

# TELEOLOGY & TRANSFORMATION

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## 1 Three Claims about Transformation

1. **No Addition:** Rational capacities are not added to an otherwise independent stock of non-rational capacities
2. **Individuation:** If an animal is rational then all of its essential animal capacities (e.g. sense, desire) are either themselves rational or are dependent on the presence of rational capacities for their individuation (i.e. they are not “self-standing” capacities)
3. **Actualization:** Possession of the capacities constitutive of rationality affects one’s other faculties/capacities (e.g. sense, desire) at least in terms of (a) their conditions of actualization; (b) the content of such acts

## 2 Two Kinds of “Rational Transformation”

*Essentialist Rational Transformation:* The possession of rational capacities changes the essence or nature of one’s other capacities (endorses 1-3)

*Actualist Rational Transformation* The possession of rational capacities changes the conditions of actualization and/or the content of the acts of one’s other capacities (endorses 1 and 3 only)

## 3 Schafer’s “Moderate” Transformative View

*Teleological Transformation:* The presence of reason (and the other higher intellectual faculties) does not leave the ends or standards of proper exercise of sensibility in human beings “untouched”. Rather, the ends (and form of proper exercise) of human sensibility is “transformed” by the presence in human beings of both sensibility and reason.

### 3.1 The Argument from Teleology

1. All capacities have “interests”<sup>1</sup>
2. The interest of a capacity determines/constitutes its end or *telos*
3. The interest of the capacity of reason is “comprehension” (*Begreifen*)
4. The interest of reason determines, but is not determined by, the interests of all of a being’s other capacities
5. ∴ In a being with the capacity for reason there is a teleological “reorientation” or “transformation” of the interests of one’s capacities to align with those of reason’s interest in comprehension

<sup>1</sup> To every faculty of the mind one can attribute an *interest*, that is, a principle that contains the condition under which alone its exercise is promoted. Reason, as the faculty of principles, determines the interest of all the powers of the mind but itself determines its own. The interest of its speculative use consists in the *cognition* of the object up to the highest a priori principles; that of its practical use consists in the determination of the *will* with respect to the final and complete end. That which is required for the possibility of any use of reason as such, namely, that its principles and affirmations must not contradict one another, constitutes no part of its interest but is instead the condition of having reason at all; only its extension, not mere consistency with itself, is reckoned as its interest. (CPrR 5:119-20)

- Q<sub>1</sub>: Is Teleological Transformation an essentialist or actualist form of rational transformation?
  - The answer seems to entirely depend on whether interests play a role in individuating capacities
- Q<sub>2</sub>: Does Teleological Transformation obtain merely in virtue of the *possession* of reason, or does it also require that reason be actualized in various dispositions to “autocracy” or self-mastery (e.g. through education and self-discipline)?

### *References & Further Reading*

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