regards soul or spirit, man, and person(ality) as different abstract ideas under which we may consider the human subject.

With respect to the thinking substance or soul, Locke not only rejects the Cartesian view that the soul always thinks; he also argues more generally, as Gassendi and others before him, that we have no certain knowledge at all about the real essence of the soul: we know that we have the faculty of thought, but our knowledge does not go beyond the evidence of inner experience. We do not know whether the substance which thinks is an immaterial or a material being. Although Locke believes it is 'more probable' that the thinking substance is immaterial,[32] he regards it as possible that matter has the power to think. Accordingly, he does not definitely make up his mind between a Cartesian dualist account of man and the view of man as an 'organiz'd living Body'.[33] He favours the non-dualist position only insofar as our (ordinary) *idea* of man is concerned.[34] However, which account of man and of soul we choose is, to Locke, irrelevant to the problem of *personal* identity, for we have to distinguish the concept of person from both that of the soul and that of man in any case. We shall return to this important distinction between person, man, and spiritual substance in the next chapter. As Locke accounts for persons and personal identity in terms of the notion of consciousness, the latter must be examined first.

3.4 LOCKE ON CONSCIOUSNESS

Locke argues that 'it is the consciousness . . . which makes the same *Person* and constitutes this inseparable *self*' (II.xxvii.17). For Locke, to consider the human subject as a person is to consider it with regard to all those thoughts and actions of which it is conscious. But what is consciousness according to Locke? This question cannot be as easily answered as it might seem. Some, like Thomas Reid, read Locke's notion of consciousness as memory. This view has had a considerable influence on the interpretation of Locke and his account of personal identity in particular. Others seem to think that consciousness is basically the same as reflection. On the reading presented here Locke equates consciousness neither with memory nor with reflection. But it has to be determined what consciousness is and how it is related to notions such as memory and reflection in order to understand the role that he assigns to that notion in his account of personal identity.

[32] Locke, *Essay*, II.xxvii.25.

[33] Ibid., II.xxvii.8. See also ibid., II.i.11, and II.xxvii.21.

[34] Wright has argued that Locke's thinking about the soul and the 'man' was influenced by a seventeenth-century Epicurean account of the material soul as the principle of life—that of Thomas Willis, in *Two Discourses Concerning the Souls of Brutes, which is also that of the Vital and Sensitive Part of Man*, trans. Pordage (1683; Latin original, 1672). See Wright, 'Locke, Willis, and the seventeenth-century Epicurean soul', in Osler (ed.) *Atoms, Pneuma, and Tranquillity: Epicurean and Stoic Themes in European Thought* (1991), pp. 239–58.

One reason for the problems of interpreting Locke's account of consciousness is that he does not say very much about it.[35] There is no chapter, no section in Locke's *Essay* entitled 'On consciousness'. In fact, even the term 'consciousness' does not occur very often at all in Locke's writings. In the *First Draft* of the *Essay* Locke uses 'consciousness' only once, and even in the *Essay* itself the term does not occur very often, except for the chapter on identity.[36] There are passages which may suggest that Locke simply equates consciousness with reflection, and many of his readers have interpreted his text in this way.[37] He may simply follow other writers of the time who identify consciousness with inner sense or reflection. Thus, John Wilkins states that the 'inward sense' is that 'by which we can discern *internal* objects, and are conscious to our selves, or sensible both of the impressions that are made upon our outward *senses*, and of the inward motions of our *minds*.'[38] Locke, in the first chapter of Book II, states that reflection is 'the Perception of the Operations of our own Minds within us' (sect. 4), and a few sections later that consciousness is 'the perception of what passes in a Man's own mind' (sect. 19). The two statements are not identical, but they would seem to be sufficiently similar to suggest that consciousness and reflection are the same thing for Locke. One could speculate about whether there is any real difference between 'operations of our own minds' and 'what passes within us'.[39] If there is no essential difference between the two, then perhaps we could equate consciousness and reflection in Locke. It should be noted that the term 'operations' here is to be understood in a very broad sense. It refers not only to 'Actions of the Mind about its *Ideas*', but also to 'some sort of Passions arising sometimes from them, such as is the satisfaction or uneasiness arising from any thought' (II.i.4). Thus some mental states are included under the title of 'operations'. Maybe for Locke all mental operations are something that 'passes in a Man's own mind', but not everything that 'passes in a Man's own mind' is a mental operation (it may be a state), so that the notion of consciousness is broader than that of reflection. Even if this were the case, however, it could still be argued that reflection and consciousness are the same kind of relating to operations and to other things that pass 'in a Man's own mind'. For Locke characterizes both reflection and consciousness in terms of the notion of perception. If there is a difference between consciousness and reflection at all, it would seem to be a difference that relates to the object, not to the nature of the activity involved.

[35] Thus, it is somewhat surprising that Kemmerling claims that Locke is a philosopher who 'schwelgt' in the terminology of consciousness: *Ideen des Ichs. Studien zu Descartes* (1996), p. 193.

[36] Strangely, Kulstad does not consider II.27 at all in his thirty-five page chapter on 'Locke on Consciousness and Reflection', in *Leibniz on Apperception, Consciousness and Reflection* (1991). His interpretation of Locke's understanding of consciousness is based on passages in the first chapter of the second book of the *Essay*.

[37] Kulstad (1991), p. 115, claims that Locke is confused: 'No consistent and definitive stand is taken one way or the other on the sameness or difference of reflection and consciousness of mental operations.'

[38] Wilkins, *Of the Principles and Duties of Natural Religion* (1677), p. 3.

[39] Kulstad (1991), for example, reflects on this (p. 88).

If we accept what the cited passages from *Essay* II.i.4 and 19 suggest, it would seem to be easy to determine what Locke's understanding of 'consciousness' is. Although Locke does not say much about consciousness, he does say a fair amount about reflection. And if consciousness is the same as reflection, then his account of reflection may also be applied to consciousness. He says about reflection that it is the only other experiential source of simple ideas, apart from sensation. It is 'the other fountain from which Experience furnisheth the Understanding with Ideas'. Our own mental operations, 'when the soul comes to reflect on and consider, do furnish the understanding with another set of *ideas*, which could not be had from things without: and such are *Perception*, *Thinking*, *Doubting*, *Believing*, *Reasoning*, *Knowing*, *Willing*, and all the different actings of our own Minds'. And: 'This source of *Ideas* every *Man* has wholly in himself: And though it be not Sense, as having nothing to do with external Objects, yet it is very like it, and might properly enough be call'd internal Sense.' He calls this source of ideas 'reflection' because 'the *Ideas* it affords being such only as the mind gets by reflecting on its own Operations within it self' (II.i.4).

According to Locke, then, in reflection we turn our own mental operations into objects of inner observation; and for this to be possible it is required that we turn our attention to these operations. 'The Understanding turns inwards upon it self, *reflects* on its own *Operations*, and makes them the Object of its own Contemplation' (II.i.8). 'Unless he turn his Thoughts that way, and considers them [Operations of his Mind] *attentively*', he will have no clear and distinct ideas of his operations. He has to apply '*himself with attention*' (II.i.7).[40] For Locke, therefore, reflection is a

[40] Lähteenmäki, 'The Sphere of Experience in Locke. The Relations between Reflection, Consciousness and Ideas', *Locke Studies*, 8 (2008), 59–100, claims that there are two distinct and clearly defined conceptions of reflection in Locke. (1) Reflection as a source of ideas which is completely passive: here, attention and what Locke calls 'contemplation' are not involved. And there are no mental operations on which we do not reflect in this sense, that is to say we acquire ideas of all of our mental operations (92ff.). (2) Reflection as an operation about ideas which is voluntary and attentive. It is only this type of reflection that Locke characterizes by the notion of 'contemplation' (59, 68–9). Only this type of reflection presupposes consciousness: namely, consciousness of the *ideas* which we have acquired through the first type of reflection (60). It is highly problematic, however, to ascribe this distinction to Locke. Although there are passages in which Locke uses the terminology of 'reflection' in a general and indeterminate sense that is not identical with the definition of reflection (in *Essay*, II.i.4) as a source of ideas (see, for example, II.xxviii.12; III. v.16), this does not justify the ascription of two clearly defined and distinct notions of reflection to Locke, as envisaged by Lähteenmäki. (Mishori, 'Locke on the Inner Sense and Inner Observation', *Locke Studies*, 4 (2004), 145–81, even distinguishes 'four meanings of Lockian reflection'.) Locke's text simply does not support Lähteenmäki's interpretation. For example, *pace* Lähteenmäki, the notion of contemplation is used by Locke to characterize reflection as a source of ideas. In *Essay*, II. i.7, Locke notes that if we contemplate the operations of the mind (the operations themselves), we will acquire ideas of them. In order to acquire ideas of mental operations, the mind 'turns its view inward upon it self, and observes its own Actions' (II.vi.1; see also II.I.24). Of course, 'contemplation' is broader than reflection understood as a source of ideas, so that not every contemplation can be explained in terms of reflection; but every act of reflection by which we acquire ideas of mental operations involves an activity that Locke characterizes through notions such as contemplation and attention. Finally, Locke nowhere states that we acquire ideas of all of our mental operations and that there are no unreflected-on operations. Rather, he says that it is 'pretty late, before most Children get *ideas* of the Operations of their own Minds' (II.i.8), and that 'in time

mental act that is directed towards other mental acts—a higher-order perception (HOP) of other perceptions.[41] And if consciousness is to be equated with reflection, consciousness too must be a HOP. According to this reading, then, Locke is a proponent of a HOP account of consciousness. And many—both proponents and critics of the HOP account of consciousness—have read Locke in this way. According to William Lycan, for example, 'Locke put forward the theory of consciousness as 'internal sense' or 'reflection'—on which theory, consciousness is perception-like second order representing of our own psychological states'.[42] This reading of Locke's notion of consciousness in terms of a higher-order act of perception was, however, proposed much earlier. For example, it is present in Leibniz,[43] who simply assumes that 'consciousness' is the same as 'reflection' in Locke. This is obvious from Leibniz's critique of Locke in *Nouveaux essais* (II.i.19). In the corresponding passage in the *Essay*, Locke states that for him thought is always (and necessarily) conscious thought. Now, Leibniz takes Locke to be saying that thought is always accompanied by an act of reflection—a higher-order act of perception. It is clear from Leibniz's critique of Locke that he reads Lockean 'consciousness' in terms of reflection. He first translates Locke's 'being conscious' (of thoughts) as 's'apercevoir de'. But then he makes use of the terminology of reflection and says:

> It is impossible that we should always reflect explicitly on all our thoughts; for if we did, the mind would reflect on each reflection, *ad infinitum*, without ever being able to move on to a new thought. For example, in being aware of ['en m'appercevant de'] some present feeling, I should have always to think that I think about that feeling, and further to think that I think of thinking about it, and so on *ad infinitum*. It must be that I stop reflecting on all these reflections, and that eventually some thought is allowed to occur without being thought about; otherwise I would dwell for ever on the same thing.[44]

the Mind comes to reflect on its operations about the *Ideas* got by *Sensation*, and thereby stores it self with a new set of *Ideas*' (II.i.24). We do not necessarily reflect on our mental operations, for Locke says: 'Whoever reflects on what passes in his own Mind, cannot miss it. And *if he does not reflect* [my italics], all the Words in the World cannot make him have any notion of it' (II.ix.2). On this point, then, I am in agreement with Scharp, who argues that for Locke, 'the mind does not reflect on all its mental operations'. See Scharp, 'Locke's Theory of Reflection', *British Journal for the History of Philosophy*, 16 (2008), 25–63, at 27, 34–6.

[41] For discussions of present-day HOP accounts of consciousness, see, for example, Gennaro (ed.), *Higher Order Theories of Consciousness: An Anthology* (2004).

[42] Lycan, 'Consciousness as Internal Monitoring', in Block, Flanagan, and Guzeldere (eds.), *The Nature of Consciousness: Philosophical Debates* (1997), pp. 755–71, at 755. For other ascriptions of a HOP account of consciousness to Locke, see, for example, Guzeldere, 'Is Consciousness the Perception of What Passes in a Man's own Mind?', in Metzinger (ed.), *Conscious Experience* (1995), pp. 335–58, at p. 335; Carruthers, 'HOP over FOR, HOT Theory', in Gennaro (2004), pp. 115–58, at p. 118.

[43] Thomas Reid claims that 'Mr. LOCKE has . . . confounded reflection with consciousness, and seems not to have been aware that they are different powers': *Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man*, ed. Brookes (2002), VI.i, p. 421.

[44] The English translation is from *New Essays on Human Understanding*, trans. Remnant and Bennett (1981), p. 118. The French original reads: 'il n'est pas possible que nous reflechissions tousjours expressement sur toutes nos pensées; autrement l'Esprit feroit reflexion sur chaque reflexion à l'infini sans pouvoir jamais passer à une nouvelle pensée. Par exemple, en m'appercevant de quelque sentiment present, je devrois tousjours penser que j'y pense, et penser

As a critique of Locke, this (old) argument from infinite regress makes sense only if it is assumed that consciousness is an act of reflection—a higher-order mental act. Leibniz's critique would be correct if Locke's conception of consciousness were indeed identical with reflection. For, as was indicated in the Introduction, the combination of a HOP account of consciousness with the thesis that all thought is accompanied by consciousness yields the infinite regress that Leibniz discusses. Locke would be saying, then, that thought is always accompanied by a higher-order act of perception.[45]

Indeed, even if we assumed a distinction between consciousness and reflection in Locke, this would by itself not be sufficient to defend Locke against Leibniz's critique. For it would still be possible that Locke conceives of consciousness in terms of a HOP, but of a kind that is different from reflection. This is an interpretation suggested by, for example, Mark Kulstad, who thinks that Locke is confused about the relation between consciousness and reflection,[46] but claims that if there is a distinction between the two in Locke it would be a distinction between two kinds of HOP.[47] On this reading, consciousness in Locke is a higher-order operation, but can give us merely 'obscure ideas' of our mental operations.[48] This is so because consciousness does not focus attention on the latter. Reflection, by contrast, is said to be 'equivalent to focusing attention on one's mental operations'; thus reflection, but not consciousness, provides us with 'clear and distinct ideas of operations of the mind'.[49] Therefore, if there is a distinction in Locke between consciousness and reflection, it is between two types of higher-order activity: in the one case (reflection) we focus attention on mental operations, and in the other case (consciousness) we do not focus our attention that way. This reading is not without its problems, for more than one reason, as it suggests that consciousness is a source of ideas, and thus

encor que je pense d'y penser, et ainsi à l'infini. Mais il faut bien que je cesse de reflechir sur toutes ces reflexions et qu'il y ait enfin quelque pensée qu'on laisse passer sans y penser; autrement on demeureroit tousjours sur la même chose' *Nouveaux essais*, II.i.19, Leibniz, *Die Philosophischen Schriften*, ed. Gerhardt, vol. 5).

[45] For a detailed discussion of this, see also Thiel, 'Leibniz and the Concept of Apperception', *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie*, 76 (1994), 195–209.

[46] Kulstad (1991), p. 115.

[47] Ibid., 86f.

[48] Recently, Locke's statement that 'the Operations of our minds, will not let us be without, at least some obscure Notions of them. No Man, can be wholly ignorant of what he does, when he thinks' (*Essay*, II.i.25) has led to some debate. Does Locke say here that *consciousness* is a source of ideas, or is he talking about reflection? Does he perhaps identify reflection and consciousness here? As noted, Kulstad (1991), pp. 86–7, 108, thinks Locke has in mind consciousness understood as a higher-order activity, but as distinct from reflection. Lähteenmäki (2008), 70, assumes that Locke is referring to reflection, although the term is not even used in the relevant section. I tend to agree with Weinberg's reading that the 'obscure Notions' are due to consciousness understood as distinct from reflection and, more generally, as distinct from any second-order perception: 'The Coherence of Consciousness in Locke's *Essay*', *History of Philosophy Quarterly*, 25 (2008), 24, 28–9. Indeed, Locke's statement when explaining the 'obscure notions' we have of our mental operations is very similar to his account of consciousness as something that 'is inseparable from thinking, and as it seems to me essential to it: . . . When we hear, see, smell, taste, feel, meditate, or will any thing, we know that we do so. Thus it is always as to our present Sensations and Perceptions' (*Essay*, II. xxvii.9).

[49] Kulstad (1991), p. 108.

introduces a third experiential source of simple ideas, apart from sensation and reflection which would contradict Locke's thesis that sensation and reflection are the only sources of such ideas. More problematic than this in the present context is that the introduction of this kind of distinction between consciousness and reflection cannot save Locke from Leibniz's critique. For the thesis that consciousness is a HOP (but different from reflection), combined with Locke's thesis that all thought is accompanied by consciousness, would still yield the infinite regress pointed out by Leibniz.

Recent defenders of the HOP account of consciousness may, perhaps with good reason, reject the thesis that all mental states are conscious and avoid the infinite regress issue this way, although this move would then raise the question of how the conscious can be grounded in the unconscious.[50] In any case, it would obviously not be an option for Locke, as that thesis is an essential feature of his account of consciousness. More recent discussions of Locke have instead rejected the standard reading of Locke discussed above, according to which Locke is a proponent of a HOP account of consciousness.[51] This is the reading defended here (and previously). If it is correct, Leibniz's critique in terms of the infinite regress issue misses the mark. But what is consciousness, according to Locke, if it is not a HOP, and how is it to be distinguished from reflection?

Although the two passages from *Essays*, II.i.4 and 19 seem to suggest that Locke equates consciousness with reflection, it is evident from a number of other passages in the *Essay* (i) that he implies a distinction between consciousness and reflection, and (ii) that this is not a distinction between two types of HOP. Locke says that 'consciousness . . . is *inseparable* from thinking, and as it seems to me essential to it . . . When we see, hear, smell, taste, feel, meditate, or will any thing, we know that we do so. Thus it is always as to our present Sensations and Perceptions'.[52] For Locke, 'being conscious' denotes an immediate awareness that is an integral part of all acts of thinking as such. Locke says that 'thinking *consists* in being conscious that one thinks' (my italics) (II.i.19). Consciousness is an essential element of thought and is 'inseparable' from it. And Locke makes it quite clear that what he means by 'reflection' is, unlike consciousness, not an essential element of thought as such. He does not say that thinking consists in reflection; he says it consists in consciousness. As we have seen, 'reflection' is Locke's technical term for inner sense; and reflection, he says, requires a special attention (II.i.24). His definition of reflection in terms of

[50] See Coventry and Kriegel, 'Locke on Consciousness', *History of Philosophy Quarterly*, 25 (2008), 225; Kriegel, 'Consciousness as Intransitive Self-Consciousness: Two Views and an Argument', *Canadian Journal of Philosophy*, 33 (2003), 103–32.

[51] See for example, Thiel, 'Leibniz and the Concept of Apperception' (1994), 195–209; Thiel, 'Hume's Notions of Consciousness and Reflection in Context', *British Journal for the History of Philosophy* 2 (1994), 75–115; and Thiel, 'Der Begriff der Intution bei Locke', *Aufklärung* 18 (2006), pp. 95–112. See also Mishori (2004), 145–81, at 160; Weinberg (2008), 21–39; and Coventry and Kriegel (2008), 221–42.

[52] Locke, *Essay*, II.xxvii.9; my italics. See also II.i.10: 'Our being sensible of it is not necessary to any thing, but to our thoughts; and to them it is; and to them it will always be necessary, till we can think without being conscious of it.'

inner sense means that reflection is not an immediate relation of oneself to oneself, and is not to be associated with consciousness. According to Locke, through reflection the mind relates to itself in the sense that it observes its own operations and produces ideas of them;[53] and he links reflection, but not consciousness, to contemplation.[54] In other words, consciousness is a presence of the mind to itself that is more fundamental than the objectifying reflection: the essential difference is that, unlike reflection, consciousness is not a HOP. Without consciousness, reflection would not have any objects upon which to reflect. Both sensation and reflection are conscious acts; but for Locke they are not necessarily accompanied by an act of reflection.[55]

Further evidence for ascribing to Locke a distinction between consciousness and reflection can be derived from changes that Locke made to later editions of the *Essay*. Consider for example the following passage from IV.iii.23. In editions 1–4 the passage reads: 'All the simple *Ideas* we have are confined . . . to those we receive from corporeal Objects by *Sensation*, and from the Operations of our own Minds, *that we are conscious of* in our selves' (last italics mine). This formulation could be read as saying that *consciousness* is the source of ideas of mental operations, and that consequently, consciousness is the same as reflection. Obviously, in order to avoid such a misinterpretation Locke changed the passage for the fifth edition by replacing the terminology of consciousness with that of reflection. Now he speaks of 'the Operations of our own Minds as the Objects of *Reflection*'.

Against this reading it can (and has been) objected that if, as this reading suggests, Locke would allow that consciousness relates directly to mental states and operations, then he would allow for objects of experience that are not ideas, and this would contradict his explicit thesis that only ideas can be objects of thought and experience.[56] As noted above, he nowhere suggests that consciousness is or could be an additional source of ideas. If consciousness can relate directly to mental states and operations without producing ideas of them, however, then, as the objection states, he would allow for objects of thoughts and experience that are not ideas. Instead, it is argued, when Locke speaks of the consciousness of mental states and operations he must mean the consciousness of *ideas* of mental operations and states, and not a direct relation of consciousness to mental states and operations.[57] Thus when Locke says that we cannot perceive without being conscious that we perceive, according to

[53] 'By REFLECTION then . . . I would be understood to mean, that notice which the Mind takes of its own Operations, and the manner of them, by reason whereof there come to be *Ideas* of these Operations in the Understanding': *Essay*, II.i.4. 'In time, the Mind comes to reflect on its own *Operations* . . . and thereby stores it self with a new set of *Ideas*, which I call *Ideas* of *Reflection*': *Essay*, II.i.24.

[54] See *Essay*, II.vi.1, II.i.4, II.i.7, and II.i.8.

[55] This does not mean, of course, that we must be conscious of all aspects and elements or details of these complex processes. Compare II.viii.10 on implicit judgements. I thank Martin Lenz for drawing my attention to this.

[56] Lähteenmäki (2008), 60–1, 73.

[57] Both Lähteenmäki and Scharp hold that for Locke, consciousness does not relate directly to mental operations but only to ideas of them which have been acquired by reflection. See Lähteenmäki (2008), 85–6; and Scharp (2008), 30, 42.

this reading, Locke is saying that we are conscious of the *idea* of perceiving, not of the act of perceiving itself. And this idea of perceiving must of course be an idea of reflection—an idea that we have acquired through the mental operation of reflection. According to this interpretation, then, consciousness of mental operations presupposes reflection on the latter. But this reading is very implausible. Of course, for Locke to have ideas means that we are conscious of these ideas or at least can become conscious of them. But does he say anywhere that mental operations and states become conscious only *via* ideas of reflection? On the contrary, we saw that for him consciousness is inseparable from thinking and is essential to *it* (not just to the idea of thinking acquired through reflection). Thinking—not just the idea of thinking—consists in being conscious that one thinks (II.i.19). The relation of consciousness to thought is not mediated through ideas, but is immediate in the sense that consciousness belongs to thought itself.

But what about the objection that such a direct relation of consciousness to mental states and operations means that there are for Locke objects of thought and experience that are not ideas—which would contradict Locke's thesis that ideas are the only objects of thought and experience? The problem with this objection is that it conceives of mental states and operations as *objects* of consciousness in the same way as such operations and states are objects of reflection. As suggested by the passages quoted above, Locke thinks of the relationship between consciousness and thought in a different way. Thinking and other mental operations are not 'objects' that are somehow separate from consciousness; rather, they are characterized by an inherent reflexivity which Locke calls consciousness (rather than reflection). This reflexivity is part of their nature as mental states and operations. Consciousness or inherent reflexivity is not a relation which may hold sometimes but not other times. One can distinguish conceptually between the content and the consciousness of thought, but this does not mean that the two aspects could be separated from each other in reality. Reflection but not consciousness is an extrinsic relation to thought. Rather, as indicated above, in order for reflection to be able to relate to operations and states, the latter must always already be characterized as *mental* operations; that is to say, by that inherent reflexivity that Locke calls 'consciousness'. Locke's statement in II.i.4 about reflection can be interpreted along these lines. We can produce ideas of mental operations because we are conscious of them ('which we being conscious of'), and can therefore consider them through an act of reflection. He illustrates his thesis that thinking consists in being consciousness that one thinks by an analogy with hunger and the feeling of hunger. To say we could think without being conscious of thinking is, Locke states, as absurd as to say we are hungry without feeling hungry. Rather, being hungry consists in this feeling of hunger—this feeling is not something that needs to be added to hunger 'itself'. In the same way, consciousness is not something that needs to be added to thinking externally; rather, it is an aspect of thinking itself.

It is plain, then, that Locke is not a proponent of a HOP account of consciousness, as the traditional reading has it. Recently, philosophers who accept the reading presented here have labelled Locke's account a Same-Order Perception (SOP)

account of consciousness.[58] I have no objection to the label as such, but the SOP account that is ascribed to Locke is typically explained in terms of later phenomenological theory—in particular, that of Franz Brentano.[59] And indeed, Brentano too constructs consciousness as something intrinsic that belongs to the mental phenomena themselves. Experience has two objects: a primary and a secondary object. 'In the same mental phenomenon in which the sound is present to our minds we simultaneously apprehend the mental phenomenon itself . . . We can say that the sound is the *primary object* of the *act* of hearing, and that the act of hearing itself is the *secondary object*.'[60] It is not clear, however, that Locke's position can be usefully illuminated by appeals to Brentano and other phenomenologists. In fact it seems unlikely that Locke would have endorsed Brentano's formulation of the SOP account of consciousness, since for Brentano the mental phenomenon is still an *object* of consciousness, even if merely a secondary one. And to liken Locke's account too much to that of Brentano would mean that, unnecessarily, objections that have been raised against Brentano become relevant to a discussion of Locke.[61] Rather, in terms of its historical relations, Locke's account would seem to be closer to earlier seventeenth-century views with which he was familiar.

We have seen above that Cudworth introduced the term 'consciousness' into English philosophical terminology, aruging that consciousness is an immediate relating to one's own self. As Locke was very was familiar with Cudworth's work and other relevant writings of the time, there can be no doubt that Cudworth's understanding of consciousness, and the notion as employed by thinkers such as William Sherlock and Robert South, are relevant background to an understanding of Locke's notion. But the account of consciousness that is closest to Locke's understanding of consciousness can be found in thinkers who attempted, within the framework of Cartesianism, to further develop the notion of consciousness: thinkers such as Louis de La Forge and in particular Antoine Arnauld, discussed in Chapter 1. We saw there that La Forge accounts for *conscience* explicitly in terms of an inherent reflexivity of thought itself, rather than as a second-order act of perception.[62] Arnauld makes the same point by explaining consciousness in terms of a *réflexion virtuelle*, as distinct from a *réflexion expresse*; that is to say, in terms of the notion that

[58] See Coventry and Kriegel (2008), 221–42. Weinberg does not make use of the SOP terminology, but speaks of 'one-level' theories, and her interpretation of Locke is similar to that of Coventry and Kriegel: Weinberg (2008), 21–39. She says that for Locke, consciousness is 'a reflexive and proprietary constituent of ordinary perception' (26), but like Coventry and Kriegel she links Locke's account to that of Brentano (27–8; compare Coventry and Kriegel (2008), 226).

[59] Caston has argued convincingly that Brentano's account was strongly influenced by Aristotle. See Caston, 'Aristotle on Consciousness', *Mind* 111 (2002), 751–815. Coventry and Kriegel's (2008) suggestion, however, that Locke too may have been influenced by Aristotle on consciousness, is highly speculative (228ff). It is more likely that Locke's immediate context is relevant.

[60] Brentano, *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint*, trans. Rancurello, Terrell, and McAlister (1973), pp. 127–8.

[61] Weinberg seems to acknowledge this, and mentions the problems in Brentano that have been discussed in the literature, saying that Locke's account is only 'a bit like Brentano': Weinberg (2008), 27–8.

[62] La Forge, *Traité de l'esprit de l'homme* (1666) p. 134. See also pp. 82, 112, 156–7.

'our thought or perception is essentially reflective on itself'.[63] Locke was very much familiar with Arnauld's work, and, indeed, his notion of consciousness is best understood in terms of an Arnauldian *réflexion virtuelle*.[64] Also, consciousness for Locke is to be understood as 'creature consciousness'. It is not the perception that is conscious, but the subject of thought. As he states, 'when we see hear, smell, taste, feel, meditate, or will any thing, *we* know that we do so' (II.xxvii.9, my italics).

3.5. LOCKE ON CONSCIOUSNESS, SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS, AND INTUITION

So far we have discussed consciousness as relating to mental states and operations, but Locke also speaks of consciousness as relating to our own self as the *subject* that has such states and performs such operations. Just as we are always immediately aware of our own thought, we are also aware in every act of thought that our own self exists as the subject of thought. 'In every Act of Sensation, Reasoning, or Thinking, we are conscious to our selves of our own Being' (IV.ix.3). Sometimes Locke describes this immediate awareness of our own existence as 'self-consciousness'.[65] Clearly, the consciousness of states and operations on the one hand and the consciousness of one's own existence or self-consciousness on the other are very closely connected in Locke. Moreover, both consciousness and self-consciousness are linked by him to the notion of intuition. Intuition or intuitive knowledge, too, relates to thoughts and ideas as well as to the existence of the self or subject. Like consciousness, intuition is an immediate self-relation which is characterized by absolute certainty. As soon as we perceive an idea we immediately perceive not only its existence, but also the identity and distinctness of its content. Locke says: 'there can be no *Idea* in the Mind, which it does not presently, by an intuitive Knowledge, perceive to be what it is, and to be different from any other'.[66] Yet although consciousness and intuition share the properties of immediacy and certainty, they are not simply identical. There is one type of intuitive knowledge which has self-evident truths as its object; it is this kind of intuitive knowledge which is the basis and essential element of what Locke calls 'demonstrative knowledge'. And he does not relate 'consciousness' to the knowledge of self-evident truths. If intuition

[63] Arnauld, *Des vrayes et des fausses idées* (1683) chapt. 6, p. 46.

[64] Arnauld's *réflexion expresse* is not, however, identical with Locke's technical concept of reflection. Locke's reflection serves as an experiential source of a certain set of simple ideas. This may be included in Arnauld's notion, but even if it is, the latter is broader than Lockean reflection.

[65] In a journal note of 1696, Locke states that 'our own existence is known to us by a certainty yet higher than our senses can give us of the existence of other things, and that is internal perception, a self-consciousness or intuition' (MS Locke, c.28, fols. 119r–120v); printed in King, *The Life of John Locke* (1830), vol. 2, p. 138f. In the *Essay* chapter on identity (II.xxvii.16), Locke uses 'self-consciousness' only once, and as a term that refers not to the intuition of our own existence but to the consciousness of states, experiences, and operations.

[66] *Essay*, IV.iii.8. See also IV.i.4, IV.ii.1, IV.ii.14, IV.iii.3, and IV.vii.19.

is not the same as consciousness, how are these notions related to one another in Locke? The *Essay* does not deal with this question.

The relationship between consciousness and intuition is directly addressed (and clarified), however, in John Wynne's correspondence with Locke.[67] Wynne published a very successful 'abridgement' of Locke's *Essay* which first appeared in 1696. Writing to Locke in March 1695 about his 'almost finished' *Abridgement* of the *Essay*, he adds the following 'querie':

> Whether the knowledge we have of our own Existence, and the perception of our Sensations, be not A sort of knowledge *Sui generis* as we say, and different from Intuitive; and might not more properly be accounted A distinct sort, under the name of consciousness. (*The Correspondence of John Locke*, ed. de Beer, vol. 4 (1979), no. 1869)

In other words, Wynne wishes to distinguish more sharply than does Locke between consciousness and intuition. Wynne proposes a fourth kind of knowledge, in addition to Locke's sensitive, demonstrative, and intuitive knowledge: namely, consciousness. 'Consciousness' should refer to the immediate knowledge of our own existence and of our perceptions, whereas 'intuition' should be restricted to knowledge of self-evident truths. Although Locke's reply to this letter has not survived, Wynne's next letter to Locke allows us to infer what Locke's answer is: here Wynne refers to 'What you have said in answer to the quare propos'd in my last' (ibid., no. 1884). According to Wynne, Locke comprehends 'under the general Name of Intuition, the Knowledge we have of our own existence and thoughts as well as of self-evident Truths'. They all belong to one kind of knowledge because of their immediacy and their 'equal degree of certainty'. A distinction between different kinds of intuitive knowledge can be drawn, however, in relation to the objects of intuitive knowledge; that is, between (1) 'the Internal perception or Sensation of our own Existence', (2) 'the Consciousness of our thoughts', and (3) 'the perception of Self-evident Truths'. Now everything falls into place: to Locke, although one may distinguish between these three kinds of knowledge (in relation to the object of knowledge), one should regard all three of them as forms of intuitive knowledge, because they are all characterized by immediacy and absolute certainty.[68]

Consciousness, then, is not identical with intuition as such, but only with that type of intuition that relates to ideas and perceptions. And self-consciousness relates to intuition only in the first sense, as an 'internal perception' of one's own existence. Clearly, self-consciousness in this sense is closely linked to the consciousness of mental states and operations. By way of the consciousness we have of mental states and operations, we perceive immediately—that is, intuitively—our own existence.

[67] The relevance of this correspondence to an understanding of Locke's concept of intuition was first discussed in Thiel, 'Leibniz and the Concept of Apperception' (1994), 203, and in Thiel, 'Hume's Notions of Consciousness and Reflection in Context' (1994), 75–115.

[68] Clearly, Locke's argument that consciousness is a type of intuition constitutes additional support for the view that he distinguishes between consciousness and reflection: for Locke does not link reflection to intuition, and he does not describe reflection in terms of the notions of immediacy and absolute certainty. Consciousness, but not reflection, is understood as an immediate form of relating to one's own self and said to be a quality of all thoughts as such.

Therefore, the knowledge of our own existence 'neither needs, nor is capable of any proof' (*Essay* IV.ix.3). Very much like Descartes, Locke states that 'if I doubt of all other Things, that very doubt makes me perceive my own *Existence*, and will not suffer me to doubt of that' (ibid.).[69] Performing a mental operation involves the consciousness of the latter, and this in turn involves the consciousness of the existence of the subject that performs the operation. 'If I know I *doubt*, I have as certain a Perception of the Existence of the thing doubting, as of that Thought, which I call *doubt*. Experience then convinces us, that *we have an intuitive Knowledge of our own Existence*, and an internal infallible Perception that we are' (ibid.).[70]

Unlike Descartes, however, Locke holds that we cannot know the nature or real essence of 'the thing doubting' or soul. This brings us back to his distinction, discussed above, between the notions of soul as substance, man, and person. As with all substances, Locke holds with respect to the thinking thing or substance that we can acquire ideas of their operations through experience (in this case, inner sense or reflection), and we know intuitively that there must be something—a 'thing' or substance—that performs these operations, though our knowledge does not extend to the nature of this substance called soul: ''Tis past controversy, that we have in us something that thinks, our very Doubts about what it is, confirm the certainty of its being, though we must content our selves in the Ignorance of what kind of *Being* it is' (IV.iii.6). In short, metaphysical questions about the material or immaterial nature of the soul are beyond human knowledge. Therefore, the question of the identity of the human subject should relate not to the soul as substance, but to what Locke calls the person or personality.

[69] In the early 'Drafts' (1671) for the *Essay* Locke explicitly refers to Descartes in this context, without, however, making use of the notion of intuition. See Nidditch and Rogers (eds.), *John Locke. Drafts for the Essay concerning Human Understanding and other Philosophical Writings. Drafts A and B* (1990), *Draft A*, §§10, 27; *Draft B*, §35.

[70] In some places, however, Locke seems to suggest that we know the existence of our own self inferentially rather than intuitively. See, for example, *Essay*, II.i.10. For a discussion of this, see Thiel (2006), 95–112, at 102–6.