

## CHAPTER IV

### The Logic

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One of the better known early Hegelians, David Friedrich Strauss, best known for his *Life of Jesus* (1835) and for Nietzsche's youthful attack on him, published just before he died (1874), said:

"One may fittingly call the *Phenomenology* the alpha and omega of Hegel's works. Here Hegel left port in his own ships for the first time and sailed, albeit in an Odyssean voyage, around the world; while his subsequent expeditions, though better conducted, were confined, as it were, to inland seas. All the later writings and lectures of Hegel, such as his *Logic*, *Philosophy of Right*, *Philosophy of Religion*, *Aesthetics*, *History of Philosophy*, and *Philosophy of History*, are merely sections from the *Phenomenology* whose riches are preserved only incompletely even in the *Encyclopedia*, and in any case in a dried state. In the *Phenomenology* Hegel's genius stands at its greatest height."<sup>1</sup>

Should we, then, study the *Phenomenology* a little more instead of proceeding to consider the *Logic* and Hegel's system? This has been done. Royce, in his *Lectures on Modern Idealism*, devoted over seventy-five pages to the *Phenomenology* and less than twenty to "Hegel's Mature System."

Glockner reaches the end of the *Phenomenology* on page 537 of his second volume, and disposes of Hegel's later works in a few pages—less for the lot of them than he devoted to the early essay "On the Scientific Modes of Treatment of

<sup>1</sup> Christian Märklin (1851), 53 f.; reprinted in *Gesammelte Schriften*, X, 224; quoted by Glockner, II, 539.

"Natural Right" (H 21). Haering goes even further: he requires thirteen hundred pages to reach the *Phenomenology*, gives that only twice as much space as he accorded the article on "Natural Right"—and then stops altogether.

What at first glance seems madness makes at least a limited amount of sense. One does not read such large two-volume works on Hegel *instead* of reading Hegel himself; one reads them to get help in understanding Hegel. Toward that end, it can be argued, nothing helps more than an analysis of his early works. Even so Glockner and Haering put one in mind of the *Historisch-Kritische Gesamtausgabe* of Nietzsche's "works" (*Werke*), which began to appear in Germany while they were both working on their second volumes: five fat volumes of "works" appeared in chronological order; then the edition was discontinued during World War II—before it had reached Nietzsche's first book, published in his twenties.

The present volume is intended to help those who want to read Hegel. An analysis of the *Logic* or the *Philosophy of Right* does not enable the reader to understand the other mature works, or the early works. But if we now stopped here, the *Logic* and the system would still pose great puzzles.

Let us first consider Hegel's further biography briefly, insofar as it is relevant. How did Schelling react to the *Phenomenology*? The last letters the two men exchanged are translated in D, which also contains the other letters and documents cited in this section.

In January 1807 Schelling eagerly anticipated the book. In April Hegel wrote Niethammer about how he wanted to distribute the few first copies—and did not include Schelling. On May first, Hegel promised Schelling a copy "soon"; he made many interesting statements about the book and apologized for its defects; he suggested that the polemic in the preface, which many students still feel sure was directed against Schelling, was in fact aimed at his followers' "mischief"; and he not only stressed his eager anticipation of Schelling's reaction

to the work but even expressed the hope that Schelling might review it.

November 2, Schelling wrote that he still had not got beyond the preface; he accepted Hegel's explanation of "the polemical part," but, unlike Hegel, referred to the possibility that the polemic could be construed as being aimed at him, and noted expressly that in the preface itself "this distinction is not made." The letter may be read as indicating that Schelling felt offended; but it was not peevish or nasty, and there is not the slightest reason for doubting that he meant it when he said in the end: "Write me soon again and remain well disposed toward Your sincere friend Sch."

It was not until July 30, 1808, that Schelling wrote Windischmann, registering his dislike for the book; he had evidently heard that Windischmann was reviewing it. In between, both Hegel and Schelling had undoubtedly expected to get another letter: Schelling, a reassuring and cordial answer to his own letter; Hegel, a letter reporting that Schelling had now finished the whole book and expressing his reactions to it.<sup>2</sup> Each waited, and neither wrote; and that was the end of their correspondence.

It is well known that the two men met once more in Karlsbad in 1829, by chance. It is almost always overlooked that in October 1812 Schelling paid Hegel a visit in Nürnberg, and in the fall of 1815 Hegel visited Munich and saw Schelling.<sup>3</sup> Thus the two men did not repeat the Kant-Fichte-Schelling pattern (H 26). And the situation was, of course, different from the start inasmuch as Hegel, who came into his own later, was five years older.

When writing letters to others about these late encounters, both men mentioned that they did not discuss philosophy, and

<sup>2</sup> Perhaps the only one to have seen this is Horst Fuhrmans, in his long account of "Schelling und Hegel: Ihre Entfremdung," in F. W. J. Schelling, *Briefe und Dokumente*, vol. I: 1775–1809, Bonn, 1962, pp. 451–553; see pp. 529–32.

<sup>3</sup> This is overlooked even by Otto Pöggeler, one of the editors of the critical edition of Hegel, in his dissertation on *Hegels Kritik der Romantik*, Bonn, 1956, p. 144; pp. 138–85 deal with "Schelling and the romantic philosophers of nature."

the rapport of their early years was obviously a matter of the past. But they remained on civil terms.

In his lectures on the history of philosophy, Hegel took up Schelling as the last philosopher before he came to "the present standpoint of philosophy," his own. The discussion of "the present standpoint"—the editor of the lectures entitled this section "E. Result"—occupies just over eight pages; the immediately preceding lectures on "D. Schelling," almost forty pages. They begin:

"The most important—or, philosophically, the only important—step beyond the Fichtean philosophy was finally taken by Schelling. The higher, genuine form that followed on Fichte is the Schellingian philosophy.

"Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph *Schelling*, born at Schorndorf in Württemberg, January 27, 1775, studied in Leipzig and Jena where he came to be close to Fichte. For several years now he has been secretary of the Academy of Fine Arts in Munich. His *life* cannot be covered completely or in decency since he is still living."

Kuno Fischer pointed out long ago that the biographical paragraph contains surprising mistakes.<sup>4</sup> Of the exposition that follows only a few sentences belong in the present context; the over-all structure of Hegel's lectures and the relative weight given to the philosophers he included belong in our discussion of his history of philosophy, later on, when we come to that part of his system (H 66).

"Schelling got his philosophical education before the public. The series of his philosophical writings is at the same time the history of his philosophical education and represents his gradual rise above the Fichtean principle and the Kantian content

<sup>4</sup> "A legion of inaccuracies! Schelling was born, not in Schorndorf but in Leonberg; in Leipzig he was not a student but a tutor; in Jena, not a student but a professor, even while Hegel was there, too; and he was a student at Tübingen, even for several years together with Hegel! Incomprehensible how Hegel could get into such a state of forgetfulness, and most reprehensible that the editor of his lectures has done nothing to correct such statements. Schelling was the companion of Hegel's youth and his friend, his model and guide on the way to philosophy" (II, 1148 n.). The last half sentence goes too far.

with which he began; it does not contain a sequence of elaborated parts of philosophy, one after the other, but a sequence of the stages of his education. When people ask for a final work in which his philosophy is presented most definitely, one cannot name one like that. Schelling's first writings are entirely Fichtean, and only by and by he emancipated himself from Fichte's form" (647 f.).

Not only is this true, nor does it merely show how Hegel related his own intentions and his own failure to publish a major work until he was thirty-six to his younger friend's publication of over half a dozen books before he was thirty; it also shows why it was so easy and almost natural for Hegel to see his own philosophy as the completion of Schelling's efforts, and indeed of the whole development from Kant beyond Fichte and Schelling.

Much later, when Schelling was called to the University of Berlin in 1841, ten years after Hegel's death, he reciprocated by relegating Hegel's philosophy, along with his own earlier philosophy, to the stage of merely "negative" philosophy, while demanding a new "positive philosophy," which he described in terms exceedingly close to Kierkegaard's later efforts. In fact, Kierkegaard was in the audience and tremendously impressed by Schelling's program, though he was to be disappointed by Schelling's later lectures.<sup>5</sup> Not only *Kierkegaard's* religious existentialism has roots in Schelling's later thought; Paul Tillich began his scholarly career with a dissertation on Schelling. And it was Schelling who coined the term "existential philosophy [*Existenzialphilosophie*]” to designate his later philosophy.<sup>6</sup>

While Schelling himself felt that his "positive philosophy" represented an altogether new stage in the development of philosophy, and a step beyond Hegel, readers of Hegel's preface to the *Phenomenology* should ask themselves whether

<sup>5</sup> For relevant quotations from Schelling's lectures and Kierkegaard's reactions, see my *Nietzsche* (1950), 102; Meridian ed., 105 f. and 377.

<sup>6</sup> In 1844, Rosenkranz already criticizes Schelling's *Existenzialphilosophie* (xviii).

We shall return to the late Schelling in H 68.

Hegel's critique of romantic philosophy is not also applicable to the religious existentialism of the *old* Schelling, of Kierkegaard, and of Tillich.

The question of whether this critique was originally aimed at Schelling himself or only at his followers is more complex than meets the eye. Hegel associated Schelling with a stage in the development of modern philosophy—a stage that constituted definite progress beyond Kant and Fichte, though it, in turn, was not final and had to be transcended. It was certainly not his intention to vilify or ridicule Schelling, but, just as certainly, he wanted to show why one could not settle down in this halfway house. In his lectures on Schelling we find the sentences:

"Schelling surely had this notion in a general way, but did not push it to a conclusion in a definite logical manner; for Schelling it is immediate truth. This is a main difficulty in Schellingian philosophy. Then it was misunderstood, made shallow."<sup>7</sup>

The following distinction may be a little too fine, but it is unquestionably very close to the truth: Hegel was conscious of criticizing and going beyond Schelling; but he probably thought he was *ridiculing* only his followers and shallow imitators. The last sentences of the lectures on Schelling point also in this direction:

"The form becomes rather an external schema; the method is the affixing of this schema to external objects. In this way formalism crept into the philosophy of nature; for example, in Oken—it borders on madness. Philosophizing thus became mere analogical reflection; that is the worst manner. Even Schelling had already made things easy for himself in part; the others have misused it totally" (683).

Some of the passages Rosenkranz quotes from Hegel's Jena lectures show that during the time he was working on the *Phenomenology* Hegel occasionally made this contrast crystal clear. Quotation is doubly worth while because Hegel's polemic is also interesting philosophically and supplements what he says against formalism in the preface to the *Phenomenology*:

<sup>7</sup> Glockner's ed., XIX, 663.

"When studying philosophy, you must not take such a terminology for what counts, and you must not respect it. Ten or twenty years ago it also seemed very difficult to work one's way into the Kantian terminology and to use the terminology of synthetic judgments *a priori*, synthetic unity of apperception, transcendent and transcendental, etc.; but such a flood roars by as quickly as it comes. More people master this language, and the secret comes to light *that very common thoughts conceal themselves behind such bugbear expressions.*<sup>8</sup>—I remark on this mainly because of the current appearance of philosophy, especially the philosophy of nature; what mischief is being done with the *Schellingian* terminology! Schelling, to be sure, expressed a good meaning and philosophical thoughts in these forms—but this by way of *actually showing himself to be free* of this terminology, for in almost every subsequent presentation of his philosophy he used a *new* one. But the way this philosophy is now discussed publicly, it is really only the *superficiality* of thought that hides beneath it. Into the depths of this philosophy, as we see it in so many publications, I cannot introduce you, for it has no depth; and I say this lest you allow yourself to be *impressed*, as if behind these bizarre, hundred-weight words there must necessarily be some meaning.—What alone can be of interest is the amazement all this produces in the ignorant mass. In fact, however, this present formalism can be taught in half an hour. Just say, not that something is *long*, but that it reaches into *length*, and this length is *magnetism*; instead of *broad*, say it reaches into *breadth* and is *electricity*; instead of *thick*, corporeal, and it reaches into the *third dimension*. . . .

"I tell you in advance that in the philosophical *system* that I present you will not find anything of this flood of formalism. When I speak of this terminology and its use, as it rages at present, as I have done, I certainly distinguish *Schelling's ideas* from the use *his students make of them*, and

<sup>8</sup> The applicability of these remarks to Heidegger should be noted. But many a reader says instead, triumphantly and joyously: "See, it is *not* meaningless! How wonderful!" Or: "Look, he is saying what X or Y has said, too!"

I honor Schelling's truly meritorious contribution to philosophy as much as I despise this formalism; and because I know Schelling's philosophy, I know that its true idea, which it has reawakened in our time, is independent of this formalism" (184 f.).

The fact remains that in the *Phenomenology* "this distinction is not made," and quite a few phrases in the preface seem applicable to Schelling himself. For details, see the commentary, which also includes some pertinent quotations from Schelling's writings (C I.3.19; cf. C III.3.11).

Incidentally, Rosenkranz himself tells us elsewhere that Hegel's students at Jena had their doubts about Hegel's attitude toward Schelling: "A student, about to go from Jena to Würzburg, took leave of him. Hegel said to him: 'I have a friend there, too, *Schelling*.' Here, the enthusiasts remarked, the word *friend* had an altogether different meaning than in ordinary life" (217).

In any case, after the publication of the *Phenomenology* Hegel could no longer be considered Schelling's disciple. He had never seen himself that way to begin with; and when others did, it had made him angry. While the articles in the *Critical Journal*, which the two men had edited together, had been unsigned, there is one signed footnote near the end of the first issue:

"About the report . . . 'that Schelling has brought a valiant fighter from his fatherland to Jena, and through him proclaims to the amazed public that even Fichte stands far beneath his views,' I could not, with all circumlocutions and attenuations, say anything else than that the author of this report is a *liar*, which I therefore declare him to be with these clear words; and this the sooner because I believe that in this way I shall earn the gratitude of a great many others to whom he is a burden with his drolleries, half-lies, digs in passing, etc.

DR. HEGEL."

The sort of comment he had got on the *Difference*, which he here protests, he was not likely to get on the *Phenome-*

nology. It was plain henceforth that he stood alone, "for himself," to use a Hegelian locution. But the book created no stir whatever. The first copies had been distributed in April 1807; the first review appeared in February 1809. A few months before publication of his book, the Battle of Jena had put an end to Hegel's university career at Jena, and he was not offered a teaching position at another university until 1816, the year his fourth volume appeared—the third volume of the *Logic*. That year he received three calls: to Heidelberg, where he actually went; to Erlangen; and to Berlin. The call to Berlin came just a little too late; when he got it, Hegel already felt committed to Heidelberg. But in 1818 Berlin asked him again, and then he accepted.

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For a year and a half, beginning just before the *Phenomenology* appeared, Hegel was the editor of a newspaper in Bamberg. Interpreters generally dismiss this intermezzo as not particularly important for Hegel's development.

Rosenzweig suggests that Niethammer, Hegel's best adviser and friend by this time, thought it prudent for his younger compatriot to move at least into the horizon of the Bavarian government, which might eventually call him to a university post. "As a rather well-paid waiting post, which would support Hegel, who was without means since he had used up his patrimony, he took over the editorship of the *Bamberger Zeitung*. . . . While Hegel was editor, it appeared every weekday, was printed in the morning and distributed in the afternoon. It was not the truly local paper in Bamberg; those tasks [town affairs] were taken care of by the *Bamberger Korrespondent*. The *Bamberger Zeitung* furnished Bamberg" and a considerable area beyond it with news about Bavaria "and above all about European events" (II, 6 f.).

Haym, who made a point of reading all of the issues Hegel edited, tells us that "the readers were not burdened with any philosophical discourses. I have been able to find one, and

only one, excursus that might remind an attentive reader of the author of the *Phenomenology*. . . . He tried here and there to obtain news in some special way and through private communications. In the main he had to rely on other papers, mostly French. But he was very correct and skilful in the composition of his material from these sources. A sure critical tact is notable whenever he seeks to review or reconcile contradictory reports. Everywhere he shows care and thoroughness. . . . To say everything: this newspaper was as well edited by Hegel as a poor newspaper could be edited by anyone" (270 f.).

In retrospect, the most interesting point about this episode is that in 1807 and 1808 Hegel was in such very close touch with day-to-day events—a far cry from the otherworldly ivory tower in which posthumous reputation has placed him. Moreover, and this is no less important, he was forced to publish six times a week what ordinary people would understand, and each issue had only four pages. So he learned to be brief, to cover a lot of material very concisely, and to finish things. In this respect, the year and a half at Bamberg were, after all, of crucial importance.

In the fall of 1808 Hegel became principal of the Gymnasium at Nürnberg; his duties specifically included instruction in philosophy; and he retained this position for eight years, until he went to Heidelberg. The only other towns where he lived that long were Stuttgart, where he was born, and Berlin, where he died.

When he went to Nürnberg he was not famous, although he had published a number of articles, as well as a book that has since been hailed as one of the great books of all time. He was thirty-eight, was immensely well read, personally knew some of the best known intellects of the time, and struck his students as an unusually impressive headmaster.

For him it was clear from the start that this occupation, too, could only be an intermezzo. For all that, it was the first real position in which he settled down, and he tried to meet its peculiar challenges. Perhaps the greatest of these was that he had to make clear philosophy for students in their teens who were not specializing in the subject. The way in which

he tried to solve this problem became the pattern for his *Encyclopedia* and *Philosophy of Right*.

He aimed at clear outlines that could be readily remembered, at great brevity, and at definitive formulations. The organization henceforth becomes neat to a fault—triads everywhere (but not theses, antitheses, and syntheses). Brevity coupled with the desire to say a great deal in few words leads to reliance on jargon and a style that borders on the oracular. And the attempt to give his students definitive formulations, coupled with the fact that the boys were nowhere near his own level, introduced a decidedly dogmatic note into Hegel's prose.

This is a prime clue to "the secret of Hegel," which has been neglected. When he went to Nürnberg he had tried for years to complete his system, but had been able to complete for publication only an introduction which, with its 850 pages, was more than three times as long as the first edition of the system, the so-called *Encyclopedia*, when it finally appeared exactly ten years later.

Rosenkranz noted that the philosophy courses Hegel gave in Nürnberg constitute an intermediary stage between the *Phenomenology* and the *Encyclopedia* when he published Hegel's manuscripts covering the course, under the title *Propädeutik*, in volume XVIII of the original edition of Hegel's *Werke*. But what is of the utmost significance is that the otherwise enigmatic transformation of Hegel becomes perfectly clear and understandable when we consider his situation, first in Bamberg and then, above all, in Nürnberg.

Without that, one ought to be perplexed, though scarcely anybody seems to have been puzzled, by the incredible contrast between the young and the mature Hegel. In his youth he was a firebrand whose vitriolic criticisms of Christianity invite comparison with Nietzsche and do not even stop before the person of Jesus. He wrote with passion and vigor, and his sarcasm was radical. Then he went to Jena in quest of a university career, wrote articles for a scholarly journal, affected what seemed the right tone for that, and often became rather obscure—though not more so than many a young Assistant Professor of Sociology a century and a

half later. Still, he could not curb his biting wit, and his great flair for the picturesque constantly broke through, sometimes even in the middle of long, hyper-academic sentences. Finally, his first big book appeared and turned out to be anything but stuffy or conventional. On the contrary, it was a Faustian book, wild, bold, and more than a little mad. And after that Hegel disappeared from view for a while, first in Bamberg, then in Nürnberg.

In the latter city he composed the first third of his system, the *Logik*, in three volumes (1812, 1813, 1816). This work still breathes at least some of the spirit of the *Phenomenology*: at the end of the preface to the first edition we are told how, when the *Phenomenology* appeared as the "first part" of Hegel's *System of Science*, the second volume was still to contain the Logic as well as the philosophy of nature and the philosophy of spirit; but now the first third of that projected volume has again grown beyond all bounds. And in the "introduction" that follows the "preface," we are told that one might say that the content of the Logic "is the account of God as he is in his eternal essence before the creation of nature and any finite spirit."<sup>9</sup> Hegel himself emphasized these words in print. This work, which we shall consider shortly, is not as mad as these words may seem; in any case, it is still the labor of an utterly lonely genius.

When Hegel emerged from his obscurity to become a famous professor, it was hard to recognize the man with whom we have largely dealt so far. Anyone who seriously compares Hegel before the age of forty with the Professor Hegel of the last fifteen years of his life is bound to ask: Whatever happened to him? We can now answer that question in a single sentence: for eight long years the poor man was headmaster of a German secondary school.

<sup>9</sup> This remark will be interpreted in H 42.

Hegel's personal development during this period is adequately reflected in the documents furnished in D. In a letter of May 27, 1810, he describes life in the "dark regions" as one who has been there, speaks of "a few years of this hypochondria," and suggests that only devotion to "science" can cure it. On December 14, 1810, he describes human life with a consummate bitterness that is infinitely closer to Shakespeare or to *Candide* than to Leibniz or the popular image of Hegel.

Then, in April he became engaged to Marie von Tucher and wrote two poems for her. They are of no literary interest, but one of them has been translated in part, both to suggest the change in mood from the preceding year and to balance the rather odd tone of the two letters to his bride that followed. He had offended her by expressing a reservation in his postscript to his bride's letter to his sister: "insofar as happiness is part of the destiny of my life." Now he tried to explain and set things right. In September they married.

In 1812, their first child, a girl, was born and soon died. His brother, Ludwig, an officer who had been the godfather of Hegel's illegitimate son, Ludwig, fell in Napoleon's Russian campaign.

From letters of July and October we learn that Hegel was still on good terms with Schelling, and that he had also developed a friendly relationship to Jacobi, another butt of strong criticisms in the preface to the *Phenomenology*. In the October letter to his friend Niethammer, who was *Oberschulrat* in Munich, Hegel submitted his views about the teaching of philosophy at the secondary school level and related his own conception of Logic to Kant's: after all, Kant already had discussed traditional metaphysics under the heading of what he called "Transcendental Logic," especially in the second part, which he entitled "Transcendental Dialectic." And Hegel explained why he had no time for the fashionable talk about teaching students to philosophize in-

stead of teaching them philosophy. He had doubts whether philosophy should be taught at all in secondary schools; probably, a good grounding in the classics would serve the students far better. But if philosophy were taught at all, then there should be some content, too, as in any other science.

In September 1813, we hear the beginning of Hegel's commencement address to his students in which he gave expression to his conservatism. That year he also became *Schulrat*, in addition to being headmaster of his school, and his wife gave birth to her first son, Karl. He was later to edit the second edition of Hegel's lectures on the philosophy of history, as well as the first collection of letters to and from Hegel.

In the fall of 1814 Marie Hegel gave birth to her second son; but in the spring, when she was still expecting, Hegel's sister suffered her first breakdown. While Hegel certainly lacked charm and was, all in all, not as attractive a figure as, say, Lessing, one can scarcely admire his letter to his sister (April 9, 1814) sufficiently: here his character appears at its best, and his wisdom, too, is impressive.

Now Christiane, the sister, moved in with the Hegels: their home became her home. In two letters of 1814 we witness Hegel's reactions to Napoleon's downfall and to the triumph of Prussia and her allies. Late in 1815, Christiane was well enough to leave.

On July 30, 1816, at long last, Hegel was offered a chair of philosophy. Fries had left Heidelberg for a professorship at Jena, where both he and Hegel had begun their academic careers at the beginning of the century, and now Daub, Professor of Theology at Heidelberg, wrote Hegel a long letter to invite him. On August 2, Hegel wrote Professor von Raumer a long letter about the teaching of philosophy at the university level; and on August 10, von Raumer forwarded it to Berlin, to the Minister of Education, who, it turned out, had asked him to interview Hegel. On August 15, the Minister wrote Hegel, telling him that the chair for philosophy was still vacant, but asking Hegel to judge for himself whether he had "the ability to give vivid and incisive lectures." Hegel did not receive the letter until the twenty-fourth, and wrote on the twenty-eighth, the day after his

forty-sixth birthday, to answer the question put to him and inform the minister that meanwhile he had committed himself to Heidelberg. (All these letters have been translated in D; the correspondence with Erlangen, which also issued him a call around the same time, has been omitted.) Finally, in December 1817, the new minister, Altenstein, offered Hegel the chair in Berlin, vacant since Fichte's death in 1814, and Hegel accepted and went to Berlin in 1818.

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The years just considered in such summary fashion were immensely productive ones for Hegel. It was in Nürnberg that he wrote and published the three volumes of his *Logic*, and in Heidelberg, during his brief stay there, he completed and published his system, in a slim volume.

In Berlin, he published his *Philosophy of Right* and the second and third editions of his *Encyclopedia*. It was also at Berlin that he attracted the devoted disciples who collected his writings after his death and included in his collected "works" four imposing cycles of lectures, mostly on the basis of student notes.

Although the *Logic* appeared in three volumes, in 1812, 1813, and 1816, Hegel conceived of it as having two volumes. The whole work he called *Wissenschaft der Logik* (*Science of Logic*; the word *Wissenschaft* appears in the titles of all four of the works he himself published). Volume I contained "Objective Logic," volume II "Subjective Logic, or The Doctrine of the Concept." The first "volume," as is not unusual in Germany, appeared in two parts, with the "First Book" containing "The Doctrine of Being" and the "Second Book: The Doctrine of Essence."

In 1831 Hegel prepared a second edition of the *Logic* and completed an extensive revision of the first volume shortly before he died. The original edition, which is a great rarity, has never been reprinted. Few scholars have consulted it, and the date of the second volume is almost invariably given as 1812, instead of 1813. The textual variants, confined to the first volume, are not indicated in any extant edition.

They are indicated in the following pages for two reasons. First, we have been following Hegel's development and would falsify it at this point if we attributed to his Nürnberg period what in fact was written nineteen years later, in Berlin. Secondly, Hegel did not write a book during his last ten years, but during his last year he revised the first volume of his *Logic* and the beginning of the preface to the *Phenomenology*.<sup>10</sup> Although many of his revisions are trivial, it is still of some interest to observe how the author of such bold works as the *Phenomenology* and the *Logic* revised his earlier works instead of writing new ones.

Hegel still found it immensely difficult to make a beginning. There is, first, a preface. (For the second edition, Hegel even added a second preface, dated November 7, 1831, exactly one week before his death.) But the preface comprises only eight pages, not more than ninety, as did that to his first book. Next comes an introduction that runs on for twenty-eight pages. Then comes a five-page section on "General Subdivision of the Logic"<sup>11</sup>; and then the "First Book" which begins with a section of thirteen pages, entitled "With what must the beginning of science be made?" Including the preface to the second edition, there are seventy-one pages of introductory text.

This would not be particularly odd if Hegel did not once again cast aspersions on what he is actually doing. The "introduction" begins: "There is no science where the need is felt more urgently to begin with the subject matter itself, without preliminary reflections, than in the science of Logic." And more in the same vein. Hegel apologizes for his argumentative and historical style in these early pages, feeling that he ought to be properly "scientific" from the start; but he obviously feels at home in what he is doing and writes, on

<sup>10</sup> For the changes Hegel made in the preface, see my commentary in Chapter VIII. In the following pages "1812" stands for the first edition of the *Logik*, "1841" for the revised edition, cited according to its *zweite unveränderte Auflage* in Hegel's *Werke*, an unchanged reprint of the first posthumous edition of 1833.

<sup>11</sup> This section was rewritten in 1831; the introduction was revised and subtitled "General Concept of Logic."

the whole, with surprising clarity and vigor. In this respect, his *Encyclopedia* and *Philosophy of Right*, with their crabbed, consecutively numbered, paragraphs cannot compare with these for the most part extremely lucid pages.

Since Kant, we are told in the preface, the Germans have become "*a civilized people without metaphysics*," which Hegel considers a "strange spectacle." In the introduction Hegel suggests that "ancient metaphysics had in this respect a higher concept of thinking than has become prevalent in recent times. For it assumed that what in things is recognized by thinking is what alone in them is truly true; thus not they in their immediacy, but only they as lifted into the form of thinking, as thought. This [Platonic and Aristotelian] metaphysics thus held that thinking and the determinations of thought were not alien to objects but rather their essence, or that *things* and the *thinking* of them (even as our language expresses some relation between them) agree in and for themselves . . ."<sup>12</sup>

While Hegel is right about Plato and Aristotle, the etymologies of "thing" and *Ding* on the one hand, and "think" and *Denken* on the other seem to be actually different. Like Plato, Hegel takes pleasure in calling attention to linguistic points; and in the preface added to the second edition he commends the German language for containing words that "have not only different meanings but even opposed meanings," which he considers evidence of "a speculative spirit of the language; it can afford thinking a delight to hit upon such words and to find the reconciliation of opposites, which is a result of speculation but an absurdity for the understanding, present lexicographically in this naïve manner in a single word of opposite meanings. Philosophy therefore requires no particular terminology at all; of course, a few words have to be accepted from foreign languages, but words that by much use have already acquired citizenship; any affected purism would be most out of place where the subject matter is all-important."

What matters to Hegel is not etymology as such. The point

<sup>12</sup> 1812, p. v; 1841, p. 27.

is that he does not see himself as one who comes to say: Ye have been told—but I say unto you. Rather he wants to bring into clear daylight and systematic order what is available before he begins. The motto is always Goethe's:

What from your fathers you received as heir,  
Acquire if you would possess it.

One may also recall Mephisto's lines, in *Faust II*, published only after Hegel's (and Goethe's) death:

Depart, “original” enthusiast!  
How would this insight peeve you: whatsoever  
A human being thinks, if dumb or clever,  
Was thought before him in the past.

Goethe also said on occasion that everything true has already been thought in the past; one merely needs to think it once more. And in a late poem, written in 1829 and entitled “Legacy [*Vermächtnis*],” he said:

*Das Wahre war schon längst gefunden, . . .*  
*Das alte Wahre, fass es an!*

These lines are wholly in Hegel's spirit: “The true has long been found, . . . The ancient true, take hold of it!” Grasp it—or as Hegel might say, what matters is to comprehend it, *es begreifen*.

The prime example of an ordinary word that shows the “speculative spirit of the language” by having seemingly opposed meanings is, of course, *aufheben* (sublimate), which was explained briefly above in section 34. The first chapter of the *Logic* ends with a “Note” on this term:

“*Aufheben* and *das Aufgehobene* (*das Ideelle*) is one of the most important concepts of philosophy, a basic determination which recurs practically everywhere. . . . What sublimates itself does not thereby become nothing. Nothing is *immediate*; what is sublimated, on the other hand, is *mediated*; it is that which is not, but as a *result*, having issued from what had being; it is therefore *still characterized by the determinateness from which it comes*.

"*Aufheben* has in the [German] language a double meaning in that it signifies conserving, *preserving*, and at the same time also making cease, *making an' end*. Even conserving includes the negative aspect that something is taken out of its immediacy, and thus out of an existence that is open to external influences, to be preserved.—Thus what is *aufgehoben* is at the same time conserved and has merely lost its immediacy but is not for that reason annihilated.<sup>13</sup>—Lexicographically, the two definitions of *aufheben* can be listed as two *meanings* of the word. But it should strike us that a language should have come to use one and the same word for two opposed definitions. For speculative thinking it is a joy to find in the language words which are characterized by a speculative significance; German has several such words. The double meaning of the Latin *tollere* (which has become famous through Cicero's joke: *tollendum esse Octavium*) does not go so far; here the affirmative definition reaches only as far as raising up. Something is *aufgehoben* only insofar as it has entered into a union with its opposite; in this more exact definition, as something reflected, it can suitably be called a *moment*. . . . More often, the observation will press itself upon us that philosophical terminology uses Latin expressions for reflected definitions, either because the mother tongue lacks pertinent expressions or, if it has them, as here, because its expressions remind us more of the immediate, and the foreign language more of the reflected. . . ."

As this passage on Hegel's most "dialectical" term suggests, his dialectic, even in the *Logic*, is not meant to flout the law of contradiction; it is not even intended to be counterintuitive. In fact, Hegel's delight at finding such a word as *aufheben* is plainly due to the opportunity it pro-

<sup>13</sup> *vernichtet*. 1812: *verschwinden* (vanished). The remainder of this paragraph is not found in the first edition, which proceeds instead: "That which is *aufgehoben* may be defined more precisely by saying that something is here *aufgehoben* only insofar as it has entered into a union with its opposite; in this narrower definition it is something reflected and can suitably be called a *moment*.—Indeed, we shall have to observe frequently that philosophical terminology uses Latin expressions for reflected definitions."

vides for him to appeal to the intuition that is embedded in the language. And his detailed explanation, as quoted, tries to overcome the rigid prejudices of the understanding by showing how both reason and intuition can make perfectly good sense of something that the understanding might be inclined to rule out without a hearing because opposite meanings *must* be mutually incompatible and therefore, if nevertheless combined, yield nonsense.

In his introduction to the *Logic*, Hegel is no less plain on this all-important point, on which he has so often been misrepresented. Again it will be best to quote Hegel's own words:

"The [Kantian] *critique of the forms of the understanding* has led to the previously mentioned result that these forms have no *application to the things-in-themselves* [this is indeed Kant's own conclusion].—But this can have no other meaning [says Hegel, but not Kant] than that these forms themselves are something untrue. But by still being conceded validity for subjective reason and for experience, the critique has not effected any change in these forms but leaves them standing for the subject as they formerly were considered valid for the object. But if they are inadequate for the thing-in-itself, then the understanding, whose forms they are supposed to be, ought to tolerate them and be satisfied with them even less. If they cannot be determinations of the *thing-in-itself*, they can even less be determinations of the understanding which ought to be conceded at least the dignity of a thing-in-itself. The determinations of the finite and infinite are in the same conflict whether they are applied to time and space, to the world [where Kant elaborated their antinomies], or as determinations within the spirit; just as black and white yield a gray, whether they are united together on a wall or still on the palette: if our notion of the *world* dissolves as soon as the determinations of the infinite and finite are transferred to it, then the *spirit* itself, which contains both, is even more something that contradicts itself and dissolves itself.—It is not the qualities of the stuff or object to which they are applied or in which they are situated that can make a difference; for the object is characterized by

contradictions only through and according to these determinations."<sup>14</sup>

Kant thought that antinomies arise only when the categories of the understanding are applied to the world as a whole, to what lies beyond all possible experience; it did not occur to him that anything might be wrong with the categories themselves. He simply took them, as Hegel puts it in the next paragraph, "out of Subjective Logic," or as Kant himself put it, from the traditional table of judgments. He failed to examine or analyze them as he should have done, and he never realized that there is something inherently odd or queer about the categories of the understanding.

Hegel discusses the same point in the introductory portion of the second and third editions of the *Encyclopedia* (cf. H 19): "This is the place to mention that it is . . . the categories for themselves which bring about the contradiction. This thought, that the contradiction which arises in reason through the determinations of the understanding is *essential* and *necessary*, must be considered one of the most important and profound advances of modern philosophy. But the solution is no less trivial than this point of view is profound . . ." (§48).

What is needed is a comprehensive review and analysis of our categories, and this is what Hegel attempts in his *Logic*. The point is to comprehend the concepts of being and nothing, of finite and infinite; then we shall see that they are all one-sided abstractions from a concreteness of which they are merely partial aspects. That is the heart of Hegel's *Logic*; that is the meaning of its much misunderstood dialectic.

The dialectic of the *Logic* is thus somewhat different from the dialectic of the *Phenomenology*: one could not possibly call it a logic of passion. As Hegel says in the penultimate paragraph of the introduction: "The system of Logic is the realm of shadows, the world of the simple essences [*Wesensheiten*], freed from all sensuous concretion. The study of this science, the sojourn and the work in this realm of shadows, is the absolute education and discipline of consciousness. Here it pursues tasks remote from sensuous intuitions and

<sup>14</sup> 1812, vii f.; 1841, 29 f., unchanged.

aims, from feelings, from the merely intended world of nations.<sup>15</sup> Considered from its negative aspect, these tasks consist in the exclusion of the accidental nature of argumentative thinking and the arbitrary business of allowing these or rather the opposite reasons to occur to one and prevail."<sup>16</sup>

Hegel still confronts us as another Odysseus: in the *Phenomenology* we followed his Odyssey, the spirit's great voyage in search of a home where it might settle down; in the *Logic* we are asked to follow him into the realm of shadows. There we move in a world where the passions had their place; here the passions are left behind. We are to contemplate Concepts and categories—and see them as one-sided abstractions and mere shadows that are not what they seem.

We are now ready to understand in context a metaphor mentioned once before (end of H 40)—on the face of it, perhaps the maddest image in all of Hegel's writings: "The Logic is thus to be understood as the system of pure reason, as the realm of pure thought. *This realm is truth as it is without any shroud in and for itself.* One might therefore say that this content is the account of God, as he is in his eternal essence before the creation of nature and any finite spirit" (Introduction).<sup>17</sup>

The image of the realm of shadows seems superior, but what both metaphors have in common is the abstraction from the world and from concreteness. The suggestion that the Logic takes us back in some sense "*before the creation of nature and any finite spirit*" undoubtedly came from the structure of Hegel's system: he had decided to begin with the Logic, to follow that with the philosophy of nature, and to place the philosophy of spirit in the end; and the philosophy of spirit, as we shall see when we take it up in detail, deals with the human (or "finite") spirit.

<sup>15</sup> This term has been used so often to render *Begriff* that it may be well to remind the reader that in this book it is employed consistently to translate *Vorstellung*. (Cf. H 34).

<sup>16</sup> 1812, xxvii f.; 1841, 44. The only change: Hegel added "intuitions and."

<sup>17</sup> 1812, xiii; 1841, 33. 1812: "truth itself as it is"; "and" was missing in the phrase "in and for itself"; and none of the words was emphasized.

One might suppose that the Logic should belong to the philosophy of (finite) spirit—and one might favor the abandonment of any attempt to offer a philosophy of nature. In the twentieth century, the philosophy of (natural) science seems to have replaced the philosophy of nature, which is now apt to strike us as an excrescence of romanticism; and once the philosophy of nature is thus transposed into the study of a human pursuit (natural science), one is bound to wonder whether Logic, too, cannot be absorbed into the philosophy of man, or philosophical anthropology.

Most of this problem can be postponed until we consider the system, but something can and must be said at this point about the status and priority of the Logic. Hegel plainly does not consider it a branch of psychology, and beyond that he claims some priority for it, even over investigations of nature, and, for that matter, over science. On both points he is far from being out of date. Indeed, he could be said to have effected a revolution in metaphysics which is as timely one hundred fifty years later as it ever was.

With Hegel, metaphysics ceases to be speculation about the nature of ultimate reality. He is still fond of speaking of "speculation" and "speculative," but as a matter of fact *he does not speculate about things of which we could say that the time for speculation is long past because we now look to the sciences for verifiable hypotheses. With Hegel, analysis of categories replaces speculative metaphysics.* He gives metaphysics the new meaning and content that it still retains with some of the best philosophers in the second half of the twentieth century.

The priority of a Logic that is conceived in this manner is illuminated in two passages in the preface to the second edition:

"The forms of thinking are first of all articulated and laid down in the *language* of man. . . . In everything that becomes for him something inward, any kind of notion, anything he makes his own, language has intruded; and what man makes into language and expresses in language, contains, shrouded, mixed in, or elaborated, a category. . . ."

". . . I have seen opponents who did not care to make the

simple reflection that their ideas and objections contain categories which are presuppositions and themselves require criticism before they are used. Unconsciousness of this point goes amazingly far; it makes for the basic misunderstanding, the uncouth and uneducated behavior of thinking *something else* when a category is considered, and not this category itself. . . ."

All discourse, whether it is about nature, science, psychology, ethics, art, or religion, involves categories that are not unproblematic, although those who engage in such discourse very rarely realize that they are begging any number of questions by packing problematic assumptions into their categories. Therefore Hegel considers it right to begin with an analysis of categories—or with what he calls "Logic."

His position vis-à-vis Kant may be summed up briefly. As Hegel himself points out in his "General Subdivision of the Logic," Kant extended the meaning of "logic" by introducing his "Transcendental Logic"; and Hegel's "Objective Logic"—the first two thirds of his *Logic*—"would partly correspond to his *Transcendental Logic*." More important yet is the corollary, stated two pages later: "The Objective Logic thus replaces old-style *metaphysics*. . . ."<sup>18</sup>

The difference from Kant is stated in the main part of the introduction: Kant's "Critical philosophy already turned *metaphysics* into *Logic*, but it, like subsequent idealism, gave the logical determinations, as already mentioned, from fear of the object, an essentially subjective significance. . . ." <sup>19</sup> Kant assumed that there was a thing-in-itself to which the categories did not apply; in that sense, then, the categories were merely subjective. Hegel follows Fichte in having no use for the thing-in-itself, which is indeed inconsistent with Kant's main ideas. Thinghood or substance is itself a category; unity and plurality are categories; cause is yet another. To claim that these categories have no application to the thing-in-itself, which must nevertheless be assumed as a

<sup>18</sup> This "General Subdivision" was expanded in 1831, but the points here mentioned are equally emphatic in both versions: 1812, 2-4; 1841, 49-51.

<sup>19</sup> 1812, xv; 1841, 35.

cause without which we should have no experiences, is manifestly self-contradictory. If these categories have application only to the objects of experience—and Kant produces powerful arguments in support of this position—then we have no grounds whatsoever for assuming anything beyond experience. But in that case we also have no grounds for considering the categories merely subjective. So far from merely telling us something about the structure of the human mind, they are part of the structure of all knowledge and of discourse on any subject whatsoever—whether that subject be knowledge and discourse, nature, ethics, art, religion, or philosophy. Therefore, the system of science—to recall the title Hegel originally gave the work to which the *Phenomenology* was meant as an introduction—should begin with the *Logic*.

## 43

When it comes to the actual contents of the *Logic*, it is easy to look at the table of contents and to copy it in the form of a chart, as some authors of studies of Hegel have done. But in the introduction Hegel says expressly:

“. . . I point out that *the subdivisions and titles of the books, sections, and chapters indicated in this work*,<sup>20</sup> as well as *any explanations*<sup>21</sup> connected with them, have been made for the sake of a preliminary survey, and that they are really solely of historical value. They *do not belong to the contents and body of the science*, but are arrangements of external reflection, which has already run through the whole execution and therefore knows the sequence of the moments in advance and indicates them. . . .”<sup>22</sup>

Once again, as in the *Phenomenology*, Hegel first wrote each volume and then asked himself what precisely he had got and how it might be arranged neatly. He never set as much

<sup>20</sup> 1812: “in the following treatise on Logic.”

<sup>21</sup> 1812: “remarks.”

<sup>22</sup> 1812, xxi; 1841, 39; Glockner’s ed., IV, 52; Lasson’s ed. (1923), 366. In the original only *historical* is emphasized.

store by his triads or by the precise sequence as some of his expositors have done. In fact, in the *Encyclopedia* of 1817, the order differs somewhat from the *Logic* of 1812–16. In 1830 Hegel published a third, revised, and definitive edition of the *Encyclopedia*, but when he prepared a second and definitive edition of the *Logic* in 1831—he completed his work on the first volume—he did not make the order conform to that of the *Encyclopedia*. The precise sequence was, after all, as he had already said in 1812, not part of the “body of the science,” any more than the neat disposition and headings.

What did matter was not any such progression from thesis to antithesis to synthesis, and hence to another antithesis, and so forth, as McTaggart claimed,<sup>23</sup> but a comprehensive analysis of categories and the demonstration that any two opposite categories are always both one-sided abstractions.

Hegel has been called an archrationalist and an essentialist, but his central purpose in the *Logic* is to demonstrate the inadequacy, the one-sidedness, the abstractness of our categories. Some are more abstract than others; hence some sort of sequential arrangement is possible; but this is not the main thesis or point of the book.

Only the somewhat cut-and-dried style of the *Encyclopedia*, which will be considered in due course, could give the impression that the table of contents structure was what mattered. The *Logic* belies it at every turn—quite especially the first volume in which the reader is introduced to the whole enterprise. But while the dehydrated summary of the “Logic” in the *Encyclopedia* was rendered into English, badly, in 1873 (the revised edition of 1892 was still bad),<sup>24</sup> no complete translation of the *Logic* itself appeared until 1929. When Stace’s influential interpretation of Hegel appeared (1924), his teacher, H. S. Macran, had published in English only approximately one ninth of the *Logic* (the first third of Part

<sup>23</sup> *Op. cit.*, §4 (cf. H 37).

<sup>24</sup> Moreover, much of the text Wallace chose to translate consists of “additions” of doubtful value which will be considered below (H 52). Wallace published an English version of the final part of the *Encyclopedia* in 1894; the middle part, containing the philosophy of nature, has never appeared in English.

III).<sup>25</sup> But when a philosopher spends a large part of his life writing a three-volume work that eventually appears in installments over a period of five years, a discussion of the ideas in that work on the basis of a translation of a syllabus of roughly a hundred pages, designed for his students' use in connection with one of his lecture courses, is hardly the best we can do.

Concerning the charge of essentialism, the following distinction from the introduction is relevant: "Considering *education and the relation of the individual to Logic*, I finally remark that this science, like grammar, appears in two different perspectives or values. It is one thing for those who first approach it and the sciences, and quite another for those who return to it from them. Whoever begins to study grammar, finds in its forms and laws dry abstractions, accidental rules, altogether a lot of isolated determinations which manifest merely the value and significance that lie in their immediate meaning; at first, knowledge recognizes nothing else in them. Whoever, on the other hand, masters a language, and at the same time knows other languages with which to compare it, will find that the spirit and culture of a people reveal themselves to him in the grammar of its language; the same rules and forms now have a full, living value. Through the grammar he can recognize the expression of the spirit, the Logic."

"Thus, whoever approaches science, at first finds in the Logic an isolated system of abstractions that, limited to itself, does not reach over into other fields of knowledge or other sciences. On the contrary, compared with the riches of a notion of the world, with the content of the other sciences, which seems real, and compared with the promise of absolute science to uncover the *essence* of these riches, the *inner nature* of the spirit and the world, the *truth*,<sup>26</sup> this science, in its abstract form and in the colorless, cold simplicity of its pure determinations, rather has the appearance that it could do anything rather than keep this promise, and it seems to confront these riches without any content. The first acquaintance

<sup>25</sup> Hegel's *Doctrine of Formal Logic*, being a translation of the first section of the *Subjective Logic* (1912).

<sup>26</sup> "the truth" was added in the 2d edition. There are a few more very minor stylistic changes that do not affect the sense.

with Logic limits its significance to Logic itself; its content is considered merely an isolated concern with the determinations of thought, while other scientific concerns lie *beside* it as separate materials with a content of their own. . . .

"In this way, Logic must indeed be learned to begin with, as something one understands and admits but in which scope, depth, and further significance are missed to begin with. It is only out of the deeper knowledge of the other sciences that Logic rises for the subjective spirit as something that is not merely general in an abstract way but as the general which includes the riches of the particular—even as the same ethical maxim in the mouth of a youth who understands it quite rightly does not have the significance and scope it has in the spirit of a man who has had much experience of life. . . ."<sup>27</sup>

## 44

The first antinomy discussed in the *Logic* is not that of being and nothing, which forms the subject of the first chapter, but that of the immediate and the mediated, which is introduced at the beginning of the section "With what must the beginning of science be made?"

"The beginning of philosophy must either be something *mediated* or something *immediate*; and it is easy to show that it could be neither the one nor the other."<sup>28</sup> This is not some slight bit of cleverness, offered in passing. This antinomy closely parallels Kant's first antinomy, which assumes that the world must either have a beginning in time or not have a beginning in time, and then shows that both the "thesis" and the "antithesis" can be shown to be impossible. Kant assumed that this must be due to the illicit application of categories to the world as a whole and concluded that this corroborated his claim that our knowledge is perforce limited to experience. Hegel shows that the antinomy does not depend on the application of categories to the world as a whole; he points to a

<sup>27</sup> 1812, xxv–xxvii; 1841, 42–44.

<sup>28</sup> 1812, 7; 1841, 55. The beginning of this section differs in the two editions, but this sentence does not.

parallel antinomy when the question is merely one about the beginning of science, or philosophy; and he finds that the fault lies in the nature of our categories.' He sums up the last point when he says on the next page "that there is nothing, nothing in the heavens or in nature or in the spirit or anywhere, which does not contain both immediacy and mediation; so these two determinations are seen to be *undivided* and *indivisible* [*ungetrennt und untrennbar*], and this opposition something vain [*ein Nichtiges*]."<sup>29</sup>

Nothing, in other words, is absolutely immediate (*unmittelbar*) in the sense that it is in no way mediated; and nothing is mediated (*vermittelt*) in the absolute sense that it is in no sense immediate. If, for example, I know "immediately" that the answer to the question "What is 5 plus 12?" is "17," my knowledge is, for all that, mediated by a process of learning back in my childhood. And, on the other hand, a picture that was not on the canvas "immediately" but got there through the mediation of many hours of work can still be seen all at once, at a glance, immediately.

What seems trivial logic-chopping, utterly academic, and remote from the concrete content of other sciences is in fact relevant to hundreds of disputes that fill thousands of articles and books as well as many oral discussions. Again and again, people, including scholars, take such categories as those just discussed in an absolute sense and hack away at each other instead of realizing the vanity, or nullity, of the dispute.

A few pages later, still in the same section, Hegel applies his point to "being" and says: "Further, what begins *is* already; but just as much, it *is not* yet. The two opposites, being and not-being, thus are found in it in immediate union; or it is their *undifferentiated unity*."

"The analysis of the beginning would thus furnish the Concept of the unity of being and not-being. . . . This Concept could be considered the first, purest, i.e., most abstract, definition of the absolute—which it would be in fact if the form of definitions and the name of the absolute mattered at all."<sup>30</sup>

<sup>29</sup> 1841, 56; not in the first edition.

<sup>30</sup> 1812, 13; 1841, 64. The phrase "i.e., most abstract" was added in 1831.

The first book of the *Logic* is called “The Doctrine of Being” and the first chapter is subdivided as follows:

## FIRST SECTION: QUALITY<sup>31</sup>

### First Chapter: Being

A. Being

B. Nothing

C. Becoming

#### 1. Unity of being and nothing

Note 1: The opposition of being and nothing in our notions

Note 2: Inadequacy of the expression: unity, identity of being and nothing<sup>32</sup>

Note 3: On isolating these abstractions<sup>33</sup>

Note 4: Incomprehensibility of beginning<sup>34</sup>

#### 2. Moments of becoming

#### 3. Sublimation of becoming

Note: The expression: *Aufheben*

<sup>31</sup> 1812: DETERMINATENESS (QUALITY)

<sup>32</sup> 1812: Being and nothing, each taken for itself

<sup>33</sup> 1812: Other relations [*Verhältnisse*] in the relation [*Beziehung*] of being and nothing

<sup>34</sup> 1812: The ordinary dialectic against becoming and against coming to be and passing away

When we turn to consider the contents of the next two chapters, we find that the differences between the original edition of 1812 and the revised version are so great that it will be best to present the two versions on facing pages to facilitate comparisons.

These pages, which "cover" about 130 pages of text, should be compared with the breakdown of the same section in the so-called Lesser Logic, in the *Encyclopedia*. Here it is, in full:

- A. Quality
  - a. Being
  - b. Existence
  - c. Being for itself

That is it, in all three editions of the *Encyclopedia*.

The *Encyclopedia* text on this section comprises less than a dozen pages, even in the third edition. The *Encyclopedia* is a syllabus that invites yet further reduction to a chart. But Hegel's *Logic* is a work of an altogether different character, as even these three pages of the table of contents may suggest.

The *Logic* is indeed a marvel of organization, and the use of "Notes" is altogether ingenious. This device allows Hegel to anticipate objections, to elaborate, and to digress, while at the same time presenting an outline that is extraordinarily neat with its repeated triadic pattern. The structure is clear and pleases the eye in its astounding simplicity; but scope, profundity, and the riches of an unusually comprehensive mind are never sacrificed to it. Whatever seems worth saying, is said—if necessary, in a Note.

FIRST EDITION: 1812

Second Chapter: Existence [*Das Dasein*]

## A. Existence as such

1. Existence in general
2. Reality [*Realität*]
  - a. Being other
  - b. Being for another and being in itself
  - c. Reality

Note: Ordinary meaning of reality

3. Something

## B. Determinateness

1. Limit
2. Determinateness
  - a. Determination
  - b. Condition [*Beschaffenheit*]
  - c. Quality

Note: Ordinary meaning of quality

3. Change [*Veränderung*]
  - a. Change of condition
  - b. Ought and barrier

Note: You ought to because you can

- c. Negation

## C. (Qualitative) Infinity

1. Finitude and infinity
2. Reciprocal determination of the finite and the infinite
3. Return of the infinite into itself

Note: Ordinary juxtaposition of the finite and infinite

## REVISED VERSION

Second Chapter: Existence [*Das Dasein*]

## A. Existence as such

- a. Existence in general
- b. Quality

Note: Reality and negation

- c. Something

## B. Finitude

- a. Something and something other
- b. Determination, condition [*Beschaffenheit*], and limit
- c. Finitude

The immediacy of finitude

The barrier and the ought

Note: The ought

Transition of the finite into the infinite

## C. Infinity

- a. The infinite in general
- b. Reciprocal determination of the finite and the infinite
- c. Affirmative infinity

The transition

Note 1: Infinite progress

Note 2: Idealism

FIRST EDITION: 1812

Third Chapter: Being for itself [*Das Fürsichsein*]

## A. Being for itself as such

1. Being for itself in general
2. The moments of being for itself
  - a. Its being in itself
  - b. Being for one [*Für eines seyn*]  
Note: *Was für einer?*
  - c. Ideality
3. Becoming of the one

B. The one [*Das Eins*]

1. The one and the void  
Note: Atomism
2. Many ones (repulsion)  
Note: Multiplicity of monads
3. Mutual repulsion

## C. Attraction

1. A one [*Ein Eins*]
2. Balance [*Gleichgewicht*] of attraction and repulsion  
Note: The Kantian construction of matter out of the force of attraction and repulsion
3. Transition to quantity

## REVISED VERSION

Third Chapter: Being for itself [*Das Fürsichsein*]

## A. Being for itself as such

- a. Existence and being for itself
- b. Being for one [*Sein-für-Eines*]

Note: The expression: *Was für eines?*

- c. One

## B. One and many

- a. The one in itself
- b. The one and the void

Note: Atomism

- c. Many ones. Repulsion

Note: Leibnizian monad

## C. Repulsion and attraction

- a. Exclusion of the one

Note: Principle of the unity of the one and the many

- b. The one one of attraction

- c. The relation of repulsion and attraction

Note: The Kantian construction of matter out of the force of attraction and repulsion

Can Hegel's many triads be construed as so many theses, antitheses, and syntheses, even if he himself did not choose to do this? Let us look at them, beginning with the first three chapters: Existence (Chapter 2) is hardly the antithesis of Being (Chapter 1), and Being for itself (Chapter 3) is not their synthesis.

Nor will this construction work when we consider the A, B, and C of the third chapter, or their further subdivisions. The story is the same when we turn back to the second chapter: finitude is certainly not the antithesis of existence as such, and infinity cannot well be construed as their synthesis. Again, the subdivisions, too, do not lend themselves to that kind of dialectic.

The sole possible exception comes in the first chapter: the first triad of the book, that of being, nothing, and becoming, seems to substantiate the myth; though even here the further breakdown of the discussion of becoming will not fit, and even the mere headings of Notes 2 and 3 suggest the shallowness of the traditional misrepresentation.

It is tempting to suggest that those who cling to the legend of thesis, antithesis, and synthesis have obviously never got beyond the first triad, and have not even read the Notes that explain what it is all about. While this is unquestionably true in the majority of cases, the way a legend spreads is, of course, different. It is not true that everyone, or almost everyone, who believes in it has come to believe it on his own, by drawing a false conclusion from, say, the first triad. People are taught the legend before they have read any Hegel—or any Nietzsche, or the four Gospels—and when they finally look at some of the books themselves, few indeed read these books straight through, with an open mind. In fact, doing that with a really unprejudiced mind, discounting everything one has been taught for years, is so difficult that it borders on the impossible.

Typically, people read a little here and there, are delighted when they find what fits in with their preconceptions, and actually assume that they have now found for themselves what they had merely assumed previously. What does not readily fit is usually discounted as being due to one's imperfect knowl-

edge. After all, everybody knows—well, what precisely? The truth of the legend.

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Still, we should consider the first triad in some detail. We find that the text down to Note 1 takes up a mere two pages, even with the three big, space-consuming headings: Being, Nothing, and Becoming. But the four Notes take up twenty pages in the first edition, almost thirty in the second.

Here is what Hegel has to say about “being”:

“*Being, pure being*—without all further determination. In its undetermined immediacy it is equal only to itself, and is not even unequal to something else, has no difference within it, nor toward the outside. Any determination or content that would be differentiated in it, or by which it would be posited as differentiated from something else, would mean that we no longer held fast to it in its purity. It is pure undeterminateness and emptiness.—There is *nothing* in it to be intuited, if one can here speak of intuition; or it is only this pure, empty intuition itself. Just as little is there anything in it to be thought, or it is just as much only this empty thinking. Being, the undetermined and immediate, is indeed *nothing*, and not more nor less than *nothing*.<sup>35</sup>”

After this comes the equally brief discussion of “nothing”:

“*Nothing, pure nothing*; it is simple equality with itself, complete emptiness, lack of all determination and content; non-differentiation in itself.—Insofar as intuition or thinking can be mentioned here, it is considered a difference whether something or *nothing* is intuited or thought. To intuit or think nothing thus has a meaning<sup>35</sup>; both are differentiated, so there *is* (exists) nothing in our intuition or thought<sup>35</sup>; or rather it is the empty intuition or thinking itself; and the same empty intuition or thinking as pure being.—Nothing is thus the same determination, or rather lack of determination, and thus altogether the same as pure *being*.<sup>35</sup>”

<sup>35</sup>The phrase between the two figures was slightly different in the first edition.

Now comes "C. Becoming. 1. Unity of being and nothing"; and this is equally brief:

"*Pure being and pure nothing are thus the same.* What is truth is neither being nor nothing, but rather that being has passed over—not that it is passing over—into nothing, and nothing into being. But just as much is truth not their non-differentiation but rather<sup>36</sup> that they are *not the same*,<sup>36</sup> that they are *absolutely different*, but just as much undivided and indivisible, and that *each immediately disappears in its opposite*. Their truth is thus this *movement* of the immediate disappearance of one in the other; *becoming*; a movement in which both are differentiated, but by a difference that has just as immediately dissolved."

Even this initial brief account is very different from the usual versions of Hegel's claim and fits our remarks about Hegel's approach to the categories. But if Hegel had stopped this discussion at this point in order to hurry on to the next triad, and hence to another, and yet another, we might still feel that he was somewhat oracular and had perhaps put something over on his audience. But now come the four Notes, all designed to elucidate what Hegel meant and what he did not mean.

It will suffice to quote some of the highlights. This discussion cannot serve as a substitute for reading Hegel's *Logic*; it is meant to clear away misconceptions and impediments and to show how the book is to be read.

We begin with Note 1:

"*Nothing* is usually opposed to *something*; but *something* is already a determinate being which is different from other somethings; thus the nothing that is opposed to something, the nothing of something, is also a determinate nothing. But here 'nothing' is to be taken in its undetermined simplicity.<sup>37</sup>—If it should be considered more correct that instead of nothing, *not-being* should be opposed to being, considering the result there would be no objection to this. . . . But what matters first is not the form of opposition . . . but rather the abstract,

<sup>36</sup> The phrase between the two figures is not found in the first edition.

<sup>37</sup> The remainder of this paragraph was added in 1831.

immediate negation, nothing purely for itself, the negation devoid of relation—what, if you wish, could also be expressed by the mere: *not.* . . .

"If the result that being and nothing is the same attracts attention, taken by itself, or seems paradoxical, there is no need to heed that particularly. . . . It would not be difficult to demonstrate this unity of being and nothing in every example, in *every* actuality or thought.<sup>38</sup> One must say the same thing that was said above about immediacy and mediation . . . about *being* and *nothing*: *that nowhere in the heavens and on earth is there anything that does not contain in itself both being and nothing.* To be sure, since here one speaks of *a something* and *what is actual*, these determinations are no longer present in the complete untruth in which they are as being and nothing, but in a further determination; and they are taken, e.g., as the *positive* and the *negative*. . . .

"One cannot try to meet all the confusions into which the ordinary consciousness enters, confronted with such a logical proposition, in every possible way; for they are inexhaustible. Only a few can be mentioned. One reason for such confusions—one among others—is that consciousness carries into such an abstract logical proposition<sup>39</sup> notions of a concrete something, forgetting that here one is not speaking of that but only of the pure abstractions of being and nothing, and that we must stick to these alone.

"Being and nothing is the same; *therefore* it is the same whether I am or am not, whether this house is or is not, whether these hundred dollars are part of my fortune or not.<sup>40</sup> —This inference or application of the proposition changes the meaning of the proposition completely. The proposition contains the pure abstractions of being and nothing; but the application makes of them a determinate being and a determi-

<sup>38</sup> The remainder of this paragraph was added in 1831.

<sup>39</sup> 1812: the paragraph was different up to this point, as follows: "The confusion into which the ordinary consciousness enters, confronted with such a logical proposition, is due to the fact that it carries into it . . ."

<sup>40</sup> Only a browser could mistake this for Hegel's own view.

nate nothing. But of a determinate being, as noted, one is not speaking at this point.”<sup>41</sup>

The example of the hundred dollars leads Hegel to discuss Kant’s analysis of the ontological proof of God’s existence at some length, and this in turn leads to the remark<sup>42</sup> “that man should raise himself to this abstract generality in his mind, so that in fact it becomes a matter of indifference to him whether the hundred dollars . . . are or are not, just as it is indifferent to him whether he is or is not . . . *si fractus illabatur orbis, impavidum ferient ruinae*, a Roman said,<sup>43</sup> and a Christian should maintain such indifference even more.”

The second Note is shorter than the first; and we shall excerpt it too:

“Another reason may be cited which is conducive to the aversion against the proposition about being and nothing. This reason is that the expression of the result . . . in the proposition, *being and nothing is one and the same*, is imperfect. The accent is placed preferably on the *one and the same*, as one would generally do in a proposition in which only the predicate proclaims what the subject is. The meaning therefore seems to be that the difference is denied, although it appears immediately in the proposition itself; for it pronounces the *two* determinations, being and nothing, and contains them as differentiated. . . . Insofar as the proposition, *being and nothing is the same*, pronounces the identity of these determinations, while also containing both as differentiated, it contradicts itself and dissolves itself. If we stick to this, a proposition is here posited which, on closer examination, contains the movement to disappear through itself. But in this way what happens to it is precisely what is supposed to constitute its true content; namely, *becoming*.

“. . . The sentence in the form of a *proposition* is not felicitous for the expression of speculative truths; acquaintance

<sup>41</sup> 1812, 23–26; 1841, 74–77.

<sup>42</sup> Only in the revised edition.

<sup>43</sup> Horace, *Odes*. III.3,7: “Even if the sky fell, broken, the ruins would slay an intrepid man.” Freud also loved this quotation.

with this circumstance would help to do away with many misunderstandings of speculative truths."<sup>44</sup>

This last point had been made by Hegel at some length in the preface to the *Phenomenology*, and is discussed in the commentary, where something is also said about his reiteration of this point in the *Encyclopedia* (II.1.25). It is one of the central points of Hegel's philosophy and as relevant to the comprehension of his *Logic* as it is to the *Phenomenology*.

The point of the *Logic* is not to flout the law of contradiction, to confound common sense, and to climb, by means of some Indian rope trick, over theses, antitheses, and syntheses, out of sight, to the absolute. What Hegel offers is a critique of our categories, an attempt to show how one-sided and abstract they are, and a work that should destroy uncritical reliance on unexamined concepts and dogmatic insistence on propositions that invite contradiction. Far from taking a delight in contradictions and paradoxes, Hegel tries to show how these are inevitable unless we carefully analyze our terms and recognize what a proposition can and cannot do.

## 47

The prose of the *Logic* is worlds removed from the prose of Heidegger, both in *Being and Time* and in *What is Metaphysics*, which revolves around "the nothing"; and Hegel's thought is, too. The distinction between being [*das Sein*] and beings [*Seiendes*] is common to both but comes from Aristotle.<sup>45</sup> What Heidegger does with being and nothing is not

<sup>44</sup> 1841, 83 f. In the first edition this Note is altogether different.

<sup>45</sup> Cf. Ros., 287 f: Many readers resisted Hegel's *Logik* "because they did not want to think the very beginning, the Concept of being as such [*des Seins als solchen*], but always looked behind this absolute abstraction for a particular substance, a being [*ein Sein*]. *Being* [*Das Sein*] was right away supposed to be something, a being [*ein Etwas, ein Seiendes*] . . . he had formed his German designations after Greek models in *Plato* and *Aristotle*; for *being-for-itself, being other, being-in-and-for-itself, being identical with oneself* all accord with ancient Greek usage, except that this was often much bolder still, as Aristotle's *to ti ēn einai* [the what it is

merely different from what Hegel did with them; it is based on a total and unfortunate neglect of Hegel's discussion of these terms.

Heidegger begins *Being and Time* (1927) as a great quest for being, which allegedly has been covered up by beings. From the start, being is given the mystique of something long lost that we must seek; and human existence is then studied as one mode of being—the mode we as human beings know best—in the hope that through such a study we might gain some inkling of what being is. The suggestion throughout is that knowing something of human existence is relatively paltry; such knowledge is scarcely worth while; a philosopher should not bother with it—and Heidegger himself assuredly would not stoop so low—if it were not for the hope that we might acquire at least a little knowledge of being, which is held to be far bigger and better.

In Heidegger's later writings being has acquired such a sacred aura that talk of Heidegger's *Seinsmystik* (his mysticism of being) has long been a commonplace. He is on the way toward being; a vision of being is not vouchsafed to our generation; our time is one in which being has been forgotten, and being has forgotten us; all one can hope to do is to start in the direction of being and perhaps take a few steps.

In *What is Metaphysics?* (published two years after *Being and Time* and well before the later writings just referred to) Heidegger discussed the revelation of the nothing in the experience of anxiety. What are we afraid of when we experience *Angst*—as opposed to fear, which is fear of something particular? Nothing! In this lecture, often reprinted with a subsequently added postscript and an introduction added still later, Heidegger created a great mystique around the nothing, which was criticized by Rudolf Carnap as a semantic confusion.<sup>46</sup>

The point that must be stressed in our context is that such writings are *not* excrescences of Hegel's spirit, but, on the

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to be that thing, or "essence"] and *entelecheia* show, as is well known."

<sup>46</sup> Cf. WK 351, 432, and 438.

contrary, examples of the sort of thing Hegel hoped to prevent henceforth by means of his discussion of being and nothing. He tried to strip them of their aura. He discussed them as the poorest and most abstract categories and found it understandable and fitting that Parmenides, so near the beginning of Western philosophy, should have extolled being.<sup>47</sup> Any attempt to go back to Parmenides in modern times and to extol being in any comparable manner would have struck Hegel as utterly perverse and as evidence that anyone proposing to do such a thing had not profited from over two thousand years of philosophical thought—which Heidegger, to be sure, has renounced as an egregious fall from grace.

This historical digression is doubly pertinent because it shows how Hegel's *Logic* is indeed, as he himself suggested, abstract and isolated only for those who come to it for the first time, ignorant—to recall Hegel's own image—of other languages and sciences. For those who have lived with his ideas for a while, and who have studied other things, too, the relevance of his discussions becomes obvious. And the alleged essentialist who, a new generation supposes, ought to hang his head in shame when confronted with the existentialists of the twentieth century, is quite able to hold his own. In fact, Hegel might say, quoting the title of one of his essays: *Who thinks abstractly?*

## 48

In the *Logic*, as in the *Phenomenology*, Hegel is the philosopher of abundance in the same sense that one might call Shakespeare's poetry the poetry of abundance. For the second time he tries to write a book with a limited aim, and this time he actually begins by apologizing for its unavoidable abstractness; and for the second time the work transcends his limited intentions, reaches out to embrace ever so much more, and in the end anticipates his system.

The idea of Hegel as a desiccated professor who eked out a

<sup>47</sup> First page of Note I: 1841, 74; Glockner's ed., IV, 89.

book at a time by ceaselessly applying a mechanical method —a thinker who did not really have very much to say because, after all, he had never had a concrete experience in his life —founders on the *Logic* as it does on the *Phenomenology*. Not counting the various prefaces, introductions, and essays in the beginning, the first volume alone contains thirty-three “Notes”<sup>48</sup>; the second has sixteen; and the last, which differs completely from the first two, as we shall see in a moment, only two. In the text, these Notes have no titles, except for the word *Anmerkung*; in the table of contents, most of them have a title indicating their approximate content, but some of them do not. Certainly, most of them were not written on set topics that were planned in advance for those particular places; and the great majority of the titles in the table of contents represent afterthoughts. The *Logic* is the work of a man who has a vast number of things to say, and who asks himself *afterwards* how best to arrange what he has said in an orderly fashion.

A man once called on a professor to ask permission to audit his seminar. He was working on a book, he said, and felt that the seminar would be of great help to him. To substantiate the impression he wished to make, he opened his brief case and produced two enormous spring binders. Opened, they revealed perhaps a thousand pages, each blank except for one or two lines. “Critique of Nicolai Hartmann,” said a typical page. “What are you going to say by way of criticizing him?” asked the professor. “I don’t know yet,” replied the man, who was twice the professor’s age; “that’s why I want to take your seminar.”

Hegel was close to the opposite extreme, much nearer to Nietzsche than to this poor “author.” But instead of beginning in his late twenties, or at least at thirty when he first came to Jena, to publish something like a book a year containing his current thoughts, he kept accumulating material and ideas and then faced the terrible problem of finally writing an orderly book. If his mind had not been so crowded with ideas that urgently pressed on him, he might have written more ordinary

<sup>48</sup> 1812: twenty-eight, one of them not included in the table of contents.

volumes. But as soon as the dike was broken and he began to write the *Phenomenology*, and later the *Logic*, everything threatened to rush in.

What exactly does the *Logic* contain? We have reproduced the “contents” of the first section, *Quality*. The second is called *Quantity*, and on the second page of it a “Note” (without title) begins. Then there are the usual three chapters, with their usual A, B, C, and with “Notes” on various subjects, including “Kantian antinomy of indivisibility and the infinite divisibility of time, space, matter”; “Modes of calculation in arithmetic. Kantian synthetic propositions *a priori* of intuition”; “Kant’s application of the determination of degree to the being of the soul”; “The high opinion of progress *ad infinitum*”; Kant’s antinomy of the finitude and infinity of the world; the mathematical infinite; and the differential calculus.

The third section is called *Measure*, and there is the usual triadic division and subdivision, and as usual the triads cannot be construed as theses, antitheses, syntheses. A long excursus on elective affinities deserves special mention, as Goethe’s novel with that title had appeared in 1809.

The second volume of the *Objective Logic*, the so-called *Doctrine of Essence*, is organized as follows. Some omissions are clearly indicated; but by simply omitting all the “Notes” one would falsify the tenor and dissemble the richness of the volume.

## FIRST SECTION: ESSENCE AS REFLECTION IN ITSELF

### First Chapter: Semblance [*Der Schein*]

- A. The essential and unessential
- B. Semblance
- C. Reflection [subdivided further]

### Second Chapter: . . . the determinations of reflection

Note: The determinations of reflections in the form of propositions [or, principles]

- A. Identity [followed by 2 Notes]

Note 2: First original law of thought, the principle of identity

- B. Difference [3 subdivisions and 2 Notes]

- C. Contradiction

Note 1: Unity of the positive and the negative

Note 2: The principle of the excluded middle

Note 3: The principle of contradiction

### Third Chapter: The ground [*Grund*]

Note: The principle of [sufficient] reason [*Grund*]

- A. The absolute ground

- a. Form and essence
- b. Form and matter
- c. Form and content

- B. The determinate ground [3 subdivisions and 2 Notes]

- C. The condition [*Bedingung*]

## SECOND SECTION: APPEARANCE [Die Erscheinung]

## First Chapter: Existence [Die Existenz]

- A. The thing and its attributes
  - a. Thing-in-itself and existence
  - b. Attribute

Note: The thing-in-itself of transcendental idealism

- c. The reciprocity of things

## B. The thing's consisting of matter

## C. The dissolution of the thing [followed by a Note]

## Second Chapter: Appearance [3 subparts]

## Third Chapter: The essential relation

## A. The relation of the whole and the parts

Note: Infinite divisibility

## B. The relation of force and its expression [3 subparts]

## C. Relation of the internal and external

Note: Immediate identity of the internal and external

THIRD SECTION: ACTUALITY [*Die Wirklichkeit*]

First Chapter: The absolute [3 subparts]

Note: Spinozistic and Leibnizian philosophy

Second Chapter: Actuality

- A. The accidental, or formal actuality, possibility, and necessity
- B. Relative necessity or real actuality, possibility, and necessity
- C. Absolute necessity

Third Chapter: The absolute relation

- A. Relation of substantiality
- B. Relation of causality [3 subparts]
- C. Reciprocity

There is one problem of translation that ought to be mentioned, though it fortunately does not have to be solved here. The second chapter of the *Logic* is entitled *Das Dasein*, rendered above as "Existence," and the first chapter of the "Second Section: Appearance" of the *Doctrine of Essence* is entitled *Die Existenz*. In a complete translation of the work one would obviously have to find two different English terms. The trouble is that there is no English equivalent for *Dasein*, which in German is a common and entirely untechnical term, by no means as cumbersome as "being-there." In English, "he is there" is as plain as *er ist da*; but "being-there" as a noun has quite a different ring.

These pages should fulfill several functions. First, they ought to give the reader some idea of the range of topics in the *Objective Logic*. Second, they should show where one can find Hegel's discussions of any number of crucial terms. Third, they should enable the reader to see for himself whether the procession of the categories is governed by the three-step of thesis-antithesis-synthesis. And finally, they show how many of the headings are plainly afterthoughts. The First Chapter is called "Semblance," and so is the second of its three parts. Similarly, the Second Section is called "Appearance," and so is the second of its three chapters. The point is not to blame Hegel on that score but rather to show that he meant what he said when he disparaged all "the subdivisions and titles of the books, sections, and chapters" (first quotation in H 43).

## 49

The last part of Hegel's *Logic* is in important respects a different kind of work from the first two. That is why Hegel himself did not divide the work as a whole into three parts but rather into two volumes, subdividing the first volume—the *Objective Logic*—into two parts. So far we have confined our attention to these: they are the part of the *Logic* that was meant to replace traditional metaphysics.

The *Subjective Logic*, though subtitled "The Doctrine of the Concept," was meant to treat the traditional subject matter of

logic. It contains only two Notes, and it will suffice if we give the barest outline.

### FIRST SECTION: SUBJECTIVITY

First Chapter: The Concept [3 subparts]

Second Chapter: The proposition

- A. The proposition of existence [*Dasein*; 3 subparts]
- B. The proposition of reflection [3 subparts]
- C. The proposition of necessity [3 subparts]
- D. The proposition of the Concept [3 subparts]

Third Chapter: The inference

- A. The inference of existence [*Dasein*; 4 subparts; Note]
- B. The inference of reflection
- C. The inference of necessity

### SECOND SECTION: OBJECTIVITY

First Chapter: Mechanism [3 subparts, 2 subdivided further]

Second Chapter: Chemism [3 subparts]

Third Chapter: Teleology [3 subparts]

### THIRD SECTION: THE IDEA

First Chapter: Life [3 subparts]

Second Chapter: The idea of knowledge

- A. The idea of the true
  - a. Analytical knowledge
  - b. Synthetic knowledge
    - 1. The definition
    - 2. The subdivision
    - 3. The axiom

- B. The idea of the good

Third Chapter: The absolute idea [no further subdivision]

Very little needs to be said about this volume. In the second chapter, which for once is divided into four parts, A, B, C, D, Hegel covers the traditional table of judgments: positive, negative, and infinite; singular, particular, and universal; categorical, hypothetical, and disjunctive; assertorial, problematic, and apodictic.

In the third chapter, under A he takes up the traditional four figures; under B the inferences of totality, induction, and analogy; under C, the categorical, hypothetical, and disjunctive inference.

None of this is really of a kind with the *Objective Logic*, and Hegel himself made plain that it was not. The point requires emphasis only because it shows how misguided all attempts are to construe the *Logic* as a relentless ascent from "being" to "the absolute." What makes this popular legend doubly silly is the fact that "the absolute" appears not at all at the pinnacle, but in the second part of the *Objective Logic* (i.e., in the second of the three volumes), and not even at the pinnacle of that but at the *beginning* of its third section, surmounted, of all things, by "actuality" (hardly in keeping with the tag of "essentialism").

There is no relentless ascent; there is rather an attempt to organize an excess of material. After traditional metaphysics has been replaced by an *Objective Logic*, which deliberately follows the precedent set by Kant's Transcendental Logic, the subject matter of traditional logic still requires a niche in the system—and is given one, rather oddly, *above* the analysis of the categories which has supplanted metaphysics. Hegelian metaphysics comes at the bottom, traditional logic above it. We simply have to discard the popular misrepresentations and all considerations of tops and bottoms. The analysis of the categories comes first because all subsequent discourse, including logic, involves them. Traditional logic is a way of manipulating such categories.

Some other subjects still remained to be taken care of before the philosophy of nature: they are put into the second of the three sections. By calling the first, which covers traditional logic, "Subjectivity," and this one "Objectivity," a semblance of symmetry is created; and one must concede that the whole

arrangement looks very neat. Alas, it looks too neat. The poor man who was struggling to impose some order on excess and abundance created such an imposing appearance of neatness that readers who saw little but the table of contents assumed that the relentless progress upwards of which they had been told was plainly there, with "Objectivity" the plain antithesis of "Subjectivity," as if these two headings were not the most palpable afterthoughts.

It should at least have struck such non-readers that while the "Subjective" Logic came above the "Objective" Logic, here "Objectivity" comes above "Subjectivity." Hegel's emphatic disclaimer about all these headings (H 43) wants to be taken at face value. It would perhaps be excessively irreverent to say that there still had to be a "third section" which naturally became the place for any leftovers—much as a speaker, groping for a conclusion after an unusually long talk, looks for a few high-sounding and noble words that will make a good ending. So Hegel brings in life and knowledge, the true and the good—but suddenly, almost unaccountably, stops with "B. The idea of the good" and does *not* round it off with "C. The idea of the beautiful." There is no "C" this time, and the beautiful is left out of the *Logic*.

This omission is the beauty spot on the otherwise too-perfect complexion of the work. It seems deliberate, a touch of spite, an indication that the author was not a slave to triads. In any case, in the *Encyclopedia* "The Idea" is still subdivided into "Life," "Knowledge" (this heading represents a very slight change from "The idea of knowledge"), and "The absolute idea"; but "Knowledge" is not broken down into the true and the good, as in the *Logic*, but into "knowing" and "willing."

The four volumes—or two books—which unquestionably constitute Hegel's most original contributions were written by him between the ages of thirty-five and forty-five when he was lonely and far from successful. Other philosophers, his own age or even a little younger, had obtained chairs and fame,

while he had no influence whatsoever. When the first book came out, he was editing a small newspaper; when the second came out in three installments, he was earning his living as the headmaster of a secondary school.

How obviously miscast he was in that role was summed up best by Clemens Brentano, the famous romantic, in a letter to a friend. One may well doubt the truth of his remark, but there is no denying that it is at least well invented: "In Nürnberg I found the honest, wooden Hegel as the principal of the Gymnasium; he read the *Edda* and *Nibelungen*, and to be able to enjoy them he translated them, as he was reading, into Greek."<sup>49</sup>

Hegel was indeed as far as ever from the romantics' aspirations to glorify the German past and the Catholic Middle Ages, aspirations with which Brentano was prominently associated. Hegel was no patriot; he had no real home; he did not belong anywhere. He put his heart into the books he was writing—and into a sentence that he wrote into a *Stammbuch* where it lay buried until it was published in 1960:<sup>50</sup>

"Not curiosity, not vanity, not the consideration of expediency, not duty and conscientiousness, but an unquenchable, unhappy thirst that brooks no compromise leads us to truth.

Nürnberg, Sep. 30, 1809      Written to remember  
HEGEL, Prof. & Principal."

<sup>49</sup> Joseph von Görres, *Gesammelte Briefe*, II (1874), 75; quoted in Fischer, 2d ed. (1911), 1209.

<sup>50</sup> B IV, 67.