door (S)}] \text{yana}_{\text{restit.}} e']]] =$

$\lambda e: e' < e \ \& \ \text{close (the_door)(S)}(e'). \text{open (the_door)(S)}(e)$

As it was observed earlier, the position of *yana* is flexible in a sentence and sustains its ambiguity regardless of its surface position, repeated in (57). This pattern cannot be explained by a structural approach as the ambiguity of *yana* does not change depending on its position. On the other hand, the lexical approach can capture this phenomenon. Based on the lexical theory, we can assume

that there are two *yanas* in Uzbek: the repetitive *yana* and the restitutive *yana*, which respectively derive the repetitive interpretation and the restitutive interpretation.

(45)

a. Meri eshik-ni *yana* och-di. (=32)

b. Meri *yana* eshik-ni ochdi.

c. *Yana*, Meri eshik-ni ochdi.

‘Mary opened the door again’

(adopted from Stechow (1996))

To sum up, I propose that *yana* has two different interpretations in the Uzbek language adopting a lexical approach of ‘again’.

5. Conclusion

In this thesis the semantic behavior of Uzbek *yana* has been observed and analyzed. From the observation and analyses given above I conclude that the ambiguity of Uzbek *yana* cannot be explained by the structural theory because its position is flexible in a sentence but maintains its ambiguity regardless of its position in a sentence. Even though the structural theory works well for some languages such as German it cannot provide a proper account to explain the ambiguity of *yana* in the Uzbek language. Given this, as an alternative solution, I suggested that *yana* has two interpretations and the lexical approach can account for the observed phenomena better.

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