Participation in Social Movements: A Review of the Literature

Introduction

The United States is a country of contradictions: although it has the most billionaires in the world by far, it also has 37 million residents who live below the federal poverty line and 47 million individuals without health insurance (U.S. Bureau of the Census, 2006). There is a myth in the United States that anyone can achieve anything if they just work hard, and that consequently it is an individual's own fault if he or she cannot make it, yet many Americans are so far behind from the outset that they have a slim chance of success regardless of how hard they try.

There are myriad suggestions of what the United States should do to address the problem of poverty from individuals of every ideological orientation: some propose expansive anti-poverty packages (see, for example, Currie, 2006 and Waldfogel, 2006), while others believe that that the social welfare system should be eliminated entirely (Murray, 2006). Danziger and Danziger (2006) note that there has not been a national dialogue about the issue of poverty and the state of the federal social safety net for many decades; even seemingly simple anti-poverty legislation like raising the minimum wage is met with resistance from a significant number of lawmakers. In general, issues of poverty cause much less of an uproar among the public than "hot button" issues like abortion, LGBT rights, or gun control.[1]

One possible reason why poverty is seemingly absent from the public agenda is that poor individuals themselves are relatively silent on the issue. A number of researchers have noted that too often in our society, individuals are led to believe that the troubles and hardships they face are largely their own fault (Young, 2004; Bullock and Limbert, 2004; Rubin and Rubin, 1992; Fox-Piven and Cloward, 1979). Ross (1977) describes this as the "fundamental attribution error," which occurs when individuals blame themselves for the societal problems that affect them, such as poverty and discrimination, instead of the larger society. Gaventa (1980) discusses something he calls the "3rd dimensional approach to power," which is when oppressed groups have so little power in a society that they buy into the dominant cultural messages and do not even believe they are oppressed.

Research with low-income individuals in the United States supports both the Fundamental

[1] Unless the issue is welfare, in which case most people have an opinion one way or the other.

Attribution Error and the 3rd dimensional approach to power: Young (2004), Newman (2006), Hochschild (1995), Bullock and Limbert (2004), and Bullock and Waugh (2006) all found that the majority of low-income people with whom they spoke largely believed in the "American Dream" and the idea that any person can make it if they just try hard enough, and tended to blame their lack of success on their own shortcomings, rather than acknowledging that the deck was stacked high against them from the outset.

There are, however, some low-income individuals in this country who overcome these myths, recognize they are being oppressed, and believe they deserve better. These people fight for such things as living wages, improved health care, safer housing, and better neighborhoods. They join neighborhood associations aimed at social change, participate in welfare rights organizations, and fight for better working conditions through Workers' Centers (Fine, 2006). One example of this activism can be seen in a national network of over fifty welfare rights organizations called The Poor People's Economic Human Rights Campaign, which describes itself as "a national effort led by poor and homeless women, men and children of all races to raise the issue of poverty as a human rights violation" (accessed online at www.economichumanrights.org). It is unclear how many members each organization has, and whether the chapters are made up primarily of low-income individuals or consist mostly of their middle-class allies, but regardless, this example shows that there are at least some low-income people in the United States who have gotten past the myth that being poor is one's own fault and are striving to make systemic changes.

Broadly, I am interested in why some low-income individuals join or participate in social movements aimed at achieving a more economically just society, while others do not. McCarthy and Zald (1977) define a social movement as a "set of opinions and beliefs in a population which represent preferences for changing some elements of the social structure and/or reward distribution in a society.[2] This paper, which will serve as a starting point for my future research on the topic, provides a basic overview of the key sociological

[2] This paper examines why some people participate in a social movement and others do not; due to space limitations, it does not examine the reasons why certain people participate in different types of social movement behavior, such as why one person signs a petition versus attending a rally versus participating in something more dangerous or even life threatening. That said, I recognize that the processes for determining whether one will participate in these different types actions varies depending on the level of risk and the time commitment involved. My future work on the topic will be more specialized and will look in further detail at types of participation and at participation among different groups.

literature on participation in social movements. It is not limited to participation among low-income and/or marginalized individuals, as it is important to first gain a strong understanding of the broad literature on movement participation before delving into the specific participatory behavior of one demographic sub-group. Because the participation literature is so broad, this paper is by no means comprehensive and will instead lay a foundation for my future work in this area.

The paper will first examine three primary theories on social movements (Classical Collective Behavior, Resource Mobilization, and the Political Process Model),[3] will explore how each body of literature explains why individuals participate in social movements, and will discuss the flaws of each model. It will then examine Klandermans' four-part theory of social movement participation, which encompasses a number of the concepts that are frequently used to explain why some individuals choose to participate in social movements and others do not. The paper will conclude with a brief discussion, a listing of some possible next steps in the research, and the ways that I plan to approach this topic in future papers.

Classical Collective Behavior Theories

A number of theories were put forth in the 1950s, 1960s, and early 1970s (Buechler, 2004, Buechler, 2000, McAdam, 1982) to explain why social movements occur, with a focus on why people participate. In these early theories, social movements were included in a broader category of actions known as "collective behavior," which included panics, crowds, masses, riots, and revolutions in addition to social movements. While these theories, known under the umbrella term of classical theories of collective behavior, differed in their explanations of what caused collective behavior, all provided a similar rationale for why individuals chose to participate. This section of the paper will explore these reasons in more detail, as well as provide a critique as to why classic collective behavior theory does not provide a useful framework for studying social movement participation.[4]

[3] There are other theories of social movements, namely New Social Movement theory, which is popular in Europe and focuses on non-economic issues like women's rights, gay rights, and the environment, but a discussion of this theory is not included in the paper due to space limitations. My future work will examine this and other theories as they relate to issues of participation.

[4] As the purpose of the paper is to provide an overview of the various explanations for why people participate in social movements and not to explain the different theories for the development of social movements, the various branches of the classical collective behavior theories will not be explored in detail.

Underlying the classical collective behavior theories was a pluralistic model of political power in the United States (Buechler (2000), McAdam (1982), and Marx and Woods (1975)), meaning that that instead of political power being concentrated in the hands of a few elites, it is distributed amongst competing groups so that no group, even minority groups with seemingly little power, go without their interests being heard. In other words, decision making arenas are assumed to be open, so that any group has a chance to have their grievances heard through institutional (i.e. traditional political) means (Gaventa, 1980). The pluralistic model is based on work by Dahl (1967), and Talcott Parsons (1951) and notes that no group can bar any other group from the political arena.

Since the existence of a pluralistic system is an assumption that underlies the classical collective behavior theories, those who developed the theories assumed that any individual who goes outside of these traditional means of political action is doing so not because their grievances cannot be heard any other way, but because they are irrational actors and need to work through a social-psychological tension that results from a structural strain. Structural strains, as defined by Smelser (1973) are ambiguities, conflicts, or deprivations in the normal, everyday functioning of society that cause abnormally high discontent/ tension among some individuals and lead them to engage in collective action. Participating in collective action is thus a way to work through these tensions, to overcome feelings of anxiety and futility, and, as noted by Smelser (1973), to provide participants with the opportunity to express their impulses in ways that are usually forbidden by society. Participants were seen as deviant, irrational, and even dangerous (Beuchler, 2000).

The classical theories have different explanations as to what the specific structural strains and the resulting social psychological reactions are that lead individuals to participate in movements, but some of the most commonly cited include social isolation, which leads to alienation and anxiety, status inconsistency, which leads to cognitive dissonance, and relative deprivation, which leads to general discontent. Larger societal changes such as urbanization and industrialization can also lead to these shifts, and some even stated that participation in collective action was related to an Oedipus complex (McCarthy, McAdam, Zald, 1988).

These classical theories of collective behavior were met with broad criticisms: that the theories were inherently conservative and maintained the status quo, that individuals who engaged in social movements

were considered deviant, irrational, or had an "abnormal psychological profile," a lack of any broader political context and the discounting of collective action as a political action, a lack of recognition that some individuals have their interests represented by the political system far more often than others, and a lack of validity given to the real problems faced by marginalized groups that might lead individuals to participate in movements (McAdam, 1982, Beuchler, 2004, Beuchler, 2000, Snow, Rochford, Worden, and Benford (1986). McCarthy and Zald (1977) additionally noted that often, participants in social movements come from outside of the actual marginalized or frustrated group, such as northern whites in the civil rights movement. The classical collective behavior theories provide no way to explain the involvement of these outsiders who are not experiencing the structural strains.

Further, much of the basis of the classical theories fell apart when held up to empirical testing (Snow, Rochford, Worden, and Benford, 1986, McCarthy and Zald, 1977). For example, much of the social movement research has focused on the importance of social networks (discussed later in the paper), yet many of the classical theories indicate that participants of social movements are isolated from broader society. If this was the case, it would not make sense that a group of isolated individuals would suddenly band together in order to deal with their psychological grievances. The collective behavior theories do not provide any explanation of the logistics of how these aggrieved individuals suddenly band together in a social movement. (McAdam, 1982).

Beuchler (2004) notes that these theories, which he calls the "strain and breakdown theories" lost so much credibility in the study of social movements between the mid 1970s and the mid 1980s that in an 1983 review article by Jenkins in the *Annual Review of Sociology*, there was no mention of these theories at all, even though they had at one time provided the foundation for the sub-field of collective behavior. Clearly a more accurate set of theories was needed to explain the occurrence of social movements in general and participation in social movements in particular.

Resource Mobilization Theory

Overview of Resource Mobilization Theory

As the classical collective behavior theories did not provide a satisfactory explanation for the occurrence of social movements, a new set of theories, known broadly as resource mobilization theories, were developed in the 1970s. Unlike the classical theories, advocates of resource mobilization acknowledged that social movements were inherently political and that the individuals who participated in them were not irrational actors reacting to structural strain. Resource mobilization theory is described by McCarthy and Zald (1973; 1977) as differing from the classical collective behavior theories because it "depends more upon political, economic, and sociological theories than on the social psychology of collective behavior." [5]

Broadly, McCarthy and Zald (1973; 1977), who developed much of the foundation for resource mobilization theory along with Tilly (1978),[6] believe the success and growth of social movement organizations (defined as a complex, formal organization which identifies its goals with the preferences of a broader social movement or countermovement[7] and attempts to implement its goals) is dependent on its ability to obtain resources. Edwards and McCarthy (2004) concur, noting that the overall purpose of resource mobilization theory is to determine how groups are able to overcome prevailing patterns of resource inequality in order to pursue social change. When there are more discretionary resources (both mass and elite) that are available to the public, then more resources will be available for social movement organizations. In a sense, the model views these organizations as being similar to small businesses in terms of competing for resources and followers.

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[5] Buechler (2004) notes that the resource mobilization approach challenged the assumptions put forth by collective behavior theory in four primary ways: 1) it insisted that social movements were different enough from the other forms of collective behavior, such as panics, riots, and crowds, that they should have their own set of explanatory factors and should not be lumped together in this broader group; 2) it argued against social movements being "non-institutionalized" and noted that they had lasting and patterned elements that make them a form of institutionalized behavior; 3) it challenged the idea that participants were not rational actors; and 4) it replaced the notion that social movements were rooted in social psychological grievances with the notion that they were inherently political in nature. Resource mobilization theory thus re-defined social movements as rational, political challenges by aggrieved groups, as opposed to an act of deviance by irrational actors in response to social-psychological strain (Beuchler, 2004).

[6] Some authors divide Resource Mobilization Theory into several strands, including political and economic. Due to space constraints, this paper will not distinguish between the various theories, especially as their reasons for why people participate in social movements are similar.

[7] According to McCarthy and Zald (1977), a social movement is a set of opinions and beliefs in a population which represents preferences for changing some elements of the social structure and or reward distribution in a society. A countermovement is a set of opinions and beliefs in a population opposed to a social movement.

The types of movement resources that help groups achieve social change include moral resources, such as legitimacy and support (Cress and Snow, 1996); cultural and knowledge-related resources that are important to the development of a social movement, such as knowing how to run a meeting, launch a protest event, or hold a news conference (Oliver and Marwell, 1992); social-organizational resources, which involve knowledge of how to build an organizational infrastructure, be it through obtaining space and facilities or recruiting volunteers and movement participants; material resources such as money and in-kind contributions; and finally human resources, such as labor and participation (Edwards and McCarthy, 2004). These resources might come from the state, local, or federal government; foundations; religious organizations; other social movement organizations, or even firms and corporations (Edwards and McCarthy, 2004). The overall theme in the resource mobilization literature is that resources are provided to deprived groups by elites, and that these groups need resources from elites in order to accomplish any kind of change.

McCarthy and Zald (1977) note that instead of having an integral part in the rationale of why social movements form, grievances are seen as constant and therefore of secondary importance. Additionally, they distinguish between "conscience" constituents and adherents and movement "beneficiaries," with the former encompassing those who directly support or participate in a social movement but do not stand to directly benefit from the movement's goals, and the latter including those who will directly benefit from the movement's goals.[8] Unlike the classical collective behavior theories described in the previous section of this paper, one key aspect of the resource mobilization theories is that many of the individuals who participate in social movements are assumed to be conscience adherents, such as wealthy individuals and middle-class college students, as opposed to beneficiaries of the movements (Jenkins, 1993). In this way, the model presents almost the opposite problem of the classical theories, which do not account for conscience participants at all. In fact, Edwards and McCarthy (2004), key proponents of the Resource Mobilization approach, note that social movements that emphasize the concerns of the middle class and that resonate with more privileged individuals are more likely to materialize that those that focus on the needs of the poor,

[8] This is an important distinction when examining theories of participation, as some theories do not clearly distinguish between the process by which conscience adherents and beneficiaries decide to participate, yet both are different groups with different motivations, and thus must be examined separately.

and that the mobilization of poor groups are rare in advanced industrial democracies. While they might be rare, they do still exist, and therefore must be explained by any type of viable social movement theory.

How Participation is explained by Resource Mobilization Theory

Although the theory itself is more focused on the development and maintenance of social movement organizations than on why individuals choose to participate, resource mobilization theorists generally explain individual participation through a cost/benefit model. Buechler (2000) notes that individuals weigh the costs and benefits of participation, and then determine, based on the expected costs and benefits, whether participation in the movement is worth it. Possible benefits include collective incentives (things that will benefit all members of the community; a shared interest in wanting to improve the public good) and selective incentives (things that only those who participate receive, can be either be material or non-material) (Olsen, 1968, Rubin and Rubin, 1992, Klandermans and Oegma, 1987). Potential costs and barriers to participation include opportunity costs (loss of time participating that could be spent on other things), biographical availability (from McAdam, 1986, this includes pre-existing responsibilities such as children, families, or jobs), countervailing social ties (friends or family members who do not support participation in the movement), direct participation costs (anything the participant has to pay for out of his/her own pocket that is related to the organization), or organizational barriers (such as a lack of knowledge or language skills that may prevent some individuals from participating) (Castelloe and Prokopy, 1994). According to resource mobilization theorists, if the benefits outweigh the costs, an individual will participate (McCarthy and Zald, 1977, Jenkins, 1993).

McCarthy and Zald (1977) note that a key challenge of resource mobilization theory is to explain why individuals participate in social movements since the purpose of movements is to obtain collective goods and often lack individual, or selective, incentives. Specifically, they address the "free rider dilemma" that is introduced in Mancur Olsen's (1968) theory of collective action, which states that since individuals will reap the benefits of collective action whether or not they participate, rational actors will not participate unless they receive selective incentives. Resource mobilization proponents (and many social movement theorists in general) solve this dilemma by pointing to the fact that a number of empirical studies on participation have

found collective incentives to be more important to participants than selective incentives, as participants cite a desire to "fight evils" and concerns based on morals and values as opposed to specific things that an individual will receive from participating (Macy, 1991, Jenkins, 1983, McCarthy and Zald, 1977)

Although the resource mobilization theory's perspective on why individuals participate in social movements is a marked improvement from the classical collective behavior theories on participation, it has several flaws. First, it does not differentiate between the processes that movement beneficiaries and conscience adherents go through when deciding whether to join a movement, participate in a rally, or go to a meeting.[9] An individual who is marginalized may not even realize he or she is marginalized, or may succumb to the Fundamental Attribution Error. Thus, there must be a social psychological process of realization that individuals experience before they get to the point where they can weigh the costs and benefits of participation. While it may be true that the majority of individuals who participate in social movements are conscience adherents who are not marginalized, there are nonetheless a number of marginalized people who have participated in social movements in the past, and who continue to participate. Resource mobilization theory's explanation of participation does not explain how people recognize that they are marginalized and seek to address those grievances through social action. It also does not provide an explanation of how conscious constituents go through this process.

Snow, Rochford, Worden, and Benford (1986) agree, pointing out that Resource Mobilization theory does not acknowledge that different individuals interpret the same grievances in a number of ways, including who is to blame and what can be done to fix the problem. Although resource mobilization theory is less focused on the micro-processes that lead to participation than on the larger macro-processes that sustain social movements, the exclusion of this important component leaves the theory incomplete. Ferree and Miller (1985) also concur, noting that a purely incentive-based, cost-benefit model does not provide a sufficient explanation for why some people choose to participate in social movements while others do not.

[9] Much of the literature does not distinguish between the different types of participation. The exception is McAdam (1986) who examines the motivations for participation in high-risk activism. McAdam's work will be explore in more detail later in this paper.

There are broader criticisms of resource mobilization theory that go beyond issues of participation. McAdam (1982) questions whether this framework is more useful for public interest lobbies than for social movements, as the literature does not clearly distinguish what differentiates a non-profit advocacy organization from a social movement. Further, it is unclear whether organizations that depend on elites for resources actually have the chance of establishing any kind of broad structural change in society, or if, as noted by McAdam, by granting small concessions to marginalized groups, elites are actually working to appease the masses and strengthen the status quo. From this perspective, the theory appears to be conservative and anti-change. As large scale, institutionalized changes for marginalized groups have occurred in the past (for example, through the civil rights movement), the usefulness of the resource mobilization theory for explaining participation in social movements among marginalized groups must be questioned.

Political Process Model

McAdam (1982; 1988) offers an alternative to resource mobilization theory that pays greater attention to the power of marginalized groups, seeks to combat the conservative bias of the resource mobilization approach, and provides a more complete explanation for why individuals participate.[10] The basic premise of the model is that wealth and power are concentrated in the hands of a few elites (called members) and that others (called challengers) have few ways to obtain influence through traditional political means, so social movements are a rational way for marginalized groups to obtain power. Unlike the Resource Mobilization approach, adherents of the Political Process Model believe that it is possible for marginalized groups to achieve changes. Quoting Schwartz (1976), McAdam notes that these marginalized groups have power because of their role in society's social and economic structures; if these "challengers" suddenly stopped cleaning office buildings, preparing food, and working in the fields, the large-scale disturbances that would results has the potential to seriously impact the livelihood of the "members."

McAdam (1982) presents three factors that generate insurgency: 1) the structure of political opportunities, 2) the level of organization within the aggrieved population, and 3) cognitive liberation. The structure of political opportunities simply means that something has occurred in greater society, such as a

[10] Although some social movement scholars (see Beuchler, 2000) believe that the political process model is essentially a type of resource mobilization theory.

war, industrialization, deindustrialization, or mass unemployment, that weakens the stability of the political system and provides opportunities for insurgent groups to leverage their demands and become sufficiently organized. Indigenous organizational strength is a second factor that leads to insurgency; it is defined by McAdams as established networks of marginalized groups such as churches, neighborhoods, social clubs, or other social movement organizations that bring "members" together, provide communication networks among the marginalized groups, and build recognized and trusted leadership.

Yet as McAdam (1982) notes, these two factors alone are not enough to lead to the creation of a social movement: something called cognitive liberation must also take place. As noted in both the introduction of this paper and its critique of resource mobilization theory, marginalized individuals must recognize that their situation is unjust in order to join a movement or participate in collective action. The concept of cognitive liberation, defined as "insurgent consciousness" about their situation (McAdam, 1982), gets at the root of why marginalized groups participate in social movements, and is the greatest strength of the Political Process model. Unlike both the classical models of collective behavior and resource mobilization theory, the political process model underscores the notion that members of marginalized groups do not view their situation in the same way, and that a process of awareness and consciousness must take place for individuals to recognize the inherent inequality in their situation. The next part of the paper will examine the concept of cognitive liberation in more depth.

McAdam includes Piven and Cloward's (1977) framework from their seminal *Poor People's Movements* as the "necessary cognitions" for cognitive liberation. The three necessary conditions are: 1) that the "system" must lose legitimacy, meaning the people must come to recognize that the institutions they used to accept are unjust; 2) people begin to believe their current situation is inevitable and start to demand change, and 3) people who are generally disempowered begin to feel a sense of efficacy, meaning they believe in their own ability to make changes. McAdam asserts that individuals are much more likely to reach a state of "cognitive liberation" when they are integrated into a social network with other individuals who are a part of the same marginalized group. Specifically, he notes that "the process of cognitive liberation is held to be far more likely and of greater consequence under conditions of strong rather than weak social integration" (pp.50). Logically,

this makes sense, as people who are closely integrated into homogenous groups are more likely to see that there are other people in their same situation (and thus to see past the Fundamental Attribution Error), to talk about the their situation with other individuals in the group, and, consequently, to attribute their problems to the system as opposed to their own personal shortcomings.

Although McAdam's model provides a better theory for why marginalized individuals choose to participate in collective action aimed at improving their lives than either classical collective behavior or resource mobilization theory, it still does not go far enough in laying out a framework for why some individuals participate in social movements and others do not. It is not difficult to envision a situation where the political opportunity is right for protest, an individual has experienced cognitive liberation and is part of a group of like minded individuals who also want to create change, yet is never recruited to participate in a protest and does not know how to instigate a protest or a social movement on his or her own. Recruitment is one aspect that is not included in McAdams' model, but there are others, including the motivation to participate even when in agreement with the movement's philosophy. These additional factors are discussed in Klandermans' comprehensive model of participation, which will be described in the next section of the paper.

Four-Step Theory of Participation

Klandermans (1987; 1988; 1997) notes that his four-step process of movement participation can best be viewed as a funnel, and that in order for an individual to actually participate in a movement, he or she has to make it through all of the stages, as people will drop out at each stage. The model below illustrates the four steps to participation.



Chart courtesy of Klandermans (1997), pp. 23.

Klandermans' theory is useful because it combines many of the common explanations for participation, including networks, framing, and critical consciousness, all of which have been found to impact participation, into one framework. Thus, by providing an overview of Klandermans' model, it is possible to integrate much of the contemporary literature and significant theories of why people participate in social movements. This section of the paper will outline Klandermans' broad theory and will integrate other theories that help to explain (or not explain) its various stages. Klandermans' four stages are both macro and micro in nature, meaning that some deal with the larger society and some deal with individual cognitions. All are important when looking at why some individuals participate in social movements and others do not.[11]

Step One: Mobilization Potential

The first step in determining who will participate in a given social movement is to examine the movement's mobilization potential. Broadly, every person who has sympathetic, positive, or even neutral feelings toward the movement and its goals could potentially be mobilized. Klandermans notes that those who are not sympathetic to the movement will not be mobilized, regardless of whether they are recruited to participate, although it is certainly possible that an individual might not be sympathetic at the outset but might have his or her opinion swayed by a recruitment agent or campaign. This means that an individual might not be part of the mobilization potential until he or she is actually recruited in Step 2. Regardless, both becoming sympathetic toward the movement and being recruited are necessary steps toward participation.

To illustrate the concept of mobilization potential, Klandermans (1997) uses the Dutch protest movements in 1983 against the deployment of cruise missiles. He notes that although three-fourths of the population of one small Dutch city said in surveys that they supported the movement, only five percent actually ended up participating in the demonstration at The Hague against missile deployment. Thus, the 75% of individuals who sympathized with the movement were considered potential adherents, and the 25% who did not sympathize were not considered potential adherents.

[11] One caveat of Klandermans' model is that it does not distinguish between conscience and beneficiary adherents, as it is actually based his research of an anti-nuclear movement, where it is difficult to distinguish between the two types of individuals. Future work in this area might re-examine Klandermans' model and determine whether the steps differ at all for these two groups.

According to Klandermans (1988; 1997) and Klandermans and Oegema (1987), in order for an individual to be included the pool of adherents, he or she must have developed something called a collective action frame. Gamson (1992) defines collective action frames as "a set of action oriented beliefs and meanings that inspire and legitimate social movement activities and campaigns," while Snow, Rorden, Wachford, Benford, and Zurcher (1986), describe collective action frames as an individual's "interpretative orientation, including one's individual interests, values, and beliefs." As noted above, it is important to emphasize that an individual could develop a collective action frame before he or she is recruited into a particular movement (i.e. a low-income person could feel oppressed by observing his or her conditions or through discussions with other low-income individuals) or could develop a collective action frame as a result of the recruitment process (i.e. a low-income person might experience the Fundamental Attribution Error until he or she comes into contact with a recruitment agent who emphasizes that his or her condition is not his or her fault). Thus, developing a frame could take place at either the first or second stage in Klandermans' four-step process, but it is an essential step that must occur in order for individuals to participate in a social movement.

Collective Action Frames

"Framing" has become an integral part of the literature on social movements in the past two decades. The concept of frames emphasizes that in order for an individual to participate in a social movement, he or she must have beliefs or interpretations of a particular issue or set of issues that correspond to the goals of a Social Movement Organization on that particular issue.[12]

Gamson's Model of Collective Action Frames

Gamson (1992) notes that collective action frames have three components: injustice, identity, and agency. *Injustice*, which is related to the moral indignation of grievances, could be due to inequality, such as with the civil rights, women's rights, and gay rights movement, or could be a reaction to how a society's elites deal with a particular social problem. *Identity* occurs when individuals identify a "they" who is responsible for

[12] There is, of course, room for confusion, deception, and the like in terms of a social movement's real and stated goals, but for the most part, one can assume that an individual is participating in a movement because he or she has goals that are similar to the movement.

the injustice and a "we" that consists of themselves and other like-minded individuals who are opposed to the "they." Finally, *agency* is when individuals believe they have the ability to accomplish change.

In many ways, Gamson's model of collective action framing is similar to the concept of cognitive liberation (the belief that a system has lost legitimacy, the feeling that change is possible, and the expectation that one can contribute to that change) discussed earlier in the paper, although the collective action frame described by Gamson could easily be applied to either a conscience or a beneficiary adherent (i.e. an oppressed person or a non-oppressed person who is supportive of a particular oppressed group), while Piven and Cloward's (1977) three criteria for cognitive liberation were formulated with disempowered people in mind. That said, it is possible that a conscience constituent might also go through a "cognitive liberation" experience to support a movement (i.e. he or she might believe the system has lost legitimacy, that it is not hopeless to try and make change, and that he or she can contribute to that change).[13]

The issue of agency /self-efficacy (see Bandura, 1982) mentioned by Gamson comes up frequently in the social movement literature. Agency is an important concept, because if individuals feel fatalistic and like they have no ability to make any positive changes, it is doubtful that they will feel any sense of interest in the movement at all and are not likely to be sympathetic toward its goals. A number of empirical studies have documented the importance of agency in movement participation. Passey and Guiguino (2001) were interested in why some people participate more intensely in social movements than others. They looked at data on members of the Bern Declaration, an organization of Swiss solidarity movements whose aim is to "sensitize its members to inequalities and imbalances in North/South relations," to better understand what factors indicated strong participation in the movement. In the study, "strong participation" was defined as "individuals who are regularly active in the organization." The analysis found a strong significant relationship between an individual's perception of his or her own effectiveness and being actively involved in the organization. Sherkat and Blocker (1994), who used data from the Youth-Parent Socialization Panel Study to determine characteristics of individuals who participated in the political protests of the 1960s, found that

[13] There are a number other theories of critical consciousness development that should be examined when developing a broader theory on social movement participation and movement framing. Due to space constraints, these theories will not be explored in detail in this paper, but they include the work of Friere (1970) and Mansbridge and Morris (2001).

personal efficacy was a statistically significant predictor of who participated; those who had higher confidence in their ability to accomplish change were more likely to become involved in the protest movements. Chavis & Wandersman (1990) also found this relationship when looking at community based organizations aimed at social change. They looked at primarily African- American neighborhood in Nashville to determine what factors led to greater participation in the local block association, which aimed to improve conditions in the community. They found that one's belief in their own personal power was significant in predicting whether they chose to participate in the organization.

Although Gamson's model of collective action framing is helpful when examining why some individuals (both beneficiaries and constituents) are sympathetic to social movements and others are not, it does not say anything about how individuals *obtain* a sense of identity, agency, and injustice. While Snow, Rochford, Worden, and Benford (1986) do not use the concepts of identity, agency, and injustice in their model of collective action framing, they do provide a better sense of how individuals who were not previously sympathetic to movement participation can become sympathetic through the use of particular framing techniques. The next section of the paper explores these techniques in more depth.

Snow, Rochford, Worden, and Benford's Collective Action Frame Model

A second model for collective action frames was developed by Snow, Rochford, Worden, and Benford (1986), which they call frame alignment processes. This process can be seen as both helping to raise the consciousness of potential participants and also working to recruit participants by framing old arguments, values, and beliefs in new ways that will appeal to a broader audience. As noted above, individuals cannot be considered part of the mobilization potential until they sympathize with the movement. However, Snow et al.'s collective action framing techniques could also be easily included in Part 2 of Klandermans' model (recruitment), as they provide ways that social movement organizations seek to align or re-align the collective action frames of potential adherents.

As noted above, Snow, Rorden, Wachford, Benford, and Zurcher (1986) describe the frame alignment processes as the "linking of individual and social movement organization interpretative orientation, such that some set of individual interests, values, and beliefs and SMO activities, goals, and ideology are

congruent and complementary." They note that in order for an individual to participate in a SMO, his or her interpretive frames must line up with the frames of the movement. Snow et al. (1986) break down the frame alignment process into four distinct types: frame bridging, frame amplification, frame extension, and frame transformation.

Frame bridging involves linking a social movement organization with groups of people who are already sympathetic with a movement's ideology but have no way to express those sentiments with an appropriate social movement organization. Snow et al. (1986) note that this type of frame alignment does not involve any kind of consciousness building or frame transformation, but is rather the structural linking of individuals with specific groups, and is achieved primarily through outreach to potential members (telephone, direct mail, and contacting individuals who are already involved in ideologically similar movements). Thus, it would probably fit better under Klandermans' next step, recruiting, than mobilization potential, but is included in this section since it is part of Snow et al.'s theory of frame alignment.

The other three types of frame alignment processes focus on changing people's interpretive frames instead of merely recruiting them. All are intended to change individuals from passive bystanders into potential participants who can be then recruited into social movement organizations. Frame amplification is the clarification or amplification of the way a person interprets or views particular issue, and is further broken down by Snow et al. (1986) into values amplification and belief amplification, with the former identifying and emphasizing a value (such as family, democracy, or justice) deemed basic to prospective participants, and the latter emphasizing and leading groups and individuals to see the relationship between two things (Snow et al use "Black is Beautiful' and "Capitalists are Exploiters" as two examples). Snow et al. (1986) identify five specific types of belief amplification: amplification that emphasizes the severity of a problem, that places blame, that expresses specific beliefs about antagonists, that discusses the probability of change, and that emphasizes the importance of taking a stand. All of these techniques are used to turn individuals into supporters of a social movement.

Frame extension occurs when an SMO tries to promote values and beliefs that may not be clearly aligned or commonly associated with their organization in an effort to make potential participants who might

not be initially interested in the cause become interested and involved. Basically, the organization is trying to increase the number of adherents by making their goals and objectives fit with the perceived goals and objectives of potential participants. Snow et al. (1986) gives the example of a peace group in Austin, Texas who felt like their focus was too narrow to recruit enough members, so they added the following goal: "To promote social justice by nonviolently confronting racism, sexism, and **all** forms of discrimination and oppression." By adding that they were interested in combating all forms of discrimination and oppression, the organization was potentially piquing the interest of people who were interested in issues that involved discrimination that did not involve race and sex.

The final frame alignment process is called frame transformation, which involves actually changing an individuals' existing interpretation of a phenomenon into a new interpretation. Frame transformation can be either domain-specific (changing the way an individual views one particular aspect of life, such as dietary habits, social consumption patterns, etc.) or global (when one experiences a change in their interpretation of life that is so far reaching it impacts all domains, like a peace activist who is able to link all of her actions back to the peace movement). The authors do not present an explanation of the techniques that social movement organizations undergo to transform an individual's interpretative frames, although one can imagine that it involves significant attempts to educate individuals about the SMO's issues and ideologies and attempts to build critical consciousness, especially among beneficiary constituents.

In order for an individual to participate in a movement, he or she must have frames that align with the frames of the movement. Gamson (1992) explained that in order to participate in a movement, an individual must experience injustice, identity, and agency, while Snow et al. (1986) describe the four types of frame alignment that turn individuals from passive observers into supporters of an SMO. How can these different models be reconciled, and is one better than another? The two are not inherently conflictual, as an individual could easily experience the phenomena described by Gamson during one of the frame alignment processes described by Snow et al.; for example, an individual might experience injustice and identity when talking with a recruiter who is utilizing frame amplification techniques. What is less clear is whether Gamson's model in particular, which Klandermans says must occur for an individual to participate in a social

movement, is supported by empirical research. Is it possible, for example, that an individual might participate without having experienced all three of these phenomena? Future work in the area of participation should examine this in more depth, as well as looking at the different ways in which conscience and beneficiary adherents become sympathetic participants.

Step Two: Recruitment

The second step in Klandermans' model is recruitment. He notes that it does not matter if an individual is sympathetic toward the movement if he or she is not recruited to participate or at least made aware of the movement's existence so he or she can join. Klandermans does not provide an extensive framework for recruitment, but a number of others have written about the ways that individuals are recruited into social movement organizations. The common theme in the social movement recruitment literature is that the vast majority of participants are either a) recruited by friends or family members or b) are recruited through an organization to which they already belong.

Snow, Zurcher, and Eckland-Olsen (1980) looked at ten studies of modes of recruitment into different social movement organizations (through friends, relatives, or by individuals they didn't know) and found that in all but one case (the religious group Hare Krishna), the vast majority of participants were recruited by individuals they already knew. Passey and Guigino (2001) also found that social networks have a strong impact on recruitment. Specifically, they found four ways that networks led to participation in the Bern Declaration, a Swiss social movement. First, being recruited to the organization by an individual who is already strongly engaged in the group was a significant predictor of becoming strongly engaged in the organization. Second, individuals became more strongly engaged when they were already affiliated with a formal network (such as a church) that was culturally close to the organization or was already involved with the organization in some way. Third, individuals who have a network of family and/or friends already engaged in the organization are predicted to become more strongly engaged themselves. Finally, people who are specifically recruited by individuals with whom they have strong ties (such as friends and family members) are more likely to become strongly involved in the movement.

The findings of Warren (2001) support the second conclusion of Passey and Guigino (2001). Warren conducted an extensive ethnography of the Texas Industrial Area Foundation (IAF), a large national interfaith and multiracial network of community organizers that focus on number of issues, including affordable housing, living wages, and job training, and recruit their members primarily through churches. Like Passey and Guiguino, Warren concluded that a key way to get individuals involved in participatory organizations that fight for issues of social justice is to work through existing organizations – such as congregations - where individuals already have strong ties. Snow, Zurcher, and Eckland (1980) also found from their research with the Nichiren Shoshu religious movement and students at the University of Texas, and Curtis and Zurcher (1973) found from their research of anti-pornography organizations, that movements that are tied to other social movement organizations and other networks (such as churches) will grow larger and more rapidly than groups that are not attached to such groups and networks. Recruiting participants through the merging of pre-existing groups or through recruiting large blocs of individuals through these pre-existing groups is known as "bloc recruitment" (Fernandez and McAdam, 1988).

McAdam (1986) and McAdam and Paulsen (1993) studied the characteristics of Northern conscience participants in the 1964 Freedom Summer activities and compared them to individuals who signed up to participate in Freedom Summer but withdrew before they actually became involved. They found that social networks were a significant predictor of who did and did not participate. Specifically, individuals who had strong friendship or kinship ties to other participants were significantly more likely to participate in the Freedom Summer than those who did not have such ties. The researchers also found that individuals who participated were more likely than non-participants to belong to Civil Rights, peace, and other political organizations prior to joining the movement. It was hypothesized that belonging to one of these organizations may have meant that individuals feel more commitment to honor their decision to participate as opposed to withdrawing.

Thus, the key finding from the participation literature is that social ties and networks are an important recruitment mechanism, as individuals are more likely to participate in a social movement if they are either recruited through people they already know or through a social network to which they already

belong.

Step Three: Motivation

Even when they were recruited, however, not all of the sympathizers in the Dutch village studied by Klandermans (1983) actually participated in the anti-missile demonstration at The Hague. Klandermans notes that in order to motivate sympathetic individuals to participate in a movement, these individuals must feel like the movement has goals that are feasible and is working toward an action that is likely to be effective.

To this end, Klandermans lays out a three step process that combines both the value expectancy theory of Feather and Norman (1982) and the idea of collective and selective incentives (described earlier in this paper) to explain why some recruited sympathizers participate in social movements and others do not. Feather and Norman's theory states that people are more likely to engage in a specific behavior if it is likely that the behavior will result in a specific set of outcomes and if these are outcomes that the individual values. As described earlier in the paper, collective incentives are those that all individuals in a certain group or community will receive regardless of their participation in the movement, while selective incentives are only available to those who participate (Olsen, 1971). Klandermans' model of motivation states that people are motivated to participate by *both* collective and selective incentives, although research has generally shown that collective incentives are more important than selective incentives in terms of encouraging social movement participation in most people. As noted earlier in this paper, some individuals felt that people would not be motivated to participate in a movement because they could "free ride" and would still receive the benefits, research has shown that this is generally not the case.

Klandermans notes that people are motivated to participate only by incentives that they believe will occur through their own participation in the movement. In terms of collective incentives specifically, three things impact ones' decision to participate are 1) motivation about whether others will participate, 2) whether one's one perceives that their own participation will make a difference in achieving success, and 3) whether many people participating will help to achieve success. Thus, it is important for organizers to not only tell potential participants that their own involvement is important, but also to emphasize that a significant number of other individuals will also be participating (if this is indeed the case!). Sherkat and Blocker (1986),

who studied activists during the 1960s, note that participants must believe that others are willing to participate and that both the individual's participation and the actions of others will make a significant difference in terms of achieving the stated goals. Using computer simulations, Macy (1991) found that individuals take into account whether other individuals will participate in a movement before deciding to participate themselves, and that even those who are highly interested in participating are not likely to do so unless they think others will be taking part in the movement as well.

The second factor, whether individuals believe they are capable of helping the movement achieve success, or efficacy, was discussed as one of the three criteria for Gamson's collective action framing at the beginning of this section, and a number of studies were presented that show the link between self-efficacy and participation. That said, it makes sense that one would have to feel even more confident in their ability to produce change in order to actually participate in the movement, as opposed to merely becoming a movement sympathizer like in step 1.

Step Four: Barrier Removal

Yet Klandermans notes that not everyone who is sympathetic, recruited, and motivated will actually participate. In order for an individual to actually become a participant in a social movement, he or she must eliminate the barriers that prevent participation. Snow, Zurcher, Ekland-Olsen, and Benford (1980) found that one of the key barriers to participation in activist student organization among undergraduate students at the University of Texas-Austin who sympathized with the causes of the organizations was time: the students indicated that they just didn't have enough of it to become involved. The authors refer to this as "differential availability," and found that one of the key differences between those who participated and those who did not was whether they said they had enough time. McAdam (1986), Passey and Guigino (2001), and Barkan, Cohn, and Whitaker (1995) all tested this hypothesis, however, and found that differential availability had little impact on whether a person participated or not. That said, McAdam noted that his sample might have been skewed since he was examining the participation of mostly middle-class college students and professors in the 1968 Freedom Summer and there was not a lot of variation in their availability; most were readily available. However, availability was also not statistically significant in three different models run by Passey and Guigino

on participation in the Bern Declaration (2001) and by Barkan, Cohn, Whitaker (1995) on participation in the national anti-hunger organization Bread for the World. Intuitively it makes sense that those with more availability would participate more often in social movements; further research is needed to determine with confidence whether biographical availability makes a difference in social movement participation. If not, more clarification may be needed on what kinds of specific barriers might prevent motivated individuals from participating, and if this fourth step is even necessary in Klandermans' model.

In addition, it is often noted that low-income people have difficulty participating in social movements because their primary concern is keeping food on the table and a roof over their heads, so they have little time to try and work to make changes in their situation (Shipler, 2005). It does not appear that much empirical work has actually been done to verify whether this is actually the case and whether availability is different across different income groups. It is an area in which future research is needed.

Klandermans' model provides a framework for evaluating why one individual might participate in a social movement over another. Although there are some parts that could benefit from clarification and further research (such as the confusion that ensues when a person actually becomes a sympathetic participant (step 1) after they are recruited (step 2); a better explanation of the difference between self efficacy at step 1 (in Goffman's theory of collective action) and step 3 (Klandermans' framework of participation); and the question of whether the 4th step of the model is empirically necessary) the framework is helpful when looking at the different components that might lead an individual to participate in a movement. The next step is to conduct empirical tests of the model that go beyond Klandermans' anti-missile demonstration; of specific importance is to see if the model differs when analyzing the steps taken by beneficiary and conscience constituents and in regard to different types of collective behavior (such as high v. low-risk activism).

Discussion and Areas for Future Research

While certainly not an exhaustive description of social movement theories on participation, this literature review provides a starting point for my future work in this area. One significant critique I found of the existing literature on social movement participation was that very little of it looked at the movement participation of low-income individuals, especially low-income individuals in the recent past. Individuals who

did look at marginalized groups include McAdam (1982), who examined African-American participation in the civil rights movement using the Political Process Model and Piven and Cloward (1979), who explored the welfare rights movements of the 1960s. Piven and Cloward (1979) did not articulate a theory of why some individuals participated in the movement and others did not, which is why a discussion of their findings is not included in this paper. It is clearly very time-consuming to collect data on movements and movement participants, and many of the researchers used the same data in a number of their articles. That said, it is frustrating that so little of the literature focuses on marginalized groups. Benford and Snow and their colleagues repeatedly looked at the Nichiren Shoshu and Hare Krishna religious movements, which are arguably quite different from social activist movements aimed at creating change for marginalized groups. It is questionable why these groups were even used for studies of social movements, as they are so different from many of the movements that the theories are supposed to be explaining. Much of McAdam's work focuses on northern white activists during the Civil Rights Movement, while Klandermans looked at the Dutch anti-missile activists. None of the literature (at least that I could find) looked at the contemporary welfare rights movement or other economic justice organizations.

However, this does mean there is a significant amount of work that can be done in the area of movement participation among low-income individuals. Existing theories, such as Klandermans' framework, including framing, networks, cost/benefit analyses, and biographical availability, can be applied to marginalized beneficiary groups as well as conscious constituents to see if the theories hold up to each group. It is entirely possible that some aspects of the theories are more relevant than others depending on the type of group examined. Further research could also create linkage with the social capital literature to examine whether those with high levels of social capital, especially low income individuals, are more likely to participate in movements, and under what circumstances they are more likely to do so. One would assume that this is the case but it would be interesting to examine the linkages empirically. Studies might also examine what makes some individuals participate more frequently than others, who is more likely to participate for a longer period of time, and the reasons why individuals who have been involved in an organization for a significant amount of decide to no longer participate. This literature review has primarily examined why

individuals initially choose to participate or not participate in a movement, but clearly there is more to movement participation than just this initial phase. It would be fascinating to examine the different theories of "consciousness raising," including framing, cognitive liberation, critical consciousness, and oppositional consciousness to determine how they differ and which are the most useful when attempting to explain participation in social movements among marginalized individuals. Finally, a more comprehensive theory of participation could include components from the community organizing literature in social work[14] and the political participation literature in political science, as both might be able to add valuable information to the debate on why some low-income people participate and others do not.

This paper has provided a starting point for my future research on why members of marginalized groups do or do not in participate in social movements aimed at increasing economic justice. Before I can begin to look at the specifics of why low-income people do and do not participate in movements, it was important to lay a framework of the existing literature so I have an understanding what general theories already exist to explain participation. There is still much literature for me to read, but I have developed a general knowledge of the major theories, research, and disagreements in the sub-field as a result of this paper and look forward to building on that knowledge in my future work.

[14] Several of the empirical studies in this paper were from the social work literature, but it would be interesting and worthwhile to incorporate their theories as well.

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