Static Analysis of Security Properties by Abstract Interpretation

École normale supérieure, équipe ABSTRACTION

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Static Analysis of Security Properties by Abstract Interpretation

Static Analysis

by Abstract Interpretation

 \longrightarrow course MPRI 2-6:

Abstract Interpretation: application to verification and static analysis

Security Properties



Security?










Security?

Information Security?







Security?

Access Control Accountability

Attack

Authenticity Authorization

Availability

Buffer Overflow

Bug

Classification

Confidentiality Control-Flow

Covert Channels

Cross-Site Scripting

Cryptanalysis Cryptography Cryptology

Dangling Pointer

Data Race

Declassification

Deadlock

Earthquake Encryption

Fire

Firewall

Flooding

Format String Implicit Flow

Information-Flow

Input Validation

Integrity Isolation

Language-Based

Least Privilege Malicious Code

Memory Safety

Non-Interference

Non-Repudiation

Obfuscation

Phishing

Policy Possession

Randomization

Reference Monitor

Risk

Runtime Check

Sandhox

SQL Injection Stack Inspection

Stack Overflow

Symlink Race

Tainting Theft Threat

Type Safety

Utility

Vulnerability

Wild Jump





Confidentiality



- Confidentiality
- Integrity



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- Disponibility

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- Integrity
- Disponibility
- Authenticity
- Accountability
- Possession
- ► Non-repudiation
- Utility

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
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
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
- Access Control
- ► Information-Flow Control
- Control-Flow Integrity
- Encryption



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\rightarrow courses

MPRI 1-13: Initiation to cryptology

MPRI 2-12-1: Cryptanalysis

MPRI 2-12-2: Arithmetic algorithms for cryptology

MPRI 2-13-2: Error correcting codes and applications to cryptography

MPRI 2-30: Cryptographic protocols: computational and symbolic proofs

Threats

- Physical: Earthquake, Fire, Flooding, Theft
- ▶ In the code:
 - Memory Safety:
 - Buffer Overruns
 - Stack Overflow
 - Dangling pointers
 - Concurrency:
 - Deadlocks
 - Data races
 - Symlink races
 - Input Validation:
 - SQL injection
 - Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)
 - Format String
 - Control/Data-Flow:
 - Type Safety
 - Wild Jumps
 - Self Modifying Code



Language-Based Mechanisms

- Runtime Checks: Reference Monitor (OS, Interpreter, Firewall), Inlined Reference Monitor
- Programming Languages: Type-Safe Languages, Typed Assembly Language (TAL)
- Executing Model: Isolation, Sandboxing, Stack Inspection
- Static Analysis: Information-Flow Typing, Abstract Interpretation
- Exotic: Obfuscation, Randomization

Security Policy (2)

- Authorization
- History-Based
- Control-Flow
- ► Information-Flow
- Classification (private/public)
- Declassification (when, where, by who and what private information can be considered public)

Information-Flow Security

Non-Interference: No two executions are observably different if they differ solely by confidential inputs.

Explicit Flows: from assignments

Implicit Flows: from Indirect Flows and Covert Channels:

- ► Termination Channel
- Timing Channel
- Probabilistic Channel
- Resource Exhaustion Channel
- Power Channel

Information-Flow Security Type System

$$\vdash exp: high \qquad \cfrac{h \notin Vars(exp)}{\vdash exp: low}$$

$$[pc] \vdash \texttt{skip} \qquad [pc] \vdash h := exp \qquad \cfrac{\vdash exp: low}{[low] \vdash l := exp}$$

$$\cfrac{[pc] \vdash C_1 \qquad [pc] \vdash C_2}{[pc] \vdash C_1; C_2} \qquad \cfrac{\vdash exp: pc \qquad [pc] \vdash C}{[pc] \vdash \text{while } exp \text{ do } C}$$

$$\cfrac{\vdash exp: pc \qquad [pc] \vdash C_1 \qquad [pc] \vdash C_2}{[pc] \vdash \text{if } exp \text{ then } C_1 \text{ else } C_2} \qquad \cfrac{[high] \vdash C}{[low] \vdash C}$$

Issues

Non-interference is too restrictive. Most real-world programs need exceptions to non-interference: declassification.

Examples?

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Examples?

Other issues:

- ► Expressiveness: first-class functions, exceptions, objects
- Concurrency: threads, nondeterminism, distribution
- Covert channels: termination, timing, probability
- Security policies: declassification, quantitative security, dynamic policies
- Certification: proven compilers, proof-carrying codes



Thank you for listening

Questions are welcome