

"[Paralogisms of Pure Reason]"³⁸

Now since the proposition **I think** (taken problematically) contains the form of every judgment of understanding whatever, and accompanies all categories as their vehicle, it is clear that the inferences from this proposition can contain a merely transcendental use of the understanding, excluding every admixture of experience; and of^b such a procedure, after what we have shown above, we cannot at the outset form any very favorable concept. Thus we will follow it through all the predication of the pure doctrine of the soul with a critical eye, <yet for the sake of brevity we will proceed to examine them in an uninterrupted exposition.^c

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To begin with, the following general remarks can sharpen our attentiveness to this mode of inference. I do not cognize any object^d merely by the fact that I think, but rather I can cognize any object only by determining a given intuition with regard to the unity of consciousness, in which all thinking consists. Thus I cognize myself not by being conscious of myself as thinking, but only if I am conscious to myself of the intuition of myself as determined in regard to the function of thought. All *modi*^e of self-consciousness in thinking are therefore not yet themselves concepts of the understanding of objects^f (categories), but mere functions, which provide thought with no object at all, and hence also do not present my self as an object to be cognized. It is not the consciousness of the **determining** self, but only that of the **determinable** self, i.e., of my inner intuition (insofar as its manifold can be combined in accord with the universal condition of the unity of apperception in thinking), that is the **object**.^g

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1) Now in every judgment I am always the **determining** subject of

^a What follows is the portion of the "Paralogisms" chapter that was rewritten for the second edition. In the original, it follows the part of the text common to both editions without any interruption or new title. The new text actually begins with the last clause of the following paragraph.

^b In the first edition: "in."

^c *Zusammenhänge*; with this final clause begins the second-edition version of the "Paralogisms."

^d *Object*

^e *modes*

^f *Objecte*

^g *Object*

that relation^a that constitutes the judgment. However, that the I that I think can always be considered as **subject**, and as something that does not depend on thinking merely as a predicate, must be valid – this is an apodictic and even an **identical proposition**; but it does not signify that I as **object^b** am for myself a **self-subsisting being or substance**. The latter goes very far, and hence demands data that are not encountered at all in thinking, and thus (insofar as I consider merely what thinks as such) perhaps demands more than I will ever encounter anywhere (in it).

B 408 2) That the I of apperception, consequently in every thought, is a **single thing** that cannot be resolved into a plurality of subjects, and hence a logically simple subject, lies already in the concept of thinking, and is consequently an analytic proposition; but that does not signify that the thinking I is a simple **substance**, which would be a synthetic proposition. The concept of substance is always related to intuitions, which in me cannot be other than sensible, and hence must lie wholly outside the field of understanding and its thinking, which is all that is really under discussion here if it is said that the I in thinking is simple. It would also be miraculous if what otherwise requires so much care in order to distinguish what is the substance and what is displayed in intuition, and even more to tell whether this substance could be simple (as in the parts of matter), were given here so directly, in the poorest representation of all, as if by a revelation.

B 409 3) The proposition of the identity of myself in everything manifold of which I am conscious is equally one lying in the concepts themselves, and hence an analytic proposition; but this identity of the subject, of which I can become conscious in every representation, does not concern the intuition of it, through which it is given as object;^c and thus cannot signify the identity of the person, by which would be understood the consciousness of the identity of its own substance as a thinking being in all changes of state; in order to prove that what would be demanded is not a mere analysis of the proposition "I think," but rather various synthetic judgments grounded on the given intuition.

4) [That] I distinguish my own existence, that of a thinking being, from other things outside me (to which my body also belongs) – this is equally an analytic proposition; for **other** things are those that I think of as **distinguished** from me. But I do not thereby know at all whether this consciousness of myself would even be possible without things outside me through which representations are given to me, and thus whether I could exist merely as a thinking being (without being a human being).

^a *Verhältnis*

^b *Object*

^c *Object*

Thus through the analysis of the consciousness of myself in thinking in general not the least is won in regard to the cognition of myself as object.^a The logical exposition of thinking in general is falsely held to be a metaphysical determination of the object.^b

It would be a great, or indeed the only stumbling block to our entire critique, if it were possible to prove *a priori* that all thinking beings are in themselves simple substances, thus (as a consequence of the same ground of proof) that personality is inseparable from them, and that they are conscious of their existence as detached from all matter. For in this way we would have taken a step beyond the sensible world, entering into the field of **noumena**,^c and then no one could deny that we are entitled to extend ourselves farther into this field, settle in it, and, as far as each of us might be favored by an auspicious star, to take possession of it. For the proposition "Every thinking being as such is a simple substance" is a synthetic proposition *a priori*, first because it goes beyond the concept that grounds it by adding the **way of existing** to thinking in general and second because it adds to that concept a predicate (simplicity) that cannot be given in any experience whatever. Thus synthetic propositions *a priori* would not, as we have asserted, be feasible and accessible merely in relation to objects of possible experience, and in particular as principles^d of the possibility of this experience itself, but rather they could reach as far as things in general and in themselves, which consequence would put an end to this whole critique and would bid us to leave things the same old way they were before. Yet that danger is not so great here if one approaches nearer to the matter.

The procedure of rational psychology is governed by a paralogism, which is exhibited through the following syllogism:

What cannot be thought otherwise than as subject does not exist otherwise than as subject, and is therefore substance.

Now a thinking being, considered merely as such, cannot be thought otherwise than as subject.

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Therefore it also exists only as such a thing, i.e., as substance.

The major premise talks about a being that can be thought of in every respect, and consequently even as it might be given in intuition. But the minor premise talks about this being only insofar as it is considered as subject, relative only to thinking and the unity of consciousness, but not at the same time in relation to the intuition through which it is given as an object^e for thinking. Thus the conclu-

^a Object

^b Object

^c Not in roman type.

^d Principien

^e Object

sion is drawn *per Sophisma figurae dictionis*,^a hence by means of a deceptive inference.*

B 412 That this resolution of the famous argument into a paralogism is entirely correct shows itself clearly if one reviews in this connection the general remark to the systematic representation of the principles^b and the section on noumena,³⁹ where it was proved that the concept of a thing that can exist for itself as subject but not as a mere predicate carries with it no objective reality at all, i.e., that one cannot know whether it applies to any object, since one has no insight into the possibility of such a way of existing, and consequently that it yields absolutely no cognition. Thus if that concept, by means of the term "substance," is to indicate an object^c that can be given, and if it is to become a cognition, then it must be grounded on a persisting intuition as the indispensable condition of the objective reality of a concept, namely, that through which alone an object is given. But now we have in inner intuition nothing at all that persists, for the I is only the consciousness of my thinking; thus if we stay merely with thinking, we also lack the necessary condition for applying the concept of substance, i.e., of a subject subsisting for itself, to itself as a thinking being; and the simplicity of substance that is bound up with the objective reality of this concept completely falls away and is transformed into a merely logically qualitative unity of self-consciousness in thinking in general, whether or not the subject is composite.

B 411 * "Thinking" is taken in an entirely different signification in the two premises: in the major premise, as it applies to an object^d in general (hence as it may be given in intuition); but in the minor premise only as it subsists in relation to self-consciousness, where, therefore, no object^e is thought, but only the relation to oneself as subject (as the form of thinking) is represented. In the first premise, things are talked about that cannot be thought of other than as subjects; the second premise, however, talks not about **things**, but about **thinking** (in that one abstracts from every object),^f in which the I always serves as subject of consciousness; hence in the conclusion it cannot follow that I cannot exist otherwise than as subject, but rather only that in thinking my existence I can use myself only as the subject of judgment, which is an identical proposition, that discloses absolutely nothing about the manner of my existence.

^a "by a sophism of a figure of speech," i.e., a fallacy of equivocation.

^b That is, the Principles of Pure Understanding.

^c Object

^d Object

^e Object

^f Object

Refutation of Mendelssohn's proof
of the persistence of the soul.⁴⁰

This acute philosopher soon noticed that the usual argument through which it is to be proved that the soul (if one grants that it is a simple being) cannot cease through **disintegration**, is insufficient for the aim of securing the soul's necessary continuing duration, since one could still assume cessation of its existence by **vanishing**. In his *Phaedo*, he sought to avoid this perishability, which would be a true annihilation, by attempting to prove that a simple being cannot cease to be at all because, since it cannot be diminished and thus lose more and more of its existence, and so be **gradually** transformed into nothing (since it has no parts and thus no plurality in itself), there would be no time at all between a moment in which it is and another moment in which it is not, which is impossible. – Yet he did not consider that even if we allow the soul this simple nature, namely, that it contains no manifold [of parts] **outside one another**, and hence no extensive magnitude, one nevertheless cannot deny to it, any more than to any other existence, an intensive magnitude, i.e., a degree of reality in regard to all its faculties, indeed to everything in general that constitutes its existence, which might diminish through all the infinitely many smaller degrees; and thus the supposed substance (the thing whose persistence has not been otherwise established already) could be transformed into nothing, although not by disintegration, but by a gradual remission (*remissio*) of all its powers (hence, if I may be allowed to use this expression, through elangescence). For even consciousness always has a degree, which can always be diminished;* consequently, so does the faculty of being conscious of oneself, and likewise with all other faculties. – Thus the persistence of the soul, merely as an object of inner sense, remains unproved and even unprovable, although its persistence in life, where the thinking being (as a human being) is at the same time an object of

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* Clarity is not, as the logicians say, the consciousness of a representation;⁴¹ for a certain degree of consciousness, which, however, is not sufficient for memory, must be met with even in some obscure representations, because without any consciousness we would make no distinction in the combination of obscure representations; yet we are capable of doing this with the marks of some concepts (such as those of right and equity, or those of a musician who, when improvising, hits many notes at the same time). Rather a representation is clear if the consciousness in it is sufficient for a **consciousness of the difference** between it and others. To be sure, if this consciousness suffices for a distinction, but not for a consciousness of the difference, then the representation must still be called obscure. So there are infinitely many degrees of consciousness down to its vanishing.

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outer sense, is clear of itself; but this is not at all sufficient for the rational psychologist, who undertakes to prove from mere concepts the absolute persistence of the soul even beyond life.*

- B415 * Those who believe that they have done enough to get a new possibility started properly when they defy one to show a contradiction in its presuppositions (as are all those who believe that they have insight into the possibility of thinking even after life has ceased, though they have an example of thinking only through the empirical intuitions in human life) can be brought into great embarrassment through other possibilities that are not the least bit bolder. Such a possibility is the division of a **simple substance** into several substances, or conversely, the fusing together (coalition) of several substances into a simple one. For although divisibility presupposes a composite, what it requires is not necessarily a composite made up of substances, but merely a composite of degrees (of several faculties) of one and the same substance. Just as one can think of all the powers and faculties of the soul, even that of consciousness, as disappearing by halves, but in such a way that the substance always remains; so likewise one can without contradiction represent this extinguished half as preserved, yet not in it but outside it; only^a since everything real in it, consequently having a degree, and so its whole existence, lacking in nothing, has been halved, another particular substance would arise outside it. For the multiplicity that was divided already existed previously, yet not as a multiplicity of substances, but rather of that reality as a quantum of existence in it,^b and the unity of substance was only a way of existing, which through this division alone is transformed into a plurality of subsistence. But in this way too several simple substances could once again fuse together into one, and nothing would be lost except merely the plurality of subsistence, since the one substance would contain the degree of reality of all the previous ones together in itself; and perhaps the simple substance, which gives us the appearance of a matter (though of course not through a mechanical or chemical influence on each other, but through one unknown to us, of which these would be only the appearance) might produce offspring-souls through such a **dynamic** division of the parent-souls, as **intensive magnitudes**, which would meanwhile replace what had departed from them by a coalition with new material of the same kind. I am far from allowing any worth or validity to such figments of the brain, and the above principles^c of the Analytic have sufficiently enjoined us to make none other than an experiential use of the categories (such as substance). But if the rationalist is keen to make the mere faculty of thinking into a self-subsisting being without any persisting intuition through which an object is given, merely because for him the unity of apperception in thinking allows of no explanation from something composite, instead of admitting, as would be better to do, that he does not know how to explain the possibility of

^a Reading *nur* with the fourth edition; earlier editions have *und*.

^b in *ibr*; whose referent is presumably *die Substanz*; however, the context would appear to require the pronoun to be plural: "in them" (*in ihnen*), sc. "in the substances."

^c *Principien*

If we take the above propositions in a **synthetic** connection, as valid for all thinking beings, as they must be taken in rational psychology as a system, and if from the category of relation,^a starting with the proposition "All thinking beings are, as such, substances" we go backward through the series of propositions until the circle closes, then we finally come up against the existence of thinking beings, which in this system are conscious of themselves not only as independent of external things but also as being able to determine themselves from themselves (in regard to the persistence belonging necessarily to the character of a substance). But from this it follows that **idealism**, at least problematic idealism, is unavoidable in that same rationalistic system, and if the existence of external things is not at all required for the determination of one's own existence in time, then such things are only assumed, entirely gratuitously, without a proof of them being able to be given.

If, on the contrary, we follow the **analytic** procedure, grounded on the "I think" given as a proposition that already includes existence in itself, and hence grounded on modality, and then we take it apart so as to cognize its content, whether and how this I determines its existence in space or time merely through it, then the propositions of the rational doctrine of the soul begin not from the concept of a thinking being in general but from an actuality; and from the way this is thought, after everything empirical has been detached from it, it is concluded what pertains to a thinking being in general, as the following table shows.

	I. I think,	
2. as subject,		3. as simple subject,
	4. as identical subject in every state of my thinking.	

Now because in the second proposition here it is not determined whether I **could** exist and be thought of only as subject and not as predicate of another thing, the concept of a subject is here taken merely logically, and it remains undetermined whether or not substance is to be understood by it. Yet in the third proposition the absolute unity of ap-

a thinking nature, then why should not the **materialist**, even though he can just as little present any experience in behalf of his possibilities, be justified in an equal boldness, retaining the rationalist's formal unity while putting his own principle to an opposite use?

^a Relation

perception, the simple I, in the representation to which every combination or separation constituting thought is related, also becomes important for its own sake,^a even if I have not settled anything about the subject's constitution or subsistence. Apperception is something real, and its simplicity lies already in its possibility. Now there is nothing real in space that is simple; for points (which constitute the only simple entities in space) are mere bounds, and not themselves something that serves to constitute space as parts. Thus from this follows the impossibility of explaining how I am constituted as a merely thinking subject on the basis of **materialism**. But because my existence in the first proposition is considered as given, since it does not say that every thinking being exists (which would at the same time predicate absolute necessity of them, and hence say too much), but only "**I exist thinking**," that proposition is empirical, and contains the determinability of my existence merely in regard to my representations in time. But since for this once again I first need something persisting, and, just insofar as I think myself, nothing of the sort is given to me in inner intuition, it is not possible at all through this simple self-consciousness to determine the way I exist, whether as substance or as accident. Thus if **materialism** will not work as a way of explaining my existence, then **spiritualism** is just as unsatisfactory for it, and the conclusion is that in no way whatsoever can we cognize anything about the constitution of our soul that in any way at all concerns the possibility of its separate existence.

And how should it be possible to go beyond experience (of our existence in life) through the unity of consciousness with which we are acquainted only because we have an indispensable need of it for the possibility of experience, and even to extend our cognition to the nature of all thinking beings in general, through the empirical but in regard to all kinds of intuition indeterminate proposition "I think"?

Thus there is no rational psychology as **doctrine** that might provide us with an addition to our self-consciousness, but only as **discipline**, setting impassable boundaries for speculative reason in this field, in order, on the one side, not to be thrown into the lap of a soulless materialism, or on the other side not to get lost wandering about in a spiritualism that must be groundless for us in life; on the contrary, it rather reminds us to regard this refusal of our reason to give an answer to those curious questions, which reach beyond this life, as reason's hint that we should turn our self-knowledge^b away from fruitless and extravagant speculation toward fruitful practical uses, which, even if it is always directed only to objects of experience, takes its principles^c from

^a *für sich*

^b *Selbsterkenntnis*

^c *Prinzipien*

somewhere higher, and so determines our behavior, as if our vocation^a extended infinitely far above experience, and hence above this life.

From all this one sees that rational psychology has its origin in a mere misunderstanding. The unity of consciousness, which grounds the categories, is here taken for an intuition of the subject as an object,^b and the category of substance is applied to it. But this unity is only the unity of thinking, through which no object^c is given; and thus the category of substance, which always presupposes a given intuition, cannot be applied to it, and hence this subject cannot be cognized at all. Thus the subject of the categories cannot, by thinking them, obtain a concept of itself as an object^d of the categories; for in order to think them, it must take its pure self-consciousness, which is just what is to be explained, as its ground. Likewise, the subject, in which the representation of time originally has its ground, cannot thereby determine its own existence in time, and if the latter cannot be, then the former as a determination of its self (as a thinking being in general) through categories can also not take place.*

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* The "I think" is, as has already been said, an empirical proposition, and contains within itself the proposition "I exist." But I cannot say "Everything that thinks, exists"; for then the property of thinking would make all beings possessing it into necessary beings. Hence my existence also cannot be regarded as inferred from the proposition "I think," as Descartes held (for otherwise the major premise, "Everything that thinks, exists" would have to precede it), but rather it is identical with it.⁴² It expresses an indeterminate empirical intuition, i.e., a perception (hence it proves that sensation, which consequently belongs to sensibility, grounds this existential proposition), but it precedes the experience that is to determine the object^e of perception through the category in regard to time; and here existence is not yet a category, which is not related to an indeterminately given object, but rather to an object of which one has a concept, and about which one wants to know whether or not it is posited outside this concept. An indeterminate perception here signifies only something real, which was given, and indeed only to thinking in general, thus not as appearance, and also not as a thing in itself (a noumenon), but rather as something that in fact exists and is indicated as an existing thing in the proposition "I think." For it is to be noted that if I have called the proposition "I think" an empirical proposition, I would not say by this that the **I** in this proposition is an empirical representation; for it is rather purely intellectual, because it belongs to thinking in general. Only without any empirical representation, which provides the material for thinking, the act I think would not take place, and the empirical is only the condition of the application, or use, of the pure intellectual faculty.⁴³

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^a Bestimmung

^b Object

^c Object

^d Object

^e Object

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In this way, then, a cognition going beyond the bounds of possible experience yet belonging to the highest interests of humanity disappears, as far as speculative philosophy is concerned, in disappointed expectation; nevertheless the strictness of critique, by proving the impossibility of settling anything dogmatically about an object of experience beyond the bounds of experience, performs a not unimportant service for reason regarding this interest, in securing it likewise against all possible assertions of the contrary; this cannot be done otherwise than by proving one's proposition apodictically, or, if that does not succeed, then by seeking the sources of this incapacity, which, if they lie in the necessary limits of our reason, must then subject every opponent to exactly the same law of renunciation for all claims to dogmatic assertions.

Nevertheless, not the least bit is lost through this regarding the warrant, or indeed the necessity, for the assumption of a future life in accordance with principles of the practical use of reason, which is bound up with its speculative use; for in any case the merely speculative proof has never been able to have an influence on common human reason. It so turns on a hairsplitting point that even the schools can retain it only as long as they can keep it standing there spinning around ceaselessly like a top, and thus even in their own eyes it provides no persisting foundation on which anything could be built. Here all the proofs that the world can use preserve their undiminished worth, and rather gain in clarity and unaffected conviction through the removal of those dogmatic pretensions, since they place reason in its proper territory, namely the order of ends that is yet at the same time an order of nature; but then since reason exists at the same time as a practical faculty in itself, without being limited to the conditions of the latter order, it is justified in extending the former order, and with it our whole existence, beyond the bounds of experience and life. By **analogy with the nature** of living beings in this world, regarding which reason must assume as a necessary principle that no organ, no faculty, nothing superfluous, or disproportionate to its use, hence nothing purposeless is to be met with, but rather that everything is to be judged as precisely suitable to its function^a in life, the human being, who alone can contain within himself the ultimate final end^b of all this, would have to be the only creature excepted from it. For his natural predispositions, not only his talents and the drives to make use of them, but chiefly the moral law in

^a Bestimmung^b letzten Endzweck

him, go so far beyond all the utility and advantage that he could draw from them in this life that the latter teaches him to esteem above all else the mere consciousness of a disposition to rectitude, even in the absence of any advantage, even of the phantom of posthumous fame, and he feels himself called inwardly, through his conduct in this world, and the sacrifice of many advantages, to make himself a suitable citizen of a better one, which he has in its idea. This powerful ground of proof, which can never be refuted, accompanied by an ever increasing cognition of the purposiveness in everything we see and by a vision of the immensity of creation, hence also by the consciousness of a certain boundlessness in the possible extension of our knowledge,^a along with a drive commensurate to it, always still remains, even if we must equally give up insight into the necessary continuation of our existence from the merely theoretical cognition of our self.

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Conclusion of the solution of the psychological paralogism.

The dialectical illusion in rational psychology rests on the confusion of an idea of reason (of a pure intelligence) with the concept, in every way indeterminate, of a thinking being in general. I think of my self, in behalf of a possible experience, by abstracting from all actual experience, and from this conclude that I could become conscious of my existence even outside experience and of its empirical conditions. Consequently I confuse the possible **abstraction** from my empirically determined existence with the supposed consciousness of a **separate** possible existence of my thinking Self, and believe that I cognize what is substantial in me as a transcendental subject, since I have in thought merely the unity of consciousness that grounds everything determinate as the mere form of cognition.

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The problem of explaining the community of the soul with the body does not properly belong to the psychology that is here at issue, because it intends to prove the personality of the soul even outside this community (after death), and so it is **transcendent** in the proper sense, even though it concerns an object^b of experience, but only to the extent that it ceases to be an object of experience. Meanwhile in accord with our doctrine^c a sufficient reply can also be given to this problem. The difficulty presented by this problem consists, as is well known, in the presumed difference in kind between the object of inner sense (the soul) and

^a *Kenntnisse*^b *Object*^c *Lehrbegriff*

the object of outer sense, since to the former only time pertains as the formal condition of its intuition, while to the latter space pertains also. But if one considers that the two kinds of objects are different not inwardly but only insofar as one of them **appears** outwardly to the other,

B428 hence that what grounds the appearance of matter as thing in itself might perhaps not be so different in kind, then this difficulty vanishes, and the only difficulty remaining is that concerning how a community of substances is possible at all, the resolution of which lies entirely outside the field of psychology, and, as the reader can easily judge from what was said in the Analytic about fundamental powers and faculties, this without any doubt also lies outside the field of all human cognition.

General remark
concerning the transition from rational psychology
to cosmology.

The proposition "I think," or "I exist thinking," is an empirical proposition. But such a proposition is grounded on empirical intuition, consequently also on the object thought, as an appearance; and thus it seems as if, according to our theory, the whole, even in thinking, is completely transformed into appearance, and in such a way our consciousness itself, as mere illusion, would in fact come down to nothing.^a

Thinking, taken in itself,^b is merely the logical function and hence the sheer^c spontaneity of combining the manifold of a merely possible intuition; and in no way does it present the subject of consciousness as appearance, merely because it takes no account at all of the kind of intuition, whether it is sensible or intellectual. In this way I represent myself to myself neither as I am nor as I appear to myself, but rather I think myself only as I do every object^d in general from whose kind of intuition I abstract. If here I represent myself as **subject** of a thought or even as **ground** of thinking, then these ways of representing do not signify the categories of substance or cause, for these categories are those functions of thinking (of judging) applied to our sensible intuition, which would obviously be demanded if I wanted to **cognize** myself. But now I want to become conscious of myself only as thinking; I put to one side how my proper self is given in intuition, and then it could be a mere appearance that I think, but not insofar as I think; in the consciousness of myself in mere thinking I am the **being itself**, about which, however, nothing yet is thereby given to me for thinking.

^a *auf nichts geben*

^b *für sich*

^c *lauter*

^d *Object*

But the proposition "I think," insofar as it says only that **I exist thinking**, is not a merely logical function, but rather determines the subject (which is then at the same time an object)^a in regard to existence, and this cannot take place without inner sense, whose intuition always makes available the object^b not as thing in itself but merely as appearance. Thus in this proposition there is already no longer merely spontaneity of thinking, but also receptivity of intuition, i.e., the thinking of my self applied to the empirical intuition of the very same subject. It is in this latter that the thinking self must now seek the conditions of the use of its logical functions for categories of substance, cause, etc., so as not merely to indicate itself as object^c in itself through the "I," but also to determine its kind of existence, i.e., to cognize it as noumenon; which, however, is impossible, since inner empirical intuition is sensible, and makes available nothing but data of appearance, which affords nothing for knowledge of the separate existence of the object^d of **pure consciousness**, but can serve merely in behalf of experience.

But suppose there subsequently turned up – not in experience but in certain (not merely logical rules but) laws holding firm *a priori* and concerning our existence – the occasion for presupposing ourselves to be **legislative** fully *a priori* in regard to our own **existence**,^e and as self-determining in this existence;^f then this would disclose a spontaneity through which our actuality is determinable without the need of conditions of empirical intuition; and here we would become aware that in the consciousness of our existence something is contained *a priori* that can serve to determine our existence, which is thoroughly determinable only sensibly, in regard to a certain inner faculty in relation to an intelligible world (obviously one only thought of).

But this would nonetheless bring all the attempts of rational psychology not the least bit further. For through this admirable faculty, which for the first time reveals to me the consciousness of the moral law, I would indeed have a principle^g for the determination of my existence that is purely intellectual; but through which predicates?^h Through none other than those that would have to be given to me in sensible intuition, and thus I would have landed right back where I was in rational psychology, namely in need of sensible intuitions in order to obtain significance for my concepts of the understanding, substance, cause, etc.; but those intuitions can never help me up beyond the field

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^a Object^b Object^c Object^d Object^e Dasein^f Existenz^g Princip

of experience. Meanwhile, I would still be warranted in applying these concepts in regard to their practical use, which is always directed to objects of experience, according to their analogical significance in their theoretical use, to freedom and the free subject, since by them I understand merely the logical functions of subject and predicate, ground and consequence, in accordance with which actions or effects are determined in conformity to those laws in such a way that they can at the same time always be explained conformably to the laws of nature and the categories of substance and cause, although they arise from a wholly different principle.^a This should have been said only to guard against a misunderstanding that easily arises regarding this doctrine about our self-intuition as appearance. In the following there will be opportunity to make use of it. >

^a Princip

refers to the occasionalism of some later Cartesians, such as Arnold Geulinckx (1624–1669) and Geraud Cordemoy (d. 1684), but developed most fully and originally by Nicolas Malebranche (1638–1715) (*On the Search for Truth* [(1675)], tr. T. M. Lennon and P. J. Olscamp [Columbus: Ohio University Press, 1980] 6.2.3, pp. 446–52). It holds that bodies and minds have no natural power to influence one another, but each influences the other through the mediation of God's causality. Occasionalism was rejected by Wolff (*Psychologia rationalis* §§ 589–611) and Baumgarten (*Metaphysica* § 767).

- 37 “Pillars of Hercules” was the name commonly given in antiquity to the headlands, Gibraltar to the north and Jebel Musa to the south, at the eastern end of the Strait of Gibralter, which opens on the Atlantic Ocean.
- 38 Reflections bearing on the revision of the “Paralogisms” for the second edition include R 5650 (1785–88, 18:298–302) and R 5811 (1783–84, 18:360).
- 39 See B 288–94 and A 235–60 / B 294–315.

- 40 Moses Mendelssohn, *Phädon oder über die Unsterblichkeit der Seele* (Berlin: Fr. Nicolai, 1767). Mendelssohn, *Gesammelte Schriften*. Jubiläumsausgabe. (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1932) 3:5–129. In the first edition of this work, Mendelssohn’s reasoning in favor of immortality of the soul is presented in the following representative passage:

“If we say,” Socrates went on, “that the soul dies, then we must suppose one of the following: Either all its powers and faculties, its actions and passions, suddenly cease, they vanish suddenly in an instant; or the soul, like the body, suffers gradual transformations, countless changes of dress, proceeding in a constant series, and in this series there is an epoch where it is no longer a human soul, but has become something other than that, becoming dust, air, plant or a part of another animal. Is there a third case, another way in which the soul can die, besides *suddenly* or *gradually*? ”

“No,” replied Cebes. “This division completely exhausts the possibilities.”

“Good,” said Socrates, “then those who still doubt whether the soul is mortal may choose, if they care to, between its suddenly vanishing or its ceasing bit by bit to be what it was . . .

“*Perhaps the soul perishes suddenly, vanishes in an instant.* In itself this kind of death is possible. But can it be produced by nature?

“Not at all, if what we have admitted is true, that nature can produce no annihilation. And have we rightly admitted this?” asked Socrates. “Between *being* and *non-being* there is a terrible gap, which can never be leapt over by nature, which works gradually . . . No, Cebes, let us sooner fear that the sun will change into ice, than fear a fundamentally evil action, *annihilation through a miracle*, from the Self-sufficient Good . . .

“But now we have seen that there is no determinate moment when one can say, ‘The animal dies now.’ The dissolution of the animal machine has long since begun before its effects become visible; for there never fail to be animal movements opposing the preservation of the whole; only they decrease bit by bit until finally the movements of the parts no longer harmonize in a single final end, but each of them has taken on its particular final end, and then the machine has dissolved . . .

“Thus if the death of the body is also to be the death of the soul, then there must be no moment in which one can say ‘Now the soul vanishes,’ but the soul must decrease in force and effectiveness bit by bit, just as the movements in the parts of the machine cease to harmonize to a single final end . . .

"Thus we only have to investigate whether the inner powers of the soul could not perish gradually, just as the parts of a machine separate . . .

"The body dies: that means, all movements now no longer appear to aim at life and the preservation of the whole . . . And the soul? my Cebes, where will we put it? Its machine is corrupted. The parts left over from it no longer belong to *it* and do not constitute a whole that could have a soul. Here there are no longer any organs for sensing or tools for feeling, through which the soul could attain to any sensation. Is everything in it therefore to be empty and desolate? Are all its sensations, imaginings, desires and abhorrences, its inclinations and passions have vanished, without leaving behind the least trace?"

"Impossible," said Cebes. "What would that be except complete annihilation? And no annihilation, as we have seen, belongs to the faculties of nature . . ." (*Phädon*, *Gesammelte Schriften* 3:69–73)

Yet the precise argument against the annihilation of the soul which Kant seems to have in mind was apparently added by Mendelssohn in an appendix to the third edition of *Phädon* in 1769:

A natural action, it has been said from time immemorial, must have a beginning, a middle and an end, that is, it must occupy a stretch of time before it is completed. This part of time may be as small as you like, but to be consistent with the nature of time, it must have moments following one after another. If the powers of nature are to produce an effect, they must approach this effect gradually and prepare for it, before it follows. But an effect that cannot be prepared, which must follow in only one instant, ceases to be natural, and cannot be produced by powers which must do everything in time. All these propositions were not unknown to the ancients, and they appear to me to be present, not without clarity, in the reasoning of Plato *about opposed states and the transition from one to the other*. Therefore I sought to put them before my readers in Plato's way, but with the clarity suitable to our time. They are quite evident to healthy reason; yet through the *doctrine of continuity* they achieve, in my opinion, a high degree of certainty. It was not reluctantly that I embraced the opportunity to acquaint my readers with this important doctrine, because they lead to *correct concepts concerning the alterations of the body and the soul, without which death and life, mortality and immortality, cannot be considered from the right standpoint*. (*Phädon*, *Gesammelte Schriften* 3:147–8)

- ⁴¹ This is, however, the account of clarity given by Kant himself (*Logic*, 9:33). But there he was expounding Georg Friedrich Meier (1718–1777), *Auszug aus der Vernunftlebtre* (Extract from the Theory of Reasoning) (Halle, 1752), which he had used as a text since 1765 (2:310–11). Meier is presumably the sort of logician Kant has in mind here.
- ⁴² In fact, Descartes *denies* that we may infer "I exist" from "I think" by way of the general proposition "Whatever thinks exists," for precisely the reason Kant mentions here. See "Reply to Second Objections," *Oeuvres de Descartes* 7:140.
- ⁴³ To this note, compare R 5661 (1788–90, 18:318–20), *Nachtrag* CLXXX to A592/B620 below (E 53, 23:42–3), and the discussion of Descartes at *Metaphysik Mrongovius*, 29:876–7. See also Leibniz's discussion of the *cogito* in *New Essays*, book IV, chapter VII § 7, G 6:411, and the treatment by Nicolaus Tétens (1736 or 1737–1807), *Philosophische Versuche über die menschliche Natur und ihre Entwicklung* (1777–78; reprint Berlin, Kant-Gesellschaft, 1913), pp. 552, 555. Wolff divided psychology into *psychologia empirica* and *psychologia rationalis*. *Psychologia empirica* begins by treating of

the soul's existence, which he grounds on the Cartesian *cogito* (*Psychologia empirica* §§ 12–15, *Gesammelte Werke* II.5 [Hildesheim: Olms, 1968]). *Psychologia rationalis* deals with the “nature and essence” of the soul, and especially the functions of the intellect (*Psychologia rationalis*, *Gesammelte Werke* II.6). See also Baumgarten, *Metaphysica* §§ 504–18.

- 44 As mentioned in note 1 above, there are a number of Kant's reflections giving evidence of his discovery of the antinomies in 1769 (e.g. R 3936–37, 17:355) and the antinomies predominate in Kant's first outlines of the “Dialectic” in R 4756–60 (1775–77, 17:699–713). Other important notes from this period are R 4742 (17:694) and R 4780 (17:725). From the 1780s, important reflections on the antinomies include R 5959–61 (18:399–401), R 5962 (1785–89, 18:401–5), R 5970 (1783–84, 18:408–9), R 5973 (1783–84, 18:411–12) and R 5979 (1785–88, 18:413–14).
- 45 With these two paragraphs, compare R 4454 (1772? 1773–75? 17:557).
- 46 “A WORLD is a series (multitude, whole) of actual finite things which are not parts of one another” (Baumgarten, *Metaphysica* § 354); “In every world there are actual parts, which are singulars connected into a whole” (*Metaphysica* § 357).
- 47 For the source of this principle in Wolffian cosmology, see following note.
- 48 “Because the parts of the world are either simultaneous or successive, if they are posited outside one another, they are connected in the world either by time or by space or by both” (Baumgarten, *Metaphysica* § 374; cf. § 238). In four successive paragraphs, Baumgarten considers the parts of the world connected in space and time (first antinomy) (*Metaphysica* § 374), connected causally (third antinomy) (*Metaphysica* § 375), connected as actual parts (second antinomy) (*Metaphysica* § 376), and as possibles forming a contingent whole (fourth antinomy) (*Metaphysica* § 377). He concludes that either there is no world, or that it must consist in a multitude or series forming a unity (*Metaphysica* § 379). This says, in effect, that if the (conditioned) members of each of the identified series are given, then the whole (the unconditioned) must also be given. At the same time, Baumgarten notes that because it is so constituted, the unity of the world is a “hypothetical unity” (*Metaphysica* § 362) as distinct from an “absolute” unity (*Metaphysica* § 76).
- 49 “A PROGRESS (regress) TO INFINITY is a series of contingent entities posited outside one another, of which one is the cause of the other” (Baumgarten, *Metaphysica* § 380).
- 50 Baumgarten argues that the world must consist of simple parts or monads (Baumgarten, *Metaphysica* §§ 392–405). Compare Leibniz, *Monadology* § 1.
- 51 Compare Baumgarten, *Metaphysica* §§ 388–90, which argues (no doubt with Spinoza in mind) that the world is not a substance, its parts are not accidents, and an infinite substance is not a unique substance.
- 52 Compare Baumgarten, *Metaphysica* §§ 358, 380–1.
- 53 Baumgarten emphasizes the contingency both of the parts of the world and of the world as a whole (*Metaphysica* §§ 361–64). He argues that if we suppose the world to be necessary, then we must suppose that the determination of its parts is also necessary, hence that the parts themselves must be necessary and therefore infinite (which contradicts the nature of parts) (*Metaphysica* § 361).