

my having grey hair as something that makes it true that two plus two equals four. An enormous amount of work would have to be done in order to develop a coherent, plausible relevance logic, but these few comments might allow me to get away with using the concept of relevant entailment in this context.

Acquaintance and Noninferential Justification

I have suggested that neither a belief nor the truth of what is believed is by itself a plausible justification at all, let alone the kind of justification that might entail the truth of what is believed. Rather, we must stand in some sort of special *relation* to the truth of what is believed, or more precisely, we must stand in some sort of special relation to the fact that makes true what we believe. I have argued elsewhere that the most fundamental concept required to make sense of traditional foundationalism is the concept of acquaintance. In order to explain my acquaintance theory of noninferential justification, however, I must briefly digress and sketch a highly controversial theory of truth and intentionality.

I take the primary bearers of truth value to be thoughts (which I also refer to as propositions). The secondary bearers of truth value are the linguistic items that express them. Thoughts I take to be nonrelational properties of a mind or self, properties whose presence is logically distinct from, though no doubt causally dependent on, and paralleled by, brain states. Thoughts can be true or false. True thoughts correspond to or "picture" facts. False thoughts fail to correspond. A fact is a nonlinguistic complex that consists in an entity or entities exemplifying properties. The world contained facts long before it contained minds and thoughts. In one perfectly clear sense the world contained no truths before there were conscious beings, for without conscious beings there would be no bearers of truth value. There were facts that would have made true the relevant thoughts had they existed, and by employing counterfactuals we can make good sense of such commonplace assertions as that it was true hundreds of millions of years ago that there were no conscious beings.

Although I once thought the difference between believing, fearing, hoping, and other intentional states should be understood in terms of a relation that the mind bears to its thought, I now believe that every intentional state *is* a thought. Believing that there are ghosts, fearing that there are ghosts, and hoping that there are ghosts are all *species* of the same thought that there are ghosts. Believing and hoping that there

are ghosts stand to each other as a blue and a yellow Ford Mustang stand to each other. We can represent true and false belief respectively as follows:

S believes truly that $P = \text{Df}$	$'P' * _s$ and $'P' C P$
S believes falsely that $P = \text{Df}$	$'P' * _s$ and it is not the case that there exists some fact x such that $'P' C x$

where s stands for S , ' P ' stands for the thought that P , $*$ indicates that the thought is a belief, C stands for correspondence, P refers to the fact that P , and x is a variable.

This correspondence theory of truth avoids the need for such ontological nightmares as nonexistent states of affairs to serve as the "objects" of false beliefs, and it preserves a much more natural way of understanding the *referents* of sentences, analogous to the referents of names and definite descriptions. Unlike Frege, we have no need for such mysteries as The True and The False to serve as the referents of true and false sentences, respectively. Rather, we adopt the more straightforward view that just as the successful use of a name refers to an individual, so the successful—that is true—attempt to refer to the world with a descriptive sentence succeeds in picking out a fact. Some names, like "Pegasus," do not succeed in referring to any individual, and some sentences, like "Dogs have eight legs," do not refer to any fact. New theories of reference aside, having a referent is not necessary for having meaning, and the thoughts that false sentences express give those sentences meaning despite the fact that they fail to refer.

Acquaintance is *not* another intentional state to be construed as a nonrelational property of the mind. Acquaintance is a *sui generis relation* that holds between a self and a thing, property, or fact. To be acquainted with a fact is not *by itself* to have any kind of propositional knowledge or justified belief, and for that reason I would prefer not to use the old terminology of knowledge by acquaintance. One can be acquainted with a property or fact without even possessing the conceptual resources to *represent* that fact in thought, and certainly without possessing the ability to linguistically express that fact. But if this is true, what has acquaintance got to do with epistemology?

Sellars once argued that the idea of the given in traditional epistemology contains irreconcilable tensions. On the one hand, to ensure that something's being given does not involve any other beliefs, proponents of the view want it to be untainted by the application of *concepts*. The

kinds of data that are given to us are also presumably given in sense experience to all sorts of other creatures. On the other hand, the whole doctrine of the given is designed to end the regress of justification, to give us secure foundations for the rest of what we justifiably infer from the given. But to make sense of making inferences from the given, the given would have to be propositional. Minimally, the given must have a truth value. But the kind of thing that has a truth value involves the application of concepts or thought, a capacity not possessed by at least lower-order animals.¹¹

The solution to the dilemma presented by Sellars and others is to reemphasize that acquaintance is not *by itself* an epistemic relation. Acquaintance is a relation that other animals probably bear to properties and even facts, but it also probably does not give these animals any kind of justification for believing anything, precisely because these other animals probably do not have beliefs to begin with. Without *thought* there is no truth, and without a bearer of truth value there is nothing to be justified or unjustified. But how does acquaintance give us noninferential justification? My suggestion is that one has a noninferentially justified belief that *P* when one has the thought that *P* and one is acquainted with the fact that *P*, the thought that *P*, *and* the relation of correspondence holding between the thought that *P* and the fact that *P*. No single act of acquaintance yields knowledge or justified belief, but when one has the relevant thought, the three acts together constitute noninferential justification. When everything that is *constitutive* of a thought's being true is immediately before consciousness, there is nothing more that one could want or need to justify a belief.

The reader might well complain that if mere acquaintance with a fact does not constitute an epistemic property, surely one cannot conjure up an epistemic property by multiplying acts of acquaintance. But if this is intended to be a formal objection to the view I presented, it involves committing the fallacy of division. Because none of the components of a complex state of affairs constitutes the exemplification of an epistemic property, it does not follow that the complex does not constitute the exemplification of such a property. Classical acquaintance theorists like Russell appropriately emphasized the role of acquaintance with particulars, properties, and even facts in grounding justification. But a fact is not a truth, and what one needs to end a regress of justification is a direct confrontation with *truth*. To secure that confrontation, one needs to be directly aware of not just a truth-maker (a fact to which a truth corresponds) but also a truth-bearer (a thought) and the correspondence that holds between them.

Because the relations of acquaintance and correspondence that the above account appeals to are *sui generis*, there is precious little one can say by way of trying to explain the concept to one who claims not to understand it. Because acquaintance is not like any other relation, there is no useful genus under which to subsume it. One can give examples of facts with which one is acquainted and in this way present a kind of "ostensive" definition of acquaintance, but philosophers who think the concept is gibberish are unlikely to find themselves acquainted with their being acquainted with various facts. When one is acquainted with a fact, the fact is *there* before consciousness. Nothing stands "between" the self and the fact. But these are metaphors and in the end are as likely to be misleading as helpful. Correspondence, too, is sometimes thought of as a picturing relation, but the picturing metaphor is largely responsible for the caricature of the view one so often encounters in the cruder theories of "ideas" as pale copies of reality. It is tempting to at least mention the metaphor of a Kodak print and the scene it depicts as a way of explaining the relation that a true thought bears to the fact with which it corresponds, but most thoughts are not "pictures" and the relation of correspondence has nothing to do with any kind of similarity that holds between the thought and the fact it represents. Correspondence is not like anything else; it cannot be informatively subsumed under a genus, and it cannot be analyzed into any less problematic concepts.

Is acquaintance a source of infallible justification? The answer is in one sense straightforward. If my being acquainted with the fact that *P* is part of what justifies me in believing *P* and if acquaintance is a genuine relation that requires the existence of its relata, then when I am acquainted with the fact that *P*, *P* is true. The fact I am acquainted with is the very fact that makes *P* true. The very source of justification includes that which makes true the belief. In a way it is this idea that makes an acquaintance foundation theory so attractive. I have no need to turn to other beliefs to justify my belief that I am in pain because the very fact that makes the belief true is unproblematically before consciousness, as is the correspondence that holds between my thought and the fact. Again, everything one could possibly want or need by way of justification is there in consciousness.

Notice that the infallibility of the justification provided by acquaintance is due to the presence of the fact itself as a constituent of the justifier. It is interesting to note that in this respect there are remarkable similarities between this classic version of foundationalism and at least some paradigmatic externalist views. On certain causal theories of di-

rect knowledge, for example, my belief that *P* is justified by its being caused in the appropriate way by the fact that *P*, the very fact that makes my belief true. If a causal relationship between the fact that *P* and my belief that *P* were a kind of justification, then that justification too would be infallible. Its existence would, trivially, entail the truth of what I believe. From the fact that a certain justification is infallible, it does *not* follow that one could not mistakenly believe that one has an infallibly justified belief. Certainly the causal theory I have just sketched would have no difficulty imagining a person who mistakenly concluded that his belief that *P* was caused by the fact that *P*, and if the causal theory were correct, that person could mistakenly infer that the justification in support of his belief entailed the truth of what he believed. Similarly, I think that it is in principle possible for a person to mistakenly conclude that he is acquainted with something actually known only through inference. One might trust a philosopher with a mistaken epistemology, for example, and falsely, perhaps even justifiably, believe that one is acquainted with a fact when one is not. Although this complicates matters considerably, I also argue that it may be possible on an acquaintance theory to have noninferential justification that does not entail the truth of what is believed. Specifically, I have argued that one might be acquainted with a fact very similar to the fact that makes *P* true, and such acquaintance might give one a justified but false belief that *P*. It should be clear that this admission is perfectly compatible with the rather trivial claim that when one's justification for believing *P* consists in part in being acquainted with the fact that *P*, that justification is infallible in that it entails the truth of *P*.

If I am asked what reason I have for thinking that there is such a relation as acquaintance, I will, of course, give the unhelpful answer that I am acquainted with such a relation. The answer is question-begging if it is designed to convince someone that there is such a relation, but if the view is true it would be unreasonable to expect its proponent to give any other answer. I can also raise dialectical considerations and object to alternatives. One of the dialectical advantages of the above view is that it can easily respond to some of the classic arguments against the existence of noninferentially justified belief.

One of the most discussed arguments against foundationalism again focuses on concepts. There is no truth value without concept application, the argument goes. But to apply a concept is to make a judgment about class membership, and to make a judgment about class membership always involves relating the thing about which the judgment is made to other paradigm members of the class. These judgments of

relevant similarity will minimally involve beliefs about the past, and thus be inferential in character. Our reply to the argument is straightforward. To make a judgment, say that this is red, involves having the thought that this is red, but the thought does not involve relating this to some other thing. Indeed, it is in principle possible to produce a thought of red in the mind of someone who has never experienced a red thing. Since language is only a secondary and conventional means of representation, it goes without saying that the inferential character of our judgments concerning the linguistically correct way to express a thought are neither here nor there when it comes to the question of whether the thought expressed can be noninferentially justified.

The intelligibility of the above account does rest on the intelligibility of a world that has structure independent of any structure imposed by the mind. Without nonlinguistic facts that are independent of the thoughts that represent them, one could not make sense of a relation of acquaintance between a self and a fact, a relation that grounds direct knowledge. Indeed, I suspect that it is concern with this idea that lies at the heart of much dissatisfaction with traditional foundationalism. Since Kant there has always been a strong undercurrent of antirealism running through philosophy. The metaphor again is that of the mind imposing a structure on reality. And there is an intuitively plausible sense in which one can genuinely wonder whether it makes sense to ask about the number of colors that are exemplified in the world independently of some framework provided by color concepts. But despite the periodic popularity of extreme nominalism and rampant antirealism, it is surely absurd to suppose that it is even in principle possible for a mind to force a structure on a *literally* unstructured world. There are indefinitely many ways to sort the books in a library and some are just as useful as others, but there would be no way to begin sorting books were books undifferentiated. The world comes to us with its differences. Indeed, it comes to us with far too many differences for us to be bothered noticing all of them. And it is in this sense that the mind *does* impose order on chaos. Thought is abstract in the sense that many different actual properties can all correspond to a single thought of red. And it is up to us how finely we want to draw our color concepts. Although I understand that the empirical evidence is at best questionable, it is common for philosophers to call our attention to the alleged fact that some cultures have far more finely grained color concepts than our culture. If one distinguishes color concepts from linguistic terms to express those concepts, the empirical claim is difficult to assess, but one must surely admit that the alleged phenomenon is in principle pos-

sible. Given the above framework for understanding thought and truth, there would be a sense in which the one culture would entertain truths about colors that the other culture would be causally unable to accept. But the fact that there is good sense to be made of the relativity of conceptual frameworks should not mislead one into thinking that the properties exemplified in the world depend for their existence on concepts.

The Acquaintance Theory of Noninferential Justification and the Internalism/Externalism Debate

I have presented at length a view that I take to be the most plausible version of classical foundationalism. In what sense, if any, is it internalist? Well, on the specific version of the view I defended, thought is an internal property of the mind, if by "internal" one means "nonrelational." The crucial concepts of acquaintance and correspondence, however, are relational. It is true that given my own views in normative epistemology, it turns out that it is always a mental state or feature of a mental state with which we are acquainted, and so the complex act of being acquainted with *X* will involve constituents all of which are "internal" to the subject. But it should be emphasized that the *meta-epistemological* acquaintance theory of noninferential justification does not by itself entail any position with respect to what might be the objects of acquaintance. In previous discussion of the attempt to define internalism in terms of internal states being sufficient for justification, I noted that one might be a sense-datum theorist who thinks one can be directly acquainted with the fact that the surface of a physical object exemplifies a certain property. One might think that there are mind-independent universals and claim to be acquainted with them. One might think that there are mind-independent, nonoccurrent states of affairs and claim to be acquainted with logical relations that hold between them. It is at best unclear as to whether or not any of the above acts of acquaintance should be called internal states, and thus equally unclear as to whether a foundationalism defined using the concept of acquaintance is always going to be a species of "internal state" internalism.

As we saw earlier, being internal might also be understood in terms of access. There appears to be a historical use of "in" the mind which makes "in" an epistemic concept. When philosophers used to argue that sense data are "in" the mind, they may have sometimes meant only that we have a kind of privileged access to sense data. Does an

acquaintance theory hold that when one is noninferentially justified in believing *P* one has access to—that is, knowledge or justified belief about—the fact that one has such justification? On the face of it, the answer seems to be no. In the paradigm case, I am noninferentially justified in believing *P* when I have the thought that *P* and am simultaneously acquainted with the thought that *P*, the fact that *P*, and the relation of correspondence holding between them. To have noninferential justification for believing that I am noninferentially justified in believing *P*, I must have that rather complex thought and simultaneously be acquainted with its correspondence to an equally complex fact. And for me to be noninferentially justified in believing that I am noninferentially justified in believing that I am noninferentially justified in believing that *P*, I must be acquainted with facts so complex as to boggle my poor consciousness. Indeed, I am not sure I can keep things straight past the fourth or fifth level. The position that in order to have a noninferentially justified belief on an acquaintance theory one *must* be noninferentially justified in believing that one has such justification invites a vicious regress of infinitely many, increasingly complex conscious states. I would strongly suggest that classic foundationalists decline the invitation.

In his influential attack on foundationalism, BonJour (1985) tried to entice the foundationalist into accepting what amounts to strong access internalism. His argument then involved claiming that any attempt to stop the regress of justification with a noninferentially justified belief would inevitably fail, because the justification would necessarily involve other beliefs. The argument was presented in a schematic way so that it applies to any version of foundationalism including the acquaintance theory discussed above. Let *X* be the properties of a belief that the foundationalist says constitute my noninferential justification for believing *P*. BonJour argues (pp. 31–32) that internalism entails that my belief's being *X* could give me justification for believing *P* only if I were (1) aware that my belief has these properties *X* and (2) aware that when a belief has properties *X* it is likely to be true. At least one of these propositions could be known only as a result of inference. (I argue later that BonJour is committed to the view that knowledge of probability relations is noninferential and so is really committed to the conclusion that it is the awareness of characteristics *X* that will require inference.)

If to be noninferentially justified in believing *P* requires that I have the justified *belief* that I am noninferentially justified in believing *P*, then it initially seems correct that there could not really be any noninferential justification. My belief that *P*, you recall, is noninferentially

justified only if its justification does not consist even partially in the having of other justified beliefs. But my belief that I am justified in believing *P* is a different belief than the belief that *P*, and if the justified metabelief is required for the justification of the first-level belief, how can the first-level belief be noninferentially justified? Ultimately, I believe that the foundationalist must conclude that one cannot hold that noninferential justification entails being justified in believing that one has noninferential justification. Such a view does lead to a vicious regress. In discussing access requirements, however, I briefly distinguished two ways in which one might introduce such requirements, only one of which leads to *conceptual* regress. There is an important distinction between a belief's justification *entailing* the having of other justified beliefs and a belief's justification *consisting* in the having of other justified beliefs. In evaluating the nature of the regress generated by access requirements, we must keep this distinction firmly in mind.

The iteration requirement for noninferential justification is literally *unintelligible* if the access requirement is thought of as part of the *analysis* of justification. One is challenged to come up with a set of conditions *X* that *constitute* noninferential justification for believing *P*. One is then invited to accept the claim that those conditions constitute justification only if one adds awareness of them. But that is tantamount to admitting that *X* was not a satisfactory analysis to begin with. *The idea that X constitutes one's justification for believing P only if one's awareness of X is added to X is equivalent to holding that X constitutes one's justification for believing P only if it does not really constitute one's justification for believing P.* If I must embrace that conditional to be an internalist, I wash my hands of the view.

One can avoid this sort of *incoherent* access internalism by holding that *X* by itself constitutes justification and is therefore sufficient for justification, but that the very nature of *X* metaphysically entails that one has an awareness of *X*. On such a view the *analysis* of justification would not involve reference to second-level awareness of the conditions that constitute justification. Consider an analogy. *P*'s being true entails that it is true that *P* is true. In accepting this proposition I am *not* committed to including its being true that *P* is true in the analysis of what makes *P* true. In the same way, a strong access internalist could argue that it is necessarily true that the conditions that constitute justification always obtain together with conditions that constitute being justified in believing that they obtain even though the conditions that constitute the second-level justification do not belong in an analysis of the conditions that constitute first-level justification. Such a view avoids a conceptual

regress (just as holding that P 's being true entails that it is true that P is true involves no conceptual regress). Unlike the regress of truth, however, the strong access requirement seems to give rise to a *vicious* regress. First-level justification entails the existence of second-level justification, which entails the existence of third-level justification, and so on ad infinitum. The metabeliefs required get more and more complex, and even if a finite mind can have an infinite number of justified beliefs, it is hard to see how it could have an infinite number of ever increasingly complex beliefs (supported by increasingly complex justification).

As I pointed out earlier, it is much easier to be a weak access internalist. One must still be careful to avoid the conceptual incoherence described above. One should not construe the possibility of access as a further condition in the *analysis* of justification. Nevertheless, one could argue that it is true, perhaps even necessary in some metaphysical sense, that when I am justified in believing P there is the possibility of access to that justification. I suggested earlier that if the possibility of access is understood broadly enough, the view is perfectly compatible with most versions of externalism. Whenever one has noninferential justification for believing P , I certainly think that it is logically possible that one has justification for believing that one is noninferentially justified in believing P . Furthermore, whenever one is noninferentially justified in believing that P , I think that it is in principle possible to have a noninferentially justified belief that one has a noninferentially justified belief. Of course, to have a justified belief at the second level would require possessing the requisite concepts, that is, it would require the capacity to think of such things as acquaintance and correspondence; and it is not certain that nonphilosophers possess such concepts—it's not even certain that most philosophers today possess such concepts. A *noninferentially* justified belief that one has a noninferentially justified belief that P would also require acquaintance with the complex set of acquaintances that constitute noninferential justification for believing P . And while I think that acquaintance is the sort of thing one could be acquainted with, I am not suggesting that whenever one is acquainted with something one is acquainted with the fact that one is acquainted with it. As we move up levels, it is not even clear to me that it is *causally* possible to become acquainted with the ever increasingly complex facts involving acquaintance that would be required to yield noninferentially justified beliefs.

If this version of what I am calling traditional foundationalism does not entail "internal state" internalism and denies strong access inter-

nalism and even some versions of weak access internalism, why call it internalism at all? The answer I suggested earlier points to its reliance on the *sui generis* concept of acquaintance that is fundamental to epistemology and that cannot be reduced to nonepistemic concepts, particularly the nomological concepts upon which all externalists build their analyses. I argued earlier that the heart of the internalist/externalist debate may have little to do with access requirements for justification (though it does have something to do with access to inferential connections). That never was the fundamental point of disagreement between internalists and externalists, and the proof of this is that externalists could in principle incorporate access requirements into their still *externalist* metaepistemological theories. Consider an odd sort of reliabilist, for example, who argues that one is noninferentially justified in believing that *P* when the belief that *P* is produced by a reliable process that takes as its "input" states that are not beliefs (I will discuss such a view in more detail shortly). And now suppose that our reliabilist decides that this is not enough, that one also needs "access" to the fact that the belief is produced this way. When asked what such access would consist in, the reliabilist responds that it would involve having a reliably produced belief that one has a reliably produced belief. And access at the third level would require having a reliably produced belief that one has a reliably produced belief that one has a reliably produced belief. Now no actual externalist is going to hold that justification at the first level requires that there be a justified metabelief about the justification of that first-level belief, and an attempt to incorporate such a view into one's externalism might well involve all kinds of insuperable problems including the potentially vicious regresses described earlier. But that is irrelevant to the question I am raising. However misguided an externalism with built-in access requirements might be, the theory will be no less externalist because of those access requirements if the access is still understood in causal terms.

The fundamental difference between externalism and one historically prominent and important form of internalism is that the internalist wants to ground all justification on a "direct confrontation" with reality. In the case of a noninferentially justified belief, the internalist wants the fact that makes true the belief "there before consciousness." The externalist can pay lip service to these desires by giving an externalist analysis of being confronted with a fact or having a fact before consciousness, but the internalist is convinced that no attempt to explain that immediacy in terms of *nomological* relations will succeed.

The above diagnosis of the essential difference between internalism

and externalism is complicated by the fact that some externalists will deny that they are *reducing* epistemic concepts to nonepistemic nomological concepts. Goldman, for one, is clear about the fact that he is not trying to *define* epistemic terms “naturalistically.”¹² Such definitions, he feels, would leave out the alleged normativity of the terms of epistemic evaluation. He is, nevertheless, attempting to provide necessary and sufficient conditions for a belief’s being justified—he is trying to discover the conditions on which epistemic justification *supervenes*. There are as many different species of supervenience, however, as there are species of necessity and sufficiency, and it is clear that the kind of supervenience that Goldman thinks one discovers in a correct philosophical analysis is stronger than any sort of lawful connection. In terminology that is not popular with all philosophers, one might describe his conception of a philosophical account of justification to be the search for conditions that are synthetically necessary and sufficient for *S*’s being justified in believing *P*. And I would qualify the earlier discussion of the fundamental difference between traditional foundationalism and external foundationalism to emphasize that the traditional “internal” foundationalist denies that the fundamental confrontation with reality that yields noninferential justification can be reduced to, or even be viewed as strongly supervenient upon, nomological relations. (*X* strongly supervenes on *Y* only if in all possible worlds in which *Y* obtains *X* obtains.)

At the risk of being repetitive, I want to make clear one more time that I am happy to recognize that there is more than one way to define the internalism/externalism controversy. Indeed, I insist on recognizing importantly different interpretations of the controversy. I have tried to explain why I think it is most illuminating to characterize the *heart* of the controversy as a disagreement over the plausibility of naturalism in epistemology. I also emphasize again that the acquaintance account of noninferential justification I offered is only one version or species of an internalism that rejects naturalistic epistemology. Obviously, one might agree with me that the fundamental mistake of externalism is its attempt to reduce the epistemic to the nomological but deny that an understanding of epistemic concepts should be based (in part) on the *sui generis* concept of acquaintance. Chisholm, for example, uses a different primitive in advancing his version of internalism.¹³

I have tried to develop a plausible traditional foundationalist account of noninferential justification, and even before contrasting it with an externalist foundationalist account of noninferential justification, I have tried to indicate what I take to be the most illuminating sense in which

it is an internalist view. I have argued that traditional foundationalists should be very careful about accepting strong and some weak access requirements. Earlier, however, I emphasized the need to make clear the distinction between accepting access requirements and accepting both clauses of the principle of inferential justification. The principle of inferential justification entails neither strong nor weak access internalism. It is a principle whose second clause will be rejected by almost all externalists, and by focusing on this fact we will be able to draw another important distinction between *inferential* internalism and *inferential* externalism. That metaepistemological difference will be revealed in their respective analyses of inferential justification.

Inferential Internalism, the Analysis of Inferential Justification, and a Conceptual Regress Argument for Foundationalism

The Principle of Inferential Justification

When I first introduced the principle of inferential justification, I noted that one need not take the principle to be the expression of a metaepistemological view at all. It could be accepted as a very general proposition of normative epistemology. In fact, though, I think that the principle is best understood as an implicit commitment to a certain analysis of inferential justification.

What is it to be inferentially justified in believing *P*? Well, if one looks at paradigm examples of appeals to evidence in support of belief, it is *prima facie* plausible to suggest that one's belief in some proposition *E* can justify one in believing another proposition *P* only when one's belief that *E* is itself justified and one has justification for thinking that *E* makes *P* probable. If asked why the conditional is true—indeed, necessarily true—it is tempting to suggest that it just describes that of which having evidence consists. As I said, one can make the claim initially plausible simply by looking at the ways in which it seems appropriate to *challenge* someone's claim to have good (epistemic) reasons for believing something. If I tell you that the world will end this century and offer as my evidence that there is an omnipotent God who has decided that he will destroy the world at midnight on January 31, 1999, you are presumably perfectly entitled to challenge the reasonability of my belief about the earth's extinction by challenging the reasonability of my belief about God. If, for example, I admit that I have no