Rationality: What Difference Does It Make?

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> the human being, as an animal endowed with the capacity of reason (*animal rationabile*), can make out of himself a rational animal (*animal rational*)
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> *Anthropology From a Pragmatic Point of View, 7:321*

How should we conceive of the possession of rationality, as Kant understands it? Is the possession of rationality a capacity like others, or is it one that changes the manner in which all of the mind's capacities function? Versions of the former view have been called 'additive' theories of rationality (AR), while versions of the latter have been called 'transformative' theories of rationality (TR).[1]

In this chapter I critically discuss TR. I argue that it cannot work as an interpretation of Kant, being more suited to Kant's successors, particularly Herder and Hegel. I argue further that Kant's conception of rationality can be "transformative" without being so in the sense advocated by Boyle, et. al.

I first discuss the "transformative" conception, focusing primarily on its clearest expression in Matt Boyle's recent work. Section two then presents three objections to ascribing TR to Kant. Section three advocates an alternative way of construing Kant's view of the "transformative" nature of rationality. Finally, section four addresses whether the view I attribute to Kant is ultimately a merely an incoherent "additive" conception of the difference rationality makes to the mental life of a rational subject.

1 Rationality as Transformative Form

The transformative conception of rationalty (TR), succinctly stated, is that "rationality is not a particular power rational animals are equipped with, but their distinctive manner of having powers."[2] Thus, in describing the human being as a rational animal, one specifies the specific—viz. rational—way in which the human being is an animal. *Rationality* differentiates

[1] For an influential statement of TR see (McDowell 1996, ch. 6). Other important statements include (McDowell 2010; Boyle 2012; 2016; 2017; Conant 2016). Note that it is not entirely clear the extent to which any of the advocates of TR attribute the view to Kant. Only (Conant 2016) and (Land 2018) explicitly attribute TR to Kant. Korsgaard (2009; 2018) interprets Kant as endorsing a view according to which non-rational animal minds are of a different kind from rational minds, but it is not clear to me that she construes this "difference in kind" in the terms offered by TR.

[2] (Boyle 2012, 399).

human beings from other kinds of animal and provides the basic principle through which to understand all of its non-accidental properties.

Boyle argues that the specific difference that sets one species from another "transforms" what it is to be a member of the genus of which both are species. He bases the source of this idea on the following passage from Aristotle's *Metaphysics*,

> What is other in species is something other than something, and this must belong to both of them…Therefore it is necessary that things that are other in species be in the same genus. For I call 'genus' such a thing, i.e. the one and same thing which both are said to be and which has a difference not incidentally, be it as matter or in another way. For not only must what is common belong (for instance, they are both animals), but this very thing—the animal—must also be other for each of them…For this reason they are this common thing, other in species than each other. … Therefore, it is necessary that the difference be this otherness of the genus. For I call 'difference of the genus' an otherness which makes this same genus other.[3]

Boyle understands Aristotle's position as one according to which different species share a generic sameness, but are 'other' to one another in the sense of their generic sameness being manifest in a specifically different way in each species. So if human beings are different from other animals by virtue of the possession of a capacity for rationality, then the difference rationality makes to the human species is not merely 'incidental', but rather *essential*, in at least the sense that it is part of what characterizes the nature or being of any rational animal. Let's set aside the question of whether this interpretation of Aristotle is sound.[4] How should we understand the claim that what is animal in human beings differs from what is animal in non-rational beings?

Boyle argues that

> "rational" specifies the sort of frame that undergirds any concrete description of what it is to be a human being. For *it does not specify a particular characteristic that we exhibit but our distinctive manner of having characteristics*. This, I believe, is the significance of saying that "rational" characterizes the form of human being.[5]

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[3] *Metaphysics Iota* 8, 1057b35–1058a7, quoted in (Boyle 2012, 409). Interpretation of this passage, as well as its place in Aristotle's overall view of the genus-species distinction, is a source of significant controversy. See (Aristotle and Castelli 2018) for discussion.

[4] For detailed discussion and commentary on *Metaphysics Iota* see (Aristotle and Castelli 2018). As Castelli notes (2018), 174ff Aristotle is not always consistent in the way in which he presents the notion of a specific difference, and sometimes indicates (e.g. *Topics* I) that the genus specifies what the species *is*, while the specific difference indicates a quality or determination of the species. Such qualitiative determination, while necessary for the species, need not entail an *essential* difference in its animal capacities. If this were Aristotle's considered view it is not clear that he would endorse TR as Boyle conceives of it.

[5] (Boyle 2012, 410).

The key claim here is that rationality "does not specify a particular characteristic that we exhibit but our distinctive manner of having characteristics." This means that, in rational beings, acts of perception, cognition, desire, choice, etc., will all be *different in kind* from those acts in non-rational animals. Hence, according to TR, the "transformative" nature of rationality entails that there is no univocal sense to the claim that both a human and an ape (or dog, or crow, etc.) *perceives* the fruit hanging from the tree, or *desires* to take a bite of it, etc..[6]

A contemporary of Kant, and clear proponent of this view, is Johann Gottfried von Herder, who argues for a similar position in his treatment of language in human beings. In the *Treatise On the Origin of Language* (1772), Herder advocates for a purely secular explanation of the origin of language in human beings. In doing so he articulates a similarly "transformative" conception of human reason, though tied to a more specific thesis than that advocated by Boyle, which is that it is the capacity for language that sets humans apart from other animals. Herder claims that "the human species does not stand above the animals in *levels* of more or less, but in *kind*."[7]

> Let one name this whole disposition of the human being's forces however one wishes: understanding, reason, taking-awareness [*Besinnung*], etc. It is indifferent to me, as long as one does not assume these names to be separate forces or mere higher levels of the animal forces. It is the "*whole organization of all human forces; the whole domestic economy of his sensuous and cognizing, of his cognizing and willing, nature*." Or rather, it is "*the single positive force of thought*, which, bound up with a certain *organization of the body*, is called *reason* in the case of human beings, just as it becomes *ability for art* in the case of animals, which is called *freedom* in the case of the human being, and in the case of animals becomes *instinct*." The difference is not in levels or the addition of forces, but in a *quite different sort of orientation* and *unfolding of all forces*. Whether one is Leibnizian or Lockean, Search or Knowall, idealist or materialist, one must in accordance with the preceding, if one is in agreement about the words, concede the matter, "*a distinctive character of humanity*" which consists in this and nothing else.[8]

Herder goes on to claim that a human being, as rational, cannot have merely animal drives or senses. Instead the presence of rationality in a creature is an "orientation of all forces that is distinctive to his species"[9] and changes all aspects of the human being's mental powers.

Similarly, Hegel argues that,

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[6] For discussion of this point, especially as it applies to the interpretive debate concerning Kant's conception of an 'intuition' see (Conant 2016; Land 2018).

[7] (Herder 2002, 81).

[8] (Herder 2002, 82–83).

[9] (Herder 2002, 85).

> the *human being* distinguishes itself from the lower animals by thinking, [so] everything human is human because it is brought about through thinking, and for that reason alone. (EL §2)

Hegel goes on to say that,

> Religion, right, and ethical life belong to man alone, and that only because he is a thinking essence. For that reason, *thinking* in its broad sense has not been inactive in these spheres, even at the level of feeling and belief, or of representation; the activity and productions of thinking are *present* in them and are *included* in them. (EL §2 Z)

Hegel here not only indicates that thinking (or the capacity thereto) differentiates humans from other animals, but that it "permeates" or "penetrates" (*durchdringt*) all aspects of human representation, even feeling.

The view articulated by Boyle and expressed in the work of figures like Herder and Hegel has at least the following three commitments:

1. Rational capacities are not added to an otherwise independently identifiable stock of "irrational" or "arational" capacities
2. If an animal is rational then all of its essential animal capacities (e.g. sense, desire, feeling) are either themselves rational or are dependent on the presence of rational capacities for their individuation (i.e. they are not "self-standing" capacities)[10]
3. Possession of the capacities constitutive of rationality affects the nature or essence of one's other faculties/capacities (e.g. sense, desire) at least in terms of (*a*) their conditions of actualization; (*b*) the content of such acts

I take commitments (1)-(3) to be necessary and jointly sufficient for the conception of rationality as "transformative" in the sense required by TR. Boyle argues that any position that rejects TR thereby endorses an 'additive' theory of rationality (AR).

> *Additive theories of rationality*…are theories that hold that an account of our capacity to reflect on perceptually-given reasons for belief and desire-based reasons for action can begin with an account of what it is to perceive and desire, in terms that do not presuppose any connection to the capacity to reflect on reasons, and then can add an account of the capacity for rational reflection, conceived as an independent capacity to 'monitor' and 'regulate' our believing-on-the-basis-of-perception and our acting-on-the-basis-of-desire[11]

However, it isn't entirely clear how we should frame the distinction between TR and AR. It seems sufficient for one to count as endorsing AR that one count as denying (1) and (2) above—

[10] See (Conant 2016, 79; Land 2018, 1276)

[11] (Boyle 2016, 527). Similarly, Conant (2016, 80) claims that the choice between and additive or "layer-cake" view and the transformative view is exhaustive—"one can be a proponent of the transformative conception only by being a critic of the layer-cake conception."

i.e. that one conceive of sensory and conative capacities as "self-standing" or as individuated without reference to the capacity for rationality. I shall argue below that if this is sufficient to count as accepting AR then Kant accepts AR. However, I think that the proponent of AR can accept a weaker version of (3)—viz. that the actualization and content of a sensory or conative act may change depending on the presence or absence of the capacity for rationality. AR does not go so far as to say this change is one concerning the very nature of the capacity, but allows that a non-rational capacity's exercise may differ considerably in rational beings. If that's right then Kant accepts, or so I argue, a moderate, plausible, and attractive "additive" theory that is also suitably "transformative", even if not in the sense required by TR.

In the next section I look at the various reasons for thinking that Kant rejects TR. Section three then looks at the moderate form of additive theory that I take him to accept.

2 Kant & the Transformative Theory

In this section I look at whether it is plausible that Kant endorses TR. I first examine whether he has to endorse TR simply by virtue of his recognition of a genus-species relation, where species are differentiated by appeal to a specific difference. I argue that his recognition of this distinction does not, by itself, commit him to TR. I then look at three reasons for doubting that Kant endorses TR. The first is that Kant's descriptions of the levels of cognition and of consciousness often feature animals in a way that belies any commitment to TR. Second, Kant consistently presents the animal and rational faculties as being in tension or conflict, which would make little sense if he considered the animal faculties as themselves transformed by rationality. Third, and to my mind most importantly, Kant's conception of the difference between our faculties of receptivity and spontaneity prohibits the possibility that rationality could transform perception or desire in the manner required by TR. I'll discuss these in turn.

2.1 Species & Genus

We've seen that TR is explicated in part by referring to Aristotle's conception of a *specific difference* between species of a genus. According to this interpretation of Aristotle, the specific difference that marks out one species from another of a common genus characterizes something about the essence of that species—of what it is to *be* that kind of being.[12]

Now, if Kant accepts that humans are specifically different from other animals by virtue of the possession of a capacity for rationality, does this fact alone require him to endorse TR?

I don't see that it does. The main reason for this is that Kant is only committed to denying that the difference between the animality of the human being and that of a non-rational being (e.g. a horse) is not merely 'incidental' to being human. But it isn't obvious that he has to accept that the *identity* of an animal capacity (e.g. sensibility) itself depends on the human being's

[12] See (Boyle 2012, 410).

rationality capacities.[13] All that Kant need accept is that the human's animal capacities are, in non-incidental or accidental ways, *different* from the animal capacities of a non-rational being. In particular, it is in keeping with the idea of a specific difference that Kant hold that the presence of rational capacities in an animal entails that (i) the conditions of the actualization of its existing stock of non-rational faculties can or will differ from those of non-rational animals, and (ii) the content of the acts of such non-rational faculties can or will also differ. In section three I describe in more detail what differences Kant ascribes to the animal capacities of human beings, and how rationality non-accidentally explains those differences. Here I merely point out that accepting that humans are specifically different from other animal species does not, in and of itself, entail that TR is the correct way to conceive of this difference.

2.2 Texts on Representation in Animals

Kant is reported as discussing the sensory states, or intuitions, of non-rational animals in a variety of his lectures on logic, anthropology, and metaphysics. If one wanted evidence that he thinks of human sensory representation, cognition, or consciousness as radically different from its animal counterpart, these texts would be an obvious place to look. Here are the relevant remarks:

> With intuition the representation of a thing is always particular; an animal can also have intuition, but the animal is not capable of having general concepts, which requires the capacity [*Vermögen*] to think. (*Menschenkunde* 206 (1781/2))

> Now how can we conceive animals as beings below human beings? […] [W]e can think of things which are below us, whose representations are different in species and not merely in degree. We perceive in ourselves a specific mark [*Merkmal*] of the understanding and of reason, namely consciousness, if I take this away there still remains something left yet, namely, sensation, imagination, the former is intuition with presence, the latter without presence of the object[.] (*Metaphysik Volckmann* 28:449 (1784/85))

> Animals cannot make concepts, there are sheer [*lauter*] intuitions with them (*Metaphysik L_2* 28:594 (1790/91)).

> Animals are not capable of any concept – intuition they do have (*Logik Dohna-Wundlacken* 24:702 (1792)).

> I must have objects of my thinking and apprehend them; otherwise I am unconscious of myself (cogito, sum: it cannot read "ergo"). It is *autonomia rationis purae*, for, without that, I would be thoughtless, even with a given intuition, like an animal, without knowing that I am. (OP 21:82)

[13] Indeed, this seems true even of Aristotle. For a conception of 'brute' or animal desire as affected by the presence of rationality but not as *essentially different*, see (Lorenz 2006, ch. 13).

Of note in these different discussions is the fact that Kant nowhere mentions any specific difference rationality might make to the intuition itself. Instead he repeatedly focuses on the fact that animals lack concepts or the capacity for thought. This is surprising if Kant endorses TR, for one would expect more emphasis on the fact that animal sensory representation (intuition) is altogether different from human representation, and not simply that it is not a form of thinking.

However, there are at least two texts that might suggest TR. First, in the *Volckmann* lecture text quoted above Kant is described as saying that animal representations "are different in species and not merely in degree." This remark is notable because it might seem that Kant here points out a difference in the *species* of representation had in non-rational animals. Relatedly, in an initial draft of the *Anthropology* Kant writes,

> The cow, lacking understanding, may well <perhaps> have something similar to what we call representations (because, in terms of effects, they coincide <greatly> with representations in humans) but which might be completely different from them. (H 7:397)

Kant here allows that animal representation might be radically different, at least in some ways, from rational human representation. Plausibly, he might say this because he thinks that rational human representation, in all its forms, is different from that of non-rational representation. Moreover, he can say this even while allowing that both animals and humans might have sensible intuitions in some suitably generic sense.

However, reading such texts as supporting TR is not the only, nor even the most plausible, way that the texts may be read. First, Kant's remark in the *Volkmann* lecture that animal representations are different in species and not merely in degree could be in defense of his longstanding point that the representations of sensibility (in all creatures) are different in kind than those of the intellect. For example, sensible representations are not merely more obscure or confused than intellectual ones. Thus the intellectual representations of discursive rational beings are not merely going to be different in degree of clarity or distinctness from those of non-rational beings, they are going to be an altogether different kind or species of representation. Indeed, in the *Volckmann* lecture he raises the issue of representational difference in the context of describing animals as "below" humans and purely intellectual beings that are "higher" than humans. He does not discuss any difference in species of representation of such "higher" beings, most likely because he thinks there would be none—as purely discursive thinkers they would have thoughts of the same basic kind as ours.

As for Kant's note in his draft of the *Anthropology*, Kant's point that the sensible representations in the cow might be very different from those in a human does not at all obviously count as an endorsement of TR as opposed to merely allowing that there could be great differences in the way in which sensible representations work in a non-rational being.[14]

[14] I discuss some of these differences in greater detail in the next section.

Besides his explicit discussions of representation in animals, Kant also mentions animals in his discussion of the various 'levels' or degrees of cognition. Again, if Kant endorsed TR, one would reasonably expect him to give some such sign of it in these discussions, but this does not happen. For example, he says,

> 1. The lowest degree is to represent something. When I cognize that which relates to the object, I represent the object.
>
> 2. To cognize, *percipere*, is to represent something in comparison with others and to have insight into its identity or diversity from them. … animals also cognize their master, but they are not conscious of this. (Wiener Logic 24:845-6 (1780–1))

Kant here indicates animals have "cognition" (*Erkenntnis*), but without the consciousness present in rational beings. He notably does not mention that their cognition is different in kind in the sense required by TR.

Similarly, in the more extensively enumerated "ladder" passage in the *Jäsche Logik* Kant says the following,

> In regard to the objective content of our cognition in general, we may think the following degrees, in accordance with which cognition can, in this respect, be graded:
>
> - The first degree of cognition is: to represent something [*sich etwas vorstellen*];
> - The second: to represent something with consciousness, or to perceive (*percipere*) [*sich mit Bewußtsein etwas vorstellen oder wahrnehmen*];
> - The third: to be acquainted with something (noscere), or to represent something in comparison with other things [*etwas kennen oder sich etwas in der Vergleichung mit anderen Dingen vorstellen*], both as to sameness and as to difference;
> - The fourth: to be acquainted with something with consciousness, i.e. to cognize it (*cognoscere*) [*mit Bewußtsein etwas kennen, d.h. erkennen*]. Animals are acquainted with objects too, but they do not cognize them [*Die Thiere kennen auch Gegenstände, aber sie erkennen sie nicht*] (JL 9:64; see also DWL 24:730-1; Notes on Logic 16:342-4 (mid/late 1760s))

There are two noteworthy (at least for our purposes) features of this text. First, Kant does not here indicate that there is any important difference between the kinds of representation had in non-rational beings and those had by humans. Second, Kant presents each level as building on the previous, such that, e.g., one cannot be acquainted with anything if one cannot perceive, and one cannot perceive if one cannot represent. This suggests that the specific difference between the rational and non-rational animal is not that they have incommensurably different kinds of sensory representations, but rather that rational beings are capable of more sophisticated or complex kinds of representation. Indeed, if Kant endorsed TR one would

expect him to say that animals are acquainted with objects in a wholly different kind of way than rational beings are. After all, according to TR, the "ladder" of cognition should really be bifurcated into a rational and a non-rational form, and non-rational animals should only be mentioned on the non-rational side. Since Kant doesn't do this, and instead presents as human cognition as simply a higher rung on a single continuous ladder of cognition, which includes merely animal acquaintance, it seems reasonable to explain this by his rejecting TR.

Hence, while textual evidence indicates Kant's agnosticism concerning the exact character of sensible representations in non-rational beings, he seems to allow that they have intuitions—i.e. particular and immediate sensory representations of objects—and he gives no clear indication in lectures or notes that these intuitions are different in kind from those in rational beings. Instead, Kant's conception of the levels of cognition and the progression in complexity of one's conscious states in such cognitive activity indicates that he conceives of non-rational beings merely as lacking the ability to attain higher or more complex cognitive states.

2.3 The Conflict Between Rational and Animal Capacities

In a wide variety of Kant's published writings and lectures, he emphasizes the tension and conflict between the 'animality' (*Thierheit*) and the 'humanity' (*Menschheit*) of human beings. Animality is specifically connected to our sensible faculties, and especially our basic 'predispositions' or instinctual desires, such as the desire to reproduce (Rel 6:26).[15] For example, in a variety of published works Kant juxtaposes the animality of the human being with its rationality.

> The predisposition to animality in the human being may be brought under the general title of physical or merely mechanical self-love, i.e. a love for which reason is not required. It is threefold: first, for self-preservation; second, for the propagation of the species, through the sexual drive, and for the preservation of the offspring thereby begotten through breeding; third, for community with other human beings, i.e. the social drive. (Rel 6:26-27)

> when reason began its business and, weak as it is, got into a scuffle with animality in its whole strength, then there had to arise ills and, what is worse, with more cultivated reason, vices, which were entirely alien to the condition of ignorance and hence of innocence. (CBHH 8:115)

> Discipline or training changes animal nature into human nature (LP 9:441)

Kant also makes extensive appeal to the opposition between animality and rationality in his anthropology lectures.

> The human being has two determinations [*Bestimmungen*], one with regard to humanity, and one with regard to animality. These two determinations conflict with

[15] For discussion of this point see (Kain 2003, 242ff; Frierson 2013, 75 and 127).

> one another. We do not achieve the perfection of humanity in the determination of animality, and if we want to achieve the perfection of humanity, then we must do violence to the determination of animality. (*Anthropologie Friedländer* 25:682 (1775/6); see also *Anthropologie Pillau* 25:736 (1777-8))

> Evil [*Böse*] originates out of the opposition between humanity and animality, or between the physical, natural predispositions and the moral ones; the inevitable evil in the determination of the human being is the spur toward the good that the human being must perform.(*Anthropologie Mrongovious* 25:1420 (1784-5); see also 25:1342-3 (1784-5))

In all these discussions Kant portrays animality as either in conflict with humanity, or as something to be overcome by it.[16] And while it is obviously true that Kant allows the possibility that our rational faculties may be in conflict with themselves (e.g. CPrR 5:121), it is unclear, if he endorsed TR, why he would make such conflict a centerpiece of his discussion of rational human beings. One would think that if he endorsed TR, human animality would *not* be a central threat to our rational action, because it would itself be informed—or rather transformed—by our rationality. Instead, the most plausible reading of the texts is that our animality is in *opposition* to our rational nature, not an *expression* of it.

Moreover, as we saw in Kant's explanation of error in judgment, he concieves of error as a result of the influence of sensbility on the understanding.

> Error is neither in the understanding alone, then, nor in the senses alone; instead, it always lies in the influence of the senses on the understanding, when we do not distinguish well the influence of sensibility on the understanding. (LL 24:825 (1780/81); cf. A294/B350; JL 9:53-4; R2142 16:250 (1776-1781))

This account of error is also consistent with his conception of the three natural sources of prejudice: habit or custom (*Gewohnheit*), inclination (*Neigung*) and imitation (*Nachahmung*). All three prejudicial sources constitute principles for associating representations, are forms of a merely animal combination of representation, and must be constantly guarded against lest they result in the irrational (i.e. "animal") acceptance of an unwarranted judgment. If Kant accepted TR it is again unclear why he would set up such an opposition between sensible and intellectual capacities, since, according to TR, both sets of capacities would be expressions of the individual's rationality. At the very least, it is unclear how sensibility could represent an external hinderance or influence on our rational faculties in the way Kant seems to claim if he also accepts TR.

[16] See also his discussion of the basis of evil in human nature in the *Religion* (6:32, 36) and the progress of our animality towards humanity in the *Conjecture* (CBHH 8:115).

2.4 Receptivity & Spontaneity

Thus far we've seen that while the textual evidence does not support attributing TR to Kant, it also doesn't unequivocally show that he rejects TR. Kant does not, in any of the texts we've reviewed concerning animals and animality, suggest that our animal nature is markedly different from that of other animals, or that other animals have wholly different kinds of cognitive or conative states. Nevertheless, because there is no definitive and incontrovertible textual evidence one way or the other as to Kant's position regarding TR one might worry that the dialectic between proponents of one or the other reading has reached a stalemate. However, I believe that we can derive an unequivocal rejection of TR from a proper understanding of Kant's distinction between the our receptive and spontaneous capacities, which are respectively the ground of our sensible and intellectual faculties.

As we saw in the discussion of control in chapter two, Kant understands sensible acts as the outcome of our receptivity as opposed to our spontaneity. On Kant's view any act of a substance is due to an exercise of its causal powers. So in one sense nothing merely "happens" to a substance—any property it has (anything that "inheres" in the substance) depends on an act of that very substance.

But Kant wants to distinguish between things that "happen" to a substance and things the substance "does" in a way which conforms to a distinction between passivity and activity. His explanation of the passive/active distinction thus hinges on his basic dichotomy between the receptive and spontaneous powers of a substance.

A receptive power is one whose actualization is ultimately grounded in something whose existence and nature is itself independent of that power. The clear example here is that of a sense modality. An actualization of one's visual capacity is ultimately due to something whose existence and nature is entirely independent of that capacity or its exercise (and so on for all the other possible sense modalities).

A spontaneous power is one whose actualization is ultimately grounded in something whose nature is *not* independent of the power so exercised. For example, what makes the mental transition from holding true the premises of an argument to holding true their conclusion a case of *inference* is that the rational agent recognize the support relation between premises and conclusion, a support relation which is itself understood in terms of the capacity for reason. Hence the nature of the ground of the inferential act itself appeals to the very rational capacity of which it is an instance.

Kant's distinction between receptivity and spontaneity is thus a distinction between two different types of causal power and the principles that constitute their actualization. Because the characterization of the principles of activity of these two powers oppose one anther there is no sense in which they could be embodied in the activity of any single capacity. In Kant's exposition in CPR of the nature of our receptive and spontaneous capacities at the beginning of the Transcendental Logic he says,

> If we will call the receptivity of our mind to receive representations insofar as it is affected in some way sensibility, then opposed to it [*so ist dagegen*] is the faculty for bringing forth representations itself, or the spontaneity of cognition, the understanding. (A51/B75)

Receptivity and spontaneity stand "opposed" to one another as fundamentally different capacities of the mind. Indeed, this is partly what motivates Kant to say that "these two faculties or capacities cannot exchange their functions" (A51/B75). In other words, there cannot be a *single* capacity that *both* exemplifies a form of receptivity *and* spontaneity. A "spontaneous receptivity" or a "receptive spontaneity" is a contradiction in terms.

If that is correct then we need only one further assumption to reject Boyle's position as a plausible interpretation of Kant. Namely, the assumption that all and only rational acts are spontaneous. If that is right, and given the above characterization of the difference between receptivity and spontaneity, it would be contradictory to claim that acts of sensibility are rational, or have the form of rationality, since this would be to claim that they are *both* receptive *and* spontaneous. It would thus be the claim that two opposed causal principles are operative in the actualization of a single causal power, which is (both logically and really) impossible.[17]

Let's examine the argument in a more explicit form:

1. The determining ground of the actualization of a receptive capacity is independent of the capacity itself [def.]
2. The determining ground of an (absolutely) spontaneous capacity is *not* independent of the capacity itself [def.]
3. All rational capacities are spontaneous
4. All sensible capacities are receptive
5. According to TR the exercise of a sensory capacity is itself the exercise of a rational capacity [def.]
6. ∴ If TR is true the actualization of a sensory capacity is both determined and not determined by an independent ground
7. It is not the case that the actualization of a capacity can be both determined and not determined by an independent ground
8. ∴ TR is false (Modus Tollens, 6, 7)

I've defended premises (1)-(2) above, as well as in chapter two. The proponent of TR is perhaps most likely to reject premise (7). Here there are at least a couple options. First, a proponent of TR might argue that rational acts are unified by some form or other that does not require treating that form as the result of a spontaneous exercise. However, I don't see what such a form could be. Kant consistently treats all rational acts (whether in a discursive or an intuitive

[17] Note that the objection here is *not* that the notion of a "passive act" is problematic. As we've seen here and in chapters one and two, Kant conceives of all of a substance's properties as due to its activity. So Kant obviously accepts that "passive" sensory acts are still activities. The problem, rather, is that TR requires conceiving of acts of perception or desire as *both* receptive and spontaneous, which is impossible given Kant's conception of the causally opposing nature of receptivity and spontaneity.

intellect) as spontaneous. Indeed, he often simply characterizes intellectual laws as those causal laws that are not themselves laws of sensibility (e.g. GIII 4:446). Thus I do not see what could unify sensible and intellectual acts as "rational" when, even in the most generic sense possible of being exercises of causal powers, such acts were fundamentally causally different.

A second strategy the proponent of TR might try is to show that one and the same capacity may be receptive in one respect (or aspect) and spontaneous in another. But this seems open to two worrisome questions. First, why would Kant so starkly individuate faculties by virtue of their being either receptive or spontaneous, and (a we saw above) characterize these features of the faculties as "opposed" or "contrary"? Second, what would unify these different aspects as aspects of *one and the same faculty/capacity* if the aspects themselves were fundamentally contrary or opposed? It is not at all clear how either of these questions might be answered.

Hence, we should not interpret Kant as endorsing TR, for it would be tantamount to attributing to him a contradictory position regarding the nature and exercise of a subject's causal powers. Fortunately, since there is no clear textual evidence of Kant's endorsing this position, we needn't take him as doing so.

3 Kant on the Difference Rationality Makes

If the discussion thus far is correct Kant does not endorse TR. However, this needn't mean that he doesn't think of the rational capacities of human beings as, in some sense distinct from that used by TR, "transformative" of their animal powers. Here I draw on the discussion concerning attention in chapter three to show how pivotal rational capacities are to virtually all of a rational subject's mental life. In this way I also hope to show, in section four, how Kant avoids the putatively problematic nature of the so-called "additive" conception of rationality (i.e. AR).

I focus on two important differences between rational and non-rational beings. There are plausibly many other differences as well, but these should serve to illustrate the radical difference between the rational and the non-rational forms of animality, even if TR is rejected. First, I discuss the way in which the rational control of attention allows a rational animal the freedom to attend to things beyond what is dictated by its instincts and inclinations. Second, I look at the manner in which rational beings have an entirely different structure to their perception and experience (in Kant's sense of these terms) than do non-rational animals. I take these points in turn.

3.1 The Determination of Attention

The discussion of attention in chapter three explained an important feature of Kant's conception of attention in non-rational beings—viz. they are determined in their acts of attention by their instincts and inclinations. Kant considers the power of choice in animals to be "pathologically" determined by its instincts (innate dispositions for desire) and inclinations (acquired

dispositions for desire). Hence, though an animal may be capable of representing a wide variety of things, that toward which it attends, and thus strives to be conscious of, is fixed by its environment plus its instincts and inclinations.

In contrast, in rational beings attention is under (at least in principle, and to some degree) the control of the cognitive subject. Since attention is a form of striving—viz. the striving to be conscious of one's representations—rational subjects can control their strivings in acts of attending. Moreover, Kant denies that non-rational animals can be conscious of themselves (TODO: citations). Kant thus seems to think that such animals cannot attend to their own mental acts, but only to external objects.[18] His reasoning here seems to be that no biological purpose (e.g. of maintaining or promoting the organism's health) is served by an organism's ability to attend to its mental acts. Instead, the animal's attention is always directed outward, towards opportunities for food, shelter, and reproduction. This is also precisely what one would expect Kant to say if he thinks that animal attention is entirely driven by instinct and inclination, for that is tantamount to saying that attention in non-rational beings is entirely determined by their biological and environmental imperatives. In this sense the scope of an animal's attention is entirely determined by the so-called 'mechanism of nature' not only in its being determined by preceding temporal events (as Kant often signals when using that phrase) but also by virtue of the animal's biological drives or imperatives, both innate and learned.

Kant's account of how attention works in rational beings is in stark contrast to his view of non-rational animals. As we saw in chapter three, rational beings can exert discretionary control over their acts of attention in ways not governed by biological imperatives, or indeed any sensible imperatives at all. This allows for a broadening of the scope of the objects of attention in two ways. First, "outer" attention to the world distinct from the attending subject is radically broadened. The subject can attend to things beyond what is dictated by its biological needs or drives. This means that a rational subject can attend not only to the differences between things, but also (as we saw in chapter four's discussion of reasoning) their *grounds* of difference.

Second, rational beings can attend to their own mental acts. This opens up the possibility, for the rational being, of generating concepts from those acts. Most important of these are the fundamental concepts of an object—the categories. Thus, the very same power that allows one's attention to range beyond that to which one is biologically driven also provisions one with a new subject matter—viz. one's own intellectual acts—from which the kind of structured intellectual representation necessary for the cognition of objects derives. Hence, the addition of an intellectual faculty to the stock of a subject's mental powers allows the possibility of controlled attention and an entirely new subject matter to which one can attend.

Thus, according to the view I attribute to Kant, the intellect, as a free faculty, allows for the exertion of control over various mental acts, most notably attention. It is the capacity for such control that explains the ability to attend to things other than as determined by one's biological drives, including one's (intellectual) mental acts. And it is in virtue of this sort of control that

[18] TODO: Discuss pains and pleasures vis-a-vis (un)consciousness for animals

one can engage in acts of reasoning both practical and theoretical. But this is not the only manner in which rational capacities "tranform" a subject's mental life. There is also the issue of how rational control over attention influences the subject's conscious sensory experience. We turn to this issue next.

3.2 Perception & Experience

As we saw in chapter three, Kant conceives of empirical cognition as requiring that one be conscious of one's intuitions ("perception") and their connection ("experience"). Since attention is necessary for consciousness, attention is necessary for cognition. Moreover, since acts of attention are partially constitutive of perception and experience itself, non-rational animals, in virtue of differences in the kinds of acts of attention they can engage in, are going to have different kinds of perception and experience.

Experience, which requires synthesis of conscious intuition by the categories, and especially the dynamical categories, presents the starkest case of difference between rational and non-rational awareness of phenomenal reality. Two examples of the kind of cognitive unity illustrative of Kant's conception of a experiential 'relation to an object' (B137) and which are especially illustrative of the cognitive limitations facing a subject lacking the categories and the capacity of judgment, are those forms of experience drawing on the concepts `<cause>` and `<substance>`. Without the concept `<substance>`, a cognizer is unable to represent the relational property of *inherence*, and thus unable to represent a property instance as "belonging to" in the sense of being *grounded in* a subject of inherence. Such a cognizer could represent a particular property instance at a place or time (e.g. *redness there now*), but not as instanced *in some subject* which itself exists at that place or time.

Relatedly, without the concept `<cause>` a cognizer is limited in the extent to which she can identify or re-identify an object, because she cannot appeal to causal connections between a thing's properties (or between the thing and its properties) in order to explain that (e.g.) a rose that blooms today is the same as the green vine that grew last week.[19]

The lack of such categorial concepts in animals is not just a lack of the ability to make particular kinds of *judgment*. We should read Kant as denying that animals have the capacity for particular kinds of *experiences* (both in our contemporary sense of that term, and Kant's technical sense). The reason for this denial is that Kant is clear, especially in the second edition of the first *Critique*, that imagination plays a role in relating intuitions (or the contents thereof) to one

[19] See (Campbell 1994) for a similar point. Note though that while the Kantian conception of an animal is limited in its cognitive capacities, it is not incapable of tracking a particular. With the rose example one can, for example, appeal to spatial continuity (the blooming rose is in the same place as the green plant was yesterday), but this isn't obviously sufficient for re-identification in all cases; cf. (Rosefeldt 2003, 150–1); (Burge 2010a, 262–3). I discuss spatial continuity further below.

another, and that this is governed, in adult rational humans, by a non-judgmental application of the categories (e.g. A101, A119, B151ff).[20]

If the above is correct, then the intuitive sensory representations of animals, and thus their perceptual experiences, are going to be limited in the ways they can be combined; ways related to lacking cognitive capacities marked by the various respective categories. I have here elaborated what I take to be two absolutely central aspects of rational human experience as Kant conceived it—viz. (i) the perceptual awareness of the properties one experiences as inhering in a subject and (ii) the causal connectedness of such a subject, both to itself across time and through change, and to other things and their properties.

If an animal lacks the ability to represent inherence relations, or even the causal relations necessary for representing the subject of inherence or its relation to other such entities, one might reasonably question whether there anything left of the animal's capacity for objective representation. Certainly, the nature of what is experienced by animals is only going to have the most basic congruence with the experience of an adult rational human. The principles that the animal's cognitive system will utilize to single out particulars in perception and experience are going to be very basic, and in some ways, quite coarse-grained.[21] They will include, for example, spatio-temporal continuity—that a particular object trace a single spatio-temporal path, and spatial cohesion—that an object's surface and outer boundary be determined by the spatial proximity of its parts.[22]

Though principles like cohesion and continuity are in some ways coarse-grained, they nevertheless allow for the presentation of spatial particulars rather than serial arrays of qualities. For example, in being visually aware of a colored sphere an animal could do more than simply have sensations of redness and roundness.[23] It could sense the redness and roundness in a

[20] For examples see (Waxman 1991; 2014; Longuenesse 1998; Messina 2014; Friedman 2015). For discussion of the manner in which the imagination constructs perceptual states see (Tolley 2017; 2019; **???**).

[21] On this point see also (Golob 2011) for discussion of the "basic measure" with which intuition provides a cognizing subject.

[22] The centrality of principles of continuity and cohesion to our representation of particulars has received a significant amount of empirical attention and confirmation. For representative discussion see (Spelke 1990; Spelke, Vishton, and Von Hofsten 1995; Cheng and Newcombe 2005; Cheries et al. 2008). For discussion of these issues in the context of Kant's conception of intuition see (Dunlop 2017). For discussion of the connection between such principles and basic referential abilities see (Burge 2010b, 40–41). Note that the animal need not conceive of either continuity or cohesion as *epistemic criteria* for identity. This would be to confuse reflective objectivity with the more minimal sense I'm articulating. All that is necessary is that the animal be aware of properties governed by these principles in order for it to use them in individuation and tracking.

[23] While there are some similarities between the account I propose here and the account of animal representation discussed in (Burge 2010a), one significant difference is that Burge conceives of animal representation as have predicational structure while I take Kant to be denying such a possibility. However, since Burge seems only to think that "topological attributives" like *connected within a boundary* are necessary for representation of spatial objects (see (Burge 2010b, 40)), it is not clear to me that there is a deep difference here. A further issue is that Burge takes his discussion of animal minds to proceed entirely at the level of representation, where I take the issue ultimately to be one of what the animal is conscious of. These issues require further attention. See (Eilan 2011; 2017) for relevant discussion.

particular, albeit one which is not presented as a subject of properties, but rather simply as a spatially continuous expanse of color at a specific location.[24]

Thus Kant need not be understood as denying that animals can perceptually "bind", both inter- and intra-modally, the various qualities of which they are aware. But the principles by which such binding occurs are not always going to result in intuitions of particulars in the same sense in which *we* enjoy intuitions of particulars, since we can utilize much more sophisticated conceptual capacities, which may well affect our sensory experience (e.g. in the case of abstract art or atonal music).[25]

There will be some inherent indeterminacy with respect to what experience of objects an animal actually enjoys. For example, does it experience the rock and the plant growing from it as one particular or two? When it sees a cup placed on a table does it see two objects go out of existence and a new, complex object, come into existence?[26] It is not obvious that there are answers to these questions, or if there are, how we could know them. But there remains a genuine sense in which the experience of animals present "unified" entities, at least in the sense of entities whose integrity is based on principles of continuity and cohesion.

Hence, non-rational animals have radically different forms of perception and experience (cognition) than rational beings, enough so that it seems appropriate to speak of experience as 'transformed' from the non-rational to the rational case, even if not in the sense required by TR.

4 The 'Additive' vs 'Transformative' Dichotomy

If the above discussion is correct then Kant rejects TR. However, according to proponents of TR, its rejection is (i) tantamount to acceptance of an 'additive' theory of rationality (AR) and (ii) AR is an incoherent theory of the (rational) mind. I think both of these points are open to challenge. I take these points in reverse order.

[24] Note that this capacity would require the capacity for locating the distal source of a sensation. This is already perceptual constancy of a sort. Kant provides no real explanation of how this would be achieved, but I take it that if what I have said above is correct, we need not think it could only be achieved in beings possessing the capacity for categorial synthesis.

[25] For further discussion of the issue of binding with regard to intuition see (Allais 2017; Dunlop 2017). Dunlop finds it problematic that such principles as cohesion and continuity may not yield "objects" as ordinarily conceived, but I take it that this is in fact a positive feature of the view I elaborate, since it allows space for genuine cognitive contributions by understanding and reason in beings capable of spontaneous synthesis. Dunlop also rejects contemporary notions of "feature binding" (e.g. Treisman and Gelade's (1980) feature integration theory) as relevant to an understanding of non-conceptual or non-intellectual object awareness. However, her argument for this ignores the relevance of "top-down" exercises of attention in the conscious representation of objects. For discussion see (Campbell 2007; Campbell 2002; Jennings 2015).

[26] See (Allais 2009, 406) for a similar point.

4.1 Is AR Incoherent?

Boyle (2016) argues that AR is an incoherent view of the suite of capacities characteristic of rational animals. AR generates what he calls an 'interaction problem':

> When I speak of an interaction problem, this is the sort of difficulty I have in mind. Such a problem will arise for any view that posits a situation with the following structure:
>
> - (Normal Explanation) For any fact F of type T_1, a normal explanation of F must appeal to a fact that relates to F in way W.
> - (Non-disruptive Influence) Facts of type T_2 can normally explain facts of type T_1
> - (System Externality) Facts of type T_2 do not relate to facts of type T_1 in way W.
>
> A view that is committed to versions of these three theses is committed to an incoherent position.[27]

In Boyle's view, no proponent of AR can explain facts concerning the exercise of one's capacities without positing a "disruptive" influence—i.e. a disruption of the "explanatory order that characterizes [a faculty's] normal operation."[28] Assuming an exhaustive dichotomy between AR and TR such that any view of rationality that does not endorse TR is a version of AR, is it right to think that AR must be incoherent, at least in the manner Boyle specifies? I shall argue that it does not. In Kant's view, it is precisely in the manner in which rational control (in a particular sense) "disrupts" the "normal" (i.e. non-rational) operation of one's sensible faculties that one comes to the rational development of one's sensory powers.

One of Boyle's central examples concerns perception, which we can use to fill out the above schema like so:[29]

- (Normal Explanation$_P$) For any judgment J of a rational subject S, a normal explanation of S's judging J must appeal to reasons available to S's reflective scrutiny.
- (Non-disruptive Influence$_P$) The fact that a rational subject has a perceptual experience of some object O's being F can normally explain S's judging O to be F.
- (System Externality$_P$) If the content of perceptual experience is nonconceptual, it cannot present a rational subject with reasons available to her reflective scrutiny.

On the view I have attributed to Kant, he rejects TR. If Boyle's conception of AR were correct then this would mean that Kant accepts the incompatible triad above. However, Kant does not do this. Kant accepts (Normal Explanation) and (Non-disruptive Influence), but he rejects

[27] (Boyle 2016, 537).

[28] (Boyle 2016, 537).

[29] See (Boyle 2016, 543).

(System Externality). Hence, in my view Boyle is mistaken in thinking that any advocate of (any version of) AR (presuming the dichotomy between TR and AR) is thereby committed to an incoherent triad of claims.

To see how Kant is not committed to denying a "normal explanation" of the warrant for perceptual judgment we need to take a brief excursion through Kant's conception of the manner in which justification or warrant accrues to doxastic attitudes and the role of sense experience, and particularly intuition, in such warrant.

For Kant, the mind can take one of two real (sensory) relations to things. It is either related to itself, in acts of inner sense, or to things that are distinct from it, in outer sense. In both case the basic nature of the intuition as an immediate and particular apprehension of an actuality is the same. Moreover, these intuitions can occur (or so I've argued) in both rational and non-rational beings.[30] On Boyle's view, this is enough to set up an incoherence, as the shared nature of intuition in rational and non-rational animals "disrupts" the normal explanation of perceptual judgment.

According to Boyle, if the nature of intuition is shared between rational and non-rational animals, then whatever entitles non-rational animals to their (analogue of) doxastic states is going to be something that is wholly unavailable to reflection. But if that is right then either the "non-conceptual content" of such states is disruptive in just the manner that Boyle argues, or it entirely drops out as something capable of providing justification for perceptual judgment. Boyle puts the dilemma as follows,

> If my thought needs a ground, but I cannot see any ground for it, then it is not clear how I can regard it as giving me a reason for any further judgment. But if it does not need a ground, then the supposed nonconceptual content of my perceptual state drops out of the picture as rationally irrelevant. In either case, the supposed nonconceptual content cannot supply me with a reason for judgment.[31]

A proper understanding of Kant's conception of how intuition provides a ground for empirical judgment shows how he avoids this dilemma. Kant considers an (epistemic) ground to be "that from which something can be cognized" (LL 24:42). In the Canon of CPR, Kant describes holding-for-true (*Fürwahrhalten*) or 'Assent' as concerned with two different kinds of grounds — one objective and one subjective (A820/ B848).

As I understand Kant's notion of an objective ground, it is simply anything that renders probable (the limit being certainty) the truth of a judgment to which one Assents (LL 24:143–4, 147, 194; JL 9:81–2). The notion of probability here is objective in the sense that it does not depend on

[30] For further discussion and defense of intuition as a relation to an actuality see (McLear, n.d.). I reject the claim that 'content' as used by Boyle (and McDowell) is compatible with Kant's conception of the 'content' (*Inhalt*) of intuition, perception, or experience. See (McLear 2016b; 2016a; 2020).

[31] (Boyle 2016, 544). Note that one straightforward move would be to argue that Boyle and others fail to distinguish two distinct types of epistemic warrant—viz. 'entitlement' and 'justification.' Only justification requires reflective capacities. For this kind of strategy see (Burge 2003). I think this is certainly an option that is open to Kant to pursue, but in what follows I take a slightly different and more textually grounded position.

the subject's capacity to grasp the probabilistic relations between the ground and the truth of his judgement. Kant calls such a subjective grasp 'plausibility' (*Scheinbarkeit*).

> Probability is concerned with things. Plausibility is concerned with whether, in the cognition, there are more grounds for the thing than against it. (LL 24:883; see also LL 24:145, 194–5; JL 9:82; RF 16:436, R2603–4)

Plausibility and probability are distinct types of relationship. The status of an objective ground as sufficient depends on probability, not plausibility.

In contrast, Kant describes subjective grounds as "causes [*Ursachen*] in the mind" of the subject, that rest on the "particular constitution of the subject" (A820/B848). An Assent is justified when the justifier—the objective ground—is also one which the subject *has* in virtue of its being part of the cause—the subjective ground—of her Assent.[32]

One important feature of Kant's view as I have presented it here is that it construes objective grounds for cognition and Assent in terms of worldly things. This means that Kant rejects what I take to be an important presupposition of Boyle's explanation of what it is for a reason to be "available to reflective scrutiny". This is what Jim Pryor (2005) has called the 'Premise Principle'—viz. that the only thing which may justify a belief or judgment that p is a state whose content is a proposition that could be used as a premiss in an argument for p.[33] Pryor notes several reasons why one might reject this principle. The most important, for our purposes, is that the principle fails to distinguish between a justifier—what makes it the case that one is justified in believing that p—and the justification that one has for one's belief that p, in the sense of an argument one has or can make in support of p.

For example, one justifier in coming to believe that one has a headache is the sensory experience of having a pain in one's head. The headache qua mental state is a justifier for believing the proposition that one has a headache. But one's headache cannot figure as a premiss in an argument and thus violates the Premise Principle. However, it also seems entirely appropriate to say that it is one's *headache*, and not merely some *proposition* concerning one's headache, which (at least partially) justifies one in believing that one has a headache.

If this is correct, then all that is required for a subject to have the empirical grounds of her perceptual beliefs be available to reflective scrutiny is that she have empirical access to those grounds—i.e. that they be made available to her in the way characteristic of conscious sensory experience. As I understand Kant, his view is that this justificatory ground just is the relevant part of the subject's sensory enviroment, which the subject "has" only insofar as she is appropriately related to it through intuition.

Hence, intuition plays exactly the same role in both the rational and non-rational case—it makes consciously available to a subject an objective ground, and does so in a way that makes

[32] For further discussion of complexities surrounding Kant's account of Assent see (Stevenson 2003; Chignell 2007b; 2007a; Pasternack 2011; 2014).

[33] (Pryor 2005, 189).

possible how the subject's subjective psychological state could be based on that very ground. However, the manner in which rational and non-rational subjects perceive and experience is radically different, owing to the fact that perception and experience are complex mental states constructed from intuitions, and the construction is going to radically differ between rational and non-rational beings. It is in this sense that the possession of rational capacities "disrupts" the normal activity of sensibility. In the merely animal case, its perception of objects counts as a kind of acquaintance of the ways in which objects are the same or differ. However, the animal is never in a position to represent the grounds of those similarities or differences as such. In a more contemporary phrase we can say that animals are responsive to, and in that sense guided by, reasons (i.e. grounds of similarity/difference), but they can never form one mental state from another on the basis of some ground of difference represented by that state (see chapter four). Their mental states are thus at best *in conformity with* the reasons or grounds presented to them through intuition, but they cannot marshal their mental powers to form states based *from* a representation of these grounds.

In contrast, rational subjects *can* form mental states on the basis of recognition of some ground of difference between one thing and another (or between one property and another). But they do this at least in part in virtue of the way that what is given in intuition is systematically represented via intellectual activity. It is this rational systematicity of representation that forms the basis of claims concerning what is a reason or ground for what.

Thus, while both the rational and non-rational animal can have (e.g.) intuitions of redness and blueness located in specific parts of their environment, only the rational being is capable of representing the ground of this difference—i.e. why it is that red and blue are different. This is because only the rational being can take these intuitions of difference and relate them—synthesize them—according to a system of principles that determines what can be a ground of what (i.e. the categories). On Kant's view the grounding relations that rational subjects track in their judgments (and ultimately what they reject or hold as true) concerning what is the case are relations that the subject itself generates in the construction of perception and experience. Perceptual experience thus *rationally constrains* judgment only because the perceptual reasons responded to in judgment are themselves reflections of the capacities called on in the (correct) judgments made. Nevertheless, it would be wrong to conceive of the basic sensory relation that rational beings have to their environment as itself different in kind (in the sense required by TR) from that which non-rational animals can have.

4.2 Difference or Dichotomy?

Whether or not AR is incoherent, one may question the cogency of dividing theories of rationality into the dichotomy required by TR. The worry about the cogency of the dichotomy stems at least in part from the somewhat vague way in which additive theories are often characterized. For example, Thomas Land argues that,

> The additive interpretation assumes that the presence of reason in humans leaves the character of their sensibility untouched. Reason, on this interpretation, is something that is "added on" to a capacity that is in all relevant respects the same as in non-rational animals.[34]

But what does it mean to say that the "character" of sensibility in rational beings is left "untouched"? Similarly, Conant argues that the reading of Kant advocated by AR must claim that sensory experience in rational animals cannot "radically differ in its internal character" from that of non-rational animals.[35] For Conant, as an advocate of TR,

> our sentient cognitive faculty, as we encounter it *in act* (say, in an exercise of, say, *seeing that such and such is the case*) represents a faculty whose form is utterly distinct in character from any whose exercise might manifest itself in the sensory life of a nonrational animal—even if, when investigated from a merely physiological point of view, that animal's sensory equipment might reveal itself to be in countless respects physiologically indistinguishable from our own.[36]

Again, the claim here as to what counts as a faculty that "radically" differs, or is "utterly distinct" in character is somewhat obscure.

In my view the conception of an 'additive' theory of rationality is ambiguous between at least two different notions of 'addition', only one of which seems plausibly objectionable. The objectionable version is one according to which reason or rationality is (i) construed as a specific and isolable faculty (or perhaps suite of faculties) whose addition to an existing stock of mental faculties does not affect either (ii) the conditions of the actualization of that existing stock of faculties nor (iii) the content of such acts.

Now, whether or not there are examples of views that endorse (i)-(iii), this is not the only version of an 'additive' view on offer. In my view, the proponent of AR can accept (i) while rejecting, in various ways, (ii) and (iii).

According to the view of Kant for which I have been advocating, Kant accepts (i). He considers the rational faculties to be constituted by a suite of spontaneous capacities for 'combination' (*Verbindung*) of one's mental acts or states, the direction of attention to matters both within and without the subject, and more generally, for the control of one's mental activity by an exercise of a rational power of discretion or choice. The presence of rational capacities has a massive—one might even say "transformative"—effect on the mental life of rational animal. With respect to (ii), the ability of a rational subject to control their attention can have, however indirectly, an effect on the conditions of their (e.g.) faculty of desire's actualization, by

[34] (Land 2018, 1276).

[35] (Conant 2016, 79).

[36] (Conant 2016, 79); original emphasis.

displacing or replacing current desires with new ones, often as the result of deliberation.[37] Moreover, with regard to (iii), the content of the actualizations of one's sensible faculties will differ between rational and non-rational creatures. On Kant's account perception is going to radically differ in non-rational animals because, insofar as they are conscious of the content of their intuitions, they do not achieve this as we do, via a synthesis by the mathematical categories. Animal perception, on Kant's view, instead operates solely through associative principles. Nevertheless, in both rational and non-rational animals, intuition is an immediate relation to a particular actuality, of which one can be conscious in sense perception, through which one is acquainted with one's environment, and on the basis of which one can discriminate between objects, noting their similarities and differences.

Hence, Kant allows that though the capacity for rationality is added to an existing stock of animal capacities, it can affect both the conditions of the actualization of those capacities as well as their content. Moreover, these latter two points are true without denying that rational and non-rational animals may, in significant important respects, share the very same kinds of basic sensory and conative relations to their environment.

Though the resulting view is to some extent 'additive', the fact that it accommodates much of what is plausible in TR's conception of rationality also indicates that this dispute over the nature of rationality may not best be expressed via appeal to a strict dichotomy between 'additive' and 'transformative' theories. Instead, what seems to be centrally at issue is how to understand the acts of a capacity, their contents, and the way in which these may change due to the influence of other mental capacities. I've argued that Kant conceives of the capacities we share with other animals as what they are independently of our rational nature. But this is compatible with the exercise of such capacities differing when influenced by rationality. In this sense I take Kant to articulate a position that does not fall neatly on one side or the other of an additive-transformative divide.

TODO: discuss the teleological structure of the faculties; must the faculties be understood as ultimately oriented towards some final set of unifying ends which give the system of rational faculties its unity? Is sensibility necessarily incorporated into this teleological structure?

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[37] For extensive discussion of this point as it appears in Kant's anthropological writings see (Kain 2003; Frierson 2014, ch. 2).

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