judge the heart of a man by his treatment of animals. Hogarth depicts this in his engravings. He shows how cruelty grows and develops. He shows the child's cruelty to animals, pinching the tail of a dog or a cat; he then depicts the grown man in his cart running over a child; and lastly, the culmination of cruelty in murder. He thus brings home to us in a terrible fashion the rewards of cruelty, and this should be an impressive lesson to children. The more we come in contact with animals and observe their behavior, the more we love them, for we see how great is their care for their young. It is then difficult for us to be cruel in thought even to a wolf.... Tender feelings towards dumb animals develop humane feelings towards mankind. In England butchers and doctors do not sit on a jury because they are accustomed to the sight of death and hardened. Vivisectionists, who use living animals for their experiments, certainly act cruelly, although their aim is praiseworthy, and they can justify their cruelty, since animals must be regarded as man's instruments; but any such cruelty for sport cannot be justified. A master who turns out his ass or his dog because the animal can no longer earn its keep manifests a small mind.... Our duties towards animals, then, are indirect duties towards mankind.

STUDY QUESTIONS

1. According to Kant, do animals have rights? What capacity do they lack that deprives them of rights?
2. Why should we be kind to animals? Do you agree with Kant? How would an opponent respond to Kant's arguments?

2

The Green Kant: Kant's Treatment of Animals

HOLLY L. WILSON

Holly Wilson is the author of Kant's Pragmatic Anthropology. *Here she argues that the central reason Kant gave animals lower moral status is that raising the status of animals would diminish the status of humans. She further points out that Kant is thus naturally able to address the problem of animal egalitarianism and that Kant should no longer be seen as standing in opposition to environmental thinking.*

Some environmental theorists want to give animals rights and in so doing raise their moral status. None of these theorists seem at all concerned that this move may lower the moral status of human beings. It is simply assumed that human status will remain unaffected when the status of some or all animals is

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raised. Kant, on the other hand, was very concerned about maintaining the moral status and dignity of human beings, and for him that meant that animals cannot have rights and must be conceived of as being "mere means" to the end of humanity. It is important to note that he did not mean that they have the same status as things when he says "mere means"; but they also do not have the same status as human beings because they are not ends-in-themselves. Kant spent a lot of time distinguishing between humans and animals ontologically, and in doing so it appears that he did not want human status to decline to that of animals. For him, human dignity depended on human beings distancing themselves from their animality.

Although Kant is criticized for holding that animals are "mere means," none of the interpreters understand correctly what he meant by "mere means" or why he thought that characterization is important. I will show that Kant, by using teleological judgment, does not mean that animals have no moral status and are no more than things. I will also show that his use of teleological judgment has a lot to offer environmental philosophy. I will hold that his position on humans is able to deal with some of the problems environmental philosophers are struggling with, while sidestepping the problems these philosophers ascribe to Kant. Kant's views on animals are consistent with green concerns and are more positive than is usually assumed.

KANT'S VIEWS ON ANIMALS

Kant holds that animals have souls because they move. This is already an ontological distinction between things and animals. In a *Metaphysics* lecture note Kant writes,

> Animals are not mere machines or just matter, for they do have souls, and they do so because everything in nature is either inanimate or animate. When, e.g., we see a mote on a paper, we look to see whether it moves. If it doesn't we'll take it as inanimate matter but as soon as it moves, we'll look to see whether it does so voluntarily. If we see *that* in the mote, we'll see that it is *animate*, an animal. So an animal is animated matter, for life is the power to determine oneself from an inner principle. Matter as such lacks an inner principle of spontaneity of motion while all matter that is animate has it, as an object of inner sense. Thus: all matter that lives is alive because of a principle of life.... And to the extent it is animated, to that extent it is besouled.[1]

Animals, in contrast to matter, have an inner principle that gives rise to spontaneous movement. Here is a clear and significant difference between things and animals. Such a distinction gives rise to the presumption that animals should be treated differently from things. Yet, at the same time, having a soul does not mean that an animal is an end-in-itself. To further determine the nature of animals, we turn to the *Critique of Teleological Judgment* where Kant makes the distinction between organized beings and things.

Our teleological judgment recognizes that there is a distinction between organized beings and artifacts and other natural realities. Kant holds that organized beings (living beings) have intrinsic purposiveness.[2] By this he means that we judge the inner organization of an organized being to be constituted by parts (organs), which are means to the ends of the organism and also means to each other's ends. There is a kind of organization that one does not find in a watch, for example. The inner organs of the organized being are mutually means and ends for each other, whereas this is not the case in a watch.[3] In a body the blood is the means of distributing oxygen to the brain; the brain is the means for keeping the blood supplied with nutrients (through eating, for instance). In a watch, one part may make the other part move, but that part is not the productive cause of the other part. The watch does not produce other watches, nor does it produce new parts when old ones malfunction. Even a tree is an organized being for Kant, and hence differs from things. The tree produces itself (maintains

itself), reproduces, and its parts are teleological wholes in their own right insofar as a branch can be taken from a tree and grafted onto another tree.[4] Organized beings have formative forces [*Bildungstrieb*]; things do not.[5] Organized beings have intrinsic purposiveness; things do not. Again we find an important distinction between animals and plants, and things.

The distinction extends even further. Kant contrasts natural things like rivers and mountains with organized beings. Here too we find a significant difference between natural objects. Organized beings do not have only intrinsic purposiveness; they are also things for which other things can be extrinsically purposive.[6] Kant writes that the sandy soil "enabled extensive spruce forests to establish themselves, for which unreasonable destruction we often blame our ancestors."[7] The sandy soil was extrinsically purposive for the forests, but the forests were not extrinsically purposive for the soil. When we make such purposive judgments it is with regard to beings that are themselves intrinsically purposive. Hence, animals and plants are intrinsically purposive and things for which other things are extrinsically purposive.[8] We make such judgments whenever we characterize an ecosystem as something in which organized beings find a "habitat." That habitat is purposive for the organized being, and that organized being may well be purposive for other organized beings, but the spotted owl is not purposive for the natural objects like dirt or stones or any other objects in the ecosystem.

Hence, organized beings (animals and plants) have another distinction from things. They can be beings for which other things are purposive, which means that they are ends for the sake of which means exist. That they are intrinsically purposive already means that they are ends for which the means of their parts exist, but we can go even further and now say they are ends for which other things and beings exist. Things don't have this kind of distinction.

There is a qualified sense in which one can say that animals have inherent worth, according to Kant, because they are intrinsically and extrinsically purposive. With respect to human beings as natural beings, we are no different from other organized beings in terms of intrinsic and extrinsic purposiveness. We too are intrinsically purposive, we too may be beings for which other beings and things are purposive, and we too may well be means to another organized being's ends (especially for the ends of bacteria and viruses). Several times Kant exclaims that there is no reason why a human being needs to exist as far as ecosystems are concerned.[9] As natural beings we too have the qualified sense of inherent worth, but as natural animals we certainly are not ends-in-ourselves according to Kant. In this limited sense we are no better than animals. However, he makes an argument that it is only as "beings under moral laws" that we have a status of being ends-in-ourselves.[10] Because animals are not capable of "being under moral laws," they do not have this same status. In this human beings distinguish themselves from animals.

There is an additional way in which animals distinguish themselves from things and also may be compared to human beings. Namely, animals have a will [*Willkür*]. A will, Kant writes in the *Critique of Pure Reason*, "is purely *animal* (*arbitrium brutum*), which cannot be determined save through sensuous impulses, that is, pathologically."[11] These wills are not determined by the concept of a law but rather by forces that are impelled from outside.[12] For instance, a lion may well choose between this zebra and that antelope in the hunt, and hence it exhibits freedom of choice (*arbitrium brutum*). Yet, the lion does not have the freedom not to hunt. It is heteronomously impelled by the presentation of the prey and reacts compelled by its instincts. The prey triggers the impulse to pursue and kill and hence the motive of the pursuit is heteronomous. The lion does not have the autonomy to choose not to be a predator, and hence it does not have a free will (*Wille*), only the freedom of choice (*Willkür*). Animals, as distinct from human beings, do not have the capacity to resist their inclinations (instincts or impulses) based on the concept of a law (for instance, a maxim that would say "refrain from killing animals"). In contrast, a human being may well choose to be a vegetarian based on the concept that killing animals is wrong. Human beings then have

the possibility of autonomous action based on the free will (*Wille*).[13] As a result, human beings can act contrary to sensuously determined carnivorous inclinations. Kant assumes animals are driven by instincts rather than by concepts of laws and in this way, animals, though like human beings, are different from human beings.

KANT'S VIEWS ON HUMAN BEINGS

There is another way in which animals differ from human beings. Human beings are capable of the idea of "I." The fact, Kant claims,

> that man can have the idea "I" raises him infinitely above all other beings living on earth. By this he is a person; and by virtue of his unity of consciousness through all the changes he may undergo, he is one and the same person.[14]

Animals are indeed conscious, have presentations,[15] and also reflect,[16] but they are not self-conscious and do not have an "I." As a student from Kant's anthropology class notes, "If a horse could grasp the idea of I, then I would dismount and regard it as my society."[17] If animals don't have an "I," then they are not our equals.

Kant does a curious thing at this point in the *Anthropology*. Right after the preceding quote he goes on to say that a human being is "altogether different in rank and dignity from things, such as irrational animals, which we can dispose of as we please." First of all, he makes it a point to say that animals are things [*Sachen*], and from this he concludes that they do not have the same rank and dignity that human beings have. He emphasizes that we may dispose of animals as we please, just like we may dispose of things as we please. But why is it so important for him now (1798) to equate animals and things after he has made it so clear that animals are not things in his earlier writings? Systematically and ontologically, Kant has established a distinction between things and animals, but now he equates them and claims we may treat them the same way. Is this a considered position, or is there another reason why Kant is taking pains to distance animals from human beings?

I think we can find a clue to unravel this mystery within Kant's essay *The Speculative Beginning of Human History* (1786). Kant acknowledges he is writing a speculative flight of fancy about the beginnings of human freedom and the departure from animality. It is about the first appearance of reason in the human species. In the experience of reason, human beings are raised "beyond any community with animals."[18] A human being (Adam) views himself for the first time as the "true end of nature" because "nothing living on earth can compete with him." He says to the sheep,

> "the pelt you bear was given to you by nature not for yourself, but for me"; the first time he took that pelt off the sheep and put it on himself (Gen. 3:21); at that same time he saw within himself a privilege by virtue of which his nature surpassed that of all animals, which he now no longer regarded as his fellows in creation, but as subject to his will as means and tools for achieving his own chosen objectives.[19]

This story of using a sheepskin is not about how we ought to relate to animals but rather about how we can indeed use animals as mere means, because we are superior in our ability to compete with animals. It is an account of how human beings, through skills, are able to use animals as means toward humans' arbitrarily chosen ends. Kant is right: In the struggle for survival, human beings have clearly outperformed other animals. Our success means that nonhuman animals are no longer our equals, our fellows, or our society.

Yet this experience entails even more. Human beings draw the conclusion that they are not only the last end of nature (*letzter Zweck*), but that they, unlike animals, are ends-in-themselves (*Endzweck*) and that no fellow human being ought to be used "merely as a means to any other end." In other words, human beings are "the equal of all rational beings." Kant ties the moment of recognition of our human dignity to the moment we are able to recognize our ability to use animals as mere

means.[20] This association of the two insights is exactly what he is doing in the *Anthropology*. Our dignity as humans is in part determined by our ability to distance ourselves from animals, by using them as means to our ends. This distancing is not just from animals, but also from our own animality because we no longer identify with animal society. The very capacity to turn animals into mere means is one way in which we distance ourselves from our own animality. Is it possible to come to this recognition without having to see animals are mere means? Could we have come to this recognition of our dignity with the use of tools?

Kant seems to think that before we used reason we were animals and that our society was with other animals. Thus, the earliest use of reason required our distancing ourselves not only from other animals but also from our own animality. That distancing doesn't seem to be something we could accomplish just by becoming aware of the possibility of using tools because we are not like tools. We are like animals. For Kant we are animals that have the capacity for reason (*animal rationabilis*).[21] One use of reason is found in our technical predisposition, that is, our capacity for skills that are capable of manipulating things "in any way whatsoever."[22] It is because of this predisposition that we are capable of turning animals into "mere means." We have the capacity to develop skills for survival nonspecific ends, or, as Kant puts it in the *Critique of Teleological Judgment*, for arbitrary ends.[23] Kant goes on to say that the culture of skill is "not adequate to assist the will in the determination and selection of its purposes. . . ."[24] Nothing about our technical predisposition and technical skills specifies only worthy ends, and hence there is nothing about these skills that would keep us from turning animals into mere means.

But our technical predisposition is only one of reason's expressions. We also have a pragmatic predisposition and a moral predisposition. These two present necessary ends for reason. The pragmatic predisposition is expressed in the skill of prudence, which aims at our happiness, a necessary end. Prudence is the capacity we have for using other human beings as means to our own ends. The moral predisposition is expressed in our capacity for limiting and refusing specific technical and pragmatic ends for moral reasons.[25] Treating animals as mere means may well have a detrimental effect on our happiness, and we may hence put a limit on how we relate to animals. Many people love animals, become friends with them, and as a result treat them very well, sometimes even like children, because it brings them happiness to do so. This treatment is the result of our pragmatic predisposition, because we are limiting our use of animals in order to allow them to bring us happiness. Some people refuse to eat animals because they are saddened by the way animals are farm-raised and slaughtered. This refusal too is a result of our pragmatic predisposition. Others want to protect animals from cruelty because they believe that animals are like us (feel pain and pleasure) and that it is ethically wrong to cause them suffering. This protection is possible using moral reasoning. Still others want to limit our ability to treat animals as mere means by even stronger measures. They want to accord animals rights to ensure their safety and well-being. They do not want our limits to be based on internal measures, mere subjective feelings for animals (as in the pragmatic predisposition), or even benevolence and good will (as in the moral predisposition). They want external coercive juridical forces to come to the aid of animals. They believe that granting animal rights would ensure to a greater extent the well-being of animals and that it would raise the status of animals to that of humans because we would no longer be able to treat animals as mere means.

CAN ANIMALS HAVE RIGHTS?

For Kant, a lot would be at stake if we did move toward according animals rights. First of all, it would entail that we could never use animals, even as we use human beings, because we could never gain their informed consent. According to the third formulation of the categorical imperative we may never treat the humanity in ourselves or in others as means only. This formulation means we may never use

human beings as means only. Yet we use people all the time, and our pragmatic predisposition is precisely for that purpose. Kant says in the *Lectures on Ethics*, "A person can, indeed, serve as a means for others, by his work, for example, but in such a way that he does not cease to exist as a person and an end."[26] The reason we can use others without turning them into mere means is because we have the other's consent or free choice.[27] I use students as students, and they use me as a professor. What makes it morally permissible to use another human being is the informed consent she gives ahead of time, which is why students register for their classes themselves and I give out a syllabus at the start of every semester. They are consenting to take the class, and I am giving them the information they need to make an informed decision about whether to permit me to evaluate them. It is impossible to gain the informed consent from animals, however, because we would need to convey information regarding the means used and the possible consequences, and we would need to procure a sure sign of their consent. Such a rigorous requirement would make it impossible for me to take my cat to the vet. She doesn't consent to being in the cat carrier, in the car, at the vet's, and she certainly doesn't consent to the vaccine shots. Having to gain animals' informed consent can be a hindrance to helping them as well as making it impossible to treat them as means. Clearly, by treating animals as "mere means" Kant means *inter alia* that we do not have to gain their consent to use them or take care of them, although, for the most part, it is preferable to treat a pet in a way it wants to be treated whenever possible.

This position, however, raises the marginal case of humans for whom we also cannot gain informed consent (children, the mentally handicapped, and those who are comatose). If we include these marginal cases as persons, why can we not also include animals, or at least animals that exhibit some rationality? Why should animals who exhibit some form of rationality be denied moral personhood while human beings not exhibiting rationality are accorded moral personhood? Kant's answer would be that it is not important for each member of the human species to exhibit all features of rationality; it is enough that the species exhibits all forms. That view is implicit in his formulation of the human species as the *animal rationabilis*, rather than the rational animal.[28]

Human beings are the animals who have the capacity for reason. Each human being, as a member of the species, has the potential for rationality even if she never exhibits it. This potential entails that we must still treat humans who do not exhibit rationality as ends-in-themselves. When it is impossible to gain their consent, it does not inhibit our ability to help them.

What is crucial here is that Kant does not want to isolate an individual human being and evaluate whether that particular individual has the capacity for reason. His position is that human nature is intrinsically communal, and hence the capacity for reason is something we share as a species rather than as individuals. Human beings are defined as the animals capable of developing reason (*animal rationabilis*), so that whether any one individual human being does or does not exhibit reason will not affect one's status and nature. Our natural predispositions, which define human nature for Kant, relate us to all other members of the human species.[29] Hence, to treat any one human being as less than an end-in-herself is already to call into question the status of all other human beings. Nonetheless, Kant's definition of human nature as *animal rationabilis* does not exclude other animals as being "like human beings" in that they exhibit "reason-like" capacities.

So, what about those cases in which animals exhibit primitive forms of rationality? Shouldn't they be granted moral personhood? How would Kant deal with animals who are very much like us? That animals are like us is relevant to moral consideration of them. In the very same section, "Of Duties to Animals and Spirits" in the *Lectures on Ethics*, where Kant grants us permission to use animals as mere means, he also claims we have indirect duties with regard to dogs that serve us and wolves that, like us, care for their young.[30] First, he makes it clear that they are like us (analogues of us), and then he claims that our mistreatment of them (animals like us) would result in diminishing our

humanity. The duty is then only indirect because it is contingent upon whether our humanity is furthered or diminished. We have a direct duty to our own humanity, but Kant is equally convinced that our treatment of animals matters because they are like us. By implication one could draw the conclusion that the more like us they are, the more consideration they deserve. This conclusion makes Kantian sense of the problem of marginal cases. Animals who exhibit rudimentary rationality certainly deserve more consideration than flies, because they are more like us. Kant's position also solves the obvious problem with animal egalitarianism, which outrageously implies that all animate beings deserve equal consideration. The less like human beings an animate being is, the less it deserves consideration. The more like us they are, the more consideration they deserve. And Kant does not have to be taken as implying that animals are like us only insofar as they exhibit reasonlike capacities. Dogs are like us in that they exhibit loyalty. Wolves are like us in that they care for their young. Thus animals can be like us in many different ways, not only in that they can suffer pain and pleasure or have capacities for reason.

Kant is also right to give human beings only indirect duties to nonhuman animals because they do not have moral rationality. They are not capable of acting on the conception of a law. They do exhibit cooperation and social behaviors, but these traits appear to be a result of survival mechanisms and conditioned inclinations and not a result of acting on the concept of treating animality as an end and never as a means only. Their behaviors do exhibit order and uniformity, but this display is due to the natural organization in their instincts and to socialized learned behavior, not due to considered reflection on whether every chimp could act on that maxim. Human beings exhibit order and character only when they submit their maxims to the moral law. Humans are held to higher standards morally because there are ontological differences between human beings and animals. We have the capacity for technical and pragmatic reason, and we need morality to limit these ends to morally permissible and worthy ends.

What about the position that would say, "granted, animals cannot give informed consent, develop character, and act on the conception of the law, but that is just the case with children"? We have the authority to make children do what is in their own best interest, while according them rights not to be mistreated. Why not treat animals the same way? But are there no ontological differences between animals and children? Children have the potential to develop reason. Should this not inform their treatment? Children should be raised rather than trained. They need to be taught in a way that develops their free will. They need to be given alternatives and to be encouraged to evaluate consequences for their actions. Eventually, they also need to be encouraged to deliberate and reflect on possible actions and on the reasons and motives for those actions. Animals, on the other hand, should be trained. They can be trained to associate reward and punishment with certain behaviors. We cannot reason with them and encourage them to choose between alternative behaviors. Would we be blurring the distinction between children and animals if we were to treat animals like children?

The blurring of the distinction between human beings and nonhuman animals is already occurring in evolutionary psychology, evolutionary ethics, and behaviorism. Human behavior is being understood on the animal model of behaviors. Focus is being put on behavior rather than action. More concern is attached to explaining and controlling behavior than developing ways to teach and instill the importance of making choices and taking responsibility for those choices. A Kantian ought to be concerned about this, and I think Kant would be were he here today.

Clearly humans need to be treated differently from animals because they are different, and animals need to be treated differently from humans. Animals should not be treated as things, but they should also not be treated as humans. The locus of our treatment of animals should be ethical rather than juridical. Cruelty to animals should be against the law, not only because it harms animals but also because it harms our humanity and makes us more likely to be cruel to humans. We can and are able to treat animals humanely without giving animals rights. We ought not to treat animal nature as an

end-in-itself, as Christine Korsgaard proposes, however, because animal nature is pursued by animals heteronomously, pathologically, and reactively. To treat animal nature as an end-in-itself would mean having to cooperate in the ends that animal nature pursues, and that would make our actions heteronomously motivated.

IN CONCLUSION

Human beings, for Kant, are under moral laws and animals are not. We find ourselves obligated not by the needs of animals but by the moral law. Animals do not find themselves obligated by the moral law nor by us and hence they cannot directly obligate us. Nevertheless, animals, in their vulnerabilities and needs, present reasons for taking them into consideration and reasons for refraining from harming them. Insofar as I have a maxim of benevolence toward human beings who have needs, and I can see those same needs in animals, then out of care for the humanity in myself, I can feel obligated to care about animals, but always by virtue of my concern for the state of my own humanity. Kant is asking us to value the best in ourselves, our humanity, and out of that to find motivation for caring for animals. When we do so it solves the problem of the apparent conflict between doing what is good for us and doing what is good for animals. Taking care of animals and not being cruel to them is good for us. Finding our care for animals in our care for our humanity does not preclude legislating against cruel or arbitrary treatment of animals, but rather gives us reason to legislate against such treatment. We can do this without considering animals to be ends-in-themselves, and thereby lowering the worth of human beings and blurring the ontological and moral lines between human life and animal life.

For Kant, animals, like human beings, are organic beings and do have a sense of inherent worth insofar as they are intrinsically and extrinsically purposive. Animals can be ends for which our actions are means, and we treat them as ends when we treat animals kindly, with benevolence, and when we refrain from harming them and their habitats. What is at stake for Kant is the motive for not treating animals cruelly. Animal rights theorists want people to be coercively motivated to keep them from treating animals cruelly by giving animals rights. If animals have a right not to be treated cruelly, then human beings can be punished if they do treat them cruelly. Kant wants us to be motivated out of respect for our own humanity to keep us from treating animals cruelly, because he knows that our dignity as human beings is always at stake in our treatment of animals. Kant holds that we preserve our moral and inherent dignity by treating animals kindly because in so doing we take our humanity as an end-in-itself since animals are like us. It would be like treating our own humanity as a mere means if we were to be arbitrarily cruel to animals like us. Kant wants us not only to treat animals well but also to learn to respect our own humanity and dignity. And for that we have to distinguish between animals and humans.

NOTES

1. Immanuel Kant, *Metaphysik L1*, in KGS 28:275 (1776), translation by Martin Schönfeld.
2. Immanuel Kant, KU, KGS V:372–76; pp. 251–56.
3. Immanuel Kant, KU, KGS V:373; p. 252.
4. Immanuel Kant, KU, KGS V:371; pp. 249–250.
5. Immanuel Kant, KU, KGS V:374; p. 253.
6. Immanuel Kant, KU, KGS V:367–68; p. 245.
7. Immanuel Kant, Ibid.
8. Immanuel Kant, KU, KGS V:369; p. 246.
9. Immanuel Kant, KU, KGS V:369; p. 247; KU, KGS V:378; p. 258.
10. Immanuel Kant, KU, KGS 435; p. 323.
11. Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason* [A802/ B830].
12. Immanuel Kant, LoE, KGS 27:344; p. 125. Fried-länder, KGS 25 (2,1):577.
13. Immanuel Kant, GR, KGS IV:412; p. 23.

14. Immanuel Kant, Anth, KGS VII:127; p. 9.
15. Immanuel Kant, KU, KGS V:464n; p. 356n.
16. Immanuel Kant, First Intro, KGS, XX:211; p. 400.
17. Immanuel Kant, Menschenkunde, KGS 25(2): 859.
18. Immanuel Kant, Mut, KGS VIII:114; p. 52.
19. Immanuel Kant, Mut, KGS VIII:114; p. 52–3.
20. Immanuel Kant, Ibid.
21. Immanuel Kant, Anth, KGS VII:321; p. 183.
22. Immanuel Kant, Anth, KGS VII:323; p. 184.
23. Immanuel Kant, KU, KGS V:430; p. 317.
24. Immanuel Kant, KU, KGS V:432; p. 319.
25. Immanuel Kant, Anth, KGS VII:323–24; p. 185.
26. Immanuel Kant, LoE, KGS 27:343; p. 124.
27. Immanuel Kant, LoE, KGS 27:384; p. 155.
28. Immanuel Kant, Anth, KGS VI:321; p. 183.
29. Holly L. Wilson, *Kant's Pragmatic Anthropology*, Chapter 1.
30. Immanuel Kant, LoE, KGS 27:459; p. 212.

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STUDY QUESTIONS

1. According to Kant, what are the differences among humans, nonhuman animals, and plants?
2. What does it mean to treat an entity as an "end-in-itself"? Why, according to Wilson, is it problematic to treat animals this way?
3. Animal egalitarianism claims that all animals deserve equal moral consideration. Discuss this view and Kant's account of why this is wrong.