

CSE 470

**CRYPTOGRAPHY AND COMPUTER
SECURITY**

Homework 1

Romulus Project Report

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Romulus is a lightweight block cipher that was designed by researchers at the University of Maryland in 2018. It was designed to be fast and efficient, while also offering a high level of security. In this report, we will delve into the details of the Romulus algorithm and how it works.

The Romulus cipher uses a 128-bit block size and a 128-bit key. It is a 16-round block cipher, with each round consisting of several different operations. The main operations in each round of Romulus are a key-dependent substitution layer, a linear layer, and a key-dependent permutation layer.

The key-dependent substitution layer in Romulus is implemented using a set of S-boxes. These S-boxes are designed to be highly non-linear and resistant to linear and differential attacks. The S-boxes in Romulus are constructed using a combination of look-up tables and Boolean functions.

The linear layer in Romulus is implemented using a set of linear transformations. These transformations are designed to be highly non-linear and resistant to linear and differential attacks. The linear transformations in Romulus are constructed using a combination of bitwise operations and modular arithmetic.

The key-dependent permutation layer in Romulus is implemented using a set of P-boxes. These P-boxes are designed to be highly non-linear and resistant to linear and differential attacks. The P-boxes in Romulus are constructed using a combination of look-up tables and Boolean functions.

In addition to the main operations in each round, Romulus also includes a key schedule that is used to generate the keys for each round. The key schedule in Romulus is designed to be highly non-linear and resistant to attacks. It is constructed using a combination of bitwise operations and modular arithmetic.

Overall, the Romulus cipher is a highly secure and efficient block cipher that is well-suited for a wide range of applications. It has a number of desirable properties, including a high level of security, fast performance, and low hardware complexity. As a result, it has the potential to be widely

The Romulus cipher uses a simple and efficient design, which makes it well-suited for a wide range of applications. It is implemented using a combination of look-up tables and Boolean functions, which allows it to be implemented efficiently in hardware.

One of the key features of the Romulus cipher is its use of S-boxes and P-boxes, which are designed to be highly non-linear and resistant to linear and differential attacks. These S-boxes and P-boxes are constructed using a combination of look-up tables and Boolean functions, which allows them to be implemented efficiently in hardware.

The Romulus cipher also includes a key schedule, which is used to generate the keys for each round of processing. The key schedule in Romulus is designed to be highly non-linear and resistant to attacks, and it is constructed using a combination of bitwise operations and modular arithmetic.

Overall, the Romulus cipher is a highly efficient and secure block cipher that is well-suited for a wide range of applications. It has a number of desirable properties, including fast performance, low hardware complexity, and a high level of security.


Specification of ROMULUS:

Let $\{0, 1\}^*$ be the set of all finite bit strings, including the empty string ε . For $X \in \{0, 1\}^*$, let $|X|$ denote its bit length. Here $|\varepsilon| = 0$. For integer $n \geq 0$, let $\{0, 1\}^n$ be the set of n -bit strings, and let $\{0, 1\}^{\leq n} = \bigcup_{i=0}^n \{0, 1\}^i$, where $\{0, 1\}^0 = \{\varepsilon\}$. Let $J_n K = \{1, \dots, n\}$ and $J_n K 0 = \{0, 1, \dots, n-1\}$.

Notation used on ROMULUS:

- Nonce length $nl \in \{96, 128\}$.
- Key length $k = 128$.
- Message block length $n = 128$.
- Counter bit length $d \in \{24, 56, 48\}$.
- AD block length $n + t$, where $t \in \{96, 128\}$.
- Tag length $\tau = 128$.
- A TBC $\tilde{E} : \mathcal{K} \times \overline{\mathcal{T}} \times \mathcal{M} \rightarrow \mathcal{M}$, where $\mathcal{K} = \{0, 1\}^k$, $\mathcal{M} = \{0, 1\}^n$, and $\overline{\mathcal{T}} = \mathcal{T} \times \mathcal{B} \times \mathcal{D}$. Here, $\mathcal{T} = \{0, 1\}^t$, $\mathcal{D} = \llbracket 2^d - 1 \rrbracket_0$, and $\mathcal{B} = \llbracket 256 \rrbracket_0$ for parameters t and d , and \mathcal{B} is also represented

Authentication with Romulus:



Domain separation. Romulus will use a domain separation byte B to ensure appropriate independence between the tweakable block cipher calls and the various versions of Romulus. Let $B = (b_7b_6b_5b_4b_3b_2b_1b_0)$ be the bitwise representation of this byte, where b_7 is the MSB and b_0 is the LSB. Then, Romulus has the following:

- $b_7b_6b_5$ will specify the parameter sets. They are fixed to:

- 000 for Romulus-N1
- 001 for Romulus-M1
- 010 for Romulus-N2
- 011 for Romulus-M2
- 100 for Romulus-N3
- 101 for Romulus-M3

Note that all nonce-respecting modes have $b_5 = 0$ and all nonce-misuse resistant modes have $b_5 = 1$.

- b_4 is set to 1 once we have handled the last block of data (AD and message chains are treated separately), to 0 otherwise.
- b_3 is set to 1 when we are performing the authentication phase of the operating mode (*i.e.*, when no ciphertext data is produced), to 0 otherwise. In the special case where $b_5 = 1$ and $b_4 = 1$ (*i.e.*, last block for the nonce-misuse mode), b_3 will instead denote if the number of message blocks is even ($b_3 = 1$ if that is the case, 0 otherwise).
- b_2 is set to 1 when we are handling a message block, to 0 otherwise. Note that in the case of the misuse-resistant modes, the message blocks will be used during authentication phase (in which case we will have $b_3 = 1$ and $b_2 = 1$). In the special case where $b_5 = 1$ and $b_4 = 1$ (*i.e.*, last block for the nonce-misuse mode), b_3 will instead denote if the number of message blocks is even ($b_3 = 1$ if that is the case, 0 otherwise).
- b_1 is set to 1 when we are handling a padded AD block, to 0 otherwise.
- b_0 is set to 1 when we are handling a padded message block, to 0 otherwise.

Security of Romulus:

Romulus consider the standard security notions for nonce-based AE [6, 7, 37]. Let Π denote an NAE scheme

consisting of an encryption procedure $\Pi.EK$ and a decryption procedure $\Pi.DK$, for secret key K uniform over set \mathcal{K}

(denoted as $K \leftarrow \mathcal{K}$). For plaintext M with nonce N and associated data A , $\Pi.EK$ takes (N, A, M) and returns

ciphertext C (typically $|C| = |M|$) and tag T . For decryption, $\Pi.DK$ takes (N, A, C, T) and returns a decrypted plaintext

M if authentication check is successful, and otherwise an error symbol, \perp .

For $A \in \{0, 1\}^*$, Romulus say A has a AD blocks if it is parsed as $(A[1], \dots, A[a])$ $n, t \leftarrow \Pi.EK(N, A, M)$.

Let $\tilde{a} = \lceil a/2 \rceil + 1$ which is

a bound of actual number of primitive calls for AD. Similarly for plaintext $M \in \{0, 1\}^*$, we say M has m message

blocks if $|M|/n \leq m$. The same applies to ciphertext C . For encryption query (N, A, M) or decryption

query (N, A, C, T) of a AD blocks and m message blocks, the number of total TBC calls is at most $\tilde{a} + m$, which is

called the number of effective blocks of a query.

Family	NR-Priv	NR-Auth	NM-Priv	NM-Auth
Romulus-N	128	128	–	–
Romulus-M	128	128	64 ~ 128	64 ~ 128

Romulus-m and Romulus-n has both 128bit key recovery as well.

l as the maximum effective block length of all the encryption and decryption queries:

$$\mathbf{Adv}_{\text{Romulus-M}}^{\text{auth}}(\mathcal{B}) \leq \mathbf{Adv}_{\tilde{E}}^{\text{tprp}}(\mathcal{B}') + \frac{2\ell q_d}{2^n} + \frac{2q_d}{2^n}.$$

ALGORITHM:

Algorithm Romulus-N.Enc_K(N, A, M) 1. $S \leftarrow 0^n$ 2. $(A[1], \dots, A[a]) \xleftarrow{n} A$ 3. if $ A[a] < n$ then $w_A \leftarrow 26$ else 24 4. $A[a] \leftarrow \text{pad}_n(A[a])$ 5. for $i = 1$ to $\lfloor a/2 \rfloor$ 6. $(S, \eta) \leftarrow \rho(S, A[2i-1])$ 7. $S \leftarrow \tilde{E}_K^{(A[2i], 8, \overline{2i-1})}(S)$ 8. end for 9. if $a \bmod 2 = 0$ then $V \leftarrow 0^n$ else $A[a]$ 10. $(S, \eta) \leftarrow \rho(S, V)$ 11. $S \leftarrow \tilde{E}_K^{(N, w_A, \bar{a})}(S)$ 12. $(M[1], \dots, M[m]) \xleftarrow{n} M$ 13. if $ M[m] < n$ then $w_M \leftarrow 21$ else 20 14. for $i = 1$ to $m-1$ 15. $(S, C[i]) \leftarrow \rho(S, M[i])$ 16. $S \leftarrow \tilde{E}_K^{(N, 4, \bar{i})}(S)$ 17. end for 18. $M'[m] \leftarrow \text{pad}_n(M[m])$ 19. $(S, C'[m]) \leftarrow \rho(S, M'[m])$ 20. $C[m] \leftarrow \text{lsb}_{ M[m] }(C'[m])$ 21. $S \leftarrow \tilde{E}_K^{(N, w_M, \bar{m})}(S)$ 22. $(\eta, T) \leftarrow \rho(S, 0^n)$ 23. $C \leftarrow C[1] \parallel \dots \parallel C[m-1] \parallel C[m]$ 24. return (C, T)	Algorithm Romulus-N.Dec_K(N, A, C, T) 1. $S \leftarrow 0^n$ 2. $(A[1], \dots, A[a]) \xleftarrow{n} A$ 3. if $ A[a] < n$ then $w_A \leftarrow 26$ else 24 4. $A[a] \leftarrow \text{pad}_n(A[a])$ 5. for $i = 1$ to $\lfloor a/2 \rfloor$ 6. $(S, \eta) \leftarrow \rho(S, A[2i-1])$ 7. $S \leftarrow \tilde{E}_K^{(A[2i], 8, \overline{2i-1})}(S)$ 8. end for 9. if $a \bmod 2 = 0$ then $V \leftarrow 0^n$ else $A[a]$ 10. $(S, \eta) \leftarrow \rho(S, V)$ 11. $S \leftarrow \tilde{E}_K^{(N, w_A, \bar{a})}(S)$ 12. $(C[1], \dots, C[m]) \xleftarrow{n} C$ 13. if $ C[m] < n$ then $w_C \leftarrow 21$ else 20 14. for $i = 1$ to $m-1$ 15. $(S, M[i]) \leftarrow \rho^{-1}(S, C[i])$ 16. $S \leftarrow \tilde{E}_K^{(N, 4, \bar{i})}(S)$ 17. end for 18. $\tilde{S} \leftarrow (0^{ C[m] } \parallel \text{msb}_{n- C[m] }(G(S)))$ 19. $C'[m] \leftarrow \text{pad}_n(C[m]) \oplus \tilde{S}$ 20. $(S, M'[m]) \leftarrow \rho^{-1}(S, C'[m])$ 21. $M[m] \leftarrow \text{lsb}_{ C[m] }(M'[m])$ 22. $S \leftarrow \tilde{E}_K^{(N, w_C, \bar{m})}(S)$ 23. $(\eta, T^*) \leftarrow \rho(S, 0^n)$ 24. $M \leftarrow M[1] \parallel \dots \parallel M[m-1] \parallel M[m]$ 25. if $T^* = T$ then return M else \perp
Algorithm $\rho(S, M)$ 1. $C \leftarrow M \oplus G(S)$ 2. $S' \leftarrow S \oplus M$ 3. return (S', C)	Algorithm $\rho^{-1}(S, C)$ 1. $M \leftarrow C \oplus G(S)$ 2. $S' \leftarrow S \oplus M$ 3. return (S', M)

Figure 2.5: The Romulus-N nonce-based AE mode. Lines of **[if (statement) then $X \leftarrow x$ else x']** are shorthand for **[if (statement) then $X \leftarrow x$ else $X \leftarrow x'$]**. The dummy variable η is always discarded.

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mbulucay@mbulucay:~/Desktop/Crypto/1801042697/romulucf$ cd
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