

Kant on the Parity of Inner & Outer Sense

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Abstract

According to the Difference Thesis, in introspection one is aware of one's self and its states in an epistemically privileged and psychologically peculiar way. I argue that as Kant's views evolve from the 1770's into the critical period he comes to reject the Difference Thesis. Kant therefore accepts, in the 1780's, that in several important senses intro and extrospection are epistemically and psychologically on par. There are, however, differences in what we can come to know in intro and extrospection, because there are differences between inner and outer experience that are not due to the senses themselves but rather to their form.

IS THERE A DEEP EPISTEMOLOGICAL AND/OR PSYCHOLOGICAL DIFFERENCE between our awareness of features of our environment and our awareness of our own mental states? Call the view that in introspection one is aware of one's self and its states in an epistemically privileged and psychologically peculiar way the "Difference Thesis."¹ Leibniz provides one famous endorsement of the Difference Thesis. He argues, against Locke, that introspection provides access to ourselves as substantial subjects, which is what provisions us with many of our central metaphysical concepts.

reflection is nothing other than attention to what is within us, and the senses do not give us what we already bring with us. Given this, can anyone deny that there is a great deal innate in our mind, since we are innate to ourselves, so to speak, and since we have within ourselves being, unity, substance, duration, change, action, perception, pleasure, and a thousand other objects of our intellectual ideas? And since these objects are immediate and always present to our understanding (though they may not always be perceived consciously on account of our distractions and our needs), why should it be surprising that we say that these ideas, and everything that depends upon them, are innate in us? (Leibniz 1996, 294)

It is reflection on the self that provides the cognitive subject with the concepts of substance, unity, etc. As Leibniz says elsewhere, also commenting on Locke, "this reflection does not limit itself solely to the operations of the spirit, as is said [in Locke's *Essays*]; it extends to the spirit itself."²

¹ For discussion of the Difference Thesis in contemporary philosophizing about self-knowledge see (Gertler 2011, 10–12) and (Smithies and Stoljar 2012, 4–6).

² From Leibniz's *Observations on Locke's Essay on Human Understanding* (A VI.i.6,14), quoted in (Bobro 2004, 27). See also the discussion of this passage in (Kulstad 1991, 43–44).

Like Leibniz, Kant construes the subject as playing a central role in metaphysical theorizing. Here I examine whether and to what extent Kant endorses the Difference Thesis. I argue that there is a shift in Kant's views from the 1770's into the 1780's. Prior to the first *Critique* Kant endorses the Difference Thesis, taking a broadly Leibnizian position regarding the significance of our access to ourselves in introspection. But in the 1780's Kant rejects the Difference Thesis, at least with respect to empirical introspection. Instead, Kant argues that in several significant respects empirical introspection and extrospection (i.e. outer intuition) are epistemically and psychologically on par. In particular, intro and extrospection both provide, and in the same sense, immediate and singular representations. Intro and extrospection also both contain, and are limited to, the same kind of things—viz. representations of properties and states. The parity thesis is controversial, as many commentators construe Kant as endorsing the “elusiveness” of the subject, in stark contrast to the givenness of outer objects. I address central criticisms of such parity claims by Allison and Caranti, among others, below.

In section one, I examine Kant's view of inner sense after his sharp distinction, first made in 1769, between sensibility and understanding. I argue that despite this distinction, Kant's view of introspection and its import for self-knowledge in the 1770's remains largely in line with that of rationalist predecessors such as Leibniz. Section two discusses Kant's view of inner sense and self-knowledge in the critical period, culminating in the second edition of the first *Critique*. I emphasize the way in which Kant's conception of self-knowledge importantly diverges from his view in the 1770's, and how his evolving conception of sensibility disallows any intuitive access that one might have to oneself as subject. However, I argue that the parity of inner and outer sense (intuition) does not result in parity of inner and outer *experience*. I then defend the view against several major objections.

1 Kant on Sense and Object

According to the Difference Thesis introspection provides a form of privileged and peculiar access to oneself, which cannot be had with respect to elements of one's environment. For Leibniz, the truth of the Difference Thesis is important for explaining our possession of central metaphysical concepts. For example, the only conditions under which we can generate the concept of a metaphysical subject or substance is via our immediate awareness, in reflection, of ourselves as such subjects. Kant explicitly indicates his endorsement of such a position in a 1769 note on Baumgarten's *Metaphysica*.³

Therefore, in every judgment the subject in general is something = x which, cognized under the mark *a*, is compared with another mark. Hence it is also no wonder that we do not cognize a subject prior to all predicates except the I, which nevertheless is no concept but rather [crossed out: a sensation] an intuition. Hence by

³ See also the discussion of this note in (Laywine 2005, 8–9).

means of the understanding we cognize in bodies not the actual subjects, but rather the predicates of extension, solidity, rest, motion, etc. The cause is: by means of our senses only the relations of things can be revealed, and we can represent the absolute or the subject only from our selves. The idea of substance actually comes from the *repraesentatione sui ipsius*, insofar as we represent that something is separate from us, and predicates cannot be thought without a subject and without an ultimate subject; the constant predicates together are then called the subject. (R3921, 17:346; see also R5290, 18:144; R5297, 18:146; R4493, 17:571-2; AC 25:14)

Here Kant argues that the senses present only (in the outer case) determinate instances of determinables such as extension, solidity, rest, and motion. The senses by themselves do not present us with a subject of such qualities. The only presentation of such a subject comes in the intuition of the self—the “idea of substance actually comes from the *repraesentatione sui ipsius*.” We then move to a thought of external substances by treating the “constant predicates together” as a stand-in for the metaphysical subject.

In the *Inaugural Dissertation* Kant’s view of these issues is less clear. He presents the intellect as a faculty, the exercise of which allows the cognizing subject to come to know about an underlying noumenal reality. Such knowledge is accomplished by means of reflection upon metaphysical concepts such as “possibility, existence, necessity, substance, cause etc.,” which are “abstracted from the laws inherent in the mind (by attending to its actions on the occasion of an experience)” (ID §8, 2:395). Here we have reference to the self’s *activity*, but not explicit reference to an awareness of the self proper. In fact Kant actually makes few explicit claims in the *Dissertation* regarding the self as subject.

Many of Kant’s remarks about the self are with respect to mind specifically. For example, Kant claims that time, “embraces...all things” including “the accidents which are not included in the relations of space, such as the thoughts of the mind” (2:405). The concepts of time and space are “cognized intuitively” via “the very action of the mind” (2:406), which perhaps suggests that some intuition of the mind’s activity is possible. Whether this intuition is empirical or intellectual is not altogether clear.⁴ In any case, the “exemplars” which the intellect considers as the “measure for all other things” are not the cognizing subject, as in the Baumgarten *reflexion*, but rather God and moral perfection (ID §9, 2:395-6).

However, in the *Dissertation*, Kant does continue to espouse the view, concerning what is given by the senses, that he articulates in the *reflexion* on Baumgarten quoted above. He says,

objects do not strike the senses in virtue of their form or aspect. Accordingly, if the various factors in an object which affect the senses are to coalesce into some

⁴ For further discussion of Kant’s views in the *Dissertation* and their relation to Kant’s subsequently evolving views in the 1770’s see (Dyck 2016). For speculation that Kant is influenced in his view here by his reading of Leibniz see (Allison 2015, 59).

representational whole there is needed an internal principle in the mind, in virtue of which those various factors may be clothed with a certain aspect, in accordance with stable and innate laws (ID 2:393).

We are not presented, at least in outer sense, with objects themselves, but rather only with qualities arrayed in space and over time, which require an “internal principle of the mind” to “coalesce” into a representation of an object.⁵

Kant continues to endorse this position regarding the senses into the mid-1770’s, and either returns to, or at least more explicitly endorses, the idea that the self is the source of our conception of a substantial thing. In writings from the “Duisberg Nachlass” Kant writes that an object may be represented only “according to its relations”, i.e., only according to the qualities, and relations between those qualities, that are presented in sense experience. However, in contrast to his position concerning external objects, Kant claims that we possess special access to a self whose qualities are not presented in this manner. As Kant puts it, “I am the original of all objects” (R4674, 17:646 (1773-5)).⁶ The self is thus the “original of all objects” in the sense that, as Allison Laywine puts it, “we somehow transfer our representations of the one true subject and apply it derivatively or by analogy to our thought of anything else.”⁷ Thus, though Kant’s might shift slightly between the *Dissertation* and the years immediately preceding and following, his general position seems to be that introspection provides a form of non-sensory intuitive acquaintance with the self as a metaphysical subject, and it is via this acquaintance that we can then form by analogy the representations of objects (construed as metaphysical subjects of properties) distinct from us.

Hence, despite Kant’s somewhat radical departure from German rationalism in 1769, with the recognition of two distinct stems of cognition—viz. sensibility and intellect, Kant nevertheless accepts a version of the Difference Thesis, and in a way that is broadly sympathetic to the rationalist tradition. By means of the Difference Thesis both Leibniz and Kant argue for the legitimacy of central metaphysical concepts including, but not limited to, the concept of a metaphysical subject or substance. In this way they conceive of self-knowledge as prior to all

⁵ In his commentary on the *Dissertation*, Markus Herz also presents part of the problematic as concerning the fact that “Every part of our cognition is a judgment in which we attribute some determination to a thing as a predicate to a subject” (Herz 1771, 123) and that there is no obvious basis for determining what is to count as subject. He takes this to be a special epistemological challenge for our cognition of nature, with which Locke was concerned, and which Kant seeks to overcome.

⁶ In a reflexion from the mid-1770’s Kant says that “The I is the intuition of a substance” (R4493, 17:571 (1772-5)). In the *Metaphysics L1* lectures, from roughly the same period, Kant contrasts consciousness of external objects with consciousness of the self. One intuitively oneself immediately, but the same is not true of external objects (28:224). The self (as intelligence) so intuited is substantial, simple, and immaterial (28:225-6). For discussion of the various texts in the *Duisburg Nachlass* and Kant’s endorsement of the rational psychology he would come to criticize see (Guyer 1987; Carl 1989b; Carl 1989a; Serck-Hanssen 2001; Laywine 2005; Laywine 2006; Kitcher 2011).

⁷ (Laywine 2005, 9); see also (Carl 1989a, 182:91–92, 97; Kitcher 2011, 73–74; Wuerth 2014, 104). For criticism of Carl’s, and to a lesser degree Laywine’s, position see (Allison 2015, 121–30).

other knowledge of nature, and as the source of the central concepts necessary for cognition of outer objects as metaphysical subjects or substances.

2 Sense & Self-Knowledge in the Critical Period

In this section I argue that by 1781 Kant rejects the Difference Thesis, at least with regard to introspection as a form of *sense*. Kant now construes introspection (“inner sense”) as, in certain central respects, epistemically and psychologically on par with empirical extrospection (“outer sense”). I offer evidence for this based on consideration of the Transcendental Aesthetic, the Fourth Paralogism, and Kant’s distinction between perception [*Wahrnehmung*] and experience [*Erfahrung*]. Despite this parity of sense, Kant holds that there *is* a disparity between inner and outer *experience*, and thus a disparity between what we can *cognize* in introspection as opposed to extrospection. But this is not, strictly speaking, a disparity concerning a relation of *sense*. The resulting picture is one according to which Kant allows that we have experiential cognition of material phenomenal substance, but that we have no cognition of the soul as a phenomenal substance.

I then address several objections to the parity thesis regarding intuition. In particular I examine whether Kant’s dictum that sensibility gives us objects is in tension with the interpretation I have advanced according to which the senses provide only qualities, never their ultimate subject. I then look at the Refutation of Idealism, and examine whether Kant plausibly could have changed his mind about the parity of intro vs. extrospection by 1787. Finally, I discuss the position, prominently advanced by Henry Allison, that introspection (inner sense) has no “manifold of its own” and that this fact constitutes an important disparity between inner and outer sense.

2.1 Introspection & the Difference Thesis

I first discuss some general considerations regarding inner and outer sense before turning to the issue of the Difference Thesis proper.

In the Transcendental Aesthetic Kant presents an extremely general account of “sensibility” as the “capacity to acquire representations through the way in which we are affected by objects” (A19/B33). Sensibility is a form of receptivity (as opposed to spontaneity), and the outcome of such affection on our sensibility, is “sensation”, which has two forms—viz. space and time. Kant refers to such enformed sensations as “empirical intuitions”, whose objects are “appearances” (A20/B34). Kant differentiates the faculty of sense (as opposed to imagination; cf. B151; An 7:153) into two, apparently corresponding, domains. On the one hand there is “outer sense” (A22/B37), which provisions the mind with representations generated by the subject’s affection by outer objects. On the other hand there is “inner sense” (A33/B49), which provisions the

mind with representations generated by the subject itself (An 7:153).⁸

Kant characterizes intuition generally in terms of two characteristics—viz. *immediacy* [*Unmittelbarkeit*] and *particularity* [*Einzelheit*] (cf. A19/B33, A68/B93; JL 9:91). This is in contrast to the mediacy and generality [*Allgemeinheit*] characteristic of conceptual representation (A68/B93; JL 9:91).

Kant also contrasts the particularity of intuition with the generality of concepts in the “stepladder” passage from the first *Critique*. The specific remark he makes is that a concept, as opposed to an intuition, is related to its object via “a mark, which can be common to many things” (A320/B377). This suggests that intuitions, in contrast to concepts, put a subject in cognitive contact with features of an object that are unique to particular objects and are not had by others.⁹

The view that emerges from Kant’s discussion in the Aesthetic (as well as corollary passages in the *Anthropology*) strongly suggests that intuition, whether outer or inner, presents sensible qualities, arrayed in space and ordered in time. These intuitions are one and all immediate and particular. They are distinguished at base by their genealogy of affection (i.e. self vs. other) and their “form” or structure (i.e. as temporal or spatial). If my explication of this view is correct then, for the critical Kant, there is no deep psychological or epistemological difference between the intuition of one’s own state versus intuition of the state of another object. This is in sharp contrast to the *Dissertation*, and especially Kant’s notes in the later 1770’s, where he explicitly contrasts the nature of what is given in introspection vs extrospection. That is to say that the critical Kant rejects the Difference Thesis, at least with regard to what is available in intuition. There is no intuition of the self as subject that provides the basis for our awareness of other substances distinct from ourselves. Empirical introspection and extrospection are, in intuition, psychologically and epistemically on par.¹⁰

Confirmation of the parity of these two forms of sensory observation comes when we turn to

⁸ In the *Anthropology* Kant distinguishes between inner sense or “*sensus internus*” and interior sense or “*sensus interior*” (7:153). Kant argues that whereas inner sense is a faculty of empirical intuition, interior sense is a “receptivity of the subject to be determined by certain ideas for the preservation or rejection of the condition of these ideas”. These latter ideas for preservation or rejection are those of pleasure and pain. The salient difference here is that Kant does not take states of pleasure or pain to be *representational* in the way in which he takes intuitions to be (cf. CPJ 5:206). Pleasure and pain are rather conative states aiming at the prolongation or cessation of one’s current state (An 7:230-1). However, this distinction aside, it does not seem that Kant would want to deny that pleasure and pain (or feeling [*Gefühl*] more generally) are temporally located, and thus elements of inner sense broadly construed. For related discussion see (Vogel 1993, 879).

⁹ It is debatable whether Kant means here to indicate that intuitions do not relate to objects by means of marks, or that they do, but not via marks that may be had by other objects. For discussion of these issues see (Smit 2000; Grüne 2009, 50–51). For argument that, whether or not intuitions are constituted by marks, they cannot relate to objects fundamentally by means of accuracy conditions, see (McLear 2016c).

¹⁰ Note that here and throughout, unless otherwise indicated, I am referring specifically to *intuition* and the intuitive awareness of what is presented in inner and outer sense. Such intuitions do not straightforwardly count as “perceptions” (*Wahrnehmungen*) in Kant’s sense, nor as “experience” (*Erfahrung*). For discussion of these distinctions see (McLear 2014, 770–2).

Kant's argument in the Fourth Paralogism in the first edition of the *Critique* and its subsequent revision as the Refutation of Idealism in the second, or "B" edition.

In an extended passage in the Fourth Paralogism (A370-1) Kant makes the following argument:

external objects (bodies) are merely appearances, hence also nothing other than a species of my representations, whose objects are something only through these representations, but are nothing separated from them. Thus external things exist as well as my self, and indeed both exist on the immediate testimony of my self-consciousness, only with this difference: the representation of my Self, as the thinking subject, is related merely to inner sense, but the representations that designate extended beings are also related to outer sense. I am no more necessitated to draw inferences in respect of the reality of external objects than I am in regard to the reality of the objects of my inner sense (my thoughts), for in both cases they are nothing but representations, the immediate perception (consciousness) of which is at the same time a sufficient proof of their reality. (A370-1)

In the background of this argument is the assumption that rational psychology privileges awareness of the subject and its states over awareness of non-subjective states. This is why Kant places this argument in the Paralogisms section of the Dialectic of the first *Critique*. I take Kant's argument here as follows:

1. Transcendental idealism entails that we are aware of both subjective and objective states, as they appear, *in the same way* – viz. via *sensible intuition*.
2. So either both kinds of awareness are immediate or they are both mediate.
3. Since awareness of subjective states is obviously immediate then awareness of objective states must also be immediate.
4. ∴ We are immediately aware of the states or properties of physical objects.

Here Kant displays what he takes to be an advantage of his transcendental idealism. Since both inner and outer sense depend on intuition, there is nothing special about inner intuition that privileges it over outer intuition. Both are, as intuitions, immediate presentations (at least of things as they appear). Unfortunately, Kant never makes clear what he means by the term "immediate" [*unmittelbar*]. At the very least, he means to signal that our awareness in intuition is not mediated by any explicit or conscious inference, as when he says that the transcendental idealist "grants to matter, as appearance, a reality which need not be inferred, but is immediately perceived" (A371). If Kant did not think that outer and inner sense were on par in this manner then we could not adequately make sense of his argument here.¹¹

¹¹ Kant makes similar claims in the *Prolegomena*. See 4:336-7. Despite parity with respect to immediacy of presentation,

A final consideration in favor of parity concerns Kant's broader critical view of cognition. I claimed, above, that the discussion of the Aesthetic points towards a view according to which empirical intuition presents sensible qualities arrayed in time and space. In the *Inaugural Dissertation* and various notes thereafter Kant denies that, at least in outer sense, any form or object, understood as the metaphysical subject of such qualities, could be presented in sense. He maintains this position in the first *Critique*. For Kant, "a manifold's combination (*Verbindung*) as such can never come to us through the senses" (B129). Predication is a form of combination. Its categorical counterpart is *inherence*. The senses cannot present anything as predicated of anything, and correspondingly, of any quality as inhering in anything.¹² This does not mean—at least not without further argument—that the senses cannot *present* anything. Much less does it mean that the senses do not present qualities, states, etc., that are not *in fact* states or qualities of some subject. Rather, it means that the senses do not present anything to the awareness of a conscious subject in terms of subject-predicate structure, or of inherence.¹³

If the discussion thus far is correct, then there is parity concerning what is available to introspection vs. extrospection, at least at the level of what is given to intuition, and thus to sense properly so-called. I have argued, further, that what are available to the senses in intro and extrospection are qualities, rather than metaphysical subjects of those qualities. Turning now to Kant's endorsement or denial of the Difference Thesis we need ask what is given, strictly speaking, in introspection, insofar as it takes sensory form. Kant writes in ways, in both the first and second editions of the first *Critique*, that at least some interpreters have taken to commit him to the position that all that is immediately given to inner sense are representations or qualities, without any persisting or underlying subject.¹⁴ For example, in the A-Deduction Kant says,

The consciousness of ourself in accordance with the determinations of our state in internal perception is merely empirical, forever variable; it can give no standing

Kant does change his mind about the status of psychology as a science (4:295) after he writes the *Prolegomena*. At least by the time the *Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science* (1786), Kant explicitly rejects the idea that a doctrine of the soul could rise to "the rank of a science properly so-called" (MFNS 4:471). But this change of position needn't be understood as a repudiation of the parity of inner and outer sense with respect to the Difference Thesis.

¹² Kant's position on this matter is also clear from his statement that the dynamical categories (relation and modality) apply necessarily only to *experience* and not unconditionally to *intuition*. The mathematical categories (of extensive and intensive magnitude) are the only categories that apply "apodictically" to intuition (A160-1/B199-200; see also A178-80/B220-3).

¹³ One might object here that these considerations show at best that there is no *de dicto* awareness of a subject. But perhaps there is *de re* awareness. Insofar as intuition allows for the tracking and responsive differential discrimination of objects then this might count as a form of *de re* awareness; cf. (McLear 2015, 104–5 and note 60). But there is no further sense in which the awareness of sensory qualities in intuition extends to a sensory awareness of the metaphysical subject of those qualities, else the objections considered above would hold. For additional discussion of this issue see (McLear 2015, 97–106; forthcoming, sec. 3.2).

¹⁴ Henry Allison (2004, 278; cf. 292), for example, explicitly connects Kant's position to Hume's. See also (Guyer 1987, 283–4; Dicker 2004, 3, 81; Kraus 2013, 18). For a more nuanced approach to the issue of the self's elusiveness, focussing not on the issue of sensory representation of the self, but rather *cognition*, see (Chignell forthcoming).

or abiding self in this stream of inner appearances [*es kann kein stehendes oder bleibendes Selbst in diesem Flusse innerer Erscheinungen geben*], and is customarily called **inner sense** or **empirical apperception**. (A107)

There is no “standing” or “abiding” self that is given in inner sense. Instead, only “thoughts, feelings, inclinations or decisions” are given (A358). In the B-Deduction Kant writes that “the empirical consciousness that accompanies different representations is by itself dispersed and without relation to the identity of the subject” (B133). A passage discussing inner sense, present in both editions, states that,

Inner sense, by means of which the mind intuits itself, or its inner state, gives, to be sure, no intuition of the soul itself, as object [*Object*]. (A22/B37)

Passages like these have led various interpreters to the conclusion that Kant, much like Hume, endorses an “elusiveness thesis” regarding the appearance (or, more accurately, lack thereof) of the self in inner sense. I agree with elements of this consensus, but two important qualifications of it are necessary.

First, the sense in which the self or subject is “elusive” in inner sense is not simply that the noumenal subject—the subject of rational psychology—is not intuited. Certainly, Kant denies that we have sensory representation, much less cognition, of such a subject or its features, and indicates as much in the Paralogisms. This is one obvious way in which he breaks with the view presented in the notes, discussed above, leading up to the critical period. Moreover, he thinks that his position concerning the elusiveness of the subject is compatible with a broadly deflationary claim concerning cognition of the “soul.”¹⁵

Meanwhile, one can quite well allow the proposition **The soul is substance** to be valid, if only one admits that this concept of ours leads no further, that it cannot teach us any of the usual conclusions of the rationalistic doctrine of the soul...’ (A350-1, Kant’s emphasis).

¹⁵ Kant sometimes distinguishes between *intelligence* and *soul*. An intelligence is sometime characterized as a noumenal entity, at best an “object of reason” (LM-K₂ 28:773). See also LM-M 29:926; Gr 4:446ff; CPrR 5:114; and LM-K₂ 28:775. However, Kant does sometimes characterize the spontaneous cognizing self as an “intelligence” (e.g. B155, B157-58, B158n). He also sometimes identifies this cognizing self or intelligence as a noumenal entity (e.g., *Reflexionen to the first Critique*, 23:34, 35). Kant’s considered position on the difference between soul and intelligence (as well as the metaphysical status of and epistemological connections to such beings) has been an issue of dispute amongst commentators. See, e.g., (Allison 1996, 65–66); (Van Cleve 1999, 182–3); (Wuerth 2014, 43, 63–64). Compare also early Kitcher – (1984, 121); (1990, 139–40) – with later Kitcher (2011, 193–7). What seems fairly clear is that a soul is or has necessarily a “principle of life,” which Kant construes as a faculty for acting on the basis of representations (LM-D 28:682, LM-K₂ 28:755, inter alia). Kant also allows that animals are alive in this sense, while lacking an intelligence, in his more substantive sense. See e.g., LM-L₁ 28:275, 276, LM-L₂ 28:594, LM-D 28:679, 690. For further discussion of life as an internal principle or determination of action, as opposed to an external physical determination see (Frierson 2014, 54–56). For helpful discussion of many of the above texts, along with further historical commentary see (Choi manuscript). I’m indebted to her paper for bringing many of these texts to my attention.

But it isn't merely that Kant denies that we are aware through sense of our simplicity, immortality, or indestructibility. I take him to be denying that, via sensory introspection, we are aware of any *subject* at all. There are thoughts, feelings, and sensations. But they are not thoughts *of* a thinker, or feelings *of* a subject.¹⁶ As perplexing as this might sound, it is clearer when we consider that in sense there is no predication of anything of anything else. Predication occurs only in judgment, or in the synthesis of perceptions with the "dynamical" categories in *experience*.

Hence, I take Kant's endorsement of the elusiveness of the subject in sensory introspection to be required by his view concerning the nature of the structure or content of intuition. As I argued above, intuition cannot provision a cognitive subject with representations whose content involves predication or the presentation of one thing's inhering in something else.¹⁷ This point brings us to the second qualification I would like to make – viz. that there is nothing special, in this regard, concerning inner sense. The same point about predication and inherence holds of outer sense. In general, as I argued above, intuition does not say anything "of" anything. It simply presents, and Kant takes sensory intuition to present qualities or states, not subjects thereof.¹⁸

This claim is, perhaps, unsurprising given the parity argument made above. But many commentators treat outer sense differently in this regard. For example, Caranti, in his extensive discussion of inner and outer sense says that,

most importantly, these [inner] representations cannot be taken as properties of an object in the same way that, for example, colour, shape, or the size of a table are properties of this object. In inner sense there is no reidentifiable object to which these properties can be attributed. This suggests that the symmetry between inner and outer sense, on which Kant often insists (and at times still insists in the B-edition), is not grounded. Given Kant's own assumptions, the representations that flow in my consciousness can at most be said to belong to the mind, but not to be representations of the mind. At least they are not representations of the mind in the same manner that the representations of colour, shape, and the size of the table in front of me are representations of this table. In the latter case we have a reidentifiable object to which these representations pertain as its properties; in the former case we have no such thing.¹⁹

¹⁶ For a contrasting position, which takes inner sense to constitute the basis for the *mineness* of our mental states, see (Valaris 2008, 3). As I see things, this is a mistake, for it assumes that a subject could be given in empirical introspection such that what is introspected is taken as belonging to the subject as part of themselves.

¹⁷ As mentioned in note 13 above, this is compatible with intuition's allowing for *de re* psychological states concerning the subject.

¹⁸ For extensive argument concerning the content of intuition see (McLear 2016c).

¹⁹ (Caranti 2007, 134). For the distinction between belonging to as opposed to being representations of the mind see also (Allison 2004, 279). For criticism of Caranti's position see (Chignell forthcoming, 14–15).

Caranti is correct that, for Kant, we cannot take inner sensory representations as representations of an object. But he is wrong to claim that this is in contrast to outer qualities of objects, such as the color or shape of a table. As we have seen, strictly speaking, the senses provide no object in either inner or outer sense. This point is compatible with the fact that Kant does often talk about sensory representations of objects in outer sense. Indeed, he also often talks of cognizing an empirical *subject* as well.

[I]n the connection of experience, matter as substance is really given to outer sense, just as the thinking I is given to inner sense, likewise as a substance-in-appearance, and in the connection of our outer as well as our inner perceptions, appearances on both sides must be connected among themselves into one experience according to the rules that the category of substance brings in. (A379)

By means of external experience I am conscious of the existence of bodies as external appearances in space, in the same manner as by means of inner experience I am conscious of the existence of my soul in time (wie vermitteltst der innern Erfahrung des Daseins meiner Seele in der Zeit bewußt) which soul I only cognize as an object of inner sense through the appearances constituting an inner state, and whose being as it is in itself, which underlies these appearances, is unknown to me. (Prol. 4:336; see also 4:295)

Everything that is represented to a sense is to that extent always appearance, and an inner sense must therefore either not be admitted at all or else the subject, which is the object of this sense, can only be represented by its means as appearance, not as it would judge of itself if its intuition were mere self-activity, i.e., intellectual. (B68)

“I” as thinking am an object of inner sense, and am called “soul” (Ich, als denkend, bin ein Gegenstand des innern Sinnes und heiße Seele). That which is an object of outer sense is called “body”. (A342/B400, original bold).

In these passages, which span both editions of the first *Critique*, Kant writes of the thought, experience, or consciousness of one’s self and of objects in space. The key thing to notice, however, is that in no case does Kant say that we specifically *intuit* the self or any outer object. In none of these cases then is Kant speaking purely about what is given to sense. So Caranti is simply mistaken in the contrast he attempts to draw concerning what is given to the senses in extrospection as opposed to introspection.

Nevertheless, the last two of the passages quoted above might seem to more clearly suggest that the self is an object of inner sense. But it is important to recognize that Kant is there talking about a state of the self as an instance of thinking (*denkend*) not the awareness as *thinker* (*Denker*). Kant clearly states in several other passages that a self is recognized as *thinker* only in the *intellectual* act of thinking rather than sensing. For example, he says,

this representation [viz. the “I think”] is an act [*Actus*] of spontaneity, i.e., it cannot be regarded as belonging to sensibility. (B-Deduction §16, B132)

In the transcendental synthesis of the manifold of representations in general, on the contrary, hence in the synthetic original unity of apperception, I am conscious of myself not as I appear to myself, nor as I am in myself, but only that I am. This representation is a thinking, not an intuiting. (B-Deduction §25, B157)

The consciousness of myself in the representation I is no intuition at all, but a merely intellectual representation of the self-activity of a thinking subject. (Refutation, B278)

if I have called the proposition “I think” an empirical proposition, I would not say by this that the I in this proposition is an empirical representation; for it is rather purely intellectual, because it belongs to thinking in general. (B423)

So Kant’s position is that sensory introspection provides only an awareness of states of thinking, feeling, sensation, etc. It provides no awareness of a subject of such states. In contrast, the awareness of one’s self as *subject*, as an existing being in which mental states inhere, is not sensory at all, but is itself an act of thought – viz. apperception.²⁰ So representation of the self as subject, insofar as it is possible at all, is something that happens downstream from sensing. The same also goes for extrospection in outer intuition.²¹

If what I have argued thus far is correct we can ask what it is that allows for cognition of the subject of properties if it is not intuition. Kant repeatedly claims during the critical period that it is via the understanding that intuitions are related to objects. While this is often taken as a claim concerning the intellectual conditions necessary to achieve states with intentional content,²² there is an alternative meaning available that better suits the dialectic we have been investigating thus far – viz. that “relation to an object” is relation to the metaphysical correlates of predication, i.e. the substance in which qualities inhere. In a late *reflexion* Kant appears to make exactly this claim. He asks,

What is an object? That whose representation is a sum [*Inbegriff*] of several predicates belonging to it. The plate is round, warm, made of tin, etc. Warm, round,

²⁰ Kant, in the *Anthropology* also contrasts the “feeling of self” [*Selbstgefühl*] possessed by the infant with the use of the first-person pronoun. “When [the child] starts to speak by means of ‘I’ a light seems to dawn on him, as it were...Before he merely felt himself, now he thinks himself” (An 7:127).

²¹ Thus I’m opting to “dissolve” the problem of why inner sense fails to provide a subject with knowledge of time determination, as argued in (Vogel 1993, 877). For discussion of why this does not conflict with Kant’s argument in the Refutation, see below.

²² For examples of this sort of position see (Bird 1962, 130–1); (George 1981); (Guyer 1987, 11–24); (Pereboom 1988; 2006, 160); (Haag 2007, ch. 2).

being made of tin, etc., are not objects, although the warmth, the tin, etc., [are].
 An object is that in the representation of which various others can be thought as
 synthetically combined. (R6350. 1796–98 (July–August 1797); 18:676)

An object is a representation of a thing with predicates (qualities) that *belong* to it.²³ Such representation, thinks Kant, cannot be accomplished via sense alone. He says similar things in the first *Critique*. For example,

[O]uter sense can also contain [enthalt]en in its representation only the relation [Verhältniß] of an object to the subject, and not that which is internal to the object in itself. It is exactly the same in the case of inner sense. (B67)

knowledge consists of the determinate relation of given representations to an object; and an object is that in the concept of which the manifold of a given intuition is united (B137)

All our representations are in fact related to some object through the understanding, and, since appearances are nothing but representations, the understanding thus relates them to a something, as the object of sensible intuition: but this something is to that extent only the transcendental object. (A250)

Thinking is the action of relating given intuitions to an object. (B304)

Intuition presents qualities, but not the subjects (the objects) of those qualities.²⁴ The understanding relates intuition to an object in the sense of relating intuition to a subject of properties, such that the apparent quality presented in the intuition is taken to be a quality of that object. However, the way in which the understanding relates intuited properties to objects of cognition does ultimately evince a disparity between inner and outer cognition, which can be better understood by consideration of the argument of the Refutation of Idealism. I turn to that, along with consideration of several other objections, below.

2.2 Objections

The interpretation I present likely encourages a variety of objections. I address three below. First I discuss the issue of Kant's dictum concerning the role of sensibility in giving objects. Second,

²³ In her discussion of this passage Stefanie Grüne (2009, 41) argues that there is not an intuition prior to the establishment of a relation between one's mental states (sensations) and a determinate object of that state. Grüne thus combines the position that Kant is articulating a mechanism by which mental states gain intentional content, which I deny, with the point that I have argued for—viz. that the senses present only qualities. For criticism of Grüne's subjective starting point see (McLear 2016b).

²⁴ Note that this interpretation does not require endorsing a reductive phenomenalist conception of empirical objects. On the reading I advocate here, intuition presents to a cognizing subject qualities arrayed in space and time, not merely subjective "raw feels," which require further intellectual work to be made into representations of an outer (or inner) world. For further discussion of the issue of phenomenalism and objectivity see (Allais 2007; 2009; 2015; McLear forthcoming).

I look at the Refutation of Idealism. Finally, I address the issue of whether inner sense has its own subject matter or “manifold”.

2.2.1 Objects and Givenness

First, as has been heavily and rightfully emphasized in recent work by Lucy Allais, Kant repeatedly characterizes the role of sensibility, and intuition in particular, as *giving an object* for cognition (e.g. A50/B74, A51/B75–6, A271/B327).²⁵ However, it may seem that, according to the interpretation I have been advocating here, sensibility does not in fact give the mind an object. My interpretation can thus be rejected as failing to take into account this central role of intuition.

In reply to this, it is important to recognize that nothing about the above interpretation entails that what is given in sense is somehow *merely subjective*, and that the understanding or intellect is required to move from awareness of merely subjective states to an awareness of objective features of reality.²⁶ The senses thus still have their central cognitive role of presenting aspects of reality to a cognizing subject. In this sense the interpretation is perfectly in line with Kant’s claim that “[w]ithout sensibility no object would be given to us, without understanding no object would be thought” (A51/B75; see also A19/B33).

However, there are at least two passages in the first *Critique* that might seem problematic for my interpretation. First, note that Kant says that it is *objects* not *qualities* that are given by means of sensibility.

Objects are given to us by means of sensibility, and it alone yields us intuitions; they are thought through the understanding, and from the understanding arise concepts (A19/B33).

Second, in the ramp-up to the main argument of the Transcendental Deduction Kant writes that,

In contrast [to the pure forms of intuition], the categories of the understanding do not at all put forward conditions under which objects in intuition can be given to us. Consequently, objects could indeed appear to us without their being necessarily related to functions of the understanding, and therefore without the understanding containing their conditions a priori (A89/B122; cf. A90/B122-3, B132, B145).

There are at least two points of note with respect to Kant’s position in these passages, as well as those in which he says that representations are related to their object by means of the understanding (e.g. B137, B304). First, Kant’s claim is that objects are given *by means of* sensibility.

²⁵ See especially (Allais 2015, ch. 7).

²⁶ Advocates of such an “intellectualist” position include (George 1981; Pereboom 1988; Grüne 2009; Stephenson 2015). For criticism of the phenomenalist view these positions suggest or outright commit themselves to see (Allais 2015, ch. 2).

This is compatible with the claim that objects are given in sensibility *by means of* giving their features or qualities. Second, it is important to distinguish between being given, or simply representing, an object in sense, and representing that object as an object.²⁷ For example, when being presented with a particularly shaped expanse of color in space (e.g. a red spherical expanse) a cognizing subject is in fact being presented with an object – viz. a red sphere. But, with respect to what is given in sense, all that is present to the subject’s consciousness *per se* are the qualities of the sphere. It takes a further cognitive act on behalf of the intellect to allow the subject to predicate those given features of a *thing* – viz. the sphere.

One might object here that there is more to being given an object in sense than being given its qualities. But it is difficult to see what this “more” could be. For example it cannot be a “bare particular” or substratum – the “I know not what” of Locke’s famous discussion. Anything else that might be presented in sense would presumably be a sensory quality of some sort, or a feeling, desire, etc.

Moreover, Kant’s position, as I’ve articulated it, doesn’t entail that we cannot *cognize* an object of inner or outer sense. Cognition is the result of the cooperation of sensibility and intellect, hence it allows (indeed, requires) that the cognitive subject’s grasp of an object with its properties is the result of something more than what sensibility alone can provide. Thus, once the distinction between givenness and representing as is clearly kept in mind, there is no tension between the interpretive position I outline and Kant’s central dictum that it is via sensibility that objects are given to us.

2.2.2 The Refutation of Idealism

The second objection that immediately arises for my proposal concerns its compatibility with the professed aim (irrespective of its success) of the argument of the Refutation of Idealism. Concerning idealism Kant says:

Idealism assumed that the only immediate experience is inner experience, and that from that outer things could only be inferred, but, as in any case in which one infers from given effects to determinate causes, only unreliably, since the cause of the representations that we perhaps falsely ascribe to outer things can also lie in us. Yet here it is proved that outer experience is really immediate (B276-7)

Like the argument of the Fourth Paralogism discussed above, Kant argues here that the idealist is wrong in thinking that experience of one’s own states is epistemically and psychologically more basic or immediate than any awareness of the states of objects distinct from oneself in space. However, unlike the Fourth Paralogism, Kant goes on to say that the determination of an objective time order of our inner states depends on our having outer experience. Kant goes

²⁷ A similar distinction is employed by Allais. See, e.g., (Allais 2015, 154–5).

so far as to say that “inner experience itself is consequently only mediate and possible only through outer experience” (B277). In this sense, outer experience has primacy over inner. Does this mean that Kant has changed his mind between the two editions of the *Critique*? Does his new position threaten the parity claim?

The extent to which Kant’s argument in the Refutation is a genuinely new argument, not present in the Fourth Paralogism, or whether it is simply a new statement of that argument, is not my concern here.²⁸ The important question is whether, in saying that “inner experience is only mediate” Kant should be understood to be marking an important contrast with outer sense, understood in terms of the intuitions it provides. That Kant does *not* mean to mark a contrast with outer intuition is supported by consideration of three points.

First, it simply does not make sense for Kant to construe inner intuition as *mediate* and particular, while outer intuition is immediate and particular. Given that immediacy/mediacy and particularity/generality are dimensions along which Kant makes his hard distinction between intuition and concept, such a position would commit him to construing inner intuitions as some sort of intuition/concept hybrid, which has no precedent in his economy of the mind.

Second, Kant here is discussing inner *experience* – viz. empirical cognition – not inner intuition. So his claim concerning the mediacy of inner experience is in fact a claim concerning the way in which cognition of one’s own states as temporally ordered in a particular manner depends on cognition of states of something external to oneself. But this claim concerning cognition is compatible with holding that inner intuition is just as immediate as outer intuition.

Finally, Kant’s discussion of time as the form of inner sense in the Aesthetic includes the claim that “[t]ime is a necessary representation that grounds all intuitions. In regard to appearances in general one cannot remove time” (A31/B46), and Kant holds that “[t]ime is the a priori formal condition of all appearances in general” (A34/B50). There is no indication that he wishes to repudiate these claims in his argument in the Refutation. Instead, Kant seems to continue to endorse parity with respect to inner and outer sense. Inner intuition is no more or less immediate than outer intuition, and if the argument of the Refutation is successful, then Kant shows that the epistemic relationship we have to our internal states, specifically with respect to the that by means of which we order them in time—and thus have empirical cognition and thereby “experience”—itself depends on our relation to something outside us. That there is this disparity in cognition does not threaten the parity claim regarding intuition that I have argued for thus far.

However, the Refutation raises a further problem beyond that of the “mediacy” of inner sense. According to the position I have advocated, extrospection in outer sense does not reveal objects—in the sense of metaphysical subjects—but only qualities. This suggests that our experience of the “outer” world is in just as much flux as our introspective experience of ourselves. But then this would seem to entail, as Jonathan Vogel (1993, 878) has argued, that “time-determination is completely impossible, contrary to the initial assumption on which the

²⁸ For discussion see (Caranti 2007).

Refutation rests.”

Vogel goes on to argue that

to complete the Refutation, Kant needs to establish some disparity between inner and outer sense, such that outer sense gives us direct knowledge of enduring objects, while inner sense does not. (1993, 878)

I agree with Vogel that some such disparity is necessary for Kant’s argument, and that Kant took this to be so. However, Vogel is mistaken in thinking that the disparity must come specifically at the level of what is given by *intuition*. We need to distinguish between two claims:

1. Nothing is intuited as persisting/enduring in either inner or outer sense
2. Nothing is experienced as persisting/enduring in either inner or outer sense

I argue only that Kant claims (1), not that he endorses (2) as well. In support of this distinction note that Kant distinguishes between intuition, perception, and experience in both the course of the argument of the first *Critique* and in its architectonic.²⁹ But this leaves us with the issue of supplying that which makes for the relevant difference between inner and outer *experience*, if the difference is not to be found in the fact that we sense outer objects, qua enduring subjects of properties, immediately in intuition. Put another way, the question is how, if intro and extrospection are epistemically and psychologically on par in the ways I have indicated, any disparity could be found between inner and outer *experience*.

However, we need not look very far to find the relevant difference between inner and outer experience, for it is obvious that the structure of what may be given in space (outer sense) is very different from that of time (inner sense). Spatial representation is representation in three-dimensions, while time admits of only one. The resulting difference matters for cognizing persistence. Kant makes clear that this is an issue in the General Note on the System of Principles. He says,

in order to give something that persists in intuition, corresponding to the concept of substance (and thereby to establish the objective reality of this concept), we need an intuition in space (of matter), since space alone persistently determines, while time, however, and thus everything that is in inner sense, constantly flows. (B291)

Similarly, in the Refutation Kant says that,

we do not even have anything persistent on which we could base the concept of a substance, as intuition, except merely **matter**, and even this persistence is not drawn from outer experience, but rather presupposed a priori as the necessary condition of all time-determination, thus also as the determination of inner sense in regard to our own existence through the existence of outer things. (B278)

²⁹ See (McLear 2014, 770–2); see also (McLear 2016a, sec. 5; Tolley, n.d.) for further discussion.

Notice that Kant focuses on the issue of persistence and its absence in inner sense. However, he does *not* appeal here to the *intuition* of a persisting outer object – as substance – he also explicitly denies that we have even outer *experience* of such a thing.³⁰

Kant's reasons for holding that the one-dimensional nature of time precludes the presentation of persistence are not immediately obvious. To my mind, the most appealing explanation of his position here comes from (i) the connection of substance with persistence (*Beharrlichkeit*) in the First Analogy; (ii) Kant's further connection of the persistent or permanent with quantity (as in something whose total quantity or quantum "is neither increased nor diminished in nature" (B224)); (iii) Kant's position that the assignment of discrete magnitudes to temporal spans (as quantifiable durations) must be *indirect*, proceeding by way of outer sense ("Only through that which persists does existence in different parts of the temporal series acquire a magnitude, which one calls duration." (A183/B226)).³¹

Hence, Kant argues that the content of inner sense is not sufficiently mathematizable to allow for the grasp of a quantity or quantum that neither increases nor diminishes.³² However, as I argued in the parity section above, that Kant in part bases his Refutation of Idealism on the priority of spatial representation to temporal does not entail that bodies, understood as subjects of properties (substances), are presented in outer intuition, while no subject of properties (the soul) is presented in inner intuition. Instead Kant can plausibly be taken to hold that introspection and extrospection are, to the extent that I have indicated, psychologically and epistemically, on par. However, since experience is not simply intuition, and the determination of the temporal order of inner experience depends on the grasp of persistence, which is itself only possible by means of appeal to things having more than one dimension, Kant can consistently reject claim (2) concerning experience above while nevertheless holding onto claim (1) concerning

³⁰ Note that "experience" in this passage may just be referring to outer intuition, or it may be referring to such intuition as synthesized by a priori concepts. In either case though, Kant is clearly denying that intuition does the work in presenting a persistent thing to the cognizing subject. Kant does here appeal to the intuition of *matter*, but this is compatible with my point. As Kant makes clear in the *Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science*, the "metaphysical" sense of "matter", with which he is concerned in the first *Critique* (on this see (Watkins 1998; cf. Friedman 2013, 44–45)) is one according to which it is explicated "not via a predicate that belongs to it itself as object, but only via relation to that cognitive faculty in which the representation can first of all be given to me, [such that] every object of the outer senses is matter" (4:481). In other words, every object of outer sense is matter with respect to outer intuition's form. Moreover, in the *Prolegomena* Kant says that "all real properties by which we cognize bodies are mere accidents for which we lack a subject – even impenetrability, which must always be conceived only as the effect of a force" (P 4:333–4; see also (McLear 2017)). This suggests that we may not even count as *cognizing* genuinely substantial subjects. Plausibly though, Kant here means only to indicate that we do not have cognition of an *ultimate* subject, as a ground of such forces and, presumably, a thing in itself.

³¹ This point about the quantification of time according to discrete magnitude is compatible with thinking that the content of inner sense is also quantifiable in other ways, ways moreover that might be independent of any appeal to outer objects or outer sense. For one such argument see (Kraus 2013). For extensive discussion of ways in which quantification of inner sense depends on outer sense see (Friedman 2013, 61–67). For argument that it is quantity of spatially extended matter that is paramount in Kant's conception of substance, as opposed to intensive magnitude, see Kant's discussion at MFNS 4:542, Friedman's commentary (2013, 315–18), and (McLear 2017).

³² See also Kant's discussion of introspective psychology as lacking the mathematizable structure necessary for proper science at MFNS 4:471.

intuition.

2.2.3 A Manifold for Inner Sense?

Another *prima facie* problem with the parity position, as outlined above, is that, unlike outer sense, inner sense is often taken to lack any analogue to the kinds of sensory states – e.g. sensations – that are provisioned by outer sense.³³ Moreover, in the second edition of the *Critique*, Kant writes in ways which are often taken as denying outright that there is any inner sensory analogue of outer sensation. Perhaps most importantly, in the General Remarks in the Aesthetic Kant writes that in the case of inner intuition “the representations of outer sense make up the proper material with which we occupy our mind” (B67).³⁴ This has suggested to at least some interpreters that Kant denies that inner sense in fact has any proprietary representational matter of its own, instead depending for its entire content on what is provisioned by outer sense.³⁵

However, there is quite some distance between Kant’s claim that the “proper material” with which we’re concerned in inner sense consists of representations from outer sense, and the claim that inner sense has no representations of its own.³⁶ Talk about “proper material” may well be limited to the issue of cognition and knowledge. Those states of the subject, which are available in introspection, that do not allow for cognition or knowledge properly so-called, thus would not count as “proper” material. But this does not mean that inner sense does not provide such representations for reflection by the subject.

Kant might also be using “proper” in a normative sense. He clearly thinks that too much focus on the content provided by inner sense can lead to mental illness.³⁷ In the *Anthropology* Kant states that inner observation can “easily lead to enthusiasm and madness” (7:132) and warns that such inner observation “is the most direct path to illuminism or even terrorism, by

³³ Arthur Collins goes so far as to claim that “it is impossible to imagine what sensation could possibly be in the setting of inner sense” (Collins 1999, 113; see also Schmitz 2015, 1045).

³⁴ In an annotation to the B-Preface Kant also says that it is the things outside of us “from which we after all get the whole matter for our cognitions, even for our inner sense” (Bxxxix, ann.); cf (Schmitz 2015, 1045). It is important to note, however, that Kant is here talking about material for *cognition* rather than representation simpliciter. More on this point below.

³⁵ See (Paton 1936a, 2:389; but cf. 1936b, 1:99–100); see also (Pippin 1982, 175); (Allison 1983, 258–63); (Aquila 1983, 158–71); (Allison 2004, 278–80); (Valaris 2008, 2–4); (Schmitz 2015, 1045–50).

³⁶ Because of his focus on the relation between inner sense and Kant’s writings on idealism, Allison seems to make this slide. See (Allison 2004, 294). Allison also moves too quickly from claims concerning what is present in *experience*, construed as the outcome of conceptual synthesis, and what is strictly speaking present in *sense*, construed as the intuitions delivered by sensibility (2004, 279). For further criticism of Allison’s position see (Vogel 1993, 879–91). Valaris (2008), in contrast, argues for the lack of content in inner sense by moving from Kant’s statements regarding subjective states (such as pains and pleasures) as non-representational, to the conclusion that only representational states are part of the subject matter of inner sense (3). While this is not an unreasonable inference, nothing about what Kant actually says requires that we take him in the manner Valaris suggests, and there are further reasons not to take him so.

³⁷ (Rosefeldt 2000, 13) notes this as well. For extensive discussion of Kant’s views on mental illness, and their relation to inner sense see (Frierson 2009a; 2009b).

way of a confusion in the mind of supposed higher inspirations and powers flowing into us, without our help, who knows from where" (7:133). Such "eavesdropping on oneself" (7:133) is to be generally avoided, for it "is either already a disease of the mind (melancholy), or leads to one and the madhouse" (7:134). Clearly, Kant regards attention to one's mental state *qua mental state* to be potentially deleterious to one's health. Thus it is proper to limit one's observation to those states that are genuine presentations of outer reality – viz. outer appearances.

Finally, and related to the above point, Kant conceives of inner sense as potentially subject to illusions in which inner appearances are taken for outer appearances (An 7:161). It is difficult to understand how such illusions could arise if there were no genuinely inner appearances that a subject could intuit, and ultimately mistake for outer appearance. It is also difficult to see how Kant could think that inner appearances, and ultimately inner experience, furnish the content for the subject of anthropology (An 7:143; cf. Nachlass 7:398; LA 25:473) if Kant also denied that inner sense has a manifold of its own.

For these reasons, there is no substantive basis for denying that inner sense, like outer sense, has its own representations or subject matter. Introspection, like extrospection, presents a subject with appearances, which are epistemically and psychologically on par with those of extrospection.

3 Conclusion

I've argued that as Kant's views evolve from the 1770's into the critical period he comes to reject what I have called the Difference Thesis, at least with respect to what is given in sense. Kant therefore accepts, in the 1780's, that intro and extrospection are in important respects epistemically and psychologically on par. There are, however, differences in how we can come to know what is given via intro and extrospection, because there are differences between inner and outer experience that are not due to what is given in the senses themselves, but rather to their form.

There is much further that needs to be said concerning how Kant's conception of our *non-empirical* awareness of ourselves in pure apperception fits with his conception of empirical introspection and his overall attitude towards the Difference Thesis. But if what I have argued above is correct then we can see how Kant conceives of the paucity of sensory content. We are given only instances of properties and states, and it is up to the intellect to fashion from this material a knowledge of nature populated by substances and their properties. In this respect, at least, Kant's view also remains broadly Leibnizian. For he agrees that, "It is...by the knowledge of necessary truths and by their abstractions that we rise to *reflective acts*, which enable us to think of what is called *I* and to consider this or that to be in us." And it is this capacity—pure apperception—which "distinguishes us from simple animals and gives us reason and the

sciences.”³⁸

Pure apperception, as opposed to inner sense, is thus important not just for accounting for our awareness of our own existence (as in the famous *cogito* of Descartes), but also for explaining how it is that we are aware of ourselves as the subjects of our states, and ultimately, for our capacity for scientific knowledge (*scientia*) of the rest of nature.³⁹ Indeed, it is from this fact about pure apperception that Kant remarks that “much may be inferred” (B133).

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³⁸ (Leibniz 1969, 645–6; §§29–30).

³⁹ I pursue the import of pure apperception with respect to these issues in other work.

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