

**THE STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE  
JUDICIAL BRANCH**

<http://www.courts.state.nh.us>

**RULE 7 NOTICE OF DISCRETIONARY APPEAL**

This form should be used only for an appeal from a final decision on the merits issued by a superior court or circuit court in (1) a post-conviction review proceeding; (2) a proceeding involving the collateral challenge to a conviction or sentence; (3) a sentence modification or suspension proceeding; (4) an imposition of sentence proceeding; (5) a parole revocation proceeding; (6) a probation revocation proceeding; (7) a landlord/tenant action or a possessory action filed under RSA chapter 540; (8) an order denying a motion to intervene; or (9) a domestic relations matter filed under RSA chapters 457 to 461-A, except that an appeal from a final divorce decree or from a decree of legal separation should be filed on a Rule 7 Notice of Mandatory Appeal form.

**1. COMPLETE CASE TITLE AND CASE NUMBERS IN TRIAL COURT**

In Re Trusts Under The Will of Mary Baker G. Eddy, Trust Docket Case No. 317-1910-TU-001

**2. COURT APPEALED FROM AND NAME OF JUDGE(S) WHO ISSUED DECISION(S)**

7<sup>th</sup> Circuit Court, Probate Division, Dover, Trust Docket; The Honorable David D. King

**3A. NAME AND MAILING ADDRESS OF APPEALING PARTY. IF REPRESENTING SELF, PROVIDE E-MAIL ADDRESS AND TELEPHONE NUMBER**

Second Church of Christ, Scientist, Melbourne (Australia)

41 Cookson Street

Camberwell, VIC 3124

Australia

E-Mail address: Not Applicable

Telephone number: Not Applicable

**3B. NAME, FIRM NAME, MAILING ADDRESS, E-MAIL ADDRESS AND TELEPHONE NUMBER OF APPEALING PARTY'S COUNSEL**

Michele E. Kenney, NH Bar No. 19333

Pierce Atwood LLP

One New Hampshire Avenue

Suite 350

Portsmouth, NH 03801

E-Mail address: mkenney@pierceatwood.com

Telephone number: (603) 633-4300

**RULE 7 NOTICE OF DISCRETIONARY APPEAL**

4A. NAME AND MAILING ADDRESS OF OPPOSING PARTY. IF OPPOSING PARTY IS REPRESENTING SELF, PROVIDE E-MAIL ADDRESS AND TELEPHONE NUMBER

Trustees of the Trusts Under The Will of Mary Baker G.

Eddy, Clause VI and Clause VIII

c/o The First Church of Christ ,Scientist

210 Massachusetts Avenue

Boston, MA 02115

E-Mail address: Not Applicable

Telephone number: Not Applicable

4B. NAME, FIRM NAME, MAILING ADDRESS, E-MAIL ADDRESS AND TELEPHONE NUMBER OF OPPOSING PARTY'S COUNSEL

James F. Raymond, NH Bar No. 2111

Michael P. Courtney, NH Bar No. 21150

Upton & Hatfield, LLP

10 Centre Street

P.O. Box 1090

Concord, NH 03302-1090

E-Mail address: jraymond@uptonhatfield.com

mcourtney@upton-hatfield.com

Telephone number: (603) 224-7791

5. NAMES OF ALL OTHER PARTIES AND COUNSEL IN TRIAL COURT

New Hampshire Department of Justice

Office of the Attorney General

Charitable Trusts Unit

33 Capitol Street

Concord, NH 03301-6397

Represented by Thomas J. Donovan, Director of Charitable Trusts, NH Bar No. 664

6. DATE OF CLERK'S NOTICE OF DECISION OR SENTENCING.

March 19, 2018

DATE OF CLERK'S NOTICE OF DECISION ON POST-TRIAL MOTION, IF ANY.

May 3, 2018 and May 17, 2018

7. CRIMINAL CASES: DEFENDANT'S SENTENCE AND BAIL STATUS

Not Applicable

8. APPELLATE DEFENDER REQUESTED? ☐ YES ☒ NO

IF YOUR ANSWER IS YES, YOU MUST CITE STATUTE OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY UPON WHICH CRIMINAL LIABILITY WAS BASED AND ATTACH FINANCIAL AFFIDAVIT (OCC FORM 4)

Not Applicable

9. IS ANY PART OF CASE CONFIDENTIAL? ☐ YES ☒ NO

IF SO, IDENTIFY WHICH PART AND CITE AUTHORITY FOR CONFIDENTIALITY.  
SEE SUPREME COURT RULE 12.

Not Applicable

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10. IF ANY PARTY IS A CORPORATION LIST THE NAMES OF PARENTS, SUBSIDIARIES AND AFFILIATES.

Not Applicable

11. DO YOU KNOW OF ANY REASON WHY ONE OR MORE OF THE SUPREME COURT JUSTICES WOULD BE DISQUALIFIED FROM THIS CASE? ☐ YES ☒ NO

IF YOUR ANSWER IS YES, YOU MUST FILE A MOTION FOR RECUSAL IN ACCORDANCE WITH SUPREME COURT RULE 21A.

12. IS A TRANSCRIPT OF TRIAL COURT PROCEEDINGS NECESSARY FOR THIS APPEAL?

☒ YES ☐ NO

IF YOUR ANSWER IS YES, YOU MUST COMPLETE THE TRANSCRIPT ORDER FORM ON PAGE 4 OF THIS FORM.

13. NATURE OF CASE AND RESULT (Limit two pages double-spaced; please attach.)

**See *infra* pp. 6-7.**

14. ISSUES ON APPEAL (Limit eight pages double-spaced; please attach.)

The New Hampshire Supreme Court reviews each discretionary notice of appeal and decides whether to accept the case, or some issues in the case, for appellate review. The following acceptance criteria, while neither controlling nor fully describing the court's discretion, indicate the character of the reasons that will be considered.

1. The case raises a question of first impression, a novel question of law, an issue of broad public interest, an important state or federal constitutional matter, or an issue on which there are conflicting decisions in New Hampshire courts.
2. The decision below conflicts with a statute or with prior decisions of this court.
3. The decision below is erroneous, illegal, and unreasonable or was an unsustainable exercise of discretion.

Separately number each issue you are appealing and for each issue: (a) state the issue; (b) explain why the acceptance criteria listed above support acceptance of that issue; and (c) if a ground for appeal is legal sufficiency of evidence include a succinct statement of why the evidence is alleged to be insufficient as a matter of law.

**See *infra* pp. 8-14.**

15. ATTACHMENTS

Attach to this notice of appeal the following documents in order: (1) a copy of the trial court decision or order from which you are appealing; (2) the clerk's notice of the decision below; (3) any court order deciding a timely post-trial motion; and (4) the clerk's notice of any order deciding a timely post-trial motion.

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Do not attach any other documents to this notice of appeal. Any other documents you wish to submit must be included in a separately bound Appendix, which must have a table of contents on the cover and consecutively numbered pages.

**See *infra* pp. 15-64.**

**16. CERTIFICATIONS**

I hereby certify that every issue specifically raised has been presented to the court below and has been properly preserved for appellate review by a contemporaneous objection or, where appropriate, by a properly filed pleading.

Michèle E. Kenney  
Appealing Party or Counsel

I hereby certify that on or before the date below, copies of this notice of appeal were served on all parties to the case and were filed with the clerk of the court from which the appeal is taken in accordance with Rule 26(2).

June 1, 2018  
Date

Michèle E. Kenney  
Appealing Party or Counsel

**RULE 7 NOTICE OF DISCRETIONARY APPEAL****TRANSCRIPT ORDER FORM**

## INSTRUCTIONS:

1. If a transcript is necessary for your appeal, you must complete this form.
2. List each portion of the proceedings that must be transcribed for appeal, e.g., entire trial (see Supreme Court Rule 15(3)), motion to suppress hearing, jury charge, etc., and provide information requested.
3. Determine the amount of deposit required for each portion of the proceedings and the total deposit required for all portions listed. Do not send the deposit to the Supreme Court. You will receive an order from the Supreme Court notifying you of the deadline for paying the deposit amount to the court transcriber. Failure to pay the deposit by the deadline may result in the dismissal of your appeal.
4. The transcriber will produce a digitally-signed electronic version of the transcript for the Supreme Court, which will be the official record of the transcribed proceedings. The court also will be provided with a paper copy of the transcript. The parties will be provided with an electronic copy of the transcript in PDF-A format.

**PROCEEDINGS TO BE TRANSCRIBED**

PROCEEDING DATE (List each day separately, e.g. 5/1/11; 5/2/11; 6/30/11)	TYPE OF PROCEEDING (Motion hearing, opening statement, trial day 2, etc.)	NAME OF JUDGE	LENGTH OF PROCEEDING (in .5 hour segments, e.g., 1.5 hours, 8 hours)	RATE (standard rate unless ordered by Supreme Court)	DEPOSIT
				X \$137.50	\$
				X \$137.50	\$
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				X \$137.50	\$
				X \$137.50	\$
				<b>TOTAL DEPOSIT</b>	<b>\$</b>

**PROCEEDINGS PREVIOUSLY TRANSCRIBED**

PROCEEDING DATE (List date of each transcript volume)	TYPE OF PROCEEDING (Motion hearing, opening statement, trial day 2, etc.)	NAME OF JUDGE	NAME OF TRANSCRIBER	DO ALL PARTIES HAVE COPY (YES OR NO)	DEPOSIT FOR ADDITIONAL COPIES
<u>11/3/17</u>	<u>Motion Hearing</u>	<u>David D. King</u>	<u>eScribers, LLC,</u> <u>By: Melissa Looney, CET-607</u>	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> No	<u>TBD</u>
				<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	TBD
				<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	TBD

**NOTE:** The deposit is an estimate of the transcript cost. After the transcript has been completed, you will be required to pay an additional amount if the final cost of the transcript exceeds the deposit. Any amount paid as a deposit in excess of the final cost will be refunded. The transcript will not be released to the parties until the final cost of the transcript is paid in full.

**NO. 13: THE NATURE OF THE CASE AND RESULT**

This appeal raises important questions of first impression in New Hampshire concerning the doctrine of special interest standing to enforce charitable trusts; the subject trusts being the testamentary trusts established under Clause VI and Clause VIII of the Will of Mary Baker G. Eddy ("Mrs. Eddy"), the founder of the religion of Christian Science, upon her death in 1910 (the "Clause VI Trust" and "Clause VIII Trust," respectively, and "Trusts," collectively). The Trusts are of great historical and continuing significance, as they were the subject of this Court's rulings from over a century ago. See *Glover v. Baker*, 76 N.H. 393 (1912); *Fernald v. First Church of Christ, Scientist*, 77 N.H. 108 (1913). In *Fernald*, this Court followed the prescient admission of New Hampshire Attorney General James P. Tuttle that the Directors of The First Church of Christ, Scientist (the "Mother Church"), should not serve alone as trustees of the Trusts. As Attorney General Tuttle observed:

the interests of those of New Hampshire may be better protected by the appointment of one or more New Hampshire trustees who either profess, or are not hostile to, the belief [Mrs. Eddy] desired to promote, to act in conjunction with these five directors [of The Mother Church] and their successors under such bonds to the Probate Court as may be determined reasonable.<sup>1</sup>

Thus, beginning in 1913, the administration of the Trusts was carried out under the supervision of a New Hampshire trustee, that is, until his death in 1949. Since then, the Trusts have been administered, in the absence of an independent trustee, by the Directors of The Mother Church who are impermissibly conflicted and who have taken hostile actions to the detriment of the Trusts.

Specifically, this appeal concerns the standing of Appellant, Second Church of Christ, Scientist, Melbourne (Australia) ("Second Church"), a branch church of the religion of Christian Science, to participate in proceedings of the Trust Docket, Probate Division of the 7th Circuit Court ("Probate Court"), seeking to restore the Trusts in respect of Mrs. Eddy's intentions. The Clause VI Trust bequeathed an endowment to the Directors of The Mother Church, for the purpose of educating Christian Scientists. The Clause VIII Trust bequeathed the residue of Mrs. Eddy's estate to The Mother Church, in trust, "for the purpose of more effectually promoting and extending the religion of Christian Science as taught by [Mrs. Eddy]." See Order (King, J.), dated Mar. 19, 2018 ("March 2018 Order"), at 5.

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<sup>1</sup> Brief for the State, *Fernald v. First Church of Christ, Scientist*, N.H. Sup. Ct. Case No. 1122 (1913 Term) at 8. See App. 12-13, 32.

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Second Church's participation and filings in this matter have again illuminated the embedded conflict of interest suffered by the Trustees of the Clause VIII Trust (the "Trustees"), in that they all also serve as Directors of The Mother Church without the supervision of a New Hampshire trustee and have treated The Mother Church as the sole *de facto* beneficiary of the Clause VIII Trust, rather than fulfilling its charitable purpose of promoting and extending the religion of Christian Science as taught by Mrs. Eddy.<sup>2</sup> Further, Second Church shined a light on the Trustees' breaches of fiduciary duty, flagrant self-dealing, and other acts of misconduct. See, e.g., App. 5-22, 33-37, 52-134, 221-29, 278-84. The Probate Court acknowledged the Trustees' embedded conflict of interest, and found that the Trustees have engaged in certain misconduct. See March 2018 Order at 19-20, 27-29, 34. The Probate Court aptly noted that the Director of Charitable Trusts ("DCT") has been, "at times, arguably deficient" in carrying out the Office of the Attorney General's statutory duty to supervise the administration of these Trusts. March 2018 Order at 20. Indeed, in the absence of the New Hampshire trustee the DCT has proven ineffective in policing these conflicted Trustees and enforcing the Trusts.

But the Probate Court has relegated Second Church to the role of a sometimes *amicus curiae*, rather than granting Second Church special interest standing to participate and take steps necessary to ensure the proper administration of the Trusts by being heard in connection with its motion for the appointment of an independent trustee, among other things. See App. at 52-98. Applying the so-called *Blasko* test developed from the leading article on special interest standing,<sup>3</sup> the Probate Court, among other things, erroneously found that Second Church lacked standing and denied its requests for post-decision relief. See March 2018 Order; Order, dated May 3, 2018; and Order, dated May 14, 2018 (collectively, the "Orders").

In the absence of this Court's review and reversal of the Probate Court's Orders, these charitable Trusts will continue to be administered by conflicted Trustees, without meaningful oversight and supervision already directed by this Court that is necessary to protect the public's interests and fulfill Mrs. Eddy's intent.

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<sup>2</sup> The embedded inherent conflict of interest was recognized by this Court from the beginning, see *Fernald*, 77 N.H. 108 (1913), yet following Fernald's passing, the Probate Court permitted the Trustees to serve unsupervised by a New Hampshire trustee. See March 2018 Order at 7; App. 206-07.

<sup>3</sup> See Mary Grace Blasko, *et al.*, *Standing to Sue in the Charitable Sector*, 28 U.S.F. L. REV. 37 (1993).

**No. 14: ISSUES ON APPEAL**

Second Church respectfully submits that the issues presented herein are properly the subject of a mandatory appeal under Rule 7(1)(A), and accordingly is filing contemporaneously herewith a Rule 7 Notice of Mandatory Appeal. In the event the Court determines that appellate review of the following issues is reserved to its discretion, for the reasons that follow, Second Church urges the Court to undertake review of the issues presented below.

**Issue No. 1**

**A. The Issue**

Whether the Probate Court erred in holding that Second Church, a branch church of the religion of Christian Science, lacks special interest standing to request certain affirmative relief in Probate Court proceedings concerning the charitable Trusts created under Clause VI and Clause VIII of the Will of Mary Baker G. Eddy, when Second Church has demonstrated that:

- i. all of the current Trustees suffer from an embedded conflict of interest that is impermissible under applicable law;
- ii. the Trustees have repeatedly breached their fiduciary duties with respect to the Trusts and acted in bad faith;
- iii. the remedies sought by Second Church are carefully tailored to remedy the Trustees' breaches and ensure that the Trusts are managed properly and in accordance with Mrs. Eddy's intent, including a request that the Probate Court appoint an independent trustee to the Clause VIII Trust pursuant to its authority under RSA 564-B:7-704(e) [Vacancy in Trusteeship; Appointment of Successor];
- iv. the New Hampshire Attorney General, through the Director of Charitable Trusts, has been ineffective in policing the Trustees' misconduct and in monitoring and enforcing remedial measures ordered by the Probate Court;
- v. Second Church is part of a defined class of entities that bear a special relationship with the Trusts, as it is one of a defined number of branch churches of the religion of Christian Science, has extensive knowledge of the Trusts, is a potential beneficiary of the Trusts but has not sought any award of a grant or other distribution from the Trust,



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has expended considerable resources performing diligence in respect of the Trustees' embedded conflict and misconduct, has a longstanding devotion to the religion of Christian Science and is not hostile to the Trusts, and receives a benefit, separate from the benefits to the general public, of seeing its religion flourish and the Church's beliefs expand according to the wishes of Mrs. Eddy; and

- vi. conferring special interest standing on Second Church would be socially desirable, given the worldwide impact of the Trusts in the expansion and promotion of the religion of Christian Science as taught by Mrs. Eddy.

**B. The Supreme Court Should Hear this Issue on Appeal**

This appeal presents important questions of first impression that are of broad public interest. The Supreme Court has yet to address whether a third party with special interests may have standing to enforce a charitable trust and, if so, what standards are to be applied in making that determination. Courts across the country have granted special interest standing, drawing on support for the doctrine in treatises as well as the leading law review article on standing to enforce charitable trusts, Mary Grace Blasko, *et al.*, *Standing to Sue in the Charitable Sector*, 28 U.S.F. L. REV. 37 (1993). Applying the so-called *Blasko* test for special interest standing here, the Probate Court (King, J.) reached the wrong result.

The Probate Court acknowledged the Trustees' embedded conflict of interest and certain "misconduct," as well as the DCT's historically "arguably deficient" oversight of the Trusts (March 2018 Order at 19, 20), but erred in declining to grant Second Church special interest standing to seek relief tailored to address the Trustees' breaches of fiduciary duty and ensure that the Trusts are managed properly and in accordance with Mrs. Eddy's intent. The Probate Court's decision rests on a misapplication of the *Blasko* test, and subsidiary errors of law. For example, the Probate Court failed to accord proper weight to the Trustees' embedded conflict of interest and history of self-dealing in contravention of applicable law, engendered by their dual role as Directors of The Mother Church, who have, contrary to their fiduciary duties as Trustees, administered the Clause VIII Trust as though it were a gift to The Mother Church, and not for its charitable purposes of "promoting and extending the religion of Christian Science as taught by [Mrs. Eddy]." Rather, the Probate Court misplaced its focus on the nature of the remedies sought by Second Church, rather than on the extraordinary nature of the Trustees' bad

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acts and the ineffectiveness and incapacity of the DCT in monitoring and enforcing remedial measures previously ordered by the Probate Court. The few remedial measures now ordered by the Probate Court to address the Trustees' embedded conflict of interest, while appreciated by Second Church, fall far short of the ongoing protections necessary to safeguard the public's interests in the Trusts, and the Probate Court has overlooked facts in the record that show the DCT's ineffectiveness at enforcing and supervising the conflicted Trustees in their administration of these public Trusts, as well as the DCT's admitted incapacity in all matters as to which the Trustees or Directors assert First Amendment privileges.

The Trusts have deep historical and continuing significance, as Mrs. Eddy intended them to be perpetual and play an important role in the education of Christian Scientists and the promotion and extension of the religion of Christian Science as taught by her. Indeed, the Trusts have worldwide impact — branch churches, reading rooms, and other potential beneficiaries are located throughout the world. The Trusts also hold significant assets, with combined principal balances exceeding \$26,000,000. This appeal, therefore, presents a matter of first impression and of tremendous public importance.

The Probate Court has effectively left conflicted Trustees, with a documented history of impermissible self-dealing, alone to administer the Trusts. Accordingly, this Court should accept this appeal and, upon review and consistent with this Court's prior ruling in 1913 in this case, reverse the decision of the Probate Court and remand the matter to the Probate Court to appoint a suitable independent New Hampshire trustee who "either profess[es], or is not hostile to, the belief Mrs. Eddy desired to promote, to act in conjunction with [the Directors] and their successors under such bonds to the Probate Court as may be determined to be reasonable."

**Issue No. 2**

**A. The Issue**

Whether the Probate Court's Order denying Second Church's motion for the appointment of an independent trustee to the Clause VIII Trust under RSA 564-B:7-704(e) [Vacancy in Trusteeship; Appointment of Successor], rests on multiple errors of law beyond the Probate Court's misapplication of the special interest standing doctrine, in that it: (a) conflicts with this Court's decision in *Fernald*; (b) improperly elevates an un-docketed, apparently *sua sponte*, 1949 letter of Judge of Probate Gordon S. Lord to the status of an order permitting the conflicted Directors of The Mother Church to remain the only

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Trustees of the Clause VIII Trust despite the binding law of the case set by this Court in its 1913 decision in *Fernald*, and thereby holding Second Church to an inapplicable “good cause” standard in seeking the appointment of an independent trustee; and in that it (c) is inconsistent with New Hampshire common law and the statutory restrictions concerning conflicts of interest and pecuniary interest transactions under RSA 7:19-a, II [Regulation of Certain Transactions Involving Directors, Officers, and Trustees of Charitable Trusts] and RSA 564-B:8-803 [Duties and Powers of Trustee].

**B. This Court Should Hear This Issue on Appeal**

That a suitable independent New Hampshire trustee who “either profess[es], or is not hostile to, the belief Mrs. Eddy desired to promote, [should be appointed] to act in conjunction with [the Directors] and their successors under such bonds to the Probate Court as may be determined to be reasonable”<sup>4</sup> is the law of the case and is *res judicata* is without question. The Probate Court’s denial of Second Church’s motion for the appointment of an independent trustee to the Clause VIII Trust failed to take into account this Court’s instruction in *Fernald*, 77 N.H. at 110, that the Clause VIII Trust was not to be administrated by the Directors of The Mother Church in Massachusetts, but here, in New Hampshire, by bonded trustees to be appointed by the Probate Court. The Probate Court heeded this instruction in 1913, when it appointed a suitable, independent New Hampshire trustee, Josiah E. Fernald, to the Clause VIII Trust, bearing in mind the admonition of Attorney General Tuttle, in his brief filed in the *Fernald* case, that an independent trustee would be necessary to the protection of the public’s interests therein. See App. 12-13, 32. Mr. Fernald served as an independent trustee of the Clause VIII Trust until his death in 1949. Since then, the Clause VIII Trust has been administered by conflicted Trustees, who are also Directors of The Mother Church in contravention of the *Fernald* Court’s direction. Second Church is aware of no proceeding before the Probate Court or this Court reconsidering or vacating the *Fernald* Court’s direction.

Second Church has demonstrated that, since beginning in or about 1971, if not before, the conflicted Directors/Trustees began systematically to strip the economic and intrinsic value of the Clause VIII Trust, left unchecked by an independent New Hampshire trustee and ineffectively supervised by the New Hampshire Attorney General’s Office. See, e.g., App. 5-18, 33-37, 65-134, 221-29, 278-84. Second Church has shown the wisdom of Attorney General Tuttle’s admonition and this Court’s direction in

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<sup>4</sup> Brief for the State, *Fernald v. First Church of Christ, Scientist*, N.H. Sup. Ct. Case No. 1122 (1913 Term) at 8. See App. 12-13, 32.

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*Fernald*, and the harm that followed after the loss of the Clause VIII Trust's independent New Hampshire trustee. Simply put, the Probate Court's denial of Second Church's request for the appointment of an independent trustee, in light of the record before it, cannot be squared with the *res judicata* law of the case established in *Fernald*.

Further, in denying its motion for the appointment of an independent trustee, the Probate Court held Second Church to an inapplicable "good cause" standard, having erroneously characterized this request as a motion to reconsider a 1949 "order" of Judge Lord that a vacancy in the Clause VIII trusteeship caused by the death of Mr. Fernald need not be filled. This 1949 letter was not docketed and is not an order of the Probate Court. But even if it were an order, it would be inconsistent with this Court's binding precedent in *Fernald* that the Probate Court appoint (independent) New Hampshire trustees to the Clause VIII Trust. And, in any event, Second Church presented "good cause" for departing from it now, after decades of flagrant self-dealing by the conflicted Directors/Trustees and perversion of Clause VIII's charitable purposes.

Compounding the Probate Court's error, it erred in failing to exercise its statutory discretion to appoint an independent trustee to the Clause VIII Trust under RSA 564-B:7-704(e), which provides that: "Whether or not a vacancy in a trusteeship exists or is required to be filled, the court may appoint an additional trustee or special fiduciary whenever the court considers the appointment necessary for the administration of the trust." In view of the Director/Trustees' embedded conflict and ample record of their self-dealing, the Probate Court's failure to exercise its statutory discretion to appoint an independent trustee to the Clause VIII Trust constitutes an unsustainable exercise of its discretion. See, e.g., *DeButts v. LaRoche*, 142 N.H. 845, 847 (1998) ("Failure to exercise discretion constitutes an abuse of discretion.").

Moreover, the Probate Court's decisions cannot be squared with common law and statutory prohibitions against the Director/Trustees' impermissible enduring conflicts and pecuniary interest transactions. See, e.g., RSA 7:19-a [Regulation of Certain Transactions Involving Directors, Officers, and Trustees]; RSA 564-B:8-803 [Impartiality]; cf. *Sparhawk v. Allen*, 21 N.H. 9 (1850) ("If the court does not watch these transactions with a jealousy almost invincible, in a great majority of cases it will lend its assistance to fraud.") (citations and quotation marks omitted); *Shelton v. Tamposi*, 164 N.H. 490, 505

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(2013) (upholding removal of trustee “who failed to satisfy her statutory duties of loyalty, impartiality and reasonable care of the trust property”).

For these reasons, the Court should accept this issue on appeal and, upon review, reverse the decisions of the Probate Court and remand the matter to the Probate Court to appoint a suitable independent New Hampshire trustee who “either profess[es], or is not hostile to, the belief Mrs. Eddy desired to promote, to act in conjunction with [the Directors] and their successors under such bonds to the Probate Court as may be determined to be reasonable.”

**Issue No. 3**

**A. The Issue**

Whether the Probate Court erred in denying as “moot” Second Church’s request to take discovery of, *inter alia*, records of the Office of the New Hampshire Attorney General, Charitable Trusts Unit, which concern the embedded conflict of the Trustees and which have not before been presented to the Probate Court, and relatedly, whether the Probate Court erred in denying Second Church’s request for standing in the absence of an opportunity to take and present “sufficient evidence” in this matter.

**B. The Court Should Hear This Issue on Appeal**

The Probate Court abused its discretion in denying Second Church an opportunity to take discovery and submit evidence regarding the Trustees’ embedded conflict of interest and misconduct, reasoning, in circular fashion, that such discovery was unnecessary in light of its ruling that Second Church lacked standing to seek the appointment of an independent trustee, but also ruling that Second Church failed to present sufficient evidence of the Trustees’ bad faith and fraud in connection with its request for the appointment of an independent trustee. Although Second Church submitted to the Probate Court ample evidence of the conflicted Trustees’ acts of self-dealing and bad faith of which the Probate Court should have taken judicial notice, to the extent that the Probate Court (erroneously) viewed the record as being too light in this regard, it should have granted Second Church’s request to take discovery and present evidence at an evidentiary hearing. Given the important and broad public interest in the Trusts, discussed above, the Court should undertake review of this issue, and upon review, reverse the decision of the Probate Court.

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**Issue No. 4**

**A. The Issue**

Whether the Probate Court abused its discretion in denying Second Church's request to amend its motion for reconsideration of the March 2018 Order to present newly-discovered evidence of the Trustees' bad faith.

**B. The Supreme Court Should Hear this Issue on Appeal**

The Probate Court abused its discretion in denying Second Church an opportunity to amend its motion for reconsideration of the March 2018 Order to present newly-discovered evidence that the Trustees had, in response to a 1996 apparently *sua sponte* Order of the Probate Court that they increase the surety bond coverage (from \$25,000 to \$100,000 for the Clause VI Trust, and from \$500,000 to \$8,000,000 for the Clause VIII Trust), misrepresented to the Probate Court that The Mother Church was the sole beneficiary of the Trusts and that an increase in coverage was unnecessary, ignoring entirely the DCT as a party in interest. In light of the record of the Trustees' bad faith and misconduct with respect to their administration of the Trusts, in particular the unauthorized loan by the Clause VIII Trust to The Mother Church which is the subject of a 1993 Stipulated Order of the Probate Court, and the DCT's ineffectiveness in supervising the Trustees and enforcing the Trusts, the Probate Court's failure to exercise its discretion to permit Second Church to present newly-discovered evidence of the Trustees' bad faith was, in and of itself, an abuse of discretion. *See, e.g., DeButts*, 142 N.H. at 847 ("Failure to exercise discretion constitutes an abuse of discretion.").

Given the broad public interest in the proper administration of these significant charitable Trusts, this Court should undertake review of this issue, and vacate the ruling of the Probate Court and remand the matter to the Probate Court to appoint a suitable independent New Hampshire trustee who "either profess[es], or is not hostile to, the belief Mrs. Eddy desired to promote, to act in conjunction with [the Directors] and their successors under such bonds to the Probate Court as may be determined to be reasonable."

**THE STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE  
JUDICIAL BRANCH  
NH CIRCUIT COURT**

7th Circuit - Probate Division - Dover  
259 County Farm Road, Suite 203  
Dover NH 03820

Telephone: 1-855-212-1234  
TTY/TDD Relay: (800) 735-2964  
<http://www.courts.state.nh.us>

**NOTICE OF DECISION**

**MICHELE E. KENNEY, ESQ.  
PIERCE ATWOOD LLP  
1 NEW HAMPSHIRE AVENUE SUITE 350  
PORTSMOUTH NH 03801**

Case Name: **Trust of Mary Baker Eddy (Clause VI & VIII)**  
Case Number: **317-1910-TU-00001**

On March 19, 2018, Judge David D. King issued orders relative to:

Order(s) on Motions; Order Issued. (See enclosed Order)

Any Motion for Reconsideration must be filed with this court by March 29, 2018. Any appeals to the Supreme Court must be filed by April 18, 2018.

March 19, 2018

Cheryll-Ann Andrews  
Clerk of Court

C: James F. Raymond, ESQ; Thomas J. Donovan, ESQ; Stuart Brown,, ESQ; Robert B. Eyre, ESQ;  
Richard D. Judkins, ESQ; Theodore E. Dinsmoor, ESQ; Russell F. Hilliard, ESQ; Patrick O'Brien  
Collins, ESQ; Michael P. Courtney, ESQ

THE STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

MERRIMACK COUNTY

TRUST DOCKET  
6<sup>TH</sup> CIRCUIT COURT  
PROBATE DIVISION

TRUST OF MARY BAKER EDDY (CLAUSE VI & VIII)

317-1910-TU-00001

ORDER(S) ON MOTIONS

Presently before the Court are a series of approximately twenty-eight (28) pleadings filed over many months by the parties in this matter concerning: (1) an *Assented-to Motion to Amend the 1993 Order, Covert Clause 6 & 8 to Unitrusts and Adopt RSA 292-B Uniform Prudent Management of Institutional Funds Act*, see Index #281 (the "*Assented-to Motion*"), submitted by the Trustees of the Trust of Mary Baker Eddy (Clause VI Trust), and the Trustees of the Trust of Mary Baker Eddy (Clause VIII Trust)(collectively the "Trusts" and "Trustees") and objections and responses thereto submitted by the Second Church of Christ, Scientist, Melbourne (Australia) (the "Second Church"), the Director of Charitable Trusts, Thomas J. Donovan (the "DCT"), and the Trustees, see Index ##282, 284-287, 298, 299; (2) the annual accountings for the Clause VI and Clause VIII Trusts for the period ending March 31, 2017, see Index ##292-295, and objections and responses thereto, see Index ##300, 302; (3) recently filed<sup>1</sup> motions concerning the standing of the Second Church to object to accountings

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<sup>1</sup> As set forth in its Scheduling Order dated September 21, 2017, see Index #289, the standing issue was first addressed nearly two years ago by the Court and briefed by the parties. See Index ##233-39,245, 252. Consideration of standing was deferred, however, after certain pleadings were withdrawn by the Second Church. See generally Order on Assented-To Motion for Continuance of Hearing at 2-3 (March



and other motions concerning the Clause VI and Clause VII Trusts, and to file briefs as *Amicus Curiae*, see generally, Scheduling Order dated September 21, 2017 (Index #289), see also Index ##297, 304, 310, 312; (4) a *Motion for Leave to File Amicus Curiae with Brief*, see Index #282, and *Motion to Appoint an Independent Trustee*, see Index #303, filed by the Second Church in which it seeks, inter alia, appointment of an independent trustee, and objections thereto filed by the Trustees and the DCT, see Index ##307-09, and a *Response*, submitted by the Second Church, see Index #313; and finally, (5) the related issue concerning the authority of the DCT (and by extension, this Court) to address a recognized "embedded conflict" in the administration of the Clause VIII Trust given that the five trustees of that trust are also Directors of the Mother Church. See *DCT Memorandum Concerning Standing of Second Church* at 11 (Index #252); *Memorandum of the Second Church Concerning Application of the First Amendment Church Autonomy Doctrine to the Trustees of the Clause 8 Trust Under the Will of Mary Baker G. Eddy* (Index #305); *Trustees' Objection(s) to Appointment of an Independent Trustee* (Index ##307-08); *DCT Objection to Appointment of an Independent Trustee* (Index #309).

After thorough consideration of all the pleadings, applicable case law, and the extensive history in this 108-year-old matter, the Court, as more fully set forth infra,

**ENTERS** the following **ORDERS**:

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24, 2016)(Index #245)(discussing standing); Order on Hearing Held April 12, 2016 (dated April 25, 2016)(Index #253). In September 2017, the Court determined, sua sponte, that in light of affirmative relief requested by the Second Church, it was necessary to address standing and ordered briefing for its consideration. See Scheduling Order dated September 21, 2017 (Index #289). A hearing on the issue, and others pending, was held on November 3, 2017. See Order dated November 6, 2017 (Index #301). Additional briefing was allowed, see id. at 3, and the issue was submitted after the Second Church filed its final pleadings on December 11, 2017. See Index #304, 310, 312. The Court observes that although consideration of standing was effectively deferred in April 2016, see Index #253, standing was mentioned or discussed in an additional seven pleadings filed between April 2016 and September 2017 before the Court ordered formal address of the issue. See Index ##268, 270, 271, 273, 276, 284-85.

- As a preliminary matter, the Court concludes that at present, and importantly in light of the renewed and diligent participation by, and/or oversight of, the DCT, the Second Church lacks standing to object to: the accountings, see Index ##292-95; the *Assented-to Motion to Amend the 1993 Order, Covert Clause 6 & 8 to Unitrusts and Adopt RSA 292-B Uniform Prudent Management of Institutional Funds Act*, see Index #281; petition for appointment of an independent trustee, see *Motion to Appoint an Independent Trustee* (Index #303); or seek to reopen accountings previously allowed by the Probate Division. See *Motion to File a Brief Amicus Curiae* at 9-18 (Index #282). That said, as this Court noted in its Order dated May 4, 2017 (Index #274), the Second Church may continue, as appropriate, to: (1) submit briefs as *amicus curiae*,<sup>2</sup> and cooperate with the "DCT, who, by statute, represents their interests in the matter." Id. at 10.
- The Trustees' *Assented-to Motion to Amend the 1993 Order, Covert Clause 6 & 8 to Unitrusts and Adopt RSA 292-B Uniform Prudent Management of Institutional Funds Act* ("Assented-To Motion"), see Index #281, is **GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART**. The Court: (1) **GRANTS Prayer A**, and, subject to further conditions, **AMENDS** a prior court order from 1993 to comply with the terms of the Trusts; (2) it **GRANTS Prayer B** requesting conversion of both Trusts to unitrusts, see RSA 564-C:1-106(b); and (3) **DENIES Prayer C** requesting adoption of certain provisions of the Uniform Prudent Management of Institutional Funds Act ("UPMIFA") with respect to the Clause VIII Trust. See RSA chapter 292-A.
- The Court **GRANTS** the *Motion to File Brief Amicus Curiae* filed in response by the Second Church. See Index #282. It considered the *Brief Amicus Curiae* in rendering its decision on the *Assented-To Motion*.
- The Court **DENIES WITHOUT PREJUDICE** the *Motion to Appoint an Independent Trustee*. See Index ##303, 307, 309, 313. As noted supra, the Second Church lacks standing to petition for appointment of a trustee. Assuming without deciding, however, that the DCT's reluctance, on First Amendment grounds,<sup>3</sup> to actively seek appointment of an independent trustee opens the door

<sup>2</sup> The Court reminds the parties, however, that should amicus curiae briefing be submitted, the Court is under no obligation to enter a ruling allowing submission, and even if a submission is allowed, rule on issues raised therein. See Order Dated May 4, 2017 (Index #274); cf. Order dated September 21, 2017, n. 1 (Index #289) (noting that the Court need not rule on issues raised in an unsolicited "Status Report," see Index #288, filed by the Second Church, and objections thereto. See Index ##290-91.

<sup>3</sup> The Court appreciates the extensive argument submitted by all parties, see Index ##305, 307-309, concerning whether the DCT, and by extension this Court, may properly oversee appointment of trustees without violating the "Church Autonomy Doctrine" of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. See generally, *Jones v. Wolf*, 443 U.S. 595, 602, 604-605 (1979) (allowing for adoption of, inter alia, a "neutral principles test" to settle church property disputes "so long as it involves no consideration of doctrinal matters" and declining to adopt "a rule of compulsory deference to religious

to the Second Church to assert standing to petition for appointment of an independent trustee, see generally, Robert Schaikenbach Foundation v. Lincoln Foundation, Inc., 91 P.3d 1019, 1025-28 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2004), the Court, at the present time, will not overturn the 1949 ruling of Judge Lord holding that "it is not necessary to fill the vacancy" created by the death of the last independent trustee. See DCT Memorandum in Support of Trustee's Motion to Amend 1993 Order and to Convert Trusts to Unitrusts, Exh. 2 (Index #284); see generally, Indian Head Nat. Bank v. Theriault, 96 N.H. 23, 27 (1949)(reopening prior orders for good cause); cf. Ford v. New Hampshire Dep't of Transp., 163 N.H. 284, 290 (2012)("When asked to reconsider a holding, the question is not whether we would decide the issue differently de novo, but whether the ruling has come to be seen so clearly as error that its enforcement was for that very reason doomed" (quotations and brackets omitted)). It notes, however, that Judge Lord did not affirmatively require that the trustees be board members of the Mother Church, and as such, the Court will take into consideration the lack of an independent trustee when reviewing candidates the next time there is a trustee vacancy. See generally, Fernald v. First Church of Christ, Scientist, in Boston, 77 N.H. 108, 109 (1912)(confirming role of court to supervise the Trusts).

- The Court **ALLOWS** the annual accounts for the Clause VI and Clause VIII Trusts for the period ending March 31, 2017, see Index ##292-295, noting that although the Second Church has objected, the DCT, aware of those objections, has reviewed them and has not objected. In addition, the Court reminds the Trustees that all future accounts are to continue to be audited by an independent auditor at least until such time as there is no longer an embedded conflict between the Trustees of the Trust(s) and the Directors of the Mother Church.

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authority" in resolving church property disputes); Berthiaume v. McCormack, 153 N.H. 239, 248-49 (2006)(recognizing adoption of the "neutral principles test" and directing courts to first consider "secular documents such as trusts" in order to "avoid any perception of entanglement"); cf. Glover v. Baker, 76 N.H. 393 (1912)(gift was not to church, but made in trust and so long as bequests comply with terms of trust, there is no breach). Although it need not decide the issue at present, and declines to do so in order to avoid rendering an advisory opinion, see, e.g., Duncan v. State, 166 N.H. 630, 640 (2014)(courts not authorized "to render advisory opinions to private individuals"); Piper v. Town of Meredith, 109 N.H. 328, 330 (1969); N.H. CONST. Part II, art. 74, after an extensive review of case law, the Court strongly deduces that pursuant to the terms of the Clause VIII trust, see Berthiaume, 153 N.H. at 248, the DCT and Court may appropriately continue to oversee appointment of trustees, as it has since 1910, without becoming unduly entangled in church doctrinal controversies. Cf. Family Federation for World Peace v. Hyun Jin Moon, 129 A.3d 234, 246 (D.C. Ct. App. 2015)(record did not suggest that claim would make court "entangle itself in church doctrine" and that to conclude otherwise "would approach granting immunity to every non-profit corporation with a religious purpose from breach of fiduciary suits and present any scrutiny of questionable transactions." (quotations and ellipses omitted)). Certainly, the Court will entertain argument on this issue at such time as there is a vacancy in the trustees of the Trusts and the issue is properly before it.

A. Brief Background

The Court recites the following facts for background purposes only and incorporates by reference all prior orders issued by it. See, e.g., Index ##245, 253, 274, 289. This matter involves two testamentary trusts, the Clause VI Trust and Clause VIII Trust, established in the Will of Mary Baker Eddy, founder of the Christian Scientists, upon her death in May 1910. The Clause VI Trust bequeathed to the "Christian Science Board of Directors of the Mother Church" \$100,000 in trust "for the purpose of providing free instruction for indigent, well-educated, worthy Christian Scientists." Clause VIII of Ms. Baker Eddy's Will devised "all the rest, residue and remainder of my estate . . . to the Mother Church – The First Church of Christ, Scientist, in Boston Massachusetts, in trust," for certain "general purposes." She directed, inter alia, that: "I desire that such portion of the income of my residuary estate as *may be necessary* shall be used for the purpose of keeping in repair the church building" (emphasis added) and her former home in Boston (or other buildings "substituted therefore"), and that:

the balance of said income, and such portion of principal as may be deemed wise, shall be devoted and used by said residuary legatee for the purpose of more effectually promoting and extending the religion of Christian Science as taught by me.

Notably, a 1912 Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court case observed that this latter purpose:

is not a gift to the particular ecclesiastical organization for its special needs. It manifests a broader design, and authorizes the use of the gift for spreading the tenets of faith taught by the testatrix over an area more extensive than could possibly be gathered in one congregation. It includes the most catholic missionary effort, both as to territory, peoples and times. It is the founding of a trust of comprehensive scope

for the upbuilding of the sect which the testatrix made the object of her bounty. While in a general sense it may be said that every church is devoted to 'promoting and extending the religion' of the denomination to which it belongs, a gift to the particular use described in this will is not a gift to the church to do with as it chooses. The testamentary statement of the purpose of the gift when coupled with its magnitude and express fiduciary words manifests an intent that it shall be devoted as a trust fund to the specified ends.

Chase v. Dickey, 99 N.E. 410, 413-14 (Mass. 1912); see Glover v. Baker, 76 N.H. 393, 401 (1912) ( finding that "[t]he testatrix gave the bulk of her property in trust to be devoted and used for the purpose of promoting and extending the religion of Christian Science as taught by her.")

This is not the first time there has been litigation concerning the Eddy Trusts, as there are two reported New Hampshire decisions, Glover v. Baker, 76 N.H. 393 (1912) and Fernald v. First Church of Christ, Scientist, in Boston, 77 N.H. 108 (1912) discussing the Will, Trusts, and key provisions at issue in this case and denying both Mrs. Baker Eddy's family's challenge(s) to the will and trusts and the Mother Church's request that funds be distributed directly to it. Notably for our purposes today, the Glover case, upheld the validity of the Eddy Trusts, 76 N.H. at 425, and established that the residuary bequest in Clause VIII was not a gift to the church, but to be held in trust for two purposes, church building repair and "promoting and extending the religion of Christian Science as taught by me." Id. at 400.<sup>4</sup> In the Fernald case, 77 N.H. at 109, the Mother Church sought direct payment of the residuary to them as administration of the estate was concluded. The Supreme Court reaffirmed that Ms. Baker Eddy intended "to create a public trust for promoting and extending Christian Science as

<sup>4</sup> In the Chase matter, 99 N.E. 410, the trustees of the Clause VIII Trust agreed to use all distributions from it for "promoting and extending religion." Id. at 416.

taught by her to all parts of the world," and that her gift was "to a charity" administered "under the direct supervision of the court." Id. The New Hampshire Supreme Court directed the administrator, Josiah E. Fernald, to "hold the property in his hands on the settlement of the final account until a trustee or trustees are appointed by the probate court." Id. at 110. As such, unchallenged court oversight of the trusts commenced, and annual accounts for both trusts, and requests for appointments of trustees, have been filed in the Concord Probate Court for over one hundred years.

It is agreed by the parties that initially the trustees of the Clause VIII Trust were comprised of the Board of Directors of the Mother Church and Josiah Fernald, the administrator of Ms. Baker Eddy's estate. Upon Mr. Fernald's death in 1949, Judge Lord ruled that it was "not necessary to fill the vacancy" and that the "five members of the Christian Science Board of Directors who are the surviving trustees" shall remain the "sole trustees" of the Clause VIII Trust. See DCT Memorandum in Support of Trustee's Motion to Amend 1993 Order and to Convert Trusts to Unitrusts, Exh. 2 (Index #284). Since that time, the trustees have all been Mother Church Board of Directors members, and the probate courts have reviewed and approved appointment of successor trustees. See, e.g., Index ##32, 41 (example, in 1998-99, of a petition to replace a trustee and appointment of successor trustee).

Of note for the Court's purposes today, is a 1993 Order by Judge Cushing approving a *Stipulation* between then-DCT William B. Cullimore and the trustees of the Clause VIII Trust in their dual capacities as trustees and directors of the Mother Church. See DCT Memorandum Concerning Standing of Second Church of Christ, Scientist, Exh. 2 (Index #252). That *Stipulation* arose after DCT Cullimore investigated a five

million dollar loan from the Clause VIII Trust to the Mother Church to be used to fund a failed television venture. See generally, Weaver v. Wood, 680 N.E.2d 918, 921 (Mass. 1997)(describing the venture). In the *Stipulation*: (1) the Mother Church agreed to repay the loan; (2) it was decreed that Clause VIII Trust income was to be used to repair the church; (3) further loans were prohibited; and (4) the principle of the Clause VIII Trust could only be invaded with court approval. See DCT Memorandum Concerning Standing of Second Church of Christ, Scientist, Exh. 2 (Index #252).

The current litigation began when the Second Church sought to review and potentially object to, the annual accounting filed by the Trustees on September 30, 2015. See Index ##234, 237. That accounting was approved by the Concord Probate Division on November 2, 2015. See Index ##229-230. The DCT assented to the Second Church's motion, however, the Trustees objected on the basis that the Second Church, as a "branch church," lacked standing to sue. Although the Court scheduled a hearing to address standing, see Order dated March 24, 2016, the parties agreed at the hearing that the Second Church would withdraw its motions and the DCT, Second Church, and Trustees would cooperate to resolve concerns raised by the Second Church and DCT. See Order dated April 25, 2016.

Notably, prior to the Court's initial scheduling order, the DCT had not weighed in on the concerns voiced by the Second Church. See Order dated February 24, 2016 (Index #241). In response to the Court's request that the DCT or an attorney from his office attend the hearing, the DCT filed a *Memorandum Concerning Standing of Second Church of Christ Scientist* with detailed briefing on the matter. See Index #252. As this Court has observed, the DCT noted prior litigation arising from "tensions" between the

two beneficial purposes of the Clause VIII Trust, namely: (1) repair of Mother Church building(s); and (2) "promoting and extending the religion of Christian Science." He stated that there were potential procedural infirmities in the 1993 *Stipulation* approved by the Probate Court allowing for distributions from the Clause VIII Trust for repairs only, because it was approved in the absence of a decree of cy pres or deviation. See generally RSA 547:3-c (deviation statute); 547:3-d (cy pres statute); Memorandum Concerning Standing of Second Church of Christ Scientist at 11 (Index #252).

Importantly, the DCT also indicated his belief that "[b]ecause the trustees of the Clause VIII Trust are also the Board of Directors of the Mother Church, they have *embedded conflicting fiduciary obligations*." Id. (emphasis added). The DCT then outlined the "Charitable Trusts Unit's Planned Review," setting a planned assessment he intended to undertake with the Trustees/Mother Church, id., and concluding that he "plans to review the distributions made from the Clause VIII [Trust] either in context of this docket or separately as part of the Charitable Trust Unit's oversight responsibilities." Id. at 12. On the standing issue, he observed that because his office had, and continued to take, an active role in monitoring the Clause VIII Trust, "special interest standing is not warranted." Id. at 9. He observed, however, that where an "attorney general adopts a neutral position on pending litigation brought by a charity, . . . standing may be appropriate." Id.

The DCT thereafter became actively involved in the matter, filing objections to accounts filed in September 2016, see Index #259, and working directly with the Trustees/Mother Church to voice his concerns. See Order dated May 4, 2017 (Index #274). The Trustees/Mother Church and DCT reached an agreement and the Trustees



filed a *Motion to Approve Amended Account and Amend 2001 Order*, assented-to by the DCT. See Index #274. The Second Church filed motions to file briefs as *Amicus Curiae*, see Index #269, continuing to raise concerns. After a hearing, the Court denied in part and granted in part the *Motion to Amend the 2001 Order*, see Order dated May 4, 2017 (Index #274), and required the Trustees to file accounts audited by an independent auditor.<sup>5</sup> The Court denied the Second Church's motion file an *amicus* brief, concluding that although thorough, it was not necessary to assist the Court with making a decision on the *Motion to Amend*. Id. at 9. It, however, indicated to the Second Church that it would "not be adverse to accept future *amicus curiae* submissions should it decide that in light of the questions before it," if the additional submissions would be helpful to the Court. Id. at 10 citing 4 AM. JUR. 2D *AMICUS CURIAE* §1 (Supp. 2017). It also encouraged the Second Church "to share their information with the DCT who, by statute, represents their interests in this matter." Id.; see generally, RSA 7:19-7:32; cf. *Concord Nat. Bank v. Town of Haverhill*, 101 N.H. 416, 419 (1958) ("While the Attorney General . . . represents the public in the enforcement and supervision of charitable trusts, this does not preclude other interested parties from presenting their views particularly where they are acting for the benefit of the charitable trust as a whole").

This Order addresses disputes that arose after the Trustees submitted an *Assented-to Motion to Amend the 1993 Order, Covert Clause 6 & 8 to Unitrusts and Adopt RSA 292-B Uniform Prudent Management of Institutional Funds Act*, see Index #281 (the "*Assented-to Motion*"), to which the DCT filed a *Memorandum in Support*, see

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<sup>5</sup> The Court observes that despite a court-order, the Trustees had failed to file audited accounts for thirteen years, however, the DCT had not entered any objections, nor had the court enforced its own order requiring audited accounts. See id. at 5.

Index #284, seeking amendment of a 1993 Probate Court Order, conversion of the Clause VI and Clause VIII Trusts to unitrusts, see RSA 564-C:1-106, and approval of the application of certain provisions of the Uniform Prudent Management of Institutional Funds Act ("UPMIFA"), see RSA chapter 292-A, to the Clause VIII Trust, as it is proposed to be amended. The Second Church, also sought to submit a brief as *amicus curiae*, see Index #282, to which the Trustees have objected, see Index #285, and the Second Church filed a responsive pleading. See Index #286-287. The Second Church additionally filed a *Status Report and Request for Time for Discovery*, see Index #288, seeking affirmative relief, despite the fact that its standing to participate as a party in this matter has not yet been determined. See Order on Hearing Held April 12, 2016 (dated April 25, 2016)(Index #253)(noting that the Court "made no orders concerning the standing of the Second Church to challenge the trust accountings in this matter, [so that] withdrawal of pleadings by the Second Church has no preclusive effect whatsoever on determination of the standing issue."); see generally Order on Assented-To Motion for Continuance of Hearing at 2-3 (March 24, 2016)(Index #245)(discussing standing). The DCT and Trustees objected. See Index ##290-91.

The Trustees also filed *Accountings* for the year-ending March 31, 2017 for both the Clause VI and Clause VIII Trust(s), see Index ##292-295, to which the Second Church objected and the Trustees filed a responsive pleading. See Index ##300, 302.

The Court scheduled a hearing for November 3, 2017, see Index #289, and shortly before it, the Trustees submitted a *Memorandum Concerning the Issue of Standing*, see Index #297, and a *Memorandum In Support of the Assented-To Motion to Amend*. See Index #299. The DCT filed a *Supplemental Memorandum Concerning*

*Proposed Conversion of Clause VIII Trust to Unitrust and Use of UPMIFA.* See Index #298. The Second Church also filed a *Motion to Appoint an Independent Trustee*, see Index #303, a *Memorandum on Standing*, see Index #304, and a *Memorandum Concerning Application of the First Amendment Church Autonomy Doctrine to the Clause VIII Trust*. See Index #305. Objections and replies were submitted by the Trustees, see Index ##307-311, as were follow-up responses by the Second Church. See Index ##312-313.

Having reviewed the avalanche of pleadings ripe for decision,<sup>6</sup> the Court now proceeds to evaluate and rule on them.

#### B. Standing

As a preliminary matter, the Court will address the standing of the Second Church, under the “special interest doctrine” to: (1) object to accountings; (2) petition for appointment of an independent trustee; and (3) otherwise seek affirmative relief.<sup>7</sup>

Generally, “[i]n evaluating whether a party has standing to sue, [courts] focus on whether the party suffered a legal injury against which the law was designed to protect.” *Petition of Lath*, 169 N.H. 616, 620 (2017). New Hampshire common law concerning the ability of a possible beneficiary of a trust to have standing is unclear. The New Hampshire Supreme Court in *In re Burnham*, 74 N.H. 492, 494 (1908), stated the

<sup>6</sup> The Court observes that the first relevant pleading, the Trustee’s *Assented-to Motion to Amend the 1993 Order, Covert Clause 6 & 8 to Unitrusts and Adopt RSA 292-B Uniform Prudent Management of Institutional Funds Act*, see Index #281, was filed on July 26, 2017, with the final volley in this protracted battle submitted nearly six months later on December 11<sup>th</sup>. See Index #313. It apologizes for the delay in issuing this order, however, it aspired to a thorough review of the matters before issuing a comprehensive order.

<sup>7</sup> As discussed *supra*, the standing issue had been raised previously and a ruling on it was deferred by agreement. See Order Dated April 25, 2016 (Index #253). The Court later concluded in its Order Dated September 21, 2017, that it had become necessary to decide the standing issue as the Second Church’s pleadings were seeking affirmative relief. *Id.* at 3 (Index #289). By the Court’s informal count, at least twenty-seven pleadings have been filed since November 2015 raising or actively addressing this issue.

general rule that once "it was determined that the trust was charitable it became the duty of the Attorney General to see that the rights of the public in the trust were protected and that it was properly executed. The heirs had no interest in the question apart from the general public, whose rights were represented by the Attorney General." Id. Fifty years later, however, the Supreme Court, called the DCT an "indispensable party," but, awarded attorney's fees to counsel for potential beneficiaries, noting: "[w]hile the Attorney General or his representative represents the public in the enforcement and supervision of charitable trusts, this does not preclude other interested parties from presenting their views particularly where they are acting for the benefit of the charitable trust as a whole." Concord Nat. Bank v. Town of Haverhill, 101 N.H. 416, 419 (1958). The Supreme Court recognized that the respondent towns in that case "were not direct beneficiaries of the charitable trust," but that their "participation in the litigation can be considered a service to the trust and aid to the Court," justifying the award of fees. Id. at 418-19.

Notwithstanding the lack of clarity under New Hampshire common law, it is nearly uniformly recognized<sup>6</sup> that in the case of charitable trusts, "[t]he general rule is that one who is merely a possible beneficiary of a charitable trust, or a member of a class of possible beneficiaries, is not entitled to sue for enforcement of the trust," and instead, that power is given to the state attorney general who is tasked with representing the public's interest in enforcement of a charitable trust. Alco Gravure, Inc.

<sup>6</sup> The DCT, in his pleadings, see DCT Reply to Second Church's Memorandum on Standing at 2, observes that the Probate Division, in In re: Nashua Center for the Arts, No. 316-2017-EQ-00191 (August 30, 2017) recently held that because the DCT represented the rights of the public in a charitable trust, the petitioners only had standing if they could demonstrate a direct and distinct interest in the matter. Id. at 4. That case is not relevant to our inquiry here, however, because, on its face, it did not involve application of the special interest doctrine, and relies on a case concerning the standing of a DCT, and not the application of the "among others" language in RSA 564-B:4-405(c) as it pertains to the special interest doctrine. See infra.

v. Knapp Found., 479 N.E.2d 752, 755 (1985); see, e.g., State ex rel. Nixon v.

Hutcherson, 96 S.W.3d 81, 83-84 (Mo. 2003). The purpose for this restriction is that:

The persons affected by such trusts are usually some or all of the members of a large and shifting class of the public. If any member of this class who deemed himself qualified might begin suit, the trustee would frequently be subjected to unreasonable and vexatious litigation. Often no individual can prove that he will necessarily benefit from the charity. All may be prospective or possible beneficiaries, but no one can be said to be a certain recipient of aid. In ultimate analysis it is the public at large which benefits, and not merely the individuals directly assisted. Obviously, there is good reason for vesting in a single authority the discretion and power incident to the enforcement of such trusts, rather than in leaving the matter to the numerous, changing, and uncertain members of the group directly to be aided.

State ex rel. Nixon, 96 S.W.3d at 84, quoting George Gleason Bogert & George Taylor

Bogert, The Law of Trusts and Trustees § 411, at 8 (Rev. 2d ed. 1991).

However, an exception to the general rule has been recognized "where an individual seeking enforcement of the trust has a 'special interest' in continued performance of the trust distinguishable from that of the public at large." Hooker v. Edes Home, 579 A.2d 608, 612 (D.C. 1990); see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS §94 comments g-g(1) Standing to Enforce a Trust (2012). This exception arises from both: (1) a recognition that where there is an identifiable litigant with a special interest, the concern that there may be unduly vexatious litigation is lessened, see Robert Schalkenbach Found., 91 P.3d at 1025-26; and (2) that given the realities of budgetary constraints on a state's attorney general, he or she may be unwilling or unable to properly represent the public good. See City of Paterson v. Paterson Gen. Hosp., 235 A.2d 487, 494-95 (N.J. Ch. Div. 1967).

The UTC provides that "[t]he settlor of a charitable trust or the director of charitable trusts, *among others*, may maintain a proceeding to enforce the trust." RSA 564-B:4-405(c)(emphasis added). The Second Church contends that this provision gives it standing to sue to enforce the trust as a person with a "special interest" in the Eddy Trusts. See Milton v. Milligan, No. 4:12CV384-RH/CAS, 2013 WL 828607, at \*4 (N.D. Fla. Mar. 5, 2013)(finding that person with a "special interest" falls under the "among others" clause of the UTC); cf. Family Federation for World Peace v. Hyun Jin Moon, 129 A.3d 234, 244 n. 16 (D.C. Ct. App. 2015)(ousted directors are "among others"); In re United Effort Plan Trust, 296 P.3d 742, 750 (Utah 2013)(assuming without deciding that "among others" includes those with a special interest).

Although the "special interest" doctrine is broadly recognized, see generally, Mary Grace Blasko, Curt S. Crossley, David Lloyd, Standing to Sue in the Charitable Sector, 28 U.S.F.L.Rev. 37 (Fall 1993)(hereinafter "Blasko on Standing"); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS §94 Standing to Enforce a Trust comments g-g(1) (2012), it has been rightly observed that "'special interest' is a term of uncertain scope." Hooker, 579 A.2d at 612. State courts addressing the issue have applied the doctrine with little uniformity and New Hampshire case law has not addressed it. However, the reported cases have generally been divided into three categories, see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS §94 Standing to Enforce a Trust comment g(1) (2012), namely those that: (1) narrowly apply the doctrine; (2) use a balancing test; and (3) broadly allow for standing.

Cases narrowly applying the doctrine require that the interest be presently and clearly identified. See State ex rel. Nixon, 93 S.W. 3d at 85 (requiring a "clear, identifiable, and present claim to any benefits"); Hardman v. Feinstein, 195 Cal. App. 3d

157, 161-62 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987)(requiring a "special and definite interest"); Weaver v. Wood, 680 N.E.2d 918, 923 (Mass. 1997)(in a matter involving the Mother Church, requiring a "personal right that directly affects the individual member").

Some courts balance specific factors to determine whether there is a special interest. A number of courts employ a two-part test, namely: (1) whether the person is one of a sharply defined and limited in number class of potential beneficiaries; and (2) whether the challenged act is "fundamental" in nature (meaning related to the core purpose of the charitable trust), rather than a challenge to the trustee's normal exercise of discretion. See Hooker, 579 A.2d at 614; Alco Gravure, Inc., 479 N.E.2d at 465-66; see also Family Federation for World Peace, 129 A.3d at 244 (noting that key consideration in Hooker is "is whether finding a justiciable interest in a given plaintiff would contravene the considerations underlying the traditional rule"); cf. In re United Effort Plan Trust, 296 P.3d at 750 (noting and applying, but not adopting, the two-part test).

Some courts adopt an even more comprehensive five-part test that was developed in Blasko on Standing. Id. at 61-75 (the "Blasko Test"). That test was developed from the various cases deciding the issue, and directs courts to evaluate: "(1) the nature of the benefitted class and its relationship to the charity; (2) the extraordinary nature of the acts complained of and the remedy sought; (3) the state attorney general's availability or effectiveness to enforce the trust; (4) the presence of fraud or misconduct on the part of the defendants; and (5) subjective and case-specific circumstances." Robert Schalkenbach Found., 91 P.3d at 1026. The Blasko Test developed these factors based upon a comprehensive survey of case law, Blasko on

Standing, supra at 61-75, and discussed how to weigh each one relative to the others. Id. at 75-79; see Robert Schalkenbach Found., 91 P.3d at 1026 (court gave "special emphasis to several of those factors—the nature of the benefitted class and its relationship to the trust, the nature of the remedy requested, and the effectiveness of attorney general enforcement of the trust").

Finally, some jurisdictions jettison most of the considerations discussed supra and allow private individuals, and often broad swaths of people, to sue for enforcement of a charitable trust where it is found that the Attorney General did not, or cannot, properly supervise the trustees. See Kapiolani Park Pres. Soc. v. City & Cty. of Honolulu, 751 P.2d 1022 (Haw. 1988); Fitzgerald v. Baxter State Park Auth., 385 A.2d 189 (Me. 1979); State of Del. ex rel. Gebelein v. Florida First Nat. Bank of Jacksonville, 381 So. 2d 1075 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979); City of Paterson v. Paterson Gen. Hosp., 235 A.2d 487 (N.J. Ch. Div. 1967).

In this matter, the Court will use the "Blasko Test" to evaluate whether the Second Church has standing under the special interest doctrine. The "Blasko Test" is premised on a comprehensive review of the law and comports with the principles developed and expanded upon by our sister courts. Cf. Robert Schalkenbach Foundation, 91 P.3d at 1026. By balancing a number of factors, it allows courts flexibility of application<sup>9</sup> to address the myriad of factual situations that may present

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<sup>9</sup> The Trustees suggest adoption of Section 6.05 the Tentative Draft American Law Institute's Restatement of the Law Charitable Nonprofit Institutions defining a "Private Party with a Special Interest for the Purposes of Standing (Approved May 22, 2017)." See Trustees' Memorandum Concerning the Issue of Standing at 9 (Index #197). Section 6.05 sets forth a five-part test and requires that all conditions be met. Id. The Court will not adopt that test in this case as it discerns that the flexibility of the Blasko Test better suits the pursuit of a just outcome. That said, even if the Court used Section 6.05 for evaluative purposes, the outcome would be the same.



themselves in the realm of charitable trusts.<sup>10</sup> Importantly, the Court's application of this test allows it to properly focus on the "key consideration" of whether the plaintiff has a "justiciable interest" distinct from the public at large that justifies application of the special interest exception. Cf. Federation for World Peace, 129 A.3d at 244. As such, it comports with New Hampshire common law directing that a "mere general interest" is insufficient to confer standing. Petition of Lath, 169 N.H. at 621; cf. Clipper Affiliates v. Checovich, 138 N.H. 271, 277 (1994). Consequently, the Court proceeds to determine whether the Second Church has standing under the Blasko Test. See Blasko on Standing at 61-76.

(1) Extraordinary Nature of Acts/Remedy

In this matter, the Second Church seeks a number of fairly extraordinary remedies. They seek to object to currently pending accountings and re-open over twenty-years of accountings allowed by the Probate Division without meaningful objection by the DCT and no prior contemporaneous attempt to object on the part of the Second Church or any other potential beneficiary. It also seeks appointment of an independent trustee, and in so-doing, implicit reconsideration of a 1949 Order of the Probate Court. Finally, they seek to object to the *Assented-to Motion to Amend the 1993 Order, Covert Clause 6 & 8 to Unitrusts and Adopt RSA 292-B Uniform Prudent Management of Institutional Funds Act* which was submitted by the Trustees after consultation with the DCT.

In each of its requests, the Second Church seeks to undo prior court orders and suggests remedies that the DCT has not chosen to adopt despite the Second Church's

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<sup>10</sup> It is this lack of flexibility that convinces the Court that it is unwise to narrowly apply the special interest doctrine, and as such, it rejects the approach used in Weaver, 680 N.E.2d at 923.

informative and thorough *amicus* submissions that the Court assumes the DCT has reviewed. As such, it appears to the Court that the Second Church seeks standing as it disagrees with the judgment of the DCT, who is granted authority to represent their interests. See generally, RSA 7:19-20; Attorney General by Anderson v. Rochester Trust Co., 115 N.H. 74, 76 (1975); Petition of Burnham, 74 N.H. at 494; but cf. Concord Nat. Bank v. Town of Haverhill, 101 N.H. at 419. Simply because a potential charitable beneficiary disagrees with the judgment of the DCT is not sufficient to justify standing. Cf. Kapiolani State Park Pre'n Soc, 751 P.2d at 1025 (HI 1988)(standing conferred when Attorney General does not take action). Consequently, this factor weighs against a finding of special interest standing.

(2) Bad Faith, Fraud or Misconduct

While the Second Church has provided a thorough history of sometimes sloppy management by the trustees, in most cases, the complained-of accountings have been allowed by the Court without objection by the DCT. It is true that the Trustees did not, for many years, comply with Judge Hampe's 2001 Order requiring independent audits, however, that fact was known and was not objected to by the DCT and implicitly approved by the courts. Certainly, ignoring the 2001 Court Order amounts to misconduct on the Trustees' part.

The Court does not find, however, sufficient evidence of outright fraud or bad faith. The Second Church offers conclusory examples of bad faith on the part of the Directors-Trustees, including "shutting down branch churches" and going so far as to suggest that they have attempted "to wipe [the] Second Church off the face of the earth." See Memorandum Concerning Standing of the Second Church In Response to

*Order of November 6, 2017* at 26 (Index #304). These assertions, however, lack sufficient factual underpinnings on which to support a finding of fraud or bad faith. Cf. generally, *Lamprey v. Britton Const., Inc.*, 163 N.H. 252, 262-263 (2012); *Brzica v. Trustees of Dartmouth College*, 147 N.H. 443, 449 (2002)(insufficient to allege fraud in general terms). As such, the Court finds this factor is neutral in its analysis of standing.

### (3) Attorney General Participation/Effectiveness

As noted supra, our statutes and common law empower the DCT to represent the public and potential beneficiaries of New Hampshire Charitable Trusts. See generally, RSA 7:19-20; *Attorney General by Anderson*, 115 N.H. at 76; *Petition of Burnham*, 74 N.H. at 494; but cf. *Concord Nat. Bank*, 101 N.H. at 419. As the authors of *Blasko on Standing* recognized, "[a] court's evaluation of the availability and effectiveness of the attorney general . . . will weigh heavily in its decision to grant or deny standing to a private party." Id. at 70. As the DCT himself recognized, when "an attorney general adopts a neutral position on pending litigation brought by a charity . . . unnamed beneficiary standing may be appropriate." *DCT's Memorandum Concerning Standing of Second Church of Christ, Scientist* at 9, citing *Coffee v. William Marsh Rice Univ.*, 403 S.W.2d 340, 341-342 (Tex. 1996); see, e.g., *Robert Schalkenbach Foundation*, 91 P.3d at 1028 (standing may be appropriate where "lack of enforcement by the Attorney General is due to a conflict of interest, ineffectiveness, or lack of resources").

Certainly, during the long history of these trusts, the quality and thoroughness of the DCT's performance of his oversight duties has been mixed, and at times, arguably deficient. However, during the pendency of the present dispute, the DCT has been an

active participant, importantly identifying the "embedded conflict" due to the dual role of the Trustees as Directors of the Mother Church and Trustees, and suggesting ways to mitigate the effect of that embedded conflict on the interests of potential distributees. As such, this important factor does not support standing on the part of the Second Church. Certainly, the Court continues to encourage it to share information with the DCT, and, should the present diligence diminish to the detriment of the Trusts, the Court could revisit the standing issue.

#### (4) Nature of Benefitted Class

As noted supra, one purpose of tasking the DCT with the authority to represent the interests of the public and potential charitable distributees is that the class of persons with an interest may be "large and shifting" and thus a charity may need protection from costly and "vexatious litigation that would result from recognition of a cause of action by any and all of a large number of individuals who might benefit incidentally from the trust." Hooker, 579 A.2d at 612. Consequently, as Blasko on Standing observes, special interest standing is appropriately granted to a litigant that is "a member of a small identifiable class that the charity is designed to benefit." Here, income from the Clause VIII Trust is to be utilized for the purpose of "effectually promoting and extending the religion of Christian Science as taught by me." It is undisputed that the Second Church is one of over 1,400 worldwide branch churches that although "identifiable," is not small by any measure, and as such, the potential for vexatious litigation is heightened, and this factor weighs against standing.

#### (5) Other Case Specific Considerations

This factor looks at the "social desirability" of allowing special interest standing. Blasko on Standing describes it as instances "the general policy concern that charities not be harassed by suits brought by a near infinite number of potential beneficiaries . . . gives way to a court's concern that an improper action will not be challenged." Although in this matter the Court remains concerned about the embedded conflict, it does not conclude that the claim that Second Church is "well positioned to monitor and enforce the terms of the Trusts" due to its status as a branch church and knowledge of the religion, *Memorandum Concerning Standing of the Second Church of Christ, Scientist of Melbourne (Australia), in Response to Order of November 6, 2017* at 34 (Index #304), weighs heavily in its determination of standing. As noted supra, the Second Church is encouraged, and in fact has acted, to share its perspective with the DCT, and, where appropriate, as an *amicus curiae* in this Court. The DCT has acted on that information, and as such, the social desirability of special interest standing is diminished.<sup>11</sup>

Consequently, the Court finds that the Second Church has not satisfied its burden to demonstrate that it qualifies under the special interest exception to justify standing in this matter, at this time, to: object to the accountings, see Index ##292-95; object to the *Assented-to Motion to Amend the 1993 Order, Covert Clause 6 & 8 to Unitrusts and Adopt RSA 292-B Uniform Prudent Management of Institutional Funds Act*, see Index #281; petition for appointment of an independent trustee, see *Motion to Appoint an Independent Trustee* (Index #303); or seek to reopen accountings previously

<sup>11</sup> The Court observes, however, that should the DCT be unable or unwilling to monitor the management of the Trust(s), it will entertain re-evaluation of the standing issue. See e.g. Robert Schalkenbach Foundation, 91 P.3d at 1028. Indeed, as noted supra, the DCT has advised that the Second Church may have standing should he take a neutral stand on controversies between potential beneficiaries and the Mother Church/Trustees. See DCT's Memorandum Concerning Standing Of Second Church of Christ, Scientist at 9 (Index #252)(where "an attorney general adopts a neutral position on pending litigation brought by a charity[.] . . unnamed beneficiary standing may be appropriate.")(citing *Coffee v. William Marsh Rice Univ.*, 403 S.W.2d 340, 341-42 (Tex. 1966)).

allowed by the Probate Division. See Motion to File a Brief Amicus Curiae at 9-18 (Index #282).<sup>12</sup>

C. Assented-to Motion to Amend 1993 Order, Covert Clause 6 & 8 to Unitrusts and Adopt RSA 292-B Uniform Prudent Management of Institutional Funds Act

The Court now considers the Trustees' *Assented to Motion to Amend the 1993 Order, Covert Clause 6 & 8 to Unitrusts and Adopt RSA 292-B Uniform Prudent Management of Institutional Funds Act*. See Index #281. The Trustees reached an agreement with the DCT to "amend" Judge Cushing's 1993 Order approving a *Stipulation* between then-DCT William B. Cullimore and the trustees of the Clause VIII Trust directing that income from that trust be used first for repairs on the Mother Church and then to support of church doctrine. In the *Assented-To Motion*, the Trustees state that the primary purpose of the Clause VIII Trust is to "more effectively promot[e] and extend[] the religion of Christian Science as taught by me." Id. at 2-5. They seek an order that the Court "restore the original intent" of the Clause VIII Trust directing them to distribute trust income to "third party recipients" chosen by the Trustees, but not as part of programs offered by the Mother Church. Id. at 6. Distributions may be used for church repairs, but only after approval by the DCT. Finally, the Mother Church will no longer be a permissible beneficiary of the Trust. Id.

The Trustees also seek an order directing conversion of both Trusts to unitrusts under the Uniform Principle and Income Act ("UPIA"), see RSA 564-C:1-106(b), id. at 6-

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<sup>12</sup> The Court notes that even if the Second Church had standing to seek re-opening of many years of prior accountings, it would not be inclined to grant that relief. Although the Second Church has alleged mismanagement of the Trusts, it has not, heretofore, objected to the accounts filed. Prior courts have reviewed the accounts, as presumably had the DCT, and as such it is not inclined to reopen them. Going forward, the accounts will be audited, and, if the DCT is unable or unwilling to undertake a proper review, the Second Church may have standing to intervene and object.

7, reserving powers to distribute principal from the Clause VI Trust "as they may deem best," and finally, adoption of the Uniform Prudent Management of Institutional Funds Act ("UPMIFA"), see RSA chapter 292-A, for the larger of the two trusts, the Clause VIII Trust. Id.

The Second Church filed a *Motion to File a Brief Amicus Curiae* with the *Amicus* brief attached, see Index #282, seeking submission of the amicus brief in which it addresses the relief sought in the *Assented-To Motion* and additionally sets forth alleged misdeeds/self-dealing by the Trustees/Directors of the Mother Church. Id. As a preliminary matter, the Court must determine whether it will consider the Second Church's *Amicus* brief. As set forth in prior orders, see Order dated May 4, 2017 (Index #274), the rules of the Circuit Court-Probate Division do not address submission of *amicus curiae* briefs. However, even if the Probate Division rules are silent, it has been recognized that "[p]ermission to appear as amici curiae . . . rests in the sound discretion of the trial court." Witty v. Planning & Zoning Comm'n of Town of Hartland, 784 A.2d 1011, 1018 (2001)(Conn. Ct. Ap. 2001); see, e.g., Parsons v. State, Dep't of Soc. & Health Servs., 118 P.3d 930, 934 (2005)(Wash. Ct. App., Div. 1, 2005); State ex rel. Com'r of Transp. v. Med. Bird Black Bear White Eagle, 63 S.W.3d 734, 758 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001)( "courts have inherent authority to appoint an amicus even in the absence of a rule or statute")(collecting cases). New Hampshire courts recognize the useful role *amici* can play in assisting courts to reach the proper result. See e.g. In re Peterson's Estate, 104 N.H. 508, 510 (1963)(courts are "not averse to wisdom in any form, from any source" (quotations omitted)). Parties seeking to submit *amicus curiae* briefs, however, "bear the burden of demonstrating that they specifically could contribute

expertise and arguments not presented by the parties." 4 AM. JUR. 2D *Amicus Curiae* §3 (Supp. 2017).

Although the Court previously declined to consider the Second Church's *amicus* submissions as it was able to make its determination without assistance from the Second Church, see Order dated May 4, 2017 (Index #274), given the issues presented by the *Assented-To Motion*, it deems it prudent to accept and consider the *amicus* submission of the Second Church. Although it agrees with the Trustees that it is likely that the Second Church has provided information to the DCT, see Trustees' *Objection to Motion for Leave to File Brief Amicus Curiae* at 2 (Index #285), it does not agree that no further expertise is needed to assist the Court with understanding and ruling on the *Assented-To Motion*. The DCT's submission, while demonstrating an understanding of the Trusts and New Hampshire laws governing investment of institutional/endowment funds, is not as comprehensive as that of the Second Church, and as such the Court finds review of the *Brief Amicus Curiae* assistive. As such, the Court **GRANTS** the *Motion to File Brief Amicus Curiae* filed in response by the Second Church. See Index #282.

In its submissions, the Second Church suggests that the 1993 Order be vacated as it argues that the *Motion to Amend* is an admission that the trustees "have failed to safeguard the Clause VIII Trust for more than two decades." *Brief Amicus Curiae* at 14. They also assert that the proposed restrictions do not safeguard the trust and are insufficient to deal with the embedded conflicts. Id. at 14-16. They seek appointment of an independent trustee and investigation into prior accountings submitted to the Court. Id. at 17-18.



The DCT subsequently filed a *Memo in Support of Trustee's Motion*, see Index #284, in which he argues that the agreement he reached with the Trustees restores the original intent of the donative provisions of the Mary Baker Eddy testamentary trusts, namely, to support worldwide dissemination of church doctrine. Id. at 8. As to an independent trustee, he states that the Trustees alleged that forcing them to appoint an independent trustee would violate their prerogative to control distributions of a religious nature, and that he "does not wish to test the limits of the application of the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment to the qualifications of Trustees for a religiously oriented Trust." Id.

The DCT also explains the reasons for seeking conversion of both trusts to unitrusts under the UPIA and to make the Clause VIII Trust subject to the UPMIFA. Id. at 9-11. Essentially, the DCT opines that the asset management provisions of UPIA and the UPMIFA, see RSA chapter 292-A, are more applicable to the long term needs of the Trusts, as both the UPIA and UPMIFA would allow the Trustees to choose investments vehicles that balance the twin goals of capital appreciation and income production, rather than "a focus on investments that produce adequate current income." See Memo in Support of Trustee's Motion at 10 (Index #283). In order for UPMIFA and the UPIA to apply, however, the DCT contends that both Trusts must be converted to unitrusts, id., see RSA 564-C:1-106(b), to allow for application of the "total return and distribution" requirements of RSA 564-C:1-106(d) that usually target long-term growth strategies. Id. He recommends subsequent application of UPMIFA to the Clause VIII Trust so that the trustees "may apply to the court for permission to use" different distribution requirements of UPMIFA set forth in RSA 292-B:3-7. Id.; compare RSA

564-C:1-106(d)(3)(establishing a "payout provision" between 3%-5%) with RSA 292-B:3-:7 (allowing for flexible asset accumulation/distribution with a 7% appropriation for expenditure deemed presumptively imprudent). Notably, the DCT does not recommend application of the UPMIFA to the smaller trust, asserting that it "could result in additional accounting requirements" and that the Trustees wish to retain the right to distribute principal of the Clause VI Trust as they see fit. See id. at 11.

In response, the Second Church filed a *Motion for Leave to Reply*, and a *Response to the Objection*. See Index ##286-287. The Second Church alleges that the DCT "has overlooked and misinterpreted" certain aspects of church history and thus has improperly sanctioned conversion of the Clause VIII Trust to a unitrust and sought application of certain provisions of UPMIFA. It also argues that the proposed resolution is "fundamentally flawed" because it does not cure the "embedded conflict;" ignores the intent of the trust(s); and does not account for, and allow recovery of losses from, prior alleged financial transgressions of the trustees. Finally, it argues that unitrusts cannot be governed by the UPMIFA as it is not an "endowment fund" subject to that chapter.

The Court **GRANTS Prayer A** of the *Assented-To Motion*, subject to certain conditions set forth infra. It agrees with the Trustees and the DCT that under the 1993 Order, one of the primary purposes of the Clause VIII Trust, namely, to "more effectively promot[e] and extend[] the religion of Christian Science as taught by me," is not fully realized. It is well-settled that the intent of the testator/settlor is the veritable North Star guiding a court when it is interpreting a will and testamentary trusts. King v. Onthank, 152 N.H. 16, 18 (2005)(intent of testator is the "sovereign guide"); see, e.g., Shelton v. Tamposi, 164 N.H. 490, 495 (2013)(intent of settlor is "paramount"). "Similarly, it is the

[testator's/] settlor's intent, as ascertained from the language of the entire instrument, which governs the distribution of assets under a [testamentary] trust." King, 152 N.H. at 18. Courts "determine that intent, whenever possible, from the express terms of the [instrument] itself." Shelton, 164 N.H. at 495. "[I]f no contrary intent appears in the will, the words within the will are to be given their common meaning . . . clauses in a will are not read in isolation; rather, their meaning is determined from the language of the will as a whole." In re Clayton J. Richardson Trust, 138 N.H. 1, 3 (1993). Finally, testators/settlers are presumed to understand the import of the words *used* in the instrument, see, e.g., Blue Ridge Bank & Trust, Co. v. McFall, 207 S.W.3d 149, 157 (Mo. App. W.D. 2006); and similarly, testators/settlers have been found to understand how to include limiting language in a will. See Cowan v. Cowan, 90 N.H. 198, 201 (1939). Here, the simple terms of the Clause VIII testamentary provisions provide for two categories of distributions: church repair and "promoting and extending the religion of Christian Science as taught by me." As noted supra, the Glover v. Baker, 76 N.H. 393 (1912), Fernald v. First Church of Christ, Scientist, in Boston, 77 N.H. 108 (1912), and Chase v. Dickey, 99 N.E. 410 (Mass. 1912) cases reviewed the Clause VIII testamentary provisions and deemed "promoting and extending" to be an important purpose of the Clause VIII Trust. The 1993 Order upends this intent, and, since the terms of the trust should be given full realization,<sup>13</sup> the Court is comfortable partially amending that order to the extent it gave priority to church repair. However, in light of the conditions that gave rise to the 1993 Order and the embedded conflict, the Court agrees with the DCT that certain conditions should be in place, namely: (1) any

<sup>13</sup> In addition, the parties to the Stipulation giving rise to the 1993 Order agree to partially amending that order.

distributions for repairs need to be disclosed to, and approved by, the DCT; and (2) the Mother Church may not receive distributions intended to "promote and extend" directly or for its programs, rather, they will be distributed to third parties; and (3) availability of those funds/potential distributions will be published prominently in the *Christian Science Monitor*. The Court notes that the Second Church argues that under this arrangement the embedded conflict will still be present as the Trustees, who are also Directors of the Mother Church, will decide which institutions receive the income from the trust(s) and thus can exclude branch churches it does not favor. The Court, however, cautions the Trustees that should they endeavor to unfairly distribute funds to those entities in their favor or withhold distributions from those they would "punish," they risk violating the specific intent of Mrs. Baker Eddy that distributions be made to "more effectually" promote and extend the Christian Science religion and their fiduciary duty of impartiality. See generally, RSA 564-B:8-803. In order to assist the DCT with monitoring the distributions to third parties in accordance with the agreement between the DCT and the Trustees, and this Order, the Trustees are further **DIRECTED** that they must furnish the DCT, along with the annual audited accounts, a schedule of recipients of Clause VIII distributions and provide affidavit(s), under oath, that these distributees are in fact "third party recipients" and not affiliated with the Mother Church.

The Court now addresses the request that it approve conversion both Trusts to unitrusts under the UPIA, see RSA 564-C:1-106(b), id. at 6-7, reserving powers to distribute principal from the Clause VI Trust "as they may deem best," and adoption of certain provisions of UPMIFA, see RSA chapter 292-A, for the Clause VIII Trust. Id.

RSA 564-C was re-enacted in 2006 to establish a set of rules to, inter alia, assist trustees with the determination of whether receipts or distributions are from "income" or "principal." See generally, Michelle M. Arruda and William F.J. Ardinger, The Policy and Provisions of the Trust Modernization and Competitiveness Act of 2006 N.H. Bar J. Fall 2006. RSA Chapter 564-C enables a trustee to convert a trust to a "unitrust" and seek a total return on investments in the trust in order to foster long term asset growth targeted to the intent of the trust "without violating the duty of impartiality [as set forth in the NHTC] and without running afoul of, and in fact better able to satisfy, the prudent investor rule." Id.; see generally, UNIFORM LAWS COMMISSION, *Uniform Principal and Income Act, Prefatory Note*, 3-4 (Feb. 9, 2009)(discussing tension between "modern investment theory" and "traditional income allocation" approaches to trust asset management).

The UPIA authorizes a trustee, subject to the terms of the trust, to convert a trust to a unitrust provided that certain requirements are met. See RSA 564-C:1-106(a). In addition, a trustee or qualified beneficiary may petition a court to authorize conversion to a unitrust, and directs that: "[t]he court shall approve the conversion or direct the requested conversion if the court concludes that the conversion will enable the trustee to better carry out the intent of the settlor and the purposes of the trust." RSA 564-C:1-106(b)(3).

As discussed infra, the Clause VI Trust was established to assist with "free instruction for indigent, well-educated, worthy Christian Scientists", and multiple courts, including the New Hampshire Supreme Court, have concluded that with respect to the Clause VIII Trust, "[t]he testatrix gave the bulk of her property in trust to be devoted and

used for the purpose of promoting and extending the religion of Christian Science as taught by her." Glover, 76 N.H. at 401. She intended "to create a public trust" supervised by this Court, with the intent of "promoting and extending" her religion "to all parts of the world." Fernald, 77 N.H. at 109. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court observed that Clause VIII "was the founding of a trust of comprehensive scope for the upbuilding of the sect which the testatrix made the object of her bounty." Chase, 99 N.E. at 414. After consideration of the submissions by the DCT, Trustees, and Second Church, the Court agrees with the DCT that an investment plan that properly balances returns for capital appreciation and income, while fostering long term growth of the trust, will enable the Trustees to continue to carry out Mrs. Baker Eddy's century old intent to support the education of Christian Scientists and the broad design to carry out a "most catholic missionary effort, both as to territory, peoples *and times*. . . ." Chase, 99 N.E. at 414. Consequently, the Court **GRANTS Prayer B** of the *Assented-To Motion* seeking court approval of conversion of the Trusts to unitrusts under RSA chapter 564-C.

However, it is unable to likewise to grant the request make the Clause VIII Trust subject to UPMIFA as it is not authorized to do so pursuant to the plain language of the statute. Although adoption of UPMIFA may allow the Trustees more flexibility in managing trust assets to effectuate the same purposes that allow for conversion to unitrusts, the Court may not authorize that request without proper statutory authority. It is well-established that Courts determine the authority granted to it in a statute by analyzing its plain terms. See generally e.g., Hogan v. Pat's Peak Skiing, LLC, 168 N.H. 71, 73 (2015). Courts "interpret legislative intent from the statute as written and will not consider what the legislature might have said or add language that the

legislature did not see fit to include." *Id.* (quotations omitted). Here, the investment/distribution provisions of UPMIFA set forth in RSA 292-B:3-7 apply to an "endowment fund" or "institutional fund." *Id.* The term "endowment fund" is defined as: "an institutional fund or part thereof that, under the terms of a gift instrument, is not wholly expendable by the institution on a current basis." RSA 292-B:2, II. An "institutional fund," is defined as "a fund held by an institution exclusively for charitable purposes." RSA 292-B:2, V. The notes to an identical provision in the Uniform Act<sup>14</sup> clarify that an institution "includes a trust organized and operated exclusively for charitable purposes, but only if a charity acts as trustee."<sup>15</sup> UNIFORM LAWS COMMISSION, *Uniform Prudent Management of Institutional Funds Act*, §2, comments at 9 (Nov. 8, 2007). The statute expressly does not include a "fund held for an institution by a trustee that is not an institution." RSA 292-B:2, V(b). The notes to the Uniform Act state: "[t]he term institutional fund includes any fund held by an institution for charitable purposes, whether the fund is expendable currently or subject to restrictions. The term does not include a fund held by a trustee that is not an institution." UNIFORM LAWS COMMISSION, *Uniform Prudent Management of Institutional Funds Act*, §2, comments at 9 (Nov. 8, 2007). As such, even if the Clause VIII Trust is converted to a unitrust, the Court was not granted authority by the Legislature to adopt certain provisions of UPMIFA for *this trust*. It must presume that the Legislature did not intend for UPMIFA to apply here as it did not include a testamentary trust with individual trustees as one of the qualifying

<sup>14</sup> The New Hampshire Supreme Court has directed courts to look to the comments of a model act for guidance as to its meaning. *See, e.g., Rabbia v. Rocha*, 162 N.H. 734, 737-38 (2011).

<sup>15</sup> An "institution" includes "a person, other than an individual, organized and operated exclusively for charitable purposes." RSA 292-B:2, IV(a). A "person" in turn can include a "trust." RSA 292-B:2, VI. However, the notes to the Uniform Law direct that: "the definition of person includes trusts, but only trusts managed by charities can be institutional funds. UPMIFA does not apply to trusts managed by corporate trustees or by individual trustees." UNIFORM LAWS COMMISSION, *Uniform Prudent Management of Institutional Funds Act*, §2, comments at 14 (Nov. 8, 2007).

trusts.<sup>16</sup> Of course, the Legislature "is free, subject to constitutional limitations, to amend the statute," Hogan, 168 N.H. at 74 (quotations omitted), however, this Court cannot, by court order, effectuate the statutory change the DCT and Trustees implicitly request. As such, the Court **DENIES Prayer C** of the *Assented-To Motion*. See Index #281.

D. Motion to Appoint Independent Trustee

In November, 2017, the Second Church filed a *Motion for Appointment of an Independent Trustee*, see Index #303, to which the Trustees and DCT objected, see Index ##306-309, and the Second Church responded. See Index #313. As discussed supra, the Second Church lacks standing to seek appointment of an independent trustee at this time. The Court, however, pauses to make clear that it is not inclined, at this time, to appoint an additional trustee *in the absence of a vacancy* on the current board of trustees, even if standing was conferred.

As the Court observed in its Order dated May 4, 2017 at 7 (Index #274), "[w]hile the authority of the probate court to reopen its decrees is undoubted, it will not be exercised except for good cause." Indian Head Nat. Bank v. Theriault, 96 N.H. 23, 27 (1949); see also Merrimack Valley Wood Prod., Inc. v. Near, 152 N.H. 192, 203 (2005)("[T]here can be no question of the inherent power of the Court to review its own proceedings to correct error or prevent injustice"); Adams v. Adams, 51 N.H. 388, 396 (1872)("[a]s a general proposition, courts have power to set aside, vacate, modify, or amend their judgments for good cause shown"). Similarly, "[w]hen asked to reconsider a holding, the question is not whether we would decide the issue differently de novo, but

<sup>16</sup> The Court observes that the Legislature is very experienced in supplementing or amending statutes applicable to trusts. See, e.g., 2017 LAWS Ch. 257 (approximately sixty-eight page piece of legislation revising the New Hampshire trust laws).



whether the ruling has come to be seen so clearly as error that its enforcement was for that very reason doomed." Ford v. New Hampshire Dep't of Transp., 163 N.H. 284, 290 (2012)(quotations and brackets omitted).

In 1949, Judge Lord refused to fill the vacancy created by the death of Josiah E. Fernald, and decreed that the five surviving trustees would constitute the trustees of the Clause VI and Clause VIII Trusts. See DCT Memorandum in Support of Trustee's Motion to Amend 1993 Order and To Convert Trusts to Unitrusts, Exh. 2 (Index #281). Since that time, numerous probate courts have granted motions to fill a vacancy with a director of the Mother Church without objection. See, e.g., Index ##32, 41. Additional orders have issued pursuant to stipulations between the DCT and Trustees where the Trustees were alleged to have failed to act impartially. See DCT Memorandum Concerning Standing of Second Church of Christ, Scientist, Exhs. 1-2 (Index #252). Although the Second Church has alleged, and the DCT has recognized, that there remains an embedded conflict between the Trustees and the Directors of the Mother Church, the Court notes that recently the DCT has taken affirmative steps to mitigate that conflict. This Court has today, and in previous orders, directed additional protections be put in place to ensure that the Trustees honor their obligations to treat all potential beneficiaries impartially. In addition, the Court has accepted, and reviewed to the extent that they do not seek affirmative relief, *amicus* submissions from the Second Church. As such, it does not, at the present time, find that there is good cause to effectively vacate Judge Lord's 1949 Order by adding a sixth member to the board of Trustees. That said, it will continue to encourage the Second Church to provide the DCT with any information it deems helpful to the DCT in its oversight responsibilities

and, as appropriate, it will continue to consider acceptance of *amicus* submissions.

Finally, it notes that nothing in Judge Lord's order requires that future vacancies be filled by Directors of the Mother Church.

E. Accountings

The Trustees submitted independently audited accountings for both the Clause VI and Clause VIII Trusts for the period ending March 30, 2017. See Index ## 292-295. The Second Church filed an objection, see Index #300, seeking, inter alia, additional information concerning the details of certain entries, the independent auditor's work papers, and justification of the Trusts' investment policies. See Index #300.<sup>17</sup> The Trustees responded, see Index #302, alleging that the Second Church lacks standing to object. Id. They also stated that the DCT "reviewed in detail the Trustees' investment policies." Id. The DCT has had the opportunity to review the independently audited statements, and, as discussed supra, has encouraged changes to the management of the Trusts' investments.<sup>18</sup> The Court observes that the DCT has not filed an objection to accountings filed and it has reviewed them.

The Clause VI and Clause VIII Accountings for the period ending March 31, 2017, see Index ##292, 294, are **ALLOWED**. As noted supra, the Second Church lacks standing to object, however, it is encouraged to share its concerns with the DCT after each accounting is filed. The Court encourages the Trustees to share data with the

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<sup>17</sup> The Court notes that although the Second Church implicitly seeks re-opening of prior years' accountings, those have been approved without timely objection by the DCT and Second Church. It is disinclined to re-open decades of accountings when either the Second Church could have registered its objections with the DCT, and in the absence of response, likely would have had standing in this Court, or DCT could have objected in a timely fashion. Neither of the acts occurred, and as such, the Court will not re-open those accounts at this time.

<sup>18</sup> The Court also notes that in 2016, significant changes to the management of the Trusts' assets and reporting were made after the DCT's objections were resolved by agreement and further restrictions were instituted by the Court. See Order dated April 4, 2017 at 2-9 (Index #274).

DCT going forward and reminds them of their obligation to submit independently audited statements.

F. Other Rulings


In light of its orders set forth supra, as a matter of housekeeping, the Court **ENTERS** the following additional **ORDERS**:

- The Trustees' *Assented-to Motion for Extension of Time to File an Objection to the Second Church's Motion for Appointment of an Independent Trustee*, see Index #306 is **GRANTED**.
- The Second Church's *Status Report and Request for Time for Discovery*, see Index #288, is **DENIED AS MOOT**.

SO ORDERED

Dated:

3/19/2015

  
\_\_\_\_\_  
David D. King, Judge

**THE STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE  
JUDICIAL BRANCH  
NH CIRCUIT COURT**

/th Circuit - Probate Division - Dover  
259 County Farm Road, Suite 203  
Dover NH 03820

Telephone: 1-855-212-1234  
TTY/TDD Relay: (800) 735-2964  
<http://www.courts.state.nh.us>

**NOTICE OF DECISION**

**MICHELE E. KENNEY, ESQ  
PIERCE ATWOOD LLP  
1 NEW HAMPSHIRE AVENUE SUITE 350  
PORTSMOUTH NH 03801**

Case Name: **Trust of Mary Baker Eddy (Clause VI & VIII)**  
Case Number: **317-1910-TU-00001**

On May 03, 2018, Judge David D. King issued orders relative to:

Orders on Motion(s) for Reconsideration  
See enclosed copy.

Any Motion for Reconsideration must be filed with this court by May 13, 2018. Any appeals to the Supreme Court must be filed by June 02, 2018.

May 03, 2018

Cheryll-Ann Andrews  
Clerk of Court

C: James F. Raymond, ESQ; Thomas J. Donovan, ESQ; Richard D. Judkins, ESQ

THE STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

MERRIMACK COUNTY

TRUST DOCKET  
6<sup>TH</sup> CIRCUIT COURT  
PROBATE DIVISION

TRUST OF MARY BAKER EDDY (CLAUSE VI & VIII)

317-1910-TU-00001

ORDERS ON MOTION(S) FOR RECONSIDERATION

Presently before the Court are a number of pleadings filed by the Trustees of the Trust of Mary Baker Eddy (Clause VI), and the Trustees of the Trust of Mary Baker Eddy (Clause VIII)(collectively the "Eddy Trusts" and "Trustees"); the Director of Charitable Trusts, Thomas J. Donovan, Esq. (the "DCT"); and the Second Church of Christ, Scientist, Melbourne (Australia) (the "Second Church") following this Court's March 19, 2018 Order (the "March 19<sup>th</sup> Order"). See Index #314. They include: (1) the *Trustees' Partially Assented-To Motion for Reconsideration*, see Index #316; the Second Church's *Limited Assent and Motion for Supplemental Relief*, see Index #320; and the Trustee's *Objection to the Limited Assent and Motion for Supplemental Relief*; see Index #321; and (2) the Second Church's *Motion for Limited Reconsideration and Clarification*, see Index #317, and *Objections* filed by the Trustees and DCT. See Index ##318-319.

In order to prevail on their motion(s), the moving party is required to demonstrate to the Court that it "has overlooked or misapprehended" particular points of law or fact.

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Cir. Ct. - Probate Div. R. 59-A (1). For the reasons that follow, the *Trustees' Partially Assented-To Motion for Reconsideration*, see Index #316; is **GRANTED IN PART** and **DENIED IN PART**; and the Second Church's *Motion for Limited Reconsideration and Clarification*, see Index #317, is **DENIED**. In addition, to the extent that the Second Church's responsive *Limited Assent and Motion for Supplemental Relief*, see Index #320, seeks additional affirmative relief, it is **DENIED**.

I. *Trustees' Partially Assented-To Motion for Reconsideration*

The Trustees filed a *Partially Assented-To Motion for Reconsideration*, see Index #316, seeking: (1) clarification that the notices concerning availability of Clause VIII grants be published in the *Christian Science Journal*, not the *Christian Science Monitor* as directed in the Order; and (2) an order striking the Court's Order directing the Trustees to confirm that recipients of Clause VIII Trust distributions are "not affiliated with the Mother Church." See March 19<sup>th</sup> Order at 29 (Index #314). The Second Church assents in part to the extent that the Trustees seek publication in the *Christian Science Journal*, but otherwise objects, and requests that the Court order the Trustees to "consult with the Director of Charitable Trusts and Second Church" concerning potential distributions to third parties. See *Second Church Limited Assent and Motion for Supplemental Relief* (Index #320).

First, the Court GRANTS IN PART the Trustee's *Motion for Partial Reconsideration* as it pertains to publication of the availability of Clause VIII funds in the *Christian Science Monitor*. In the Trustees' *Assented to Motion to Amend the 1993 Order, Covert Clause 6 & 8 to Unitrusts and Adopt RSA 292-B Uniform Prudent Management of Institutional Funds Act*, see Index #281, the Trustees represented to the

Court that in order to address an on-going concern about the embedded conflict arising from their dual role as trustees of the Clause VIII Trust and Directors of the Mother Church, they agreed with the DCT to: (1) seek a court order "amending" Judge Cushing's 1993 Order approving a *Stipulation* between then-DCT William B. Cullimore and the trustees of the Clause VIII Trust directing that income from that trust be used first for repairs on the Mother Church and then to "more effectively promot[e] and extend[] the religion of Christian Science as taught by [Mrs. Baker Eddy]," see id. at 5-6; and (2) "restore the original intent" of the Clause VIII Trust by directing them to distribute trust income to "third party recipients, as chosen by the Trustees in their discretion, and not directly to the Mother Church or to specific programs administered by the Mother Church." Id. at 6. The Court, expressing concern about prior compliance with Court-orders, granted that request, subject to additional safeguards. See March 19<sup>th</sup> Order at 28-29.

First, the Court in its March 19<sup>th</sup> Order agreed with the DCT and Trustees that it would be prudent to publish the availability of Clause VIII funds in an appropriate publication. See March 19<sup>th</sup> Order at 28-29 (Index #314). However, it inadvertently indicated that publication be accomplished through the more commonly known *Christian Science Monitor*, see id. at 29, instead of the *Christian Science Journal* as requested by the Mother Church and assented-to by the DCT. See *Assented to Motion to Amend the 1993 Order, Covert Clause 6 & 8 to Unitrusts and Adopt RSA 292-B Uniform Prudent Management of Institutional Funds Act* at 6 (Index #281). The Court therefore GRANTS IN PART the *Trustee's Partially Assented-To Motion for Reconsideration* to the extent it

now corrects its error concerning the publication vehicle and makes clear that any agreed-upon notice as to availability of funds be made in the *Christian Science Journal*.<sup>1</sup>

Next, the Court, in its March 29<sup>th</sup> Order, instituted additional safeguards applicable to distribution of Clause VIII funds to those negotiated by the DCT that it felt were appropriate in light of the recognized embedded conflict. See id. at 28-29. In their *Assented to Motion to Amend the 1993 Order, Covert Clause 6 & 8 to Unitrusts and Adopt RSA 292-B Uniform Prudent Management of Institutional Funds Act*, see Index #281, the Trustees represented to the Court that the DCT had reviewed non-compliance with Court orders by the Trustees. See id. at 1-2. After discussions between the DCT and Trustees after that review, and to specifically to address the DCT's concern about the embedded conflict and "to better reflect the original intent" of the Clause VIII Trust, id. at 1, the Trustees, with assent of the DCT, requested that this Court

restore the primary purpose of the Clause 8 Trust to permit the disbursement of funds for the promotion and extension of Christian Science, with the further condition that the funds be disbursed to third party recipients, as determined by the Trustees at their discretion, and not directly to the [Mother Church].

Id. at 2. Prayer A of that motion further clarified the scope of the requested restriction so that funds would be distributed only to "third party recipients" and that no distribution from the Clause VIII Trust would be made "to The Mother Church or to specific programs administered by The Mother Church." Id. at 6.

After consideration of the pleadings, the applicable statutes and common law, and the record of the management of the Clause VIII Trust, in particular the existence of

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<sup>1</sup> Although the Second Church suggests in its *Limited Assent and Motion for Supplemental Relief* (Index #320) that the Court order publication in both the *Christian Science Monitor* and *Christian Science Journal*, id. at ¶15 (Index #320), that suggestion effectively constitutes a request for additional relief that is not appropriate on reconsideration, see Cir. Ct. – Prob. Div. R. 59-A, and is therefore DENIED.



the embedded conflict and a certain history of lack of compliance on the part of the Trustees with Court orders, this Court accepted the compromise set forth by the DCT and Trustees, but with additional reporting requirements to assist with monitoring compliance by the Trustees. See generally RSA 564-B:2-201(a). Specifically, the Court directed that:

In order to assist the DCT with monitoring the distributions to third parties in accordance with the agreement between the DCT and the Trustees, and this Order, the Trustees are further **DIRECTED** that they must furnish the DCT, along with the annual audited accounts, a schedule of recipients of Clause VIII distributions *and provide affidavit(s), under oath, that these distributees are in fact "third party recipients" and not affiliated with the Mother Church.*

Id. at 29 (emphasis added). The Trustees seek reconsideration of the Court's use of the terms "affiliated with the Mother Church" asserting that it is "ambiguous and may exclude recipients that otherwise would fall within the class of permitted recipients described in the motion." *Trustee's Partially Assented-To Motion for Reconsideration* ¶18 (Index #281). In particular, they assert that

branch churches *may* be considered as affiliated with the Mother Church. Although they are independently self-governed, branch churches are formed in accordance with the Manual of the Mother Church and officially recognized by the Mother Church, and they and their members are subject to disciplinary action by the Mother Church."

Id. ¶9 (emphasis added). The Trustees proceed to request that this Court "reconsider its order and only restrict distributions as worded in the Motion, to The Mother Church

and to specific programs administered by the Mother Church, but not exclude affiliates.”

Id. ¶11.<sup>2</sup>

The Court DENIES the *Trustee's Partially Assented-To Motion for Reconsideration* to the extent it requests that the Court remove the terms “not affiliated with the Mother Church” from its Order. Instead, it CLARIFIES the meaning of that phrase as intended to give full realization the meaning of “third party recipient” and ensure that neither the Mother Church nor any of its programs, directly or indirectly, receive Clause VIII funds in accordance with the agreement between the Trustees and DCT. The Court intended the term “affiliated” to have its common meaning, namely, to be controlled by, or share a common governing body with, the Mother Church. See generally BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY at 69-70 (Tenth Edition 2014). Branch churches, if possessing independent self-governance, would not qualify as an “affiliate” under this common meaning.<sup>3</sup>

## II. Second Church's Motion for Limited Reconsideration and Clarification

The Second Church has also filed a motion seeking reconsideration of certain court orders. See Motion for Limited Reconsideration and Clarification (Index #317). In its motion, the Second Church requests that: (1) this Court reconsider its determination that it lacks standing; and (2) provide clarification of the “on-going relationship between

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<sup>2</sup>The Court observes that the Trustee's requested reconsideration in paragraph 11 does not recognize an important qualification in the original *Assented to Motion to Amend the 1993 Order, Covert Clause 6 & 8 to Unitrusts and Adopt RSA 292-B Uniform Prudent Management of Institutional Funds Act*, see Index #281, namely, that distributions be made to “third party recipients.”

<sup>3</sup> Should the Trustees possess any concerns about whether certain distributions might be in violation of the Court's order, they are certainly entitled to petition for instructions from it. *Motion for Limited Reconsideration and Clarification* at (Index #317).

the Director of Charitable Trusts and the Second Church."<sup>4</sup> The Trustees and the DCT have objected. See Index ##318-319.

First, the Second Church seeks reconsideration of this Court's: (1) determination that it lacks standing to request appointment of an independent trustee under the "special interest exception" to the rule that grants the DCT authority to represent potential charitable beneficiaries of a charitable trust, see generally Robert Schalkenbach Foundation v. Lincoln Foundation, Inc., 91 P.3d 1019, 1025-28 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2004); and (2) even assuming requisite standing, refusing to appoint an additional trustee and thus effectively re-open and vacate Judge Lord's 1949 Order that held that it was unnecessary to fill a vacancy created by the death of the last independent trustee. See generally, March 19<sup>th</sup> Order at 3-4.

The Court, in its March 19<sup>th</sup> Order, although recognizing that the Second Church lacked standing, directed that even if standing was conferred, it would not, at this time, appoint an additional trustee in the absence of a vacancy. See March 19<sup>th</sup> Order at 33-35. It noted that while it had the authority to reopen prior probate orders, it did not find good cause to do so at this time. Id. The Second Church contends that Judge Lord's 1949 decree was not a "court order" as the Second Church did not find it docketed in the public record, but rather was a letter sent to the Trustees and attached to a pleading submitted by the DCT. See Director of Charitable Trusts Memorandum in Support of Trustee's Motion to Amend 1993 Order Exh. 2 (Index #284). Consequently, it argues

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<sup>4</sup> The Second Church asserts that one current trustee has resigned as Director of the Mother Church and thus should be replaced as trustee by an independent trustee. It also appears to complain that the current composition of the Trustees and Directors of the Mother Church is contemptuous of Judge Lord's Order. Both subjects are not properly before this Court in a Motion for Reconsideration and should be raised, in the first instance with the DCT.

that it should not be given the effect of a court order and that this Court's unwillingness to overturn a long standing court order was misplaced.<sup>5</sup>

The Court disagrees. Although the format is unusual for modern court documents, and the then-register of probate did not follow what would be considered present-day clerk-of-court docketing procedures, the Court finds that the 1949 decree at issue was intended to be, and had the force and effect, of a court order. Judge Lord stated:

Upon consideration of the matter of a vacancy in the trusteeship . . . due to the death of Josiah E. Fernald, you are informed that it is not necessary to fill the vacancy, and that I hereby *authorize and decree* that the five members of the Christian Science Board of Directors who are surviving trustees . . . shall constitute the sole trustees . . . however, that being all non-residents of New Hampshire, shall appoint a resident agent for the trusts . . . who shall also be retained as New Hampshire counsel for the trustees.

See Director of Charitable Trusts Memorandum in Support of Trustee's Motion to Amend 1993 Order Exh. 2 (Index #284)(emphasis added). Consequently, this Court did not err in applying the well-established "good cause" standard used to determine whether it is prudent to vacate a prior court order.<sup>6</sup>

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<sup>5</sup> They presently, for the first time, assert evidentiary objections based upon authentication of Judge Lord's Order and the Court's reliance on it. Despite numerous filings and detailed pleadings submitted by the Second Church concerning the history of the Baker Eddy Trusts, including some with brief references to Judge Lord's decision, the Court cannot find any evidentiary challenge to consideration of it. They do note that it was not docketed, and complain that the DCT did not promptly provide it to them, but they do not take issue with its authenticity or affirmatively contend it is not an order. They presently concede that if it is considered a court order, however, the Court may properly take judicial notice of the Court order. See Motion for Limited Reconsideration and Clarification at 3, n. 6 (Index #317); see generally, N.H. R. Ev. 201.


<sup>6</sup> The Court further notes that this analysis was conducted on the stated assumption that even if the Second Church had standing to participate and seek relief in this case it would not have prevailed. It does not possess standing to intervene. As such, the Second Church lacks standing to request that this Court should schedule discovery and/or an evidentiary hearing as to whether there is "good cause" to reopen Judge Lord's order.

Next, the Second Church asserts that the Court did not properly apply the "Blasko Factors" in this matter, see generally, Mary Grace Blasko, Curt S. Crossley, David Lloyd, Standing to Sue in the Charitable Sector, 28 U.S.F.L.Rev. 37 (Fall 1993), claiming that instead of analyzing the extraordinary nature of the remedy sought, see id., the Court should have focused "on the extraordinary nature of the Trustee's acts complained of by the Second Church." *Motion for Limited Reconsideration and Clarification* at 3 (Index #317). The Court has reviewed the March 29<sup>th</sup> Order and is satisfied that it properly applied the Blasko analysis. See Cir. Ct. - Probate Div. R. 59-A (1).

Finally, the Second Church requests that given this Court's: (1) observation that the DCT represents potential charitable beneficiaries; and (2) encouragement of the Second Church to share information with the DCT, that the Court clarify "the manner in which the Court envisions [a relationship between the DCT and Second Church]." The request is DENIED as it is not the proper subject of a *Motion for Reconsideration*. See Cir. Ct. - Probate Div. R. 59-A (1). In addition, the Court finds it would be inappropriate to provide such direction beyond what has already been suggested and thus declines to do so.

SO ORDERED

Dated: 5/3/2018

  
\_\_\_\_\_  
David D. King, Judge

**THE STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE  
JUDICIAL BRANCH  
NH CIRCUIT COURT**

7th Circuit - Probate Division - Dover  
259 County Farm Road, Suite 203  
Dover NH 03820

Telephone: 1-855-212-1234  
TTY/TDD Relay: (800) 735-2964  
<http://www.courts.state.nh.us>

**NOTICE OF DECISION**

**MICHELE E. KENNEY, ESQ  
PIERCE ATWOOD LLP  
1 NEW HAMPSHIRE AVENUE SUITE 350  
PORTSMOUTH NH 03801**

Case Name: **Trust of Mary Baker Eddy (Clause VI & VIII)**  
Case Number: **317-1910-TU-00001**

On May 14, 2018, Judge David D. King issued orders relative to:

Motion to Amend Second Church of Christ Scientist's Motion for Limited Reconsideration and Clarification.

Motion is **DENIED** for reasons set forth in the Objection of the Director of Charitable Trusts.  
(Index #324)

Any Motion for Reconsideration must be filed with this court by May 27, 2018. Any appeals to the Supreme Court must be filed by June 16, 2018.

May 17, 2018

Cheryll-Ann Andrews  
Clerk of Court

C: James F. Raymond, ESQ; Thomas J. Donovan, ESQ; Stuart Brown,, ESQ; Robert B. Eyre, ESQ;  
Richard D. Judkins, ESQ; Theodore E. Dinsmoor, ESQ; Russell F. Hilliard, ESQ; Patrick O'Brien  
Collins, ESQ; Michael P. Courtney, ESQ

THE STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE  
6<sup>th</sup> CIRCUIT COURT – PROBATE DIVISION - CONCORD  
TRUST DOCKET  
IN RE: MARY BAKER EDDY CLAUSE VI AND VIII TRUSTS  
317-1910-TU-00001

DIRECTOR OF CHARITABLE TRUSTS' OBJECTION TO SECOND CHURCH'S  
MOTION TO AMEND MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION

NOW COMES the Attorney General, Director of Charitable Trusts, and in objection to the Motion to Amend Second Church of Christ Scientist's Motion for Limited Reconsideration, states as follows:

1. By order dated May 3, 2018, this Court denied Second Church's Motion for Limited Reconsideration, so Second Church's Motion to Amend that motion likewise should be denied.

2. Moreover, The Motion to Amend was not filed within ten days of the clerk's written notice of the order, and so is not timely. Probate Division Rule 59-A(1).

3. Second Church's Motion to Amend is focused on activities that took place before this Court in 1996 with respect to setting the size of the probate bond for the Clause VIII trust. Second Church's counsel obliquely raised the question of probate bonds at a hearing on November 3, 2017. See, Transcript attached to Motion, p. 44. It is too late now to present new evidence on this subject.

4. The Court's records reflect that there is a bond currently in place with respect to the Clause VIII Trust.

WHEREFORE, the Director of Charitable Trusts respectfully requests that this Honorable Court:

(A) Deny Second Church's Motion to Amend Motion for Reconsideration; and

(B) Grant such further relief as may be deemed just and proper.


Respectfully submitted,

ATTORNEY GENERAL,  
DIRECTOR OF CHARITABLE TRUSTS

By his attorneys,

GORDON J. MACDONALD  
ATTORNEY GENERAL

Date: May 9, 2018

  
\_\_\_\_\_  
Thomas J. Donovan, NH Bar #664  
Director of Charitable Trusts  
33 Capitol Street  
Concord, NH 03301-6397  
(603) 271-3591

**CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**

I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing Objection was forwarded by electronic and U.S. First Class mail to the following counsel of record:


James F. Raymond, Esquire  
Michael P. Courtney, Esquire  
Upton & Hatfield LLP  
PO Box 1090  
Concord, NH 03302-1090

Stuart Brown, Esquire  
DLA Piper, LLP  
1201 North Market Street, Suite 2100  
Wilmington, DE 19801

Theodore E. Dinsmoor, Esquire  
128 Great Plain Avenue  
Wellesley, MA 02482

Robert B. Eyre, Esquire  
Foehl & Eyre, PC  
27 East Front Street  
Media, PA 19063

Michelle E. Kenney, Esquire  
Patrick O. Collins, Esquire  
Pierce Atwood LLP  
One New Hampshire Avenue, Suite 205  
Portsmouth, NH 03801

  
\_\_\_\_\_  
Thomas J. Donovan