Master Thesis Defence

The Eurosceptic Misfit - Popular Euroscepticism and Electoral Support for Eurosceptic Parties

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Overview

1. Motivation

- The phenomenon of the "Eurosceptic misfit"
- A gap in the research field

2. Methodology

- ▶ The data set
- The statistical models

3. Findings

- Eurosceptic misfit across time
- Eurosceptic misfit across regions
- Regression models
- 4. Conclusion



1. Motivation
2. Methodology
3. Findings

1. Motivation

The phenomenon of the "Eurosceptic misfit"

- Wide gap between popular levels of Euroscepticism and the aggregate vote share received by Eurosceptic parties
- ► First mentioned by Taggart (1998)
 - ► He suspected the translation of Eurosceptic attitudes into Eurosceptic vote was driven by national contextual factors

Understanding national contextual drivers of the "Eurosceptic misfit" is a puzzle-piece in understanding the political impact of Eurosceptic parties

A gap in the research field

- Literature on Euroscepticism mainly revolves around:
 - Categorisation of Euroscepticism
 - Derterminants of Euroscepticism
- ► The Eurosceptic misfit has received no thorough scholarly attention outside a few mentions (e.g. Taggart & Sczerbiak, 2002; Verney (2011))

Possibility to make a contribution to an underdeveloped research field

Motivation
 Methodology
 Findings

2. Methodology

2.1. The data set

I created my own study data set from

- European Parliament election data from 1979 to 2009
- Eurobarometer data adjacent to each election round
- This yielded a data set which had
 - 110 observations
 - ▶ 27 panel units
 - 7 time periods

2.2. The statistical models


- ▶ **Dependent variable**: share of voters holding Eurosceptic attitudes sum of the vote share Eurosceptic parties
- Independent variables
 - ► Two measures of Eurosceptic attitudes
 - Party system polarisation
 - Effective number of parties
 - Membership duration in the EU
 - ► Location in Central and Eastern Europe
- Models
 - ► Fixed effects, random effects (and pooled OLS)




- 1. Motivation 2. Methodology
 - 3. Findings


3. Findings


3.1. Eurosceptic misfit across time




3.2. Eurosceptic misfit across regions









3.3. Regression models

 Table 1: Regression results

	Dependent variable: Eurosceptic Misfit	
	FE	RE
	(1)	(2)
General Euroscepticism	0.48***	0.45***
	(0.10)	(0.09)
Instrumental Euroscepticism	0.38***	0.43***
	(0.06)	(0.05)
Polarisation Index	-1.52*	-1.92**
	(0.84)	(0.74)
Effective Number of Parties	0.02	-0.06
	(0.12)	(0.10)
Membership Duration	0.08	0.04
	(80.0)	(0.06)
Central/Eastern European		-5.52*
		(3.09)
Constant		40 .57 4 🗗 ▶

4. Conclusion

- ► The Eurosceptic misfit has stayed relatively constant over time, except for a spike in 1994
- Eurosceptic misfit somewhat smaller in CEE countries
- ► Eurosceptic vote share generally fails to "catch up" with increases in popular Eurosceptic attitudes
- Higher degrees of party polarisation shrink the Eurosceptic misfit

Thank you for listening!

Please check out my Github repository for all source codes for the analysis and presentation documents:

github.com/mberneaud/EuroscepticMisfitMasterThesis

Extra: Model considerations

- Combination of pooled OLS, fixed effects and random effects models used in the thesis
 - Fixed effects to cleanly isolate causal effects (read: removing unobserved heterogeneity) to measure country-specific variation
 - Random effects to allow for inclusion of time-invariant variables (like region) and higher efficiency
 - Pooled OLS for comparison