

The Transcendental Doctrine of Elements

First Part

The Transcendental Aesthetic^a

<§ 1>^b

In whatever way and through whatever means a cognition may relate to objects, that through which it relates immediately to them, and at which all thought as a means is directed as an end, is **intuition**. This, however, takes place only insofar as the object is given to us; but this in turn, <at least for us humans,> is possible only if it affects the mind in a certain way. The capacity (receptivity) to acquire representations through the way in which we are affected by objects is called **sensibility**. Objects are therefore **given** to us by means of sensibility, and it alone affords us **intuitions**; but they are **thought** through the understanding, and from it arise **concepts**. But all thought, whether straightaway (*directe*) or through a detour (*indirecte*), must, <by means of certain marks,> ultimately be related to intuitions, thus, in our case, to sensibility, since there is no other way in which objects can be given to us.

B 34 The effect of an object on the capacity for representation, insofar as
A 20 we are affected by it, is **sensation**. That intuition which is related to the object through sensation is called **empirical**. The undetermined object of an empirical intuition is called **appearance**.

I call that in the appearance which corresponds to sensation its **matter**, but that which allows the manifold of appearance to be ordered^c in

^a We here present the revised version of the "Transcendental Aesthetic" that Kant prepared for the second edition of the *Critique*. Since in addition to the major changes that he made, all of which will be noted, Kant also made numerous minor changes that it would be cumbersome to note individually, we will enclose all the changes Kant made in B within angled brackets (< . . . >), whether or not they are otherwise noted. Editorial notes on passages unchanged from A will not be repeated.

^b In the second edition, Kant divided the "Transcendental Doctrine of Elements" from the beginning of the "Transcendental Aesthetic" through the end of the "Transcendental Deduction of the Pure Concepts of the Understanding" into twenty-seven numbered sections. In the case of some sections, new titles were also added for material otherwise taken over without other change from the first edition.

^c In the first edition this reads "intuited as ordered in certain relations . . ."

certain relations^a I call the **form** of appearance. Since that within which the sensations can alone be ordered and placed in a certain form cannot itself be in turn sensation, the matter of all appearance is only given to us *a posteriori*, but its form must all lie ready for it in the mind *a priori*, and can therefore be considered separately from all sensation.

I call all representations **pure** (in the transcendental sense) in which nothing is to be encountered that belongs to sensation. Accordingly the pure form of sensible intuitions in general is to be encountered in the mind *a priori*, wherein all of the manifold of appearances is intuited in certain relations. This pure form of sensibility itself is also called **pure intuition**. So if I separate from the representation of a body that which the understanding thinks about it, such as substance, force, divisibility, etc., as well as that which belongs to sensation, such as impenetrability, hardness, color, etc., something from this empirical intuition is still left for me, namely extension and form. These belong to the pure intuition, which occurs *a priori*, even without an actual object of the senses or sensation, as a mere form of sensibility in the mind.

I call a science of all principles^b of *a priori* sensibility the **transcendental aesthetic**.^{*} There must therefore be such a science, which constitutes the first part of the transcendental doctrine of elements, in opposition to that which contains the principles^c of pure thinking, and which is named transcendental logic.

* The Germans are the only ones who now employ the word “aesthetics” to designate that which others call the critique of taste. The ground for this is a failed hope, held by the excellent analyst Baumgarten, of bringing the critical estimation of the beautiful under principles of reason,^d and elevating its rules to a science. But this effort is futile. For the putative rules or criteria are merely empirical as far as their <most prominent> sources are concerned, and can therefore never serve as <determinate> *a priori* rules according to which our judgment of taste must be directed; rather the latter constitutes the genuine touchstone of the correctness of the former. For this reason it is advisable <either> again to desist from the use of this term and preserve it for that doctrine which is true science (whereby one would come closer to the language and the sense of the ancients, among whom the division of cognition into *διθητα και νοητα* was very well known), <or else to share the term with speculative philosophy and take aesthetics partly in a transcendental meaning, partly in a psychological meaning>.

^a As already noted at p. 156, note *a*, with the exception of four cases in its final section, throughout the “Transcendental Aesthetic” Kant characteristically uses the term *Verhältnis*, connoting a relation among objects, rather than *Beziehung*, connoting a relation between subject and object; thus, unless otherwise noted, “relation” or its plural translates *Verhältnis* or its derivatives.

^b *Prinzipien*

^c *Prinzipien*

^d *Vernunftprincipien*

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A 21 / B 35

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In the transcendental aesthetic we will therefore first **isolate** sensibility by separating off everything that the understanding thinks through its concepts, so that nothing but empirical intuition remains. Second, we will then detach from the latter everything that belongs to sensation, so that nothing remains except pure intuition and the mere form of appearances, which is the only thing that sensibility can make available *a priori*. In this investigation it will be found that there are two pure forms of sensible intuition as principles^a of *a priori* cognition, namely space and time, with the assessment of which we will now be concerned.

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The Transcendental Aesthetic

First Section

On space.

<§ 2

Metaphysical exposition of this concept.>

A 23

By means of outer sense (a property of our mind) we represent to ourselves objects as outside us, and all as in space. In space their shape, magnitude, and relation to one another is determined, or determinable. Inner sense, by means of which the mind intuits itself, or its inner state, gives, to be sure, no intuition of the soul itself, as an object;^b yet it is still a determinate form, under which the intuition of its inner state is alone possible, so that everything that belongs to the inner determinations is represented in relations of time. Time can no more be intuited externally than space can be intuited as something in us. Now what are space and time? Are they actual entities?^c Are they only determinations or relations of things, yet ones that would pertain to them even if they were not intuited, or are they relations that only attach to the form of intuition alone, and thus to the subjective constitution of our mind, without which these predicates could not be ascribed to any thing at all? In order to instruct ourselves about this, we will <expound the concept of space> first.^d <I understand by **exposition** (*expositio*) the distinct (even if not complete) representation of that which belongs to a concept; but the exposition is **metaphysical** when it contains that which exhibits the concept as given *a priori*.>

B 38

- 1) Space is not an empirical concept that has been drawn from outer

^a *Principien*

^b *Object*

^c *wirkliche Wesen*

^d In the first edition: "first consider space."

experiences. For in order for certain sensations to be related^a to something outside me (i.e., to something in another place in space from that in which I find myself), thus in order for me to represent them as outside <and next to> one another, thus not merely as different but as in different places, the representation of space must already be their ground. Thus the representation of space cannot be obtained from the relations of outer appearance through experience, but this outer experience is itself first possible only through this representation.

2) Space is a necessary representation, *a priori*, that is the ground of all outer intuitions. One can never represent that there is no space, though one can very well think that there are no objects to be encountered in it. It is therefore to be regarded as the condition of the possibility of appearances, not as a determination dependent on them, and is an *a priori* representation that necessarily grounds outer appearances.^b

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<3> Space is not a discursive or, as is said, general concept of relations of things in general, but a pure intuition. For, first, one can only represent a single space, and if one speaks of many spaces, one understands by that only parts of one and the same unique space. And these parts cannot as it were precede the single all-encompassing space as its components (from which its composition would be possible), but rather are only thought **in it**. It is essentially single; the manifold in it, thus also the general concept of spaces in general, rests merely on limitations. From this it follows that in respect to it an *a priori* intuition (which is not empirical) grounds all concepts of it.^c Thus also all geometrical principles, e.g., that in a triangle two sides together are always greater than the third, are never derived from general concepts of line and triangle, but rather are derived from intuition and indeed derived *a priori* with apodictic certainty.

<^d4> Space is represented as an infinite **given** magnitude. Now one must, to be sure, think of every concept as a representation that is contained in an infinite set of different possible representations (as their common mark), which thus contains these **under itself**; but no concept, as such, can be thought as if it contained an infinite set of representations **within itself**. Nevertheless space is so thought (for all the parts of space, even to infinity, are simultaneous). Therefore the original representation of space is an *a priori* intuition, not a concept.>

B 40

^a bezogen

^b In the first edition there follows a paragraph (3) (at A 24 above) that is replaced by the "Transcendental Exposition of the Concept of Space" in the second (see B 40-1 below); the following paragraphs, (3) and (4), were thus originally numbered (4) and (5); the content of the original paragraph (5), now renumbered (4), is also changed.

^c In the first edition: "of them," i.e., the limitations of space.

^d As previously mentioned, the content of this paragraph is changed from the first edition.

<§ 3

Transcendental exposition of the concept of space.

I understand by a **transcendental exposition** the explanation of a concept as a principle^a from which insight into the possibility of other synthetic *a priori* cognitions can be gained. For this aim it is required 1) that such cognitions actually flow from the given concept, and 2) that these cognitions are only possible under the presupposition of a given way of explaining this concept.

Geometry is a science that determines the properties of space synthetically and yet *a priori*. What then must the representation of space be for such a cognition of it to be possible? It must originally be intuition; for from a mere concept no propositions can be drawn that go beyond the concept, which, however, happens in geometry (Introduction V). But this intuition must be encountered in us *a priori*, i.e., prior to all perception of an object, thus it must be pure, not empirical intuition. For geometrical propositions are all apodictic, i.e., combined with consciousness of their necessity, e.g., space has only three dimensions; but such propositions cannot be empirical or judgments of experience, nor inferred from them (Introduction II).

Now how can an outer intuition inhabit the mind that precedes the objects^b themselves, and in which the concept of the latter can be determined *a priori*? Obviously not otherwise than insofar as it has its seat merely in the subject, as its formal constitution for being affected by objects^c and thereby acquiring **immediate representation**, i.e., **intuition**, of them, thus only as the form of outer **sense** in general.

Thus our explanation alone makes the **possibility** of geometry as a synthetic *a priori* cognition comprehensible. Any kind of explanation that does not accomplish this, even if it appears to have some similarity with it, can most surely be distinguished from it by means of this characteristic.²⁹

a26/b42

Conclusions from the above concepts.

a) Space represents no property at all of any things in themselves nor any relation of them to each other, i.e., no determination of them that attaches to objects themselves and that would remain even if one were to abstract from all subjective conditions of intuition. For neither absolute nor relative determinations can be intuited prior to the existence of the things to which they pertain, thus be intuited *a priori*.

^a Princips^b Objecten^c Objecten

Section I. On Space

b) Space is nothing other than merely the form of all appearances of outer sense, i.e., the subjective condition of sensibility, under which alone outer intuition is possible for us. Now since the receptivity of the subject to be affected by objects necessarily precedes all intuitions of these objects, it can be understood how the form of all appearances can be given in the mind prior to all actual perceptions, thus *a priori*, and how as a pure intuition, in which all objects must be determined, it can contain principles^a of their relations prior to all experience.

We can accordingly speak of space, extended beings, and so on, only from the human standpoint. If we depart from the subjective condition under which alone we can acquire outer intuition, namely that through which we may be affected by objects, then the representation of space signifies nothing at all. This predicate is attributed to things only insofar as they appear to us, i.e., are objects of sensibility. The constant form of this receptivity, which we call sensibility, is a necessary condition of all the relations within which objects can be intuited as outside us, and, if one abstracts from these objects, it is a pure intuition, which bears the name of space. Since we cannot make the special conditions of sensibility into conditions of the possibility of things, but only of their appearances, we can well say that space comprehends all things that may appear to us externally, but not all things in themselves, whether they be intuited or not, or by whatever subject they may be intuited. For we cannot judge at all whether the intuitions of other thinking beings are bound to the same conditions that limit our intuition and that are universally valid for us. If we add the limitation of a judgment to the concept of the subject, then the judgment is unconditionally valid. The proposition: "All things are next to one another in space," is valid under the limitation that these things be taken as objects of our sensible intuition. If here I add the condition to the concept and say "All things, as outer intuitions, are next to one another in space," then this rule is valid universally and without limitation. Our expositions accordingly teach the **reality** (i.e., objective validity) of space in regard to everything that can come before us externally as an object, but at the same time the **ideality** of space in regard to things when they are considered in themselves through reason, i.e., without taking account of the constitution of our sensibility. We therefore assert the **empirical reality** of space (with respect to all possible outer experience), though to be sure its **transcendental ideality**, i.e., that it is nothing as soon as we leave aside the condition of the possibility of all experience, and take it as something that grounds the things in themselves.

Besides space, however, there is no other subjective representation

A 27/B 43

B 44
A 28

^a *Principien*

related^a to something **external** that could be called *a priori* objective.
^b<For one cannot derive synthetic *a priori* propositions from any such representation, as one can from intuition in space (§ 3). Strictly speaking, therefore, ideality does not pertain to them, although they coincide with the representation of space in belonging only to the subjective constitution of the kind of sense, e.g., of sight, hearing, and feeling, through the sensations of colors, sounds, and warmth, which, however, since they are merely sensations and not intuitions, do not in themselves allow any object^c to be cognized, least of all *a priori*.>

- B 45** The aim of this remark is only to prevent one from thinking of illustrating the asserted ideality of space with completely inadequate examples, since things like colors, taste, etc., are correctly considered not as qualities of things but as mere alterations of our subject, which can even be different in different people. For in this case that which is originally itself only appearance, e.g., a rose, counts in an empirical sense as a thing in itself, which yet can appear different to every eye in regard to color. The transcendental concept of appearances in space, on the contrary, is a critical reminder that absolutely nothing that is intuited in space is a thing in itself, and that space is not a form that is proper to anything in itself, but rather that objects in themselves are not known to us at all, and that what we call outer objects are nothing other than mere representations of our sensibility, whose form is space, but whose true correlate, i.e., the thing in itself, is not and cannot be cognized through them, but is also never asked after in experience.

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The Transcendental Aesthetic Second Section On time.

<§ 4

Metaphysical exposition of the concept of time.>

Time is <1> not an empirical concept that is somehow drawn from an experience. For simultaneity or succession would not themselves come into perception if the representation of time did not ground them *a priori*. Only under its presupposition can one represent that several things exist at one and the same time (simultaneously) or in different times (successively).

- A 31** 2) Time is a necessary representation that grounds all intuitions. In regard to appearances in general one cannot remove time, though one

^a bezogene

^b In the first edition, the remainder of this paragraph reads differently; see A 28–9 above.

^c Object

can very well take the appearances away from time. Time is therefore given *a priori*. In it alone is all actuality of appearances possible. The latter could all disappear, but time itself (as the universal condition of their possibility)^a cannot be removed.

3) This *a priori* necessity also grounds the possibility of apodictic principles of relations of time, or axioms of time in general. It has only one dimension: different times are not simultaneous, but successive (just as different spaces are not successive, but simultaneous). These principles could not be drawn from experience, for this would yield neither strict universality nor apodictic certainty. We would only be able to say: This is what common perception teaches, but not: This is how matters must stand. These principles are valid as rules under which alone experiences are possible at all, and instruct us prior to them, not through it.^b

4) Time is no discursive or, as one calls it, general concept, but a pure form of sensible intuition. Different times are only parts of one and the same time. That representation, however, which can only be given through a single object, is an intuition. Further, the proposition that different times cannot be simultaneous cannot be derived from a general concept. The proposition is synthetic, and cannot arise from concepts alone. It is therefore immediately contained in the intuition and representation of time.

5) The infinitude of time signifies nothing more than that every determinate magnitude of time is only possible through limitations of a single time grounding it. The original representation **time** must therefore be given as unlimited. But where the parts themselves and every magnitude of an object can be determinately represented only through limitation, there the entire representation cannot be given through concepts, (<for they contain only partial representations>),^c but immediate intuition must ground them.^d

<§ 5

Transcendental exposition of the concept of time.

I can appeal to No. 3 where, in order to be brief, I have placed that which is properly transcendental under the heading of the metaphysical exposition. Here I add further that the concept of alteration and, with

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A 32

B 48

^a These parentheses added in B.

^b The text reads "*belebren uns vor derselben, und nicht durch dieselbe.*" Earlier editors suggested emending the last word to "*dieselben*"; but if the sentence is interpreted to mean "instructs us prior to experiences, not through common perception," it can be read without emendation.

^c In the first edition: "for there the partial representations precede."

^d B has *ihnen* instead of *ibre* here.

it, the concept of motion (as alteration of place), is only possible through and in the representation of time – that if this representation were not *a priori* (inner) intuition, then no concept, whatever it might be, could make comprehensible the possibility of an alteration, i.e., of a combination of contradictorily opposed predicates (e.g., a thing's being in a place and the not-being of the very same thing in the same place) in one and the same object.^a Only in time can both contradictorily opposed determinations in one thing be encountered, namely **successively**. Our concept of time therefore explains the possibility of as much synthetic *a priori* cognition as is presented by the general theory of motion, which is no less fruitful.>³⁰

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<§ 6>

Conclusions from these concepts.

a) Time is not something that would subsist for itself or attach to things as an objective determination, and thus remain if one abstracted from all subjective conditions of the intuition of them; for in the first case it would be something that was actual yet without an actual object. As far

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as the second case is concerned, however, time could not precede the objects as a determination or order attaching to the things themselves as their condition and be cognized and intuited *a priori* through synthetic propositions. But the latter, on the contrary, can very well occur if time is nothing other than the subjective condition under which all intuitions can take place in us. For then this form of inner intuition can be represented prior to the objects, thus *a priori*.

b) Time is nothing other than the form of inner sense, i.e., of the intuition of our self and our inner state. For time cannot be a determination of outer appearances; it belongs neither to a shape or a position, etc., but on the contrary determines the relation of representations in our inner state. And just because this inner intuition yields no shape we also attempt to remedy this lack through analogies, and represent the temporal sequence through a line progressing to infinity, in which the manifold constitutes a series that is of only one dimension, and infer from the properties of this line to all the properties of time, with the sole difference that the parts of the former are simultaneous but those of the latter always exist successively. From this it is also apparent that the representation of time is itself an intuition, since all its relations can be expressed in an outer intuition.

B 50

c) Time is the *a priori* formal condition of all appearances in general. Space, as the pure form of all outer intuitions, is limited as an *a priori*

Time is not an objective feature of reality

Time is nothing but the form of inner sense

Time is the condition of all appearances

A 34

condition merely to outer intuitions. But since, on the contrary, all representations, whether or not they have outer things as their object, nevertheless as determinations of the mind themselves belong to the inner state, while this inner state belongs under the formal condition of inner intuition, and thus of time, so time is an *a priori* condition of all appearance in general, and indeed the immediate condition of the inner intuition (of our souls), and thereby also the mediate condition of outer appearances. If I can say *a priori*: all outer appearances are in space and determined *a priori* according to the relations of space, so from the principle^a of inner sense I can say entirely generally: all appearances in general, i.e., all objects of the senses, are in time, and necessarily stand in relations of time.

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If we abstract from our way of internally intuiting ourselves and by means of this intuition also dealing with all outer intuitions in the power of representation, and thus take objects as they may be in themselves, then time is nothing. It is only of objective validity in regard to appearances, because these are already things that we take as **objects of our senses**; but it is no longer objective if one abstracts from the sensibility of our intuition, thus from that kind of representation that is peculiar to us, and speaks of **things in general**. Time is therefore merely a subjective condition of our (human) intuition (which is always sensible, i.e., insofar as we are affected by objects), and in itself, outside the subject, is nothing. Nonetheless it is necessarily objective in regard to all appearances, thus also in regard to all things that can come before us in **experience**. We cannot say all things are in time, because with the concept of things in general abstraction is made from every kind of intuition of them, but this is the real condition under which time belongs to the representation of objects. Now if the condition is added to the concept, and the principle says that all things as appearances (objects of sensible intuition) are in time, then the principle has its sound objective correctness and *a priori* universality.

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Our assertions accordingly teach the **empirical reality** of time, i.e., objective validity in regard to all objects that may ever be given to our senses. And since our intuition is always sensible, no object can ever be given to us in experience that would not belong under the condition of time. But, on the contrary, we dispute all claim of time to absolute reality, namely where it would attach to things absolutely as a condition or property even without regard to the form of our sensible intuition. Such properties, which pertain to things in themselves, can never be given to us through the senses. In this therefore consists the **transcendental ideality** of time, according to which it is nothing at all if one ab-

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The transcendental
ideality of time^a *Princip*

B 53

stracts from the subjective conditions of sensible intuition, and cannot be counted as either subsisting or inhering in the objects in themselves (without their relation to our intuition). Yet this ideality is to be compared with the subreptions of sensation just as little as that of space is, because in that case one presupposes that the appearance itself, in which these predicates inhere, has objective reality, which is here entirely absent except insofar as it is merely empirical, i.e., the object itself is regarded merely as appearance: concerning which the above remark in the previous sections is to be consulted.^a

<§ 7>
Elucidation.

A 37

Against this theory, which concedes empirical reality to time but disputes its absolute and transcendental reality, insightful men have so unanimously proposed one objection that I conclude that it must naturally occur to every reader who is not accustomed to these considerations.³¹ It goes thus: Alterations are real (this is proved by the change of our own representations, even if one would deny all outer appearances together with their alterations). Now alterations are possible only in time, therefore time is something real. There is no difficulty in answering. I admit the entire argument. Time is certainly something real, namely the real form of inner intuition. It therefore has subjective reality in regard to inner experience, i.e., I really have the representation of time and <my^b> determinations in it. It is therefore to be regarded really not as object^c but as the way of representing myself as object.^d But if I or another being could intuit myself without this condition of sensibility, then these very determinations, which we now represent to ourselves as alterations, would yield us a cognition in which the representation of time and thus also of alteration would not occur at all. Its empirical reality therefore remains as a condition of all our experiences. Only absolute reality cannot be granted to it according to what has been adduced above. It is nothing except the form of our inner intuition.* If

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* I can, to be sure, say: my representations succeed one another; but that only means that we are conscious of them as in a temporal sequence, i.e., according to the form of inner sense. Time is not on that account something in itself, nor any determination objectively adhering to things.

^a This refers to A 28–30/B 44–5 in § 3.

^b In the first edition: "of my."

^c Object

^d Object

one removes the special condition of our sensibility from it, then the concept of time also disappears, and it does not adhere to the objects themselves, rather merely to the subject that intuits them.

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The cause, however, on account of which this objection is so unanimously made, and indeed by those who nevertheless know of nothing convincing to object against the doctrine of the ideality of space,³² is this. They did not expect to be able to demonstrate the absolute reality of space apodictically, since they were confronted by idealism, according to which the reality of outer objects is not capable of any strict proof: on the contrary, the reality of the object of our inner sense (of myself and my state) is immediately clear through consciousness. The former could have been a mere illusion, but the latter, according to their opinion, is undeniably something real. But they did not consider that both, without their reality as representations being disputed, nevertheless belong only to appearance, which always has two sides, one where the object^a is considered in itself (without regard to the way in which it is to be intuited), the constitution of which however must for that very reason always remain problematic), the other where the form of the intuition of this object is considered, which must not be sought in the object in itself but in the subject to which it appears, but which nevertheless really and necessarily pertains to the representation of this object.

B 55

Time and space are accordingly two sources of cognition, from which different synthetic cognitions can be drawn *a priori*, of which especially pure mathematics in regard to the cognitions of space and its relations provides a splendid example. Both taken together are, namely, the pure forms of all sensible intuition, and thereby make possible synthetic *a priori* propositions. But these *a priori* sources of cognition determine their own boundaries by that very fact (that they are merely conditions of sensibility), namely that they apply to objects only so far as they are considered as appearances, but do not present things in themselves. Those alone are the field of their validity, beyond which no further objective use of them takes place. This reality of space and time, further, leaves the certainty of experiential cognition untouched: for we are just as certain of that whether these forms necessarily adhere to the things in themselves or only to our intuition of these things. Those, however, who assert the absolute reality of space and time, whether they assume it to be subsisting or only inhering, must themselves come into conflict with the principles^b of experience.

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B 56

^a Object^b Principien

For if they decide in favor of the first (which is generally the position of the mathematical investigators of nature),³³ then they must assume two eternal and infinite self-subsisting non-entities (space and time), which exist (yet without there being anything real) only in order to comprehend everything real within themselves. If they adopt the second position (as do some metaphysicians of nature), and hold space and time to be relations of appearances (next to or successive to one another) that are abstracted from experience though confusedly represented in this abstraction, then they must dispute the validity or at least the apodictic certainty of *a priori* mathematical doctrines in regard to real things (e.g., in space), since this certainty does not occur *a posteriori*, and on this view the *a priori* concepts of space and time are only creatures of the imagination, the origin of which must really be sought in experience, out of whose abstracted relations imagination has made something that, to be sure, contains what is general in them but that cannot occur without the restrictions that nature has attached to them.³⁴ The first succeed in opening the field of appearances for mathematical assertions.^a However, they themselves become very confused through precisely these conditions if the understanding would go beyond this field. The second succeed, to be sure, with respect to the latter, in that the representations of space and time do not stand in their way if they would judge of objects not as appearances but merely in relation to the understanding; but they can neither offer any ground for the possibility of *a priori* mathematical cognitions (since they lack a true and objectively valid *a priori* intuition), nor can they bring the propositions of experience into necessary accord with those assertions.

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B58 On our theory of the true constitution of these two original forms of sensibility both difficulties are remedied.

Finally, that the transcendental aesthetic cannot contain more than these two elements, namely space and time, is clear from the fact that all other concepts belonging to sensibility, even that of motion, which unites both elements, presuppose something empirical. For this presupposes the perception of something movable. In space considered in itself there is nothing movable; hence the movable must be something that is found **in space only through experience**, thus an empirical datum. In the same way the transcendental aesthetic cannot count the concept of alteration among its *a priori* data; for time itself does not alter, but only something that is within time. For this there is required the perception of some existence and the succession of its determinations, thus experience.

^a A colon in the first edition is replaced with a period in the second.

<§ 8>
General remarks
on the transcendental aesthetic

<I.>^a It will first be necessary to explain as distinctly as possible our opinion in regard to the fundamental constitution of sensible cognition in general, in order to preclude all misinterpretation of it.

We have therefore wanted to say that all our intuition is nothing but the representation of appearance; that the things that we intuit are not in themselves what we intuit them to be, nor are their relations so constituted in themselves as they appear to us; and that if we remove our own subject or even only the subjective constitution of the senses in general, then all constitution, all relations of objects^b in space and time, indeed space and time themselves would disappear, and as appearances they cannot exist in themselves, but only in us. What may be the case with objects in themselves and abstracted from all this receptivity of our sensibility remains entirely unknown to us. We are acquainted with nothing except our way of perceiving them, which is peculiar to us, and which therefore does not necessarily pertain to every being, though to be sure it pertains to every human being. We are concerned solely with this. Space and time are its pure forms, sensation in general its matter. We can cognize only the former *a priori*, i.e., prior to all actual perception, and they are therefore called pure intuition; the latter, however, is that in our cognition that is responsible for it being called *a posteriori* cognition, i.e., empirical intuition. The former adheres to our sensibility absolutely necessarily, whatever sort of sensations we may have; the latter can be very different. Even if we could bring this intuition of ours to the highest degree of distinctness we would not thereby come any closer to the constitution of objects in themselves. For in any case we would still completely cognize only our own way of intuiting, i.e., our sensibility, and this always only under the conditions originally depending on the subject, space and time; what the objects may be in themselves would still never be known through the most enlightened cognition of their appearance, which alone is given to us.

That our entire sensibility is nothing but the confused representation of things, which contains solely that which pertains to them in themselves but only under a heap of marks and partial representations that we can never consciously separate from one another, is therefore a falsification of the concept of sensibility and of appearance that renders

Against sensibility
as providing
confused
representation

^a "I." is added in the second edition because of the addition of the further numbered paragraphs (II through IV) added at B 66–73.

^b *Objecte*

B61 the entire theory of them useless and empty. The difference between an indistinct and a distinct representation is merely logical, and does not concern the content. Without doubt the concept of **right** that is used by the healthy understanding contains the very same things that the most subtle speculation can evolve out of it, only in common and practical use one is not conscious of these manifold representations in these thoughts. Thus one cannot say that the common concept is sensible and contains a mere appearance, for right cannot appear at all; rather its concept lies in the understanding and represents a constitution (the moral constitution) of actions that pertains to them in themselves. The representation of a **body** in intuition, on the contrary, contains nothing at all that could pertain to an object in itself, but merely the appearance of something and the way in which we are affected by it; and this receptivity of our cognitive capacity is called sensibility and remains worlds apart from the cognition of the object in itself even if one might see through to the very bottom of it (the appearance).

A44 The Leibnizian-Wolffian philosophy has therefore directed all investigations of the nature and origin of our cognitions to an entirely unjust point of view in considering the distinction between sensibility and the intellectual as merely logical, since it is obviously transcendental, and does not concern merely the form of distinctness or indistinctness, but its origin and content, so that through sensibility we do not cognize the constitution of things in themselves merely indistinctly, but rather not at all, and, as soon as we take away our subjective constitution, the represented object^a with the properties that sensible intuition attributes to it is nowhere to be encountered, nor can it be encountered, for it is just this subjective constitution that determines its form as appearance.³⁵

B62 **A45** We ordinarily distinguish quite well between that which is essentially attached to the intuition of appearances, and is valid for every human sense in general, and that which pertains to them only contingently because it is not valid for the relation^b of sensibility in general but only for a particular situation or organization of this or that sense. And thus one calls the first cognition one that represents the object in itself, but the second one only its appearance. This distinction, however, is only empirical. If one stands by it (as commonly happens) and does not regard that empirical intuition as in turn mere appearance (as ought to happen), so that there is nothing to be encountered in it that pertains to anything in itself, then our transcendental distinction is lost, and we be-

^a Object

^b As noted in the first-edition version above, here Kant switches from *Verhältnis* to *Beziehung* as his topic switches from the relation of objects in space or time to each other to the relation of space and time to us. With one exception to be noted, therefore, for the remainder of this section (I) “relation” translates *Verhältnis*. In the new paragraphs II through IV added below, however, Kant again reverts to *Verhältnis*.

B63

A46

B64

A47

lieve ourselves to cognize things in themselves, though we have nothing to do with anything except appearances anywhere (in the world of sense), even in the deepest research into its objects. Thus, we would certainly call a rainbow a mere appearance in a sun-shower, but would call this rain the thing in itself, and this is correct, as long as we understand the latter concept in a merely physical sense, as that which in universal experience and all different positions relative to the senses is always determined thus and not otherwise in intuition. But if we consider this empirical object in general and, without turning to its agreement with every human sense, ask whether it (not the raindrops, since these, as appearances, are already empirical objects)^a represents an object in itself, then the question of the relation of the representation to the object is transcendental, and not only these drops are mere appearances, but even their round form, indeed even the space through which they fall are nothing in themselves, but only mere modifications or foundations^b of our sensible intuition; the transcendental object,^c however, remains unknown to us.

The second important concern of our transcendental aesthetic is that it not merely earn some favor as a plausible hypothesis, but that it be as certain and indubitable as can ever be demanded of a theory that is to serve as an organon. In order to make this certainty fully convincing we will choose a case in which its validity can become obvious <and that can serve to make that which has been adduced in § 3 even more clear>.

Thus, if it were to be supposed that space and time are in themselves objective and conditions of the possibility of things in themselves, then it would be shown, first, that there is a large number of *a priori* apodictic and synthetic propositions about both, but especially about space, which we will therefore here investigate as our primary example. Since the propositions of geometry are cognized synthetically *a priori* and with apodictic certainty, I ask: Whence do you take such propositions, and on what does our understanding rely in attaining to such absolutely necessary and universally valid truths? There is no other way than through concepts or through intuitions, both of which, however, are given, as such, either *a priori* or *a posteriori*. The latter, namely empirical concepts, together with that on which they are grounded, empirical intuition, cannot yield any synthetic proposition except one that is also merely empirical, i.e., a proposition of experience; thus it can never contain necessity and absolute universality of the sort that is nevertheless characteristic of all propositions of geometry. Concerning the first and only means for attaining to such cognitions, however, namely

^a *Objecte* die Dinge in sich selbst.

^b *Grundlagen* der dingen möglichkeit.

^c *Object*

through mere concepts or *a priori* intuitions, it is clear that from mere concepts no synthetic cognition but only merely analytic cognition can be attained. Take the proposition that with two straight lines no space at all can be enclosed, thus no figure is possible, and try to derive it from the concept of straight lines and the number two; or take the proposition that a figure is possible with three straight lines, and in the same way try to derive it from these concepts. All of your effort is in vain, and you see yourself forced to take refuge in intuition, as indeed geometry always does. You thus give yourself an object in intuition; but what kind is this, is it a pure *a priori* intuition or an empirical one? If it were the latter, then no universally valid, let alone apodictic proposition could ever come from it: for experience can never provide anything of this sort. You must therefore give your object *a priori* in intuition, and ground your synthetic proposition on this. If there did not lie in you a faculty for intuiting *a priori*; if this subjective condition regarding form were not at the same time the universal *a priori* condition under which alone the object^a of this (outer) intuition is itself possible; if the object (the triangle) were something in itself without relation to your subject: then how could you say that what necessarily lies in your subjective conditions for constructing a triangle must also necessarily pertain to the triangle in itself? for you could not add to your concept (of three lines) something new (the figure) that must thereby necessarily be encountered in the object, since this is given prior to your cognition and not through it. If, therefore, space (and time as well) were not a mere form of your intuition that contains *a priori* conditions under which alone things could be outer objects for you, which are nothing in themselves without these subjective conditions, then you could make out absolutely nothing synthetic and *a priori* about outer objects.^b It is therefore indubitably certain and not merely possible or even probable that space and time, as the necessary conditions of all (outer and inner) experience, are merely subjective conditions of all our intuition, in relation to which therefore all objects are mere appearances and not things given for themselves in this way; about these appearances, further, much may be said *a priori* that concerns their form but nothing whatsoever about the things in themselves that may ground them.

^c<II. For confirmation of this theory of the ideality of outer as well as inner sense, thus of all objects^d of the senses, as mere appearances, this comment is especially useful: that everything in our cognition that belongs to intuition (with the exception, therefore, of the feeling of plea-

^a Object

^b Objecte

^c From here to the end of the "Transcendental Aesthetic" added in the second edition.

^d Objecte

Section II. On Time

sure and displeasure and the will, which are not cognitions at all) contains nothing but mere relations,^a of places in one intuition (extension), alteration of places (motion), and laws in accordance with which this alteration is determined (moving forces). But what is present in the place, or what it produces in the things themselves besides the alteration of place, is not given through these relations. Now through mere relations no thing in itself is cognized; it is therefore right to judge that since nothing is given to us through outer sense except mere representations of relation, outer sense can also contain in its representation only the relation of an object to the subject, and not that which is internal to the object^b in itself.³⁶ It is exactly the same in the case of inner sense. It is not merely that the representations of outer sense make up the proper material with which we occupy our mind, but also the time in which we place these representations, which itself precedes the consciousness of them in experience and grounds the way in which we place them in mind as a formal condition, already contains relations of succession, of simultaneity, and of that which is simultaneous with succession (of that which persists). Now that which, as representation, can precede any act of thinking something is intuition and, if it contains nothing but relations, it is the form of intuition, which, since it does not represent anything except insofar as something is posited in the mind, can be nothing other than the way in which the mind is affected by its own activity, namely this positing of its representation, thus the way it is affected through itself, i.e., it is an inner sense as far as regards its form. Everything that is represented through a sense is to that extent always appearance, and an inner sense must therefore either not be admitted at all or else the subject, which is the object of this sense, can only be represented by its means as appearance, not as it would judge of itself if its intuition were mere self-activity, i.e., intellectual. Any difficulty in this depends merely on the question how a subject can internally intuit itself; yet this difficulty is common to every theory. Consciousness of itself (apprehension) is the simple representation of the I, and if all of the manifold in the subject were given self-actively through that alone, then the inner intuition would be intellectual. In human beings this consciousness requires inner perception of the manifold that is antecedently given in the subject, and the manner in which this is given in the mind without spontaneity must be called sensibility on account of this difference. If the faculty for becoming conscious of oneself is to seek out (apprehend) that which lies in the mind, it must affect the lat-

pure intuition
contains nothing
but relations

b67

Outer sense is the
"proper material" of
inner sense

b68

intellectual
intuition

^a Here Kant reverts to the use of *Verhältnis* for the remainder of the "Transcendental Aesthetic," and it is thus this word that is translated by "relation" here and for the remainder of the section unless otherwise noted.

^b *Objekte*

ter, and it can only produce an intuition of itself in such a way, whose form, however, which antecedently grounds it in the mind, determines the way in which the manifold is together in the mind in the representation of time; there it then intuits itself not as it would immediately self-actively represent itself, but in accordance with the way in which it is affected from within, consequently as it appears to itself, not as it is.

III. If I say: in space and time intuition represents both outer objects^a as well as the self-intuition of the mind as each affects our senses, i.e., as it appears, that is not to say that these objects would be a mere illusion.^b³⁷ For in the appearance the objects,^c indeed even properties^d that we attribute to them, are always regarded as something really given, only insofar as this property depends only on the kind of intuition of the subject in the relation^e of the given object to it then this object as appearance is to be distinguished from itself as object^f in itself. Thus I do not say that bodies merely seem^g to exist outside me or that my soul only seems^h to be given if I assert that the quality of space and time – in accordance with which, as condition of their existence, I posit both of these – lies in my kind of intuition and not in these objectsⁱ in themselves. It would be my own fault if I made that which I should count as appearance into mere illusion.* But this does not happen according to

B69 *The predicates of appearance can be attributed to the object^j in itself, in relation to our sense, e.g., the red color or fragrance to the rose; but the illusion can never be attributed to the object as predicate, precisely because that would be to attribute to the object^k for itself what pertains to it only in relation to the senses or in general to the subject, e.g., the two handles that were originally attributed to Saturn. What is not to be encountered in the object^l in itself at all, but is always to be encountered in its relation to the subject and is inseparable from the representation of the object, is appearance, and thus the predicates of space and of time are rightly attributed to the objects of the senses as such, and there is no illusion in this. On the contrary, if I attribute the redness to the rose in itself, the handles to Saturn or extension to all outer objects in themselves, without looking to a determinate relation of these objects to the subject and limiting my judgment to this, then illusion first arises.

^a Objecte

^b Schein

^c Objecte

^d Beschaffenheiten, here and in the remainder of this paragraph.

^e Relation

^f Object

^g scheinen

^h scheint

ⁱ Objecten

^j Objecte

^k Object

^l Objecte

our principle^a of the ideality of all of our sensible intuitions; rather, if one ascribes **objective reality** to those forms of representation then one cannot avoid thereby transforming everything into mere **illusion**. For if one regards space and time as properties that, as far as their possibility is concerned, must be encountered in things in themselves, and reflects on the absurdities in which one then becomes entangled, because two infinite things that are neither substances nor anything really inhering in substances must nevertheless be something existing, indeed the necessary condition of the existence of all things, which also remain even if all existing things are removed; then one cannot well blame the good Berkeley if he demotes bodies to mere illusion;³⁸ indeed even our own existence, which would be made dependent in such a way on the self-subsisting reality of a non-entity such as time, would be transformed along with this into mere illusion; an absurdity of which no one has yet allowed himself to be guilty.

B 71

IV. In natural theology, where one conceives of an object that is not only not an object of intuition for us but cannot even be an object of sensible intuition for itself, one is careful to remove the conditions of time and space from all of its intuition (for all of its cognition must be intuition and not **thinking**, which is always proof of limitations). But with what right can one do this if one has antecedently made both of these into forms of things in themselves, and indeed ones that, as *a priori* conditions of the existence of things, would remain even if one removed the things themselves? – for as conditions of all existence in general they would also have to be conditions of the existence of God. If one will not make them into objective forms of all things, then no alternative remains but to make them into subjective forms of our kind of outer as well as inner intuition, which is called sensible because it is **not original**, i.e., one through which the existence of the object^b of intuition is itself given (and that, so far as we can have insight, can only pertain to the original being); rather it is dependent on the existence of the object,^c thus it is possible only insofar as the representational capacity of the subject is affected through that.³⁹

B 72

It is also not necessary for us to limit the kind of intuition in space and time to the sensibility of human beings; it may well be that all finite thinking beings must necessarily agree with human beings in this regard (though we cannot decide this), yet even given such universal validity this kind of intuition would not cease to be sensibility, for the very reason that it is derived (*intuitus derivatus*),^d not original (*intuitus originis*).

^a Princip^b Objects^c Objects^d derivative intuition

inarius),^a thus not intellectual intuition, which for the ground already adduced seems to pertain only to the original being, never to one that is dependent as regards both its existence and its intuition (which determines its existence in relation^b to given objects);^c although the last remark must be counted only as an illustration of our aesthetic theory and not as a ground of its proof.

B73

Conclusion of the Transcendental Aesthetic.

Here we now have one of the required pieces for the solution of the general problem of transcendental philosophy – **how are synthetic *a priori* propositions possible?** – namely pure *a priori* intuitions, space and time, in which, if we want to go beyond the given concept in an *a priori* judgment, we encounter that which is to be discovered *a priori* and synthetically connected with it, not in the concept but in the intuition that corresponds to it; but on this ground such a judgment never extends beyond the objects of the senses and can hold only for objects^d of possible experience.>

^a original intuition

^b Beziehung

^c Objecte

^d Objecte

- 20 For several earlier formulations of this point, see R 5115 and 5116 (1776–78, 18:94–6).
- 21 The first five paragraphs of this section are loosely based on *Prolegomena*, § 5 (2:275–80), but, unlike the preceding paragraphs on mathematics, not directly copied from it.
- 22 In the *Treatise of Human Nature*, Hume does argue that “the ideas which are most essential to geometry, *viz.* those of equality and inequality, of a right line and a plain surface, are far from being exact and determinate . . . As the ultimate standard of these figures is deriv’d from nothing but the senses and imagination, ‘tis absurd to talk of any perfection beyond what these faculties can judge of . . .” (book I, part II, section IV; in the edition by L. A. Selby-Bigge, revised by Ph. H. Nidditch [Oxford, 1978], pp. 50–1). In other words, he here denies the possibility of pure mathematics, precisely what Kant supposes his “sound understanding” would have prevented him from doing. Kant’s ignorance of Hume’s assertion of the empirical foundation and limitation of mathematics in the *Treatise*, which is not repeated in the first *Enquiry*, is good evidence for the traditional assumption that Kant had no firsthand acquaintance with most of the *Treatise*, which was not translated into German until 1791.
- 23 See note 6 to the first-edition introduction, above.

Transcendental aesthetic

- 1 After having begun to distinguish the methods of mathematics and philosophy in the *Inquiry concerning the distinctness of the principles of natural theology and morality* written in 1762 and published in 1764, Kant first publicly distinguishes between the cognitive faculties of sensibility and intellect in his inaugural dissertation, “On the form and principles of the sensible and intelligible world,” defended and published in 1770. His argument there anticipates the argument of the present section of the *Critique* that space and time are the necessary conditions of outer and inner sense, and as such are principles of “phenomena” or things as they appear rather than of “noumena” or things as they are in themselves (§ 13, 2:398). The detailed arguments that space and time are *a priori* forms of intuition are anticipated in §§ 14 and 15 of the inaugural dissertation (2:399–405). However, Kant did not begin to use the name “Transcendental Aesthetic” as his term for the science of the *a priori* conditions of sensibility until several years after 1770. The term “aesthetic” is used as the designation for the “philosophy of sensibility” as early as 1769 in R 1584 (16:25), but the term “transcendental aesthetic” seems to appear first in R 4643 (17:622–3), a note ascribed to the period 1772–76. Other important anticipations of the “Transcendental Aesthetic” include R 4673, notes Kant made on a letter dated 28 April 1774 (17:636–42), and the loose sheet R 4756 (17:699–703), an important draft of an outline for the emerging *Critique* in which Kant deals with the matter of the “Transcendental Aesthetic” under the rubric of a “Transcendental Theory of Appearance,” and also heads other sections of his outline as a “Transcendental Theory of Experience” and a “Dialectic of Sensibility.”
- 2 Elsewhere, Kant defines an intuition as the “immediate relation of the

- power of representation to an individual object" (R 5643, 1780–88, 18:282). For earlier accounts of intuition, see R 3955, 3957, 3958, and 3961 (1769, 17:364–7).
- 3 On the contrast between intuition and sensation, see R 4636 (1772–76, 17:619–20). More generally, on Kant's classification of the various forms of cognitive states, see the inaugural dissertation, § 5 (2:394); R 619–20 (1769, 15:268); R 2835–6 (1773–77, 16:536–40); and the scheme given at A320/B367 below, as well as the further reflections noted there.
- 4 Kant refers in this note to Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten (1711–1762), who was not only the author of the textbooks on metaphysics and ethics on which Kant based his lecture courses in those subjects, but also the author of the two works which introduced and gave currency to the term "aesthetics" used in its modern sense, i.e., as the name for the philosophy of art and/or beauty; these works were Baumgarten's dissertation *Meditationes philosophicae de nominibus ad poema pertinentibus* (Halle, 1735), and the two-volume though uncompleted *Aesthetica* (Halle, 1750 and 1758). It is not clear whether Kant was acquainted with Baumgarten's aesthetic theory firsthand or through the three-volume work in German published by Baumgarten's disciple Georg Friedrich Meier, *Die Anfangsgründe aller schönen Künste und Wissenschaften* (Halle, 1748–50) (Meier was also the author of the textbook used in Kant's logic courses). In any case, although in the present footnote Kant evinced a hostility to Baumgarten's new usage which he modified only slightly in the revisions of this note in the second edition, by 1790 Kant had accepted Baumgarten's usage, and so entitled the section of the *Critique of Judgment* of that year dealing with what he here says should be called the "critique of taste" the "Critique of Aesthetic Judgment." For comments on Baumgarten, see R 5081 (1776–78, 18:81–2). For further critical comments about the status of aesthetics in Baumgarten's (and the modern) sense, see R 1578, 1579, 1587, 1588 (1760s, 16:16–23, 26–7), R 4276 (1770–71, 17:492), and R 5063 (1776–78, 18:76–7).
- 5 Compare R 5298 (1776–78 or 1780s, 18:146–8).
- 6 With this paragraph compare R 4188 and 4189 (1769–70, 17:449–50).
- 7 See R 4199 (1769–70, 17:453).
- 8 Compare R 5315 (1776–1780s, 18:151).
- 9 For a contrasting assertion, see R 4511 (1772–75, 17:578). For further discussion, see R 5636 (1780s, 18:267–8).
- 10 See R 5637 (1780s, 18:271–6, especially p. 271).
- 11 See R 4071 (1769, 17:404), R 4315 (1769–71, 17:503–4), R 4425 (1771, 17:541), and R 4673 (1773–75, 17:636–42, especially p. 638).
- 12 Kant suggests a quite different argument for this point in the *Opus postumum*, where he states that it is because space is a form of intuition that it must be infinite; the unstated premise is presumably that no matter how much is given to us, we must always be able to represent it spatially because space is the form of intuition of outer objects. Of course, this might be thought to presuppose the proof that space is a form of intuition which is still being given here. See *Opus postumum*, 22:12, 43–4, 415, 417, 419–20; in Kant, *Opus postumum*, edited by Eckart Förster (Cambridge: Cambridge

University Press, 1993), pp. 170–1, 178–9, 181–3. See also R 6338 and 6338a (1794–98, 18:658–65).

¹³ A large number of reflections bear on the argument of this paragraph. See R 4077–8 (1769, 17:405–6), R 4191 (1769–70, 17:451), R 4673 (1773–75, 17:536–42), R 4674 (1773–75, 17:643–7, especially p. 645), R 5329 (1776–78, 18:153), R 5552 (1778–79? 1780s?, 18:218–20, especially p. 220), R 5637 (1780s, 18:271–6, especially pp. 271–2), R 5876 (1783–84, 18:374–5), and, even as late as 1797, R 6342 (18:667), R 6346 (18:670–1), R 6348 (18:671–2), R 6349 (18:672–5), R 6350 (18:676–7), R 6351 (18:677–8), and 6352 (18:678–9). Kant's interest in this long-settled matter may have been revived at this late date by an essay competition of the Royal Academy of Sciences intended to call forth defenses of the anti-Kantian position that all knowledge is of empirical origin; see R 6351.

¹⁴ Kant describes this as hypothetical correctness at R 4976 (1776–78, 18:46–7).

¹⁵ For alternative versions of the metaphysical exposition of time, see, in addition to the inaugural dissertation § 14, R 4673 (1774, 17:636–42, especially pp. 636–7) and R 4756 (1775–77, 17:699–703, especially p. 700).

¹⁶ See R 4071 (1769, 17:404).

¹⁷ Compare R 4319 (1770–71, 17:504–5).

¹⁸ See note 13 above.

¹⁹ See R 5317, 5319, 5320 (1776–78, 18:151), and R 5325 (1776–78, 18:152).

²⁰ Kant refers here to objections that had been brought against his inaugural dissertation by two of the most important philosophers of the period, Johann Heinrich Lambert and Moses Mendelssohn, as well as by the then well-known aesthetician and member of the Berlin Academy of Sciences, Johann Georg Sulzer. Lambert objected that even though Kant was correct to maintain that “Time is indisputably a *conditio sine qua non*” of all of our representations of objects, it does not follow from this that time is unreal, for “*If alterations are real then time is also real*, whatever it might be” (letter 61 to Kant, of 18 October 1770, 10:103–11, at 106–7). Mendelssohn also wrote that he could not convince himself that time is “something merely subjective,” for “Succession is at least a necessary condition of the representations of finite spirits. Now finite spirits are not only subjects, but also objects of representations, those of both God and their fellow spirits. Hence the sequence [of representations] on one another is also to be regarded as something objective” (letter 63 to Kant, of 25 December 1770, 10:113–16, at 115). (The objection that time cannot be denied to be real just because it is a necessary property of our representations, since our representations themselves are real, has continued to be pressed against Kant; see, for instance, P. F. Strawson, *The Bounds of Sense* [London: Methuen, 1966], pp. 39 and 54.) Sulzer took an only slightly more conciliatory line: he insisted that “Duration and extension are absolutely simple concepts, which cannot be explained, although they have in my opinion a true reality,” even though he was prepared to concede that “Time and space, however, are composite concepts,” which may thus be regarded as subjective although grounded in an objectively valid experience of duration and extension (letter 62 to Kant, of 8 December 1770, 10:110–12, at 111). Sulzer

describes himself as having been an adherent of Leibniz's view of time and space, but his view that time is a composite concept grounded on the simple concept of duration is also reminiscent of Locke's treatment of the idea of time as a complex idea (specifically, a simple mode) formed from the experience of duration (*Essay concerning Human Understanding*, book II, chapter XIV).

- 21 See again R 5320 (1776–78, 18:151).
- 22 This is somewhat disingenuous: Lambert at least made it clear that his reservations about Kant's account of time apply equally to the case of space. He wrote: "The reality of time and of space appears to have something so simple and so heterogeneous from everything else that one can only think it but not define it . . . I therefore cannot say that time and also space are merely an aid in behalf of human representation" (letter of 13 October 1770, at 10:107).
- 23 To the whole of this paragraph, compare R 4673 (1773–75, 17:636–42).
- 24 Here Kant refers to the theory of absolute space of Newton and his followers such as Samuel Clarke. Newton's view of absolute space and time is presented in *Philosophiae Naturalis Principia Mathematica* (London, 1687), Scholium to Definition VIII, book I, and discussed by Clarke in his contributions, beginning with Clarke's First Reply, to the Leibniz-Clarke correspondence, *A Collection of Papers which Passed between the Late Learned Mr. Leibnitz and Dr. Clarke, in the Years 1715 and 1716* (London, 1717); a German edition of the correspondence, translated by Heinrich Köhler, with an introduction by Christian Wolff and a posthumous reply to Clarke's fifth letter by L. P. Thümmig, was published in 1720 (Frankfurt and Leipzig), as was a French edition, edited by Des Maiseaux (Amsterdam). There is no doubt about Kant's familiarity with this famous controversy.
- 25 Here Kant refers to the view of Leibniz and his followers. He had already anticipated his striking objection, which focuses on this epistemological problem with Leibniz's position rather than its ontology (which Kant essentially shares), in the inaugural dissertation, § 15D (2:404). See also R 5298 (1776–1780s, 18:146–7), R 5327 (1776–1780s, 18:153), and R 5876 (1783–84, 18:374–5).
- 26 See R 4652 (1772–78, 17:626). See also *Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science*, 4:476–7.
- 27 For a classical statement of the view to which Kant is objecting, see G. W. Leibniz, *New Essays on Human Understanding*, book I, chapter I, § 11: "But the ideas that come from the senses are confused; and so too, at least in part, are the truths which depend on them; whereas intellectual ideas, and the truths depending on them, are distinct, and neither [the ideas nor the truths] originate in the senses; though it is true that without the senses we would never think of them" (translation by Jonathan Bennett and Peter Remnant [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981], p. 81).
- 28 For a parallel passage, also using the example of a triangle, see Kant's letter to Marcus Herz of 26 May 1789 (letter 362, 11:48–55; translation in Arnulf Zweig, *Kant: Philosophical Correspondence 1759–99* [Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967], pp. 150–6).
- 29 Compare to this whole section R 5637 (1780–83 or 1785–88, 18:268–76),

probably a draft for the first edition of the *Critique* but possibly a draft for the second edition.

- 30 On the argument of this section, see also R 5805 (1783–84, 18:358–9); R 5811 (1783–84, 18:360); R 5813 (1785–89, 18:361); R 6329 (1793, 18:650–1); and *Metaphysik Volckmann*, 28:419–20. In the first draft of the introduction to the *Critique of Judgment*, however, Kant suggests that there is little content to the “general theory of time” (20:237).
- 31 See note 3 above.
- 32 See note 4 above.
- 33 See note 5 above.
- 34 See note 6 above.
- 35 See note 7 above.
- 36 For related arguments, see R 5655 (1788–89, 18:313–16, especially pp. 314–15); Kant’s essay “Some remarks to Ludwig Heinrich Jakob’s *Examination of Mendelssohn’s Morgenstunden*” (8:149–55, at pp. 153–4); and the argument against Leibniz’s monadology in *Metaphysik Mrongovius*, 29:827.
- 37 On the contrast between appearance and illusion, see also R 4999 (1776–78, 18:56).
- 38 Berkeley typically attacks the reality of *matter* rather than of space and time themselves; thus Kant would appear to be closer to the mark in the last part of this sentence than in the earlier part, in which he seems to suggest that Berkeley’s idealism results from the supposition that there are contradictions inherent in the idea of space and time themselves as self-subsisting entities. In *The Principles of Human Knowledge* §§ 98–9, however, Berkeley does object to the “attempt to frame a simple idea of *time*, abstracted from the succession of ideas in my mind, which flows uniformly, and is participated in by all beings,” and likewise to the attempt to “abstract extension and motion from all other qualities” (*The Works of George Berkeley, Bishop of Cloyne*, ed. A. A. Luce and T. E. Jessop [Edinburgh: Nelson, 1949], vol. II, pp. 83–4). Here Berkeley comes closer to the reasoning Kant imputes to him.
- 39 On the argument of this paragraph, see also R 5781 (1780s, 18:353), R 5797 (1780s, 18:357), R 5962 (1785–89, 18:401–5), and R 6317 (1790–91, 18:623–9, especially p. 626).

Transcendental analytic (“Analytic of concepts”)

- 1 For related comments, see R 5087 and 5089 (1776–78, 18:83–4).
- 2 An early account of the restrictions on what Kant was later to call “general logic” may be found at R 1599 (1769–70, 16:29–30); see also R 1608 (1776–78, 16:34). Other precursors of the present passage from the same period are R 3946 (17:350–60) and R 3949 (17:361). For later comments, see R 1624 (1780s, 16:42) and R 1647 (1790s, 16:43). See also Kant’s *Logic*, edited by Benjamin Gottlob Jäsche, introduction I (9:12; in Immanuel Kant, *Lectures on Logic*, tr. J. Michael Young [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992], p. 528).
- 3 Kant would appear to have derived this figure from the Greek satirist Lucian of Samosata (b. ca. 120 A.D.), who writes in his dialogue *Demonax*,