Conversations about human nature appear to be the most agreeable in social intercourse,[a] for the subject matter is societies must be such that everyone can pronounce judgment on it.

The spirit of observation makes one lenient and liberal.[b]

We will estimate a human being not in accordance with his hidden qualities, such as serve only for speculation, but chiefly in accordance with his practical qualities.

The transition from the corporeal motion to the spiritual cannot be further explained, so Bonnet and various others[5] are in great error when they believe they can infer with certainty from the brain to the soul. 25:10

TREATISE

The first thought that strikes us when we observe ourselves expresses the I; it expresses the inspection of oneself. We want to analyze the I. All the proofs that have been presented of the simplicity of the I are nothing more than analyses of the I. In the little word 'I' is not a mere intuition of oneself, but also the simplicity of our Self, for it is the most perfect singular. Moreover, it expresses my substantiality, for I distinguish the I, as an ultimate subject that cannot be further predicated of any thing, and that is itself the subject of all predicates. The little word also expresses a rational substance, for the I expresses that one makes oneself into an object of thoughts with consciousness. In it there also lies personality. Every human being, every creature, that makes itself into an object of its thoughts, must regard itself not as a part of the world, filling up the void of creation, but rather as a member of creation, as its center and its end.

The I is the foundation of the capacity for understanding and reason, and the entire power of cognition, for all these rest on my observing and inspecting myself and what goes on in me. It is difficult to make oneself into an object of thoughts, which is why one so often omits to do so. In the little word 'I' one finds even the concept of freedom, the consciousness of self-activity; for the I is not an external thing. From this analysis of the I we see that what many philosophers pass off as profound inferences are nothing but the immediate intuitions of our self.

Every being that can say I and can make itself into an object of its consideration, has an immediate value, all others have only a mediated one; the attentiveness and intuition of oneself must not be easy, hence children up until their third year do not attain to this concept of their Self at all, but as soon as they do attain to this thought, then that appears to be the point at which their capacities develop.

[a] *im Umgange*

[b] *nachsichtig und milde*

An author allows the reader also a vote in his judgments when he
25:11 speaks in the plural, hence the word we is modest.

Whoever inquires into the inwardness of incentives, as Montaigne does, can hardly speak in anything but the singular; hence Pascal and Malebranche blame him without good grounds.[6]

Personality is that something can be imputed to me, and personality arises from the thought I. From the combination of several simultaneous ideas into a single one is inferred the existence of our simple, indivisible I.

It is unfortunate that one is made conscious of one's state; hence a creature which cannot say 'I' might well suffer many pains but is not unhappy on that account. Thus only through the I are we capable of
25:12 happiness or unhappiness. The entire proof in philosophy that the soul is a simple substance is grounded on the I, because this is the most perfect singular.

Logical egoism consists in regarding the judgment of all others as superfluous in regard to the decision about what is true and untrue.

"*Étant continuellement affecté des sensations, ou immédiatement, ou par la mémoire, comment puis je savoir si le sentiment du moi es quelque chose hors de ces mêmes sensations, et s'il peut être indépendant d'elles?*" Rousseau. "*L'identité du moi ne se prolonge que par la* mémoire."[a]

In conversations when one often talks of himself, even if he blames himself, he is annoying to society; for every human being regards himself as a chief part of creation, and does not want to place himself in the standpoint of individual persons, unless perhaps it is an important encounter. Human beings would rather regard the world generally from an indifferent standpoint. Reflections have something very agreeable about them: if one is accustomed to reflect tranquilly, then all affairs in the world are going well for him. Leibniz carefully placed the little worm he was observing back on its leaf,[7] and everyone loves what gives him occasion for contemplation.[b] That is the cause why Montaigne pleases us so much. If one talks in society about one's ends, exertions, and private circumstances, then that is the way to make one's hearers perplexed

[a] "Being affected continuously by sensations, whether immediately or by memory, how do I know if the feeling of myself is something outside those same sensations, and if it might be independent of them?" (Rousseau, *Émile*, *Oeuvres complètes* (Paris: Gallimard, 1969) 4:571. Cf. "*Ce que je sais bien c'est que l'identité du moi ne se prolonge que par la mémoire, et que pour être le même en effet, il faut que je me souvienne d'avior été*" (*ibid.*, 4:590). "What I know well is that the identity of myself prolongs itself only through memory, and that to be the same in fact it is necessary only that I remember having been." The most influential modern proponent of memory as the criterion of personal identity is John Locke, *Essay Concerning Human Understanding* (ed. Peter Nidditch) (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1972) Book II, Chapter XXVII, Sections 6–26.

[b] *Betrachtungen*

and silent; but if one prattles on[a] about his own affair, then the company 25:13
gladly hears about it and one does not have to sacrifice his worth in doing it. So there are no rules about this, each is so intent on his own I that he does not like to hear about another I. Within ten years the body is made up of other matter, like a stream flowing with other water, yet the I is unalterable, and this I is indivisible. If all the members were separated from my body, and I can speak only the I, then I would be conscious of no diminution in me. Every human being has in himself a double personality, as it were, the I as soul and the I as human being.

The real[b] I is something substantial, simple and persisting; whereas one on the contrary regards the I as human being as alterable, one says for example, 'I was tall', 'I was short'. The I would not alter if one were in another body.

Regarding his body, the human being is little different from the animals, and the Hottentot is so near to the Orangutan that in estimating the mere shape, if one looks at the speciation he might be dubious about 25:14
it. If one were to remove reason from the human being, then the question is: What sort of animal would the human being then be? He certainly might not be the last one, but his animality, since it is moderated by the human soul, is hard to recognize; for who knows what kind of animality the Deity mixes with reason in order to make a human being. The Stoics want to posit animality entirely uncombined with the human soul, for they regard the body not as a part of the self, but as something belonging to us, from whose intimacy we must withdraw ourselves; it is like the shell of the snail, merely our dwelling, and the body itself, along with its alterations, belong to our contingent state.[8] Epicurus, by contrast, asserted that there are no other beings except the objects encountered by the senses, so what pertains to the body, only that pertains to our self.[9] I am, that is an intuition, and not an inference as Cartesius believed.[10] But my body is, that is a mere appearance. In me, namely, there is nothing but the representation of my self, I intuit only myself. Insofar as there are alterations in me corresponding to objects, they are called 'appearances'. We have no intuition in the whole world except the intuition of our self; all other things are appearances. The I is the mere soul, the body is the 25:15
husk. There is no human being who would not like to exchange his face for another's, or his whole physique, or even indeed the qualities of his soul; but to exchange his entire I, no one resolves to do that: this is in itself a contradiction, hence it is really nothing at all obscure.

In our soul we find two sides, as it were, one in accordance with which it is passive, the other in accordance with which it is active. According to the first I am a play of all the impressions that happen to me from nature,

[a] *railliert* [b] *eigentliche*

according to the other I am a free self-active principle,[a] the human being recognizes himself as so much lower to the extent that he is passive and bound in regard to self-activity.

If a human being in his external demeanor shows no marks of an inner worth, then we despise him, but if the contrary, then we say that he possesses respectability.[b] But he must also provide marks[c] that he does not fail to recognize the worth of others, which one calls 'modesty'.

The question is: Where do we locate the source of ill in the human being? We find it in the human being's animality. In some human beings there are such strong incentives that it is hard for his intelligence to discipline them. And the difference between human beings appears to rest more on their animality than on their spiritual nature.

The human being makes himself as far as possible into an intelligence, and acts as if he wholly neglects his animality.

We have capacities, faculties and powers.

A capacity is the quality of mind to be modified by alien impressions. We can have great faculties and yet only a small power. Thus powers are
25:16 sources of execution, and the faculty is the sufficiency for certain actions. It is not easy to gain insight into[d] what must be added to a faculty in order that it should become an active power.

The capacity to be modified, or to be passive, one calls the lower power of the soul; the capacity to act self-actively[e] is the higher power. Insofar as the soul is capable of impressions that the body suffers passively,[f] it is called *anima*,[g] but insofar as it is capable of self-active action, it is called *mens*.[h] Insofar as both are united and the former capacity stands under the moderating influence[i] of the other, it is called *animus*[j] – *anima* is called 'soul', *animus* 'mind', *mens* 'spirit'.[11] These are not three substances but three ways we feel ourselves living. In regard to the first way we are passive, in regard to the other, passive but simultaneously reactive, in regard to the third way we are entirely self-active. We can distinguish in the case of agreeable and sad sensations.

1) The feeling of enjoyment, and
2) Cheerfulness about this enjoyment.

Likewise one can distinguish in the case of painful sensations

1) The pain itself or the grief
2) The painful sensations about the grief

[a] *Principium*
[b] *Anstand*
[c] *Marquen*
[d] *einsehen*
[e] *selbstthätig to handeln*
[f] *leidet*
[g] soul (f.)
[h] mind, though Kant here equates it with spirit (*Geist*).
[i] *moderation*, written lower case, as a Latin word.
[j] soul (m.), though Kant here equates it with mind *(Gemüth)*.

The Stoics understood by a sage the human being who is never mis- 25:17
erable; he feels, indeed, all the pains in his soul, though they never get to his mind, but let him react. A human being can feel the most sensitive pains in his soul and yet be of cheerful and tranquil mind. The mind is also called the 'heart', which borders on the higher powers of the human mind. A good mind or heart[a] is the good relation between sensations or inclinations and the reaction[b] of the understanding. Socrates had an evil heart,[c] but the principles of his understanding overpowered sensibility and made the relation between it and reason correct again.[12] Thus besides pleasure and displeasure in the soul and in the mind, there is also a pleasure and displeasure in the spirit, which is approvals of his good or reproaches[d] of his evil actions. The soul can be swimming entirely in pain, and yet in the spirit there can be great gladness,[e] just as on the contrary, the spirit often looks gloomy when sheer joys in the soul delude the mind. Sicknesses of the mind are the strongest ones – Depression[f] is
worse than pain – it is displeasure with my entire state. Dissatisfaction 25:18
with my own person is spiritual sadness and the worst one of all. It is wonderful that the stronger and more pressing enjoyments are, the more delicate they are and the most sublimely removed from sensibility.

What ascends from pleasure or displeasure to the spirit, comes back again into the mind with redoubled strength. Hence the most desperate actions are from self-reproach, just as the most sublime have arisen from self-approval. It is sometimes said that human beings, societies or speeches have spirit, i.e. moving force. We call 'spirit' what contains real moving force, e.g. the spirit[g] of liquors. We always gladly seek out what sets our heart[h] in motion; one sees the spirit in the human being is the same as his life, or the first ground for life in the human being. All depression comes largely from the fact that one makes a great idea of the importance of life. A sage regards everything in the world, even his life, as unimportant. That helps him to outweigh and react[i] against strong sensible feelings.[j] As for what further pertains to the mind or heart,[k] I remark that the heart[l] is usually an object of love. A good heart[m] is still

[a] Reading with the Philippi transcription, *Gemüth oder Herz*; in the following passage, *Gemüth* will sometimes be translated 'heart' when that makes for more idiomatic English. But such cases will also be noted.
[b] *reaction*, written lower case, as a Latin word.
[c] *Gemüth*
[d] *reprochen*, written lower case, as a French word, though with a German plural.
[e] *Heiterkeit*
[f] *Betrübnis*
[g] *Spiritus*, the Latin word, but capitalized as a German noun.
[h] *Gemüth*
[i] *reaction*, written lower case, as a Latin word.
[j] *Empfindungen*
[k] *Gemüth*
[l] *Gemüth*
[m] *Gemüth*

loved even when all else is sacrificed to evil excesses. There are *aimables debauchés*, lovable debauchees. One has complete confidence in such good hearts,[a] and sooner in them than in those who act well from principles. In regard to the practical the mind[b] is usually called the 'heart'. As for the spirit, one never says that a human being has an evil spirit, for the spirit is not affected by any inclinations, and since it judges everything merely from reason, not from sense, it judges the good and is the principle[c] of judgment about the good, hence nothing evil can derive from it, from it all good is derived, but evil from the mind. But if one attends to the common opinion of human beings, especially of savages, then the word 'spirit' signifies that which animates the inert matter in the whole of nature. Thus chemists have their *spiritus rectores* in oils, *et cetera*.

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CONDITIONS OF TASTE

Beauty pleases immediately; we can say that something is agreeable mediately (as a means), e.g. an inheritance. One can also say that something is '*mediately* good', but to call it 'mediately beautiful' will not do. Are the sciences mediately or immediately good? – Do they increase the perfection of the human being in themselves, or do they only contribute something to this? – Whether a person is beautiful or ugly one sees through intuition. – The bad features of an ugly face cannot be beautified by any treasure.[d] Beauty has to do with the judgment about intuition, and intuition is something immediate. Beauty is always only something contingent and is easy to do without. But it can be that if beauty is united with utility, the liking for it becomes more well-grounded and enduring. Just the same, pure beauty, which is only for taste and furnishes a certain pure gratification, remains void of all utility. It pleases us whenever we
25:177 set our collective living powers[e] in activity; but it is a gratification *apart*[f] only if one sets an activity into play. We like to have everything pure, e.g. gratification in mathematics. In the same way, if taste is to be satisfied,[g] then one must see the beautiful alone without regard to utility. If, therefore, one wants to gratify taste purely and for itself, then no utility in the object must be conspicuous. A silver receptacle pleases because it has an inner value, but an enamel[h] is always more beautiful; with an enameled golden receptacle, one seems to pay no attention to the gold. This paying no respect to value is always a chief ingredient in beauty

[a] *Gemüther*
[b] *Gemüth*
[c] *principium*
[d] The text provides no punctuation here, but a new sentence seems to begin at this point.
[e] *Lebhaftigkeiten*
[f] aside (Fr.)
[g] *satisfacirt*
[h] *emaille*