Sense & Self-Awareness in Kant’s Theory of Cognition

Anil Gomes & Colin McLear

Trinity Term 2017

This seminar will consider a set of issues relating to Kant’s views on the senses and the intellect. Questions to be considered include the relationship between cognition and knowledge, the relationship between sensibility and the intellect, the distinction between introspection and apperception, and the nature of our awareness of ourselves in inner sense and apperception.

# Weeks 1 and 2 – The Critical Project

The aim of these first two weeks is to introduce those students without a background in Kant to some of the material which we’ll be discussing in weeks 3-8. We’ll focus on the overall shape of the Critical project, and aim to get clear on the structure of the Critique of Pure Reason, and its role in Kant’s Critical philosophy. The discussion in these weeks will be aimed primarily at those without a background in Kant. Those who are already familiar with the material should feel free to attend from week 3 onwards. The reading for Week 1 is listed below; we’ll decide at the first meeting what material to cover in Week 2.

## Core Reading

* Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, Preface and Introductions, in both editions.

## Recommended Reading

* Gardner, Kant and the Critique of Pure Reason, ch.1
* Anderson, ‘The Introduction to the Critique’, in Guyer (ed.) Cambridge Companion to Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason.
* Moore, ‘Kant: ‘The possibility, Scope, and Limits of Metaphysics’, in his The Evolution of Modern Metaphysics
* Walker, Kant, ch.1

# Week 3 - Representation, Cognition, & Knowledge

Our discussion this week concerns the various distinctions Kant makes between kinds of representation, particularly between intuition, perception, and experience. He also has two epistemically charged notions—viz. cognition and knowledge. Here we aim to get as clear as we can concerning what all these distinctions come to.

## Core Readings

* Kant: excerpts from Logic lectures; *Stufenleiter*; Canon
* Kant: Prolegomena §§8-10; CPJ §§76-7
* Watkins & Willaschek, Kant’s Account of Cognition

## Recommended Readings

* Chignell, Kant’s Concepts of Justification
* Tolley, The distinction between intuition, ‘perception’, and experience in Kant
* Schafer, Kant’s Conception of Cognition and our Knowledge of Things-in-Themselves
* Gomes & Stephenson, On the Relation of Intuition to Cognition

# Week 4 - Conceptual Representation & Conceptual Content

Debate about whether, and to what extent, Kant’s view of sensory experience construes it as depending on “higher” intellectual forms of representation, particularly *conceptual* representation, often remains somewhat unclear as to what conceptual representation *is*. This week we try to figure this out—focusing in particular on both Kant’s explicit statements about conceptual representation, and their broader connection to Kant’s characterization of intellectual activity. We’ll then go on to look at whether it makes sense say that intuition has conceptual “content” in any relevant sense.

## Core Readings

* Kant: B-Deduction; excerpts from Logic lectures; excerpts from *Anthropology*; intro to the Dialectic of CPR
* McLear, Kant and Perceptual Content

## Recommended Readings

* McLear, Getting Acquainted with Kant
* McDowell, Introduction & Concepts and Intuitions (from *Mind and World*)
* Allais, Kant, Non-conceptual Content, and the Representation of Space
* Land, No Other Use Than in Judgment?: Kant on Concepts and Sensible Synthesis
* Ginsborg, Kant and the Problem of Experience
* Dunlop, Kant and Strawson on the Content of Geometrical Concepts

# Week 5 - The Autonomy of Sense

Kant distinguishes between to basic faculties—sensibility and the intellect (or understanding & reason). However, a significant and influential swath of Kant scholarship nevertheless construes Kant as claiming that basic sensory representations—intuitions—are in part dependent on acts of the intellect for their formation. This week we discuss whether, and to what extent, such claims of dependence could be correct.

## Core Readings

* Kant: Transcendental Aesthetic; B-Deduction
* McLear, Two Kinds of Unity in the *Critique of Pure Reason*

## Recommended Readings

* Messina, Kant on the Unity of Space and the Synthetic Unity of Apperception
* Onof & Schulting, Space as Form of Intuition and as Formal Intuition
* Gomes, Naive Realism in Kantian Phrase
* Longuenesse, Synthesis Speciosa and Forms of Sensibility (ch. 8 of *Kant and the Capacity to Judge*)

# Week 6 - Introspection as Inner Sense

Kant famously characterizes our introspective awareness of our states as, following Locke, a kind of *sense*—viz. “inner” sense. This week we’ll look at two issues. First, the issue of whether, and to what extent, inner sense is really a form of *sense*. Second, whether, and to what extent, inner sense differs from “outer” sense in the what and how of its presentation of things.

## Core Readings

* Kant: excertps from Aesthetic, B-Deduction
* McLear, Kant on the Parity of Inner & Outer Sense

## Recommended Readings

* Geach, The Notion of ‘Inner Sense’
* Valaris, Inner Sense, Self-Affection, & Temporal Consciousness in Kant’s *Critique of Pure Reason*
* Shoemaker, Self-Knowledge and “Inner Sense”: Lecture I

# Week 7 - Pure Apperception

Kant’s position in the “critical” period of the 1780s-1790s has it that our awareness of ourselves is bifurcated between a sensory awareness of our states (“inner sense”) and a purely intellectual awareness of ourselves as subjects of mental activity (“pure apperception”). But what *is* pure apperception? What role is it supposed to play in Kant’s overall critical conception of cognition? This week, we’ll look at some possible answers to these questions.

## Core Readings

* Kant: excerpts from the Transcendental Deduction, Paralogisms
* McLear, I am the Original of All Objects—Kant on the Substantial Subject

## Recommended Readings

* Engstrom, Unity of Apperception
* Kitcher, *Kant’s Thinker* (chs. 9-11)
* Wuerth, Kant’s Immediatism, Pre-Critique

# Week 8 - Apperception, Reflection & Critical Reasoning

Last week we discussed how Kant construes the principle of apperception as the ground from which all other cognition is derived (B142). Moreover, Kant seems to conceive of the importance of apperception as, at least in part, stemming from the need for awareness of one’s own mental activity *as one’s own*. Reflection on one’s own mental activity forms the basis for our capacity to act as critical *reasoners*. This week we look further at the role Kant construes self-consciousness to play in the foundations of metaphysics.

## Core Readings

* Kant: excerpts from the *Lectures on Metaphysics*; excerpts from *Lectures on Logic*; “On the amphiboly of the concepts of reflection” from CPR
* McLear, Apperception and Reflection

## Recommended Readings

* Merrit, Varieties of Reflection in Kant’s Logic
* Burge, Reason and the First Person
* Moran, Self-Knowledge, ‘Transparency’, and the Forms of Activity
* Boyle, Two Kinds of Self-Knowledge
* Boyle, Transparent Self-Knowledge