**Problem 1):** Let  $x, y, e, x^{-1} \in \mathcal{G}$  where  $e \in \mathcal{G}$  is the identity element of  $\mathcal{G}$  and  $x^{-1}$  is such that both  $x x^{-1} = e = x^{-1} x$  and  $y x^{-1} = e = x^{-1} y$  hold. Therefore we have

$$x x^{-1} = y x^{-1} ag{1.1}$$

$$x x^{-1} = x^{-1} y ag{1.2}$$

$$x^{-1} x = y x^{-1} (1.3)$$

$$x^{-1}x = x^{-1}y ag{1.4}$$

By applying the cancelation rule ( $ab = ac \Rightarrow b = c$  for  $a, b, c \in \mathbb{G}$  for any group  $\mathbb{G}$ ) to the expression in 1.1 and 1.4, it is clear that we have

$$x = y \tag{1.5}$$

Since G is abelian, we may rewrite the expression in 1.2 as

$$x x^{-1} = x^{-1} x = x^{-1} y$$

or

$$x x^{-1} = y x^{-1} = x^{-1} y$$

From either expression, the application of the cancelation rule yields the same result as in expression 1.5. Similarly, we use the abelian property of  $\mathcal{G}$  to rewrite the expression in 1.3 as

$$x^{-1} x = x x^{-1} = y x^{-1}$$

or

$$x^{-1} x = x^{-1} y = y x^{-1}$$

Again, applying the cancelation rule to either expression yields the same result as in 1.5. Therefore, every element in an abelian group must have a unique inverse.

**Problem 2):** Let  $\mathcal{G}$  be a finite group and  $g \in \mathcal{G}$ . Now define  $\langle g \rangle \equiv g^0, g^1, g^2, \dots, g^k, \dots$ , where  $k \in \mathbb{N}$ . Beginning with the multiplicative case, let  $m, n \in \mathbb{N}$  so that we have

$$g^m g^n = g^{m+n}$$

Since  $m, n \in \mathbb{N}$  and  $\mathbb{N}$  is closed under addition,  $(m+n) \in \mathbb{N}$ , it is clear that  $g^{m+n} \in \langle g \rangle$ . Therefore,  $\langle g \rangle$  is closed under its operation. From our definition of  $\langle g \rangle$ , we know that  $g^0 \in \langle g \rangle$ . Additionally,  $g^0 \equiv e = 1$ ; therefore  $\langle g \rangle$  contains the identity element. Now, let  $m \in \mathbb{Z}^+$  and write  $g^{-m} g^m$ . Using  $g^{-m} \equiv (g^{-1})^m$ , this yields

$$g^{-m} g^m = (g^{-1})^m g^m = (g^{-1} g)^m = (e)^m = e = 1$$

which implies the existence of an inverse for each element in  $\langle g \rangle$ . Finally, let  $m, n, k \in \mathbb{N}$ , then we have

$$g^{m}(g^{n}g^{k}) = g^{m}(g^{n+k}) = g^{m+(n+k)}$$
 (2.1)

Since  $\mathbb N$  is associative under addition, the expression in 2.1 may be rewritten as

$$g^{m+(n+k)} = g^{(m+n)+k} = (g^{m+n}) g^k = (g^m g^n) g^k$$

thereby demonstrating the associativity of operations in  $\langle g \rangle$ . Since  $\mathcal{G}$  is finite, it has order  $m = |\mathcal{G}|$ . Therefore, the elements of  $\langle g \rangle$  will be repeats of elements in  $\mathcal{G}$  starting with  $g^{m+1}$ . Moreover, this means that  $\langle g \rangle \subseteq \mathcal{G}$ , thus satisfying the last condition for  $\langle g \rangle$  to be a sub-group of  $\mathcal{G}$ .

Continuing with the additive case, let  $m, n \in \mathbb{N}$  so that we have

$$m \times g \, n \times g = (m+n) \times g$$

Since  $m, n \in \mathbb{N}$  and  $\mathbb{N}$  is closed under addition,  $(m+n) \in \mathbb{N}$ , it is clear that  $(m+n) \times g \in \langle g \rangle$ . Therefore,  $\langle g \rangle$  is closed under its operation. From our definition of  $\langle g \rangle$ , we know that  $0 \times g \in \langle g \rangle$ . Additionally,  $0 \times g \equiv e = 0$ ; therefore  $\langle g \rangle$  contains the identity element. Now, let  $m \in \mathbb{Z}^+$  and write  $(-m) \times g = m \times (-g)^m$ , this yields

$$(-m) \times g \, m \times g = m \times (-g) \, m \times g = m \times (-g \, g) = m \times (e) = e = 0$$

which implies the existence of an inverse for each element in  $\langle q \rangle$ . Finally, let  $m, n, k \in \mathbb{N}$ , then we have

$$m \times g \ (n \times g \ k \times g) = m \times g \ ((n+k) \times g) = (m+(n+k)) \times g \tag{2.2}$$

Since  $\mathbb N$  is associative under addition, the expression in 2.2 may be rewritten as

$$(m+(n+k))\times g=((m+n)+k)\times g=(m+n)\times g\ k\times g=(m\times g\ n\times g)\ k\times g$$

thereby demonstrating the associativity of operations in  $\langle g \rangle$ . Since  $\mathcal G$  is finite, it has order  $m = |\mathcal G|$ . Therefore, the elements of  $\langle g \rangle$  will be repeats of elements in  $\mathcal G$  starting with  $(m+1) \times g$ . Moreover, this means that  $\langle g \rangle \subseteq \mathcal G$ , thus satisfying the last condition for  $\langle g \rangle$  to be a sub-group of  $\mathcal G$ .

**Problem 3):** Since  $\mathbb{Z}_{\mathfrak{p}}^{\star} \equiv \{a \in \{1, 2, \dots, \mathfrak{p} - 1\} \mid \gcd(a, \mathfrak{p}) = 1\}$ , for any  $\mathfrak{p} \in \mathbb{Z}^+$ , the set of possible elements for  $\mathbb{Z}_{\mathfrak{p}^e}^{\star}$  is defined as

$$\mathbb{Z}_{p^e}^{\star} \subset \{1, 2, \dots, p^e - 1\}$$
 (3.1)

This implies the following relation between the cardinalities of these sets

$$|\mathbb{Z}_{p^e}^{\star}| < |\{1, 2, \dots, p^e - 1\}|,$$

where  $|\{1,2,\ldots,p^e-1\}|$  has the value  $|\{1,2,\ldots,p^e-1\}|=(p^e-1)$ . It follows that the value of  $|\mathbb{Z}_{p^e}^*|$  can be obtained by determining the set of all values in  $\{1,2,\ldots,p^e-1\}$  that do not satisfy the conition given in 3.1 and subtracting the cardinality of this set from  $(p^e-1)$ . Since the common multiple is p, we will write this set in terms of be. Thus, the set of values in  $\{1,2,\ldots,p^e-1\}$  that do not satisfy the condition in 3.1 may be defined as

$$\{p, 2p, 3p, \dots, pp, 2pp, 3pp, \dots, p^2p, \dots, (p^{e-1}-1)p\}$$

This definition arises because only multiples of p do not satisfy the condition in 3.1 and because  $(p^{e-1}-1)$   $p=p^e-p$  is the largest element of  $\{1,2,\ldots,p^e-1\}$  that does not satisfy the confition in 3.1. The cardinality of this set,  $\{p,2p,3p,\ldots,p\,p,2p\,p,3p\,p,\ldots,p^2\,p,\ldots,(p^{e-1}-1)\,p\}$  is clearly

$$|\{p, 2p, 3p, \dots, p p, 2p p, 3p p, \dots, p^2 p, \dots, (p^{e-1} - 1) p\}| = (p^{e-1} - 1)$$

Subtracting this value from  $|\{1, 2, \dots, p^e - 1\}| = (p^e - 1)$  finally yields

$$\phi(p^e) = (p^e - 1) - (p^{e-1} - 1) = p^e - 1 - p^{e-1} + 1 = p^e - p^{e-1} = p^{e-1}(p - 1)$$

as desired.

To show that

$$\phi(pq) = \phi(p) \ \phi(q)$$

holds for any relatively prime p and q, we apply a similarly strategy to the one used above. The number of possible elements of  $\mathbb{Z}_{pq}^{\star}$  is pq-1. As before, we must take into account that some possible elements of  $\mathbb{Z}_{pq}^{\star}$  will not satisfy the definition in 3.1. If we subtract the number of these elements, then we will have  $\phi(pq) = |\mathbb{Z}_{pq}^{\star}|$ . Since there are p-1 multiples of q that do not satisfy the condition in 3.1, we must subtract p-1 from pq-1. Similarly, since there are also q-1 multiples of p that do not satisfy the same condition, we must also subtract q-1 from pq-1. Carrying out these subtractions gives

$$\phi(pq) = (pq - 1) - (p - 1) - (q - 1)$$

$$= pq - 1 - p + 1 - q + 1$$

$$= pq - p - q + 1$$

$$= (p - 1)(q - 1)$$

$$= \phi(p) \phi(q)$$

since  $\phi(p)$  and  $\phi(q)$  are defined as  $\phi(p) = p - 1$  and  $\phi(q) = q - 1$ , respectively.

We will now use the previous result to show that, for an integer  $N = \prod_i \{p_i^{e_i}\}$  and  $p_i$  distinct primes, we have

$$\phi(N) = \prod_{i} \{ p_i^{e_i - 1} (p_i - 1) \}$$

To begin, we substitute  $N = \prod_{i} \{p_i^{e_i}\}$  for N in the previous expression. This gives

$$\phi\left(N\right) = \phi\left(\prod_{i} \left\{p_{i}^{e_{i}}\right\}\right)$$

Using the result  $\phi(pq) = \phi(p) \phi(q)$ , we have

$$\phi\left(N\right) = \prod_{i} \left\{\phi\left(p_{i}^{e_{i}}\right)\right\}$$

Finally, we apply the result  $\phi\left(p^{e}\right)=p^{e-1}\left(p-1\right)$  to obtain

$$\phi(N) = \prod_{i} \{ p_i^{e_i - 1} (p_i - 1) \}$$

as expected.

**Problem 4):** We denote the cross product of groups  $\mathcal{G}$  and  $\mathcal{H}$  as  $\mathcal{G} \times \mathcal{H}$  and define it by

$$(g,h) \circ (g',h') \equiv (g \circ_{\mathcal{G}} g', h \circ_{\mathcal{H}} h') \tag{4.1}$$

To show that  $\mathcal{G} \times \mathcal{H}$  is a group, we begin by proving closure under its operation. Since  $\mathcal{G}$  and  $\mathcal{H}$  are groups, the we have  $(g \circ_{\mathcal{G}} g') \in \mathcal{G}$  and  $(h \circ_{\mathcal{H}} h') \in \langle$ . Thus  $\mathcal{G} \times \mathcal{H}$  is closed under its operation. Next, we must show the existence of an identity in  $\mathcal{G} \times \mathcal{H}$ . If we modify the expression in 4.1 so that  $g' = e_{\mathcal{G}}$  and  $h' = e_{\mathcal{H}}$ , then we have

$$(g,h) \circ (e_{\mathcal{G}}, e_{\mathcal{H}}) = (g \circ_{\mathcal{G}} e_{\mathcal{G}}, h \circ_{\mathcal{H}} e_{\mathcal{H}})$$
  
=  $(g,h)$ 

Therefore,  $\mathcal{G} \times \mathcal{H}$  contains an identity element and it is defined as  $(e_{\mathcal{G}}, e_{\mathcal{H}})$ . Next, we must demonstrate

the existence of inversed in  $\mathcal{G} \times \mathcal{H}$ . To do this, we again modify the expression in 4.1. This time we substitute  $g' = g^{-1}$  and  $h' = h^{-1}$ . Applying this substitution to the expression in 4.1 gives

$$(g,h) \circ (g^{-1}, h^{-1}) = (g \circ_{\mathcal{G}} g^{-1}, h \circ_{\mathcal{H}} h^{-1})$$
$$= (e_{\mathcal{G}}, e_{\mathcal{H}})$$

Thus,  $\mathcal{G} \times \mathcal{H}$  contains inverses for each of its elements. Lastly, we show that associativity holds in  $\mathcal{G} \times \mathcal{H}$ . We begin with

$$((g_1, h_1) \circ (g_2, h_2)) \circ (g_3, h_3) = (g_1 \circ_{\mathcal{G}} g_2, h_1 \circ_{\mathcal{H}} h_2) \circ (g_3, h_3)$$
$$= ((g_1 \circ_{\mathcal{G}} g_2) \circ_{\mathcal{G}} g_3, (h_1 \circ_{\mathcal{H}} h_2) \circ_{\mathcal{H}} h_3)$$
(4.2)

Using the associativity of  $\mathcal{G}$  and  $\mathcal{H}$ , we have

$$((g_1 \circ_{\mathcal{G}} g_2) \circ_{\mathcal{G}} g_3, (h_1 \circ_{\mathcal{H}} h_2) \circ_{\mathcal{H}} h_3) = (g_1 \circ_{\mathcal{G}} (g_2 \circ_{\mathcal{G}} g_3), h_1 \circ_{\mathcal{H}} (h_2 \circ_{\mathcal{H}} h_3))$$

Thus, the expression in 4.2 becomes

$$((g_1, h_1) \circ (g_2, h_2)) \circ (g_3, h_3) = ((g_1 \circ_{\mathcal{G}} g_2) \circ_{\mathcal{G}} g_3, (h_1 \circ_{\mathcal{H}} h_2) \circ_{\mathcal{H}} h_3)$$
$$= (g_1 \circ_{\mathcal{G}} (g_2 \circ_{\mathcal{G}} g_3), h_1 \circ_{\mathcal{H}} (h_2 \circ_{\mathcal{H}} h_3))$$

which implies that associativity holds for  $\mathcal{G} \times \mathcal{H}$ .

**Problem 5):** First, we will show that if  $x \in \mathbb{Z}_N$ , then  $\forall x \in \mathbb{Z}_N^{\star}$ ,  $f(x) = (x_p, x_q)$  where  $x_p \in \mathbb{Z}_p$  &  $x_q \in \mathbb{Z}_q$  and  $x_p \in \mathbb{Z}_p^{\star}$  &  $x_q \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{\star}$ . To do this, we assume, to the contrary, that  $x_p \notin \mathbb{Z}_p^{\star}$ . This assumption implies that  $\gcd([x \mod p], p) \neq 1$  and, by extension, that  $\gcd(x, p) \neq 1$ . Moreover, this leads to the conclusion that

 $\gcd(x,N) \neq 1$ . This cannot be, otherwise we would have  $z \notin \mathbb{Z}_N^{\star}$ , violating the definition of  $\mathbb{Z}_N^{\star}$  we started with. Therefore,  $x_p \in \mathbb{Z}_p^{\star}$  must hold. To show that  $x_q \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{\star}$  must also hold, we make the similar contrary assumption (that  $x_q \notin \mathbb{Z}_q^{\star}$ ) and arrive at a similar contradiction, thereby requiring that  $x_q \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{\star}$ .

Next, we will show that f is an isomorphism. We begin by showing that f is one-to-one. To begin, let

$$f\left(x\right) = \left(x_p, x_q\right) = f\left(x'\right)$$

Then, we let

$$x = x_p = x' \mod p$$

and

$$x = x_q = x' \mod q$$

This implies that (x - x') is divisible by both p and q. However, since p|N & q|N and  $\gcd(p,q) = 1$ , we must have (x - x') divisible by pq = N. This implies that  $x = x' \mod N$  and  $x' = x \mod N$ . Moreover, since  $x, x' \in \mathbb{Z}_N$ , we <u>must</u> have x = x' so f must also be **one-to-one**.

Continuing, since  $|\mathbb{Z}_p| = p$  and  $|\mathbb{Z}_q| = q$ , we must have

$$|\mathbb{Z}_p \times \mathbb{Z}_q| = |\mathbb{Z}_p| \cdot |\mathbb{Z}_q| = pq \tag{5.1}$$

Now, we have N = pq and  $|\mathbb{Z}_N| = N$ , so the expression in 5.1 becomes

$$|\mathbb{Z}_p \times \mathbb{Z}_q| = pq$$

$$= N$$

$$= |\mathbb{Z}_N|$$

Therefore, f must also be <u>onto</u> and, by extension, bijective.

Finally, we must show that

$$f((a+b) \mod N) = [(a+b) \mod p] \circ_{\mathbb{Z}_N} [(a+b) \mod q]$$
$$= [(a+b) \mod p] \boxplus [(a+b) \mod q]$$
$$= f(a) \boxplus f(b)$$

Since we have defined  $f(x) \equiv ([x \mod p], [x \mod q])$ , we may write  $f((a+b) \mod N)$  as

$$f((a+b) \mod N) = ([[(a+b) \mod N] \mod p], [[(a+b) \mod N] \mod q])$$
 (5.2)

Now, since p|N and q|N, we have

$$[[X \mod N] \mod p] = [[X \mod p] \mod p]$$
$$= [X \mod p]$$

and

$$\begin{aligned} [[X \mod N] \mod q] &= [[X \mod q] \mod q] \\ &= [X \mod p] \end{aligned}$$

Therefore, the expression in 5.2 becomes

$$\begin{split} f\left((a+b) \mod N\right) &= \left(\left[\left[(a+b) \mod N\right] \mod p\right], \left[\left[(a+b) \mod N\right] \mod q\right]\right) \\ &= \left(\left[\left[(a+b) \mod p\right] \mod p\right], \left[\left[(a+b) \mod q\right] \mod q\right]\right) \\ &= \left(\left[(a+b) \mod p\right], \left[(a+b) \mod q\right]\right) \end{split}$$

Separating this result according to a and b gives

$$([(a+b) \mod p], [(a+b) \mod q]) = ([a \mod p], [a \mod q]) \boxplus ([b \mod p], [b \mod q])$$

$$= f(a) \boxplus f(b)$$

as desired.

**Problem 6):** We begin by applying the function mapping  $\mathbb{Z}_N$  to  $\mathbb{Z}_p \times \mathbb{Z}_q$  (denoted f) to  $(x^e)^d$ . This gives us

$$\begin{split} f\left(\left(x^{e}\right)^{d}\right) &= \left(\left[\left(x_{p}^{e}\right)^{d} \mod p\right], \left[\left(x_{q}^{e}\right)^{d} \mod q\right]\right) \\ &= \left(\left[\left(x_{p}^{e\,d}\right) \mod p\right], \left[\left(x_{q}^{e\,d}\right) \mod q\right]\right) \end{split}$$

We now substitute  $ed = 1 \mod \phi(N)$  into our previous result to obtain

$$\begin{split} f\left(\left(x^{e}\right)^{d}\right) &= \left(\left[\left(x_{p}^{e\,d}\right) \mod p\right], \left[\left(x_{q}^{e\,d}\right) \mod q\right]\right) \\ &= \left(\left[\left(x_{p}^{1 \mod \phi(N)}\right) \mod p\right], \left[\left(x_{q}^{1 \mod \phi(N)}\right) \mod q\right]\right) \end{split}$$

Using the definition of  $\phi(\cdots)$  as well as the fact that N=pq, where p and q are distinct primes, we note that  $\phi(N)=\phi(p)$   $\phi(q)$ . Therefore, our previous result can be rewritten as

$$f\left(\left(x^{e}\right)^{d}\right) = \left(\left[\left(x_{p}^{1 \mod \phi(N)}\right) \mod p\right], \left[\left(x_{q}^{1 \mod \phi(N)}\right) \mod q\right]\right)$$

$$= \left(\left[\left(x_{p}^{1 \mod \phi(p) \phi(q)}\right) \mod p\right], \left[\left(x_{q}^{1 \mod \phi(p) \phi(q)}\right) \mod q\right]\right) \tag{6.1}$$

Using the relation  $a^{\phi(N)}=1 \mod N$ , we see that  $\phi(q)$  will cancel from the exponent in the first part of the left-hand-term in 6.1. Similarly,  $\phi(q)$  will also cancel from the second part of the left-hand-term in 6.1. Therefore, our expression in 6.1 can be simplified to give

$$\begin{split} f\left(\left(x^e\right)^d\right) &= \left(\left[\left(x_p^{1 \mod \phi(p) \ \phi(q)}\right) \mod p\right], \left[\left(x_q^{1 \mod \phi(p) \ \phi(q)}\right) \mod q\right]\right) \\ &= \left(\left[\left(x_p^{1 \mod \phi(q)}\right) \mod p\right], \left[\left(q^{1 \mod \phi(p)}\right) \mod q\right]\right) \end{split}$$

Noting that  $b \mod p = [b \mod c] \mod c$ , we modify our previous result to give

$$\begin{split} f\left((x^e)^d\right) &= \left(\left[\left(x_p^{1 \mod \phi(q)}\right) \mod p\right], \left[\left(x_q^{1 \mod \phi(p)}\right) \mod q\right]\right) \\ &= \left(\left[\left(\left(x_p^{1 \mod \phi(q)}\right) \mod p\right) \mod p\right], \left[\left(\left(x_q^{1 \mod \phi(p)}\right) \mod q\right) \mod q\right]\right) \end{split}$$

Again using the relation  $a^{\phi(N)} = 1 \mod N$ , we are able to simplify our previous result as

$$f\left((x^e)^d\right) = \left(\left[\left(\left(x^{1 \mod \phi(q)}\right) \mod p\right) \mod p\right], \left[\left(\left(x^{1 \mod \phi(p)}\right) \mod q\right) \mod q\right]\right)$$

$$= \left(\left[\left(x_p \mod (pq)\right) \mod p\right], \left[\left(x_q \mod (qp)\right) \mod q\right]\right)$$
(6.2)

Finally, we note that pq = qp = N and recall the definition of  $f(\cdots)$ . These relations allow us to rewrite our result in expression 6.2 to give

$$\begin{split} f\left((x^e)^d\right) &= \left(\left[(x_p \mod (pq)) \mod p\right], \left[(x_q \mod (qp)) \mod q\right]\right) \\ &= \left(\left[(x_p \mod N) \mod p\right], \left[(x_q \mod N) \mod q\right]\right) \\ &= f\left(x \mod N\right) \end{split}$$

We then take the inverse of  $f(\cdots)$  to ultimately give

$$f\left(\left(x^{e}\right)^{d}\right) = f\left(x \mod N\right) \implies \left(x^{e}\right)^{d} = x \mod N$$

as desired.

**Problem 7):** We start with values for N and  $\phi(N)$ . For clarity, we will denote the numerical value for  $\phi(N)$  by the symbol  $\Phi_N$ . Further, we know both that N=pq and

$$\phi(N) = \phi(p) \ \phi(q)$$

$$= (p-1)(q-1)$$

$$= pq - p - q + 1 = \Phi_N$$
(7.1)

Additionally, note that the result in 7.1 was obtained using the relations  $\phi(p) = p - 1$  and  $\phi(q) = q - 1$ . The result in 7.1, along with N = pq, means that we have the system of equations

$$\Phi_N = pq - p - q + 1 \tag{7.1}$$

and

$$N = pq (7.2)$$

Rewriting the expression in 7.2 as  $N = pq \Rightarrow q = N/p$  and applying the result, along with N = pq to the expression in 7.1, we have

$$\Phi_{N} = N - p - \frac{N}{p} + 1$$

$$p \Phi_{N} = p N - p^{2} - N + p$$

$$0 = p^{2} + (\Phi_{N} - N - 1) p + N$$
(7.3)

which is solvable for p in polynomial time (using the quadratic formula). Applying the result from solving 7.3 for p to the expression in 7.2 yields a value for q in polynomial time as well.

**Problem 8):** For a public key encryption scheme  $\Pi = (\text{Gen, Enc, Dec})$ , we define **CPA** security according to the probability obtaining a secure result, as defined in the privacy experiment  $\text{PubK}_{\mathcal{A},\Pi}^{\text{LR-cpa}}$ . This experiment goes as follows

# The LR-orcale experiment $\mathsf{PubK}_{\mathcal{A},\prod}^{\mathsf{LR-cpa}}\left(n\right)$

- 1. Gen  $(1^n)$  is run to obtain keys (pk, sk).
- 2. A uniform bit  $b \in \{0,1\}$  is chosen.
- 3. The adversary A is given input pk and oracle access to  $\mathsf{LR}_{pk,b}\left(\cdot,\cdot\right)$ .
- 4. The adversary A outputs a bit b'.
- 5. The adversary  $\mathcal{A}$  is defined to be 1 if b'=b, and 0 otherwise. If  $\mathsf{PubK}_{\mathcal{A},\prod}^{\mathsf{LR-cpa}}(n)=1$ , we say that  $\mathcal{A}$  succeeds.

Using this definition for the experiment  $\mathsf{PubK}_{\mathcal{A},\prod}^{\mathsf{LR-cpa}}$ , we say that the encryption scheme  $\prod$  is secure if the probability of  $\mathcal{A}$  succeeding,  $\Pr\left[\mathsf{PubK}_{\mathcal{A},\prod}^{\mathsf{LR-cpa}}(n)=1\right]$  satisfies the condition

$$\Pr\left[\mathsf{PubK}_{\mathcal{A},\prod}^{\mathsf{LR-cpa}}\left(n\right)=1\right] \leq \frac{1}{2} + \mathsf{negl}\ \left(n\right) \tag{8.1}$$

where negl(n) is a function/value which is negligible on the order of n.

In detail, what we are seeking is indistinguishability of multiple encryptions. That is to say, if we have the plain-text of two different messages (*denote them*  $m_1$  *and*  $m_2$ ), which we encrypt using a public key (*denote it* pk), then an adversary A having access to the cipher-text of both messages **and** the public key should not be able to distinguish the cipher-text of the messages under any circumstances. Using pk, the encryption algorithm (*denoted*  $Enc_{pk}$ ) generates cipher-text from messages  $m_1$  and  $m_2$ . We use

$$\mathsf{Enc}_{pk}\left(m_{1}\right)$$
 **and**  $\mathsf{Enc}_{pk}\left(m_{2}\right)$ 

to denote the cipher-text generated for these messages, respectively.

We denote both the information  $(pk, \operatorname{Enc}_{pk}(m_1), \& \operatorname{Enc}_{pk}(m_2))$  available/provided to the adversary A by

$$\mathcal{A}\left(pk,\mathsf{Enc}_{pk}\left(m_{1}\right),\mathsf{Enc}_{pk}\left(m_{2}\right)\right)\tag{8.2}$$

furthermore, we also use this notating to represent the outcome of running PubK on A. When A succeeds, then the expression in 8.2 yields the result

$$\mathcal{A}\left(pk,\mathsf{Enc}_{pk}\left(m_{1}\right),\mathsf{Enc}_{pk}\left(m_{2}\right)\right)=1\tag{8.3}$$

The expression in 8.2 yields

$$\mathcal{A}\left(pk,\mathsf{Enc}_{pk}\left(m_{1}\right),\mathsf{Enc}_{pk}\left(m_{2}\right)\right)=0\tag{8.4}$$

otherwise.

Since **CPA** security requires security over multiple encryptions using the same public key, we will formally define this security using *two* pairs of messages that are all being encrypted using the same public key. We denote the first pair of messages by  $m_{1,0}$  and  $m_{2,0}$ . Similarly, the second pair of messages are denoted by  $m_{1,1}$  and  $m_{2,1}$ . We now use the same notation as in 8.2 with these message pairs (*and their associated public key ph*) to represent the attack by A. This gives

$$A(pk, \mathsf{Enc}_{pk}(m_{1,0}), \mathsf{Enc}_{pk}(m_{2,0})),$$
 (8.2 a)

for the first message pair; and

$$A(pk, \mathsf{Enc}_{pk}(m_{1,1}), \mathsf{Enc}_{pk}(m_{2,1})),$$
 (8.2 b)

for the second message pair.

Before proceeding, we point out that we can equivalently use the expression from 8.3 in place of the  $\mathsf{PubK}^{\mathsf{LR-cpa}}_{\mathcal{A},\Pi}(n)=1$  term from 8.1. More clearly, we may formally write this equivalence as

$$\mathsf{PubK}_{\mathcal{A},\prod}^{\mathsf{LR-cpa}}\left(n\right) = 1 \qquad \longleftrightarrow \qquad \mathcal{A}\left(pk,\mathsf{Enc}_{pk}\left(m_{1}\right),\mathsf{Enc}_{pk}\left(m_{2}\right)\right) = 1$$

This allows us to write a version of 8.1 for both and . For the first message pair (*represented in*), this gives the result

$$\Pr\left[\mathcal{A}\left(pk, \mathsf{Enc}_{pk}\left(m_{1,0}\right), \mathsf{Enc}_{pk}\left(m_{2,0}\right)\right) = 1\right] \leq \frac{1}{2} + \mathsf{negl}_{0}\left(n\right),\tag{8.3}$$

where  $\mathsf{negl}_0$  represents the negligible function required to satisfy this expression as applied to this

message pair (we are making allowances in case the results in and use different negl functions). Writing our expression for the second message pair In a similar fashion yields

$$\Pr\left[\mathcal{A}\left(pk, \mathsf{Enc}_{pk}\left(m_{1,1}\right), \mathsf{Enc}_{pk}\left(m_{2,1}\right)\right) = 1\right] \leq \frac{1}{2} + \mathsf{negl}_{1}\left(n\right) \tag{8.4}$$

where  $negl_1$  represents the negligible function required to satisfy this expression as applied to this message pair just as before (we will see later that any difference between these negl functions is inconsequential; however differentiating between the negl functions used in either case is required for mathematical rigor).

We now subtract the equation in 8.4 from the equation in 8.3 to obtain

$$\begin{split} \left\{ &\Pr\left[ \mathcal{A}\left(pk, \mathsf{Enc}_{pk}\left(m_{1,0}\right), \mathsf{Enc}_{pk}\left(m_{2,0}\right) \right) = 1 \right] - \\ &- \Pr\left[ \mathcal{A}\left(pk, \mathsf{Enc}_{pk}\left(m_{1,1}\right), \mathsf{Enc}_{pk}\left(m_{2,1}\right) \right) = 1 \right] \right\} \leq \\ &\leq \left( \frac{1}{2} + \mathsf{negl}_{0}\left(n\right) \right) - \left( \frac{1}{2} + \mathsf{negl}_{1}0\left(n\right) \right) \\ &\leq \mathsf{negl}_{0}\left(n\right) - \mathsf{negl}_{1}\left(n\right) \end{split}$$

$$\begin{split} \left\{ \Pr\left[ \mathcal{A}\left(pk, \mathsf{Enc}_{pk}\left(m_{1,0}\right), \mathsf{Enc}_{pk}\left(m_{2,0}\right) \right) = 1 \right] - \\ - \Pr\left[ \mathcal{A}\left(pk, \mathsf{Enc}_{pk}\left(m_{1,1}\right), \mathsf{Enc}_{pk}\left(m_{2,1}\right) \right) = 1 \right] \right\} \leq \left( \frac{1}{2} + \mathsf{negl}_{0}\left(n\right) \right) - \left( \frac{1}{2} + \mathsf{negl}_{1}0\left(n\right) \right) \end{split}$$

$$\begin{split} \left\{ \Pr\left[ \mathcal{A}\left(pk, \mathsf{Enc}_{pk}\left(m_{1,0}\right), \mathsf{Enc}_{pk}\left(m_{2,0}\right) \right) = 1 \right] - \\ - \Pr\left[ \mathcal{A}\left(pk, \mathsf{Enc}_{pk}\left(m_{1,1}\right), \mathsf{Enc}_{pk}\left(m_{2,1}\right) \right) = 1 \right] \right\} \leq \mathsf{negl}_0\left(n\right) - \mathsf{negl}_1\left(n\right) \end{split}$$

$$\begin{split} \left\{ &\Pr\left[\mathcal{A}\left(pk, \mathsf{Enc}_{pk}\left(m_{1,0}\right), \mathsf{Enc}_{pk}\left(m_{2,0}\right)\right) = 1\right] - \\ &- \Pr\left[\mathcal{A}\left(pk, \mathsf{Enc}_{pk}\left(m_{1,1}\right), \mathsf{Enc}_{pk}\left(m_{2,1}\right)\right) = 1\right] \right\} \leq \left(\frac{1}{2} + \mathsf{negl}_{0}\left(n\right)\right) - \left(\frac{1}{2} + \mathsf{negl}_{1}0\left(n\right)\right) \\ \left\{ \Pr\left[\mathcal{A}\left(pk, \mathsf{Enc}_{pk}\left(m_{1,0}\right), \mathsf{Enc}_{pk}\left(m_{2,0}\right)\right) = 1\right] - \\ &- \Pr\left[\mathcal{A}\left(pk, \mathsf{Enc}_{pk}\left(m_{1,1}\right), \mathsf{Enc}_{pk}\left(m_{2,1}\right)\right) = 1\right] \right\} \leq \mathsf{negl}_{0}\left(n\right) - \mathsf{negl}_{1}\left(n\right) \end{split}$$

Adapting the secuity

Since we will eventually make use of the security definition in 8.1, we differentiate the expressions in and

hat  $\mathcal{A}$  be unable to break

Problem 9):

# Problem 10):

# Problem 11):

# Problem 12):

#### Problem 14):

# Problem 15):

# Problem 16):

# Problem 17):

# Problem 18):