

merely observing. So it is advisable and even necessary to begin with observed *appearances* in oneself, and then to progress above all to the assertion of certain propositions that concern human nature; that is, to *inner experience*.

Apology for sensibility

§ 8. Everyone shows the greatest respect for understanding, as is already indicated by the very name *higher* cognitive faculty. Anyone who wanted to praise it would be dismissed with the same scorn earned by an orator exalting virtue (*stulte! quis unquam vituperavit*).^a Sensibility, on the other hand, is in bad repute. Many evil things are said about it: e.g., 1) that it *confuses* the power of representation, 2) that it monopolizes conversation and is like an *autocrat*, stubborn and hard to restrain, when it should be merely the *servant* of the understanding, 3) that it even *deceives* us, and that we cannot be sufficiently on guard where it is concerned. – On the other hand sensibility is not at a loss for eulogists, especially among poets and people of taste, who not only extol the merits of *sensualizing* the concepts of the understanding, but who also assign the *fertility* (wealth of ideas) and *emphasis* (vigor) of language and the *evidence* of ideas (their lucidity in consciousness) directly to this sensualizing of concepts and to the view that concepts must not be analyzed into their constituent parts with meticulous care. The bareness^b of the understanding, however, they declare to be sheer poverty.* We do not need any panegyrists here, but only an advocate against the accuser.

7: 144

The *passive* element in sensibility, which we after all cannot get rid of, is actually the cause of all the evil said about it. The inner perfection of the human being consists in having in his power the use of all of his faculties, in order to subject them to his *free choice*. For this, it is required that *understanding* should rule without weakening sensibility (which in itself is like a mob, because it does not think), for without sensibility there would

* Since we are speaking here only of the cognitive faculty and therefore of representation (not of the feeling of pleasure or displeasure, *sensation* will mean nothing more than [7: 144] sense representation (empirical intuition) in distinction from concepts (thoughts) as well as from pure intuition (representations of space and time). [Marginal note in H:] Consciousness of oneself is either discursive in concept or intuitive in the inner intuition of time. – The I of apperception is simple and binding; however, the I of apprehension is a matter of a manifold with representations joined to one another in the I as object of intuition. This manifold in one's intuition is given . . . [smudged] an *a priori* form in which it can be ordered . . .

^a Trans.: Fool! Who has ever criticized virtue?

^b *Nacktheit*.

be no material that could be processed for the use of legislative understanding.

Defense of sensibility against the first accusation

§ 9. *The senses do not confuse.* He who has *grasped* a given manifold, but *not yet ordered* it, cannot be said to have *confused* it. Sense perceptions (empirical representations accompanied by consciousness) can only be called inner *appearances*. The understanding, which comes in and connects appearances under a rule of thought (brings *order* into the manifold), first makes empirical cognition out of them; that is, *experience*. The *understanding* is therefore neglecting its obligation, if it judges rashly without first having ordered the sense representations according to concepts, and then later complains about their confusion, which it blames on the particular sensual nature of the human being. This reproach applies both to the ungrounded complaint over the confusion of outer as well as inner representations through sensibility.^a

Certainly, sense representations come before those of the understanding and present themselves *en masse*. But the fruits are all the more plentiful when understanding comes in with its order and intellectual form and brings into consciousness, e.g., *concise* expressions for the concept, *emphatic* expressions for the feeling, and *interesting* ideas for determining the will. – When the *riches* that the mind produces in rhetoric and poetry are placed before the understanding all at once (*en masse*), the understanding is often embarrassed on account of its rational employment.^b It often falls into confusion, when it ought to make clear and set forth all the acts of reflection that it actually employs, although obscurely. But sensibility is not at fault here, rather it is much more to its credit that it has presented abundant material to understanding, whereas the abstract concepts of understanding are often only glittering poverty.

7: 145

Defense of sensibility against the second accusation

§ 10. *The senses do not have command* over understanding. Rather, they offer themselves to understanding merely in order to be at its disposal.

^a *Marginal note in H:* Perception (empirical intuition with consciousness) could be called merely appearance of inner sense. However, in order for it to become inner experience the law must be known which determines the form of this connection is a consciousness of the object.

The human being cannot observe himself internally if he is not led by means of a rule, under which perceptions alone must be united, if they are to furnish him with an experience. Therefore they are together only appearances of himself. To cognize himself from them he must take a principle of appearance (in space and time) as a basis, in order to know what the human being is.

Sensibility as strength or weakness.

^b the . . . employment only in *H*.

That the senses do not wish to have their importance misjudged, an importance that is due to them especially in what is called common sense (*sensus communis*), cannot be credited to them because of the presumption of wanting to rule over understanding. It is true that there are judgments which one does not bring *formally* before the tribunal of understanding in order to pronounce sentence on them, and which therefore seem to be directly dictated by sense. They are embodied in so-called aphorisms or oracular outbursts (such as those to whose utterance Socrates attributed his genius). That is to say, it is thereby assumed^a that the *first* judgment about the right and wise thing to do in a given case is normally also the *correct* one, and that pondering over it will only spoil it. But in fact these judgments do not come from the senses; they come from real,^b though obscure, reflections of understanding. – The senses make no claim in this matter; they are like the common people who, if they are not a mob (*ignobile vulgus*), gladly submit to their superior, understanding, but still want to be heard. But if certain judgments and insights are assumed to spring directly from inner sense (without the help of understanding), and if they are further assumed to command themselves, so that sensations count as judgments, then this is sheer *enthusiasm*, which stands in close relation to derangement of the senses.

7: 146

Defense of sensibility against the third accusation

§ 11. *The senses do not deceive.* This proposition is the rejection of the most important but also, on careful consideration, the emptiest reproach made against the senses; not because they always judge correctly, but rather because they do not judge at all. Error is thus a burden only to the understanding. – Still, *sensory appearances* (*species, apparentia*) serve to excuse, if not exactly to justify, understanding. Thus the human being often mistakes what is subjective in his way of representation for objective (the distant tower, on which he sees no corners, seems to be round; the sea, whose distant part strikes his eyes through higher light rays, seems to be higher than the shore (*altum mare*); the full moon, which he sees ascending near the horizon through a hazy air, seems to be further away, and also larger, than when it is high in the heavens, although he catches sight of it from the same visual angle). And so one takes *appearance* for *experience*; thereby falling into error, but it is an error of the understanding, not of the senses.

A reproach which logic throws against sensibility is that in so far as cognition is promoted by sensibility, one reproaches it with

^a it . . . assumed added in A2.

^b real added in A2.

superficiality (individuality, limitation to the particular), whereas understanding, which goes up to the universal and for that reason has to trouble itself with abstractions, encounters the reproach of *dryness*. However aesthetic treatment, whose first requirement is popularity, adopts a method by which both errors can be avoided.

On ability with regard to the cognitive faculty in general

§ 12. The preceding paragraph, which dealt with the faculty of appearance,^a which no human being can control, leads us to a discussion of the concepts of the *easy* and the *difficult*^b (*leve et grave*), which literally in German signify only physical conditions and powers. But in Latin, according to a certain analogy, they should signify the *practicable* (*facile*) and the *comparatively-impracticable* (*difficile*); for the barely practicable is regarded as *subjectively-impracticable* by a subject who is doubtful of the degree of his requisite capacity^c in certain situations and conditions.

7: 147

Facility in doing something (*promptitudo*) must not be confused with *skill*^d in such actions (*habitus*). The former signifies a certain degree of mechanical capacity: "I can if I want to," and designates subjective *possibility*. The latter signifies subjective-practical *necessity*, that is, *habit*, and so designates a certain degree of will,^e acquired through the frequently repeated use of one's faculty: "I choose^f this, because duty commands it." Therefore one cannot explain *virtue* as *skill* in free lawful actions, for then it would be a mere mechanism of applying power. Rather, virtue is *moral strength* in adherence to one's duty, which never should become habit but should always emerge entirely new and original from one's way of thinking.^g

The *easy* is contrasted to the *difficult*, but often it is contrasted to the *onerous* as well. A subject regards something as *easy* whenever he encounters a large surplus in his capacity for applying the requisite power to an action. What is easier than observing the formalities of visits, congratulations, and condolences? But what is also more arduous for a busy man? They are friendship's *vexations* (drudgeries), from which everyone heartily wishes to be free, and yet still carries scruples about offending against custom.

What vexations there are in external customs that are attributed to religion but which actually collect around ecclesiastical form! The merit of piety is set up exactly in such a way that it serves no purpose other

^a *Scheinvermögen*.

^b *die Begriffe vom Leichten und Schweren*.

^c *Vermögen*.

^d skill: *Fertigkeit*; facility: *Leichtigkeit*.

^e *Wille*.

^f *ich will*.

^g *Denkungsart*.