

# *The Transcendental Doctrine of Elements*

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## *Second Part*

### *The Transcendental Logic*

#### Introduction

#### The Idea of a Transcendental Logic

##### I.

##### On logic in general.

Our cognition arises from two fundamental sources in the mind, the first of which is the reception of representations (the receptivity of impressions), the second the faculty for cognizing an object by means of these representations (spontaneity of concepts); through the former an object is **given** to us, through the latter it is **thought** in relation to that representation (as a mere determination of the mind). Intuition and concepts therefore constitute the elements of all our cognition, so that neither concepts without intuition corresponding to them in some way nor intuition without concepts can<sup>a</sup> yield a cognition. Both are either pure or empirical. **Empirical**, if sensation (which presupposes the actual presence of the object) is contained therein; but **pure** if no sensation is mixed into the representation. One can call the latter the matter of sensible cognition. Thus pure intuition contains merely the form under which something is intuited, and pure concept only the form of thinking of an object in general. Only pure intuitions or concepts alone are possible *a priori*, empirical ones only *a posteriori*.

two sources  
of cognition

If we will call the **receptivity** of our mind to receive representations insofar as it is affected in some way **sensibility**, then on the contrary the faculty for bringing forth representations itself, or the **spontaneity** of cognition, is the **understanding**. It comes along with our nature that **intuition** can never be other than **sensible**, i.e., that it contains only the way in which we are affected by objects. The faculty for **thinking** of objects of sensible intuition, on the contrary, is the **understanding**. Neither of these properties is to be preferred to the other. Without sensibility no object would be given to us, and without understanding none would be thought. Thoughts without content are empty, intuitions

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<sup>a</sup> The second edition has the plural verb *können*; the first had the singular *kann*.

without concepts are blind.<sup>1</sup> It is thus just as necessary to make the mind's concepts sensible (i.e., to add an object to them in intuition) as it is to make its intuitions understandable (i.e., to bring them under concepts). **Further, these two faculties or capacities cannot exchange their functions.** The understanding is not capable of intuiting anything, and the senses are not capable of thinking anything. Only from their unification can cognition arise. But on this account one must not mix up their roles, rather one has great cause to separate them carefully from each other and distinguish them. Hence we distinguish the science of the rules of sensibility in general, i.e., aesthetic, from the science of the rules of understanding in general, i.e., logic.

Now logic in turn can be undertaken with two different aims, either as the logic of the general or of the particular use of the understanding. **The former contains the absolutely necessary rules of thinking, without which no use of the understanding takes place,** and it therefore concerns these rules without regard to the difference of the objects to which it may be directed.<sup>2</sup> The logic of the particular use of the understanding contains the rules for correctly thinking about a certain kind of objects. The former can be called elementary logic, the latter, however, the organon of this or that science. In the schools the latter is often stuck before the sciences as their propaedeutic, though in the course of human reason they are certainly the latest to be reached, once the science is already long complete, and requires only the final touch for its improvement and perfection. For one must already know the objects rather well if one will offer the rules for how a science of them is to be brought about.

Now general logic is either pure or applied logic. In the former we abstract from all empirical conditions under which our understanding is exercised, e.g., from the influence of the senses, from the play of imagination,<sup>a</sup> the laws of memory, the power of habit, inclination, etc., hence also from the sources of prejudice, indeed in general from all causes from which certain cognitions arise or may be supposed to arise, because these merely concern the understanding under certain circumstances of its application, and experience is required in order to know these. A **general but pure logic** therefore has to do with strictly *a priori* principles,<sup>b</sup> and is a **canon of the understanding** and reason, but only in regard to what is formal in their use, be the content what it may (empirical or transcendental). A **general logic**, however, is then called **applied** if it is directed to the rules of the use of the understanding under the subjective empirical conditions that psychology teaches us. It therefore has empirical principles,<sup>c</sup> although it is to be sure general in-

<sup>a</sup> *Einbildung*<sup>b</sup> *Prinzipien*<sup>c</sup> *Prinzipien*

sofar as it concerns the use of the understanding without regard to the difference of objects. On this account it is also neither a canon of the understanding in general nor an organon of particular sciences, but merely a cathartic of the common understanding.

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In general logic the part that is to constitute the pure doctrine of reason must therefore be entirely separated from that which constitutes applied (though still general) logic. The former alone is properly science, although brief and dry, as the scholastically correct presentation of a doctrine of the elements of the understanding requires. In this therefore logicians must always have two rules in view.

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1) As general logic it abstracts from all contents of the cognition of the understanding and of the difference of its objects, and has to do with nothing but the mere form of thinking.

2) As pure logic it has no empirical principles,<sup>a</sup> thus it draws nothing from psychology (as one has occasionally been persuaded), which therefore has no influence at all on the canon of the understanding. It is a proven doctrine, and everything in it must be completely *a priori*.

What I call applied logic (in opposition to the common signification of this word, according to which it ought to contain certain exercises to which pure logic gives the rule) is thus a representation of the understanding and the rules of its necessary use *in concreto*, namely under the contingent conditions of the subject, which can hinder or promote this use, and which can all be given only empirically. It deals with attention, its hindrance and consequences, the cause of error, the condition of doubt, of reservation, of conviction, etc., and general and pure logic is related to it as pure morality, which contains merely the necessary moral laws of a free will in general, is related to the doctrine of virtue proper, which assesses these laws under the hindrances of the feelings, inclinations, and passions to which human beings are more or less subject, and which can never yield a true and proven science, since it requires empirical and psychological principles<sup>b</sup> just as much as that applied logic does.

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## II. On transcendental logic.

General logic abstracts, as we have shown, from all content of cognition, i.e. from any relation<sup>c</sup> of it to the object,<sup>d</sup> and considers only the

<sup>a</sup> *Principien*

<sup>b</sup> *Principien*

<sup>c</sup> *Beziehung*. The contrast between this term and the following use of *Verhältnis* (p. 196, note a) shows that Kant continues to use the former to connote a relation between subject and object and the latter among objects, though in this case objects of thought rather than sensibility. Further, unnoted instances of "relation" translate *Beziehung*.

<sup>d</sup> *Object*

logical form in the relation<sup>a</sup> of cognitions to one another, i.e., the form of thinking in general. But now since there are pure as well as empirical intuitions (as the transcendental aesthetic proved), a distinction be-

b 80 between pure and empirical thinking of objects could also well be found. In this case there would be a logic in which one did not abstract from all content of cognition; for that logic that contained merely the rules of the pure thinking of an object would exclude all those cognitions that were of empirical content. It would therefore concern the origin of our

A 56 cognitions of objects insofar as that cannot be ascribed to the objects; while general logic, on the contrary, has nothing to do with this origin of cognition, but rather considers representations, whether they are originally given *a priori* in ourselves or only empirically, merely in respect of the laws according to which the understanding brings them into relation<sup>b</sup> to one another when it thinks, and therefore it deals only with the form of the understanding, which can be given to the representations wherever they may have originated.

And here I make a remark the import of which extends to all of the following considerations, and that we must keep well in view, namely that not every *a priori* cognition must be called transcendental, but only that by means of which we cognize that and how certain representations (intuitions or concepts) are applied entirely *a priori*, or are possible (i.e.,

b 81 the possibility of cognition or its use *a priori*). Hence neither space nor any geometrical determination of it *a priori* is a transcendental representation, but only the cognition that these representations are not of empirical origin at all and the possibility that they can<sup>c</sup> nevertheless be related *a priori* to objects of experience can be called transcendental. Likewise the use of space about all objects in general would also be transcendental; but if it is restricted solely to objects of the senses, then it is called empirical. The difference between the transcendental and the empirical therefore belongs only to the critique of cognitions and does not concern their relation to their object.

In the expectation, therefore, that there can perhaps be concepts that may be related to objects *a priori*, not as pure or sensible intuitions but rather merely as acts of pure thinking, that are thus concepts but of neither empirical nor aesthetic origin, we provisionally formulate the idea of a science of pure understanding and of the pure cognition of reason, by means of which we think objects completely *a priori*. Such a science, which would determine the origin, the domain, and the objective validity of such cognitions, would have to be called **transcendental logic**, since it has to do merely with the laws of the understanding and reason,

<sup>a</sup> Verhältnisse

<sup>b</sup> Verhältnis

<sup>c</sup> Following Erdmann, reading *können* instead of *könne*.

but solely insofar as they are related to objects *a priori* and not, as in the case of general logic, to empirical as well as pure cognitions of reason without distinction.

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### III. On the division of general logic into analytic and dialectic.

The old and famous question with which the logicians were to be driven into a corner and brought to such a pass that they must either fall into a miserable circle<sup>a</sup> or else confess their ignorance, hence the vanity of their entire art, is this: **What is truth?** The nominal definition of truth, namely that it is the agreement of cognition with its object, is here granted and presupposed; but one demands to know what is the general and certain criterion of the truth of any cognition.

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It is already a great and necessary proof of cleverness or insight to know what one should reasonably ask. For if the question is absurd in itself and demands unnecessary answers, then, besides the embarrassment of the one who proposes it, it also has the disadvantage of misleading the incautious listener into absurd answers, and presenting the ridiculous sight (as the ancients said) of one person milking a billy-goat while the other holds a sieve underneath.<sup>3</sup>

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If truth consists in the agreement of a cognition with its object, then this object must thereby be distinguished from others; for a cognition is false if it does not agree with the object to which it is related even if it contains something that could well be valid of other objects. Now a general criterion of truth would be that which was valid of all cognitions without any distinction among their objects. But it is clear that since with such a criterion one abstracts from all content of cognition (relation to its object),<sup>b</sup> yet truth concerns precisely this content, it would be completely impossible and absurd to ask for a mark of the truth of this content of cognition, and thus it is clear that a sufficient and yet at the same time general sign of truth cannot possibly be provided. Since above we have called the content of a cognition its matter, one must therefore say that no general sign of the truth of the matter of cognition can be demanded, because it is self-contradictory.

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But concerning the mere form of cognition (setting aside all content), it is equally clear that a logic, so far as it expounds the general and necessary rules of understanding, must present criteria of truth in these very rules. For that which contradicts these is false, since the understanding thereby contradicts its general rules of thinking and thus con-

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<sup>a</sup> In the second edition, *Dialectis*; in the first, *Dialele*, i.e. reasoning in a circle.

<sup>b</sup> Object

tradicts itself. But these criteria concern only the form of truth, i.e., of thinking in general, and are to that extent entirely correct but not sufficient. For although a cognition may be in complete accord with logical form, i.e., not contradict itself, yet it can still always contradict the object. The merely logical criterion of truth, namely the agreement of a cognition with the general and formal laws of understanding and reason, is therefore certainly the *conditio sine qua non* and thus the negative condition of all truth; further, however, logic cannot go, and the error that concerns not form but content cannot be discovered by any touchstone of logic.<sup>4</sup>

General logic

General logic analyzes the entire formal business of the understanding and reason into its elements, and presents these as principles<sup>a</sup> of all logical assessment<sup>b</sup> of our cognition. This part of logic can therefore be called an analytic, and is on that very account at least the negative touchstone of truth, since one must before all else examine and evaluate by means of these rules the form of all cognition before investigating its content in order to find out whether with regard to the object it contains positive truth. But since the mere form of cognition, however well it may agree with logical laws, is far from sufficing to constitute the material (objective) truth of the cognition, nobody can dare to judge of objects and to assert anything about them merely with logic without having drawn on antecedently well-founded information about them from outside of logic, in order subsequently merely to investigate its use and connection in a coherent whole according to logical laws, or, better, solely to examine them according to such laws. Nevertheless there is something so seductive in the possession of an apparent art for giving all of our cognitions the form of understanding, even though with regard to their content one may yet be very empty and poor, that this general logic, which is merely a **canon** for judging,<sup>c</sup> has been used as if it were an **organon** for the actual production of at least the semblance of objective assertions, and thus in fact it has thereby been misused. Now general logic, as a putative organon, is called **dialectic**.

Dialectic

As different as the significance of the employment of this designation of a science or art among the ancients may have been, one can still infer from their actual use of it that among them it was nothing other than the **logic of illusion** – a sophistical art for giving to its ignorance, indeed even to its intentional tricks, the air of truth, by imitating the method of thoroughness, which logic prescribes in general, and using its topics for the embellishment of every empty pretension. Now one can take it as a certain and useful warning that general logic, consid-

<sup>a</sup> *Prinzipien*<sup>b</sup> *Beurtheilung*<sup>c</sup> *Beurtheilung*

**ered as an organon**, is always a logic of illusion, i.e., is dialectical. For since it teaches us nothing at all about the content of cognition, but only the formal conditions of agreement with the understanding, which are entirely indifferent with regard to the objects, the effrontery of using it as a tool (organon) for an expansion and extension of its information,<sup>a</sup> or at least the pretension of so doing, comes down to nothing but idle chatter, asserting or impeaching whatever one wants with some plausibility.

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Such instruction by no means befits the dignity of philosophy. For this reason it would be better to take this designation of "dialectic" as a **critique of dialectical illusion**, which is counted as part of logic, and in such a way we would here have it be understood.

## IV.

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On the division of transcendental logic into  
the transcendental analytic and dialectic.

In a transcendental logic we isolate the understanding (as we did above with sensibility in the transcendental aesthetic), and elevate from our cognition merely the part of our thought that has its origin solely in the understanding. The use of this pure cognition, however, depends on this as its condition: that objects are given to us in intuition, to which it can be applied. For without intuition all of our cognition would lack objects,<sup>b</sup> and therefore remain completely empty. The part of transcendental logic, therefore, that expounds the elements of the pure cognition of the understanding and the principles<sup>c</sup> without which no object can be thought at all, is the transcendental analytic, and at the same time a logic of truth. For no cognition can contradict it without at the same time losing all content, i.e., all relation to any object,<sup>d</sup> hence all truth. But because it is very enticing and seductive to make use of these pure cognitions of the understanding and principles by themselves, and even beyond all bounds of experience, which however itself alone can give us the matter (objects)<sup>e</sup> to which those pure concepts of the understanding can be applied, the understanding falls into the danger of making a material use of the merely formal principles<sup>f</sup> of pure understanding through empty sophistries, and of judging without distinction about objects that are not given to us, which perhaps indeed

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<sup>a</sup> Kenntnisse<sup>b</sup> Objecten<sup>c</sup> Prinzipien<sup>d</sup> Object<sup>e</sup> Objecte<sup>f</sup> Prinzipien

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could not be given to us in any way. Since it should properly be only a canon for the assessment of empirical use, it is misused if one lets it count as the organon of a general and unrestricted use, and dares to synthetically judge, assert, and decide about objects in general with the pure understanding alone. The use of the pure understanding would in this case therefore be dialectical. The second part of the transcendental logic must therefore be a critique of this dialectical illusion, and is called transcendental dialectic, not as an art of dogmatically arousing such illusion (an unfortunately highly prevalent art among the manifold works of metaphysical jugglery), but rather as a critique of the understanding and reason in regard to their hyperphysical use, in order to uncover the false illusion of their groundless pretensions and to reduce their claims to invention and amplification, putatively to be attained through transcendental principles, to the mere assessment and evaluation of the pure understanding, guarding it against sophistical tricks.

# *Transcendental Logic*

## *First Division*

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### *The Transcendental Analytic*

This Analytic is the analysis<sup>a</sup> of the entirety of our *a priori* cognition into the elements of the pure cognition of the understanding. It is concerned with the following points: 1.<sup>b</sup> That the concepts be pure and not empirical concepts. 2. That they belong not to intuition and to sensibility, but rather to thinking and understanding. 3. That they be elementary concepts, and clearly distinguished from those which are derived or composed from them. 4. That the table of them be complete, and that they entirely exhaust the entire field of pure understanding. Now this completeness of a science cannot reliably be assumed from a rough calculation of an aggregate put together by mere estimates; hence it is possible only by means of an idea of the whole of the *a priori* cognition of the understanding, and through<sup>c</sup> the division of concepts that such an idea determines and that constitutes it, thus only through their connection in a system. The pure understanding separates itself completely not only from everything empirical, but even from all sensibility. It is therefore a unity that subsists on its own, which is sufficient by itself, and which is not to be supplemented by any external additions. Hence the sum total of its cognition will constitute a system that is to be grasped and determined under one idea, the completeness and articulation of which system can at the same time yield a touchstone of the correctness and genuineness of all the pieces of cognition fitting into it. This whole part of the transcendental logic, however, consists of two books, the first of which contains the concepts of pure understanding, the second its principles.

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<sup>a</sup> Zergliederung

<sup>b</sup> The numeral "1." is missing in the second edition.

<sup>c</sup> Added in the second edition.

# *Transcendental Analytic*

## *First Book*

### *The Analytic of Concepts.<sup>a</sup>*

The analysis of  
the  
understanding

A66 I understand by an analytic of concepts not their analysis, or the usual procedure of philosophical investigations, that of analyzing<sup>b</sup> the content of concepts that present themselves and bringing them to distinctness, but rather the much less frequently attempted **analysis<sup>c</sup> of the faculty of understanding** itself, in order to research the possibility of *a priori*

B91 concepts by seeking them only in the understanding as their birthplace and analyzing its pure use in general; for this is the proper business of

<sup>a</sup> The following notes appear at this point in Kant's copy of the first edition:

"We remarked above that experience consists of synthetic propositions, and how synthetic *a posteriori* propositions are possible is not to be regarded as a question requiring a solution, since it is a fact.

"Now it is to be asked how this fact is possible.

"Experience consists of judgments, but it is to be asked whether these empirical judgments do not in the end presuppose *a priori* (pure) judgments. The analysis [Analysis] of experience contains, first, its analysis [Zergliederung] insofar as judgments are in it; second, beyond the *a posteriori* concepts also *a priori* concepts.

"The problem is: How is experience possible? 1. What does the understanding do in judgments in general? 2. What do the senses do in empirical judgments? 3. In empirical cognition, what does the understanding, applied to the representations of the senses, do in order to bring forth a cognition of objects [Objecte]?

"One sees at first that experience is only possible through synthetic *a priori* propositions. Hence *a priori* principles [Principien] are 1. immanent: in accordance with use; 2. it is to be asked, whether they are also transcendent.

"The test for whether something is also experience, i.e., a fact, is as it were experimentation with the universal propositions under which the particular empirical judgment belongs. If the latter cannot stand under a universal rule for judging, if no concept can be made out of that, then it is a *vitium subreptionis* [*vicious fallacy*]. Why in superstition and credulity." (E XXXIII, pp. 21-2; 23:24-5)

<sup>b</sup> zergliedern

<sup>c</sup> Zergliederung

## Div. I. Transcendental Analytic

cepts in philosophy in general. We will therefore pursue the pure concepts into their first seeds and predispositions in the human understanding, where they lie ready, until with the opportunity of experience they are finally developed and exhibited in their clarity by the very same understanding, liberated from the empirical conditions attaching to them.

*The Analytic of Concepts*  
*First Chapter*  
*On the Clue to the Discovery of all*  
*Pure Concepts of the Understanding*

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If one sets a faculty of cognition into play, then on various occasions different concepts will become prominent that will make this faculty known and that can be collected in a more or less exhaustive treatise depending on whether they have been observed for a longer time or with greater acuteness. Where this investigation will be completed can never be determined with certainty by means of this as it were mechanical procedure. Further, the concepts that are discovered only as the opportunity arises will not reveal any order and systematic unity, but will rather be ordered in pairs only according to similarities and placed in series only in accord with the magnitude of their content, from the simple to the more composite, which series are by no means systematic even if to some extent methodically produced.

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Transcendental philosophy has the advantage but also the obligation to seek its concepts in accordance with a principle,<sup>a</sup> since they spring pure and unmixed from the understanding, as absolute unity, and must therefore be connected among themselves in accordance with a concept or idea. Such a connection, however, provides a rule by means of which the place of each pure concept of the understanding and the completeness of all of them together can be determined *a priori*, which would otherwise depend upon whim or chance.

On the Transcendental Clue for the Discovery of all Pure  
Concepts of the Understanding  
First Section

On the logical use of the understanding  
in general.

The understanding has been explained above only negatively, as a non-sensible faculty of cognition. Now we cannot partake of intuition inde-

<sup>a</sup> *Princip*

pendently of sensibility. The understanding is therefore not a faculty of intuition. But besides intuition there is no other kind of cognition than through concepts. Thus the cognition of every, at least human, understanding is a cognition through concepts, not intuitive but discursive.<sup>a</sup> All intuitions, as sensible, rest on affections, concepts therefore on functions. By a function, however, I understand the unity of the action of ordering different representations under a common one. Concepts are therefore grounded on the spontaneity of thinking, as sensible intuitions are grounded on the receptivity of impressions. Now the understanding can make no other use of these concepts than that of judging by means of them. Since no<sup>a</sup> representation pertains to the object immediately except intuition alone, a concept is thus never immediately related to an object, but is always related to some other representation of it (whether that be an intuition or itself already a concept).<sup>b</sup> Judgment is therefore the mediate cognition of an object, hence the representation of a representation of it. In every judgment there is a concept that holds of many, and that among this many also comprehends a given representation, which is then related immediately to the object.<sup>c</sup> So in the judgment, e.g., “All bodies are divisible,”<sup>c</sup> the concept of the divisible is related to various other concepts; among these, however, it is here particularly related to the concept of body, and this in turn is related to certain appearances<sup>d</sup> that come before us. These objects are therefore mediately represented by the concept of divisibility. All judgments are accordingly functions of unity among our representations, since instead of an immediate representation a higher one, which comprehends this and other representations under itself, is used for the cognition of the object, and many possible cognitions are thereby drawn together into one. We can, however, trace all actions of the understanding back to judgments, so that the understanding in general can be represented as a **faculty for judging**. For according to what has been said above it is a faculty for thinking. Thinking is cognition through concepts. Concepts, however, as predicates of possible judgments, are related to some representation of a still undetermined object. The concept of body thus signifies something, e.g., metal, which can be cognized through that concept. It is therefore a concept only because other representations are contained under it by means of which it can be re-

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the discursive  
understanding

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<sup>a</sup> In his copy of the first edition, Kant inserts here the word “other” (E XXIV, p. 23; 23:45).

<sup>b</sup> Kant’s copy of the first edition replaces this parenthetical aside with the following words, without parentheses: “which itself contains intuition only mediately or immediately” (E XXXV, p. 23; 23:45).

<sup>c</sup> *Teilbar*, rather than *veränderlich*, following the fourth edition.

<sup>d</sup> Kant’s copy of the first edition changes “appearances” to “intuitions” (E XXXVI, p. 23; 23:45).

lated to objects. It is therefore the predicate for a possible judgment, e.g., "Every metal is a body." The functions of the understanding can therefore all be found together if one can exhaustively exhibit the functions of unity in judgments. The following section will make it evident that this can readily be accomplished.

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### On the Clue to the Discovery of all Pure Concepts of the Understanding Second Section

<§ 9.><sup>a</sup>

#### On the logical function of the understanding in judgments.

If we abstract from all content of a judgment in general, and attend only to the mere form of the understanding in it, we find that the function of thinking in that can be brought under four titles, each of which contains under itself three moments. They can suitably be represented in the following table.<sup>6</sup>

The table of judgment

I. <b>Quantity of Judgments</b>			
2. <b>Quality</b>		3. <b>Relation<sup>b</sup></b>	
Affirmative	Universal	Categorical	
Negative	Particular	Hypothetical	
Infinite	Singular	Disjunctive	
4. <b>Modality</b>			
	Problematic		
	Assertoric		
	Apodictic		

B96      A71      Since this division seems to depart in several points, although not essential ones, from the customary technique of the logicians, the following protests against a worrisome misunderstanding are not unnecessary.

<sup>a</sup> Here Kant resumes the numbering of paragraphs begun in the "Transcendental Aesthetic" in the second edition. This will continue through the end of the "Transcendental Deduction."

<sup>b</sup> Here Kant uses the latinate word *Relation* instead of either *Beziehung* or *Verhältnis*.

1. The logicians rightly say that in the use of judgments in syllogisms singular judgments can be treated like universal ones. For just because they have no domain at all, their predicate is not merely related to some of what is contained under the concept of the subject while being excluded from another part of it. The predicate therefore holds of that concept without exception, just as if the latter were a generally valid<sup>a</sup> concept with a domain with the predicate applying to the whole of what is signified.<sup>b</sup> If, on the contrary, we compare a singular judgment with a generally valid one, merely as cognition, with respect to quantity,<sup>c</sup> then the former<sup>d</sup> relates to the latter as unity relates to infinity, and is therefore in itself essentially different from the latter. Therefore, if I consider a singular judgment (*judicium singulare*) not only with respect to its internal validity, but also, as cognition in general, with respect to the quantity<sup>e</sup> it has in comparison with other cognitions, then it is surely different from generally valid judgments (*judicia communia*), and deserves a special place in a complete table of the moments of thinking in general (though obviously not in that logic that is limited only to the use of judgments with respect to each other).

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2. Likewise, in a transcendental logic **infinite judgments** must also be distinguished from **affirmative** ones, even though in general logic they are rightly included with the latter and do not constitute a special member of the classification. General logic abstracts from all content of the predicate (even if it is negative), and considers only whether it is attributed to the subject or opposed to it. Transcendental logic, however, also considers the value or content of the logical affirmation made in a judgment by means of a merely negative predicate, and what sort of gain this yields for the whole of cognition. If I had said of the soul that it is not mortal, then I would at least have avoided an error by means of a negative judgment. Now by means of the proposition "The soul is not mortal" I have certainly made an actual affirmation as far as logical form is concerned, for I have placed the soul within the unlimited domain of undying beings. Now since that which is mortal contains one part of the whole domain of possible beings, but that which is undying<sup>f</sup> the other,

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<sup>a</sup> *gemeingültiger*. While this would normally be translated "commonly valid," in this context it clearly refers to the universal (*allgemein*) judgment; we have used "generally" to preserve this reference while still marking the difference from *allgemein*.

<sup>b</sup> *von dessen ganzer Bedeutung*; here Kant uses *Bedeutung*, as Frege was later to use it, to mean the reference or denotation of a concept; more typically, he uses it to mean something closer to what Frege called *Sinn* or sense, that is, the connotation.

<sup>c</sup> *Größe*

<sup>d</sup> The text has *sie* rather than *es*, but in spite of the shift in gender there is nothing for the pronoun to refer to except "a singular judgment."

<sup>e</sup> *Größe*

<sup>f</sup> In the second edition, *Nichtsterbende*; in the first, *Nichtsterbliche*, or "immortal."

nothing is said by my proposition but that the soul is one of the infinite multitude of things that remain if I take away everything that is mortal. But the infinite sphere of the possible is thereby limited only to the extent that that which is mortal is separated from it, and the soul is placed in the remaining space of its domain.<sup>a</sup> But even with this exception this space still remains infinite, and more parts could be taken away from it without the concept of the soul growing in the least and being affirmatively determined. In regard to logical domain, therefore, this infinite judgment is merely limiting with regard to the content of cognition in general, and to this extent it must not be omitted from the transcendental table of all moments of thinking in judgments, since the function of understanding that is hereby exercised may perhaps be important in the field of its pure *a priori* cognition.<sup>7</sup>

3. All relations<sup>b</sup> of thinking in judgments are those *a)* of the predicate to the subject, *b)* of the ground to the consequence, and *c)* between the cognition that is to be divided and<sup>c</sup> all of the members of the division. In the first kind of judgment only two concepts are considered to be in relation to each other, in the second, two judgments, and in the third, several judgments. The hypothetical proposition "If there is perfect justice, then obstinate evil will be punished" really contains the relation of two propositions, "There is a perfect justice" and "Obstinate evil is punished." Whether both of these propositions in themselves are true remains unsettled here. It is only the implication that is thought by means of this judgment. Finally, the disjunctive judgment contains the relations of two or more propositions to one another, though not the relation of sequence, but rather that of logical opposition, insofar as the sphere of one judgment excludes that of the other, yet at the same time the relation of community, insofar as the judgments together exhaust the sphere of cognition proper; it is therefore a relation of the parts of the sphere of a cognition where the sphere of each part is the complement of that of the others in the sum total of the divided cognition, e.g., "The world exists either through blind chance, or through inner necessity, or through an external cause." Each of these propositions occupies one part of the sphere of the possible cognition about the existence of a world in general, and together they occupy the entire sphere. To remove the cognition from one of these spheres means to place it in one of the

<sup>a</sup> Following the first edition, *Raum ihres Umfangs*, rather than the second, *Umfangs ihres Raums*.

<sup>b</sup> *Verhältnisse*; although he is now speaking of the functions of judgment the table had listed under the latinate heading *Relation*, Kant now reverts to *Verhältnis*, and in the remainder of this paragraph *Verhältnis* is translated by "relation." Kant's reversion to *Verhältnis* here is consistent with his use of this term elsewhere, since he is talking of the relation of parts of judgments to each other rather than to us.

<sup>c</sup> Kant's copy of the first edition replaces "and" with "of" (E XXXVII, p. 23; 23:45).

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A74

## Section II. On the logical function in judgments

others, and to place it in one sphere, on the contrary, means to remove it from the others. In a disjunctive judgment there is therefore a certain community of cognitions, consisting in the fact that they mutually exclude each other, yet thereby determine the true cognition **in its entirety**, since taken together they constitute the entire content of a particular given cognition.<sup>8</sup> And this is also all that I find it necessary to remark upon for the sake of what follows.<sup>a</sup>

4. The modality of judgments is a quite special function of them, which is distinctive in that it contributes nothing to the content of the judgment (for besides quantity, quality, and relation<sup>b</sup> there is nothing more that constitutes the content of a judgment), but rather concerns only the value of the copula in relation to thinking in general.<sup>9</sup> **Problematic** judgments are those in which one regards the assertion or denial as merely **possible** (arbitrary). **Assertoric** judgments are those in which it is considered **actual** (true). **Apodictic** judgments are those in which it is seen as **necessary**.<sup>\*</sup> Thus the two judgments whose relation constitutes the hypothetical judgment (*antecedens* and *consequens*), as well as those in whose reciprocal relation<sup>c</sup> the disjunctive judgment consists (the members of the division), are all merely problematic. In the above example the proposition "There is a perfect justice" is not said assertorically, but is only thought of as an arbitrary judgment that it is possible that someone might assume, and only the implication is assertoric. Thus such judgments can be obviously false and yet, if taken problematically, conditions of the cognition of truth. Thus the judgment "**The world exists through blind chance**" is of only problematic significance in the disjunctive judgment, that is, someone might momentarily assume this proposition, and yet it serves (like the designation of the false path among the number of all of those one can take) to find the true one. The problematic proposition is therefore that which only expresses logical possibility (which is not objective), i.e., a free choice to allow such a proposition to count as valid, a merely arbitrary assumption of it in the understanding. The assertoric proposition speaks of logical actuality or truth, as say in a hypothetical syllogism the antecedent in the major premise is problematic, but that in the minor premise assertoric, and in-

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modality is a  
feature of the  
intellect/Judgment

A 75

B 101

A 76

\* It is just as if in the first case thought were a function of the **understanding**, in the second of the **power of judgment**, and in the third of **reason**. This is a remark the elucidation of which can be expected only in the sequel.

<sup>a</sup> The following note occurs in Kant's copy of the first edition: "Judgments and propositions are different. That the latter are *verbis expressa* [explicit words], since they are assertoric" (E XXXVIII, p. 23; 23:25).

<sup>b</sup> *Verhältnis*

<sup>c</sup> *Wechselwirkung*

dicates that the proposition is already bound to the understanding according to its laws; the apodictic proposition thinks of the assertoric one as determined through these laws of the understanding itself, and as thus asserting *a priori*, and in this way expresses logical necessity. Now since everything here is gradually incorporated into the understanding, so that one first judges something problematically, then assumes it assertorically as true, and finally asserts it to be inseparably connected with the understanding, i.e., asserts it as necessary and apodictic, these three functions of modality can also be called so many moments of thinking in general.

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### On the Clue to the Discovery of all Pure Concepts of the Understanding Third Section

&lt;§ 10.&gt;

#### On the pure concepts of the understanding or categories.

A 77

As has already been frequently said, general logic abstracts from all content of cognition, and expects that representations will be given to it from elsewhere, wherever this may be, in order for it to transform them into concepts analytically. Transcendental logic, on the contrary, has a manifold of sensibility that lies before it *a priori*, which the transcendental aesthetic has offered to it, in order to provide the pure concepts of the understanding with a matter, without which they would be without any content, thus completely empty. Now space and time contain a manifold of pure *a priori* intuition, but belong nevertheless among the conditions of the receptivity of our mind, under which alone it can receive representations of objects, and thus they must always also affect the concept of these objects. Only the spontaneity of our thought requires that this manifold first be gone through, taken up, and combined in a certain way in order for a cognition to be made out of it. I call this action synthesis.

B 103

Synthesis

By synthesis in the most general sense, however, I understand<sup>a</sup> the action of putting different representations together with each other and comprehending their manifoldness in one cognition. Such a synthesis is pure if the manifold is given not empirically but *a priori* (as is that in space and time). Prior to all analysis of our representations these must first be given, and no concepts can arise analytically as far as the con-

<sup>a</sup> In his copy of the first edition, Kant changes this sentence to this point to "I understand by synthesis, however, the action through which synthetic judgments come to be, in the general sense, . . ." (E XXXIX, p. 23; 23:45). Kant also adds the words "Combination, composition, and nexus" (E XL, p. 24).

### Section III. On the pure concepts of the understanding<sup>a</sup>

**tent is concerned.** The synthesis of a manifold, however, (whether it be given empirically or *a priori*) first brings forth a cognition, which to be sure may initially still be raw and confused, and thus in need of analysis; yet the synthesis alone is that which properly collects the elements for cognitions and unifies them into a certain content; it is therefore the first thing to which we have to attend if we wish to judge about the first origin of our cognition.

A 78

Synthesis in general is, as we shall subsequently see, the mere effect of the imagination, of a blind though indispensable function of the soul,<sup>b</sup> without which we would have no cognition at all, but of which we are seldom even conscious. Yet to bring this synthesis to concepts is a function that pertains to the understanding, and by means of which it first provides cognition in the proper sense.<sup>c</sup>

Cognition in the proper sense

Now **pure synthesis, generally represented**, yields the pure concept of the understanding. By this synthesis, however, I understand that which rests on a ground of synthetic unity *a priori*; thus our counting (as is especially noticeable in the case of larger numbers) is a **synthesis in accordance with concepts**, since it takes place in accordance with a common ground of unity (e.g., the decad). Under this concept, therefore, the synthesis of the manifold becomes necessary.

B 104

Different representations are brought under one concept analytically (a business treated by general logic). Transcendental logic, however, teaches how to bring under concepts not the representations but the **pure synthesis** of representations. The first thing that must be given to us *a priori* for the cognition of all objects is the **manifold** of pure intuition; the **synthesis** of this manifold by means of the imagination is the second thing, but it still does not yield cognition. The concepts that give this pure synthesis **unity**, and that consist solely in the representation of this necessary synthetic unity, are the third thing necessary for cognition of an object that comes before us, and they depend on the understanding.<sup>10</sup>

A 79

The same function that gives unity to the different representations in a judgment also gives unity to the mere synthesis of different representations in an intuition, which, expressed generally, is called the **pure concept of understanding**.<sup>11</sup> The same understanding, therefore, and indeed by means of the very same actions through which it brings the logical form of a judgment into concepts by means of the analytical unity, also brings a transcendental content into its representations by means of

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unity in judgment & intuition

<sup>a</sup> In the first edition, the right-hand running head is "Section III. On the pure concepts of understanding or categories"

<sup>b</sup> In his copy of the first edition Kant replaces this clause with "of a function of the understanding" (E XLI, p. 24; 23:45).

<sup>c</sup> *in eigentlicher Bedeutung*

the synthetic unity of the manifold in intuition in general, on account of which they are called pure concepts of the understanding that pertain to objects<sup>a</sup> *a priori*; this can never be accomplished by universal logic.

In such a way there arise exactly as many pure concepts of the understanding, which apply to objects of intuition in general *a priori*, as there were logical functions of all possible judgments in the previous table: for the understanding is completely exhausted and its capacity<sup>b</sup> entirely measured by these functions.<sup>c</sup> Following Aristotle we will call these concepts **categories**, for our aim is basically identical with his although very distant from it in execution.<sup>d</sup>

A80

**B 106**Table of Categories<sup>t2</sup>

	I.	
	<b>Of Quantity</b>	
	Unity	
	Plurality	
	Totality	
		3.
	<b>Of Relation<sup>e</sup></b>	
	Of Inherence and Subsistence <i>(substantia et accidentis)</i>	
	Of Causality and Dependence (cause and effect)	
	Of Community (reciprocity between agent and patient)	
		4.
	<b>Of Modality</b>	
	Possibility – Impossibility	
	Existence – Non-existence	
	Necessity – Contingency	

<sup>a</sup> *Objecte*<sup>b</sup> *Vermögen*<sup>c</sup> *gedachte Functionen*<sup>d</sup> The following notes precede the ensuing table of the categories in Kant's copy of the first edition:

"Logical functions are only forms for the relation of concepts in thinking. Categories are concepts, through which certain intuitions are determined in regard to the synthetic unity of their consciousness as contained under these functions; e.g., what must be thought as subject and not as predicate." (E XLII, p. 24; 23:25)

"On the use of the categories in the division of a system."

"On the analytic of the categories and the predicables."

"On a characteristic of concepts; of intellectual, empirical, and pure sensible representations."

" – *Lex originaria*: concept of the understanding." (E XLIII, p. 24; 23:25)

<sup>e</sup> *Relation*

### Section III. On the pure concepts of the understanding

Now this is the listing of all original pure concepts of synthesis<sup>a</sup> that the understanding contains in itself *a priori*, and on account of which it is only a pure understanding; for by these concepts alone can it understand something in the manifold of intuition, i.e., think an object<sup>b</sup> for it. This division is systematically generated from a common principle,<sup>c</sup> namely the faculty for judging (which is the same as the faculty for thinking), and has not arisen rhapsodically from a haphazard search for pure concepts, of the completeness of which one could never be certain, since one would only infer it through induction, without reflecting that in this way one would never see why just these and not other concepts should inhabit the pure understanding. Aristotle's search for these fundamental concepts was an effort worthy of an acute man. But since he had no principle,<sup>d</sup> he rounded them up as he stumbled on them, and first got up a list of ten of them, which he called **categories** (predicaments). Subsequently he believed that he had found five more of them, which he added under the name of post-predicaments. But his table still had holes. Further, it also included several *modi* of pure sensibility (*quando, ubi, situs*, as well as *prius, simul*),<sup>e</sup> as well as an empirical one (*motus*),<sup>f</sup> which do not belong in this ancestral registry<sup>g</sup> of the understanding; derivative concepts were also included among the primary ones (*actio, passio*),<sup>b</sup> and several of the latter were entirely missing.

For the sake of the primary concepts it is therefore still necessary to remark that the categories, as the true **ancestral concepts**<sup>i</sup> of pure understanding, also have their equally pure **derivative concepts**, which could by no means be passed over in a complete system of transcendental philosophy, but with the mere mention of which I can be satisfied in a merely critical essay.

Let me be allowed to call these pure but derivative concepts the **predicables** of pure understanding (in contrast to the predicaments). If one has the original and primitive concepts, the derivative and subordinate ones can easily be added, and the family tree<sup>k</sup> of pure understanding fully illustrated. Since I am concerned here not with the

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A 82

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<sup>a</sup> The words "of synthesis" are stricken in Kant's copy of the first edition (E XLIV, p. 24; 23:46).

<sup>b</sup> Object

<sup>c</sup> Princip

<sup>d</sup> Principium

<sup>e</sup> That is, the concepts of when, where, and position, and the relations of priority and simultaneity.

<sup>f</sup> motion

<sup>g</sup> Stammregister

<sup>h</sup> action, passion

<sup>i</sup> Stammbegiffe

<sup>j</sup> Clearly emphasized only in the first edition.

<sup>k</sup> Stammbaum

completeness of the system but rather only with the principles<sup>a</sup> for a system, I reserve this supplementation for another job. But one could readily reach this aim if one took the ontological textbooks in hand, and, e.g., under the category of causality, subordinated the predicables of force, action, and passion; under that of community, those of presence and resistance; under the predicaments of modality those of generation, corruption, alteration, and so on. The categories combined either with the *modis* of sensibility or with each other yield a great multitude of derivative *a priori* concepts, to take note of which and, as far as possible, completely catalogue would be a useful and not unpleasant but here dispensable effort.

I deliberately spare myself the definitions of these categories in this treatise, although I should like to be in possession of them.<sup>13</sup> In the sequel I will analyze these concepts to the degree that is sufficient in relation to the doctrine of method that I am working up. In a system of pure reason one could rightly demand these of me; but here they would only distract us from the chief point of the investigation by arousing doubts and objections that can well be referred to another occasion without detracting from our essential aim. In any case, from the little that I have here adduced it becomes clear that a complete lexicon with all the requisite definitions should be not only possible but even easy to produce. The headings already exist; it is merely necessary to fill them out, and a systematic topic, such as the present one, will make it easy not to miss the place where every concept properly belongs and at the same time will make it easy to notice any that is still empty.<sup>b</sup>

### § 11.<sup>c</sup>

Subtle considerations about this table of categories could be made, which could perhaps have considerable consequences with regard to the scientific form of all cognitions of reason. For that this table is uncommonly useful, indeed indispensable in the theoretical part of philosophy for completely outlining the plan for the whole of a science insofar as it rests on *a priori* concepts, and dividing it mathematically in accordance with determinate principles,<sup>d</sup> is already self-evident from the fact that this table completely contains all the elementary concepts

<sup>a</sup> *Principien*

<sup>b</sup> Inserted in Kant's copy of the first edition:

"What are categories? — That they extend only to objects of experience.

"1. Whence do they arise?

"2. How are they valid *a priori* of objects of experience?" (E XLV, pp. 24–5; 23:25)

<sup>c</sup> Sections 11 and 12 were added in the second edition. This explains how Kant can refer to the *Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science*, not published until 1786.

<sup>d</sup> *Principien*

### Section III. On the pure concepts of the understanding

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of the understanding, indeed even the form of a system of them in the human understanding, consequently that it gives instruction about all the **moments**, indeed even of their **order**, of a planned speculative science, as I have elsewhere given proof.\* Now here are several of these remarks.

**The first is** that this table, which contains four classes of concepts of the understanding, can first be split into two divisions, the first of which is concerned with objects of intuition (pure as well as empirical), the second of which, however, is directed at the existence of these objects (either in relation to each other or to the understanding).

I will call the first class the **mathematical** categories, the second, the **dynamical** ones. As one sees, the first class has no correlates, which are to be met with only in the second class. Yet this difference must have a ground in the nature of the understanding.

**Second remark:** that each class always has the same number of categories, namely three, which calls for reflection, since otherwise all *a priori* division by means of concepts must be a dichotomy. But here the third category always arises from the combination of the first two in its class.

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Thus **allness** (totality) is nothing other than plurality considered as a unity, **limitation** is nothing other than reality combined with negation, **community** is the **causality** of a substance in the reciprocal determination of others, finally **necessity** is nothing other than the existence that is given by possibility itself. But one should not think that the third category is therefore a merely derivative one and not an ancestral concept of pure understanding. For the combination of the first and second in order to bring forth the third concept requires a special act of the understanding, which is not identical with that act performed in the first and second. Thus the concept of a **number** (which belongs to the category of allness) is not always possible wherever the concepts of multitude and of unity are (e.g., in the representation of the infinite); or **influence**, i.e., how one substance can be the cause of something in another substance, is not to be understood immediately by combining the concept of a **cause** and that of a **substance**. From this it is clear that a special act of the understanding is requisite for this; and likewise in the other cases.

**Third remark:** The agreement of a single category, namely that of **community**, which is to be found under the third title, with the form of a disjunctive judgment, which is what corresponds to it in the table of logical functions, is not as obvious as in the other cases.

B 112

In order to be assured of this agreement one must note that in all disjunctive judgments the sphere (the multitude of everything that is con-

\* *Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science.*

B 110

tained under it) is represented as a whole divided into parts (the subordinated concepts), and, since none of these can be contained under any other, they are thought of as **coordinated** with one another, not **subordinated**, so that they do not determine each other **unilaterally**, as in a **series**, but **reciprocally**, as in an **aggregate** (if one member of the division is posited, all the rest are excluded, and vice versa).

Now a similar connection is thought of in **an entirety of things**, since one is not **subordinated**,<sup>a</sup> as effect, under another, as the cause of its existence, but is rather **coordinated**<sup>b</sup> with the other simultaneously and reciprocally as cause with regard to its determination (e.g., in a body, the parts of which reciprocally attract yet also repel each other), which is an entirely different kind of connection from that which is to be found in the mere relation<sup>c</sup> of cause to effect (of ground to consequence), in which the consequence does not reciprocally determine the ground and therefore does not constitute a whole with the latter (as the world-creator with the world). The understanding follows the same procedure when it represents the divided sphere of a concept as when it thinks of a thing as divisible, and just as in the first case the members of the division exclude each other and yet are connected in one sphere, so in the latter case the parts are represented as ones to which existence (as substances) pertains to each exclusively of the others, and which are yet connected in one whole.

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### § 12.

But there is also yet another chapter in the transcendental philosophy of the ancients that contains pure concepts of the understanding that, although they are not reckoned among the categories, nevertheless according to them should also count as *a priori* concepts of objects, in which case, however, they would increase the number of the categories, which cannot be. These are expounded in the proposition, so famous among the scholastics: *quodlibet ens est unum, verum, bonum.*<sup>d</sup> Now although the use of this principle<sup>e</sup> for inferences has turned out to be very meager (they have yielded merely tautological propositions), so that in modern times it has been customary to grant it a place in metaphysics almost solely by courtesy, nevertheless a thought that has sustained itself so long, no matter how empty it seems, always deserves an investigation of its origin, and justifies the conjecture that it must have its

<sup>a</sup> untergeordnet

<sup>b</sup> beygeordnet

<sup>c</sup> Verhältnis

<sup>d</sup> Every being is one, true, and good.

<sup>e</sup> Princip

### Section III. On the pure concepts of the understanding

ground in some rule of the understanding, which, as so often happens, has merely been falsely interpreted. These supposedly transcendental predicates of **things** are nothing other than logical requisites and criteria of all **cognition of things** in general, and ground it in the categories of quantity, namely, the categories of **unity**, **plurality**, and **totality**; yet these categories must really have been taken as material, as belonging to the possibility of things itself, when in fact they should have been used in a merely formal sense, as belonging to the logical requirements for every cognition; thus these criteria of thinking were carelessly made into properties of things in themselves. In every cognition of an object<sup>a</sup> there is, namely, **unity** of the concept, which one can call **qualitative unity** insofar as by that only the unity of the comprehension<sup>b</sup> of the manifold of cognition is thought, as, say, the unity of the theme in a play, a speech, or a fable. Second, **truth** in respect of the consequences. The more true consequences from a given concept, the more indication of its objective reality. One could call this the **qualitative plurality** of the marks that belong to a concept as a common ground (not thought of in it as a magnitude). Third, finally, **perfection**, which consists in this plurality conversely being traced back to the unity of the concept, and agreeing completely with this one and no other one, which one can call **qualitative completeness** (**totality**). From this it is obvious that these logical criteria of the possibility of cognition in general transform the three categories of magnitude,<sup>c</sup> in which the unity in the generation of the magnitude<sup>d</sup> must be assumed to be completely homogeneous, into a principle<sup>e</sup> with the quality of a cognition for the connection of **heterogeneous** elements of cognition into one consciousness also. Thus the criterion of the possibility of a concept (not of its object)<sup>f</sup> is the definition, in which the **unity** of the concept, the **truth** of everything that may initially be derived from it, and finally the **completeness** of everything that is drawn from it, constitute everything that is necessary for the production of the entire concept; or the **criterion of a hypothesis** is also the intelligibility of the assumed **ground of explanation** or its **unity** (without auxiliary hypotheses), the **truth** (agreement with itself and with experience) of the consequences that are derived from it, and finally the **completeness** of the ground of explanation of these consequences, which do not refer us back to anything more or less than was already assumed in the hypothesis, and which merely analytically give back *a posteriori* and agree with that which was thought synthetically *a*

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<sup>a</sup> *Objects*

<sup>b</sup> *Zusammenfassung*

<sup>c</sup> *Größe*

<sup>d</sup> *Quantum*

<sup>e</sup> *Princip*

<sup>f</sup> *Objects*

*priori.* — The transcendental table of the categories is thus not completed with the concepts of unity, truth, and perfection, as if it were lacking something, but rather, the relation<sup>a</sup> of these concepts to objects<sup>b</sup> being entirely set aside, our procedure with these concepts is only being thought under general logical rules for the agreement of cognition with itself.>

<sup>a</sup> *Verhältnis*

<sup>b</sup> *Objecte*

*Second Chapter*

*On the Deduction of the Pure Concepts of  
the Understanding*

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First Section

<§ 13><sup>a</sup>

On the

principles<sup>b</sup> of a transcendental deduction in general.<sup>14</sup>

Jurists, when they speak of entitlements and claims, distinguish in a legal matter between the questions about what is lawful<sup>d</sup> (*quid juris*) and

<sup>a</sup> Paragraph number added in the second edition. In the first edition, the second chapter of the "Transcendental Analytic," the "Transcendental Deduction," is divided into three main sections, the first of which is in turn subdivided into two subsections. Apart from a few minor changes in wording, which will be noted, and the addition of the section numbers themselves, the two subsections of the first section are retained in the second edition and are identical until the last paragraph of their second subsection, which is replaced by three new paragraphs in the second edition. The second and third sections of the chapter in the first edition are then replaced by an entirely new second section in the second edition, which is broken up into numbered paragraphs § 15 through § 27. We will present all of this material in the following sequence: the first section as it appeared in both editions, with the last paragraph of the first-edition version followed by the last three paragraphs that replaced it in the second edition; the second and third sections as they appeared in the first edition; then the second section, consisting of numbered parts § 15 through § 27, as it appeared in the second edition.

<sup>b</sup> *Principien*

<sup>c</sup> The following notes are inserted here in Kant's copy of the first edition:

"Consciousness and inner sense are different. 'I think' is spontaneity and does not depend on any object. The representation, however, with which I think, must be given to me antecedently in intuition (through imagination). With regard to it I am affected." (E XLVI, p. 25; 23:26)

"It must be proved that if there were no sensible intuition *a priori*, and if this were not the form of sensibility in the subject, with which all appearances must be in accord, then:

"1. No categories would have significance.

"2. From mere categories no synthetic *a priori* propositions at all would be possible."

(E XLVII, p. 25; 23:26)

<sup>d</sup> was *Rechterns ist*

that which concerns the fact (*quid facti*), and since they demand proof of both, they call the first, that which is to establish the entitlement or the legal claim, the **deduction**.<sup>15</sup> We make use of a multitude of empirical concepts without objection from anyone, and take ourselves to be justified in granting them a sense and a supposed signification even without any deduction, because we always have experience ready at hand to prove their objective reality. But there are also concepts that have been usurped, such as **fortune** and **fate**, which circulate with almost universal indulgence, but that are occasionally called upon to establish their claim by the question *quid juris*, and then there is not a little embarrassment about their deduction because one can adduce no clear legal ground for an entitlement to their use either from experience or from reason.

Among the many concepts, however, that constitute the very mixed fabric of human cognition, there are some that are also destined<sup>a</sup> for pure use *a priori* (completely independently of all experience), and these always require a deduction of their entitlement, since proofs from experience are not sufficient for the lawfulness of such a use, and yet one must know how these concepts can be related to objects<sup>b</sup> that they do not derive from any experience. I therefore call the explanation of the way in which concepts can relate to objects *a priori* their **transcendental deduction**, and distinguish this from the **empirical** deduction, which shows how a concept is acquired through experience and reflection on it, and therefore concerns not the lawfulness but the fact from which the possession has arisen.

Now we already have two sorts of concepts of an entirely different kind,<sup>c</sup> which yet agree with each other in that they both relate to objects completely *a priori*, namely the concepts of space and time, as forms of sensibility, and the categories, as concepts of the understanding. To seek an empirical deduction of them would be entirely futile work, for what

No empirical deduction

is distinctive in their nature is precisely that they are related to their objects without having borrowed anything from experience for their representation. Thus if a deduction of them is necessary, it must always be transcendental.

Nevertheless, in the case of these concepts, as in the case of all cognition, we can search in experience, if not for the principle<sup>d</sup> of their possibility, then for the occasional causes of their generation, where the impressions of the senses provide the first occasion for opening the en-

<sup>a</sup> bestimmt

<sup>b</sup> Objekte

<sup>c</sup> Kant's copy of the first edition inserts: "They are not borrowed from experience" (E XLVIII, p. 25; 23:46).

<sup>d</sup> Principium

## Section I. On the principles of a transcendental deduction

tire power of cognition to them and for bringing about experience, which contains two very heterogeneous elements, namely a **matter** for cognition from the senses and a certain **form** for ordering it from the inner source of pure intuiting and thinking, which, on the occasion of the former, are first brought into use and bring forth concepts. Such a tracing of the first endeavors of our power of cognition to ascend from individual perceptions to general concepts is without doubt of great utility, and the famous Locke is to be thanked for having first opened the way for this. Yet a **deduction** of the pure *a priori* concepts can never be achieved in this way; it does not lie down this path at all, for in regard to their future use, which should be entirely independent of experience, an entirely different birth certificate than that of an ancestry from experiences must be produced. I will therefore call this attempted physiological derivation,<sup>16</sup> which cannot properly be called a deduction at all because it concerns a *quaestio facti*,<sup>a</sup> the explanation of the **possession** of a pure cognition. It is therefore clear that only a transcendental and never an empirical deduction of them can be given, and that in regard to pure *a priori* concepts empirical deductions are nothing but idle attempts, which can occupy only those who have not grasped the entirely distinctive nature of these cognitions.

B 119

A 87

But now even if the sole manner of a possible deduction of pure *a priori* cognition is conceded, namely that which takes the transcendental path, it is still not obvious that it is unavoidably necessary. We have above traced the concepts of space and time to their sources by means of a transcendental deduction, and explained and determined their *a priori* objective validity. Geometry nevertheless follows its secure course through strictly *a priori* cognitions without having to beg philosophy for any certification of the pure and lawful pedigree of its fundamental concept of space. Yet the use of the<sup>b</sup> concept in this science concerns only the external world of the senses, of which space is the pure form of its intuition, and in which therefore all geometrical cognition is immediately evident because it is grounded on intuition *a priori*, and the objects are given through the cognition itself *a priori* in intuition (as far as their form is concerned). With the **pure concepts of the understanding**, however, there first arises the unavoidable need to search for the transcendental deduction not only of them but also of space, for since they speak of objects not through predicates of intuition and sensibility but through those of pure *a priori* thinking, they relate to objects generally without any conditions of sensibility; and since they are not grounded in experience and cannot exhibit any object<sup>c</sup> in *a priori* intuition on which

B 120

A 88

<sup>a</sup> As in the first edition; the second, declining *quaestio*, prints *quaestionem*.

<sup>b</sup> The first edition here reads "dieses" instead of the second's "des."

<sup>c</sup> Object

"inclination" to  
misuse the concept  
of space

B 121

A 89

The legitimacy of  
<space> & <time> is  
easy to show

B 122

to ground their synthesis prior to any experience, they not only arouse suspicion about the objective validity and limits of their use but also make the **concept of space** ambiguous by inclining us to use it beyond the conditions of sensible intuition, on which account a transcendental deduction of it was also needed above. Thus the reader must be convinced of the unavoidable necessity of such a transcendental deduction before he has taken a single step in the field of pure reason; for he would otherwise proceed blindly, and after much wandering around would still have to return to the ignorance from which he had begun. But he must also clearly understand from the outset its inevitable difficulty, so that he will not complain of obscurity where the subject-matter itself is deeply veiled or become annoyed too soon over the removal of hindrances, since we must either surrender completely all claims to insights of pure reason in its favorite field, namely that beyond the boundaries of all possible experience, or else perfect this critical investigation.

In the case of the concepts of space and time, we were able above to make comprehensible with little effort how these, as *a priori* cognitions, must nevertheless necessarily relate to objects, and made possible a synthetic cognition of them independent of all experience. For since an object can appear to us only by means of such pure forms of sensibility, i.e., be an object<sup>a</sup> of empirical intuition, space and time are thus pure intuitions that contain *a priori* the conditions of the possibility of objects as appearances, and the synthesis in them has objective validity.

The categories of the understanding, on the contrary, do not represent to us the conditions under which objects are given in intuition at all, hence objects can indeed appear to us without necessarily having to be related to functions of the understanding, and therefore without the understanding containing their *a priori* conditions.<sup>17</sup> Thus a difficulty is revealed here that we did not encounter in the field of sensibility, namely how **subjective conditions of thinking** should have **objective validity**, i.e., yield conditions of the possibility of all cognition of objects; for appearances can certainly be given in intuition without functions of the understanding. I take, e.g., the concept of cause, which signifies a particular kind of synthesis, in which given something *A* something entirely different *B* is posited according to a rule.<sup>b</sup> It is not clear *a priori* why appearances should contain anything of this sort (one cannot adduce experiences for the proof, for the objective validity of this *a priori* concept must be able to be demonstrated), and it is therefore *a priori* doubtful whether such a concept is not perhaps entirely empty and finds no object anywhere among the appearances. For that

<sup>a</sup> Object

<sup>b</sup> Emended in Kant's copy of the first edition to "posited according to an *a priori* rule, i.e., necessarily" (E XLIX, p. 25; 23:46).

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objects of sensible intuition must accord with the formal conditions of sensibility that lie in the mind *a priori* is clear from the fact that otherwise they would not be objects for us; but that they must also accord with the conditions that the understanding requires for the synthetic unity<sup>a</sup> of thinking is a conclusion that is not so easily seen.<sup>b</sup> For appearances could after all be so constituted that the understanding would not find them in accord with the conditions of its unity, and everything would then lie in such confusion that, e.g., in the succession of appearances nothing would offer itself that would furnish a rule of synthesis and thus correspond to the concept of cause and effect, so that this concept would therefore be entirely empty, nugatory, and without significance. Appearances would nonetheless offer objects to our intuition, for intuition by no means requires the functions of thinking.

B 123

Intuition does not require the activity of thinking

If one were to think of escaping from the toils of these investigations by saying that experience constantly offers examples of a regularity of appearances that give sufficient occasion for abstracting the concept of cause from them, and thereby at the same time thought to confirm the objective validity of such a concept, then one has not noticed that the concept of cause cannot arise in this way at all, but must either be grounded in the understanding completely *a priori* or else be entirely surrendered as a mere fantasy of the brain. For this concept always requires that something *A* be of such a kind that something else *B* follows from it **necessarily and in accordance with an absolutely universal rule**. Appearances may well offer cases from which a rule is possible in accordance with which something usually happens, but never a rule in accordance with which the succession is **necessary**; thus to the synthesis of cause and effect there attaches a dignity that can never be expressed empirically, namely, that the effect does not merely come along with the cause, but is posited **through** it and follows **from** it. The strict universality of the rule is therefore not any property of empirical rules, which cannot acquire anything more through induction than comparative universality, i.e., widespread usefulness. But now the use of the pure concepts of the understanding would be entirely altered if one were to treat them only as empirical products.

A 91

Either the categories are *a priori* or they are mere fictions

B 124

A 92

<sup>a</sup> Following Erdmann in reading “*Einheit*” for “*Einsicht*”; Kant uses “*Einheit*” in a parallel fashion in the next sentence.

<sup>b</sup> Inserted in Kant’s copy of the first edition: “If I were simply to say that without the connection of causes and effects I would not grasp the sequence of alterations, it would not at all follow from this that this must be precisely as an understanding needs it to be to grasp it, but I would not be able to explain whence they continuously follow one another. Only I would not raise this question if I did not already have the concept of cause and of the necessity of such persistence. A subjective necessity, habit, would make it worse. An implanted necessity would not prove necessity.” (E L, pp. 25–6; 23:26)

"Transition  
to the transcendental deduction of the categories.

There are only two possible cases in which synthetic representation and its objects can come together, necessarily relate to each other, and, as it were, meet each other: Either if the object alone makes the representation possible, or if the representation alone makes the object possible.

B 125

Two possible ways of relating representation & object

If it is the first, then this relation is only empirical, and the representation is never possible *a priori*. And this is the case with appearance in respect of that in it which belongs to sensation. But if it is the second, then since representation in itself (for we are not here talking about its causality by means of the will) does not produce its object as far as its **existence** is concerned, the representation is still determinant of the object *a priori* if it is possible through it alone to **cognize something as an object**. But there are two conditions under which alone the cognition of an object is possible: first, **intuition**, through which it is given, but only as appearance; second, **concept**, through which an object is

a 93

Objective deduction

thought that corresponds to this intuition. It is clear from what has been said above, however, that the first condition, namely that under which alone objects can be intuited, in fact does lie<sup>b</sup> in the mind *a priori* as the ground of the form of objects.<sup>c</sup> All appearances therefore necessarily agree with this formal condition of sensibility, because only through it can they appear, i.e., be empirically intuited and given. The question now is whether *a priori* concepts do not also precede, as conditions under which alone something can be, if not intuited, nevertheless thought as object in general, for then all empirical cognition of objects is necessarily in accord with such concepts, since without their presupposition nothing is possible as **object<sup>d</sup> of experience**. Now, however, all experience contains in addition to the intuition of the senses, through which something is given, a **concept** of an object that is given in intuition, or appears;<sup>18</sup> hence concepts of objects in general lie at the ground of all experiential cognition as *a priori* conditions; consequently the objective validity of the categories, as *a priori* concepts, rests on the fact that through them alone is experience possible (as far as the form of thinking is concerned). For they then are related necessarily and *a priori* to objects of experience, since only by means of them can any object of experience be thought at all.

B 126

<sup>a</sup> No section number appears here in the second edition, but "§ 14" should have been added to avoid an unnumbered section between § 13 and § 15.

<sup>b</sup> Following Erdmann in reading "liegt" for "liegen"; Kant seems to have confused the singular antecedent (*Bedingung*) with the plural, perhaps because of the intervening occurrence of the plural "objects."

<sup>c</sup> *Objecten*

<sup>d</sup> *Object*

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A 94

The transcendental deduction of all *a priori* concepts therefore has a principle<sup>a</sup> toward which the entire investigation must be directed, namely this: that they must be recognized as *a priori* conditions of the possibility of experiences (whether of the intuition that is encountered in them, or of the thinking).<sup>19</sup> Concepts that supply the objective ground of the possibility of experience are necessary just for that reason. The unfolding of the experience in which they are encountered, however, is not their deduction (but their illustration), since they would thereby be only contingent. Without this original relation to possible experience, in which all objects of cognition are found, their relation to any object<sup>b</sup> could not be comprehended at all.

B 127

[There are, however, three original sources (capacities or faculties of the soul), which contain the conditions of the possibility of all experience, and cannot themselves be derived from any other faculty of the mind, namely **sense**, **imagination**, and **appception**. On these are grounded 1) the **synopsis** of the manifold *a priori* through sense; 2) the **synthesis** of this manifold through the imagination; finally 3) the **unity** of this synthesis through original appception. In addition to their empirical use, all of these faculties have a transcendental one, which is concerned solely with form, and which is possible *a priori*. We have discussed this **with regard to the senses** in the first part above, however, we will now attempt to understand the nature of the two other ones.]

A 95

<sup>d</sup><The famous Locke, from neglect of this consideration, and because he encountered pure concepts of the understanding in experience, also derived them from this experience, and thus proceeded so **inconsistently** that he thereby dared to make attempts at cognitions that go far beyond the boundary of all experience. David Hume recognized that in order to be able to do the latter it is necessary that these concepts would have to have their origin *a priori*. But since he could not explain at all how it is possible for the understanding to think of concepts that in themselves are not combined in the understanding as still necessarily combined in the object, and it never occurred to him that perhaps the understanding itself, by means of these concepts, could be the originator of the experience in which its objects are encountered, he thus, driven by necessity, derived them from experience (namely from a subjective necessity arisen from frequent association in experience, which is subsequently falsely held to be objective, i.e., **custom**);<sup>e</sup> however he

B 127

Locke & Hume

<sup>a</sup> *Principium*

<sup>b</sup> *Object*

<sup>c</sup> This paragraph in the first edition is omitted in the second and replaced by three that here follow it.

<sup>d</sup> The next three paragraphs are added in the second edition, replacing the previous one.

<sup>e</sup> *Gewohnheit*

B 128

subsequently proceeded quite consistently in declaring it to be impossible to go beyond the boundary of experience with these concepts and the principles that they occasion. The **empirical** derivation, however, to which both of them resorted, cannot be reconciled with the reality of the scientific cognition *a priori* that we possess, that namely of **pure mathematics** and **general natural science**, and is therefore refuted by the fact.<sup>a</sup>

enthusiasm  
& skepticism

The first of these two famous men opened the gates wide to **enthusiasm**, since reason, once it has authority on its side, will not be kept within limits by indeterminate recommendations of moderation; the second gave way entirely to **skepticism**, since he believed himself to have discovered in what is generally held to be reason a deception of our faculty of cognition. — We are now about to make an attempt to see whether we cannot successfully steer human reason between these two cliffs, assign its determinate boundaries, and still keep open the entire field of its purposive activity.

B 129

I will merely precede this with the **explanation of the categories**. They are concepts of an object in general, by means of which its intuition is regarded as **determined** with regard to one of the **logical functions** for judgments.<sup>20</sup> Thus, the function of the **categorical** judgment was that of the relationship of the subject to the predicate, e.g., "All bodies are divisible." Yet in regard to the merely logical use of the understanding it would remain undetermined which of these two concepts will be given the function of the subject and which will be given that of the predicate. For one can also say: "Something divisible is a body." Through the category of substance, however, if I bring the concept of a body under it, it is determined that its empirical intuition in experience must always be considered as subject, never as mere predicate; and likewise with all the other categories.>

A 95

### The Deduction of the Pure Concepts of the Understanding Second Section

<sup>b</sup>On the *a priori* grounds for the possibility of experience.

It is entirely contradictory and impossible that a concept should be generated completely *a priori* and be related to an object although it

<sup>a</sup> das Factum

<sup>b</sup> What follows is the version of the "Transcendental Deduction" as it appeared in the first edition, where it is divided into the second and third sections of the present chapter. In the second edition, these two sections will be replaced by a single second section, divided into subsections numbered from § 15 to § 27. See B 129-69 below.