

Locke on Knowledge

Three features of knowledge

1. Relation between ideas
 - (a) identity/diversity
 - (b) relation
 - (c) co-existence (necessary connection)
 - (d) real existence
2. Subject must perceive the agreement/disagreement between ideas
3. Knowledge is certain

Different kinds of knowledge

1. Intuitive knowledge
2. Demonstrative knowledge
3. Sensitive knowledge

Locke on sensitive knowledge

whether there be anything more than barely that idea in our minds; whether we can thence certainly infer the existence of anything without us, which corresponds to that idea, is that whereof some men think there may be a question made; because men may have such ideas in their minds, when no such thing exists, no such object affects their senses. But yet here I think we are provided with an evidence that puts us past doubting. For I ask any one, (1) Whether he be not invincibly conscious to himself of a different perception, when he looks on the sun by day, and thinks on it by night; when he actually tastes wormwood, or smells a rose, or only thinks on that savour or odour? (2) We as plainly find the difference there is between any idea revived in our minds by our own memory, and actually coming into our minds by our senses, as we do between any two distinct ideas. If any one say, a dream may do the same thing, and all these ideas may be produced in us without any external objects; he may please to dream that I make him this answer:— (3) 1. That it is no great matter, whether I remove his scruple or no: where all is but dream, reasoning and arguments are of no use, truth and knowledge nothing. (4) 2. That I believe he will allow a very manifest difference between dreaming of being in the fire, and being actually in it. (IV.ii.14)

Epistemic states/attitudes distinct from knowledge

Belief

- Subjective conviction without certainty

Opinion

- No certainty and no subjective conviction either

Review of Scientific Knowledge

- Corpuscularianism is the best hypothesis about how things are
 - We can't know for sure that corpuscularianism is true
 - Even if we could know that corpuscularianism is true we lack knowledge of the real essences of things
 - * Obscurity of the primary qualities of particular corpuscles
 - * Even if we had this “obscure” knowledge of primary qualities of corpuscles, the connections between these qualities and their secondary qualities are wholly inscrutable to us, if not God or other more advanced cognitive beings (e.g. angels)

Leibniz on Matter

Cartesian Substance

1. “Substanding” individual (a thing with properties)
2. “Subsist” independently (i.e. exist independently of other things)

Matter is not a true unity as substance

1. All space is infinitely divisible
2. All bodies are extended in space
3. All bodies are infinitely divisible (1,2)
4. Bodies that are divisible are actually divided—i.e. have parts
5. What has parts depends for its existence on its parts
6. All bodies depend for their existence on their parts (4,5)
7. Substance is that which does not depend on anything (except God) for its existence
8. No material body is a substance (6,7)

Matter is not fundamentally real

1. All bodies are aggregates — they are composed of parts
2. Aggregates borrow their reality from their component parts (PBR)
3. There cannot be an infinite chain of borrowed realities
4. The reality of material bodies cannot itself be explained in material terms
5. There exists something else which is not itself material and which is responsible for the derivative reality of body

Real Substances

Monad: true unity (being without parts)