

5 *Prot.* Very true.

Soc. Again, in the case of extremes of cold and heat its advent removes what is far too much and indeterminate and produces what is measured and commensurable.

Prot. Yes indeed.

b *Soc.* So the mixture of indeterminate factors and determinants is responsible for good climate and generally for everything we have
* that is fine.

5 *Prot.* Clearly.

Soc. There are countless other things I could mention: the fineness and strength of health, and many fine points of character
* (*psyche*) and intellect (*psyche*) too. For this goddess, Philebus, saw everyone's arrogance and all their other wickedness, with no determinant of pleasures and indulgences, and she established law and
10 order as determinants. You, of course, will say she destroyed them,
c but I think that on the contrary she was their salvation. What's your view, Protarchus?

Prot. I agree with you entirely.

Soc. Well, then, if you've understood, that completes the description of three of the classes.

5 *Prot.* I think I've followed you. You seem to be saying that the indeterminate is one and that the second, the determinant in things, is also one; but I'm not too sure what you are getting at with the third.

Soc. The vast variety of the third class has daunted you. Yet the
d indeterminate manifested a large number of forms, although they constituted a single class marked by the more and less.

Prot. True.

* *Soc.* Again, with the determinant, we did not complain either
5 that it exhibited many forms or that it was not itself one.

Prot. Of course not.

Soc. Well then, my point about the third is this: I am asserting that the whole progeny of these two forms one class—where anything
* comes into being from the measure effected by the determinant.

10 *Prot.* I see.

e *Soc.* Now we said earlier that besides these three there was a fourth class to be examined, and you must help me. So tell me, do

you think that in all cases of a thing coming to be something there must be something responsible for its becoming that thing? *

Prot. I do. How else could it become anything? 5

Soc. What produces and what is responsible for something, I take it, differ in name only? We are justified in identifying what produces something and what is responsible for it?

Prot. We are.

Soc. Again, as in the case just now, we shall find that 'that which is produced' and 'that which becomes something' are just two ways of saying the same thing? 27a

Prot. Yes.

Soc. And surely that which produces something has a natural priority, and what is produced follows in its train in coming into being? 5

Prot. Surely.

Soc. In fact what is responsible for something and that which is under its influence in the process of generation are not identical? They are two different things?

Prot. Of course. 10

Soc. Now the things that come into being and their elements together make our three earlier classes?

Prot. Yes indeed.

Soc. Can we call the factor which fashions all these a fourth class, that which is responsible for them, now adequately shown to be different from the others? b

Prot. Certainly, it's different.

Soc. It will be a good thing, now we have the four distinguished, to enumerate them in order to help us remember them. 5

Prot. Fair enough.

Soc. The first class, then, is the indeterminate, the second the determinant, thirdly there is the sort of thing that is brought about as a mixture of these, and it would be in harmony with what we have said to call the fourth what is responsible for this mixture and generation? c

Prot. Yes indeed.

Soc. Well, we must now consider the next step in the argument, and see what is the point of what we have covered so far. The point