I. *Universal doctrine of elements*

FIRST SECTION

91

Of concepts

§1

The concept in general and its distinction from intuition

All cognitions, that is, all representations related with consciousness to an object, are either *intuitions* or *concepts*. An intuition is a *singular*[a] representation (*repraesentatio singularis*), a concept a universal (*repraesentatio per notas communes*) or *reflected*[b] representation (*repraesentatio discursiva*).

Cognition through concepts is called *thought* (*cognitio discursiva*).

Note 1. A concept is opposed to intuition, for it is a universal representation, or a representation of what is common to several objects, hence a representation *insofar as it can be contained in various ones*.[20]

2. It is a mere tautology to speak of universal or common[c] concepts – a mistake that is grounded in an incorrect division of concepts into *universal, particular,* and *singular.* Concepts themselves cannot be so divided, but only *their use.*

§2

Matter and form of concepts

With every concept we are to distinguish *matter* and *form*. The matter of concepts is the *object*, their form *universality.*

[a] "*einzelne.*"
[b] "*reflectirte.*"
[c] "gemeinsamen."

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§3

Empirical and pure concept

A concept is either an *empirical* or a *pure* concept (*vel empiricus vel intellectualis*). A *pure* concept is one that is not abstracted[y] from experience but arises rather from the understanding even *as to content.*

An *idea* is a concept of reason whose object simply cannot be met with in experience.

Note 1. An empirical concept arises from the senses through comparison of objects of experience and attains through the understanding merely the form of universality. The reality of these concepts rests on actual experience, from which, as to their content, they are drawn.[z] But whether there are *pure concepts of the understanding* (*conceptus puri*), which, as such, arise merely from the understanding, independently of all experience, must be investigated by metaphysics.

2. Concepts of reason, or ideas, simply cannot lead to actual objects, because these latter must all be contained in a possible experience. But they serve to lead the understanding by means of reason in regard to experience and to the use of its rules in the greatest perfection, or also to show that not all possible things are objects of experience, and that the principles of the possibility of the latter do not hold of things in themselves, nor of objects of experience as things in themselves.

An idea contains the *archetype* for the use of the understanding, e.g., the idea of the *world whole*, which idea must necessarily be, *not as constitutive* principle for the empirical use of the understanding, but as *regulative* principle for the sake of the thoroughgoing connection[a] of our empirical use of the understanding. Thus it is to be regarded as a necessary basic concept, either for *objectively completing* the understanding's actions of subordination or for regarding them as *unlimited.* – The idea *cannot* be attained *by composition*, either, for the whole is prior to the part. There are ideas, however, to which an approximation occurs. This is the case with *mathematical* ideas, or ideas of the *mathematical production of a whole*, which differ essentially from *dynamical* ideas, which are completely *heterogeneous*
93 from all concrete concepts, because the whole is different from concrete concepts not as to quantity (as with the mathematical ideas) but rather as to *kind.*

One cannot provide objective reality for any theoretical idea, or prove it, except for the idea of freedom, because this is the condition of the *moral*

[y] "abgezogen."
[z] "geschöpft."
[a] "des durchgängigen Zusammenhanges."

law, whose reality is an axiom. The reality of the idea of *God* can only be proved by means of this idea, and hence only with a *practical* purpose, *i.e., to act as if there is a God*, and hence only *for* this purpose.

In all sciences, above all in those of reason, the idea of the science is its universal *abstract* or *outline*, hence the extension of all the cognitions[b] that belong to it. Such an idea of the whole – the first thing one has to look to in a science, and which one has to seek – is *architectonic*, as, e.g., the idea of jurisprudence.[c]

Most men lack the idea of humanity, the idea of a perfect republic, of a happy life, etc. Many men have no idea of what they want, hence they proceed according to instinct and authority.

§4

Concepts that are given (a priori *or* a posteriori) *and concepts that are made*

All concepts, *as to matter*, are either *given* (*conceptus dati*) or *made* (*conceptus factitii*). The former are given either *a priori* or *a posteriori*.

All concepts that are given empirically or *a posteriori* are called *concepts of experience*,[d] all that are given *a priori* are called *notions*.

Note. The form of a concept, as that of a discursive representation, is always made.

§5

Logical origin of concepts

The origin of concepts as to *mere form* rests on reflection and on abstraction from the difference among things that are signified by a certain representation. And thus arises here the question: *Which acts of the understanding constitute a concept?* or what is the same, *Which are involved in the generation of a concept out of given representations?*

Note 1. Since universal logic abstracts from all content of cognition through concepts, or from all matter of thought, it can consider a concept only in respect of its form, i.e., only *subjectively*; not how it determines an object through a mark, but only how it can be related to several objects. Hence 94

[b] "Kenntnisse."
[c] "Rechtswissenschaft."
[d] "*Erfahrungsbegriffe*."

universal logic does not have to investigate the *source* of concepts, not how concepts *arise as representations*, but merely *how given representations become concepts in thought*; these concepts, moreover, may contain something that is derived from experience, or something invented, or borrowed from the nature of the understanding. – This *logical* origin of concepts – the origin as to their mere form – consists in reflection, whereby a representation common to several objects (*conceptus communis*) arises, as that form which is required for the power of judgment. Thus in logic *only the difference in reflection* in concepts is considered.

2. The origin of concepts in regard to their *matter*, according to which a concept is either *empirical* or *arbitrary* or *intellectual*, is considered in metaphysics.

§6

Logical Actus *of comparison, reflection, and abstraction*

The logical *actus* of the understanding, through which concepts are generated as to their form, are:

1. *comparison*[e] of representations among one another in relation to the unity of consciousness;
2. *reflection*[f] as to how various representations can be conceived in one consciousness; and finally
3. *abstraction*[g] of everything else in which the given representations differ.

Note 1. To make concepts out of representations one must thus be able *to compare*, *to reflect*, and *to abstract*, for these three logical operations of the understanding are the essential and universal conditions for generation of every concept whatsoever. I see, e.g., a spruce, a willow, and a linden. By first comparing these objects with one another I note that they are different from one another in regard to the trunk, the branches, the leaves, etc.; but next I reflect on that which they have in common
95 among themselves, trunk, branches, and leaves themselves, and I abstract from the quantity, the figure, etc., of these; thus I acquire a concept of a tree.

2. The expression *abstraction* is not always used correctly in logic. We must not speak of abstracting something (*abstrahere aliquid*), but rather of abstracting *from something* (*abstrahere ab aliquo*). With a scarlet cloth, for example, if I think only of the red color, then I abstract from the cloth; if I abstract from this too and think the scarlet as a material stuff in general, then I abstract from still more determinations, and my concept has in this

[e] "*Comparation*, d.i., die Vergleichung."
[f] "*Reflexion*, d.i. die Überlegung."
[g] "*Abstraction* oder die Absonderung."

way become still more abstract. For the more the differences among things that are left out of a concept, or the more the determinations from which we abstract in that concept, the more abstract the concept is. Abstract concepts, therefore, should really be called *abstracting* concepts (*conceptus abstrahentes*), i.e., ones in which several abstractions occur. Thus the concept *body* is really not an abstract concept, for I cannot abstract from body itself, else I would not have the concept of it. But I must of course abstract from the size, the color, the hardness or fluidity, in short, from all the special determinations of particular bodies. The *most abstract* concept is the one that has nothing in common with any distinct from itself. This is the concept of *something*, for that which is different from it is *nothing*, and it thus has nothing in common with something.

3. Abstraction is only the *negative* condition under which universal representations can be generated, the *positive* condition is comparison and reflection. For no concept *comes to be* through abstraction; abstraction only perfects it and encloses it in its determinate limits.

§7

Content and extension of concepts

Every concept, *as partial concept*, is contained in the representation of things; as *ground of cognition, i.e., as mark*,[h] these things are contained *under* it. In the former respect every concept has a *content*, in the other an *extension*.

The content and extension of a concept stand in inverse relation to one another. The more a concept contains *under* itself, namely, the less it contains *in* itself, and conversely.

Note. The universality or universal validity of a concept does not rest on the fact that the concept is a *partial concept*, but rather on the fact that it is a *ground of cognition*.

§8

96

Quantity of the extension of concepts

The more the things that stand under a concept and can be thought through it, the greater is its extension or *sphere*.

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[h] Ak, "*d.i.* als *Merkmal*"; 1st ed., "*d.i. als Merkmal.*"

Note. As one says of a *ground* in general that it contains the *consequence* under itself, so can one also say of the concept that as *ground of cognition* it contains all those things under itself from which it has been abstracted, e.g., the concept of metal contains under itself gold, silver, copper, etc. For since every concept, as a universally valid representation, contains that which is common to several representations of various things, all these things, which are to this extent contained under it, can be represented through it. And it is just this that constitutes the *usefulness* of a concept. The more the things that can be represented through a concept, the greater is its sphere. Thus the concept *body*, for example, has a greater extension than the concept *metal*.

§9

Higher and lower concepts

Concepts are called *higher* (*conceptus superiores*) insofar as they have other concepts under themselves, which, in relation to them, are called *lower* concepts. A mark of a mark – a *remote* mark – is a higher concept, the concept in relation to a remote mark is a lower one.

Note. Since higher and lower concepts are so called only *relatively* (*respective*$_{L}$), one and the same concept can, in various relations, be simultaneously a higher one and a lower one. Thus the concept *man* is a higher one in relation to the concept *Negro*,[i] but a lower one in relation to the concept *animal*.

§10

Genus and species

The higher concept, in respect to its lower one, is called genus,[j] the lower concept in regard to its higher one *species*.[k]

97 Like higher and lower concepts, *genus* and *species concepts* are distinguished not as to their nature, then, but only in regard to their relation to one another (*termini a quo* or *ad quod*[l]) in logical subordination.

[i] Ak, "Neger"; 1st ed., "Pferd."
[j] "*Gattung* (*genus*)."
[k] "*Art* (*species*)."
[l] terms from which [or] to which.

§11

Highest genus and lowest species

The *highest* genus is that which is not a species (*genus summum non est species*), just as the *lowest* species is that which is not a genus (*species, quae non est genus, est infima*).

In consequence of the law of continuity, however, there cannot be either a *lowest* or a *next* species.

Note. If we think of a series of several concepts subordinated to one another, e.g., iron, metal, body, substance, thing, then here we can attain ever higher genera – for every *species* is always to be considered at the same time as *genus* in regard to its lower concept, e.g., the concept *learned man* in regard to the concept *philosopher* – until we finally come to a *genus* that cannot in turn be a *species*. And we must finally be able to attain such a one, because in the end there must be a highest concept (*conceptus summus*), from which, as such, nothing further may be abstracted without the whole concept disappearing. – But in the series of species and genera there is no lowest concept (*conceptus infimus*) or lowest species, under which no other would be contained, because such a one cannot possibly be determined. For even if we have a concept that we apply *immediately* to individuals, there can still be specific differences in regard to it, which we either do not note, or which we disregard. Only *comparatively for use* are there lowest concepts, which have attained this significance,[m] as it were, through convention, insofar as one has agreed not to go deeper here.

In respect to the determination of species and genus concepts, then, the following universal law holds: *There is a genus that cannot in turn be a species, but there is no species that should not be able in turn to be a genus.*

§12 98

Broader and narrower concept – Convertible concepts

The higher concept is also called a *broader* concept, the lower concept a *narrower* one.

Concepts that have one and the same sphere are called *convertible concepts*[n] (*conceptus reciproci*).

[m] "Bedeutung."

[n] "*Wechselbegriffe.*"

§13

Relation of the lower concept to the higher, of the broader to the narrower

The lower concept is not contained *in* the higher, for it contains *more* in itself than does the higher one; it is contained *under* it, however, because the higher contains the ground of cognition of the lower.

Furthermore, one concept is not *broader* than another because it contains *more* under itself – for one cannot know that – but rather insofar as it contains under itself the *other concept* and *besides this still more*.

§14

Universal rules in respect of the subordination of concepts

In regard to the logical extension of concepts, the following universal rules hold:

1. What belongs to or contradicts higher concepts also belongs to or contradicts all lower concepts that are contained under those higher ones; and
2. conversely: What belongs to or contradicts *all* lower concepts also belongs to or contradicts their higher concept.

Note. Because that in which things agree flows from their *universal* properties, and that in which they are different from one another flows from their *particular* properties, one cannot infer that what belongs to or contradicts *one* lower concept also belongs to or contradicts *other* lower concepts,
99 which belong with it to one higher concept. Thus one cannot infer, e.g., that what does not belong to man does not belong to angels either.

§15

Conditions for higher and lower concepts to arise: Logical abstraction and logical determination

Through continued logical abstraction higher and higher concepts arise, just as through continued logical determination, on the other hand, lower and lower concepts arise. The greatest possible abstraction yields the highest or most abstract concept – that from which no determination can be further thought away. The highest, completed determination would yield a *thoroughly determinate* concept (*conceptus omnimode determinatus*), i.e., one to which no further determination might be added in thought.

Note. Since only individual things,[e] or individuals,[f] are thoroughly determinate, there can be thoroughly determinate cognitions only as *intuitions*, but not *as concepts*; in regard to the latter, logical determination can never be regarded as completed (§ 11, Note).

§16

Use of concepts in abstracto *and* in concreto

Every concept can be used *universally* or *particularly* (*in abstracto* or *in concreto*). The lower concept is used *in abstracto* in regard to its higher one, the higher concept *in concreto* in regard to its lower one.

Note 1. Thus the expressions *abstract* and *concrete* relate not to concepts in themselves – for every concept is an abstract concept – but rather only to their *use*. And this use can in turn have various degrees, accordingly as one treats a concept more or less abstractly or concretely, i.e., as one either leaves aside or adds more or fewer determinations. Through abstract use a concept comes closer to the highest genus, through concrete 100
use, on the other hand, to the individual.

2. Which use of concepts, the abstract or the concrete, has an advantage over the other? Nothing can be decided about this. The worth of the one is not to be valued less than the worth of the other. Through very abstract concepts we cognize *little* in *many* things, through very concrete concepts we cognize *much* in *few* things; what we win on the one side, then, we lose again on the other. A concept that has a large sphere is very useful insofar as one can apply it to many things; but in return for that, there is that much less contained in it. In the concept *substance*, for example, I do not think as much as in the concept *chalk*.

3. The *art of popularity* consists in finding the relation between representation *in abstracto* and *in concreto* in the same cognition, hence between concepts and their exhibition, through which the maximum of cognition is achieved, both as to extension and as to content.

SECOND SECTION 101

Of judgments

§17

Definition[g] *of a judgment in general*

A judgment is the representation of the unity of the consciousness of various representations, or the representation of their relation insofar as they constitute a concept.

[e] "einzelne Dinge."
[f] "Individuen."
[g] "*Erklärung.*"

§18

Matter and form of judgments

Matter and *form* belong to every judgment as essential constituents of it. The *matter* of the judgment consists in the given representations that are combined in the unity of consciousness in the judgment, the *form* in the determination of the way that the various representations belong, as such, to one consciousness.

§19

Object of logical reflection the mere form of judgments

Since logic abstracts from all real or objective difference of cognition, it can occupy itself as little with the matter of judgments as with the content of concepts. Thus it has only the difference among judgments in regard to their mere form to take into consideration.

102

§20

Logical forms of judgments: Quantity, quality, relation, and modality

The distinctions among judgments in respect of their form may be traced back to the four principal moments of *quantity*, *quality*, *relation*, and *modality*, in regard to which just as many different kinds of judgments are determined.

§21

Quantity of judgments: Universal, particular, singular

As to quantity, judgments are either *universal* or *particular* or *singular*, accordingly as the subject is either *wholly in*cluded in or *ex*cluded from the notion of the predicate or is only *in part in*cluded in or *ex*cluded from it. In the *universal* judgment, the sphere of one concept is wholly enclosed within the sphere of another; in the *particular*, a part of the former is enclosed under the sphere of the other; and in the *singular* judgment, finally, a concept that has no sphere at all is enclosed, merely as part then, under the sphere of another.