

arliness, which come ever nearer to a scholar. That is the continuity of kinds in the logical sense. The physical proposition of the continuity of the forms <formarum> is quite different from the logical. The physical [proposition] has indeed a great lustre in reason, but not in its execution. I do find a transition from the mineral kingdom into the plant kingdom, which is already a beginning of life; further from the plant kingdom into the animal kingdom, where there are also various small degrees of life; but the highest life is freedom, which I find with human beings. If I go still further, then I am already among thinking beings in the ideal world. Now it is asked whether this determines itself, or whether the series continues. If one says: God ends the series; then *Voltaire* correctly says: God does not belong to the series, rather he *maintains* the series; he is, according to his nature, wholly different from the series, and if the series could be continued to infinity, one still could not come upon beings who would be next to God, and [go] from this immediately to God. *Voltaire* says: human beings like to imagine such series; e.g., from the Pope down to the Capuchins.<sup>1</sup> But this would still not be a continuous quantum <quantum continuum>, but rather a discrete one <discretum>, whose parts are determinable in space. If creatures exist there still must be a space between one and the other creature, in which there is no infinite degree of intermediate creatures; thus the physical law of continuity is only *comparative*.<sup>2</sup>

### ON THE PARTS OF THE UNIVERSE

28:206 It is very good to bring the dogmatist into motion, so that he does not believe: he is sure and his matter is certain. A certain kind of skeptical method is therefore necessary to form doubt, in order better to comprehend and discover the truth. Now which doubts are these? The first thing that is entirely certain is this: that I am; I feel myself, I know for certain that I am; but with just such certainty I do not know that other beings are outside me. I do see appearances (phenomena); but I am not certain that the same thing underlies these appearances; for in dreams I also have representations and appearances, and were the dreams only orderly, so that one would always begin to dream where one had left off, then one could always maintain that one was in the other world. Thus here I also cannot know what underlies the appearance. – Whoever maintains that nothing exists besides himself is an egoist. One cannot refute an egoist by demonstration, and indeed for this reason, that from the same effects <causatis> one cannot infer the cause. These appearances could indeed have many other causes underlying them, which produce just such effects. The possibility of two causes of the same effect thus makes it that one cannot prove it apodictically to the egoist.<sup>3</sup>

That appearances are, is certain; but that we cannot know *what* underlies the appearances comes from this, that our intuitions are not intellec-

tual, but rather sensuous. *We know nothing more of things than the manner in which we are affected by them; but not what is in the things.* – He who imagines that bodies have no reality,<sup>1</sup> but rather are only appearances, that there are no true objects of the senses, which actual beings underlie, who thus assumes mere spirits, and no substances underlying the body, he is an idealist.

Egoism and idealism can be taken in two ways in philosophy: *problematically* and *dogmatically*. *Problematically* it is only a skeptical trial for testing the strength of certainty, and indeed of egoism for the existence of other beings, and of idealism for the existence of corporeal beings outside of us. It is a skeptical test of the reliability of my senses. The reliability of inner sense is certain. I am, I feel that and intuit myself immediately. This proposition thus has a reliability of experience. But that something is *outside me*, of that the senses can provide no reliability; for the appearances can indeed be a play of my power of imagination. – Further the senses also cannot provide any reliability against idealism, for bodies could indeed be only the manner of the appearance, how we are affected by them. It is not proved yet that bodies are, just because I see; for such appearance can also always take place without the things, just as, e.g., color, warmth, the rainbow are not properties of bodies, but rather only the manner in which we are affected by objects. The senses prove only *the manner of the contact* by the appearances in me. Egoism and idealism are thus a skeptical trial *where one denies not the things, but rather takes away the reliability of the senses*. That the senses cannot give any proof (which is very good in philosophy) serves to distinguish the investigations. The understanding can indeed add something to the reliability of the senses, for if things are altered, then there must be in them a ground of the alteration. Thus egoism and idealism remain as problematic in philosophy.<sup>1</sup>

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But *dogmatic egoism* is a hidden Spinozism.<sup>4</sup> *Spinoza* says: there is only one being, and all others are modifications of the one being. *Dogmatic idealism* is mystical, and can be called *Platonic idealism*. I myself intuit myself, but bodies only as they affect me. But this manner does not teach me the properties of things, e.g., wax held by a fire melts, and clay dries. Thus the difference lies here in the bodies, how they are affected. But bodies are pure appearances which something must underlie. So far I have philosophized correctly. But if I want to go further in the determinations, then I deteriorate into mystical idealism. *If I maintain thinking beings of which I have intellectual intuition, then that is mystical*. But intuition is only sensuous, for only the senses intuit; the understanding does not intuit, but rather reflects. Dogmatic egoism and idealism must be banned from

<sup>1</sup> We follow Lehmann in changing *Realstaten* (realities) in Politz to *Realstat* (reality) (206<sub>26</sub>).

<sup>1</sup> Pölitz reads *Idealismus als problematisch in der Philosophie*, which we follow; Lehmann omits *als* and moves *problematisch* (207<sub>17</sub>).

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philosophy because it is of no use. *Leibniz* was attached to Platonic idealism. He says: the world is an aggregate of monads, and their essential power is the power of representation *<vis repraesentativa>*. I cannot imagine any other power than the thinking power as essential in substances; all others are only modifications. Representation is thus the only one that I can cognize absolutely as an accident in substances. Accordingly, *Leibniz* thus says: all substances are monads or simple parts that have power of representation *<vim repraesentativam>*, and appear among all phenomena *<phaenomenis>*. But it was already just said: all appearance is continuous, and no part of the appearance is simple, thus bodies do not consist of simple parts or monads. However, if they are thought through the understanding the substantial composites *<composita substantialia>* consist of simple parts. But whether all substances *<substantialia>* have representative power *<vim repraesentativam>* cannot be decided here. Thus the proposition that leads us to the mystical and intelligible worlds *<mundo mystico . . . intelligibili>* is banned from philosophy.

Now we come to the transcendental concepts of bodies, and that is *impenetrability* and *extension*. Impenetrability means the resistance of the extended in space, insofar as it is impossible to occupy the space of the object other than by annihilation of the object, thus what can fill a space and resists the impossibility of sustaining its presence in space.

Mathematical points were already discussed above. Matter does [not]<sup>1</sup> consist of simple parts, thus not of points. Physical points *<puncta physica>* are a contradiction *<contradictio>*; they are supposed to mean appearance that is simple and immediate. All points are mathematical; they are not parts, but rather determinations.

The location of each thing is a point. If I want to know the location of a thing, e.g., of the moon, then I must search it until the center, and there no grain of sand can be the location; for otherwise one could ask, on<sup>k</sup> which side of the grain of sand is the location? Rather the location is a point. Thus space does not consist of points, much less matter of simple parts.

## ON THE GENESIS OF BODIES

~~The connection of substances constitutes what is essential in the concept of the world. Reciprocal action constitutes the form of the world. Reaction *<reactio>* is reaction.<sup>1</sup> Reciprocal action is in the whole, and here a substance is acting *<agens>*; and so there must be a reciprocal action with every whole. Not every reaction is a counteraction. Counteraction is resistance *<resistentia>*; but not every reaction *<reactio>* is a resistance *<re-*~~

<sup>k</sup> We follow Lehmann in changing *von* (in Pölitiz) to *auf* (208<sub>26</sub>).

<sup>1</sup> Here the Latin *reactio* is given its German equivalent, *Rückwirkung* (208<sub>32</sub>). Related words in this passage are *Wechselwirkung* (reciprocal action) and *Gegenwirkung* (counteraction).