

Second Book of the Transcendental Dialectic

A 341 / B 399

First Chapter

The paralogisms of pure reason^a

A logical paralogism consists in the falsity of a syllogism due to its form, whatever its content may otherwise be. A transcendental paralogism, however, has a transcendental ground for inferring falsely due to its form.²¹ Thus a fallacy of this kind will have its ground in the nature of human reason, and will bring with it an unavoidable, although not insoluble, illusion.

Now we come to a concept that was not catalogued above in the general list of transcendental concepts, and nevertheless must be assigned to it, yet without altering that table in the least and declaring it defective. This is the concept – or rather, if one prefers, the judgment – **I think**. But one will easily see that this concept is the vehicle of all concepts whatever, and hence also of transcendental concepts, and is thus always comprehended among them, and hence is likewise transcendental, but that it can have no special title, because it serves only to intro-

^a Note added to Kant's copy of the first edition: "The question is whether, if I cognize a transcendental object [*Object*] (I) through pure categories, without otherwise having any properties of it, I thereby actually cognize it or have only a negative concept of it. Further, whether these categories could be cognized through perception regarding this object, or whether they lie *a priori* in thinking in general. Third, whether through these cognition would be extended." (E CLIV, p. 47; 23:38; cf. A 592/B 620)

"A paralogism is a syllogism that is false *in forma*. Now it also belongs to the form that the major is a universal proposition, and also that the premises are not tautological. But here the major is a singular judgment and contains a tautology in itself. Consequently, the syllogism has only two *termini*." (E CLV, p. 47, 23:38)

"The paralogisms begin from existence as modality: 'I am'; proceed to relation [*Relation*] in order to determine existence not in time, which would be empirical. Therefore: I am as substance, simple as to quality, identical in my duration. The time of my duration is thus the time of my own self-determination." (E CLVI, p. 47; 23:38–9; cf. B 418)

"The proposition 'a exists,' is a simple substance, always the same, must in other cases be cognized through marks: 1. of perception, at least in time; 2. through properties that are persisting; 3. through demonstration of their [parts] in space and time; 4. through perception. Here I, as it were, [have sensation of] the categories or know them *a priori*." (E CLVII, p. 48; 23:39)

B 400 duce^a all thinking as belonging to consciousness. Meanwhile, however
 A 342 pure from the empirical (from impressions of sense) it may be, it still
 serves to distinguish two kinds of objects through the nature of our
 power of representation. I, as thinking, am an object of inner sense, and
 am called "soul." That which is an object of outer sense is called "body."
 Accordingly, the expression "I," as a thinking being, already signifies
 the object of a psychology that could be called the rational doctrine of
 the soul, if I do not seek to know anything about the soul beyond what,
 independently of all experience (which always determines me more
 closely and *in concreto*), can be inferred from this concept I insofar as it
 occurs in all thinking.

Now the **rational** doctrine of the soul²² is really an undertaking of
 this kind; for if the least bit of anything empirical in my thinking, any
 particular perception of my inner state, were mixed among the
 grounds of cognition of this science, then it would no longer be a rational
 but rather an **empirical** doctrine of the soul. We have thus already
 before us a putative science, which is built on the single
 proposition **I think**; and we can, in accordance with the nature of a
 transcendental philosophy, quite appropriately investigate its ground
 or groundlessness. One should not be brought up short by the fact that
 I have an inner experience of this proposition, which expresses the perception
 of oneself, and hence that the rational doctrine of the soul that
 is built on it is never pure but is grounded in part on an empirical principle.^b
 For this inner perception is nothing beyond the mere apperception **I think**,
 which even makes all transcendental concepts possible, which say "I think
 substance, cause, etc."^c For inner experience in general and its possibility,
 or perception in general and its relation^d to another perception, without
 any particular distinction or empirical determination being given in it,
 cannot be regarded as empirical cognition, but must be regarded as cognition
 of the empirical in general, and belongs to the investigation of the possibility
 of every experience, which is of course transcendental. The least object^e
 of perception (e.g., pleasure or displeasure), which might be added to the
 general repre-

^a *aufführen*

^b *Principium*

^c Added in Kant's copy of the first edition: "The propositions of rational psychology all are grounded on the 'I am.' For if even time should be added to them, then it would be an object of experience that they were treating of, and everything that would be produced through this would not have to reach any further than to this life." (E CLVIII, p. 48; 23:39)

"[The] I, object and subject of thoughts, is identical, exists, [substance, reality], but as unity in itself . . . of the subject in all its consciousness – these are purely identical propositions." (E CLIX, p. 48; 23:39)

^d *Verhältnis*

^e *Object*

sensation of self-consciousness, would at once transform rational psychology into an empirical psychology.

I think^a is thus the sole text of rational psychology, from which it is to develop its entire wisdom. One easily sees that this thought, if it is to be related to an object (myself), can contain nothing other than its transcendental predicates; because the least empirical predicate would corrupt the rational purity and independence of the science from all experience.

Here, however, we have merely to follow the guide of the categories; only since here first a thing, I as a thinking being, is given, we will not, to be sure, alter the above order of the categories to one another as represented in their table, but we will begin here with the category of substance, and thus go backwards through the series. The topics of the rational doctrine of the soul, from which everything else that it may contain has to be derived, are therefore the following:

A 344/B 402

<p>2. In its quality, simple</p>	<p>1. The soul is substance^b</p>	<p>3. In the different times in which it exists, numerically identical i.e., unity (not plurality)</p>
	<p>4. In relation^c to possible objects in space*</p>	

* The reader, who will not so easily guess from these expressions in their transcendental abstraction, their psychological sense and why the ultimate attribute of the soul belongs to the category of **existence**, will find this adequately explained and justified in what follows. Besides, on account of the Latin expressions that, contrary to good taste in writing, have inundated us here in place of equivalent German ones, in this section as well as in the whole work, I must adduce the following by way of apology: I would rather lose something by way of elegance of language than make scholastic usage even more difficult through the least unintelligibility.

B 403
A 345

^a Note in Kant's copy of the first edition: "[This] is a proposition *a priori*, is a mere category of the subject, intellectual representation without anywhere or at any time, hence not empirical. Whether the category of reality lies in it, whether objective inferences are to be drawn from it." (E CLX, p. 48; 23:39)

^b Kant's copy of the critique contains the revision: "The soul exists as substance" (E CLXI, p. 49).

^c *Verhältnis*

A 345/B 403

From these elements, at least through composition, spring all the concepts of the pure doctrine of the soul, without any other principle^a being cognized in the least. This substance, merely as an object of inner sense, gives us the concept of **immateriality**; as simple substance, it gives us that of **incorruptibility**; its identity, as an intellectual substance, gives us **personality**; all these points together give us **spirituality**; the relation^b to objects in space gives us the **interaction**^c with bodies; thus it represents the thinking substance as the principle^d of life in matter, i.e., as a soul (*anima*) and as the ground of **animality**, and this – limited by spirituality – is **immortality**.

B 404

A 346

Now to these concepts four paralogsms of a transcendental doctrine of the soul are related, which are falsely held to be a science of pure reason about the nature of our thinking being. At the ground of this doctrine we can place nothing but the simple and in content for itself wholly empty representation **I**, of which one cannot even say that it is a concept, but a mere consciousness that accompanies every concept. Through this **I**, or *He*, or *It* (the thing), which thinks, nothing further is represented than a transcendental subject of thoughts = *x*,^e which is recognized only through the thoughts that are its predicates, and about which, in abstraction, we can never have even the least concept; because of which we therefore turn in a constant circle, since we must always already avail ourselves of the representation of it at all times in order to judge anything about it; we cannot separate ourselves from this inconvenience, because the consciousness in itself is not even a representation distinguishing a particular object,^f but rather a form of representation in general, insofar as it is to be called a cognition; for of it^g alone can I say that through it I think anything.

B 405

But right at the start it must seem strange that the condition under which I think in general, and which is therefore merely a property^h of my subject, is at the same time to be valid for everything that thinks, and that on an empirical-seeming proposition we can presume to ground an apodictic and universal judgment, namely, that everything that thinks is constituted as the claim of self-consciousness asserts of me. But the cause of this lies in the fact that we must necessarily ascribe to things *a priori*

^a *Principium*

^b *Verhältnis*

^c *das commercium*

^d *Principium*

^e In the first and third editions, this letter is capitalized.

^f *Object*

^g *sie*, which probably refers to "cognition," but would also agree grammatically with "representation."

^h *Beschaffenheit*; elsewhere in the passage, "property" translates *Eigenschaft*.

all the properties that constitute the conditions under which alone we think them. Now I cannot have the least representation of a thinking being through an external experience, but only through self-consciousness. Thus such objects are nothing further than the transference of this consciousness of mine to other things, which can be represented as thinking beings only in this way. The proposition "I think" is, however, taken here only problematically; not insofar as it may contain a perception of an existence (the Cartesian *cogito, ergo sum*),^a but only in its mere possibility, in order to see which properties might flow from so simple a proposition as this for its subject (whether or not such a thing might now exist). A 347

If more than the *cogito*^b were the ground of our pure rational cognition of thinking beings in general; if we also made use of observations about the play of our thoughts and the natural laws of the thinking self created from them: then an empirical psychology would arise, which would be a species of the **physiology** of inner sense, which would perhaps explain the appearances of inner sense, but could never serve to reveal such properties as do not belong to possible experience at all (as properties of the simple), nor could it serve to teach **apodictically** about thinking beings in general something touching on their nature; thus it would be no **rational** psychology. B 406

Now since the proposition **I think** (taken problematically) contains the form of every judgment of understanding whatever and accompanies all categories as their vehicle, it is clear that the conclusions from this can contain a merely transcendental use of the understanding, which excludes every admixture of experience; and of^c whose progress, after what we have shown above, we can at the start form no advantageous concept. Thus we will follow it through all the predications of the pure doctrine of the soul with a critical eye.^d A 348

First paralogism
of substantiality.

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of substantiality.

That the representation of which is the **absolute subject** of our judgments, and hence cannot be used as the determination of another thing, is **substance**.

I, as a thinking being, am the **absolute subject** of all my possible

^a I think, therefore I am.

^b I think.

^c In the first edition: "in."

^d From this point on, Kant completely rewrote the remainder of the chapter for the second edition. The first-edition version follows immediately; the remainder of the chapter as rewritten for the second edition follows below.

judgments, and this representation of Myself^a cannot be used as the predicate of any other thing.

Thus I, as thinking being (soul), am **substance**.²³

Criticism of the first paralogism
of pure psychology.

We have shown in the analytical part of the Transcendental Logic that pure categories (and among them also the category of substance) have in themselves no objective significance at all unless an intuition is subsumed under^b them, to the manifold of which they can be applied as functions of synthetic unity. Without that they are merely functions of a judgment without content. Of any thing in general I can say that it is a substance, insofar as I distinguish it from mere predicates and determinations of things. Now in all our thinking the I is the subject, in which thoughts inhere only as determinations, and this I cannot be used as the determination of another thing. Thus everyone must necessarily regard Himself as a substance, but regard his thinking only as accidents of his existence and determinations of his state.

But now what sort of use am I to make of this concept of a substance?^c That I, as a thinking being, **endure**^d for myself, that naturally I **neither arise** nor **perish** – this I can by no means infer, and yet it is for that alone that the concept of the substantiality of my thinking subject can be useful to me; without that I could very well dispense with it altogether.

So much is lacking for us to be able to infer these properties solely from the pure category of substance, that we must rather ground the persistence of a given object on experience if we would apply to that object the empirically usable concept of a **substance**. But now we have not grounded the present proposition on any experience, but have merely inferred [it] from the concept of the relation that all thought has to the I as the common subject in which it inheres. Nor would we be able to establish such a persistence through any secure observation, even if we supposed one. For the I is, to be sure, in all thoughts; but not the least intuition is bound up with this representation, which would distinguish it from other objects of intuition. Therefore one can, to be sure, perceive that this representation continually recurs with every thought, but

^a *Mir selbst*, the capitalization is nonstandard, suggesting that “*Mir*” is a noun rather than a pronoun; changed to *mir selbst* in fourth edition. Below capitalizations of “Me,” “Myself,” “Self,” “Himself,” etc., will be used to translate similar nonstandard capitalizations in Kant’s German.

^b *untergelegt*; fourth edition: *unterlegt*, “an intuition underlies them”.

^c Kant ends this sentence with a period.

^d *fortdauere*

not that it is a standing and abiding intuition, in which thoughts (as variable) would change.

From this it follows that the first syllogism of transcendental psychology imposes on us an only allegedly new insight when it passes off the constant logical subject of thinking as the cognition of a real subject of inference, with which we do not and cannot have the least acquaintance, because consciousness is the one single thing that makes all representations into thoughts, and in which, therefore, as in the transcendental subject, our perceptions must be encountered; and apart from this logical significance of the I, we have no acquaintance with the subject in itself that grounds this I as a substratum, just as it grounds all thoughts. Meanwhile, one can quite well allow the proposition **The soul is substance** to be valid, if only one admits that this concept of ours leads no further, that it cannot teach us any of the usual conclusions of the rationalistic doctrine of the soul, such as, e.g., the everlasting duration of the soul through all alterations, even the human being's death, thus that it signifies a substance only in the idea but not in reality.

I' as
substratum

A351

Second paralogism of simplicity.

That thing whose action can never be regarded as the **concurrence** of many acting things, is **simple**.

Now the soul, or the thinking I, is such a thing.

Thus etc.²⁴

Criticism of the second paralogism of transcendental psychology.

This is the Achilles of all the dialectical inferences of the pure doctrine of the soul, nothing like a mere sophistical play that a dogmatist devised in order to give his assertions a fleeting plausibility,^a but an inference that seems^b to withstand even the sharpest testing and the greatest scruples of inquiry. Here it is.

Every **composite** substance is an aggregate of many, and the action of a composite, or of that which inheres in it as such a composite, is an aggregate of many actions or accidents, which is distributed among the multitude^c of substances. Now of course an effect that arises from the concurrence of many acting substances is possible if this effect is merely external (as, e.g., the movement of a body is the united movement of all

A352

^a Schein

^b scheint

^c Menge