The Meaning of Ouch and Oops[*]

David Kaplan, transcribed by Elizabeth Coppock

Howison Lecture in Philosophy delivered at UC Berkeley

[5:10] I'm very honored to be here. You can see the suit, it's a display of respect. I'm going to talk about displays of respect. Unfortunately, displays of respect aren't always sincere – we'll come to that later – but this one is.

I actually looked at this long list of distinguished Howison lecturers and I found it very reassuring. With the quality of the Howison lectures so firmly established over such a long period of time, my own performance can't really do very much to lower the average.

[5:54] This paper that I'm going to try to zoom through is a bit of a ride; it's a long and kind of complicated paper and I've tried to chop it down to get it into something like a little bit over an hour and I hope I'll be able to do that by reading fast and it addresses audiences of different levels of sophistication, none quite adequately, and it pretty much rides roughshod over nuance. So it's more of a George Bush paper than a John Kerry paper in that respect. But I hope that I can break open some new ground. So here we go.

Outline of the talk

[6:36] So, this is the outline of the talk, its:

Prologue
Logical validity
Truth
Logic deviance
Ouch
Oops
Non-translational metalanguage
Eliminability (which may have to be eliminated)
Goodbye
and then some conclusions.

1 Prologue

[6:52] There are words that have a meaning, or at least for which we can give their meaning, words like *fortnight* and *feral*. There are also words that *don't* seem to have a meaning, words like *goodbye* and the first person pronoun *I*. If the latter have a meaning, they're at least hard to define. Still, they have a use, and those who know English know how to use them. In fact, I venture to say that all English speakers know how to use *goodbye* and the first person pronoun *I* whereas relatively few could define *fortnight* and *feral*.

[*] http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iaGRLlgPl6w&feature=player_embedded#!

[7:27] Within philosophy and especially 20th-century philosophy, there are two great traditions of semantic theory, one a formalist tradition in which the great figures are all logicians: Frege, Russell, Tarski, Carnap, Church and Kripke, and the other an anti-formalist tradition, in which the great figures are Wittgenstein, Strawson, Austin, and Grice. (Berkeley's own Donald Davidson is actually in the formalist tradition although he wasn't a formalist himself.) The formalists for the most part study the idealized languages of science; the anti-formalists studied natural language, especially its context-sensitivity. It's from Wittgenstein that the slogan 'Meaning is use' is derived.

[8:22] I was trained by Carnap, Church and Montague and came to believe that the slogan 'Meaning is use' was simply a cop-out to keep the study of language humanistic and to avoid the rigors of logical theory. Now this was a foolish and naive view but I was a graduate student. (No offense to graduate students.)

The slogan 'Meaning is use' was a theme of Strawson's 1950 classic *On Referring*. Strawson argues that the primary bearers of reference and truth are not expressions but *uses* of them. And Strawson closes that famous article with the following sentence: He says, "Neither Aristotelian nor Russellian rules give the exact logic of any expression of ordinary language, for ordinary language has no exact logic." So there's a lot of logician-bashing in this kind of movement.

[9:18] Strawson's article reflected a widespread view that the methods of logic were by their nature only suitable to a highly regimented, unadorned core of language, a core that is perhaps adequate to mathematics and parts of science, but that is hopelessly remote from the subtle riches of natural language. Strawson thought that where meaning is use, it lies beyond logic's domain. Now this is the obverse of the foolish and naive view that I held as a graduate student, but it's equally foolish and naive.

[9:54] The most prominent logician of the time encouraged this view for his own reasons. When I asked Strawson (I used to live across the street from Strawson) why there could be no logic for a language with indexicals, he said, it was because W.V.L. Quine had told him so (Quine, a famous logician). Thus there was formed a strange alliance between those who disdained the regimented language and those who preferred it. The point of agreement was the gulf between logic's domain and natural language. The alliance was sustained by the notion that in *natural* language, meaning is determined by use. Strawson asked, in effect, "How could the lumbering formalist capture the context-sensitive, intention-driven quicksilver of individual use," and the logician replied, "Why would we want to?"

[10:57] In a paper of mine from the early 70's, I tried to show that by adding *context* as a parameter, Strawson's "conventions for referring" as he calls them, even if neglected by logicians, could be accommodated within the range of our methods. And at the time I regarded my work as extending current semantical methods *just* to the degree necessary to incorporate the indexicals. (Indexicals are words that change reference depending when and where and who uses them, words like *I, now, here, today, tomorrow,* and so on; when different people use these words at different times, they refer to different things, so we call those "indexicals". I won't say why we call them "indexicals" [laugh].)

[11:40] I regarded what I was doing as a sort of epicycle on Carnap's method of extension and intension and I didn't think of it as involving any different conception of semantics or what semantics was supposed to do. Some years ago, it occurred to me that the analysis of indexicals in *Demonstratives*[1] could be seen as the scientific realization of a Strawsonian

[1]Kaplan, David (1977), "Demonstratives: An essay on the semantics, logic, metaphysics, and epistemology of demonstratives and other indexicals," published in *Themes from Kaplan* (pp. 267–298), edited by Joseph

semantics of use. Ask not after other-worldly meanings, ask only after *rules of use*. This led me to explore the differences between what I now call a semantics of Meanings and a semantics of Use. I began to see the semantics of indexicals as having greater affinities with the semantics (or potential semantics) of epithets, diminutives, interjections, nicknames, ethnic slur terms, and the like,[2] than with the paradigms of meaningfulness, things like *fortnight* and *feral* and so on – the language of science.

[12:43] So here's what I'm trying to do: I want to explore the semantics (that is the conventionalized information that's carried by the expressions of our language – I call it "semantic information") of a range of expressions whose semantics has been largely ignored by those like myself, who work in a formalist tradition. The fact that we have ignored these expressions is probably best explained as flowing from three factors, a combination of:

1. disdain (I mean, think of the expressions I'm talking about, diminutives, I mean [erngghh], little, things.)
2. acceptance of a false theory, namely: that these expressions are just kind of stylistic variants of expressions that we can already account for. So for example the expression *honky,* which is a perjorative term for caucasians, is really just a stylistic variant of the word *caucasian* (that's the view)
3. the imagined impossibility of a systematic semantics whose goal is to capture anything other than what's *said,* what is *asserted* by a sentence, what is *claimed* by a sentence. Not that one couldn't say illuminating things about this, but the question is, could one do what I call a systematic semantics, that is, a kind of formalistic kind of thing.

[14:20] I now believe that by attending to rules of use – the right *sort* of rules of use – we can extend our formal semantics, and thus even our logic, to systematically account for the ignored semantic phenomena, and with surprising and, I hope, illuminating results.

[14:33] So, here's my method: I don't ask what the expression means, for example, I don't ask, "What does *goodbye* mean?" Instead I ask, what are the conditions under which the expression would be correctly or accurately used? This seems a much more fruitful line of inquiry for a word like *goodbye*. To the degree that such conditions reflect linguistic convention, the information that such a condition obtains is carried in the semantics of the expression. (I'm speaking a little bit roughly here but you'll get lots of examples.)

[15:17] Now, note that in the case of indexicals, a similar situation holds. Take for example the first person pronoun *I*: It seems fruitless to ask what the first person pronoun means; as Frege said, it seems to mean different things on different occasions of use. But the question, "What are the conditions under which the first person pronoun would be correctly used?" quickly yields a good answer, namely: to refer to the person who uses it. And this simple, good answer constitutes an adequate basis for a fruitful semantics of indexicals (or so I believe).

[16:02] I now think that there really isn't any incompatibility between the project of the formalist and the antiformalist view, that for at least certain expressions, meaning *is* use, or, to put it somewhat more exactly: For certain expressions of natural language, a correct semantic theory would state rules of use, rather than giving a translation, or providing something like a concept or a meaning expressed. Once I recognized that the work I had done in constructing a logic of indexicals could be viewed as a scientific realization of the idea that, for indexicals, meaning is use, I began to explore the extension of those ideas

Almog, John Perry and Howard Wettstein, published by Oxford University Press (Oxford).

[2]Epithets: e.g. *that damn Kaplan*. Interjections: e.g. Oh! Ouch! Woohoo! Diminutives: e.g. *tutchen*. Nicknames: e.g. Liz. Ethnic slur terms: derogatory terms for ethnicities, e.g. *chink* for Chinese people

to a range of other expressions that it seemed, or that I had been taught, were intractible to formal methods.

2 Logical validity

[16:53] Now I'm going to move to this topic, logical validity, and I'm going to turn to my most audacious claim.

[17:00] In my earlier work on indexicals, I attempted to show, through the use of formal methods, that the semantic rules governing indexicals produce a distinctive and deviant pattern of logical consequence. For example, the sentence *I am here now* may be regarded as a logical truth of a language containing indexicals – true whenever uttered, one might say. But the sentence *It is necessary that I am here now* would not be true, let alone be a logical truth. I mean, I am here now, as you've all noticed, but it isn't necessary that I be here now; I mean, the taxi could have broken down, the plane could have broken down; I'm in the process of breaking down, I could have broken down a little bit earlier, and so on. OK. So, the familiar modal principle of *necessity generalization* – to derive from the fact that ϕ is a logical truth, the conclusion that 'necessarily ϕ' is also a logical truth – seems to fail.

[18:07] I will below try to show the same, that is that the semantic rules produce a distinctive and deviant pattern of logical consequence for epithets, as well as diminutives, interjections, ethnic slur terms, and the like. I will try, that is, to challenge this dictum that 'logic is immune to epithetical color'. Frege and Carnap (Frege is a great founder of analytic philosophy, and certainly of modern philosophy of language, and he was a teacher of Carnap, and Carnap was my teacher, so I am his grand-student, right, so this is one of those things where you go against your parents and there's lots to say about it, but I won't go into that side of the issue.) would have said that epithets do not contribute to the cognitive content, and thus the study of their use belongs not to semantics, but to pragmatics, something that's more situational, and so on. But I want to show that that's not the case. So I'm going to challenge that dictum.

[19:22] Now, this is a more consequential, and even controversial project, raising questions not only about the semantics of epithets, but about the very nature of logic. I think it is (or should be) uncontroversial that expressions of these kinds have a stable, conventional meaning, or perhaps better, a stable, conventional use; we say *hello* when we meet, *goodbye* when we part. One who used these expressions in the opposite way would be making a linguistic error, an error on a part with using *fortnight* to mean a period of one week. Similarly, the word *honkey* is a derogatory term for caucasians, and anyone who claims to be using it in a non-derogatory sense is also making a linguistic error, the kind of error a person would be making if they said well, they use the word *kitcheonette* to apply to any kitchen, no matter what size it is, or where it's located.

[20:25] So the question is not whether there are rules governing the correct use of such expressions; there are. The question is: whether such rules, which give expressions what I call "expressive content" *can affect logic.* (By rules, I'm talking about linguistic conventions that are common across the language.) My argument that the stable linguistic conventions under discussion can have consequences for the notion of logical validity turns on some examples, and here's a main example.

[21:07] So, I'm going to present you with two arguments. Each one has a premise and a conclusion. You have to make a judgment as to whether, intuitively, these strike you as logically valid arguments; that is, does the conclusion follow from the premise or not?

[21:22] By the way, if you're very sophisticated about the notion of logical validity, then you have to put all your sophistication aside, because you have to... logic is not a stipulative subject, right, so you have to go into it on an intuitive basis, in terms of, how does it strike you? What strikes you as being the correct thing to say. So here's the argument. The first premise is this: *That damn Kaplan was promoted*. That's the premise. And the conclusion is: *Kaplan was promoted*. This I call Argument 1.

Argument 1
Premise: That damn Kaplan was promoted.
Conclusion: Kaplan was promoted.

This seems like a logically valid argument to me. Your intuitions may differ from mine, but to me, it seems like a perfectly good argument; the conclusion is a logical consequence of the premise.

Now I'm going to give you a second argument. Here's the second argument. The second argument has as premise, *Kaplan was promoted*. And the conclusion is: *That damn Kaplan was promoted*.

Argument 2
Premise: Kaplan was promoted.
Conclusion: That damn Kaplan was promoted.

There are some variants on this; we could make the conclusion *Alas, Kaplan was promoted,* right? And that would work in the other case too; you could take as premise, *Alas, Kaplan was promoted*; conclusion: *Kaplan was promoted*. Right? And so on.

[22:42] Now, I'm disinclined to accept the second as a valid argument. How does it come about that one of these seems valid and the other one doesn't seem valid? Well, in order to give an analysis of the two arguments, I want to use a little bit of terminology.

A **descriptive** is an expression which, roughly, describes something which either is or is not the case. So, a normal, declarative sentence is a descriptive.

Let us call an expression an **expressive** if it expresses or displays something which either is or is not the case.

Now, if what is displayed or expressed is to either be or not be the case, it must have sentential form, and to transform what we intuitively take to be the expressive – in the present case [*damn*] derogatory – content of a term, into sentential form sometimes takes a bit of ingenuity. For example, one might intuitively say that the exclamation *Ouch!* expresses or displays pain. I shall say – this is a slight variant on that – that it displays the fact that 'I am in pain'. So instead of saying that when I say *Ouch!* what's expressed is 'pain', I am going to say that what's expressed is 'that I am in pain'. Now there may be problems here, but let's see where it takes us.

[24:40] This is critical, actually, to the line of development of the project, since once we have expressive content in sentential form, we can bring out our old toolbox and go to work. Now I say that an expression is **descriptively correct** if what it describes is the case. I say that an expression is **expressively correct** if what is expresses or displays is the case. Now, you need to take account of context for most of the expressives, because they often express something about the speaker. Thus, your exclamation *Ouch!* has a certain expressive content – that you are in pain – and it may be expressively correct because you *are* in pain. Whereas, my exclamation *Ouch!* has a different expressive content, namely that *I* am in pain, and it may fail to be expressively correct, because I'm faking. I don't

want you to get all the sympathy for all your screaming *ouch, ouch ouch*; I wanna share in some of that sympathy. So the expressive content is different, because one is about you and one is about me; in your case, the utterance was expressively correct, because the content held, and in my case, it was not expressively correct.

[26:14] Usually, but subject to exceptions noted below (this is important, the exceptions), expressives display something about a state or attitude of the speaker. One of the notable features of language as a system for conveying information is that you can *lie* with it, and a correct semantics for expressives must provide for the ability to use expressives in this dishonest way, as in my saying *Ouch!* when in fact, I'm not in pain. I don't know if that's exactly a lie – I'm not sure if we would quite use that term there, but there's a kind of dissimulation of some form that's taking place. I'll actually talk about what that is in a little bit.

[27:10] So, it's important for that reason to separate the semantic information that's associated with the expression, that is what is expressed, the expressive content of it, from what the question of whether what is expressed is or is not the case. So we need to know what the content is, and then it's a separate question as to whether it holds or not.

[27:31] OK. Assuming that the epithet *damn* is an expressive, and that it expresses a derogatory attitude on the part of the speaker, then the sentence *that damn Kaplan was promoted* is going to be expressively correct just in case the speaker *has* a derogatory attitude toward Kaplan, and descriptively correct just in case Kaplan was promoted. Now it may be that the epithet does more than express, that is, display or ventilate, a certain attitude; it may also belittle, thus carrying a performative role in addition to its expressive role. Because I'm still uncertain as to how this fits together with the semantics, pragmatics, logic and the other subjects on which I wish to focus, and because I do believe that the performative function is over-and-above the semantic expressive function, I'll not take up this aspect of derogatory expressions.

3 Truth

[28:34] Now I want to turn to the vexed question of truth. If one were inclined to call as sentence true if it were merely descriptively correct, independently of its expressive correctness, then one would regard both arguments as being truth-preserving, since the descriptive contents of the premise and conclusion are the same. Because I regard Argument 1 but not Argument 2 as a logically valid argument, I would come to the conclusion that logical validity is not about **truth-preservation**. That pretty much is the conclusion that I come to: That it's not about truth-preservation, but rather, about what I might call **information delimitation**. I mean, that's an awkward phrase but I haven't really been able to think of a more graceful phrase for it. 'Information delimitation'. And I've written that idea down here. For a semantic argument to be valid, there must be no information in the conclusion that is not already contained in the premises.

[29:41] Now this gives a necessary, though it doesn't give a sufficient condition; it doesn't claim to give a sufficient condition. There are reasons why this doesn't quite give a sufficient condition and it gets fairly complicated and I'm not going to go into that: a sufficient condition for logical validity.

[29:56] The medievals called this view of validity the *containment theory* of logical validity. The idea was that the conclusion is somehow contained in the premises, and some of you read early logic know that before there was all the talk about truth and truth preservation, that was the original view. I use my notion of semantic information to try to

explicate this idea of containment. It's obviously not obvious what it means to say that the conclusion is contained in the premises, although I don't think it means that if the premises are true, then the conclusion must be true also.

[30:54] For me, the problem of Argument 2 is that it violates this constraint. (Argument 2, remember: Kaplan was promoted → That damn Kaplan was promoted, or alas, Kaplan was promoted.) Nothing is said in the conclusion – nothing is *asserted* in the conclusion – that is not said or asserted in the premises. But there is an intrusion of information that's expressed or displayed in the conclusion that is not expressed in the premises, something that speaks to the attitude of the person who is speaking, which wasn't there in the premise.

[31:39] It isn't the fact that there's expressives involved that makes it invalid: That damn Kaplan was promoted – Conclusion: That damn Kaplan was promoted. I don't think there's a problem with that, right? Or 'Either that damn Kaplan was promoted, or he wasn't', or 'Either that damn Kaplan was promoted or that damn Smith was promoted', right? I don't think there's a problem with those inferences. But there's a problem with 'Kaplan was promoted' to 'That damn Kaplan was promoted' because somehow, it's not that more is *said,* but somehow, there's more semantic information in the conclusion than in the premises.

[32:13] Now there's an alternative view that one might adopt; one might decide to use truth in a broader way, so that in the case of an expression that has both descriptive and expressive elements, we would say that the sentence is true only if it's both descriptively correct and expressively correct. We would then say that the sentence 'That damn Kaplan was promoted', when taken as uttered by a particular person is true in a wider sense, call it 'true-plus', only if the person who spoke did have a derogatory attitude toward him. If we use this notion of truth – sometimes I call it *truth with an attitude* – then you could say that logical validity is indeed truth-preserving, or more precisely, truth-plus-preserving.

[33:01] Now there's a terminological question here that doesn't really matter; you could settle it by stipulation. But stipulation doesn't settle the vexed question, and the vexed question is: What's the *right* notion of truth in a case like this, or, is there a correct notion of truth, I mean, is there a correct extension of the notion of truth that we have for sentences of the normal kind to deal with sentences that have these expressive elements in them.

[33:30] So, one of the things that I think is important and extremely interesting is that although we may have differing, even shaky, intuitions about how to apply the pretheoretical notion of truth in these cases, we – or at least some of us – have more stable intuitions about logical consequence. That is, the intuition that one of these arguments is valid and the other argument isn't – in one case the conclusion is a logical consequence of the premise, in the other case it isn't a logical consequence of the premise – that's a much more widely shared intuition than intuitions about when the premises are true and when they're false and does the expressive content have to be true, and then what do you want to say about that? Now these more stable intuitions about logical consequence have been ignored, because of the nearly universal, and according to me, fallacious, assumption that the notion of logical consequence is derivative from the more secure notion of truth. As I say, the way history has unrolled, the old containment idea was beaten out by the notion of truth preservation, so the modern notion of logical validity is dependent on a prior understanding of truth.

[35:10] The concept of truth is already problematic as soon as we contemplate any sentence where the semantics associates more than one content with it. Here, it's interesting to compare our problem in dealing with sentences having both descriptive content and ex-

pressive content with Frege's treatment of the relative clause construction. So I'm going to say a few words about this, and then I think I'll skip a bunch of stuff so this all doesn't get too tedious, but some of you who are interested in this stuff I'd be happy to chat with you later on.

So there's this famous sentence in Frege's famous paper *Über Sinn und Bedeutung*: *Napoleon, who recognized the danger to his right flank, personally led his troops against the enemy's position*. So here we have a relative clause, and what does Frege say about it? Frege says: This sentence expresses two propositions. It just separately expresses two propositions. It doesn't express a *conjunctive* proposition, in the way in which *Napoleon both recognized the danger to his right flank and led his troops against the enemy's position* [would], right? That you might say is a conjunction or has a conjunctive predicate; this *Napoleon,* comma, *who,* relative clause, close comma – it's a non-restrictive relative clause; that's important. So Frege says, there are two propositions expressed, one of them, *Napoleon recognized the danger to his right flank* (that's what's in the non-restrictive relative clause), the other *Napoleon personally led his troops against the enemy's position*.

[36:57] Now, Frege goes on to say that the truth condition for the sentence with the non-restrictive relative clause in it is this: The original sentence is true if and only if both of the two propositions are true. And if either of them is false, then the original sentence is false.

[37:18] So there's two claims that Frege's making here: One: that the sentence expresses two propositions; and secondly, he proposes a way of resolving the vexed question of truth, that is you've got a sentence with two propositions, there's four cases: True - True, True - False, False - True, False - False, right? In which of these cases should we say that the original sentence is true? How should we deal with that? And he says, the answer is: Take the conjunction of the two sentences.

[37:49] Now, there are other cases in which sentences have been seen by important figures to express more than one proposition, for example, in the theory of descriptions, in Russell's theory of descriptions as a classical case, if you say *The author of Waverley is Scottish* both the proposition that there's one and only one author of Waverley and the proposition that a certain person is Scottish is expressed. Now, Russell's view was rather like Frege's here – almost, roughly, but not precisely, that it's the conjunction of the propositions that we should use in order to determine the truth of a sentence like this. But other authors, Strawson for example, says no, one of these propositions should be regarded as a presupposition, and the other proposition should be regarded as what's asserted, and if the presupposition is false, then the sentence has no truth value, and if the presupposition is true, then the sentence has the truth value of the other one. So Strawson has a different way of resolving what I call the 'vexed question of truth' in this two-proposition case from the way in which Russell resolves it, and from the way in which Frege resolves his situation.

[39:14] So I think it's this phenomenon about a single sentence involving more than one proposition, not all of which may be asserted, perhaps, as part of what's said when the sentence is used that causes the application of the notion of truth to often be more uncertain than the application of the notion of validity.

[39:32] Much of the literature on pejoratives recognizes that sentences like *That damn Kaplan was promoted* have two contents, something like 'what is said' (which I call 'descriptive content') and something like 'what is expressed or displayed' (what I call 'expressive content'). However, because most of these authors focus on the vexed question of truth, rather than on semantic information, their emphasis is often on an unpersuasive general account of how expressive content figures into truth.

4 Logic deviance

[40:06] Now I want to talk about the deviance in these logics. Before I leave *That damn Kaplan was promoted* I wanted to say a few more things about it. There's some interesting features of the logic of expressives that show that something more than mere description is going on. As I said, I thought that Argument #1, *That damn Kaplan was promoted, therefore, Kaplan was promoted* is valid. On the other hand, the corresponding conditional: *If that damn Kaplan was promoted, then Kaplan was promoted* simply is not a logical truth. And the same for *Either that damn Kaplan was promoted or it's not the case that that damn Kaplan was promoted*. So compare: *Either Kaplan is a honkey or he isn't,* right? I mean, is that just a logical truth? It can't be a logical truth and still have a disparaging content to it; it should be empty in a certain way of both descriptive and expressive content if it's going to be regarded as a logical truth.

[41:16] There's a related phenomenon in the non-restrictive relative clauses that Frege didn't actually notice. So if you took *Napoleon, who is my uncle, led his troops into battle,* if you take the negation, *It's not the case that Napoleon, who is my uncle, led his troops into battle,* you're not actually negating the conjunction of the two. What you're doing is, you're negating that Napoleon led his troops into battle, and you've still got the other proposition, that Napoleon is my uncle, or Napoleon recognized the threat on his right, and so on. Somehow, the non-restrictive relative clause sort of pops out of the sentence when you embed the sentence in a larger sentence, I mean, you make the antecedent of a conditional or put a negation in front of it, and it still sits there as a separate proposition. So Frege's idea that the truth condition is to take the conjunction of the two, you have to keep tracking what conjunction you're gonna take. When you negate the whole thing, you're not negating the conjunction, you're negating something else. Anyway, there's a deviant logic that shows up in almost all of these cases.

[42:36] The deviant logic is a question of compositionality: That is, how do we compute the expressive content of compound expression, you know, a negation or a conjunction of two expressions, or a generalization on an expression – how do we compute the descriptive and expressive content of the compound from the descriptive and expressive content of the parts, and as I say, it comes out to be a little deviant in almost all of these cases.

[43:07] Now not all expressives do combine with other expressions to form compounds; *goodbye* and *hello* don't, really, but many do: *damn, honkey,* and so on, and interestingly, among those that do are certain indexicals, for example, you know there's a whole stack of first person pronouns in Japanese, just as one might imagine, depending on whether you're speaking with your peer... there's a first person pronoun that only the emperor is allowed to use, there's a first person pronoun that you use when you're talking to your peer, there's a first person pronoun that you use when you're talking to bank officials, you know, and so on, and we're all familiar with the two forms of second person pronoun in French and German, one of which expresses familiarity, and so on. So there's expressive content all around us, actually, if you think about it, and it's stable and conventionalized.

5 *Ouch*

[44:15] So now, consider the case of *ouch*. In English, we have the interjection *ouch,* and we have the sentence *I am in pain*. As noted, expressives tend to display something about the speaker. Hence, if the object language contains indexicals, and is sufficiently rich, it will often be the case that there is a way of saying descriptively what is only displayed by

the expressive. So in the case of *ouch,* we have *ouch* and *I am in pain*.

[44:43] Now the connection between these two is actually quite famous and controversial, and I plan to join the controversy. There are those who have said that *ouch* means *I am in pain,* but Wittgenstein said that *I am in pain* means *ouch,* which is really quite shocking. I have the quote. So before I do this, I'll wanna get to *oops,* so let me say a little bit more about the general situation regarding both *ouch* and *oops*; they're importantly different.

[45:16] So here I kind of wave my hands at developing a sort of model theory for this stuff; that's a rather technical mathematical kind of development, as to how a formal language would be developed. What we would need to know about any expressive in the language is what must be the case in order for the expressive to be expressively correct. Right, so for it to be expressively correct is for its expressive content to hold, right, so this is where the rules of use come in, right?

[46:18] So I take it that the rule for *ouch* is reasonably simple: That the speaker has just experienced probably a sudden and sharp pain. I'm not going to worry too much about giving exact... how precise the analysis is; I wanna get a rough cut at it. *Ouch* does not combine with other expressions to form complex sentences, but some expressives do, as noted, so we'll need rules to compute the expressive content of expressions from their parts, and the point of the preceding discussion about logical deviance is that these rules may not be obvious. That is, the way in which, for example if you had a sentence with expressive content and you take its negation, the expressive content of the resulting sentence may not be sort of the complement of the expressive content of the original sentence; in fact, it isn't, right? So the rules are not going to be simple, Boolean rules in the way that one might hope them to be.

[47:26] So now, to return to semantic information, we can understand a kind of model-theoretic framework as representing such information by looking at the contexts of use in which the given expression would be correctly used, that is, in which it would be expressively correct. So my claim, which is a soft and an old one, is that we get a useful way of representing the information in a descriptive sentence simply by looking at all the contexts in which the sentence would be descriptively correct, and this has been invaluable in developing traditional logics, and the new idea is that we can get an equally useful measure of the expressive information that is in a sentence by looking at all the contexts at which it, the sentence containing the expressive, is expressively correct.

[48:40] So we have:

Descriptives: Descriptively correct, Descriptive content

Expressives: Expressively correct, Expressive content

Now we can return to *ouch* and *I am in pain*.

[48:48] Now I claim that *ouch* is an expressive that is used to express the *content* that the agent is in pain, so what is the semantic information on this kind of model-theoretic analysis (if it is that)? The semantic information in the word *ouch* is represented by the set of those contexts at which the word *ouch* is expressively correct, namely, the set of those contexts at which the agent is in pain. That set of contexts represents the semantic information contained in the word *ouch*.

[49:19] What's the information that is in the sentence *I am in pain*? Now this is a descriptive sentence, entirely descriptive, and the information in that sentence is the set of all contexts

at which the sentence is *descriptively* correct, namely, true, and that again is the set of all contexts at which the agent is in pain.

[49:41] So by this representation of semantic information, the semantic information in *ouch* is exactly the same as the semantic information in *I am in pain*. Now mind you, I'm not saying, therefore, that there is no linguistic difference between *ouch* and *I am in pain*. The former is a single word, an interjection, an expressive; it lacks a truth value and does not syntactically combine with other expressions in ways in which sentences do. The latter, the sentence *I am in pain*, is a sentence, it has a truth value, and it does combine in all the old familiar ways, with negation and conditionalization, and so on. But at least according to the present representation, the information, the semantic information in *ouch* is identical with the semantic information in *I am in pain,* so we may come to the conclusion that *ouch* and *I am in pain* are (oh and I didn't get to write this on the board) – what my term is, is **informationally equivalent**. That's what I want to say about them. They are informationally equivalent.

[50:46] Now, some may conclude that this is a *reductio ad absurdum* of this way of representing the information, but I myself find it in accord with intuition. On this analysis, the linguistic differences between the interjection and the sentence seem more syntactical than semantical. The information they convey is the same, but they convey it through different modes of expression.

[51:14] Note, however, the following: That differing hierarchies of tropes are generated by the two expressions. There is, for example – and this is fairly common across the expressives – there is, for example, the *empathetic* use of *ouch*, when we see another person hurt. You know, you see somebody drop something on their toe, and you say *ouch!* It's kind of empathetically speaking for the person. I know of no corresponding empathetic use of *I am in pain*.

[51:53] Now this may suggest that there are other important differences between the two modes of expression, differences not captured by the model-theoretic representation, and probably there are; I hope that these differences need not be the concern of logic, which is grounded more in the literal use of language than in things like an empathetic use. But I thought the empathetic use was very interesting in showing that even though the information is the same, there's something about the structure of the expressive that allows this kind of transformation, whereas the purely scientific descriptive statement just doesn't allow for it.

[52:33] Please note that it is the semantic information in the expressions that we're talking about, not something that can be derived from the fact that someone has uttered such an expression. From the fact that someone has uttered *I am in pain,* we can conclude that the utterer has mastered a certain portion of English, but that isn't part of the semantic information in the sentence *I am in pain*.

[53:00] Now if I'm correct, it's easy to see why somebody might mistake the simple semantic fact – the informational equivalence between the two expressions – for some kind of profound epistemological insight into the functioning of language, and come to the conclusion, a conclusion that, to me, is simply perverse, that the sentence *I am in pain* is actually *synonymous* with the word *ouch*. And that since *ouch* is so plainly an expressive, *I am in pain* must likewise be an expressive and must therefore attribute no property to any subject. So I'm being a bit unfair here to Wittgenstein, but it seems like a good thing to do. He gets lots of praise. I'm going to come back to this, but first I want to turn to *oops*.

[53:42] One little side comment: There have been many pronouncements about particular uses

of expressives, all the way from Wittgenstein on pain to Stephenson on *good,* and all of this has been done without any general framework within which to try to assess these things, and that's one of the things that I'm aiming to do: to give a kind of general framework in which we can talk in a scientific way about, you know, ethnic slur terms and all the rest of this stuff. And ultimately try, I mean maybe we could try to answer some of these issues about emotivism and so on in that framework.

6 Oops

[54:21] *Oops* is very interesting and importantly different from *ouch,* as I'm sure you're aware. I take it that *oops* is an expressive and that it expresses the fact that the agent has just observed a minor mishap. So in the present terminology, *oops* has the expressive content, 'I have just observed a minor mishap'. It's expressively correct, just in case I *have* just observed a minor mishap. But as I've said, expressives, just like any other parts of language, can be used insincerely; you can pretend, in other words, using them.

[55:09] So here again we have informational equivalence between an expressive interjection and a purely descriptive sentence. Again, I beg your forbearance regarding small imperfections of my analysis of the expressive content of *oops,* since, as is obvious, the merit of the analyses I propose does not depend on whether they apply exactly to the examples I've chosen, but rather on whether English *could* contain expressions that conform to my analysis, and on whether the tools of the analysis are of value in thinking about philosophical issues of meaning. So I'm a theoretician of language, not an experimentalist. So allow me 'I have just observed a minor mishap' for *oops*.

[55:48] Now I want you to think about the following situation. Actually I wrote this when we were in Scandinavia. So you're in a glassware store, and there's a small pyramid of glasses set up on a table. Say, a dozen glasses in a little pyramid on display. And you observe someone walk down the aisle, bump into the pyramid, causing it to collapse, and causing all the glasses to break, and as an observer you say, *oops!* – completely appropriate, it seems; you have just become aware of a minor mishap.

[56:15] Now, notice that if the bump had caused the whole building to collapse, killing hundreds of people, you wouldn't have said *oops,* unless by characterizing the disaster as a minor mishap, you were intending a macabre joke. An utterance of *oops* in the face of a true disaster is expressively *incorrect*. The main point I want to make at this stage of the discussion is that for *oops* to be expressively correct, the observed event must be correctly characterized as a minor mishap.

[56:53] Now, note on the side that if you *had* said *oops* when the building collapsed, in spite of the incorrectness, and even the vileness your speech act, I would understand it. I would get what you were doing, namely, making a macabre joke by playing on the literal meaning of *oops*. So you might have thought initially, does *oops* have a meaning? Does it have a *literal meaning*? Can you *play* on the literal meaning in order to produce something else? All that seems to fall into place in a rather smooth way.

[57:31] Another nice case that my colleague Seana Schiffrin called to my attention, in which one manipulates the literal meaning of the word *oops* to achieve a certain emotional purpose concerns my saying *oops* when my guest has caused in fact a not so minor mishap, right, I mean in fact, it was the valuable glass heirloom that was knocked off the table and smashed into a thousand pieces. And I say, *oops,* you know, making as if it were a minor mishap. In this case, the reasons are dictated by social practices of blame-taking and blame-placing and so on.

[58:14] What I'm trying to show here is that my analysis of the literal meaning of *oops* – its a use thing of course; it's not a meaning with a capital M – can be used to explain various other uses of the expression, some that aren't literal, and this I take to provide indirect support for the analysis of what I take to be the literal meaning.

[58:34] So let me continue with the original story of the broken glasses, putting aside the fantastic alternative in which the building collapses. You saw this person bump into the pyramid, the glass broke, and you said *oops,* they sweep away the broken glass and build the pyramid again. And the person who bumped into it backs away and waits a little while and then walks down the aisle again on exactly the same path, bumps again, and the glasses come down again! You can't figure out what's going on. They sweep up the glass, rebuild the pyramid for a second time, and the same person walks around down the aisle, bumps into the pyramid, and again, the glasses come down.

[59:57] Now, we in Los Angeles would quickly realize that they're making a movie, and the man, who's an actor, is supposed to bump into the glasses and knock them down and break them, and we can imagine a continuation of the story, in which for the fourth time, he bumps into the pyramid, but this time the glasses shake, but they *don't* fall down, and the actor stops and says *oops!*

Now here we have a case in which you, the speaker, sincerely thought that you were observing a minor mishap. You thought it was a minor mishap. But it wasn't; it wasn't a mishap at all; it was something that was done deliberately. It was done intentionally. You were sincere, but mistaken in the thought that you expressed. Although it's perfectly understandable how you made that mistake, still, what you expressed – you have just observed a minor mishap – was incorrect.

[1:00:18] Now the moral of this story, in contrast to that of *ouch,* is that in this case, you, the *oops*-er, do not have privileged access to the state of affairs which must obtain in order for the expressive to be expressively correct. In saying *oops,* you made an error. I'm inclined to call it a factual error. You didn't make an error by saying something false, because *oops* isn't a sentence, so I wouldn't say it's true or false. It does however contain semantic information. The semantic information was that you had just observed a minor mishap, but you had not just observed a minor mishap. Given that your exclamation was sincere, you made an erroneous judgment.

[1:01:11] So here's the important thing. Here we've got a classical expressive, and what's expressed is not something attitudinal at all; it's something factual. I call expressives that express no more than a state of the speaker *subjective,* and I call expressives that express more than that *objective*. This is very rough. *Ouch* is a *subjective* expression; it expresses something about the state of the speaker. *Oops* is an objective one; it expresses something about the nature of the external world. It may be that when we're in pain, we have privileged access to that fact and cannot fail to know that we're in pain, but when we believe we've observed a minor mishap, we certainly do not have privileged access to that fact, to whether what we observed is minor or not, and even to whether it was a mishap or something done intentionally.

[1:02:09] So an expressive can express a state to which the utterer does not have any special access. More importantly, and this is the main lesson of *oops,* an expressive can express a state that isn't attitudinal at all.

[1:02:27] I wish to note briefly that the *subjective/objective* distinction among expressives does not really articulate any special epistemological distinction, and I could have defined it in a

way that made it closer to some epistemological distinction, but it's better to keep your distance.

[1:02:45] There's an interesting issue regarding honorific and derogatory expressions (you know, honorifics like *sir, your honor, the honorable so-and-so,* and so on and so on, an derogatory like... well you all know the derogatory expressions) that can be put using this terminology. The question is this: When we use derogatory titles, say, and honorific titles, say, does the honorific express the speaker's respect or the subject's respectability, that is, worthiness of respect? So you have to ask yourself, what do we want to take as the expressive content of the honorifics and the derogatory things. Do you want to take it to express something about the attitude of the speaker, which would be *subjective,* as I roughly divide it, or *objective,* something about the worthiness of respect, say, of the figure being addressed? (Or the worthiness of disdain of the subject being addressed.)

[1:04:02] The fact that rationality commands us to bring these two into line, that is, to respect those and only those who merit it makes it more difficult to mount a decisive case. Still, I'm inclined to believe that the correct semantics for these expressives is subjective. Now this may make me sound like an emotivist of the old style, but I'm nothing like that. I regard worthiness of respect as a perfectly acceptable objective notion not to be reduced to some subjective notion and I don't regard *good* as an expressive. I've written stuff about this and I'm wondering... Maybe I'll just read one little bit here. I mean to me, there's *evaluating* – this is an activity that all academics engage in constantly, right, and then there is something more subjective which is, one might call it *approving* or *preferring,* right, and these seem to me to be dramatically different.

[1:05:09] The early emotivists sometimes characterize their own theory as the *Boo!-Hurrah!* theory. (Now here's a couple more of those interjections with a lot of expressive content.) Now the paradigm setting for those interjections is the sports field, in which such expressions of approval and rejection are *de rigeur*. If you have never booed what you know to be the better team or cheered for what you know to be the worse, you're not a sports fan, or you're in full denial as many sports fans are, right? So when you boo, when you say *boo* or say *hurrah,* I think what you're expressing is approval and whatever the opposite of that is. I don't think you're saying something objective, that the team is worthy of approval; I don't think you're making that kind of evaluative remark; I think you're simply expressing something subjective. At any rate, *boo* and *hurrah* I think are characteristic subjective expressions, and it seems very odd to think that something like that could substitute for evaluatives.

[1:06:35] At any rate, I think the linguistic relationship between *oops* and *I have just observed a minor mishap* is exactly the same as that between *ouch* and *I am in pain*. They are informationally equivalent, they're not logically equivalent because you can't derive *oops* and you can't derive *ouch*. Syntax alone blocks that move because neither is a sentence. One shouldn't get confused about that. But by the same token, one shouldn't get confused by the syntax and deny the fact that they're informationally equivalent.

7 Non-translational meta-language

[1:07:03] Now the topic is non-translational meta-language. Having undertaken the analysis of some particular expressions for which rules of use provide the semantical information they carry, I want to call attention to a feature of my own earlier work on indexicals that I feel I did not sufficiently stress. And it's this: That the meta-language in which the semantics is given for an object langauge containing indexicals is non-translational.

[1:07:38] That is, we use no indexicals, and we need use no indexicals, in describing the semantics of a language that contains indexicals. Remember, I said, for the first person pronoun, for example, there's that simple, good rule, right? The correct use of the first person pronoun is to refer to the individual who's using it. I don't have to use any indexicals in order to explain that rule; that's a rule that could be explained in a purely scientific language.

[1:08:15] So the meta-language in which we describe the rules of use for the language containing indexicals doesn't have a translation in it for the indexicals. Now this is actually a rather surprising fact, if you think about it, since many say that what has to be done in providing a semantic theory is to give a translational theory. That is, an adequate semantic theory must allow you to derive, or in some way obtain all sentences of the form 'S is true if and only if P' where S is a sentence of the object language and P is its translation into the meta-language. Now, how are you going to do that if the object language contains indexicals, but the meta-language doesn't? You can't. You're going to have to come up with some other mechanism whereby the semantics is given. And it's here that the distinction between terms like *fortnight* and *feral* and those like *goodbye* and the indexicals has bite.

[1:09:16] When we move to epithets and derogatory terms and expressives, it's even more obvious that it must be possible to describe the semantics of swear words without swearing, of obscene words without becoming obscene, and of derogatory words without insulting anybody. So we shouldn't have to have ethnic slur terms in our semantic meta-language in order to be able to describe what the use is of ethnic slur terms in the object language. It seems obvious, when you think about it, but it's a little surprising against the background tradition that the job of semantics is to provide these translational things.

[1:10:07] For example, for the first person pronoun, we would say that it's used by a speaker to refer to him- or herself. Compare this to how you would describe the use of *fortnight*. You might say, 'to refer to a period of 14 days', right? There you need a translation in order to explain what's going on. But in the case of the indexicals, you don't need a translation of the indexical.

[1:10:30] So the task for a semantic theory is to give a scientific description of the semantics of the object language, not to reproduce it. Not to give synonyms, not to provide equivalent means of expression, but to describe it from above. And this we certainly can do for indexicals, and we can do it without referring to ourselves, or where we are, or what day it is, and so on in the way we would if we were *using* indexicals. We should be able to use as our semantical meta-language what Quine called 'the austere language of science': a language without indexicals, tense, epithets, euphemisms, and so on.

We have here a kind of application of Carnap's 'principle of tolerance', one form of which was: "Allow any form of object language, but keep the meta-language clean and simple."

But whereas the availability of translations of object language expressions into the meta-language is at least useful for classical object languages, it seems useless for the expressions here under consideration. This suggests that the semantic relation between these expressions and the rules of use that give the semantic information they carry is in some fundamental way different from the semantic relation, as we have conceived it, between words like *feral* and *fortnight* and the semantic information *they* carry.

[1:12:02] This is the heart of my claim that there's a real difference between *rules of use* and *rules of meaning*.

8 Eliminability

[1:12:45] I'll skip this stuff. I mean, the question is, could we eliminate expressives? Why do we need expressives? *Do* we need expressives? There's a similar, very interesting question, can we eliminate indexicals from our language, right? Do you need indexicals? I mean, why not name things, and just use names? What do you need indexicals for? And there's a lot of interesting things that one could say, and I've tried to write a little bit about that subject. The sense in which you could eliminate them, the sense in which you really can't eliminate them, and so on, and so there's a lot of epistemology that comes into it.

And there's other interesting things about expressives and the role that expressives play in displaying attitudes as opposed to averring that one has an attitude. Respect is one of those things that people want to see display. People want to be respected, but they also want respectful *behavior,* right, independent of whether the respectful behavior is sincere or not. You know, in the army they tell you, oh, you're saluting the uniform, you're not saluting the person. That means, you can make a sign of respect by saluting, even though you don't respect the person you're saluting. So this is typical army-talk. Oh it's the *uniform* you respect. Pfft.

[1:14:07] So it's an insincere form of respect to salute when you don't really respect the person that you're saluting, but people like respectful behavior, right, and honorifics maybe the coin of respectful behavior, so there's a series of interesting arguments as to why the expressions which carry information expressively, rather than just saying "Oh, I respect you. I respect you and I'll always respect you, I'll respect in the morning, and so on", you know, don't work in the way in which certain behaviors that *display* respect [work]. I mean, don't just tell me you love me. You know, show it, show me as it says in the song. Right? OK.

9 Goodbye

[1:15:06] So I've taken *goodbye* as a paradigm of expressions requiring a semantics of use. It's also a paradigm of useful expressions that do not seem to represent anything, thereby challenging the widely-held view that language is a system of representations. And for these reasons it's important to my project to be able to give a correct analysis of *goodbye* within the framework of my central notions: semantic information, mode of expression, and the correlative notions of expressive content and expressive correctness, all this along with a resulting notion of sincere use, because remember, I said every form of language you should be able to lie with, so here it isn't quite lying, but there should be insincere ways of using these forms of language, which carry information.

[1:15:59] So here's a problem that I initially found very puzzling. I thought to myself, if the analysis is right, then there ought to be insincere uses of *goodbye,* so I thought, OK, so, what would be an insincere use of *goodbye*? It wasn't easy. It wasn't easy. OK? But then, when I started to go back and say, well, let's look at what the expressive content is, and let's try to find a situation in which the person does not believe true the expressive content, I immediately thought of the case in which I drop you off at the door of your surprise party, and I say *goodbye!* insincerely, planning to park and quickly run around, and join the party.

[1:16:54] Now, I take it that the expressive (in this case, the word *goodbye*) has as its expressive content something like 'You and I are now parting from one another for a significant period of time'. Probably it doesn't any longer contain the elements of well-wishing, you know, the etymology of *goodbye* is from 'God be with you', and probably well-wishing

isn't any part of the expressive content any longer because I think nowadays if someone said *goodbye* and plainly did not wish the person well, you wouldn't think that that was an insincere use of *goodbye,* right? *Goodbye* seems perfectly acceptable to be used in that situation. So that's the expressive content.

[1:17:40] Insincerity is always the failure to believe that the expression used is informationally correct. It's always a failure to believe true what the expressive content is or what the descriptive content is. That's what insincerity is.

[1:18:09] So, that gives us a use of *goodbye* in which a person does not believe that they're really parting for a significant period of time, and then you quickly think of the surprise party kind of situation.

[1:18:23] For me, the generation of insincere uses of *goodbye* again, sort of helped me to partially confirm this approach to the subject. The notion of expressive content can also be used to restore confidence in the view that language is a system of representations, for we can regard expressives as representing their information content, though not, of course, in the descriptive mode. As in all other cases, the semantic information could be expressed in another mode – that's a central idea of my project – thus I regard *goodbye* and *you and I are now parting from one another* as informationally equivalent.

Conclusions

[1:19:03] So now the conclusions. So the distinction I've tried to make between descriptives and expressives, between descriptive content and expressive content, is not that between characterizations of the world and expressions of emotion, an echo of the old distinction between cognitive and emotive meaning. The mode of expression, descriptive vs. expressive, does not correlate with the nature of the semantic information, objective vs. subjective. The distinction doesn't correlate with whether it's about me or whether it's about the external world – that's part of the lesson of *oops*. In *oops* the information is objective but the word is an expressive. Similarly, the information in *I am in a state of joyful elation* is presented in a descriptive mode although the semantic information itself is as subjective as can be, and perhaps the very same semantic information is contained in the expressive *hurray*. *Ouch* and *I am in pain* were given as an analogous pair.

[1:20:08] To recognize that more detailed argument may be required to account for differences in our responses to expressions that I regard as informationally equivalent, and thus to build the case for my semantic information... In fact, one of the interesting topics that I did skip over was that we do respond differently to the way in which the information is carried. Part of the stuff that I skipped over is a contrast between editorial cartoons and the way we respond to them, and the way that we respond to discursive editorials. Cartoons have a lot more punch, even though what they say, somehow, is the same as something that can be said in another way, but our response is different, and you know, I have hypotheses and it has to do with evolutionary kinds of things.

[1:21:09] At any rate. So, part of such an argument involves getting clear on the fact that to the degree that information is encoded semantically, to that degree there exists the possibility of insincere use. For some obscure reason, when people think about expressives, they forget about the craft of actors, and imagine that utterances of *ouch, oops,* and *hurray* and the like are generated by the autonomic nervous system. If such utterances *were* generated by the autonomic nervous system and could not be consciously simulated, they would carry no semantic information, because they could not be part of any system of conventional representation that constitutes language.

[1:21:52] So here are the morals. First, it seems to be quite possible to extend semantic methods, even formal model-theoretic semantics to a range of expressions that have been regarded as falling outside semantics, and perhaps even as being insusceptible to formalization. This allows those of us of a logical turn of mind, those of us who think of language as a formal system, to use our familiar techniques. For me, it's illuminating to do so. I think it allows us to see more clearly the relationship between expressives and descriptives, and especially expressions of mixed kind, like these, you know, mixing in ethnic slur terms in ordinary kinds of sentences, and to treat expressives in a serious, scientific way. In so doing, we see that there is indeed a technical distinction between a semantics of use and a traditional semantics for meaning.

[1:22:46] Second moral: By clarifying the relation between speaker intention and linguistic convention... Ach, this was part of the paper I skipped over; I'll skip over that moral...

Third, in in acknowledging the.... That had to do with linguistic convention vs. other kinds of conventions that govern the use of language. I call them *social practices,* but just because I need two different words. So, for example, many of you may not know but one is not allowed to ask a question of the queen, you know, so when you're in the receiving.... probably most of you have not been in a receiving line with the queen... you probably have, right? But when you meet the queen, you can say, *Nice day, Your hat's on funny,* you know, but you can't say *Who does your hair?* right? OK.

[1:23:40] So there's two kinds.... I mean, not asking a question of the queen is a convention, and it governs linguistic use, right? But we need to somehow get a line between these two different kinds of conventions and there's a long section on that.

[1:24:02] So [third moral]: In acknowledging the conventionalized significance of the expressive side of language, the concept of semantic information may turn out to be useful in combatting the excesses of those who feel that there's no limit to the amount of ideology and belief that is embedded in the words and phrases of our language. Surely, this latter view is a council of despair that threatens the very concept of precise communication between parties and disagreements. It's one thing to enlarge our view of meaning; it's another to give way to metaphysical monism.

[1:24:35] Fourth, and last: As a philosophical bonus, I hope my analysis will help us to see that although there may be profound epistemological insights that relate to the connection between the descriptive *I am in pain* and the expressive *ouch*, there is also a purely semantical explanation of the connection, and explanation that makes it exactly analogous to the connection between *oops* and *I have observed a minor mishap,* a case that is free of epistemological considerations. And here, I continue my long-term project of trying to unmask semantical truths in epistemological clothing.

Thanks.