

# *The Schematism & the Second Analogy*

PHIL 871

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## *1 The Aims of the Analytic of Principles*

- Four questions:
  1. *Which* concepts are a priori? (The Metaphysical Deduction)
  2. *Must* the categories apply to objects of experience? (the Transcendental Deduction)
  3. *How* could the categories apply to objects of experience? (the Schematism)
  4. *What* synthetic a priori truths do we know as the result of their application? (the Principles)

The Analytic of Principles aims to answer questions (3) and (4). A full vindication of the categories thus depends not only on the arguments of the Analytic of Concepts but also those of the Principles.

## *2 The Schematism (A137-47/B176-87)*

### *2.1 The Aim of Kant's Argument*

- What's the scope of Kant's argument?
  - Specific: explain how *the categories*, whose content is purely logical, apply to object of experience
  - General: explain how *concepts in general* apply to objects of experience

### *2.2 The Homogeneity Requirement<sup>1</sup>*

*Homogeneity:* Two representations(?) X and Y are (partially) homogeneous iff X and Y share (some of) the same content

- What is *Homogeneity* a problem for?
  - All concepts as they relate to objects via intuition? (Pendlebury)
  - Pure (a priori) concepts as they relate to objects via intuition? (Guyer)

<sup>1</sup> In all subsumptions of an object under a concept the representations of the former must be **homogeneous** with the latter, i.e., the concept must contain that which is represented in the object that is to be subsumed under it, for that is just what is meant by the expression "an object is contained under a concept." (A137/B176).

### 2.3 Guyer's Interpretation

- Empirical concepts are their own schemata<sup>2</sup>
  - Empirical concepts relate 'immediately' to schemata (A141/B180)
    - \* Why would the schematism be a 'hidden art' then? (A141/B180-1)
  - Avoids empiricist problem of abstract ideas
- Schemata are required only for pure concepts<sup>3</sup>

#### KANT'S 'TERTIUM QUID' – TIME

- Kant requires an intermediary that is homogeneous with both the categories and appearances, as well as being
  - *universal*: applies to all appearances
  - *knowable a priori*: allows for knowledge of the a priori applicability of the categories to appearances
  - *diverse*: compatible with the full variety of logical properties and relations specified by the categories
- Only the representation of time and temporal relations satisfies all three conditions
  - Allows for a distinctive form of anti-skeptical argument since Kant also argues that representation of determinate temporal relations depends on the spatial content of representation<sup>4</sup>

### 2.4 Pendlebury's Interpretation

- The schematism concerns the *general* problem of how *concepts* apply to objects via the subsumption of intuitions under concepts
  - The categories are only a special instance of a general problem
- The Homogeneity Requirement is understood in terms of *shared representational content* between representations (i.e. intuition and concept)<sup>5</sup>
  - How can an intuition and a concept have (or share) the same representational content?
- Kant's solution is *not* to appeal to a *tertium quid* but rather to appeal to a pre-conceptual capacity for synthesis which is 'exercised in both the formation and the application of concepts'<sup>6</sup>
  - Schemata are fundamentally *dispositions* to group 'bare' (i.e. non-representational) sensations<sup>7</sup>

## 3 The Analogies

- Principles concerning truths generated from application of the categories of *relation* (<substance>, <cause>, <community>)

<sup>2</sup> The rule by which the reproductive imagination represents a dog or the understanding recognizes an object presented to it as a dog is just the rule that anything which displays four-footedness (and of course a number of other similarly sensible properties, such as certain characteristics of dentition, musculature, and so on) is to be called a "dog," and this rule is precisely the rule signified by the concept *dog*. In other words, the rule which functions as a schema is the concept signified by the expression "dog." (Guyer (1987), 164)

<sup>3</sup> the problem is that the *content* of the pure concepts of the understanding does not include any predicates which do directly designate any properties of pure or empirical intuition...Although being four-footed or triangular is something that may be *both* thought in a concept and directly presented in the appropriate kind of intuition, being *real* or *a ground of a consequence* – that is, possessing the property which is the objective correlate of the logical function of affirmation or the logical relation of antecedent to consequent – is not the kind of property that is directly presented in pure or empirical intuition. (Guyer (1987, 165))

<sup>4</sup> By beginning with the premise that the categories can be interpreted in the purely temporal forms of inner sense, but then arguing that the determinate temporal relations of subjective states thus called for can be judged only if those states are also linked to independent objects in space, Kant can show that the categories can be given empirical sense in terms of knowledge which even the skeptic must concede...but that they can be *used* only if knowledge of external reality is also conceded. (Guyer (1987), 168)

<sup>5</sup> an intuition, i, and a concept, C, are homogeneous if and only if C-ness is part of the *content* of i. Here and elsewhere in this paper I use the word "content" in the sense which is now common in the philosophy of mind and language...one representation subsumes another if the content of the latter includes the content of the former. (Pendlebury (1995), 781)

<sup>6</sup> Pendlebury (1995), 784

<sup>7</sup> my inclination would be to define a schema canonically as the (repeatable) *process-type* which yields the relevant synthesis. In terms of this suggestion, Kant is most accurate when he describes a schema as a rule, for there is a minimal sense in which a rule is in effect a process-type, viz., the sense in which it is not something which an agent obeys or follows, but something which a particular sequence of event tokens fits or instantiates. (Pendlebury (1995), 786n15)

#### 4 *The Second Analogy (A189-211/B231-B256)*

*The Causal Principle:* All alterations occur in accordance with the law of the connection of cause and effect (B231)

- What are the relata of the cause-effect relation?
  - events (standard reading)
  - substances & their causal powers (Watkins 2005)
- Is this fatal for the existence of a real dispute between Hume and Kant?<sup>8</sup>

##### 4.1 *Kant's Challenge to Hume*

- According to Hume representation of causal relations is representation of nothing more than constant conjunction
- The Humean argument presupposes that we can distinguish the objective sequence of events from our subjective train of sense experiences (e.g. representation of the house vs. the riverboat)
  - How is this possible on the Humean model?
  - Depends on the application of a rule for objectively ordering a time series—i.e. depends on the concept <cause>

<sup>8</sup> What we're left with on Watkins's view by way of clear variation from broadly Humean theories is that Kant invokes irreducible active causal powers and, by contrast with Hume's own view, the first relatum of a causal relation can persist beyond an instant. It remains unclear whether the idea that causal powers or grounds are indeterminate diverges from what broadly Humean theories might endorse. (Chignell and Pereboom (2010), 586)

##### 4.2 *Dicker's Reconstruction*<sup>9</sup>

<sup>9</sup> Dicker (2004), 173.

1. We cannot know by observation that an [objective] event—that is, a transition from a state A to a state B—is occurring by knowing any of the following (either individually or jointly)
  - i. that the perceptions of A and B occur in the order A, B
  - ii. that the perceptions of A and B are irreversible
  - iii. that A precedes B by reference to absolute time
  - iv. that these perceptions are of successive states of things-in-themselves.
2. If (1), then the only way we can know by perception that an event is occurring is by knowing that B follows A according to a rule, that is, that the event has a cause.
3. If the only way we can know by perception that an event has a cause, then any event such that we can know of its occurrence by perception must have a cause.
4. ∴ Any event such that we can know of its occurrence by perception must have a cause.

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