discusses most of the selected authors very briefly indeed, and Martin and Barresi are concerned only with the development in Britain, focusing, as the title suggests, on the issue of the 'naturalization of the soul'.[13]

Certainly I owe a debt of knowledge to many of these publications. Insofar as they do cover similar material, however, my interpretations often differ significantly from theirs. Moreover, the present study also attempts to broaden the scope of the treatment of these issues considerably, and in more than one sense, by dealing, for example, with more than a hundred years of philosophical debate in France, Britain, and Germany, while at the same time not neglecting the details of the arguments as well as, in many cases, discussing alternative interpretations.

I.3. THE ISSUES

As indicated, the notions of self-consciousness and personal identity are closely connected. It would be difficult to account for the discussion of personal identity without invoking the notion of consciousness, understood as a relating to one's own self. The reverse does not apply, however. The notion of self-consciousness has a broader significance than its link to the issue of personal identity. Before analysing those connections and the details of the arguments and developments, it is important to provide some preliminary conceptual and historical background for the three central notions that are examined in this book: self-consciousness, identity, and person.

I.3.1. Consciousness and self-consciousness

There are very few explicit discussions of consciousness dating from the seventeenth century and the early part of the eighteenth century. In Britain, the term 'consciousness' was used extensively by a large number of philosophical and theological writers in the

[13] Martin and Barresi are to be congratulated in particular for having rediscovered Hazlitt's contribution to the issue of personal identity from the early nineteenth century (1805), which is outside the scope of the present volume. The earliest survey of British eighteenth-century accounts of personal identity seems to be an 86-page tract from 1827 by a certain Thomas Wallace, which covers Locke, Butler, Reid, Brown, and Stewart, but omits Hume: Wallace, *A Review of the Doctrine of Personal Identity* (1827). Other, more recent, book-length publications include Hauser's thesis *Selbstbewußtsein und Personale Identität* (1994), which deals with only Locke, Leibniz, Hume, and Tetens. Moreover, it has to be said that the standard of his analyses and arguments is not very high. For details, see my review in *Das Achtzehnte Jahrhundert*, 19 (1995), 243–5. There are a few relevant edited collections, such as Barber's and Gracia's *Individuation and Identity in Early Modern Philosophy. Descartes to Kant* (1994). This book does not deal with the issue of self-consciousness, however, and is very selective as far as the eighteenth century is concerned. It discusses the issue of *personal* identity only in relation to Locke and Hume. For a critical discussion of *Individuation and Identity*, see Thiel, '"Epistemologism" and Early Modern Debates about Individuation and Identity', *British Journal for the History of Philosophy*, 5 (1997), 353–72. Cazzaniga's and Zarka's edited collection *L'individu dans la pensée moderne xvi^e–xviii^e siècle*, 2 vols. (1995), has some relevant contributions on individual thinkers (such as Diderot and Condillac). Many of the contributions, however, are concerned with larger political and anthropological issues and with material from the sixteenth century.

1690s and in the early eighteenth century, but none of these authors examined the notion of consciousness itself in any detail. It was not until the 1720s that consciousness became an object of enquiry in its own right. In some contexts, consciousness was thought of as being concerned with external objects, but this was not how the notion was generally understood. In 1727, John Maxwell distinguished between three meanings of the term 'consciousness':[14] (a) 'the reflex Act, by which a Man knows his Thoughts to be his own Thoughts', (b) 'the Direct Act of Thinking; or (which is of the same Import;) simple Sensation', or (c) 'the Power of Self-motion, or of beginning of Motion by the Will'.[15] Maxwell insists that (a)—consciousness understood as a 'reflex act' on our own thoughts—is 'the strict and properest Sense of the Word'.[16] Consciousness, then, is understood here as a way of relating to one's own mental states. This inner-directed sense of consciousness dominated the eighteenth-century discussions, not only in Britain, but also in France and Germany.[17]

Although consciousness understood in this way is obviously a form of relating to one's own self, it has to be distinguished from *self*-consciousness—the consciousness of a self or subject or *I*.[18] This very distinction raises further questions, however, about the relation between these different forms of relating to one's own self. For example, can there be self-consciousness without consciousness? Or does self-consciousness require consciousness? Can there be consciousness without self-consciousness, or is the former always and necessarily accompanied by the latter?

[14] Discussed in more detail in Thiel, 'Cudworth and Seventeenth-Century Theories of Consciousness', in Gaukroger (1991), pp. 79–99, at pp. 80–1.

[15] *A Treatise of the Laws of Nature. By . . . Richard Cumberland . . . Made English from the Latin by John Maxwell, ...At the End is subjoin'd, An Appendix, containing two Discourses, 1. Concerning the Immateriality of Thinking Substance. 2. Concerning the Obligation, Promulgation, and Observance of the Law of Nature, by the Translator* (1727). (Cumberland's Latin original was first published in 1672.) The quoted passages are from the first discourse in the appendix (p. 5; separate pagination). The discourse's full title is *A Summary of the Controversy between Dr. Samuel Clarke and an anonymous Author* [Anthony Collins]*, concerning the Immateriality of Thinking Substance*. The controversy between Clarke and Collins took place from 1706 to 1708, and was initiated by Henry Dodwell's *An Epistolary Discourse, proving from the Scripture and the first Fathers, that the Soul is a Principle naturally Mortal* (1706). In this controversy, extensive use was made of the term 'consciousness'. For Clarke and Collins, see Chapters 4 and 7 below.

[16] This is how Clarke defines 'consciousness' in *A Second Defense of an Argument made use of in a Letter to Mr. Dodwell* (1707), p. 42.

[17] Compare also the comment by the eighteenth-century American philosopher Jonathan Edwards, who says: 'Consciousness is the mind's perceiving what is in itself—ideas, actions, passions, and every thing that is there perceptible. It is a sort of feeling within itself': *'The Mind' of Jonathan Edwards: A Reconstructed Text*, ed. Howard (1963), p. 101. For a discussion of Edwards, see Chapter 8 below.

[18] Compare, for example, Frank's distinction between 'egological self-consciousness' and 'non-egological self-consciousness'. The former is the 'consciousness of the owner of consciousness (the *subject* or *I*)'; the latter is the consciousness of mental states. Non-egological self-consciousness can, in turn, relate either to the mental states, acts, or experiences themselves, or to the contents of these mental states—a distinction that is not always made explicit in early modern discussions. See Frank, 'Non-objectal Subjectivity', in *Journal of Consciousness Studies*, 14 (2007), 152–73. Here, what Frank calls 'non-egological self-consciousness' is simply called 'consciousness'; and his 'egological self-consciousness' is our 'self-consciousness'. Frank is of course, perfectly justified in referring to both as forms of self-consciousness, as both involve a relating to one's own self.

Early modern philosophers do not always formulate these kinds of question explicitly, but views and arguments about them can be identified in many of them, even if they hint only implicitly at the importance of various conceptual distinctions concerning the issue of relating to oneself.

In 1728 an essay solely devoted to the notion of consciousness understood essentially in the inner-directed sense, and dealing also with self-consciousness, was published anonymously in London.[19] The author, who has now been identified as a certain Charles Mein,[20] says that consciousness is 'that inward Sense and Knowledge which the Mind hath of its own Being and Existence, and of whatever passes within itself, in the Use and Exercise of any of its Faculties or Powers' (pp. 144–5). This essay seems to have been the first extensive and detailed treatment of the topic in the early modern context. The author himself appears to be aware of this, and finds it 'not a little surprising that They, who have search'd and ransack'd every nook and corner of the Mind, for *Ideas*... should never once happen to *Stumble* upon *Consciousness*' (ibid., p. 195). In Germany, Christian Wolff's empirical and rational psychologies of the 1720s and 1730s contain reflections on consciousness and self-consciousness, and by the 1730s these notions had come to be regarded as fundamental philosophical concepts. For Wolff, the issue of self-consciousness is central to his account of our knowledge of the external world: the problem of external objects cannot even be formulated without raising questions about our own self. Thus, Mein's *Essay* and the writings of Wolff constitute a turning point in the philosophical discussion of consciousness and self-consciousness. These notions now become central to the philosophical enterprise. And in the second half of the century—especially from the mid-1760s onwards, with the development of empirical psychology—consciousness was discussed not only in the context of other philosophical debates, but also in an increasing number of independent tracts devoted to consciousness itself. In 1778 Joseph Priestley could safely say that 'in all metaphysical subjects, there is a perpetual appeal made to *consciousness*'.[21]

The question is, however, what form of self-relation the 'reflex act' or 'inward Sense and Knowledge' called consciousness was held to be, and how it was thought to connect to other forms of relating to one's own self. This question is not as easy to answer as it may seem, and there appears to be no general agreement among early modern philosophers as to precisely what kind of self-relation terms such as 'consciousness' or 'self-consciousness' denote. It is important in this context to look at the etymological and conceptual connection between the notions of consciousness and conscience. Like English 'conscience', French 'conscience', and German 'Bewußtsein' and 'Gewissen', the term 'consciousness' derives from the Latin 'conscientia'—the

[19] Anon. [Charles Mein]. *Two Dissertations concerning Sense, and the Imagination. With an Essay on Consciousness* (1728). A modern edition of the *Essay, Pseudo-Mayne. Über das Bewusstsein 1728*, trans. and ed. Brandt (1983), contains an introduction and notes by the editor.

[20] Buickerood has made this identification in '*Two Dissertations concerning Sense, and the Imagination. With an Essay on Consciousness* (1728): A Study in Attribution', *1650–1850: Ideas, Aesthetics, and Inquiries in the Early Modern Era*, 7 (2002), 51–86.

[21] Priestley, *A Free Discussion of the Doctrines of Materialism and Philosophical Necessity* (1778), p. 280.

noun for 'con-sc/i/re'. The details of the etymology of 'conscientia' are complex and controversial, but it seems that it is a translation of Greek terms—the main candidates being 'syneidesis,' 'synesis', and 'synaisthesis.'[22] Indeed, the first English writing philosopher to make extensive use of the noun 'consciousness' and to attach to it a particular philosophical meaning, the Cambridge Platonist Ralph Cudworth, uses the term as a translation of 'synaisthesis'.[23] Initially, Latin 'conscientia', Greek 'syneidesis', and even English 'consciousness' or being 'conscious', meant a perception or knowledge of something that one shares with someone else: being conscious meant being privy to something. In fact, this was how 'being conscious' was still defined occasionally in the seventeenth century, but it was clearly no longer the standard meaning. Rather, like Greek 'syneidesis' and Latin 'conscientia' (much earlier), 'consciousness' changed its meaning from 'knowing together with someone else' to 'knowing something with oneself': the person with whom I am privy to something else is not someone else but my own person. It came to be understood in a self-relating sense.

The English 'conscience' is much older than 'consciousness', and derives from a further development of 'conscientia' denoting a moral judgement of one's own actions and thoughts. In Scholastic thought, 'conscientia' formed a very special topic within moral theology.[24] This tradition was still relevant in the early modern period. In England in the first half of the seventeenth century there were countless sermons and tracts on the problem of 'conscientia'—especially in the context of Puritan teaching and its emphasis on the individual's conscience. The notion of *conscientia* applied here seems to be very similar to that in Scholastic thought. *Conscientia* as a whole was thought to consist of three parts or elements. The first is a set of objective moral principles which set the standard according to which we ought to direct our actions—sometimes referred to as the rational or pure part of conscience. The second

[22] For the etymology of 'conscientia', 'conscience', 'consciousness', and 'Bewußtsein', see Zucker, *Syneidesis-Conscientia* (1928); Jung, 'Syneidesis, Conscientia, Bewußtsein', in *Archiv für die Gesamte Psychologie*, 89 (1933), 525–40; Seel, 'Zur Vorgeschichte des Gewissens-Begriffes im altgriechischen Denken', in Kusch (ed.), *Festschrift Franz Dornseiff* (1953), pp. 291–319; Hennig, *'Conscientia' bei Descartes* (2006), pp. 80–94. Hennig assumes that 'conscientia' is not a translation of 'syneidesis', and that the Greek background can be neglected (pp. 87–8). Even if this were acceptable for the interpretation of Descartes, such neglect would be highly problematic for an understanding of seventeenth-century notions of consciousness, given the importance of neo-Platonic sources in the early modern period. For the etymology of 'consciousness', see also Lewis, *Studies in Words* (1960), pp. 181–213.

[23] Cudworth, *True Intellectual System of the Universe* (1678; *imprimatur* 1671), p. 159. Thus, the following statement is obviously false: 'Outside of several minor uses of the word itself, the earliest written use of the term *consciousness* in the language is by John Locke' (Fox, 1988 p. 12). Cudworth's statements about consciousness are not so much part of an analysis of human subjectivity, but of a metaphysical account of nature in general—an account that relies heavily on Plotinus. See Plotinus, *Enneads*, III.8.4, V.8.11. On Plotinus, see Schwyzer, '"Bewusst" und "unbewusst" bei Plotin', in *Les sources de Plotin. Entretiens sur l'antiquité classique*, vol. V (1960), pp. 343–90; Warren, 'Consciousness in Plotinus', *Phronesis*, 9 (1964), 83–97; O'Daly, *Plotinus' Philosophy of the Self* (1973). For further comment on Cudworth on consciousness, see Chapter 2 below; and for a discussion of Cudworth's account of consciousness, see Thiel (1991), pp. 79–99.

[24] For the history of the notion of conscience, see Stelzenberger, *Conscientia bei Augustinus: Studien zur Geschichte der Moraltheologie* (1959); Potts, *Conscience in Medieval Philosophy* (1980); Kittsteiner, *Die Entstehung des modernen Gewissens* (1995); Hennig (2006), pp. 96–183.

is a knowledge or remembrance of thoughts and actions performed by us. In 1621 Anthony Cade described it as 'a Chronicle, or register, roll or record' where all our 'thoughts, words, and actions be they good or evil' are set down. The third part is the moral judgement of our remembered actions on the basis of the moral principles.[25] Clearly, in this account a non-evaluative sense of relating to one's own self is present as the second part or element—as the remembering of our own thoughts and actions. This is a prerequisite for our moral judgement of our actions. But in this context *conscientia* as 'chronicle' is just an element of the moral 'conscientia' theorem as whole.[26]

While in French there is only 'conscience' for the Latin 'conscientia', in German and English two different terms for evaluative and non-evaluative *conscientia* respectively evolved: 'consciousness' and 'conscience'; 'Bewußtsein' and 'Gewissen'. While Cudworth introduced the term 'consciousness' into English philosophical terminology, Christian Wolff introduced the German 'Bewußtsein' for the non-evaluative relating to one's own self.[27] The fact that French and Latin texts of the time had only one term for both consciousness and conscience can create some confusion, and not just for present-day readers. It would be a mistake, however, simply to assume that all uses of 'conscientia' and French 'conscience' should be understood in terms of conscience. Some philosophers writing in French and/or Latin only (Leibniz and Pierre Coste, for example) clearly struggled to distinguish between the two meanings of the one French or Latin term. It would seem that Descartes, too, makes use of 'conscientia' or 'conscium esse' in the non-evaluative sense—at least in some contexts.[28] Other seventeenth- and early eighteenth-century thinkers clearly made use of the non-evaluative sense of the French and Latin terms. Leibniz, for example, suggests in *Principes de la nature et de la grâce* (1714) that conscience is 'the reflective knowledge [connaissance réflexive]' of our inner states (§ 4). In *Nouveaux essais* he sometimes translates Locke's 'consciousness' as 'conscience', and at other times attempts to coin new terms (such as 'consciosité') to maintain the distinction

[25] Cade, *A Sermon on the Nature of Conscience* (1621), pp. 19–22. For scholastic definitions, see Goclenius, *Lexicon philosophicum* (1613), p. 447; and Micraelius, *Lexicon philosophicum*, second edn. (1662; first edition, 1653), col. 321.

[26] Sometimes the term 'conscientia' was used to denote the old notion of *sensus communis*. This is true, for example, of Herbert of Cherbury, who defines 'conscientia' as the 'sensus communis of the inner senses'. Here, too, however, the function ascribed to *conscientia* is mainly a moral one. See Herbert of Cherbury, *De veritate*, third edn. (1645; first edition, 1624), p. 104. *Conscientia* is said to be that by which we examine what is good and evil, and by means of which we apply the 'common notions' to particular cases.

[27] Wolff, *Vernünfftige Gedancken von Gott, der Welt und der Seele des Menschen, auch allen Dingen überhaupt* (1719), reprint of 1751, ed. Corr (1983); at Section 719. There are earlier versions of 'Bewußtsein'—for example, in Thomasius's German writings (see Chapter 11 below), but it was Wolff's usage that became influential in subsequent philosophical discussion.

[28] *Oeuvres de Descartes*, ed. Adam and Tannery (1964–76), vol. 10, p. 524; *Philosophical Writings*, ed. Cottingham, Stoothoff, Murdoch, and Kenny (1984–91), vol. 2, p. 418. See also *Oeuvres* (1964–76), vol. 7, p. 559; *Philosophical Writings*, vol. 2, p. 382. In *Philosophical Writings*, 'conscientia' is translated as 'awareness'. It has been claimed, however, that in Descartes, *conscientia* is to be understood in an evaluative sense. Henning, for example, argues that all occurrences of 'conscientia' and 'conscium esse' in Descartes are to be understood in an evaluative sense of *conscientia*. See Hennig (2006), and the detailed discussion of Descartes on consciousness in Chapter 1 below.

between consciousness and conscience in French.[29] Samuel Christian Hollmann and Daniel Strähler make a point of distinguishing between what they call 'logical' 'conscientia' (consciousness) and 'moral' 'conscientia' (conscience).[30] La Forge and Malebranche also use the French term 'conscience' in a non-evaluative sense—as synonymous with 'sentiment intérieur'.[31] Malebranche says that we know our own thoughts and souls only through a 'sentiment intérieur' or 'conscience'.[32] Pierre Coste, whose French translation of Locke's *Essay Concerning Human Understanding* (1st edn. 1690) Concerning Human Understanding (1st edn. 1690) first appeared in 1700, translates Locke's 'consciousness' as 'conscience'. In later editions Coste remarks that Malebranche's 'conscience' corresponds to Locke's 'consciousness'.[33] Elsewhere, Gerard de Vries, for example, who in the late 1680s and 1690s published widely on ontology and pneumatology in general and on Descartes's philosophy in particular,[34] and who was influential in early eighteenth-century Britain, [35] makes use of the notion of non-evaluative *conscientia*. He defines thought in terms of *conscientia*, and holds that thought is always conscious of itself.[36] In spite of the

[29] For references and a detailed discussion of Leibniz, see Chapter 9 below.

[30] Hollmann, *Philosophia rationalis, quae Logica vulgo dicitur, multum aucta et emendate* (1746), p. 92. For a discussion of Hollmann, see Chapter 11 below. Strähler, *Prüfung der Vernünftigen Gedancken des Herrn Hof-Rath Wolffes von Gott, der Welt und der Seele des Menschen, auch allen Dingen überhaupt* (1723; reprinted, 1999), p. 557.

[31] La Forge speaks of 'cette conscience, ce tesmoignage, & ce sentiment interieur par lequel l'Esprit est aduertry de tout ce qu'il fait ou qu'il souffre': Clair (ed.), *Louis de La Forge (1632–1666). Oeuvres philosophiques* (1974), p. 134. The passage is from chapter 6 of La Forge's *Traité de l'esprit de l'homme* (1666). His use of 'conscience' is noted by Lewis (1960), p. 113; by Balz, *Cartesian Studies* (1951), p. 95; and by Davies (1990), p. 13f.

[32] Malebranche, *De la recherche de la vérité*, III.1.1: 'on ne connoît la pensée que par sentiment intérieur ou par conscience'. In III.2.7, Malebranche says about the soul: 'nous ne la connoissons que par *conscience*'. References to Malebranche's *Recherche* are to (Rodis-)Lewis (ed.), *Oeuvres de Malebranche* (1962), vol. 1.

[33] Coste, *Essai philosophique concernant L'entendement humain . . . Traduit de l'anglois de Mr. Locke* (1700), p. 404. For the remark on Malebranche, see, for example, the fifth edition (1755), p. 265. For a detailed discussion of Coste's translation of Locke's 'consciousness', see Davies, (1990) pp. 26–38.

[34] de Vries, *De catholicis rerum attributis determinatones ontologica* (1687); *De natura dei et humanae mentis determinationes pneumatologicae* (1687); *Exercitationes rationales de deo divinisque perfectionibus: nec non philosophemata miscellanea, editio nova* (1695) (an expanded version with a treatise on innate ideas; the first edition appeared in 1685). *De R. Cartesii Mediationibus a Petro Gassendo impugnatis dissertatiuncula historico-philosophica* (1691). I refer to the 'sixth edition' of *De Naturae Dei et Humanae Mentis Determinationes Pneumatologicae*, (1718) (abbr. *Pneumatology*). This edition was issued together with the 1718 edition of the work on ontology. The two works have continuous pagination.

[35] Watts, for example, cites 'that just censure, and that forbidding character, which the learned professor de Vries gives to the Metaphysics of the schools of former ages', in *Philosophical Essays on Various Subjects . . . To which is subjointed A Brief Scheme of Ontology* (1733). The quote is from the preface to the 'Brief Scheme'. There are also references to de Vries in Berkeley: *The Works of George Berkeley*, ed. Luce and Jessop (1948–57), vol. 1, p. 104 (entry nos. 887 and 888). For many years de Vries's books on ontology and pneumatology were used as textbooks at the University of Edinburgh. Thus it is very likely that Hume became familiar with some of de Vries's writings whilst studying there. M. A. Stewart drew my attention to this.

[36] See de Vries, *Pneumatology*, p. 72: 'Tale esse cogitandi facultatem, evincit, quae in hac omni semper involvitur, conscientia sui'; p. 76: 'Cogitatio actio cum conscientia est'. See also p. 83, where de Vries states that the intellect perceives 'cum conscientia'.

distinction that evolved between consciousness and conscience, there are some contexts in which the connection between the two notions must be taken into account. We shall see that this is the case, for example, with Locke. The moral significance he ascribes to personal identity relates to the connection between consciousness and conscience. Some authors explicitly distinguish between consciousness and conscience and explain how the two notions are related to one another.[37]

Apart from the distinctions between (inner-directed) consciousness and self-consciousness, and between consciousness and conscience, however, there remains the question about the nature of inner-directed consciousness itself. And here again, early modern thought relates to pre-modern philosophy. There are relevant sections in Plato's *Charmides*, for example, and especially in Aristotle's *De anima*.[38] As Victor Caston's seminal study has shown, although there seems to be no single term in their writings for what is called 'consciousness' in the early modern period or today, issues concerning the nature of consciousness as discussed in the early modern period and in current debates can be identified in Plato and in particular in Aristotle's discussion of perceiving that we perceive (*De anima*, 425b12–25).[39] This concerns, for example, a fundamental distinction between first-order and higher-order accounts of consciousness. According to the former, consciousness is an awareness of mental states that is an intrinsic and essential feature of those mental states—a feature which is not further analysable. According to the latter, consciousness consists in a higher-order thought or perception—that is to say, on this view, mental states become conscious in virtue of another, distinct mental state that is directed at the first mental state. This distinction is addressed by Aristotle who, as Caston argues, opts for a first-order account. Aristotle's argument against the higher-order accounts includes the issue of an infinite regress. For combined with the thesis that all mental states are conscious, higher-order accounts cannot, it seems, avoid an infinite regress of higher-order states. To avoid the infinite regress one must assume a higher-order state by which another state becomes conscious without being conscious itself (Caston, 2002, 754).

[37] Thus Grove, for example, argues that consciousness is the 'knowledge of the existence' of actions, while conscience is the knowledge of 'the moral Nature of Actions'. Therefore, he says, '*Consciousness* is a province of *Metaphysicks*, *Conscience* of *Morality*': Grove, *A System of Moral Philosophy*, ed. Amory, 2 vols. second edn. (1749; reprinted, 2000). Sell (ed.), *Henry Grove: Ethical and Theological Writings*, 6 vols. (2000). Vols. 5 and 6 contain Grove's *A System of Moral Philosophy* (1749). The quote is from *System* I, pp. 5–6. Grove's account of consciousness is discussed in detail in Chapter 7 below.

[38] For relevant discussions of Plato's *Charmides*, see, for example, Wellman, 'The Question posed at *Charmides* 165a–166c', *Phronesis* (1964), 107–13; Martens, *Das Selbstbezügliche Wissen in Platons 'Charmides'* (1973); Gloy, 'Platons Theorie der "episteme heautes" im *Charmides* als Vorläufer der modernen Selbstbewußtseinstheorien', *Kant-Studien*, 77 (1986), 137–64. For Aristotle see, for example, Kahn, 'Sensation and Consciousness in Aristotle's Psychology', *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie*, 48 (1966), 43–81; Oehler, *Subjektivität und Selbstbewußtsein in der Antike* (1997); Sihvola, 'The Problem of Consciousness in Aristotle's Psychology', in Heinämaa, Lähteenmäki, and Remes (eds.), *Consciousness: From Perception to Reflection in the History of Philosophy* (2007), pp. 49–65.

[39] Caston, 'Aristotle on Consciousness', *Mind*, 111 (2002), 751–815.

While it is difficult to determine with any certainty whether or not early modern philosophers were influenced by Aristotle's discussion, either directly or indirectly, these issues are present in early modern thought. Although the distinction between the two conceptions of consciousness is not made explicit, some thinkers clearly adopt a higher-order account of consciousness, while others opt for a first-order notion of consciousness. The issue of an infinite regress, too, is discussed in several early modern treatments of consciousness (for example, in Hobbes and Leibniz). Another issue, related to a first-order understanding of consciousness, concerns the notion of what is called today 'creature consciousness'. The idea that consciousness is an intrinsic feature of mental states might suggest that what is claimed here is that mental states such as perceptions are aware. The opposing view is that only the subjects or 'creatures' themselves who have the mental states can be conscious of something, no matter if we account for this consciousness in terms of a first-order or higher-order theory.[40] Again, in the early modern period, philosophers do not explicitly address this distinction between 'creature consciousness' and the notion that perceptions are aware, but the issue itself is present. While some formulate their views in such a way as to suggest that mental states are aware, it becomes clear in most cases that consciousness is understood as 'creature consciousness'. When Antoine Arnauld, for example, argues in *Des vrayes et des fausses idées* (1683) that 'our thought or perception is essentially reflective on itself',[41] he could be read as saying that the perception is aware. Elsewhere, however, he suggests that only 'creatures' such as human beings '*sunt conscia sui, et suae operationis*'.[42]

Apart from thematic points of contact between ancient and early modern accounts of consciousness, there are also direct borrowings of ancient theory and even terminology. Ralph Cudworth's seventeenth-century account (noted above) is deeply informed by neo-Platonic thought, and especially by Plotinus. Prior to Cudworth the English term 'consciousness' appeared only occasionally in philosophical contexts. One that is potentially significant concerns a translation of Stoic sources. Thomas Stanley, in his famous *History of Philosophy* (1656), translates 'syneidesis' in Diogenes Laertius's account of Chrysippus (*Lives*, VII, 85) as consciousness:

> The first appetite of a living creature is to preserve it self, this being from the beginning proper to it by nature, as *Chrysippus* in his first Book of Ends, who affirmes that the care of our selves, and consciousnesse thereof, is the first property of all living Creatures.[43]

[40] As Caston (2002) points out, Aristotle talks of *our* perceiving that we perceive, and thus assumes that consciousness is 'creature consciousness' (769).

[41] Arnauld, *Des vrayes et des fausses idées* (1683), chapt. 6, p. 46: 'nostre *pensée ou perception* est essentiellement reflechissante sur elle même: ou, ce qui se dit plus heureusement en Latin, *est sui conscia*'. In a letter to Descartes he speaks of an 'intrinsic reflection of all thoughts': *Oeuvres* (1964–76), vol. 5, p. 213. For further discussion of Arnauld on consciousness, see Chapter 1 below.

[42] Arnauld, *Des vrayes et des fausses idées*, chapt. 2, p. 11.

[43] Stanley, *The History of Philosophy, the Eighth Part, Containing the Stoick Philosophers* (1656), p. 60. Forschner has pointed out that the reading 'syneidesis' here is controversial. On the basis of other sources, he argues, 'synaisthesis' seems more plausible: Forschner, *Die Stoische Ethik* (1981), p. 146.

Stanley then proceeds to account for this idea in terms of the notion of a sense of one's own self ('sensus sui') by presenting essentially a translation of a passage from Cicero's *De finibus* (III, 16):

> As soon therefore as a living Creature cometh into the World, it is conciliated to it self; commended to the conservation of it self and its own state, and to the election of such things as may preserve its state, but alienated from destruction, and from all such things as may destroy it . . . Neither could they desire any thing without having some sense of themselves, whereby they love themselves, and what belongs to them. Hence it is manifest, that the principle of this love is derived from themselves. (Stanley, *History*, Part 8, p. 60)

Other occurrences of 'consciousness' or 'conscientia' in early modern thought also point towards Stoic sources. When Spinoza, for example, speaks of the consciousness of one's drive of self-preservation ('mens sui conatus conscia', *Ethica*, III, prop. 9, dem.) he clearly appeals to Stoic ideas.[44] For example, he defines desire ('cupiditas') in man as a drive that is accompanied by the consciousness of this drive.[45] Moreover, even Cudworth's account of consciousness in terms of Plotinus's *synaisthesis* may well be linked to the Stoics, as it has been argued that Plotinus's notion of *synaisthesis* was inspired by Stoic doctrine.[46]

As these early modern references to the issue of relating to one's own self appeal to Stoic contexts, it is tempting to think that early modern thought about consciousness in general was inspired above all by Stoic doctrine.[47] As was indicated above, however, care needs to be taken here, as it can be seriously misleading to assimilate ancient sources to early modern concerns which are in general somewhat less alien to philosophical minds of the twenty-first century. In Stoic thought the notions of consciousness and 'sense of self' belong to the doctrine of *oikeiosis*—a doctrine that has been said to be the very 'foundation of Stoic ethics'.[48] Classical scholars note the difficulty of translating 'oikeiosis' into modern languages and therefore tend to transcribe rather than translate the term, but common English translations include 'familiarization' and 'appropriation'.[49] In any case, the doctrine is part of the Stoic account of moral development. The view is that this development begins with a basis that is natural to all human beings (indeed to all animals). The 'appropriation' to oneself or, rather, to one's own physical 'constitution' (*systasis*/*constitutio*) is part of

[44] This was noted by Pohlenz, *Die Stoa. Geschichte einer geistigen Bewegung*, vol. 2 (1949), p. 229.

[45] 'Cupiditas est appetitus cum eiusdem conscientia': Spinoza, *Ethica*, III, prop. 9, schol. In *Spinoza Opera*, ed. Gebhardt (1925), vol. 2.

[46] Pohlenz (1949), p. 190.

[47] Thus, Brandt has claimed that 'the whole of the modern philosophy of consciousness' was inspired by Stoic doctrine: 'Selbstbewusstsein und Selbstsorge. Zur Tradition der οἰκείωσις in der Neuzeit', *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie*, 85 (2003) 179–97, at 181. He does not, however, cite any of the sources in Stanley, Spinoza, and Cudworth given here and elsewhere to support this claim. Rather, he speculates that there are three Stoic 'succession-fragments' in Locke and Kant. Even if these speculations were convincing, they would hardly prove the rather sweeping claim about 'modern philosophy' in general.

[48] Pohlenz (1949), p. 113.

[49] Compare Gill, *The Structured Self in Hellenistic and Roman Thought* (2006), p. 37. The Latin notion used, for example, in Cicero, *De finibus*, III, 16, and Seneca, *Epistulae Morales*, ltr. 121, para. 16, is 'conciliatio'. The Loeb translation of Seneca uses 'adaptation'.

this process. Its natural basis concerns the desire to preserve our own physical constitution. Animals, including humans, are naturally adapted to develop in a way that preserves their being or constitution (Gill, 2006, p. 36). Such a desire is said to require a feeling of affection, concern for, or attachment ('appropriation') to our constitution.[50] The affection or concern for our constitution in turn requires an elementary sense or 'consciousness' that we all have of our own self or our own constitution.[51] At first, this 'appropriation' to one's own constitution is expressed by our acceptance of what is 'appropriate' to us and what preserves our life (ibid., p. 37). But the striving for self-preservation is only the *prote horme*—the first impulse (Diogenes Laertius on Chrysippus, *Lives*, VII, 85). A later development concerns the striving of reason and relates to the whole cosmos. In adult humans, preservation is not restricted to oneself but includes others and is informed by reason (see Gill, 2006, p. 36). And reason is understood here as the bearer of insight and moral striving (Forschner, 1981, p. 150). Thus the doctrine of *oikeiosis* is sometimes described in terms of 'two faces'—'an inward looking one and an outward looking one'.[52]

In spite of the occasional explicit and implicit references to this Stoic doctrine, however, the differences between early modern thought on consciousness and related ideas in Stoic philosophy are more significant than the (seeming) similarities.[53] Early modern philosophers' discussions of consciousness are concerned with the consciousness of mental states such as thoughts, memories, and emotions, and not primarily with Stoic self-preservation. As we shall see, this applies even to an admirer of ancient thought such as Ralph Cudworth. Although Cudworth develops his account of consciousness in terms of the notion of plastic nature rather than that of an individual subject, when applied to human subjects, consciousness, for Cudworth, relates to thoughts and actions rather than to the physical nature or constitution of its being. In Descartes, Locke, and other early modern thinkers too, consciousness is understood as an individual human subject's relating to its thoughts, feelings, and actions. It is not—or at least is not primarily—a consciousness of the essence of one's physical nature or constitution for which one then can feel affection, which is in turn the basis for the desire to preserve that constitution.

The Stoic material and, indeed, the notion of conscience, relates more to the issue of self-consciousness than to merely the consciousness of mental states. And it is with

[50] Compare Diogenes Laertius's account of this: 'The dearest thing 'proton oikeion' to every animal is its own constitution and the consciousness thereof': *Lives*, VII, 85 (transl. Hicks (1925)).

[51] This is the 'sensus sui' in Cicero, *De finibus*, III, 16. Seneca speaks of the sense of our own constitution: *Epistulae Morales*, ltr. 121, para. 9.

[52] G. B. Kerferd, 'The Search for Personal Identity in Stoic Thought', Bulletin of the John Rylands University Library of Manchester, 55 (1972), 177–96, at 179.

[53] This has been pointed out by several classical scholars who seem to be more sensitive to these differences than are writers on early modern thought such as Brandt (2003). See, for example, Long, 'Hierocles on Oikeiosis and Self-Perception', in Long, *Stoic Studies* (1996), pp. 250–63, at pp. 156–7. See, especially, the detailed study by Gill (2006), pp. 363–4. As Gill notes, the Stoic doctrine 'runs counter to the assumption typical of post-Cartesian thought that certain types of reflexive or self-related experiences notably self-consciousness have a special status as an expression of personhood'.

respect to self-consciousness in particular that early modern thought has been said to distinguish itself from pre-modern thought. Thus, Klaus Brinkmann argues that what distinguishes modern from pre-modern conceptions of subjectivity is precisely that only with the former does self-consciousness become a necessary condition of object-awareness.[54] But the relation between what modern thought calls consciousness and self-consciousness was debated well before the early modern period. Again, this debate can be said to go back to Aristotle. For Aristotle the consciousness we have of our own self and its thoughts and actions is dependent on and derived from the consciousness of objects. We arrive at a consciousness of our own self only on the basis of a consciousness of objects.[55] Self-consciousness, by this account, requires an activity of distinguishing oneself from the objects to which consciousness primarily relates—an idea that became relevant with Christian Wolff in the eighteenth century, as we shall see.[56] Aristotle also speaks of a self-relation that is not mediated through a consciousness of outer things, but this is possible only for the divine being.[57] In Stoic sources one can identify the view that all external experience or consciousness of outer things requires self-consciousness. It seems, however, that self-consciousness as included in external experience could not exist without or independently of such external experience, and is in this sense dependent on the latter.[58] Aquinas takes up the Aristotelian idea when dealing with the question of how 'the intellect knows itself', and says, referring approvingly to Aristotle's *De anima*: 'What is first known by the human intellect is this object; then, in the second place, the act by which the object is known is itself known; and finally, by way of the act, the intellect itself, of which the act of understanding is the perfection, is known'. Thus the primary objects of knowledge are external objects, and the intellect 'comes to a knowledge of all else from these'.[59] This view—that the consciousness of external things has priority over the consciousness of one's own self—was widely held by early modern thinkers who tended towards empiricist lines of thought.

Thus, when Aquinas says that the 'mind knows itself by means of itself', this is not to be understood as an immediate or direct form of self-awareness, as 'by means of itself' is to be understood as 'by means of its acts', and these relate to objects which are 'what is first known by the human intellect'.[60] The notion of an immediate and

[54] Brinkmann (2005), 27–48, at 32–5. Brinkmann maintains that this view is present in Descartes. As we shall see, however, Descartes does not even investigate the notion of consciousness in any detail. The view is present in Wolff, whom Brinkmann does not discuss.

[55] Compare *De anima*, 415a16. Aristotle suggests here that we first know the objects, then the acts that relate to the objects, and then the capacities for those acts. Compare, for example, the discussion in Oehler (1997), pp. 20, 22ff, 38, 39; and Owens, 'The Self in Aristotle', *Review of Metaphysics*, 41 (1988), 707–22.

[56] For the importance of the activity of distinguishing in Aristotle's discussion of self-consciousness, see Schmitt, 'Synästhesie im Urteil aristotelischer Philosophie', in Adler and Zeuch (eds.), *Synästhesie. Interferenz-Transfer-Synthese der Sinne* (2002), pp. 109–47, at pp. 122–30.

[57] Its 'thinking is a thinking of thinking': *Metaphysica*, 1074b34. Compare Oehler (1997), pp. 40ff.

[58] See the discussion of Chrysippus, Cicero, and Seneca, in Annas (1992), pp. 56–61.

[59] Aquinas, *Summa theologiae*, 1a.87.3; transl. Gilby et al. (1964–80), pp. 115–17.

[60] Aquinas, *Summa theologiae*, 1a.87.1; p. 109; and 1a.87.3, p. 115.

direct relating to one's own thought and soul, also present in early modern thought, is typically associated with Augustine, but, as Deborah Black has shown, can also be found, for example, in Avicenna.[61] Augustine suggests (in the context of an account of the trinity) that the knowledge of one's own existence is immediate and direct. The mind knows itself simply by being 'present to itself'.[62] It does not require the bodily senses or prior knowledge of external things. Moreover, mental faculties, such as memory, intelligence, and the will, are mutually related to one another but also essentially self-reflexive. Importantly, this internal reflexivity that is present in all mental acts is distinguished from thinking about or reflecting on those mental acts.[63] It seems that Augustine even ascribes to the mind what is called a pre-reflective knowledge of itself—for example, when he states in *De trinitate*: 'When the mind seeks to know itself, it already knows that it is a mind'.[64] These apparently very modern thoughts have tempted scholars to read Augustine through a variety of much later developments, including Kantian transcendental philosophy and twentieth-century phenomenology.[65] Avicenna's discussion of consciousness is less well known than Augustine's (and is independent of the latter), but his so-called 'Flying Man' argument is often seen as a precursor of the Cartesian *cogito*. The argument attempts to show that the human soul is always aware of itself, quite independently of its awareness of other objects. Moreover, Avicenna appears to hold that such self-awareness is primitive and involved in, and presupposed by a more explicit knowledge of myself as well as of my awareness of other things.[66]

In Descartes and in Cartesian thought more generally too, consciousness or knowledge of self does not seem to depend on the consciousness or knowledge of objects. In the framework of his 'methodical' doubt Descartes famously argues that the knowledge of one's own existence is fundamental, and that this knowledge is based on the immediate knowledge we have of our own thinking activity. The knowledge we have of the external world is secured only after the existence of the

[61] See Black, 'Consciousness and Self-Knowledge in Aquinas's Critique of Averroes's Psychology', *Journal of the History of Philosophy*, 31 (1993), 349–85, at 351–2; and especially Black, 'Avicenna on Self-Awareness and Knowing that One Knows', in Rahman, Hassan, and Street (eds.), *The Unity of Science in the Arabic Tradition* (2008), pp. 63–87.

[62] Augustine, *De trinitate*, X.9.12. *The trinity*, transl. Mckenna (1963). See the discussion, for example, in Matthews, 'Si fallor, sum', in Markus (ed.), *Augustine. A Collection of Critical Essays* (1972), pp. 151–67, at pp. 159–60.

[63] Augustine, *De trinitate*, X.11.17–8. Christoph Horn has drawn attention to the historical importance of this distinction in Augustine: Horn, 'Seele, Geist und Bewusstsein bei Augustinus', in Crone, Schnepf, and Stolzenberg (eds.), *Über die Seele* (2010), pp. 77–93, at pp. 87–8. See also Horn, 'Selbstbezüglichkeit des Geistes bei Plotin und Augustinus', in Brachtendorf (ed.), *Gott und sein Bild. Augustins 'De Trinitate' im Spiegel gegenwärtiger Forschung* (2000), pp. 81–103.

[64] Augustine, *De trinitate*, X.4.6.

[65] See, for example, Delahaye, who links Augustine to Kant on self-consciousness: Delahaye, *Die 'memoria interior'-Lehre des heiligen Augustinus und der Begriff der 'transzendentalen Apperzeption' Kants. Versuch eines historisch-systematischen Vergleichs* (1936). Hölscher reads Augustine through twentieth-century phenomenology: Hölscher, *The Reality of the Mind. Augustine's Philosophical Arguments for the Human Soul as a Spiritual Substance* (1986).

[66] See the discussion in Black (2008), 65–70. See also Sorabji, *Self. Ancient and Modern Insights about Individuality, Life and Death*, (2006), pp. 222–6. Sorabji argues that the views of Augustine and Avicenna on these matters may have a common source in Porphyry (pp. 226–9).

self and that of God have been proved. But Descartes's position on this issue is not as clear as it may seem, as he does not seem to deal with the question of whether those thoughts, through the knowledge of which I come to know my own existence, are primarily inner-directed or outer-directed. Moreover (as we shall see), Descartes does not present any detailed account of precisely what kind of self-relation the 'knowledge' of one's own thinking (and of one's own self as subject of these thoughts) is supposed to be, nor how it may be related to other forms of relating to the self.

Early modern accounts of self-consciousness in general have been criticized by philosophers such as Dieter Henrich and other members of the so-called Heidelberg School.[67] Henrich argues that early modern philosophy is guilty of accounting for self-consciousness in terms of what he calls a 'reflection theory', according to which the self 'knows itself by entering into a relation to itself; that is, by turning itself back into itself' (Henrich, 1982, 20).

> This theory begins by assuming a subject of thinking and emphasizes that this subject stands in a constant relationship to itself. It then goes on to assert that this relationship is a result of the subject's making itself into its own object; in other words, the activity of representing, which is originally related to objects, is turned back upon itself and in this way produces the unique case of an identity between the activity and the result of the activity. (ibid., p. 19)

Henrich argues that this 'theory of the Self as reflection . . . continually turns in a circle' (ibid., pp. 19–20). For if we assume, as we must, that the subject that reflects on itself is really a self, then that subject would already be conscious of itself, prior to any act of reflection. As Henrich argues, 'anyone who sets reflection into motion must himself already be both knower and the known' (ibid., p. 20). In this way the reflection theory is viciously circular, in that it presupposes what it sets out to explain. Reflection, Henrich argues, presupposes a prior, pre-reflective 'familiarity' of the self with itself: 'The self knows itself in an original way, not through exhortations or clever inferences' (ibid., p. 21).[68] This original self-consciousness cannot first be brought about by reflection. Reflection is merely a 'secondary phenomenon' (ibid., p. 22).

Now Henrich maintains that all early modern treatments of self-consciousness are in terms of reflection, so that 'an entire epoch' has fallen into the trap of the reflection theory.[69] Fichte, Henrich argues, was the first philosopher who not only recognized the circularity of the reflection theory but also developed a philosophy of the self that

[67] Henrich, 'Fichte's Original Insight', *Contemporary German Philosophy*, 1 (1982), 15–53; first published as 'Fichte's ursprüngliche Einsicht', in Henrich and Wagner (eds.), *Subjektivität und Metaphysik, Festschrift für Wolfgang Cramer* (1966), pp. 188–232. Quotations are from the English translation.

[68] See also Frank, *What is Neo-Structuralism?* (1989): 'Reflection can recognize as identical to itself only that whose identity it already previously has known. This prior familiarity with itself cannot, however, be the work of autonomous reflection itself, for all reflection is relative; i.e. it is the relation of *two* to each other, and these two are thus to this extent not simply *one*' (p. 280).

[69] Henrich (1982), 19–20. Henrich writes about the philosophy from Descartes to Kant that 'all of these theories . . . are guided by the very same idea of the structure of the Self' in terms of the reflection-theory (p. 19). See also Frank, *Selbstbewußtseinstheorien von Fichte bis Sartre* (1991), pp. 427, 435, 446–7.

'successfully avoids' this circularity (ibid., pp. 21, 27).[70] Even assuming that Henrich's analysis and critique of the reflection theory of self-consciousness are valid, however, we shall see that his rather sweeping statements about early modern philosophy are highly problematic. Although, possibly, some early modern thinkers (Descartes, Leibniz, Mein) can be reconstructed in terms of the reflection theory, this does not apply to several other thinkers of the period. These include Locke, with his account of self-consciousness in terms of intuition, for example, and philosophers such as Mérian, who speaks of a pre-reflective, 'original' apperception that is presupposed by any reflective turning to one's own self.[71]

It is plain, then, that early modern discussions of consciousness and self-consciousness are more complex than we may like to think. Recasting them in terms of later philosophical thought without qualification will fail to do them justice.

I.3.2. Individuation and identity

The problem of identity in general—that is, the problem of what constitutes the identity of any object—is the historical as well as the systematic basis of the special issue of the identity of persons. The issue of identity was not always clearly distinguished by philosophers of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries from a closely related issue: the problem of individuation. Indeed, identity often came to be discussed under the heading of 'individuation'. But the latter issue is about what it is that makes an individual the individual that it is, and distinguishes it from all other individuals of the same kind. The search for a principle of individuation is the search for a cause or principle of the individuality of individuals. The question about identity, by contrast, concerns the requirements for an individual's remaining the same through time and partial change. The search for a principle of individuation was of course a standard topic in medieval philosophy. And the medieval disputes about the principle of individuation formed a large part of the background to seventeenth-century discussions of the issue. It is important to note, however, that the main concern of Locke and other seventeenth- and eighteenth-century philosophers is the question of identity through time, and not the problem of individuation.

The disputes about individuation and identity were not purely philosophically motivated. Both in medieval and in early modern philosophy problems of individuation and identity were rarely discussed in isolation from theological issues and related moral issues. Quite often, in both periods, the issue of individuation was explored in the course of an explanation of the doctrine of the trinity. Indeed, early medieval discussions of individuation arose out of the trinitarian debates: If there is one God, how can there be three divine persons—Father, Son, and Holy Spirit? This

[70] In a later article, Henrich assigns Karl Leonhard Reinhold a role in this discovery. See Henrich, 'Die Anfänge der Theorie des Subjekts (1789)', 1989, pp. 106–70, at p. 139ff.

[71] There are problems with the Heidelbergers' own positive account of self-consciousness in terms of an original 'familiarity' of oneself with oneself. For a discussion of these, see Zahavi, 'The Heidelberg School and the Limits of Reflection', in Heinämaa, Lähteenmäki, and Remes (eds.), *Consciousness: From Perception to Reflection in the History of Philosophy*, (2007), pp. 267–85.