Of Somethings and Nothings: Wittgenstein on Emotion

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ABSTRACT: In philosophical discussions of emotion, feeling theories identify emotions with bodily events while cognitive theories insist that any coherent conception of emotion begins with acts of mind. The purpose of this paper is to argue the extent to which this debate is motivated by Cartesian considerations that unduly problematize the relationship between mind and body, and to suggest that in Wittgenstein we find resources for a view of emotions that overcomes this Cartesian problematic. My strategy is to show the important intuitions captured by each theory, intuitions the accommodation of which is necessary for any satisfactory theory of emotion, and then to suggest that Wittgenstein enables this accommodation without the stalemate characteristic of the present debate.

COMPETING THEORIES OF EMOTION offer different accounts of what an emotion is. Put most bluntly, feeling theories identify emotions with bodily events while cognitive theories insist that any coherent conception of emotion begins with acts of mind. The purpose of this paper is to argue the extent to which this debate is motivated by Cartesian considerations that unduly problematize the relationship between mind and body, and to suggest that in Wittgenstein we find resources for a view of emotions that overcomes this Cartesian problematic. My strategy will be to show the important intuitions captured by each theory, intuitions whose accommodation is necessary for any satisfactory theory of emotion, and how it is that Wittgenstein enables this accommodation without the stalemate characteristic of the present debate. To this end, the first part gives an account of theories of emotion that take as central body and mind, and of the state of debate between these accounts. I attempt to show that in its present state, the debate as constituted by competing Cartesian motivations is intractable. In the second part I give an account of Wittgenstein that shows both feeling theories and cognitive theories to be ultimately insufficient to the complexity of emotion, and I show how it is that Wittgenstein's account, while overcoming these insufficiencies, retains the important insights that make each theory attractive to its proponents. In the third part I attempt to show how Wittgenstein might help us to overcome certain intractable issues characteristic of the debate between the two theories. My aim is to show that in emotion theory we can, with Wittgenstein, have our cake and eat it too. We can give an account of emotion that accommodates the roles of the body and of the mind by showing that the barriers between them are not foundational and irreducible as Descartes would have us think, but are instead already bridged by the logic of our concepts.

I

Descartes recognized that emotions stood at the heart of a tension involved in seeing the human being as both embodied and minded. For him, an emotion is caused by corporeal processes but the emotion itself is the knowledge in the soul of those processes. He defines passions as "those perceptions, sensations or emotions of the soul which we refer particularly to it, and which are caused, maintained and strengthened by some movement of the spirits."[1] Here already a certain pattern is laid down: one aspect of an emotion is taken as central, necessary and sufficient, and definitive; others are linked to it only contingently. For Descartes, the mental experience is central while the emotion's physiological effects (its body), causal history, object, and associated behaviors, are labeled contingent concomitants. There are of course problems with Descartes' approach that one could mention, but my intention here is only to highlight that a theory of emotion can begin problematically by taking sides in a debate between mind and body. In this section I aim to show that this pattern is reproduced in contemporary feeling and cognitive accounts of emotion.

Feeling theory is often associated with William James and has recently received a strong defense by Jesse Prinz.[2] James identifies emotions as felt changes in the body. In his classic formulation, James holds that "bodily changes follow directly the perception of the exciting fact, and that our feeling of the same changes as they occur *is* the emotion. . . . We feel sorry because we cry, angry because we strike, afraid because we tremble."[3] Here the body is made central. Emotions concern human beings as bodies; mental states (sorrow, anger, fear) are shown as derivative, following causally and conceptually changes in the body. James's claim is that when we abstract all bodily feelings from the typical manifestation of an emotion, "we find we have nothing left behind, no 'mind-stuff' out of which the emotion can be constituted, and that a cold and neutral state of intellectual perception is all that remains."[4] Whatever the mental content of an emotion, that content is not what makes it an emotion; the body and its changes make emotions emotional, and so an emotion is bodily first, an aspect of mind and world only secondarily and contingently.

The strength of James's position lies in the nearly indubitable role of the body in our emotions, for it is in fact the case that we can scarcely conceive of an emotion except as at least accompanied by characteristic changes in the body. Furthermore, Prinz highlights a series of empirical studies that seem to support James's proposed order of causation. That is, when we study emotional responses in the laboratory, the body seems to be running the show. Neuro-imaging studies of emotion have shown evidence for the co-occurrence of conscious emotions and physiological changes. Evidence of the effect of spinal cord injuries on the intensity of felt emotion has buttressed James's view that the experience of an emotion follows bodily changes

[1]René Descartes, "Passions of the Soul" in *Descartes: Selected Philosophical Writings*, trans. John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff, and Dugald Murdach (Cambridge UK: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1988), pp. 228–29.

[2]Jesse Prinz, "Are Emotions Feelings?" *Journal of Consciousness Studies* 12 (2005): 9–25. Prinz holds that emotions are changes in the body only sometimes felt, i.e., that there are unfelt and so unconscious emotions.

[3]William James, *The Principles of Psychology*, vol. II (New York NY: Henry Holt, 1923), pp. 449–50.

[4]Ibid., p. 1067.

(and their transmission via the spinal cord). Perhaps most importantly, several studies have shown that the occurrence of interoceptive states is a sufficient cause of felt emotion.[5] These latter studies seem, for Prinz, sufficient to show that in order to understand emotions in their totality, we need look only at the body.

James and Prinz seem right to suggest that any account of emotion will have to account for the role of the body. It remains unclear, however, whether that role is sufficient for the occurrence of an emotion. One now standard argument against feeling theory is that there are more emotions than there are discernable "feeling states." If not, two emotions might need to share the same subjective feeling or phenomenology. If this is the case, then information other than that of a physiological kind, such as the eliciting context and the appropriate social behavioral responses, need to enter into the demarcation of emotions. Therefore, the objection goes, body states are not the only necessary components of emotion. Prinz's response to this objection, to my mind, is unsatisfying. He writes:

> Some emotions have the same bodily realization, and therefore feel alike. I think guilt and sadness are a case of this. If so, how can they be distinguished? The answer has to do with causal history. Sadness is a bodily state caused by a loss. Guilt is a bodily state caused by transgressing a norm. The body state may be the same, but they are occasioned by different eliciting conditions. . . . I am not suggesting that guilt includes a cognitive component. Guilt is not a somatic feeling of sadness *plus* a belief that the feeling is caused by a transgression. Rather, I am suggesting that guilt is a case of sadness that happens to be caused by acts of transgression. . . . The belief that "I have transgressed" is not a component of the emotion; it is a cause.[6]

Prinz here evades a likely response by way of simple stipulation. The cause of the emotion is just that, a cause, and not a component. We will see that cognitive theorists will claim that if one needs to refer to the causal history of an emotion in order to identify it, then that history forms part of the emotion. Indeed, they will point to this role to suggest the very opposite of the James/Prinz view by urging that it is the judgment of context that makes the emotion what it is. In the third part I will return to this problem in order to offer a solution. My purpose here is just to highlight that the state of debate offers up only stalemate. Where Prinz will stipulate that the cause is not a component, cognitivist theorists will just as obdurately assert the opposite. The vocabulary of neither camp offers a description that meaningfully engages that of the other. With feeling theory claiming central status for the body, and cognitivists doing the same for acts of the mind, there seems to be no possibility for a meaningful resolution of the debate so construed. The problem, as I will suggest in the second part, is precisely this manner of construal that divides body from mind, but I need first to lay out cognitive theories of emotion.

Cognitive theories are those for which emotions essentially involve propositional attitudes such as beliefs, judgments, and thoughts. Here, aspects of what we usually think of as mind are held as necessary and sufficient for the occurrence of an

[5]For details of these studies, see Prinz, "Are Emotions Feelings?" pp. 13–14.
[6]Ibid., p. 19.

emotion, and any connections that a given emotion has to the body are deemed contingent. Robert Solomon's early work is emblematic in this regard. Consider two representative quotations: "My embarrassment is my judgment to the effect that I am in an exceedingly awkward situation. . . . My sadness, my sorrow, and my grief are judgments of various severity to the effect that I have suffered a loss. An emotion is an evaluative (or a 'normative') judgment, a judgment about my situation and about myself and/or about all other people."[7] Elsewhere, in response to the Jamesian account of emotion, he writes: "Anger *is* the interpretation plus the view of a cause (as well as the 'object' of emotion) and consequent behavior. That anger also has a biological backing and includes sensation is inessential to understanding the emotion, though no doubt significant in certain measurements, which only *contingently* correlate with the intensity of an emotion or its significance."[8] Where James encourages us to strip away the bodily effects of emotion and see what remains, Solomon might instead suggest that we abstract away the role of judgments of mind and see what the body tells us. The claim of cognitive theorists is that the body is not an open book. No mere feeling can cause its own interpretation or can tell us what it is. For that sort of answer, we must seek its place in a social context, and for that we need the mind. If a given body state has meaning, it is not by way of the feeling itself but rather its connection to an agent's judgments about her situation *vis-à-vis* relevant social facts.

Insofar as cognitivists claim that emotions are socially-situated judgments, a common means of defending their position is to point to seemingly important differences in emotional repertoires across cultures. If anger differs between cultures but physiology does not, then anger is not strictly physiological. To this end, Solomon points to anthropological literature detailing manifestations of anger peculiar to specific cultures. Clear and important differences in the intensity, associated behaviors, eliciting conditions, and the place or importance of the emotion in a culture's emotional makeup as a whole all suggest that there is no "anger" itself, variously modified by cultural factors.[9] Rather, anger *is* the judgment of an agent, and insofar as any agent's judgments are circumscribed by the norms of his or her culture, anger is an act of a socially-situated mind.

Where I claimed that James was right to stress the importance of the body, and that any satisfactory account of emotion will do the same, I would suggest that the same is true of cognitive theory. Any account of emotion ought to be able to account for the central role of acts of mind. For all but certainly the more complex emotions require fine-grained understandings of social context and its concomitant host of social roles and expectations. We can scarcely conceive of a jealous lover who does not judge, nor an angry and slighted friend whose anger involves no evaluation of his friend's actions. Emotions concern our relationships with others, and insofar as these relationships are constituted by a host of social norms and expectations, our dealings with others and the emotional responses that follow cannot help but

[7]Robert Solomon, *The Passions* (New York NY: Anchor, 1977), p. 187.

[8]Robert Solomon, "Getting Angry: The Jamesian Theory of Emotion in Anthropology" in *Not Passion's Slave: Emotions and Choice*, ed. Robert Solomon (New York NY: Oxford Univ. Press, 2003), p. 87.

[9]Ibid., p. 81.

rely upon judgments concerning how well our own actions and the actions of others comply with relevant social norms. Tell a grieving wife that her husband is in fact alive and while her physiology remains altered for some time, her grief, in the instant that her judgment changes, disappears.

To summarize our progress thus far, where Prinz's Jamesian position suggests that guilt and sadness are phenomenologically identical emotions distinguished by causes that do not enter into the definition of the emotion itself, cognitivists assert that if we must, in order to differentiate one emotion from another, seek the agent's judgment of the eliciting situation, then that judgment is central and necessary to the emotion. There seems to me no clear way to settle this dispute in the vocabulary offered by either side. Where the Jamesian view makes the body central and necessary, and so makes mind and its judgments about the world contingent, cognitivists make mind central to emotion, and any physiological concomitants are deemed inessential to understanding the emotion itself. Insofar as both are following through on the program laid down by Descartes in choosing one feature among body and mind as central, and then construing the other as connected only contingently, the only result seems to be stalemate: two views unable to speak to each other from their isolated perches atop different starting points. In the second part I attempt to show that in Wittgenstein we find hope for a way out of this impasse.

II

Wittgenstein's later philosophy offers a criticism of old ways of picturing human experience and hints towards a new picture. This new picture is a response to the view made popular by Descartes that the relationship between body and mind is a mysterious one in need of philosophical treatment. It is not surprising, then, that Wittgenstein has something interesting to say about emotion, for a coherent account of emotion calls for an equally coherent account of what we mean by "body" and "mind" and how we approach their relationship. Wittgenstein cautions us to pay heed to our everyday dealings with each other and how in these dealings the problems of dualism simply do not arise. We pre-theoretically understand others as always and already minded and embodied. Indeed, it is the very manner of our embodiment that allows us to speak of mindedness. Applying this view to emotions will enable us to work through the stalemates characteristic of feeling-state and cognitivist theories, for here there will be no attempt to rank body and mind. Rather, we will see how the logic of our concepts already keeps them in a tight logical and conceptual knit.

Descartes cuts off mind from world. The mental becomes a realm of inner objects, and so the mental lives of others become available to us only via inference. He writes: "If I look out of the window and see men crossing the square, as I just happen to have done, I normally say that I see the men themselves. . . . Yet do I see any more than hats and coats which could conceal automatons? I *judge* that they are men."[10] Wittgenstein argues that when we interact with others we are in no need of any such judgment. He suggests, contra Descartes, that "if I see someone writhing in pain

[10]René Descartes, *The Philosophical Writings of Descartes*, vol. II, trans. J. Cottingham, R. Stoothoff, and D. Murdoch (Cambridge UK: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1984), p. 21.

with evident cause I do not think: all the same, his feelings are hidden from me."[11] We pre-theoretically deal with others as beings with inner lives, and those inner lives are as available to us as to themselves, but in different ways. For Wittgenstein, the body is *expressive* of mind.

In viewing the body as expressive of mind, Wittgenstein seeks to understand the inner lives of others as truly "inner" and theirs, but also available to others. That is, he wants to preserve the Cartesian intuition that our own lives are in some sense private and inner, but suggest that this privacy is only partial and does not lead necessarily to Descartes' problematic. Importantly, privacy does not have the epistemic consequences attributed to it by Descartes. We may allow Wittgenstein to speak for himself before trying to articulate more clearly his position:

> But that which is in him, how can I see it? Between his experience and me there is always the expression! Here is the picture: He sees it immediately, I only mediately. But that's not the way it is. He doesn't see something and describe it to us.[12]
>
> 'We *see* emotion.'—As opposed to what?—We do not see facial contortions and make inferences from them (like a doctor framing a diagnosis) to joy, grief, boredom. We describe a face immediately as sad, radiant, bored, even when we are unable to give any other description of the features.—Grief, one would like to say, is personified in the face.[13]
>
> In general I do not surmise fear in him—I *see* it. I do not feel that I am deducing the probable existence of something inside from something outside; rather it is as if the human face were in a way translucent and that I were seeing it not in reflected light but rather in its own.[14]

We can see Wittgenstein weaning us from the view that others are importantly mysterious to us. On Descartes' view, mental lives are composed of inner events available to one introspectively and immediately, to others only by inference. Descartes must "judge" the figures in the square to be men. This is the picture that Wittgenstein questions. For it is actually so that in the normal case we have no doubts about the inner lives of others, that they exist or what, roughly, their content is at any given time. We see emotion in the face without inference or judgment. We are skilled social beings who cannot help interact with others as minded creatures. It takes a philosopher to convince us that there is a problem here.

The confusion issues from a mistake fundamental to Cartesian dualism. That mistake is a false inference from two different kinds of access to mental events to different types of evidence for those events that have markedly different epistemic status. Descartes construes mental events as inner objects. To know an object is to perceive it correctly, and so for inner objects, only the person affected can properly

[11]Ludwig Wittgenstein, *On Certainty*, ed. G. E. M. Anscombe and G. H. von Wright, trans. Denis Paul and G. E. M. Anscombe (Oxford UK: Basil Blackwell, 1969), p. 122.

[12]Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Last Writings on the Philosophy of Psychology*, vol. II, ed. G. H. von Wright and H. Nyman, trans. C. G. Luckhardt and M. A. E. Aue (Oxford UK: Blackwell, 1992), p. 92.

[13]Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Zettel*, ed. G. E. M. Anscombe and G. H. von Wright, trans. G. E. M. Anscombe (Berkeley CA: Univ. of California Press, 1970), p. 225.

[14]Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology*, vol. II, ed. G. H. von Wright and H. Nyman, trans. C. G. Luckhardt and M. A. E. Aue (Chicago IL: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1980), p. 33.

know them. All others can manage only indirect access. But this picture only seems attractive as long as we follow Descartes in construing all bodies—our own and others'—as thing-like, cut off from the mind, so that knowing what is happening in any body is the fruit of observation. For my own body, that observation is immediate, for others it is mediate, and so first-person reports are intrinsically superior epistemically to third-person accounts. But it is simply not the case that we "observe" our bodies in the way that Descartes imagines. Wittgenstein writes: "One *feels* conviction, one doesn't infer it from one's own words or tone of voice."[15] We do not judge that we are experiencing an emotion in the same way that we do not judge that we are seeing. We simply are the type of creatures who see and grieve, and whatever occurs in the body when we see or grieve, that is not what it is for a human being to do either. While it is true that we have different kinds of access to the minds of others, that is, we must observe their behavior to know what they are feeling while we do not so observe our own to know the same, this only seems to affect the reliability of our knowledge if we think of the mental as Descartes does, as composed of inner objects, features of a thing-like body. To see the body as expressive of mind is to see the minds of others as available to us through their embodied movements. What makes it possible for us to have a language of emotion is that we are able to recognize emotional states as finding a natural expression in bodily behavior:

> Words are connected with the primitive, the natural, expressions of the sensation and used in their place. A child has hurt himself and he cries; and then adults talk to him and teach him exclamations and, later, sentences. They teach the child new pain-behavior.
>
> So you are saying that the word 'pain' really means crying? On the contrary: the verbal expression of pain replaces crying and does not describe it.[16]

Talking about pain replaces crying as pain behavior. Talk does not describe or add onto the emotion, it becomes one of its expressions, on par with crying. Behavior of others is not *evidence* of their mental states *qua* inner objects, but is instead the only possible criterion for what one means when one ascribes emotions to them. Their body is expressive of inner events, not subject to their effects as one object is subject to the effects of another.

At §580 Wittgenstein's *Philosophical Investigations* reads: "An 'inner process' stands in need of outward criteria."[17] Here, Wittgenstein attempts not to deny the existence of "the inner" but only to deny the Cartesian claim that the inner lives of others are completely private. There are undoubtedly "inner processes," but we can have usable concepts of them (and what would a concept be that no one could use?) only insofar as they are tied to outward behavior. That is, our concepts of inner events include associated behavior not as causal components but as conceptual, logical ones; we are unable to ascribe feelings to others unless those feelings are tied

[15]Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology*, vol. I, ed. G. H. von Wright and H. Nyman, trans. C. G. Luckhardt and M. A. E. Aue (Oxford UK: Basil Blackwell, 1980), p. 130.

[16]Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, trans. G. E. M. Anscombe (Malden MA: Blackwell, 1997), p. 89.

[17]Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, p. 153.

up with particular natural expressions. The link between feeling and expression is not causal. It is not the case that an inner event so reliably produces its expression that the two are in practice linked. Instead, the link is conceptual. Typical behavioral expressions of emotion become criteria for ascribing that emotion's concept, that is, they form part of the concept's definition.

A criterion for an expression may be considered as an aspect of that expression's meaning, sense, or grammar. To explain the criterion for the use of an expression is, for Wittgenstein, in an openly loose way, to explain the meaning of that concept. Criteria do not offer necessary and sufficient warrant conditions for asserting a term, even though most criteria coincide with the phenomena in the vast majority of cases. A comparison to James might help. Wittgenstein writes, "Consider the James-Lange theory of emotions. . . . [It said that] 'He is sad because he cries.' And this is good, but *not* if taken as 'Part of his sadness is that he cries.'"[18] Wittgenstein wants to say that "he is sad because he cries" makes sense as long as we are using his crying as a criterion for sadness, rather than a cause, effect, or component. To see it as any one of the latter options is to subscribe to the basically Cartesian position that the body and mind represent completely distinct spheres whose interaction is explainable in terms of causation and composition, relationships suitable for talk of interactions between objects. The Cartesian assumption is that the relation between mental states and behavior is a contingent, causal one, and we can only hope that this relation can form the basis for an inference from behavior to state of mind. But for Wittgenstein "this is precisely what we *do not* do. . . . We do not need to believe (with justification) that others are human beings to treat them as such. We relate to them as fellow thinkers and sufferers, which is to say we acknowledge them, their pains, their need for help."[19] Our concepts function as logical bridges between body and mind. Talk of one entails a role for the other. We say that he is sad because he cries; his crying is part of what it means to be sad, his behavior is part of what it means to have the feeling.

Emotion concepts come complete with their place in a community's form of life, articulated by a given concept's criteria. Of love, Wittgenstein writes: "'if it passes, then it was not true love.' Why was it not in that case? Is it our experience, that only this feeling and not that endures? Or are we using a picture: we test love for its *inner* character, which the immediate feeling does not discover."[20] Surely it is the former. The question of whether or not it is love is decided by the normal course of love, and a putative lover either meets the criteria or does not. If she says or does certain things, we say that she did not love him. These behavioral criteria define the emotion. They form part of the concept, and it is only by appeal to them that we can sensibly speak of inner events. Of course, love consists in part of a racing heart and quickening pulse, but we would have no way to talk about such inner events without their expression in behavior.[21]

[18]P. T. Geach, ed., *Wittgenstein's Lectures on Philosophical Psychology, 1946–47* (London UK: Harvester-Wheatsheaf, 1988) p. 281.

[19]Alessandra Tanesini, *Wittgenstein: A Feminist Interpretation* (Malden MA: Polity Press, 2004), p. 112.

[20]Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology*, vol. I, p. 24.

[21]This is what is wrong with affect theories of emotion in which some simple emotions are equated with involuntary facial expressions. Researches show snapshots of faces with characteristic expressions

Seeing the body as expressive is a strategy designed to loosen the grip of Cartesian thinking. Wittgenstein suggests that it is the philosopher's folly to separate body from mind and then to have to put them back together as if so many awkward puzzle pieces. Our ordinary use of language shows that body and mind are co-implicated in our concepts. What is precisely wrong with Cartesianism, and so with feeling theory and cognitivism as I have described them, is that emotions are made into inner events, either mental or physiological. Wittgenstein's clearest argument against construing emotions as inner events is contained in his private language arguments, in particular his beetle box paragraphs:

> If I say of myself that it is only from my own case that I know what the word "pain" means, must I not say the same of other people too? And how can I generalize the *one* case so irresponsibly?
>
> Now someone tells me that *he* knows what pain is only from his own case! Suppose everyone had a box with something in it: we call it a "beetle." No one can look into anyone else's box, and everyone says he knows what a beetle is only by looking at *his* beetle. Here it would be quite possible for everyone to have something different in his box. One might even imagine such a thing constantly changing. But suppose the word "beetle" had a use in these people's language? If so it would not be used as the name of a thing. The thing in the box has no place in the language-game at all; not even as a *something*: for the box might even be empty. No, one can "divide through" by the thing in the box; it cancels out, whatever it is.
>
> That is to say: if we construe the grammar of the expression of sensation on the model of "object and designation" the object drops out of consideration as irrelevant.[22]

The crucial paragraph here is the final one. If we hold that sensation terms generally, and emotions insofar as they are conceived as inner events (felt changes in the body or acts of mind) in particular, operate on the model of object and designation so that my word "anger" is an attempt to refer to an inner event that is in some sense discernable, then whatever that event is, it is not part of our concept of anger. It cancels out. Wittgenstein's argument is a *reductio* of Jamesian views, and it applies equally to any view that equates emotions with events in the body or mind not conceptually tied to behavior. If we grant with James that the emotion *is* the felt change in the body, then the dubious result is that the feeling itself plays no role in our concept of it. Likewise if my jealousy is, with Solomon, my judgment of a social situation,

of happiness, sadness, anger, and so on. Recognition of the snapshots is reliable across cultures, and so it is concluded that certain emotions have typically "hard-wired" expressions in all humans. Anger exists in all humans, because all humans recognize an angry face. We might ask, however, with Wittgenstein, what the respondents are "picking out" when they correctly identify a facial expression. Surely they recognize the facial expression as an artificial caricature of a more complex emotion that has a place in their culture. What they are recognizing is not the face *qua* snapshot but *qua* part of a process. For if we showed the same respondents a video with a face alternating second by second between an expression of anger and one of joy, we would expect the respondents to say, correctly, that the person was really experiencing neither emotion. Likewise, if someone lived with the same facial expression at all times, Ekman's anger, joy, or any other, than we would say that he feels nothing. Both anger and joy have a course. Anger is not merely an inner event, or merely a fleeting facial expression, for our use of the term "anger" calls for more.

[22]Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, p. 100.

then that judgment plays no role in our use of the concept of jealousy. Wittgenstein is not against the role of the body or mind in emotions; rather, he is showing that if we want to preserve that role, we must admit that emotion concepts logically include behavioral criteria. In a theory of emotion, neither the role of the body nor of the mind, if it is to be a necessary one, can also be sufficient. A condition of possibility for talk of inner events is a conceptual link between an event and its outer expression.

This account makes sense of Wittgenstein's claim that "Joy is not joyful behavior, nor yet a feeling round the corners of the mouth and the eyes. . . . Joy designates nothing at all. Neither any inward nor any outward thing." To say that joy designates nothing is not to say that joy does not exist, nor that it is mere behavior. It is to say that our word "joy" is not applied in the manner of object and designation. Wittgenstein responds to the objection that his is a behaviorist view that makes of inner events "nothings": "Not at all. It is not a *something*, but not a *nothing* either! The conclusion was only that a nothing would serve just as well as a something about which nothing could be said. We have only rejected the grammar which tries to force itself on us here."[23] The two options of "nothing" or "something" gain their force from two views that Wittgenstein intends to avoid. To call joy "nothing" would be to take a behaviorist position in which joy is, rather than an inner event, outward behavior; to call it a "something" would be to take a Cartesian view whereby the mind is populated by private objects to which it is the function of language to refer. To say that emotion terms are neither somethings nor nothings is to say that we are rejecting the view that emotion terms could be coherent without appeal to outward behavior. Our concepts bring together aspects of so-called body with aspects of so-called mind. In our everyday use of language, there is no mysterious gap to be bridged between mind and body.

One may object that Wittgenstein gives too much weight to our present use of emotion terms, with little regard to what those terms are purportedly about, the thing itself. What that thing *is*, is taken to be a question decided by the way the world is, regardless of our present attempts through language to represent it. Paul E. Griffiths voices this objection when he writes:

> Conceptual analysis alone cannot determine the real nature or the extension of fear. Linguistic intuitions about the extension of a natural kind term may simply be mistaken. All conceptual analysis will reveal is the current stereotype of fear. . . . Current science, rather than conceptual analysis, must be used to fill in the schematic element of the meaning of "fear." If science can find no interesting kind corresponding to all the paradigm cases of fear, then we must either reclassify some of the paradigm cases or replace fear and its companions with some more adequate categories.[24]

The intuition here is that science studies the world as it is, and sometimes serves as a corrective to our concepts. Our language almost certainly enshrines false beliefs about the world, and so language itself cannot serve as a reliable guide to the nature of features of the world. Instead, science must lead the way. Griffiths suggests that

[23]Ibid., p.102.

[24]Paul E. Griffiths, *What Emotions Really Are* (Chicago IL: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1997), p. 5.

water is a good example. Whatever the folk say about water, science has discovered that it is really H_2O. Wittgenstein might ask what motivates the sense in which any x is *really* y. That is, the question of how descriptions of x's are to be ranked is a social question, not a scientific one. It makes little sense to suggest to a priest that holy water is really H_2O, and perhaps less to suggest to an engineer that her bridge is really made mostly of empty space because of the distance between sub-atomic particles. The priest can argue with the scientist about the value of their vocabularies, but any appeal to either's specialist vocabulary is question-begging. Their argument must be a social and political rather than an epistemological one, an argument about what we get when we adopt either vocabulary. Viewing water as H_2O gets us certain valuable things, while viewing it as holy water gets us others. No amount of studying the brain or the body will shatter our ordinary understanding of emotions in any straightforward sense. This is not to say that developments in science *never* lead us to see the grammar of our concepts differently; they can and do give us new criteria for the use of a term, just as a doctor can now cite a chemical imbalance in order to attribute depression to a patient. But this is a new way to use the term and does not undermine or replace other more primordial ways. The important point is that there is no core to an emotion concept, no beetle in the box that it is the purpose of a word to get right and that science might tell us about. The language of emotion terms, for Wittgenstein, just is not an attempt to correctly describe an inner object. The import of the private language argument is that inner events do not fall under the same grammar as external objects. On this point Griffiths says: "linguistic intuitions might be mistaken about the nature of the beetle in the box. It is the job of science to discover what the beetle really is." But we have already seen that if we construe psychological predicates in the manner of object and designation, the object disappears from view. Emotion concepts are not attempts to get anything right, neither a something nor a nothing, and so Griffiths's criticism misses the mark.

III

In what remains I want to make clearer the ramifications of Wittgenstein's philosophy for the debate between feeling theory and cognitivism. We saw that feeling theory and cognitivism lock horns over the issue of the proper place of an emotion's causal history in that emotion's concept. While both agree that in differentiating one emotion type from another we may need refer to its causal history, Prinz suggests that it does not follow that the cause forms part of the emotion. Cognitivists claim that the same appeal shows that judgments of relevant social facts *vis-à-vis* one's own position are necessary features of an emotion. Wittgenstein will be of no help in solving this debate in its own terms. I hope, however, that I have shown the ways in which he might help us get past the debate by showing by what considerations it is motivated. Wittgenstein helps us to see that the debate loses interest once we no longer conceive of the body and mind as radically distinct, for the debate is at bottom about which of the two takes precedence in an emotion's identity. Prinz wants to show that physiological factors are necessary and sufficient for an emotion to occur, but the private language argument shows that if we construe inner events as objects

to be named, then we dubiously lose any conceptual connection between the name and thing named. Cognitivists claim that acts of mind are necessary and sufficient features of emotions and that bodily effects are contingent concomitants, but the private language argument applies as much to inner events of the mind as it does to those of the body. We are now in a position to see that the view that unites these two positions is fundamentally a Cartesian one: both feeling theorists and cognitivists view the mind and body as radically separate; both view the body as an object and the mind as populated by inner objects, and so both model the relationship between body and mind on relations between external objects. Emotions would then straddle these awkward relations between body, mind, and world. Wittgenstein shows that the body is no mere object, the mind no mere ghost in the machine. Instead, our bodies express our mindedness in a tightly bound logical connection borne out by the way in which our concepts work to unite us with each other in a social world. Body and mind are not puzzle pieces in need of arrangement. They are, instead, two indissociable ways of talking about living human beings.

The debate over object-directedness provides another case-in-point. Cognitivists claim that to be an emotion is to have an object in the world, what the emotion is "about." Feeling theories suggest that some emotions, such as depression, have no clear object. The cognitivist response is to deny that depression is an emotion because it has no object. Such recourse to stipulation is emblematic of any debate in which competing arguments share the basic Cartesian intuition that mind and body are mysteriously distinct. We should not try so much to solve these debates as to question the picture that lends them plausibility. I have suggested that in Wittgenstein's later philosophy we find resources for just such a line of questioning. Wittgenstein urges us to no longer construe the human being as an object, and so to no longer construe emotions as objects, neither of the body nor of the mind. Emotions are ways of talking about human beings, ways that exhibit in their very functioning the mindedness of our embodied peers. They are of the body, and of the mind, which is just to say that they are ours.