

# PHILOSOPHY 101

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# CONTROL & MORAL RESPONSIBILITY

# REVIEW

## FREE WILL

### Freedom of Will:

(1) a capacity of an agent to (2) choose according to her preferences (3) from amongst a set of relevant alternatives such that (4) the agent is responsible for that choice or action

## QUESTION 1

Determinism says that there is no free will.

*A. True*

*B. False*

# DETERMINISM

## Determinism:

For any state of the subject, that subject's states are necessitated by the condition of its previous states plus the laws of nature.

- Is determinism compatible with free will?
  - Yes: 'Compatibilism'
  - No: 'Incompatibilism'

## ALTERNATIVE POSSIBILITIES & INCOMPATIBILISM

- Why might determinism & freedom be incompatible?
  - Determinism is like *coercion* or *manipulation*
  - Coercion/manipulation deprives us of the *power or ability to do or choose otherwise*.



## QUESTION 2

The Principle of Alternate Possibilities says:

- A. Moral responsibility requires being able to do otherwise*
- B. Moral responsibility requires being able to act on reasons*
- C. We could never do otherwise than what we have done*
- D. We could at least sometimes do otherwise than what we do*

## ALTERNATIVE POSSIBILITIES & INCOMPATIBILISM

### **The Principle of Alternate Possibilities (PAP):**

a person is morally responsible for what s/he has done only if s/he could have done otherwise (or chosen otherwise)

### **Leeway Incompatibilism:**

The truth of determinism is incompatible with an agent's having the capacity to do otherwise than as she did

### QUESTION 3

According to Frankfurt, if determinism and free will are incompatible then it **isn't** because:

- A. We couldn't have chosen otherwise*
- B. Responsibility is based on the reasons for which we act*
- C. Determinism is false*
- D. We can always choose to do otherwise*

# ALTERNATIVE POSSIBILITIES & INCOMPATIBILISM

- Frankfurt cases suggest that responsibility depends on the source of the agent's decision for acting rather than the ability to do otherwise

# SOURCE OF AGENCY

- The agent must have control over the production of her decision to act if she is to be morally responsible for it
- If an agent does *not* have control over the production of her decision to act then she is not morally responsible for it

*Jane is considering what to eat in the student union. She deliberates about her choices and decides that, of the options available, Subway's offerings most closely match what she desires, and so she decides to order a sub.*

- Did Jane play an appropriate role in the production of this decision?
- Is she responsible for the decision?

*Jane is considering what to eat in the student union. Unbeknownst to her, Subway is filling the air with a chemical that subliminally generates in subjects an intention to eat a sandwich. Jane forms the intention, and decides on Subway accordingly. She enjoys her sandwich.*

- Did Jane play an appropriate role in the production of this decision?
- Is she responsible for the decision?

## The Source Requirement:

If an agent is morally responsible for her deciding to perform an action, then the production of this decision must be something over which the agent has *control*, and an agent is not morally responsible for the decision if it is produced by a source over which she has no control



# ANOTHER KIND OF INCOMPATIBILISM

## Source Incompatibilism:

The truth of determinism is incompatible with an agent's having a causal history of a sort that allows the agent to be the source of her action, and thus have the action be under her control in the manner required for moral responsibility

- If determinism were false would people be the appropriate sources of their decisions?

# FREE WILL & INDETERMINISM

*perhaps [determinism] isn't true. Many scientists now believe that it isn't true for the basic particles of matter-that in a given situation, there's more than one thing that an electron may do. Perhaps if determinism isn't true for human actions, either, this leaves room for free will and responsibility. What if human actions, or at least some of them, are not determined in advance? (Nagel, 55)*

- If actions aren't determined 'in advance' then what determines them?

*is even [indeterminism] enough for free will? Is this all you mean when you say, “I could have chosen fruit instead?” - that the choice wasn't determined in advance? No, you believe something more. You believe that you determined what you would do, by doing it. It wasn't determined in advance, but it didn't just happen, either. You did it, and you could have done the opposite. (Nagel, 53)*

- Is indeterminism enough for freedom?
  - No: Indeterminism is equally incompatible with the source requirement
  - Source of intention must issue in the right way from the subject

# STRAWSON'S 'BASIC ARGUMENT'

## FIRST STATEMENT

1. Nothing can be the cause of itself
2. In order to be truly morally responsible for one's actions one would have to be the cause of oneself in some crucial respects
3.  $\therefore$  No one can be truly morally responsible

## QUESTIONS ABOUT THE BASIC ARGUMENT

- Why does being morally responsible require being self-caused?
- What 'crucial respects' must be caused?
  - character
  - evaluative dispositions & preferences

## STRAWSON'S REVISION

1. You do what you do because of the way you are.
2. To be morally responsible for what you do you must be truly morally responsible for the way you are – at least in certain crucial mental respects.
3. To be truly responsible for the way you are, you must have intentionally brought it about that you are the way you are, and this is impossible.
4.  $\therefore$  You cannot be truly morally responsible for what you do, because you cannot be truly responsible for the way you are.

- Is the argument valid? Sound?

## QUESTIONS ABOUT STRAWSON'S REVISION

- *Premise 2:* Why does moral responsibility require that one be responsible for how one is 'in certain crucial mental respects'?
- *Premise 3:* Why is it impossible to have intentionally brought about how one is?
- *Conclusion:* Why think that if one cannot be morally responsible for the way one is, one cannot be morally responsible for what one does?



