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A History of Social Injustice in: Napier Park

Don Mount Court

Rivertowne

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Introduction

This paper is an attempt to examine issues of social justice in urban planning processes. To meet this goal, a case-study approach will be utilized; it will focus on the redevelopment of a small neighborhood in south central Toronto. The neighborhood, bordered by Dundas Street, Broadview Avenue, Queen Street, and Don Valley Parkway, has gone by three different names over the past one hundred years: Napier Place, Don Mount or Don Mount Court, and Rivertowne (Figure 1). This paper will examine each as a separate place. The first section will examine the history of each, from its start as Napier Place through to its present day alias, Rivertowne. The redevelopment of the neighborhood with a focus on its subsidized housing will be explored in the context of Canadian and American housing policy during the mid- and latetwentieth century. As a case-study, this will include an examination of the actors involved and the mechanisms that supported redevelopment. The subsequent section will detail the broader theoretical context that enabled and informed the redevelopment action. The third section will be a critical exploration of social justice issues present study area. The first part of this section will focus primarily on the built form of Don Mount Court and Rivertowne as drivers of injustice. The latter part of the section will examine meetings between Rivertowne market residents and subsidized tenants. These meetings, which were facilitated by a contracted community developer, serve to demonstrate the social struggles that emerged from Rivertowne's construction as a spatial solution to poverty and will reveal further (and ongoing) injustices. The ultimate section will be a further discussion of the social justice issues, their potential solutions, and a brief conclusion. Attached to this report is an Appendix of pictures from the study area that should help to provide visual context for the discussion. The images are referenced in the report where relevant.

History and Development

In 1934, the Bruce Report was released. The report condemned Toronto's public health and housing quality; many homes were in disrepair and lacked modern amenities like indoor plumbing (George 92). The Bruce Report was a call to the central government to fix the most egregious offenders – notably Cabbagetown, a neighborhood directly across the Don River from Napier Place. It took over ten years for the first effects of this report to be felt, but, in 1947, parts of Cabbagetown were finally cleared and redeveloped. This process occurred through a mix of local and federal cost sharing, not through legislative policy which the Canadian government was hesitant to provide. When the redeveloped area finally reopened, it was branded "Regent Park" and was met with critical acclaim. This acclaim, and the passing of the Housing Act of 1949 in the United States, spurred the Canadian government to pass its own National Housing Act in 1949 (Mair 13). The Act established the Central Mortgage Housing Corporation as a financial intermediary between the federal government and local municipalities that would provide capital support for slum clearance and redevelopment – urban renewal (Sewell 33-34).

During this post-war period, white flight became common. As the working-class Anglo-Saxon residents of Napier Place moved to sprawling suburbs (Keating 1), immigrants of from Italy, Greek, and Yugoslavia took over the neighborhood (Mair 10). The new residents and their lifestyles must have not been appreciated, because in 1956, Napier Place was identified as a blighted area in a city commissioned report, *Urban Renewal: A Study of the City of Toronto*. In this report, Napier Place was considered "blighted for broader reasons that entwined the physical environment with the more sociological and ideological notions of what made a successful neighborhood". The report further designated Napier Place as a priority area for renewal, going

as far as providing a map of the properties that were in disrepair – all but one of them (Figure 2) (Mair 14). In this designation was a self-fulfilling prophecy:

The threat of expropriation not only affected the area by persuading people to move out and making residents in the area fearful at the prospect of losing their homes, it also played a crucial role in accelerating the physical decline in the area. The vague insidious threat of expropriation and urban renewal always produces a vicious circle: the area is considered for urban renewal because a planner has decided that there is bad housing in the area, and yet once urban renewal is publicly discussed, no homeowner or landlord dares to repair this house for fear he will be expropriated without being compensated. (Fraser 34)

Ten years later, in 1966, renewal of Napier Place finally began. By this time, the neighborhood had truly fallen into disrepair due to absentee landlords and unenforced housing provisions. The federal government provided half of the \$6.7 million expected cost, enough "to expropriate 238 properties and displace 1,200 residents" (Mair 17-18). Compensation for expropriation was supposedly based on fair market value (Fraser 107). However, due to the blighted nature of the neighborhood and cycle of disrepair, fair market value was laughably low. On average, "homeowners in Napier Place had to pay 56% more [than they were compensated] for their new properties" (Mair 19). The blighted nature of the neighborhood had one other effect: it soiled the reputation of the name "Napier Place". As a result, in mid-1966, local residents successfully petitioned the City of Toronto to rename the neighborhood "Don Mount Village" (Mair 20).

Replacing the 238 expropriated properties in Don Mount Village was a modernist public housing complex, called Don Mount Court, with 232 rent-geared-to-income units. That is, tenant rent was based directly on income. The complex was built over the gridded urban landscape and

encompassed a mix of multistory buildings that sharply contrasted with the single-family Victorian homes in the surrounding area. Access to the buildings was gained through an interior courtyard, an expansive greenspace which was the crowning innovation of the housing project. The goal of this was to bolster the feeling of community among residents by giving them a beautified space to interact. It also had the effect of disincentivizing dangerous behavior like children playing in the street by relocating them to the central courtyard. The construction on Don Mount Court was completed in 1968 (Figure 3 and Figure 4) (Mair 22-23). Unfortunately, this was also the same year that public perception began to turn against urban renewal. Neighboring Regent Park was deemed a failure around this time (James 25), and consensus that public housing were sites of both physical and social degeneration was reached (Hellyer 53-54). As a result, Don Mount Court was one of the last public housing projects undertaken in Canada (August 1165).

Over the next thirty years, there would be two distinct changes that would directly impact Don Mount Court. Demographically, the neighborhood continued to shift away from its Anglo-Saxon roots through the 1990s. An influx of black immigrants from African and Caribbean nations, as well as Asian immigrants from China and Japan, drastically upset the white dominance in Don Mount Village (Mair 30-31). Legislatively, the Canadian government, which remained in fiscally responsible for housing, instituted sharp budget cuts that drastically impacted public housing in the 1990s (Mair 37). This forced the provincial government of Ontario to take control of the housing projects. Under the Social Housing Reform Act of 2000 (Canada's version of HOPE VI), these housing projects were then passed onto the newly formed housing agencies (Mair 38-39); Don Mount Court became the property of the Toronto Community Housing Corporation (TCHC). During this changeover, catastrophic structural

damage was found in several of Don Mount Court's multistory buildings (Canada 5). In order to fix the damage, 150 units would need to be evacuated. At this point,

The TCHC saw an opportunity to bring the community in line with contemporary planning wisdom by replacing the modernist project with a mixed-income, New Urbanist-style community. While costlier than simple repair, TCHC argued that it was worth the extra cost to 'regenerate' the site, 'normalize' the community and provide a 'better environment' for tenant. (August 1166)

This occurred while South Riverside, the larger neighborhood that contains Don Mounty Village (and thus, Don Mount Court), was gentrifying. Don Mount Court was seen as one of the last remaining barriers to "middle-class resettlement". Recognizing this, the TCHC "argued that 'the full development potential' of the site was not being 'utilized', and proposed market units to create social mix, but also to 'recover development value of the land not required for replacement units" (August 1166).

In 2004, after several years of proposals and negotiations with tenants, TCHC demolished Don Mount Court and began construction on the rebranded Rivertowne development. It spent the next four years building 232 subsidized units and an additional 187 townhouses that would create class heterogeneity. That is to say that Rivertowne residents consisted of the subsidized tenants and the market residents, those that either lived in the market-rate townhomes at Rivertowne or lived in private homes adjacent to Rivertowne. The goal of the redevelopment, TCHC stated, "was to 'create a site plan and building form that normalizes the community ... including re-introducing the streets ... [and] minimizing the common outdoor elements and spaces that contribute to a sense of insecurity". It did this by reintroducing the grid street pattern that once occupied Napier Place. The new site also did away with the interior courtyard,

and other spaces that could be "controlled", and instead sought to put more "eyes on the street" (Figure 5). As this was TCHC's first foray into mixed-income public housing redevelopment, they "funded a 2-year community development position to foster social inclusion in Rivertowne" (August 1166). The goal of the community developer was to ensure the success of the social mix model by simply building a sense of community among the many residents at Rivertowne. The community developer aimed to achieve this by first:

Organizing a visioning retreat to identify key issues in the area. She then put together a steering committee (the 'Navigators'), with representatives from the community, and five 'action teams' to focus on community-identified priorities, including: youth, seniors, training, the environment, and crime prevention and safety ... the additional efforts of the community developer were extensive, and included (among other things) creating a newsletter, applying for and receiving grants for arts and cultural programming in the community, and organizing many workshops and events. (August 1166-1167)

Through this work, and specifically several meetings that brought together subsidized tenants and market residents, clear struggles emerged. Before discussing those struggles, the underlying arguments that justify mixed-income housing, and thus guide state involvement in subsidized housing, must be addressed. The following section will address the key arguments that favor "social mixing" as well as both recent and historical critiques of those arguments. This brief discussion will demonstrate the mechanisms that have enabled Rivertowne to be built and will serve as a background context for the following sections on struggle and social justice in the study area.

Social Mix Arguments

Though the destruction of Don Mount Court (public housing) in favor of creating Rivertowne (mixed-income housing) was a new practice in Toronto, it was hardly a new concept. In the United States, HOPE VI, a project to lessen "concentrations of poverty by placing public housing in nonpoverty neighborhoods and promoting mixed-income communities" through the destruction of existing public housing, had existed since 1992 (USHUD 1-2). HOPE VI, its Canadian counterpart – the Social Housing Reform Act of 2000 – and other programs like it were based largely on the works of William Wilson. In The Truly Disadvantaged: The Inner City, the Underclass, and Public Policy, Wilson argued that the drastic increase in the concentration of urban poverty "has undermined community institutions formerly maintained by black middleand working-class families, removed positive role models for young children and cut off young blacks from the informal networks and contacts prevalent in neighborhoods where most adults are employed" (Greenstein 3). Wilson's work construed poverty and its corequisites – crime, unemployment, poor education, disease, et cetera – as spatially constructed phenomena born out of the social isolation of the impoverished. Thus, a spatial solution, the demolition of public housing which served to concentrate poverty, was obvious. Removing public housing was politically palatable because it symbolically eradicated poverty and, more importantly, opened "up valuable land for redevelopment" in an increasingly neoliberal and privatizing economy (Crump 2002, 582). What then should replace public housing? Keying in on the notion of deconcentrating poverty, policy-makers turned to the New Urbanism movement that was advocating for walkable, mixed-use urban landscapes. Combining mixed-use design to attract wealthier tenants and mixed-income design to deconcentrate poverty, the hope was for "social mixing" to create organic interactions between the wealthy and poor. The wealthy residents were

expected to "act as role models, provide upward mobility and access to jobs via their social networks, and use their social capital and political influence to fight for better infrastructure and services" (August 1161).

However, these rationales have all been contested. Critics have argued that the issue of poverty is incredibly complex. The poor are not, in fact, socially isolated and considering that poverty and public housing have strong racial correlations, there must be larger structural issues involved. These structural issues cannot be solved simply through "social mixing", which dubiously assumes "that the interests of higher-income newcomers will align with those of public-housing residents" (August 1163). Additionally, the very notion that the poor need to live with the wealthy disregards all research regarding the effects of gentrification on the poor. For example, Jeff Crump argues that "public housing policy is part of a still merging set of institutional initiatives intended to move the recipients of public and assisted housing aid into the low-wage contingent labor market" – a distinctly neoliberal function – and is "intended to reengineer the class and racial structure of the city by bringing middle-class European-Americans back to the inner city" (Crump 2003, 185). Further, demolishing and rebuilding is a place-based solution, a "simplistic spatial solution to what are complex social and spatial problems" (Crump 2002, 582). Theorists, like David Harvey, have posited that spatial solutions have limited effect in solving social problems. Spatial solutions may, at best, serve to move and spread problems rather than actually solve them. To paraphrase Harvey:

If ... [poverty] is merely being moved around ... under standard practices, then aggregate efficiency is being impaired in the long-run if, as is increasingly the case, there are fewer and fewer empty 'sinks' within which [the poor] can costlessly be absorbed. (Harvey 378)

Harvey identifies a contradiction within the neoliberal motivation to deconcentrate poverty in the long-term. This exposes (and reinforces) the distinctly neoliberal assumption that, like capitalist growth, poverty can be shifted and spread indefinitely.

Interestingly, these critiques of public housing are not new; they appear to be rooted in nineteenth century critiques of capitalism. In 1872 and 1873, Frederick Engels wrote a series of articles that were redistributed as a pamphlet called *Zur Wohnungsfrage*, or *The Housing Question*. The articles focused on the shortage of affordable housing in industrialized urban areas. Similar to Crump's critique that public housing is an effort to control the low-wage labor force and Harvey's position that spatial solutions to poverty do not actually eradicate poverty, Engels wrote on public housing:

This a striking example of how the bourgeoisie solves the housing question in practice. The breeding places of disease, the infamous holes and cellars in which the capitalist mode of production confines our workers night after night, are not abolished; they are merely shifted elsewhere! (Engels 24)

This serves as evidence of the long-standing commitment by the empowered classes to move poverty around as a means of "fixing it". In a prescient statement, Engels further critiqued the problem of twentieth and twenty-first century housing policy when we wrote that "it is not the solution of the housing question which simultaneously solves the social question, but only by the solution of the social question, that is, by the abolition of the capitalist mode of production, is the solution of the housing question made possible" (Engels 9). This makes clear that "social mix" and poverty "deconcentration" are based on suspect theories of poverty causation that are seemingly enacted for the sole purpose of justifying dispossession and gentrification under capitalism.

Social Justice Issues

This section will consist primarily of a lengthy discussion on social justice grounded in practices that created the current Rivertowne community. The discussion will be broken down into two parts: Planning and Built Form, and Community Development. The former will comb through much of the previous discussion, making light of social justice issues that were discovered throughout the research process. It will also add to this discussion by examining the current built form of the Rivertowne development and its implications. The latter section will focus specifically on the actions of the community developer and the meetings that took place between subsidized tenants and market residents. While overlapping with the section on Planning and Built Form, this discussion will look more closely at ongoing debates and the production of social justice at Rivertowne. Before proceeding, social justice must first be briefly defined.

The domain of social justice is the society. Society implicitly includes people and their interactions, relationships, cultures, and institutions. Justice is slightly more ambiguous, but can be expressed simply as fairness. Fairness brings to mind concepts of equity and equality.

Together, social justice can be expressed superficially as fairness in society. A key component of the social justice discussion is how it is defined and administered. That is, who decides what is fair, how can they do so, and given that conception of justice, how will it be achieved? Since answering these questions has proven to be incredibly difficult, if not impossible, David Harvey and Raymond Williams have argued that social justice can only be achieved through an aggregation of social (in)justices. That is, by recognizing and correcting particular occurrences of social injustice – militant particularism – these discrete movements can be aggregated to:

Create a more transcendent and universal politics ... [by adopting] a politics of abstraction capable of reaching out across space, across the multiple environmental and social conditions that constitute the geography of difference in a contemporary world that capitalism has intensely shaped to its own purpose. (Harvey 400)

This is just one theoretical understanding of social justice, of which are countless, but it serves to contextualize the point of the following discussion. The next sections on social justice will accomplish just the very first part of Harvey's strategy to achieve universal justice: they will recognize social injustices in a particular place at a particular time.

Planning and Built Form

To begin, the designation of Napier Place as blighted in the 1956 *Urban Renewal: A Study of the City of Toronto* report was certainly a major issue. This decision, made with arguable good intentions to improve the neighborhood, failed to acknowledge the neighborhood residents. The designation created the self-fulfilling prophecy of urban disinvestment and greatly marginalized the community. This was further exacerbated by the distressingly low fair value compensation paid to residents as compensation for their displacement. The only positive that came from this process was that residents had a say in the renaming of the area to Don Mount Village, something that would not occur decades later when the region was once again renamed to Rivertowne.

As previously mentioned, Don Mount Court looked distinctly different from the single-family homes in the area (Figure 6). This modern, edgy design with its interior courtyard was seen as a good idea at the time. In fact, public housing as a whole was often seen as an upgrade to the dilapidated housing that it replaced (Buron 5). However, this design served to isolate public housing residents from the surrounding area; one journalist described the atmosphere as

"cagey" (Bielski 2). While this structural demarcation was an issue that needed to be resolved, it is important to emphasize that Don Mount was not replaced because of it. Nor was Don Mount replaced due to crime or any other stereotypes associated with public housing. Don Mount was replaced because its owners, TCHC, saw an opportunity to capitalize on gentrification increasing rent in the area. While Don Mount was a (poor) place-based solution to disinvestment in Napier Place, Rivertowne is not a solution to anything. TCHC, given the "false choice between a gentrified condo community and continued neglect and deterioration of public housing" (August 1165), simply used impending structural repairs to justify the former, allowing them to renovict tenants from their homes with little political opposition. While there were "public consultations on the redevelopment" (Bielski 4), tenants were given no say in the choice to repair or rebuild. By not involving tenants "in the fundamental decisions affecting their autonomy", social injustice was caused (Lake 166). This was a violation of the principle of self-determination: the "ability not only to select among a set of options but also to determine the options presented for consideration" (Lake 165).

Similar to Don Mount Court, the built form of Rivertowne has also had evident effects on neighborhood life. In contrast to Don Mount Court, the community was built to blend in (as much as possible) with the still-standing and rapidly gentrifying Victorian homes that occupy the area. Additionally, the subsidized housing and market-rate housing were designed to be similar in appearance. This was done in an effort to prevent public housing residents from being "stigmatized simply by what their houses looked like" (Turbov and Piper 30). While this "blending" is probably a good thing, it could be argued that it also "signals the triumph of middle-class aesthetic values over the value placed on housing projects by those living in them" (August 1168-1169). The Rivertowne architects, smartly, referenced influential planning phrases

like "eyes on the street" and "defensible spaces" in designing the community. The public courtyard was dismantled and replaced with urban streets. Streets are places of social mixing and they are a place for interaction and activity; by encouraging public use, streets provide security to the neighborhood. Further, the interior courtyard at Don Mount Court was "controllable" due to its shrouded nature. By eliminating spaces that are controllable, the architects sought to reduce criminal activities that tend to take place in these areas (Mair 84-85). At the very least, the references to respected academic principles of design are progressive and instill hope. However, they do too little, only offering place-based solutions to community-based problems.

Unfortunately, the built form of Rivertowne was not comprehensively progressive. As the site plan shows (Figure 7), the subsidized housing (beige) is distinctly separate from the market-rate townhouses (pink). This has created an "us/them" dichotomy between tenants and residents, the latter group even calling for a fence to be installed (Mair 94-95). In one area by the townhouses, there is a chain that has been installed to prevent vehicular traffic (Figure 8). However, this chain is viewed as an impassible boundary by subsidized tenants. The chain also serves to close of the interior alleyways between the townhouses; in this way, it has effectively created controllable space (Mair 97). In another area between the subsidized housing and townhouses, there is a large wall that separates the two (Figure 9). The wall serves to separate a parking lot from the townhouses, but serves as a visual reminder of the "us/them" dichotomy (Mair 98-99). These subtle physical boundaries are exclusionary demarcations that isolate the subsidized tenants from the surround community in the same way that Don Mount Court did; they continually reproduce injustice despite existing within a community designed to minimize

class disparities. Additionally, it is likely that the visual differences between communities have exacerbated the issues encountered during community development meetings.

Community Development

Martine August's research revealed "four key areas of struggle between tenants and market residents [that] emerged during meetings". These areas, "power dynamics and control over local decision making; neighbourhood aesthetics and branding; representing space and defining its 'proper' use; and community safety and security" (August 1167) will now be explored.

In order to foster social mix, the community developer hosted meetings to discuss community issues. These meetings, which consisted of between 5 and 25 people, included "a core group of tenants made up of women of colour" and fluctuating group of predominantly white market residents who were both educated and employed (August 1166). This created a power dynamic that was largely shaped by existing structural inequalities. Market residents exhibited not only a sense of entitlement, but a tactical advantage in controlling the narrative of meetings through their collective corporate experiences. The market residents often volunteered to chair meetings and were "adamant" about following a strict agenda. The residents would "insist on adherence to the formal agenda whenever the conversation steered away from their priorities", but this was true only when tenants spoke. On the other hand, "market residents displayed a consistent sense of entitlement to speak up on any topic, at any point during a meeting". This subtle difference was exacerbated by more explicit power relationships where market residents often shouted at, interrupted, and intimidated tenants when they tried to speak. The market residents viewed these meetings as a favor to the tenants, and continually threatened to walk-out if their concerns were not prioritized. At one point, a community developer

recognized this negative power relationship that had overtaken the meetings, but was treated like a subsidized tenant when she attempted to address the issue. These power dynamics will continue to shape relationships and the strong anti-tenant sentiment through the remaining three struggles (August 1167-1168).

The neighborhood aesthetics and branding have been a huge point of contestation between tenants and residents. Though the tenants, most of who had lived at Don Mount Court, had no say in the new Rivertowne name, they did seem to embrace it. Working with a market resident, a group of tenants designed and proposed a logo to represent their new community (Figure 10). The logo was quickly met with objections from residents that it was unsophisticated and that it did not represent everyone in the community. The residents proceeded to request that a professional design several options to choose from. "This privileging of 'expert' or 'professional' knowledge is a subtle tactic often used to exert control, and mirrors the insistence on formal or 'corporate' meeting styles discussed earlier." This problem, and the structural inequality based power dynamics, were worsened when "it was decided that a small group should continue the discussion [about the logo] over email. This would necessarily exclude tenant participants, who had frequently informed the group that they could not access the internet." The final logo (Figure 11) was eventually chosen by a small group of market residents. Market residents further devalued the tenants by erasing any associations with the name "Don Mount". This name, stained by both its connection to public housing (or structural inequality: poor, minority, crime-laden, et cetera) and its use to describe subsidized tenants, was forcefully eradicated from the neighborhood (August 1169-1170). This is common tactic to exert power by rendering the space "ahistorical, devoid of any indications of the social struggles around its production, or traces of the concrete space it replaces" (McCann 169).

The third struggle that emerged in Rivertowne was conflict over "legitimate" uses of space and "proper" public behavior. The site of the former was a back alley between subsidized housing and private homes (Figure 12). Because the architects designed Rivertowne to have limited public space, the back alley became a natural gathering spot. Children often played in and tenants would gather to socialize in this area. This use of space was vehemently opposed by market residents who viewed this space as "for cars" only. "The discursive construction of the alley as 'for cars' permitted homeowners to characterize as deviant people who used the space for anything but driving and parking." As a result, tenants suggested the creation of a small community garden at one end of the alley on a small grassy plot, thus relocating tenant socialization to a confined area. Again, this was vehemently opposed. Residents believed this would offer tenants a "legitimate excuse" for being in the alley (August 1170-1171). One resident was quoted as stating: "the problem with community garden means 'community' comes and uses it" (qtd. in August 1171). Market residents again used their power to quash the tenant proposal, instead opting to landscape the small area. However, "concerned that grass and a fence will create a playpen and result in the parking area becoming a play area", residents suggested the planting of "thorny plants ... to prevent people from walking around in areas and using the spaces". The residents did succumb and offered the tenants one instance to use the alley – for a "police-led walkabout". In the end, residents' view "that their 'right' to not be made uncomfortable, afraid, or irritated by the sights and sounds of tenants" won out over "the rights of the tenants to use the space behind their homes" (August 1171). They were successful in turning the back alley into a Panopticon, where the tenants were constantly under the threat of surveillance. This is despite the fact that the community was explicitly designed to put "eyes on the street" to ensure safety and security for all.

This struggle shifted into the fourth and final struggle that Martine August observed, a struggle over safety and security. While many safety and security concerns existed (and exist) in Rivertowne, the market residents made clear that their preeminent concern was "protecting themselves *from* tenants and youth". This concern was legitimated through the community meetings where proposals included "enhancing surveillance and control of tenants by 'logging' incidents more effectively, installing security cameras, installing 'no loitering' and 'no trespassing' signs, and clearly labelling tenant apartments to assist in identifying 'problem units' to police" (August 1172). A Rivertowne manager "agreed to order 'no trespassing' and 'no loitering' signs 'so that we can charge people', and agreed to put address numbers on the backs of TCHC townhouses, so that homeowners across the alley could more easily identify units when calling police and security" (August 1172-1173). The residents' lopsided relationship with the police was further legitimated when a police officer, who was invited to one of the community meetings, stated: "If we can prove our calls to service are going up, even if crime is not going up, we can say: we need more officers" (qtd. in August 1173). This encouraged a "discourse about 'gangs of unknown youth' 'congregating' on TCHC property" among residents and had the effect of increasing the number of negative interactions between police and subsidized tenants. Another structure that further this inequality was age, where the youth were not part of community decisions but were increasingly singled out as symbols of deviance (August 1173). The same officer quoted above would go on to blame "youth for 'playing into' stereotypes, and suggested that youth themselves were at fault for the prejudice and ignorance of others" (August 1174).

Discussion

The efforts of the Toronto Community Housing Corporation to make its Rivertowne development a success are rather interesting. The commitment, although temporary, to hire a community developer shows some degree of interest from the TCHC in creating an inclusive and social just environment. However, the issues of injustice that have been highlighted above are a result of actions taken by the TCHC, both directly and indirectly in conjunction with the market-rate residents. Directly, these actions include failing to consider the opinions of tenants in the planning and naming process. Further, TCHC created both physical boundaries and demarcations that served to isolate the two communities from one another. Indirectly, TCHC failed to facilitate equal interactions between residents and tenants at meetings. Instead, the residents were able to exploit existing structural inequalities in order to devalue the opinions of the tenants. They allowed the residents to use their education and income as an excuse to privilege their own values and opinions. Additionally, on multiple occasions, TCHC gave into resident requests to make the Rivertowne development more hostile to tenants through the use of signage, landscaping, regulations, and police presence.

Looking back at the issues raised, this mirrors a historical trend in the neighborhood: the lack of respect for lower-income residents. From the first 1956 report that created the self-fulfilling prophecy through to present day Rivertowne, the lower-income residents have been continually dispossessed of their values, identity, integrity, and neighborhood. While TCHC may have wanted to create an inclusive neighborhood, they certainly failed to do so. Their efforts to foster community interaction through the community developer appear superficial at best. It was a half-hearted attempt at deliberative democracy with lopsided power relations – a problem exacerbated by the fact that neither side had an obligation to participate in the meetings in the


first place. And now, given the concessions made by TCHC to the residents, it is clear that the TCHC cares more about capital than they do about their tenants. This realization is crucial for solving the injustices present in Rivertowne.

In order to achieve a more socially just Rivertowne, the tenants must take responsibility for their own justice. The TCHC clearly only cares about serving the needs of its market-rate residents, and those residents already believe the neighborhood is just. The tenants must subvert this privileged attitude. They must prevent the residents from relying on what amounts to extortion as a negotiation tactic at the community meetings. If the TCHC has any power to step in to this situation and bolster the standing of its tenants (without damaging their economic capacity, of course), that would be the easiest solution. However, without knowing what mechanisms are available to the TCHC, or if they care, the responsibility for mitigating these injustices shifts to the tenants. Revisiting David Harvey's militant particularism, the tenants must organize and fight against every injustice, no matter how small. This not only brings crucial attention to the issues, but it will help to create a larger conception of justice. The tenants may also use this opportunity to do damage to TCHCs bottom-line, a move that would certainly garner attention and, eventually, aid in repositioning the tenants as equal to the residents.

Persistence and determination are the tenants' best weapons in their fight for social justice.

Appendix

Figure 1. Study Area



Source: Google Maps





Figure 3. Don Mount Court Site Plan



Source: Mair 23

Figure 4. Don Mount Court Multistory Buildings







Source: Mair 85





Figure 7. Rivertowne Site Plan



Source: Mair 93







Figure 9. Wall between Rivertowne townhouses and tenant parking lot

Source: Mair 99

Figure 10. Tenant's Rivertowne Logo



Source: August 1169

Figure 11. Final Rivertowne Logo



Source: August 1169

Figure 12. Back Alley Site



Source: August 1170

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