

PHILOSOPHY 101

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CONTROL & MORAL RESPONSIBILITY

FREE WILL

Freedom of Will:

(1) a capacity of an agent to (2) choose according to her preferences (3) from amongst a set of relevant alternatives such that (4) the agent is responsible for that choice or action

QUESTION 1

If Determinism is true then there is no free will.

1. *True*
2. *False*

DETERMINISM

Determinism:

For any state of the subject, that subject's states are necessitated by the condition of its previous states plus the laws of nature.

- Is determinism compatible with free will?
 - Yes: 'Compatibilism'
 - No: 'Incompatibilism'

ALTERNATIVE POSSIBILITIES & INCOMPATIBILISM

- Why might determinism & freedom be incompatible?
 - Determinism is like *coercion* or *manipulation*
 - Coercion/manipulation deprives us of the *power or ability to do or choose otherwise*.

QUESTION 2

The Principle of Alternate Possibilities says:

- 1. Moral responsibility requires being able to do otherwise*
- 2. Moral responsibility requires being able to act on reasons*
- 3. We could never do otherwise than what we have done*
- 4. We could at least sometimes do otherwise than what we do*

ALTERNATIVE POSSIBILITIES & INCOMPATIBILISM

The Principle of Alternate Possibilities (PAP):

a person is morally responsible for what s/he has done only if s/he could have done otherwise (or chosen otherwise)

Leeway Incompatibilism:

The truth of determinism is **incompatible** with an agent's having the capacity to do otherwise than as she did, and thus with an agent's acting freely

QUESTION 3

According to Frankfurt, determinism and free will (and responsibility) are compatible because:

- 1. We couldn't have chosen otherwise*
- 2. Responsibility is based on the reasons for which we act*
- 3. Determinism is false*
- 4. We can always choose to do otherwise*

FRANKFURT CASES

- Frankfurt cases suggest that responsibility depends on the source of the agent's decision for acting (i.e. their reasons for acting) rather than the ability to do otherwise
- If Determinism is true can we really be considered the sources of our actions?

SOURCE OF AGENCY

- The agent must have control over the production of her decision to act if she is to be morally responsible for it
- If an agent does *not* have control over the production of her decision to act then she is not morally responsible for it

Jane is considering what to eat in the student union. She deliberates about her choices and decides that, of the options available, Subway's offerings most closely match what she desires, and so she decides to order a sub.

- Did Jane play an appropriate role in the production of this decision?
- Is she responsible for the decision?

Jane is considering what to eat in the student union. Unbeknownst to her, Subway is filling the air with a chemical that subliminally generates in people an intention to eat a sandwich. Jane breathes the chemical, forms the intention, and decides on Subway accordingly. She enjoys her sandwich.

- Did Jane play an appropriate role in the production of this decision?
- Is she responsible for the decision?

The Source Requirement:

If an agent is morally responsible for her deciding to perform an action, then the production of this decision must be something over which the agent has *control*, and an agent is not morally responsible for the decision if it is produced by a source over which she has no control

ANOTHER KIND OF INCOMPATIBILISM

Source Incompatibilism:

The truth of determinism is incompatible with an agent's having a causal history of a sort that allows the agent to be the source of her action, and thus have the action be under her control in the manner required for moral responsibility

- If determinism were false would people be the appropriate sources of their decisions?

FREE WILL & INDETERMINISM

perhaps [determinism] isn't true. Many scientists now believe that it isn't true for the basic particles of matter-that in a given situation, there's more than one thing that an electron may do. Perhaps if determinism isn't true for human actions, either, this leaves room for free will and responsibility. What if human actions, or at least some of them, are not determined in advance? (Nagel, 55)

- If actions aren't determined 'in advance' then what determines them?

is even [indeterminism] enough for free will? Is this all you mean when you say, “I could have chosen fruit instead?” - that the choice wasn't determined in advance? No, you believe something more. You believe that you determined what you would do, by doing it. It wasn't determined in advance, but it didn't just happen, either. You did it, and you could have done the opposite. (Nagel, 53)

- Is indeterminism enough for freedom?
 - No: Indeterminism is equally incompatible with the source requirement
 - Source of intention must issue in the right way from the subject

