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Can a Soup Be Beautiful? The Rise of Gastronomy and the Aesthetics of Food

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Can a *potage de Crécy*, a carrot soup, ever be beautiful? Could shrimp Creole, one of the classic dishes of New Orleans cuisine, ever be recognized as profound? Is calling such dishes "beautiful" or "profound" a misuse of these evaluative labels? Because it appeals to our bodily appetite for sustenance, is food not the sort of thing that can be beautiful? Is food too simple a pleasure to be seriously identified with these aesthetic labels? Philosophers have been thinking about these questions for some time, and quite a few of them have argued that food cannot be beautiful.

Plato reserved 'the beautiful' as an appropriate description only for objects of sight and hearing and excluded as laughable any suggestion that food and drink could be beautiful.[1] In the Middle Ages, St. Thomas Aquinas similarly opposed food and drink being candidates for the beautiful, and in the nineteenth century, G. W. F. Hegel continued to insist on this division. He maintained that when they possessed a spiritual quality, objects of sight and hearing could be beautiful; however, objects of our bodily senses of smell, taste, and touch must always remain caught up in the material and be excluded from having any aesthetic character.[2]

If one thinks that this traditional negative view about the aesthetic character of food is mistaken – and many people nowadays do – we ought to be able to come up with a counterargument in favor of a soup or other dishes being recognized as beautiful. One can find the beginnings of such a counterargument to the negative tradition

emerging in the early nineteenth century. By then, one starts to see a definite resistance to the view that objects of taste, smell, and touch – particularly, the food and drink we ingest – must be excluded from the beautiful.

An indication that this exclusionary division has come under criticism and that food and drink should be recognized as having a potential aesthetic character is found in the fanciful example of the Mock Turtle's song in Lewis Carroll's *Alice's Adventures in Wonderland* (1865):

> Beautiful soup, so rich and green,
> Waiting in a hot tureen!
> Who for such dainties would not stoop?
> Soup of the evening, beautiful Soup!
> Soup of the evening, beautiful Soup![3]

The Mock Turtle is quite convinced that a soup can be beautiful.[4] Even so, one might object that, in Wonderland, a lot of bizarre and logic-defying events occur. Why should one think that such an example expresses a cogent idea and poses a serious challenge to excluding food from the realm of the aesthetic?

The answer lies in the nature of the soup referred to in the song. The rich green soup in the song is probably mock turtle soup, a soup made out of veal to resemble turtle soup.[5] The importance of mock turtle soup being hailed as a beautiful soup is that such a soup has a mimetic quality (i.e., it *imitates* something, namely turtle soup). The Mock Turtle recognizes food as a medium that can be used mimetically, just like the media that other art forms employ. Crediting a soup with having this mimetic character shows that a soup is the sort of thing that can be beautiful. In the earlier-discussed division between objects of sight and sound and objects of taste and smell, the former could be crafted into mimetic objects whereas the latter, it was thought, could only be examples of themselves. Yet here was an example that challenged that distinction: a food was recognized as being mimetic and, in virtue of that, might be beautiful. Perhaps the distinction could be challenged in other ways as well.

Challenges to the view that food could not be beautiful actually started in the late eighteenth century and, by the middle of the nineteenth century, presented a formidable counter-position. Such

challenges developed along two fronts. First, there was a philosophical attack that sought to overturn the view that food could not be aesthetic. Second, a social practice developed that introduced changes in the way that food was presented and consumed. This practice encouraged consumers to approach food in a way similar to the way they approached other aesthetic objects. At the time that Carroll wrote in the mid-nineteenth century, the challenge to food's being denied an aesthetic character had been widely debated.[6]

The philosophical attack came in response to a major change in the paradigmatic way we think and talk about our appreciation of works of art and nature. During the eighteenth century, such appreciation was held to resemble, *metaphorically*, alimentary experience (i.e., our ingesting of food and drink). Our appreciation of poetry, music, and painting, for instance, was referred to as an exercise of *critical taste*. In his essay "Of the Standard of Taste," David Hume notices the "great resemblance between mental and bodily taste," identifying the former critical capacity as being taste in a "metaphorical sense."[7] Voltaire also holds a metaphorical account of taste. "The external sense of taste," he writes, "with which nature has furnished us, and by which we distinguish and relish the various kinds of nourishment that are adapted to health and pleasure, has in all languages given occasion to the metaphorical word *taste*, by which we express our perception of beauty, deformity, or defect, in the several arts."[8]

Thinkers in the eighteenth century noticed several bases for this metaphorical resemblance. First, gustatory experience (i.e., appreciative sensing of what we ingest) was held to be *hedonically judgmental*: we naturally evaluate what we ingest by responding pleasurably or displeasurably, while other sensory modalities seem less pervasively hedonic (i.e., what we see or what we hear does not always provoke a hedonic reaction).[9] Second, gustatory experience was thought to have an *immediacy*: we quickly respond pleasurably or displeasurably to what we ingest. (Voltaire claims that critical taste is "a quick discernment, a sudden perception, which, like the sensation of the palate, anticipates reflection.")[10] In seeking your opinion, suppose a chef offers you a spoonful of a *potage de Crécy* which is slowly simmering on the stove. If, after tasting it, you were to say that before you give your opinion you would need a little while to think about what you have tasted, such a response would generally be thought to be very peculiar. Rather, we are expected to give an immediate

verdict on that spoonful. Third, gustatory judgment, like critical appreciation, must be based on our own sensory experience. Even though a well-respected restaurant critic lavishly praises a restaurant's *potage de Crécy*, we ought to base our judgment of the dish on our own experience of the soup; we ought not to form our critical judgments merely by emulating a judgment based on another's experience. So, the individual's own experience as the basis for judgment, the hedonic character of that experience, and its immediacy were, for many eighteenth-century thinkers, salient comparative qualities for both gustatory taste and critical taste.

Drawing attention to the individual's own experience as the basis for judgment in both alimentation and critical appreciation, Immanuel Kant claimed:

> [T]his is one of the main reasons why this aesthetic power of judging was given that very name: taste. For even if someone lists all the ingredients of a dish, pointing out that I have always found each of them agreeable, and goes on to praise this food – and rightly so – as wholesome, I shall be deaf to all these reasons: I shall try the dish on *my* tongue and palate, and thereby (and not by universal principles) make my judgment.[11]

A corollary to this view is that literal tastes are not established or changed by rational argument. Someone cannot rationally persuade you to change your mind and like gazpacho if you detest it. Nevertheless, one's tastes can be emotionally swayed and culturally influenced. A worrisome consequence of this emphasis on an individual's own validating experience is that critical taste was open to the charge of being idiosyncratic or *subjectively relative*. Critical judgments, on this emphasis, would lack objectivity and reflect only a subjective liking or disliking.

During the nineteenth century, this concept of critical *taste* metaphorically based on gustatory experience is overthrown, and a new paradigm is introduced. The notion of critical taste is replaced by the *aesthetic*, which is a new category referring to a special attitude toward, or critical experience of, nature and of the arts. With the rise of the aesthetic, gustatory taste loses its status as the major paradigm for critical appreciation. Although Alexander Baumgarten is credited with introducing the term *aesthetic*,[12] it is Kant, in the

Critique of Judgment (1790), who popularizes the *aesthetic* as the main category of critical appreciation. By 1794, when Friedrich Schiller publishes *On the Aesthetic Education of Man in a Series of Letters*, the concept is well on its way to being firmly established.[13]

While Kant still preserves the notion of taste as a critical category, he loosens the metaphorical connection between gustatory experience and critical appreciation. As the earlier quotation shows, Kant believes that our aesthetic experience, such as our experience of things beautiful, is like gustatory experience in being based on our own experience; however, in other respects critical appreciation is very different from gustatory experience. Kant suggests that gustatory experience cannot offer a reflective aesthetic encounter. What we eat or drink provokes only an agreeable or disagreeable sensory response. Consequently, no object of gustatory experience can be beautiful.[14] At the risk of reductively simplifying Kant's aesthetic theory, I would like to explore the way in which Kant distinguishes the experience of the beautiful from gustatory-like experiences with respect to the experience of pleasure and the immediacy of the evaluation.

In a prominent example, Kant says about appreciating natural beauty: "for we consider someone's way of thinking to be coarse and ignoble if he has no *feeling* for beautiful nature . . . and sticks to the enjoyments of mere sense that he gets from meals or the bottle."[15] Kant here contrasts "enjoyments of mere sense," associated with food and drink, with our appreciation of things beautiful. Kant distinguishes the "taste of sense," from the more contemplative and imaginative activity of experiencing the beautiful, what he calls the "taste of reflection."[16] The experience of sense, he claims, has only an individual or subjective application, reflecting our individual preferences. I might like *potage de Crécy* or mock turtle soup, and you might not. The *taste of reflection* yields a contemplative enjoyment of the beautiful, one not reflecting individual preferences. He identifies it as a universal form of appreciation which is based on a *common sense* or shared evaluative sensibility. To exercise this common sense, one had to put aside one's personal preferences and approach the object of appreciation *disinterestedly*.[17]

Kant distinguishes the *taste of sense* from the *taste of reflection* in another way. Considering the condition of immediacy, Kant claims that in exercising the taste of sense one experiences a direct, hedonic, stimulated response to an object. Kant says the pleasure comes

"first" and, on that basis, one judges the object to be agreeable or not.[18] Exercising the taste of sense, it seems, is a rather passive activity. One confronts the object – one is stimulated by it – and then immediately responds. With the taste of reflection, one could say that the pleasure comes second or follows the contemplative activity that Kant describes as a free play of one's imaginative engagement with the object.[19] Experiences of reflection take some time and constitute a more active form of engagement. One's pleasure follows and reflects the harmonious exercise of one's imaginative and cognitive faculties in free play with the object. Kant refers to this active engagement as imaginative free play because we employ our cognitive faculties without applying a particular (determinate) concept or *purpose* to the object as one would in knowing what the object is. We exercise our imagination so as to experience the object as having what Kant calls a "purposiveness." That is, in imaginative free play with the object, we employ our cognitive faculties but are free from the restrictions of knowing, and we reflectively and imaginatively experience the object as having what Kant calls a "purposiveness without a purpose."[20]

Without going into greater detail about Kant's aesthetic theory, let me summarize the basis for his rejection of an aesthetic appreciation of food. Kant points out that we have individual, and at times quirky, likes and dislikes of particular foods. We sense liking or disliking a soup, for instance, immediately on tasting it, and our appreciative attitude towards food is one of a "taste of sense." However, our attitude towards things beautiful is quite different. To value something as beautiful, Kant thought, demanded a universal assent and should not be based on a personal preference. Appreciation of the beautiful calls for our exhibiting a disinterested attitude. Our enjoyment of things beautiful is not a hedonic reflex. It requires a taste of reflection, a sustained contemplative activity, one which engages our common cognitive faculties, especially our imagination, in an unrestricted way. Our pleasure with such an experience derives from the exercise of this imaginative free play.

Kant's argument for a distinction between the taste of reflection based on a sustained cognitive involvement with an object and the taste of sense consisting of a hedonic reflexive attitude seriously undermined the metaphorical relationship between the critical and the gustatory. Also, the introduction of new critical concepts beyond the traditional concept of the beautiful, such as the *sublime* and the

picturesque, called for a broader conception of appreciative affective response and hastened the abandonment of metaphorical taste. Sixty years after Kant, John Ruskin disparaged the "baseness" of the concept of taste, noting its inappropriateness for art criticism and referring to it as providing "only a kind of pleasure analogous to that derived from eating by the palate."[21] Nevertheless, although overthrown as the major category of artistic criticism, *taste* at the same time emerged as the basic concern of a new cultural inquiry, as the focus of an investigation into the nature and values of *gastronomy*.

Supposedly, the word 'gastronomy' was coined by the poet Joseph Berchoux (1801), and it quickly became popular, generating a ballooning literary and critical interest in "the art and science of delicate eating."[22] One might wonder whether the surge of interest in gastronomy was unwarranted at this time given the philosophical criticisms of both metaphorical and gustatory taste. The Kantian criticisms of taste seemed to support the charge that alimentary pleasure was idiosyncratic, passive in its penchant for immediate response, and offered little to engage the free play of the imagination. Kant's characterization of the taste of sense suggested that the pleasures of the palate could never offer the imaginative content necessary to support crediting objects of gustatory taste with being beautiful. Kant also accepted the traditional distinction between the higher sensory modalities of sight and hearing and the lower modalities of smell, taste, and touch.[23] As a lower sensory modality, taste was excluded from any experiential connection with the beautiful. The impression left is that for Kant there could never be a *gustatory aesthetic*.[24]

Nevertheless, with the growing interest in gastronomy, several writers challenged the Kantian opposition to an aesthetic response to gustatory experience and in so doing prepared the way for a gustatory aesthetics. I want to explore the views on gustatory taste expressed in Jean-Anthelme Brillat-Savarin's *The Physiology of Taste, or Meditations on Transcendental Gastronomy*, a classic work in early nineteenth-century gastronomy.[25] Brillat-Savarin is not a professional philosopher, yet his attitude toward food and his model for the valuational nature of gustatory experience stand directly opposed to the Kantian perspective.

I understand Brillat-Savarin's use of the expression 'transcendental gastronomy' in the title of his work to be a challenge to the Kantian

restrictions on gustatory experience and to set the groundwork for a gustatory aesthetic – a *transcendental gastronomy*. (Use of the term 'transcendental' in an early nineteenth-century work is more than likely a reference to Kant, who popularized it.) While Brillat-Savarin does not specifically refer to Kant in his work – his references are to French thinkers, with Voltaire being his favorite – his characterization of taste challenges both Kant's distinction between the taste of sense and the taste of reflection and Kant's exclusion of gustatory experience, because of its immediacy, from being aesthetic experience. Brillat-Savarin offers a model of gustatory experience that characterizes appreciative alimentation as reflective aesthetic experience. He points out that the physiology of alimentation with its distinctive temporal sequence allows for a reflective experience rather than just an immediate response to a stimulus.

For Brillat-Savarin, tasting food is often a complex experience. We frequently engage with a great variety of gustatory elements, often coming upon new and different elements, in the successive stages of our ingesting experience. We are able to sense this great variety of elements because we engage them with our retro-nasal sense of smell. While Aristotle notes "an analogy between smell and taste," he also noted a major difference: "our sense of taste is more discriminating than our sense of smell, because the former is a modification of touch."[26] Whereas Aristotle distinguishes smell from taste – smell is the lesser sense and taste the greater – Brillat-Savarin does not. "I am not only convinced," Brillat-Savarin insists, "that there is no full act of tasting without the participation of the sense of smell, but I am also tempted to believe that smell and taste form a single sense."[27] This allows him to posit that the "number of tastes is infinite."[28]

Instead of taste being a rather limited sense in keeping with the traditional view of its being a kind of touch, Brillat-Savarin thinks of the amalgam of taste and smell as a complex sensory faculty. Contemporary scientific research supports his view of the integral nature of taste and smell: much of what we claim to taste we in fact smell. The synaesthetic experience of taste and smell is now commonly referred to as one of *flavor*. True, there are simple tastes one senses without benefit of olfactory engagement: sweet, sour, bitter, salt, and most recently, umami (generally associated with tasting protein). However, there are "tastes" (e.g., vanilla) which are sensed

exclusively by smell. Brillat-Savarin identifies several simple tastes: sweet, sour, and bitter, but, mirroring Kant's view that the taste of sense only registers what is agreeable or disagreeable, he refers to such simple tastes as also only being "*agreeable* or *disagreeable*."[29] The majority of our gustatory experiences, he believes, involve a much broader range of intricate flavors, ample resources for a complex aesthetic encounter.

In order to show that gustatory experience can allow for a reflective encounter, Brillat-Savarin divides the temporal sequence of ingestion into three main stages; each, he claims, features its own set of sensory qualities. He refers to them respectively as *direct*, *complete*, and *reflective* sensations. Let me quote his description of the tripartite process of appreciative ingesting which he illustrates with the example of eating a peach:

> The *direct* sensation is the first one felt, produced from the immediate operations of the organs of the mouth, while the body under consideration is still on the forepart of the tongue.
>
> The *complete* sensation is the one made up of this first perception plus the impression which arises when the food leaves its original position, passes to the back of the mouth, and attacks the whole organ with its taste and its aroma.
>
> Finally, the *reflective* sensation is the opinion which one's spirit forms from the impressions which have been transmitted to it by the mouth.
>
> Let us put this theory into action, by seeing what happens to a man who is eating or drinking. He who eats a peach, for instance, is first of all agreeably struck by the perfume which it exhales; he puts a piece of it into his mouth, and enjoys a sensation of tart freshness which invites him to continue; but it is not until the instant of swallowing, when the mouthful passes under his nasal channel, that the full aroma is revealed to him; and this completes the sensation which the peach can cause. Finally, it is not until it has been swallowed that the man, considering what he has just experienced, will say to himself, "Now there is something really delicious!"[30]

One should note that this process of successive ingesting is developmental, leading to an overall impression of the structure of what one tastes. After experiencing the aroma, one initially encounters what one is tasting on the forefront of the palate; one then proceeds into a middle range of flavors produced when what one has ingested affects

the olfactory receptors in the retro-nasal passages. Finally, one swallows and enters the last third of the experience, the reflective phase, where a set of aftertastes provides both a final tonal development and the opportunity for a reflective assessment of the structure and character of the whole experience.

Yet there might still be some doubts about whether such an experience is imaginative, as opposed to merely registering the sum of the sensations or conceptually fitting them into a particular determinate form (e.g., the taste of a peach). When we taste, how *actively* and *imaginatively* engaged are we? For Brillat-Savarin, such a successive experience is not merely a compounding of *direct* sensory details. The initial tastes, Brillat-Savarin's *direct* sensations – say of sweet, sour, and bitter – might produce only an immediate effect, but the full experience, in its successive developmental unfolding, encourages an extended period of consideration. It is an occasion for reflection, requiring one to compare the beginning, middle, and end of one's experience. One might even have to retaste what one has ingested to evaluate it more fully or to check one's earlier evaluation. Such a sensitive tasting calls for a contemplative attitude.

In our extended reflective experience with what we ingest, we do not simply experience a sum of sensed qualities. Instead, in the temporal sequence of our gustatory experience, we imaginatively shape the character and overall structure of what we taste: we recall and imaginatively compare the flavors that we encounter at different stages of the process, note complementary and contrasting qualities, and come to realize how these qualities form unities and other regional structures. There are also stylistic and expressive features that we come to experience. Suppose a New Orleans chef prepares shrimp Creole for us. Its complex aromas assault us. We taste the shrimp in the dark *roux* that combines onion, garlic, tomato, and peppers. We note the way the spicy heat lingers, how that heat integrates with spices such as thyme, clove, allspice, and perhaps a touch of sassafras. There is a lot to taste and think about in such a dish. Together these flavors express some of the distinctive features of southern Louisianan cuisine. The dish not only speaks to us of its regional origins but its culinary history with French, Spanish, African, and Native American contributions. We are sensitive to the way the chef expressively crafts the dish, perhaps emphasizing qualities of the particular ingredients, their seasonal character or association with the time of the

harvest. All of these expressive and stylistic features are not simply identified; they imaginatively infuse the whole tasting experience. Savoring such a dish with its complex tastes and expressive character, we might very well think of it as profound.

Thus, I believe that Brillat-Savarin is proposing something like a Kantian reflective aesthetic in his account of appreciative tasting. Of course, he does not employ the full Kantian psychology, though he does advocate a shared sensibility or *common sense*. As human beings, we share a "physiology" of alimentation. Yet tasting, over and above direct stimulation, is not a reflexive act. We have to pay attention to what we are consuming, to cultivate an interest in what we ingest. The ordered sequence of gustatory experience supports such a view, but requires our imaginative attention. Of course, a skeptical critic of gustatory aesthetics might object that a shared physiology and developed structure of imaginative experience will not overcome the problem of the idiosyncrasies of preference. However, the quirkiness of preference is not a characteristic unique to taste. We like or dislike particular colors, and, for some, bagpipe music is excruciating. We exhibit individual preferences towards objects of all sensory modalities. Yet, Brillat-Savarin has done a great deal to counter the view that objects of taste provoke a simple hedonic response. His account of taste demands that we think of gustatory experience as affording a complex evolving gustatory encounter worthy of reflective enjoyment.

While Brillat-Savarin and others wrote to change the way their contemporaries thought about food,[31] there were changes afoot in the presentation and consumption of food. Individuals were given the space and opportunity to encounter food in an appreciative way, a way that was similar to the way they approached other aesthetic objects. The end of the eighteenth century and the beginning of the nineteenth century saw a culinary revolution in Paris and other European cities.[32] No longer the exclusive concern of aristocratic households, fine dining and culinary appreciation developed a bourgeois following and witnessed the rise of different culinary and gustatory paradigms associated with the works of famous chef-authors such as Antonin Carême, Félix Urbain Dubois, and, most popularly, Auguste Escoffier. These chefs wrote influential cookbooks which spread their ideas to a growing interested public and to other chefs in the huge number of restaurants that opened in the first decades

of the nineteenth century. Culinary invention available in these restaurants became just as important as creative change in the arts.

The rise of the restaurant, as Rebecca Sprang has meticulously shown, contributed to the development of an aesthetic interest in food in several important ways.[33] First of all, restaurants were open not just to the aristocracy or the extremely wealthy but to all who could pay for their meal. Cuisine became not just the isolated hobby of the rich or aristocratic but served to develop an interest in gustatory pleasure in a growing middle class. Just as the opening of public art museums such as the Louvre in the early nineteenth century introduced the world of the visual arts to the bourgeoisie, so restaurants introduced food as an aesthetic experience to middle-class palates.

Second, food was presented to the consumer in a different way in restaurants than in earlier establishments where one could sit down to eat prepared food. Since antiquity, prepared food had been available to the public in inns. However, it was served in a style now referred to as a *table d'hôte*: there was a large table around which people sat; all the food, restricted to a few dishes, was placed on large platters in the center of the table, and people helped themselves. There was no choice of dishes, just what the establishment was serving that day.[34] In restaurants, the form of service was as it is today. Patrons sat at their own table and chose particular dishes from a menu. Those dishes were served in courses, one at a time, usually starting off with an appetizer or soup and proceeding through various courses to a dessert. This form of presenting the food in individual servings in a sequence of courses was called *service à la russe*. It replaced an earlier form of food presentation, called *service à la française*. The latter form of presenting a meal consisted of presenting all the food, in a buffet style, from soup to dessert, all at once on a central table. People just helped themselves to whatever they wanted. In seventeenth-century France, this was the way food was served in aristocratic houses or at the royal court.[35]

By the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century, people's ideas about the nature of food and their experience of food had undergone a change. There were new ideas promulgated by innovative thinkers, but there were also new opportunities to taste food worthy of an aesthetic interest. The birth of the restaurant and the changes in the presentation of food brought about by adopting *service à la russe* encouraged people to approach a meal differently. Middle-class

people began to savor what they tasted and to notice the distinctive aesthetic characters of the different dishes that they consumed. Because of these changes in the way a meal was presented, people had the opportunity to contemplate the food they consumed. Food was more likely to be approached in an aesthetic way.

In conclusion, we can answer the question "Can a soup be beautiful?" in the affirmative because a soup can be the object of a complex aesthetic experience that warrants an evaluative label like 'beautiful.' Unlike those who hold that food offers only an immediate simple pleasure, we – as beneficiaries of Brillat-Savarin – now recognize that food offers us a contemplative experience, because of the alimentary sequence by which it is consumed and the sensory modalities of taste and smell with which it is engaged. The sensory experience of eating presents us with a rich and varied aesthetic sequence of gustatory qualities that we must register and imaginatively order into different structures. This response to food is not an immediate reaction but an imaginative activity. In addition, new practices for the presentation of food, such as *service à la russe*, developed at the time of the rise of the restaurant, have further encouraged our aesthetic engagement with food. Thus, with these innovations, both theoretical and practical, if there are beautiful soups to be tasted, people are prepared to encounter and savor them.

Notes

I would like to thank Donald W. Crawford, Elizabeth Winston, and my editor, Fritz Allhoff, for helpful advice with this essay.

1 Plato. *Hippias Major*. 297e–298a. For a discussion of Plato on taste, see Summers, David, *The Judgment of Sense: Renaissance Naturalism and the Rise of Aesthetics*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987: 54–5; and Korsmeyer, Carolyn, *Making Sense of Taste: Food and Philosophy*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1999: 12–18.

2 St. Thomas Aquinas. *Summa Theologiae* (1265–73). Ia 2ae 27, 1; Hegel, Georg W. F. *Hegel's Introduction to Aesthetics* (1820). Trans. T. M. Knox, with an interpretative essay by Charles Karelis. New York: Oxford University Press, 1977: 38–9.

3 Carroll, Lewis. *Alice in Wonderland: Authoritative Texts of Alice's Adventures in Wonderland, Through the Looking-Glass, The Hunting*

of the Snark. Ed. Donald J. Gray, Norton Critical Edition. New York: Norton, 1971: 84.

4 When Alice says that she does not know what a Mock Turtle is, she is told: "It's the thing Mock Turtle Soup is made from." In Sir John Tenniel's illustrations of the Mock Turtle which accompany Carroll's text, the creature has the head, rear hooves, and tail of a calf, but the shell and front flippers of a turtle.

5 In the mid-eighteenth century, turtle soup was considered an elaborate and expensive dish found only at the tables of England's wealthy and aristocratic families. The green turtles used to make the soup had to be brought back to England all the way from the West Indies. In a desire to emulate the ways of the rich, nineteenth-century middle-class English families were fond of serving mock turtle soup, which resembled turtle soup but substituted a veal head for the turtle. It was, of course, considerably less expensive. A recipe for mock turtle soup first appeared in the sixth edition of Hannah Glasse's popular cook book, *The Art of Cookery Made Plain and Easy* (1758). See Wilson, C. Anne, *Food and Drink in Britain from the Stone Age to Recent Times*. London: Constable, 1991: 225.

6 The debate has by no means ended. In the twentieth century there were still advocates of the position that objects of taste could not be credited will a full aesthetic character. See Prall, D. W., *Aesthetic Judgment*. New York: Thomas Y. Crowell C., 1929: 57–75; Beardsley, Monroe, *Aesthetics: Problems in the Philosophy of Criticism*, 2nd edn. Indianapolis: Hackett, 1987: 98, 99, 111; and two works by Roger Scruton: *The Aesthetics of Architecture*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979: 104–34; and *Art and Imagination: A Study in the Philosophy of Mind*. London: Routledge, 1982.

7 Hume, David. "Of the Standard of Taste" (1757). In *Essays, Moral, Political, and Literary*. Ed. Eugene F. Miller. Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1987: 235.

8 Voltaire, "An Essay on Taste," translated from Voltaire's article on taste in Diderot and D'Alembert's *Encyclopédie* (1757) in Gerard, Alexander. *An Essay on Taste*, 2nd edn. (1764). New York: Garland, 1970: 209.

9 For a fuller account of the nature of critical taste and its conceptual history, see the chapter "Taste" in Townsend, Dabney, *Hume's Aesthetic Theory*. London: Routledge, 2001: 47–85.

10 Voltaire, "An Essay on Taste," p. 209.

11 Kant, Immanuel. *Critique of Judgment*. Trans. Werner S. Pluhar. Indianapolis: Hackett, 1987: Book II, sects. 33, p. 148.

12 Shiner, Larry. *The Invention of Art: A Cultural History*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001: 131–2.

13 See Schiller, Friedrich, *On the Aesthetic Education of Man in a Series of Letters* (1794). Trans. Reginald Snell. New York: Frederick Ungar, 1965: 3.
14 I say that Kant suggests this because in the *Critique of Judgment* he never flatly makes that claim. Nevertheless, he does use a series of prominent gustatory examples that suggest such a position.
15 Kant, *Critique of Judgment*, pp. 169–70.
16 Ibid., pp. 55–64.
17 To illustrate the distinction between an *interested* versus a *disinterested* appreciation, Kant gives the example of some seventeenth-century Iroquois *sachem* who came to Paris and were not impressed with the appearances of the palaces but greatly admired the Parisian rotisseries. The *sachem*'s admiration for the rotisseries was not a disinterested appreciation but reflected their interest in the food, the roast meats. Our enjoyment of food was not a disinterested pleasure, Kant thought, since it reflected the interest of satisfying our appetite (p. 45).
18 Ibid., p. 61.
19 Ibid., p. 62.
20 Ibid., p. 65.
21 *Modern Painters*, vol. 3 (1856), reprinted in *The Art Criticism of John Ruskin*. Ed. Robert L. Herbert. New York: Da Capo Press, 1987: 167.
22 Mennell, Stephen. *All Manners of Food: Eating and Taste in England and France from the Middle Ages to the Present*, 2nd edn. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1996: 266. For an English translation of part of Berchoux's poem "Gastronomy, or the Bon-Vivant's Guide," see *Gusto: Essential Readings in Nineteenth-Century Gastronomy*. Ed. Denise Gigante. New York: Routledge, 2005: 275–81.
23 Kant, Immanuel. *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View* (1798). Ed. and trans. Robert B. Louden, introduction by Manfred Kuehn. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006: 46–9.
24 For further discussion of Kant's opposition to a gustatory aesthetic, see Korsmeyer, *Making Sense of Taste*, pp. 54–63.
25 Brillat-Savarin, Jean-Anthelme, *The Physiology of Taste, or Meditations on Transcendental Gastronomy* (1825). Trans. M. F. K. Fisher. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1978.
26 Aristotle. *De Anima*. II, 9, 421a; as quoted in Townsend, *Hume's Aesthetic Theory*, p. 49.
27 Brillat-Savarin, *The Physiology of Taste*, p. 39.
28 Ibid., p. 38.
29 Ibid., p. 38.
30 Ibid., p. 40.

31 Notable among these writers was Grimod de La Reynière, who in his yearly publication *Almanach des Gourmands* (1803–12) was at the forefront of this culinary revolution. See MacDonogh, Giles, *A Palate in Revolution: Grimod de La Reynière and the Almanach des Gourmands*. London: Robin Clark, 1987. For an English translation of some of the *Almanach* and the writings of other writers in this movement, see Gigante, *Gusto*.

32 Mennell, in *All Manners of Food*, cautions: "The story of how the great Parisian restaurants arose after the Revolution is a little more complicated than how it is sometimes told. It was not simply that the cooks formerly employed in the kitchens of aristocrats who had fled abroad or perished in the Terror, finding themselves without work, were obliged to open fine restaurants. Noble emigration and the guillotine certainly did play their part in making available an increased supply of skilled manpower. Yet the first of a new form of eating-place open to the public – that which came to be known as the restaurant – made its appearance in Paris during the two decades before the Revolution. All the same, though it may seem paradoxical in the light of Paris's later reputation for its great restaurants, 'eating out' seems to have been more a part of the way of life of respectable gentlemen in eighteenth-century London than in Paris" (pp. 135–6). Kenneth James, however, resolutely holds that the restaurant and the culinary revolution are Parisian phenomena; see *Escoffier: The King of Chiefs*. New York: Hambledon and London, 2002: 25–7.

33 For a full account of the development of the Parisian restaurant, see Sprang, Rebecca L., *The Invention of the Restaurant: Paris and Modern Gastronomic Culture*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000. For a fine overview of this culinary revolution, see Gigante's "Introduction," pp. xvii–xliii.

34 Sprang, *The Invention of the Restaurant*, pp. 7–8.

35 For an overview of the transition to *service à la russe* and the role that the great French chef and culinary author, Antonin Carême, played in the transition, see Kelly, Ian, *Cooking for Kings: The Life of Antonin Carême, the First Celebrity Chef*. London: Short Books, 2003.