

Workshop #1

Secure Development Series

07/15 - 12PM PST / 7PM UTC

The Dangers of Token Integration

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Series of sessions

Secure Development


The dangers of token integration

Strategies for secure access controls


The dangers of price oracles

and more!

Composability



Decentralized Finance: On Blockchain- and Smart Contract-Based Financial Markets
by Fabian Schär



risks ? assumptions ?

Your contract

some initial triggers

```
interface IERC20 {  
    function transferFrom(address sender, address recipient, uint256 amount) external returns (bool);  
}  
  
contract ArbitraryTokenHandler {  
    IERC20 immutable token;  
    uint256 totalDeposits;  
    mapping (address => uint256) deposits;  
  
    constructor(address _token) {  
        token = IERC20(_token);  
    }  
  
    function deposit(uint256 amount) external {  
        token.transferFrom(msg.sender, address(this), amount);  
        deposits[msg.sender] += amount;  
        totalDeposits += amount;  
    }  
}
```

Does it even compile ?

What Solidity version ? Isn't that overflowing ?

No docstrings - what's this *supposed* to do ?

No functions to withdraw tokens ?

No visibility on state variables ?

No events ?

Assuming previous approval ?

Not checking return value ?

Reentrancy ?

Works with any token ?

...

USDC

```
contract FiatTokenV1 is AbstractFiatTokenV1, Ownable, Pausable, Blacklistable {  
  
    function transfer(address to, uint256 value)  
        external  
        override  
        whenNotPaused  
        notBlacklisted(msg.sender)  
        notBlacklisted(to)  
        returns (bool)  
    {  
        _transfer(msg.sender, to, value);  
        return true;  
    }  
}
```

9. blacklist

0x5db0115f3b72d19cea34dd697cf412ff86dc7e1b

```
if IUUSD(usdcAddress).isBlacklisted(someAddress) {  
    // logic for address blocked  
} else {  
    // logic address allowed  
}
```

Addresses can be
blocked

Compromised blockers may put your system at risk

USDT

```
contract TetherToken is Pausable, StandardToken, BlackList {  
  
    function destroyBlackFunds (address _blackListedUser) public onlyOwner {  
  
    function transfer(address _to, uint _value) public whenNotPaused {  
        require(!isBlackListed[msg.sender]);  
    }  
}
```

14. owner

0xc6cde7c39eb2f0f0095f41570af89efc2c1ea828

```
if IUUSD(usdtAddress).isBlackListed(someAddress) {  
    // logic for address blocked  
} else {  
    // logic address allowed  
}
```

Can be paused

USDC

```
function pause() external onlyPauser {
    paused = true;
    emit Pause();
}

function transfer(address to, uint256 value)
    external
    override
    whenNotPaused
```

USDT

```
function pause() onlyOwner whenNotPaused public {
    paused = true;
    Pause();
}

function transfer(address _to, uint _value) public whenNotPaused {
```

BNT

```
function disableTransfers(bool _disable) public ownerOnly {
    transfersEnabled = !_disable;
}

modifier transfersAllowed {
    assert(transfersEnabled);
    _;
}

function transfer(address _to, uint256 _value) public transfersAllowed returns (bool success) {
```

Send / receive hooks

ERC777 → hooks on sender & receiver

ERC721 → hook on receiver

ERC1363 → hook on receiver /
spender

and more!

Send / receive hooks

For example, on transfers:

1. call sender
2. modify balances
3. call receiver

Send / receive hooks

```
15  /* VULNERABLE CODE */
16
17  function supply(uint256 amount) public {
18      uint256 newBalance = amount + deposits[msg.sender];
19
20      /*
21       * behind the scenes:
22       * 1. executes hook on attacker --> transfers execution to attacker!
23       * 2. updates balances
24       * 3. executes hook on receiver
25       */
26      token.transferFrom(msg.sender, address(this), amount);
27
28      deposits[msg.sender] = newBalance;
29  }
30
31  function withdraw() public {
32      uint256 amountToWithdraw = deposits[msg.sender];
33
34      deposits[msg.sender] = 0;
35
36      token.transfer(msg.sender, amountToWithdraw);
37  }
38 }
```

Read more:

- imBTC hacks
- <https://github.com/OpenZeppelin/exploit-uniswap>

Prevent transfers

- to token contract
- to zero address
- to caller's address
- of value zero

```
modifier validRecipient(address _recipient) {  
    require(_recipient != address(0) && _recipient != address(this));  
    -;  
}  
  
/   
function transfer(address _to, uint _value)  
    public  
    validRecipient(_to)
```

LINK

```
function transfer(address _to, uint256 _value) {  
    if (_to == 0x0) throw;  
    if (_value <= 0) throw;
```

BNB

```
require(dst != address(0), "Uni::_transferTokens: cannot transfer to the zero address");
```

UNI

```
function _transfer(  
    address sender,  
    address recipient,  
    uint256 amount  
) internal virtual {
```

OpenZeppelin's ERC20

```
    require(recipient != address(0), "ERC20: transfer to the zero address");
```

```
/* Do not allow self-transfers */
```

Compound's cTokens

```
if (src == dst) {  
    return fail(Error.BAD_INPUT, FailureInfo.TRANSFER_NOT_ALLOWED);  
}
```

Take fees
on transfers

USDT

```
function transferFrom(address _from, address _to, uint _value) public  
    uint sendAmount = _value.sub(fee);  
    balances[_from] = balances[_from].sub(_value);  
    balances[_to] = balances[_to].add(sendAmount);
```

STA

```
function transferFrom(address from, address to, uint256 value) public returns (bool) {  
    _balances[from] = _balances[from].sub(value);  
    uint256 tokensToBurn = cut(value);  
    uint256 tokensToTransfer = value.sub(tokensToBurn);  
    _balances[to] = _balances[to].add(tokensToTransfer);  
    _totalSupply = _totalSupply.sub(tokensToBurn);  
}
```

was used to steal from Balancer pools

How does Uniswap v2 tackle this ?

Take fees
on transfers

```
function addLiquidity(  
    address tokenA,  
    address tokenB,  
    uint amountADesired,  
    uint amountBDesired,  
    uint amountAMin,  
    uint amountBMin,  
    address to,  
    uint deadline  
) external virtual override ensure(deadline) returns (uint amountA, uint amountB, uint liquidity) {  
    (amountA, amountB) = _addLiquidity(tokenA, tokenB, amountADesired, amountBDesired, amountAMin, amountBMin);  
    address pair = UniswapV2Library.pairFor(factory, tokenA, tokenB);  
    TransferHelper.safeTransferFrom(tokenA, msg.sender, pair, amountA);  
    TransferHelper.safeTransferFrom(tokenB, msg.sender, pair, amountB);  
    liquidity = IUniswapV2Pair(pair).mint(to);  
}
```

```
function mint(address to) external lock returns (uint liquidity) {  
    (uint112 _reserve0, uint112 _reserve1,) = getReserves(); // gas savings  
    uint balance0 = IERC20(token0).balanceOf(address(this));  
    uint balance1 = IERC20(token1).balanceOf(address(this));
```

Just accounting for
what it actually
received

How does Compound tackle this ?

Take fees on transfers

```
function doTransferIn(address from, uint amount) internal returns (uint) {
    EIP20NonStandardInterface token = EIP20NonStandardInterface(underlying);
    uint balanceBefore = EIP20Interface(underlying).balanceOf(address(this));
    token.transferFrom(from, address(this), amount);

    bool success;
    assembly {
        switch returndatasize()
        case 0 {
            success := not(0)
        }
        case 32 {
            returndatacopy(0, 0, 32)
            success := mload(0)
        }
        default {
            revert(0, 0)
        }
    }
    require(success, "TOKEN_TRANSFER_IN_FAILED");

    // Calculate the amount that was *actually* transferred
    uint balanceAfter = EIP20Interface(underlying).balanceOf(address(this));
    require(balanceAfter >= balanceBefore, "TOKEN_TRANSFER_IN_OVERFLOW");
    return balanceAfter - balanceBefore;
}
```

1. Check balance *before* transfer
2. Execute transfer

3. Check balance *after* transfer

4. Only account for difference
(what the contract actually received)

Different ways of signaling failure / success

```
function transfer(address _to, uint _value) returns (bool) {  
    //Default assumes totalSupply can't be over max (2^256 - 1).  
    if (balances[msg.sender] >= _value && balances[_to] + _value >= balances[_to]) {  
        balances[msg.sender] -= _value;  
        balances[_to] += _value;  
        Transfer(msg.sender, _to, _value);  
        return true;  
    } else { return false; }  
}
```

ZRX

```
function transferFrom(address _from, address _to, uint256 _value) returns (bool success) {  
function transfer(address _to, uint256 _value) {
```

BNB

```
function transfer(address _to, uint _value) public onlyPayloadSize(2 * 32) {
```

USDT

```
function transfer(address _to, uint _value) public returns (bool) {  
    uint fee = calcFee(_value);  
    uint sendAmount = _value.sub(fee);  
  
    super.transfer(_to, sendAmount);  
    if (fee > 0) {  
        super.transfer(owner(), fee);  
    }  
}
```

Gold Tether

Different ways of signaling failure / success

How to handle *most* of these cases ?

Using **wrappers** for a more consistent behavior

SafeERC20

#

```
import "@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC20/utils/SafeERC20.sol";
```

Wrappers around ERC20 operations that throw on failure (when the token contract returns false). Tokens that return no value (and instead revert or throw on failure) are also supported, non-reverting calls are assumed to be successful. To use this library you can add a `using SafeERC20 for IERC20;` statement to your contract, which allows you to call the safe operations as `token.safeTransfer(...)`, etc.

FUNCTIONS

```
safeTransfer(token, to, value)
```

```
safeTransferFrom(token, from, to, value)
```

```
safeApprove(token, spender, value)
```

```
safeIncreaseAllowance(token, spender, value)
```

```
safeDecreaseAllowance(token, spender, value)
```

docs.openzeppelin.com/contracts/4.x/api/token/erc20#SafeERC20

Be flash-loanable

Don't assume an account cannot have a significantly large balance of tokens.

Test for extreme values in deposits, swaps, etc.

In some cases token snapshots from a previous block help.

```
require(  
  comp.getPriorVotes(msg.sender, sub256(block.number, 1)) > proposalThreshold,  
  "GovernorBravo::propose: proposer votes below proposal threshold"  
);
```


Be flash-mintable

Don't assume an account cannot have a
absurdly large balance of tokens.

ERC20FlashMint

#

```
import "@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC20/extensions/draft-ERC20FlashMint.sol";
```

Implementation of the ERC3156 Flash loans extension, as defined in [ERC-3156](#).

Adds the [flashLoan](#) method, which provides flash loan support at the token level. By default there is no fee, but this can be changed by overriding [flashFee](#).

Available since v4.1.

FUNCTIONS

```
maxFlashLoan(token)
```

```
flashFee(token, amount)
```

```
flashLoan(receiver, token, amount, data)
```



Brian McMichael 😊
@brianmcmichael

Replying to @brianmcmichael

We've enabled Flash Minting of Dai!
You can borrow **up to 500 million Dai in a single call.**
No need to bring your own capital to bear if you identify
a profitable trade or vulnerable defi exploit. 😊



DssFlash | 0x1EB4CF3A948E7D72A198fe073cCb8C7a948c...
The Contract Address
0x1EB4CF3A948E7D72A198fe073cCb8C7a948cD853 page ...
🔗 etherscan.io

Have huge total supply
(breaking interoperability)

Uniswap V2 limits pool
balances to $2^{112}-1$

```
// update reserves and, on the first call per block, price accumulators
function _update(uint balance0, uint balance1, uint112 _reserve0, uint112 _reserve1) private {
    require(balance0 <= uint112(-1) && balance1 <= uint112(-1), 'UniswapV2: OVERFLOW');
```

this limit is due to use of fixed point math libraries

Modify accounts balance

outside transfer operations

```
/**
 * @dev Calculates the balance of the user: principal balance + interest generated by the principal
 * @param user The user whose balance is calculated
 * @return The balance of the user
 */
function balanceOf(address user)
    public
    view
    override(IncentivizedERC20, IERC20)
    returns (uint256)
{
    return super.balanceOf(user).rayMul(_pool.getReserveNormalizedIncome(_underlyingAsset));
}
```

```
function balanceOf(address _human) public view returns (uint256) {
    return getAccruedValue(_human).add(balance[_human]);
}
```

```
function rebase(uint256 epoch, int256 supplyDelta)
    external
    onlyMonetaryPolicy
    returns (uint256)
{
    if (supplyDelta == 0) {
        emit LogRebase(epoch, _totalSupply);
        return _totalSupply;
    }

    if (supplyDelta < 0) {
        _totalSupply = _totalSupply.sub(uint256(supplyDelta.abs()));
    } else {
        _totalSupply = _totalSupply.add(uint256(supplyDelta));
    }

    if (_totalSupply > MAX_SUPPLY) {
        _totalSupply = MAX_SUPPLY;
    }

    _gonsPerFragment = TOTAL_GONS.div(_totalSupply);
}
```

```
function balanceOf(address who) external view override returns (uint256) {
    return _gonBalances[who].div(_gonsPerFragment);
}
```

aTokens

UBI

AMPL

Not expose decimals

Not expose name

Not expose symbol

(and still be ERC20-compliant)

name

Returns the name of the token - e.g. "MyToken".

OPTIONAL - This method can be used to improve usability, but interfaces and other contracts MUST NOT expect these values to be present.

```
function name() public view returns (string)
```

symbol

Returns the symbol of the token. E.g. "HIX".

OPTIONAL - This method can be used to improve usability, but interfaces and other contracts MUST NOT expect these values to be present.

```
function symbol() public view returns (string)
```

decimals

Returns the number of decimals the token uses - e.g. 8, means to divide the token amount by 100000000 to get its user representation.

OPTIONAL - This method can be used to improve usability, but interfaces and other contracts MUST NOT expect these values to be present.

```
function decimals() public view returns (uint8)
```

eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-20#specification

```
// IERC20Standard.decimals() will revert if the collateral contract has not implemented the decimals() method,  
// which is possible since the method is only an OPTIONAL method in the ERC20 standard:  
// https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-20#methods.  
function _getSyntheticDecimals(address _collateralAddress) public view returns (uint8 decimals) {  
    try IERC20Standard(_collateralAddress).decimals() returns (uint8 _decimals) {  
        return _decimals;  
    } catch {  
        return 18;  
    }  
}
```

<https://github.com/UMAprotocol/protocol/blob/master/packages/core/contracts/financial-templates/expiring-multiparty/PricelessPositionManager.sol>

Don't assume all tokens have 18 decimals

DAI → 18 decimals

USDC → 6 decimals

YAM-v2 → 24 decimals

cTokens → 8 decimals

WBTC → 8 decimals

Not have
18 decimals

Some cases of handling decimals:

- github.com/compound-finance/open-oracle/blob/master/contracts/Uniswap/UniswapAnchoredView.sol
- github.com/aave/protocol-v2/blob/master/contracts/adapters/BaseUniswapAdapter.sol

OpenZeppelin's ERC20

```
148     function transferFrom(  
149         address sender,  
150         address recipient,  
151         uint256 amount  
152     ) public virtual override returns (bool) {  
153         _transfer(sender, recipient, amount);  
154  
155         uint256 currentAllowance = _allowances[sender][_msgSender()];  
156         require(currentAllowance >= amount, "ERC20: transfer amount exceeds allowance");  
157         unchecked {  
158             _approve(sender, _msgSender(), currentAllowance - amount);  
159         }  
160  
161         return true;  
162     }
```

Have “infinite” approval

(does not decrease on `transferFrom`)

vs.

DAI

```
function transferFrom(address src, address dst, uint wad)  
    public returns (bool)  
{  
    require(balanceOf[src] >= wad, "Dai/insufficient-balance");  
    if (src != msg.sender && allowance[src][msg.sender] != uint(-1)) {  
        require(allowance[src][msg.sender] >= wad, "Dai/insufficient-allowance");  
        allowance[src][msg.sender] = sub(allowance[src][msg.sender], wad);  
    }  
}
```

Approval of $2^{256}-1$ is considered permanent and never decreases

May not guard against
the ERC20
allowance front-running
attack

OpenZeppelin Contract's ERC20 implements functions to prevent this attack

increaseAllowance(address spender, uint256 addedValue) → bool public #

Atomically increases the allowance granted to `spender` by the caller.

This is an alternative to [approve](#) that can be used as a mitigation for problems described in [IERC20.approve](#).

Emits an [Approval](#) event indicating the updated allowance.

Requirements:

- `spender` cannot be the zero address.

decreaseAllowance(address spender, uint256 subtractedValue) → bool public #

Atomically decreases the allowance granted to `spender` by the caller.

This is an alternative to [approve](#) that can be used as a mitigation for problems described in [IERC20.approve](#).

Emits an [Approval](#) event indicating the updated allowance.

Requirements:

- `spender` cannot be the zero address.
- `spender` must have allowance for the caller of at least `subtractedValue`.

<https://docs.openzeppelin.com/contracts/4.x/api/token/erc20>

The ERC20 allowance front-running attack by Vladimirov & Khovratovich

[https://docs.google.com/document/d/1YLPtQxZu1UAvO9cZ1O2RPXBbT0mooh4DYKjA_jp-RLM/ed](https://docs.google.com/document/d/1YLPtQxZu1UAvO9cZ1O2RPXBbT0mooh4DYKjA_jp-RLM/edit)
it

Disallow approvals

when already positive

```
function approve(address _spender, uint _value) public onlyPayloadSize(2 * 32) {  
    // To change the approve amount you first have to reduce the addresses`  
    // allowance to zero by calling `approve(_spender, 0)` if it is not  
    // already 0 to mitigate the race condition described here:  
    // https://github.com/ethereum/EIPs/issues/20#issuecomment-263524729  
    require(!((_value != 0) && (allowed[msg.sender][_spender] != 0)));  
  
    allowed[msg.sender][_spender] = _value;  
    Approval(msg.sender, _spender, _value);  
}
```

USDT

Does not allow approving tokens
when approval is non-zero.

This is a way to prevent the ERC20 allowance front-running attack,
but introducing unexpected behavior might break interoperability.

Consider special cases in off-chain monitoring

Not emit expected
events

```
function mint(address guy, uint wad) public auth stoppable {  
    _balances[guy] = add(_balances[guy], wad);  
    supply = add(supply, wad);  
    Mint(guy, wad);  
}  
function burn(address guy, uint wad) public auth stoppable {  
    if (guy != msg.sender && _approvals[guy][msg.sender] != uint(-1)) {  
        _approvals[guy][msg.sender] = sub(_approvals[guy][msg.sender], wad);  
    }  
    _balances[guy] = sub(_balances[guy], wad);  
    supply = sub(supply, wad);  
    Burn(guy, wad);  
}
```

MKR

Be upgradeable

USDC

```
function upgradeTo(address newImplementation) external ifAdmin {  
    _upgradeTo(newImplementation);  
}
```

TUSD

```
function upgradeTo(address implementation) external onlyProxyOwner {  
    _upgradeTo(implementation);  
}
```


UBI

```
function upgradeTo(address newImplementation) external ifAdmin {  
    _upgradeTo(newImplementation);  
}
```

Might need allowing interactions
only with known implementations

```
require(implementations[gem.implementation()] == 1, "GemJoin6/implementation-invalid");
```

And we haven't even
discussed economic risks



On token integration

Closing thoughts

- 1 Zero trust mindset. Tokens are arbitrary code.
- 2 Healthy distrust for standards.
- 3 Consider list of allowed tokens. Verify behavior. Analyze risks.
- 4 See how experienced players do it. Learn from their code.
- 5 Document your trust assumptions.

On token integration

Where do I learn more ?

(because yes, there's probably more)

- <https://github.com/d-xo/weird-erc20>
- Token integration checklist by Trail of Bits
- Token interaction checklist by Consensys Diligence
- <https://github.com/sec-bit/awesome-buggy-erc20-tokens>

Series of sessions

Secure Development

The dangers of token integration



Strategies for secure access controls

The dangers of price oracles

and more!

In the meantime...

docs.openzeppelin.com/defender/advisor

Thanks!

Learn more

openzeppelin.com

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