

Materialism & Mechanism

Materialism a metaphysical view about what there is – viz. matter (i.e. stuff with properties of extension and perhaps impenetrability)

Mechanism an explanatory view about what explains what. Specifically, concerning how (sub)microscopic bodies with size, shape, motion, etc., interact and explain all manifest properties of macroscopic things

Galileo's Conceivably Argument

Now I say that whenever I conceive any material or corporeal substance, I immediately feel the need to think of it as bounded, and as having this or that shape...[etc.]...From these conditions I cannot separate such a substance by any stretch of my imagination. But that it must be white or red, bitter or sweet, noisy or silent, and of sweet or foul odor, my mind does not feel compelled to bring in as necessary accompaniments. Without the senses as our guides, reason or imagination unaided would probably never arrive at qualities like these. Hence I think that tastes, odors, colors, and so on are no more than mere names so far as the object in which we place them is concerned, and that they reside only in the consciousness (Galileo, p. 274).

- Galileo espouses “eliminativism” about secondary qualities

Determinate vs Determinable Qualities

Determinable general class/genus

Determinate specific species or member of a class