

17: 344 **3920.** 1769. *M III.*

17: 345 In all judgments of the understanding things are like this. (If anything  $x$  can be cognized by means of a representation  $a$ , then  $a$  is a mark of something  $x$ ; but the cognition of  $x$  by means of  $a$  is a concept. Thus extension, motion, ignorance, etc., is a mark of something  $x$ .) If anything  $x$ , which is cognized by means of a representation  $a$ , is compared with another concept  $b$ , as either including or excluding this concept, then this relation is in the judgment. This judgment is thus either the cognition of agreement or of opposition, so that in the thing  $x$ , which I know by means of the concept  $a$ , either  $b$  is contained as a partial concept and thus  $x$ , which is cognized by means of  $a$ , can also be cognized by means of  $b$ , or  $x$  negates the concept of  $b$ .

In all judgments matter and form are to be considered. The former are concepts of the subject ( $y + a = x$ ) and the predicate  $b$ . Second, the form, which is called, among logicians, the concept of combination (*copula*). (One can represent any concept in relation with all others; those which it includes stand toward it in the relation of affirmation, those it excludes stand over against it in negation.) The possible concept of a thing is called  $x$ ; the representation by means of which I think it,  $a$ . Any form of judgment is either affirmation or negation. The former represents the relation in which the concept of the thing  $y + a$  contains the mark  $b$  and thus is partially identical. Negation consists in the fact that the concept of the thing  $y + a$  is what is opposed to the mark  $b$ , and negation consists in the representation of nullification.

17: 345 **3921.** 1769. *M IV.*

17: 346 The predicate is not a partial concept of the subject, but rather a representation of the [*crossed out*: whole] subject by means of a partial concept. The understanding always cognizes something by means of a clear or obscure judgment, in that it resolves something into its predicates. All of our concepts are marks drawn from sensation. Sensation itself is not an object of the understanding, but its marks; hence, e.g., the concept of the human being is nothing other than the representation of something that has the predicates into which we can resolve the concept of a human being. Therefore, in every judgment the subject in general is something  $= x$  which, cognized under the mark  $a$ , is compared with another mark. Hence it is also no wonder that we do not cognize a subject prior to all predicates except the I, which nevertheless is no concept but rather [*crossed out*: a sensation] an intuition. Hence by means of the understanding we cognize in bodies not the actual subjects, but rather the predicates of extension, solidity, rest, motion, etc. The cause is: by means of our senses only the relations of things can be revealed, and we can represent the absolute or the subject only from

our selves. The idea of substance actually comes from the *repraesentatione sui ipsius*,<sup>a</sup> insofar as we represent that something is separate from us, and predicates cannot be thought without a subject and without an ultimate subject; the constant predicates together are then called the subject.

By means of a predicate I do not represent a part of the thing or have a concept of the part, but rather I represent the object itself and have a partial concept of it; therefore, designation by means of mathematical signs is impossible. Let  $y + s$  be the thing itself, which is represented under the concept  $s$ , and let its predicate be  $p$ . Then  $y + s - p = o$ , hence  $y + s = p$ .

3922. 1769. M III–IV.

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Material principles seem to be: whatever happens, must have a ground. Every successive series has a beginning.\* The former proposition implies the latter: for since the beginning is a coming-to-be or event, there must in turn be a ground for it. The idea of freedom designates a coming-to-be without an antecedent determining ground. The nature of our understanding entails in accordance with this rule that nothing contingent is conceivable without a connection to grounds, and that a consequence (in time) without a ground and an occurrence of something without a connection to its ground cannot be conceived, because then the understanding would be entirely unusable.

\* (and every series of subordinated things has a first member.†)

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† (Later addition: It is difficult to conceive of a beginning in the series of all things, which everything else succeeds, as a **creation**. It is likewise equally difficult to conceive of an infinite series that has passed. It seems to be false to use the idea **all** of an infinite series, and yet the necessity of the *causa prima* is based on that, for otherwise **everything** would be *causatum*.)

Another synthetic principle is: whatever thinks is only a simple subject. Everything must (not *absolute* but *respective* to another) exist sometime, either simultaneously with it or successively to it.

It does not follow that that which must be judged in accordance with the laws of our understanding must be true if it concerns things which our understanding is not determined to judge in accordance with the terms of its use.

We borrow the law of sufficient reason from corporeal appearances; but if we would make it universal and apply it to things that are elevated above the idea of our understanding, then we confuse the idea of absolute incomprehensibility for us with that of intrinsic impossibility.

<sup>a</sup> representation of oneself

In *analysis* the whole is prior to the parts, in *synthesis* the part is prior to the whole.

*idem et diversum*<sup>a</sup> [crossed out:  
quantitas qualitas]: *realitas, negatio*  
*consentiens et oppositum*<sup>b</sup> (*forma*  
*affirmationis et negationis*):  
*externum et internum* (*quantitas,*  
*qualitas*):  
*absolutum et relativum*

comparison	{ (later addition at right of bracket: Judgments of relation, i. of consensus, compatibility)
combination	
relation	

17: 566 4477. 1772-75? 1776-78?? M 3, at §4, in *Possibile*.<sup>14</sup>

Analytic propositions can be proved from the *principio contradictionis* or *identitatis*, but not synthetic ones; how do we get to these? 1. Empirically. 2. Through pure intuition. 3. Through subjective conditions of the representation of the understanding.

17: 567 4478. 1772-75? 1776-78?? M 3, at §7.

The *principium* of all synthetic judgments of pure reason (not of pure intuition) is that everything that contains the conditions without which an apprehension would be impossible is true. The *principium contradictionis* is valid for all cognitions, insofar as they are regarded as merely possible. I.e., whatever contradicts the concept that I could have of an object is false.

17: 569 4483. 1772? (1773-75? 1776-78?) M 6, at §18, still in *Possibile*.<sup>115</sup>

Even for possibility there needs to be something that is given. The first *data* are not cognized as possible *a priori*, rather they constitute the condition of all our judgments of possibility, so that only that is possible which is in agreement with the *a priori* conditions of empirical cognition. Logical possibility, the *principium contradictionis*, is not objective, only cognition. We cannot think up any possibility of intuition, of reality, of real relation, of what is necessary, except insofar as the principles thereof are given in experience.<sup>116</sup>

17: 571 4493. 1772-75. M 58, at §19 iff., in *Substantia et accidens*.<sup>117</sup>

Only three types of *respectus reales*<sup>c</sup> are possible:

1. that of consequence to ground, *dependentiae ab una et causalitatis ab altera partes*,<sup>d</sup>
2. that of part to whole;
3. that of *accidens* to substance.

<sup>a</sup> the same and different

<sup>b</sup> agreement and opposition (the form of affirmation and negation)

<sup>c</sup> real relations

<sup>d</sup> dependence on one part and the causality of another

In all three there arises unity: of subordination,\* of coordination, and of inherence of many accidents in a substance. The I is the intuition of a substance.<sup>118</sup> 17: 572

All three have their boundaries:

1. the *independens* and *absolute necessarium*;\*\*
2. the *totalitas absoluta (completa [or] infinitum)*, i.e., a *synthesis* than which none greater is possible;
3. the *substantiale*.

The first concept indicates how things belong because of one another; the second, to one another; the third, in one another. All three are *termini*.<sup>a</sup> The first, the *necessarium* and its *oppositum*: the *absolute* or *primum contingens (libertas)*; the second, the *universitatem*: everything aggregated and its *oppositum*: no aggregate, *simplex*; the third, substantiality and its opposite: mere relation.

We have no insight into any of the three; the first, because the condition of necessity or, on the other hand, all necessity is lacking; the second, because the *terminus* of the *synthesis* is lacking, and because in the third the predicates are lacking. All these relations are only the realized logical [forms] of the relation of subject and predicate, of *antecedente* to *consequente*, and of the universality of the concept of the subject. Subject and predicate with the appended *est* means *existere*. The *identitas*: necessity. Or only universality: necessity; particularity: contingency.

\*One can also think a subordinated division.

\*\*It is not yet clear that the first ground (e.g., freedom) is something that is necessary.

4496. 1772–75. M 60, at §200, still in *Substantia et accidens*.

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Three *principia*. 1. In everything actual there is the relation of a substance to an accident (*inhaerentia*); 2. that of the ground to the consequence (*dependentia*); 3. that of parts and of interconnection (composition).

There are thus three presuppositions: subject, ground, and parts; and three real *modi*: insition,<sup>b</sup> [*sic*] subordination, and composition. Consequently, there are also three *principia*: 1. a subject that is not a predicate; 2. a ground that is not a consequence; 3. a unity that in itself is not composite.

4503. 1772–75? (1769–70?) (1773–75?) M 71, between §236 and §237, in *Monas*.<sup>119</sup> 17: 576

Space and time only permit of boundaries, but not of totality. The first beginning and the outermost boundary of the world are equally

<sup>a</sup> end-points

<sup>b</sup> inherence

P. IV.

We think of everything by means of predicates, thus there is always a relation to  $x$ . But in judgments it is a relation of  $a : b$ , which are both related to  $x$ .  $a$  and  $b$  in  $x$ ,  $x$  by means of  $a : b$ , finally  $a + b = x$ .

The absolute predicate in general is reality and whence.<sup>a</sup>

Determinate predicates (relational predicates) which are real pertain only to relations. Of these there are three. According to the three relations in judging.

The relational predicates are transcendental, the relation of predicates is logical.

What expresses the relational predicate in the mind for action and on which is grounded its relation on the one side to sensibility, on the other side to the logical, so that it acquires through the former reality, through the latter the form of thinking[?]

Is the  $x$  the form of inner sensibility or that which is real in apprehension?

4677. 1773–75. *LB* Duisburg 11.

17: 657

P. I.

Only because the relation that is posited in accordance with the conditions of intuition is assumed to be determinable in accordance with a rule is the appearance related to an object; otherwise it is merely an inner affection of the mind.

Everything that is **thought** as an object of intuition stands under a rule of construction.

Everything that is **thought** as an object of perception stands under a rule of apperception, self-perception.

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Experience in general. Either intuition or sensation.

Appearance is made objective by being brought as contained under a title of self-perception. And thus the original relations of apprehension are the conditions of the perception of the real relations in appearance, and indeed just insofar as one says that an appearance belongs thereunder is it determined from the universal and represented as objective, i.e., thought. When one does not represent it as belonging under the functions of self-sensation, but rather represents it by means of an isolated perception, then it is called mere sensation. We can determine this just as *a priori* from the functions of perception with regard to the objective, i.e., the conditions which are independent from the individual relations of the senses, as we can with regard to the relations of space and time. The mind must have a faculty for apprehending, and its functions are just as necessary for perception as is the receptivity of appearances.

If we intuited intellectually, then no title of apprehension would be needed to represent an object. In that case the object would not even

<sup>a</sup> *wovon*, i.e., that which from all else flows

appear. Now the appearance must be subordinated to a [*crossed out*: ground] function by means of which the mind disposes over it, and indeed to a universal condition of this, for otherwise nothing universal would be found therein.

All synthetic propositions have a condition of sensibility (an expansive one), either for the intuition (pure construction or empirical exposition) or of thinking through the understanding (specification) or of insight through reason.

17: 659 The  $x$  thus always contains the condition.

Either an objective condition of appearance or a subjective one of pure intuitions, both in judgments whether the predicate is sensible,

or an objective one of the understanding with regard to [*crossed out*: perception] intellection or a subjective one of reason with regard to conception, both in the case of intellectual predicates.

In the case of an analytical proposition the subject is thus always taken substantively. The concept of learnedness is contradictory to the concept of the unlearned.

P. II.

All appearances are related to the concept of an object that is valid for all of them, e.g., appearances of a rectangle; thus they stand under rules of judging, by means of which this concept can be determined (optical illusion). The perceptions are not appearances alone, i.e., representations of appearances, but of their existence. E.g., that reality exists, that it is successive, that it is simultaneous with other reality. Perception is position in inner sense in general and pertains to sensation in accordance with the relations of the apperception of self-consciousness, in accordance with which we become conscious of our own existence. All perception thus likewise stands under a rule of judging.

17: 660 The presumption is not an anticipation, because it does not determine, but only says that something is determinable in accordance with a certain given exponent according to a rule that is yet to be found. It thus serves to search for this determination and to expound the appearance, and is the *principium* for judging it. E.g., that which happens has its ground in something preceding.

17: 660 ~~1678. 1773. 75. LPL Duisburg 12.~~  
P. I.

~~That in the soul there lies a *principium* of disposition as well as of affection. That the appearances can have no other order and cannot otherwise belong to the unity of the power of representation except insofar as they are in accord with the common *principio* of disposition. For all appearances with their common determination must still have unity in the mind, consequently must be subject to such conditions by means of~~

I distinguish all things only through their light, as if they had originally been lifted out of the gloom. I can very well think of a negation if I have a reality, but not if no reality is given. This reality is the first *logice*, and from this it is inferred that it is also *metaphysice* and *objective* the first and the gloom out of which the light of experience elaborates shapes. Thus, appearances are originally manifold, and unity arises if one abstracts from the manifold.

5277. 1776–78? (1770–71?) *M* 48, in §§165–90, *Prima matheseos intensorum principia*.<sup>97</sup> 18: 141

Mathematics is the science of the construction of concepts; hence it pertains only to intuition as such and has only empirical use.

Philosophy pertains only to concepts of being in general, hence to those which correspond to sensation, and thus cannot make its concepts intuitive. Precisely for that reason it also pertains to objects independently of the conditions of intuition.

5285. 1776–78. *M* 59, at §191, in *Substantia et accidens*. 18: 143

Since our understanding cannot think except by means of judgments, we also cannot have any concepts of things except by means of predicates, which are connected with something constant as the sign of the subject. Thus the concept of substance and *accidens* otherwise has no meaning.

5289. 1776–78? (1775–77?) (1773–75?) (1772?) *M* 59, at §197, still in *Substantia et accidens*. 18: 144

1. *Substratum* (inherence). 2. *Principium caussalitatis* (consequence). *a. ratio realis. sive synthetica. Caussalitas quoad accidentia est Vis. primitiva, derivativa. Actio, passio, Influxus.* 3. *Commercium. Reciproca actio. Triplex Unitas, cuius functiones sunt a priori, sed non nisi a posteriori dari possunt (construi).*

*Substantia, Ratio, Compositum. Phaenomena.* Time is constant, while [~~crossed out: determinations~~] appearances change.<sup>a</sup>

5290. 1776–78? (1778–1780s?) *M* 59, at §196, still in *Substantia et accidens*. 18: 144

The relation of a substance to the *accidens* is mere *actio*.<sup>98</sup> *Vis.* That of substances to one another can be either *actio* or *passio*; if it is *mutua*, then it is *commercio*.<sup>b</sup>

<sup>a</sup> 1. *Substratum* (inherence). 2. Principle of causality (consequence). *a.* real or synthetic reason. Causality as an accident (property of a thing) is force. primitive or derivative. Action, passion, influence. 3. Interaction. Reciprocal action. A triplex unity, whose functions are *a priori* but can be given (constructed) only *a posteriori*. Substance, Reason, Composite. Phenomena.

<sup>b</sup> In other words, if each substance is both active and passive with regard to the other, then there is interaction.

Since we can only know a thing through its predicates, we cannot know the subject by itself alone.

18: 145 **5294.** 1776–78? (1773–75?) 1769?? *M* 60, opposite §§201, 202, in *Substantia et accidens*.<sup>99</sup>

Bodies are *substantiae comparativae, substrata phaenomenorum*.<sup>a</sup> It is ridiculous to want to think of the soul in corporeal terms; for we have the concept of substance only from the soul, and we form the concept of the substance of body only afterwards. The transcendental concepts must not overstep the boundaries of the *intellectualium* and make the sensitive concepts in the same sense into intellectual ones, e.g., substance as *noumenon* or *phaenomenon*: consequently not the proposition: Bodies are divisible.<sup>b</sup>

Necessity cannot present itself in experience, likewise substance; hence the pure intellectual concept is not valid in its complete purity of that which is sensible.

18: 146 **5297.** 1776–78. *M* 61, still in *Substantia et accidens*.

The logical relation between substance and *accidens* is synthetic. The subject is itself a predicate (for one can think of anything only by means of predicates, except the I), but for that reason only that which is not in turn a predicate is called a substance: 1. because no subject is thought for it; 2. because it is the presupposition and *substratum* of the others. This can be inferred only from its endurance, while the other changes. Thus it belongs to the essence of a subject that it is permanent.<sup>100</sup> If one assumes that the substance ceases to be, then this cessation proves that it is not a substance, and thus since no *substratum* is thought for this appearance, there are predicates without subjects, thus no judgments and no thoughts.

18: 146 **5208.** 1776–78? 1778–1780s? *M* 61.

18: 147 ~~All concepts are predicates, and these are either substance or *accidens* or relation. Space and time are neither, and therefore are not predicates of objects in themselves at all. Space and time are *a priori* intuitions. For from their concepts the (synthetic) propositions cannot be derived that we have of them *a priori*. How are *a priori* intuitions possible? In no other way than that the form for intuiting something through the senses can be represented in itself, without matter, i.e., without a given object of the senses. Thus space and time are forms of sensible intuition. Thus we can recognize *a priori* much about space and time and the objects in them,~~

<sup>a</sup> substances relatively speaking, the substrata of phenomena

<sup>b</sup> That is, the sensible predicate of divisibility derived from bodies should not be applied to the soul.