

## **Research question: what explains the selection of different ministers' profiles?**

To address this research question, we can structure the explanation around short-term variables and long-term variables that influence the selection of ministers' profiles. These variables help explain why certain ministers, such as technocrats, non-partisan ministers, or partisan ministers, are chosen in specific contexts.

### **Part 1**

#### **Long term factors**

**Critical junctures** can trigger the selection of nonpartisan and technocratic ministers, as “unexpected events that create a high level of uncertainty and constitute a threat to the primary goals of an organization” (Castaldo & Verzichelli, 2025: 78)

#### ***H1: Negative economic conditions increase the likelihood of ‘outsiders’ entering government***

Variables used:

Economic crises: defined as a GDP growth rate falling below 0 in the appointment year (data sourced from the World Bank, following Pastorella, 2016: 63)

**Political instability**, characterized by frequent government changes or conflicts, has long-term implications for governance. It increases uncertainty, potentially undermines trust in traditional political institutions, making appointments of ministers from outside the realm of politics more likely.

#### ***H2: Political instability increases the likelihood of appointment of nonpartisan and experts ministers.***

Political crises: political instability (fall of governments)

#### ***Vincolo esterno***

The increasing policy-making complexity generated by European Union (EU) integration has led to a greater demand for technical expertise in the policy areas most influenced by the EU.

European integration discourages the presence of professional politicians in cabinets by increasing the need for experts better able to master EU policies and to co-ordinate national and European policies (Bäck et al. 2009).

***H3: Critical EU policymaking/ integration moments increases the likelihood of appointing non-partisan or expert ministers in policy areas most influenced by the EU.***

**Increasing complexity of governance**, “early choices have a persistent influence thereafter”

***H4: The previous appointment of nonpartisan ministers increases the likelihood of future nonpartisan ministerial appointments, especially in contexts of governance complexity.***

## **Part 2**

### **Short term variables**

#### **Legislative support:**

***H5: the proportion of non-partisan ministers in cabinet tends to rise as legislative fragmentation increases (Neto and Samuels 2010)***

***H6: non-partisan appointments increase with electoral volatility, and is higher under minority than majority governments (Neto and Strom 2006).***

#### **Agency losses and coalition governments:**

non-partisan ministers can increase **intra-coalition uncertainty** (because they are not bound by partisan loyalties or political structures (Alexiadou et al. 2022). Their autonomy and technical expertise create an **informational gap** between them and partisan ministers, making their decisions harder to predict and control.

**H7: Coalition governments tend to generate a greater likelihood of partisan appointments**

#### **Party level dynamics:**

Partisan ministers are involved in intra- and interparty politics, whereas technocrats are totally free and disconnected from that competition (Sozzi, 2024)

Party factions significantly influence ministerial selection, as party leaders must balance power among factions and accommodate different intra-party interests to maintain stability (Mershon, 2001; Ceron, 2014).

## **Executive approval**

***H8: As executive approval wanes, the likelihood of appointing technocrats increases.***

## **PART 3**

Test these patterns across different portfolios

Different portfolios

### **Inner vs outer**

“‘Inner’ portfolios constitute the president’s closest advisors and have regular access to him/her (such as defence, treasury, home office and foreign office), while ‘outer’ portfolios deal with specialized 69 areas and may not even have regular access to the president (Weisberg 1987; Cohen 1988). “ (Claveria 2013, 68)

Inner portfolios: “inner portfolios represent the traditional ‘core’ of government”. Escobar-Lemmon and Taylor-Robinson (2009) acrescentam a estas pastas, a área da justiça e segurança. Estas são, também, pastas reconhecidas por serem “more consequential for prime-ministerial performance than others” (Grotz et al, 2022: 1256).

Outros, argumentam que “the outstanding role of these core portfolios derives from their control over large resources, responsibility for the key functions of the state, as well as coordination or even veto rights over policy initiatives from other portfolios” (Druckman and Warwick 2005). Finalmente, as pastas mais centrais (core) são “responsible for policy coordination” (Batista, 2023: 920)

experts ministers will be appointed to inner portfolios in order to strengthen the core of government with qualified skills.

Inner portfolios are crucial for presidents and prime ministers, so they will tend to appoint expert ministers in order to strengthen the core of government with qualified skills. (Claveria 2013)

*Atenção ao argumento de primo-ministerialização: ovo ou a galinha. O problema é que um dos indicadores da Primo-ministerialização é a escolha de ministros não partidários, mais leais ao PM do que ao partido; e a sua inclusão e pastas core. Mas se este é um indicador de Primo-ministerialização, este não pode ser usado como um argumento para a selecção de ministros não partidários-*