

**Problem 8):** This **MAC** is *not* secure due to the high probability of collisions. To see this, consider any two messages  $m, m^* \in \mathcal{M}$  such that  $m = \{m_1, m_2, \dots, m_k, \dots, m_l\}$ ,  $m^* = \{m_1^*, m_2^*, \dots, m_k^*, \dots, m_l^*\}$ ,  $m_i = m_j^*$ ,  $m_j = m_i^*$ , and  $m_k = m_k^*$  for all other  $k < l$ . Then, clearly we have

$$t = F_k(m_1) \oplus F_k(m_2) \oplus \dots \oplus F_k(m_i) \oplus \dots \oplus F_k(m_j) \oplus \dots \oplus F_k(m_l)$$

which, by the the of **XOR**, is equivalent to

$$t = F_k(m_1) \oplus F_k(m_2) \oplus \dots \oplus F_k(m_j) \oplus \dots \oplus F_k(m_i) \oplus \dots \oplus F_k(m_l)$$

Applying our definitions for  $m$  and  $m^*$  from above, we clearly see that

$$\begin{aligned} t &= F_k(m_1) \oplus F_k(m_2) \oplus \dots \oplus F_k(m_j) \oplus \dots \oplus F_k(m_i) \oplus \dots \oplus F_k(m_l) \\ &= F_k(m_1^*) \oplus F_k(m_2^*) \oplus \dots \oplus F_k(m_i^*) \oplus \dots \oplus F_k(m_j^*) \oplus \dots \oplus F_k(m_l^*) = t^* \end{aligned}$$

thereby showing collisions for this hash function.