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Language and Emotion

An International Handbook

Edited by
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and Bee Chin Ng

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C Perspectives of Cultural Studies, Literary Studies, Art Theory and Theory of Media

Gesine Lenore Schiewer

65 A survey of approaches to culture, art and media and their relation to emotions

- 1 Theoretical foundations and research developments
- 2 Selected approaches and subject areas
- 3 Perspectives of research and application fields
- 4 References

Abstract: This contribution is an overview chapter, which means that the broad field of cultural theories as well as the theories of art, language and media are viewed through the lens of emotion theory. The chapter is divided into three major parts, followed by the references. It begins with theoretical principles and selected research developments. First, it is shown why cognitive emotion theories and constructivism are of utmost relevance for the respective disciplines. This first part is concluded with a short description of examples of research centres around the world. In the second part, aspects of semiotics are discussed, since the dimensions of sign theory are to be understood as research foci in culture, art and media and in their relationship to emotions. As the topics of this part of the handbook are closely related to application areas, this must be taken into account. These issues are discussed in the third main part of the chapter. Please note that in this chapter media is understood in the broad sense of mass media, which means that press, television, new media and cinema are included.

1 Theoretical foundations and research developments

The spectrum of possible questions and methodological approaches at the interfaces of culture, art, literature, media and emotion is wide. Moreover, it is undergoing dynamic development, so it can by no means be conclusively outlined.

Against this background, the first question that arises is which theoretical foundations can act as a common umbrella for the various research interests. It should be obvious that such an emotion theory must take into account the specifics of language. This is above all due to the fact that language offers people possibilities to express their own emotions, to recognize and interpret their own emotions and those of others. Another special feature of language is the fact that it gives humans a wide range of possibilities to deal with emotions, from a completely spontaneous and involuntary way of expressing, perceiving and interpreting them, to a completely controlled and voluntary way. In view of this, the cognitive emotion theory is an interesting candidate for the aforementioned function of an umbrella.

Moreover, this is the type of theory of emotion that has been characterized by dynamic development and intensive discussion in research for decades.

1.1 Cognitive emotion theories in cultural, art, literature and media studies

Nonetheless, there has not yet been a systematic discussion of the question of whether cognitive emotion theories are particularly suitable for culture, art, literature and media studies (Schiewer 2017, 2014, 2009). Yet the well-known literary scholar Reuven Tsur refers to the foundations of the theories of cognitive emotions. He is convinced of a so-called broad concept of cognition, which means that cognition and emotion are closely related. In his approach to *Cognitive Poetics* he shows that language in general is a kind of logical tool. However, in literature and poetry, language can “diffuse emotional qualities”, which means that language is used in a different way in these kinds of texts (Tsur 2006: 1–2).

In opposition to the broad concept of cognition is the narrow concept, which implies that cognition and emotion are two independent branches of the human psyche and behaviour (Winko 2003: 70–77). According to this approach, cognition refers to the processes of thinking, whereas emotions are understood in a phylogenetic view as earlier aspects of behaviour and are characterized as having priority. Thus, cognitively oriented emotion theories are practically excluded from the horizon of literary studies, and theories that explain emotions on a visceral basis are favoured. Of course, it is not wrong to look at emotions both in terms of mental aspects and in terms of neurophysical aspects. But the emphasis of the physical basis leads, in consequence, to a problem concerning the question whether emotions are in any case forced and inevitable or whether they can be controlled or directed by humans under certain circumstances.

This question may seem very philosophical or even unimportant, but it is not at all. Rather, it is of the utmost importance and must be explained: Physiologically directly evoked feelings or emotions are often linked to innate mechanisms of triggering emotion. For example, even gentle children often become extremely stubborn and very angry when forced to eat bitter or sour food. This is explained with reference to the general phylogenetic development of humans (Gessner 2004: 58–61).

It is this inevitability that makes physiological states associated with emotional aspects unsuitable as candidates for cognitive emotions. Only the exclusion of the inevitable makes it possible to explain individual, variable and relative forms of emotions and emotion-induced action.

Cognitive emotion theories are thus concerned with the analysis of individuals, are subjectively conditioned and are therefore different forms of emotional processing and reactions to the same event. Here, too, an example is given: At the end of one and the same football match some of the spectators are happy while others are disappointed. For the individual development of such reaction variables, ontogenetic development plays an important role (Holodyniski 2006). The description of the subjectivity and individuality of emotions and emotional reactions as achieved in cognitive emotion theories is of great interest for cultural, art, literature and media studies. Here, too, it is often a matter of the

scientific description of the specifics of emotions in their cultural imprints and their respective forms in art, literature and media, at least in views of culture, art, literature since the 18th century of the occidental world.

The Geneva-based emotion researcher Klaus R. Scherer was among the first to investigate the individual cognitive evaluation process, which under certain circumstances can lead to emotion elicitation. This process is described in the so-called *Stimulus Evaluation Check* or *Component Process Model of Emotion*. It takes into account that the evaluation process can be influenced by various factors such as individual differences, temporary states of moderation and moods, cultural values, peer pressure, etc. (Brosch et al. 2013). In this way, cognitive theories of emotion have important interfaces to cultural, art, literature and media studies. It is of particular interest that Ortony, Clore, and Collins (1988) have already included literary emotions in their basic work:

The writer describes a situation that readers recognize as being important to a character in the sense that it has important implications with respect to the goals, standards, or attitudes that the character is known or assumed to have. Then, the character is portrayed as correctly or incorrectly construing the situation as good or bad relative to these goals or standards or attitudes, and typically is described as having, or is assumed to have, a valenced (i.e., a positive or negative) reaction to the situation. Finally, the construal together with the reaction usually results in some sort of change in the character's judgment or behaviour. (Ortony, Clore, and Collins 1988: 3)

An interesting aspect is emphasized here, namely, that a literary figure assesses a situation and how it should react. In fact, it is assumed in cognitive theories of emotion that those emotions which are elicited correspond to the individual's current circumstances. This highlights the adaptive aspect of emotions and their potential to cope with an emotion-triggering situation (Roseman and Smith 2001: 8). The basic assumption is that emotions allow an appropriate adjustment to the situation.

However, the adequacy of the reaction is by no means always given. For example, fear can lead to blockage, although an action would be required. Many people are looking for therapeutic help to cope with emotions such as panic attacks that they find stressful. Also, emotions sometimes seem irrational or difficult to control; under these aspects they are often treated in culturally shaped forms of religion, art and literature. All theories of emotion which assume that emotions correspond to the assessments, intentions and goals of the person concerned, have an unexplained area of phenomena here.

When emphasizing the subjectivity of evaluations, the variability of emotional reactions and subsequent dispositions for action, the focus is on the fact that emotional reactions are by no means always reasonable. That is why there is a wide range of inappropriate and deviant behaviour, at least in comparison to common norms and rules. This raises the important question of whether the theory should assume that emotions at least generally induce optimally adapted human action decisions.

The Austrian-born psychologist Magda Arnold (1903–2002) emphasized in her pioneering writings that conscious cognitive processes of a complex nature as well as rather simple, unconscious processes can play a role in assessment processes (Arnold and Gasson 1954; Arnold 1960, 1970). Both can even contradict each other or be influenced by unconscious motifs and conflicting goals. In such cases, they can lead to emotions that seem unreasonable or irrational and can lead to stress (Roseman and Smith 2001: 8–9). The

famous cognitive psychologist Jérôme Bruner, for example, focuses on such phenomena in his definition of the narrative (Bruner 1990):

[...], I propose to examine some of the ways in which the young human being achieves (or realizes) the power of narrative, the ability not only to mark what is culturally canonical but to account for deviations that can be incorporated in narrative. The achievement of this skill, as I shall try to show, is not simply a mental achievement, but an achievement of social practice that lends stability to the child's social life. For one of the most powerful forms of social stability, [...] is the human propensity to share stories of human diversity and to make their interpretations congruent with the divergent moral commitments and institutional obligations that prevail in every culture. (Bruner 1990: 68)

Bruner's interest in narrative is based on his belief that it has an important social function. This function is that deviant behaviour can be explained without forcing a consensus on the establishment of uniform norms and rules (Bruner 1990: 95).

In summary, it can be said that arts and literature offer a large pool of representations of emotional processes, especially emotional turbulence. Likewise, it can be shown how emotion theory should describe the often-conflicting interplay of conscious and unconscious individual assessments and should also take into account cultural, social and normative perspectives of adapted and deviating emotions.

Closely linked to the assumption that emotions are not direct reactions to situations, but rather subjective evaluations and individual reactions, is the overall influence of constructivism for emotion research in this area. This is explained in the next subsection, which aims at a general overview of central characteristics of constructivist approaches in emotion theory, but please note that there is no intention to discuss constructivism in general or individual research positions in detail.

1.2 Constructivism in cultural, arts, literature and media studies

Jérôme Bruner is one of the fathers of constructivist views. This means that he advocated settings of so-called *discovery learning* based on the main thesis that learners create an individual representation of the world. It is common knowledge that constructivism has become a general way of thinking in many sciences such as philosophy, art, architecture, psychology of learning, international relations, and so on. What does this mean for emotion studies with regard to the central fields of research dealt with in this chapter?

1. First, it should be emphasized that constructivism, like cognitive emotion theories, generally assumes a broad understanding of cognition. Cognitively here is thus – in one sense or another – closely connected with emotionality. Richard S. Lazarus' contribution to the *Handbook of Cognition and Emotion* published in 1999 by Tim Dalgleish and Mick J. Power gives an overview of the cognition-emotion debate and its history. After all, the whole discussion goes back to antiquity, but this is not the right place for a comprehensive account of the long history of thinking about cognition and emotion. Rather, this question must be put into focus: Can cognition and emotion be separated (Lazarus 1999: 10)? After what has already been explained in this chapter about Bruner's approach, it should come as no surprise that he refused to separate cognition and emotion, which would mean a violation of the unity of psychological functions

(Lazarus 1999: 11). Lazarus shares this view, although he makes it clear that the exact relationship regarding the mutual effects of cognitive and emotional processes could not be determined even after centuries (Lazarus 1999: 16).

2. One of Bruner's main representatives of Constructivism is the famous Swiss pioneer of the cognitive developmental psychology of children, Jean Piaget. This brings us to a second point: Besides these roots of constructivism in the psychology of the individual and its ontogenesis, constructivist thinking is strongly linked to sociological paradigms of society. This is of great relevance because the overall approach of constructivism in emotion theory consequently encompasses the entire living conditions of humans (and usually also of animals), namely, their double existence as individuals and at the same time as community beings.

Therefore, the approach of other important emotion scholars must be considered, namely Horace Romano Harré, called Rom Harré, and James Averill. They advocate the social constructionist approach. This approach "assigns important roles to culture and socialization in influencing neurological and physiological structure and function" (Harré and Parrott 1996: 15). Following this, a phenomenon of emotion is "one that involves monitoring of social norms and juggling of cognitive attributions to produce a distinctive conscious experience that has meaning in a culture's moral system" (Harré and Parrot 1996: 15). Of course, there are specific discussions in sociology. For example, they concern the "idea that emotion is responsible for social outcomes [which] has been emphasized by writers such as Thomas Scheff and Theodore Kemper" (Barbalet [1998] 2008: 109). A contrary approach argues that the "other possibility [...] is that emotion is principally a consequence of cultural and cognitive [...] processes" (Barbalet 2008: 109). Without deepening such discussions at this point, although they are undoubtedly of great relevance for sociological approaches, it can be stated that this concept is generally of great interest for cultural, art, literature and media studies concepts. One of several reasons is that it has another implication, and that is the aspect of relativism.

3. The core paradigm of relativism must therefore be considered. In order to understand the relevant basic idea, it is useful to refer once again to Rom Harré:

They [emotions, GLS] seem to have deep evolutionary roots, yet they are, among human phenomena, notably culturally variable in many of their aspects. [...] There are emotion displays and there are, in some cultures, emotion feelings, and neither is immune from cultural influence. [...] considered functionally, emotion displays have their proper places in unfolding episodes of interpersonal reaction: they are acts embedded in patterns of acts; their display is subject to rules and conventions; they are embedded in culturally specific moral orders and normative systems that allow for assessments of the correctness or impropriety of emotions. In some cultures, emotions do not include private bodily feelings as the somatic bearers of judgements – they are all display – yet others take bodily feelings to be one of the salient aspects of emotion. (Harré and Parrott 1996: 2)

The importance of the relativistic paradigm of emotion research, besides which there is also a universalistic paradigm, should by no means be underestimated, especially with regard to culture, art, literature and media. Nevertheless, the universalist paradigm is very influential. In short, the universalistic paradigm means focusing on about 5 to 8 or 9 so-called *basic emotions* such as happiness, fear and anger. It goes back to

the works and the theory of evolution of Charles Darwin. The main assumption is that the set of basic emotions is to be regarded as universal or as basically common to all people. Facial expression is one of the core fields of universalistic emotion research. According to this assumption, at least the facial expression of a small number of emotions is reliably recognized not only within a certain cultural and linguistic community, but everywhere in the world at all times, i.e., in the past, present and future. This assumption also has serious consequences for research. Emotion research that follows this approach generally focuses on the small amount of emotion mentioned and its expression, or *display rules* that can influence the expression.

The German psychologist Wilhelm Wundt explained the basics of his theory of expression in his ten-volume masterpiece *Völkerpsychologie*, which was published between 1900 and 1920. The germ cell of his approach is his famous scheme of the three emotional dimensions, which includes the dimensions *excitement-inhibition* (tranquillization), *pleasure-displeasure* and *tension-relaxation*. Wundt's scheme is the starting point for a different view of emotions. This is the concept of an unlimited gradation and arbitrary variation of emotions, including the inner states of an individual and their modes of expression – and of course their interpretation (and possible misinterpretation) by other people. This theory may even take into account the simultaneous mixing of different and, under certain circumstances, conflicting emotions. Obviously, this theory is suitable for broadening the view not only to a much larger set of emotions, but also to their infinite possible variation in different cultures, languages and periods of history as compared with the universalist paradigm.

4. Fourth, the constructivist paradigm concerns another important tradition of thought in addition to the three implications already mentioned, i.e., (i) a broad concept of knowledge, (ii) an individual as well as a social dimension and (iii) relativism. Indeed, the constructivist idea must be seen as a kind of overarching conception and as one of the most important developments (or even the most influential in current philosophy and beyond) of the 20th century. This is the turning point in the philosophy of language with structuralist and semiological foundations by the Swiss researcher Ferdinand de Saussure. Later, the linguistic turn had an important influence on cultural studies with its different orientations and so-called turns like the Interpretative turn, Performative turn, Postcolonial turn and others (Bachmann-Medick 2016).

The linguistic turn is particularly interesting for cultural studies, art, literature and media studies because language plays an important role in these fields and can also be closely linked to emotions. Therefore, the central aspects are outlined here.

As is well known, the basic idea is that language forms the access to any phenomenon, be it so-called reality, ideas, conceptions and perceptions, science or any other kind (Rorty 1967.) Since language in principle comprises a multitude of varieties, which can include more or less emotional components, it follows that access to phenomena of all kinds can also be subject to emotional influences. On the other hand, language of course also shapes what is spoken and written about, including emotions (Sieben 2007: 14). Due to the specifics of the semantics of each language, this aspect also implies at least a certain component of relativity, which is reflected in the fields of culture, art in general and literature in particular, and media as mentioned above. For instance,

already in ancient rhetoric, corresponding possibilities of languages were described, e.g. to manipulate the opinions and views of the listeners in a legal hearing or to specifically emotionalize the audience of a tragedy. Indeed, also the *New Rhetoric* of Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca can be counted among the roots of the linguistic turn (Sieben 2007: 44).

5. Creativity is one of the numerous fields of emotion research that has been of great interest in cultural, art, literature and media research for some time. Creativity is also the prerequisite for rhetorically convincing and original language use in everyday life, science, literature and media.

Essentially, since Alexander Baumgarten's writings and especially his *Aesthetica* (1750–1758) in the 18th century, connections between (a) emotionality, affect or sensuality (the so-called lower cognitive abilities), (b) language, especially language in poetry, and (c) the genius that produces individual new creations have been studied at the highest level.

One of the most important research works of the last decades is the monograph of the psychologist James R. Averill and Elma P. Nunley from 1992. Again, the starting point is a constructivist concept of emotion. The approach is interdisciplinary and takes into account concepts from biology, history, anthropology, psychopathology, aesthetics and others. The reference to literature and art represents a dominant aspect of the overarching theoretical conception. A work of art can basically (i) serve to broaden the spectrum of human experience by means of so-called aesthetic emotions that relate to the form of the work of art, or (ii) stimulate new ways of thinking and feeling by means of emotions that are described on the content level of, for example, a literary text.

The publications of the American neurologist Antonio R. Damasio have achieved particular prominence since the 1990s. Damasio combines creativity with the concept of intuition and draws parallels between artist and scientist. Following Damasio, the aim is always to draw intuitively ground-breaking findings from a very large number of theoretically possible conclusions because creative processes in both science and art are not logical deductions, but rather take place through a fusion of intuition and reason.

This introduction to the most important theoretical foundations at the interface of emotion research and cultural, art, literary and media research has focused on cognitive emotion theory including constructivist thinking and its central implications. The following is a brief overview of currently selected research centres worldwide.

1.3 Selected research centres worldwide

There is no question that emotion research in the areas of this handbook chapter has recently gained considerable momentum in European research as well as in the Anglo-American linguistic area and in other regions of the scientific world. Some few selected focal points of these developments are outlined below. They are ordered by country.

1.3.1 Australia

The Australian Research Council Centre of Excellence for the History of Emotions was established in 2011 with a seven-year grant under the ARC Centres of Excellence programme, and continues since 2018 with funding from its node universities. The Centre uses historical knowledge from Europe, initially from the period 1100–1800, to understand the long history of emotional behaviours. The initial assumption is that emotions shape individual, community and national identities.

Associated with the centre is the Society for the History of Emotions (SHE) and the journal *Emotions: History, Culture, Society* published by Brill Publishing, among other things. See for more information: <https://www.historyofemotions.org.au>.

1.3.2 Germany

The Research Centre History of Emotions exists at the famous Max Planck Institute for Human Development. To explore the emotional orders of the past, historians work closely with psychologists and education specialists. In addition, they draw on the expertise of anthropologists, sociologists, musicologists and scholars working on literature and art. First, emotions, feelings and their expression are shaped by culture and learnt/acquired in social contexts. There are several specific research areas like Citizenship and Nation Building and of course numerous publications. See for more information: <https://www.mpib-berlin.mpg.de/research/research-centers/history-of-emotions>.

At the interdisciplinary research centre Languages of Emotion of Freie Universität Berlin, scholars and scientists from over 20 disciplines investigate the complex relationships between emotions and language, art, culture, and society. Languages of Emotion was founded in 2007 within the German Excellence Initiative. See for more information: <http://www.loe.fu-berlin.de>.

1.3.3 United Kingdom

The Queen Mary Centre for the History of the Emotions, launched in November 2008, is the first research centre in the United Kingdom concerned with the history of emotions. One of its key objectives is to provide a focus for interactions between social and cultural historians of the emotions on the one hand, and historians of science and medicine on the other. There are several activities such as research on religious practices and regimes of emotion or research on the definition, control, and punishment of passions and emotions. See for more information: <https://projects.history.qmul.ac.uk/emotions/>.

1.3.4 Switzerland

The National Centre of Competence in Research (NCCR) for the Affective Sciences was founded in 2005 with the support of the Swiss National Science Foundation and several

Swiss universities, in particular the University of Geneva. The centre is the first of this size in the world in the new interdisciplinary academic field of affective science and brings together all disciplines around the common goal of understanding emotions and other affective phenomena such as moods and preferences. Scholars from the natural sciences, humanities and social sciences carry out research projects to investigate the nature of emotion and its effects on individual behaviour and society. Methods and instruments are developed to study the neural, psychological, physical and social underpinnings of emotions.

Furthermore, applied research is carried out in collaboration with public and private partners.

Thanks to the success of the NCCR Affective Sciences over 12 years, research in this field continues to develop beyond the NCCR. The University of Geneva supports this goal, hosting a whole research centre on emotion, the Swiss Centre for Affective Sciences. See for more information: <https://www.unige.ch/cisa/>.

2 Selected approaches and subject areas

2.1 The semiotic dimension of utterances and artefacts

The first thing to mention is the theming of emotions in culture, art, literature and media.

The theming of emotions is particularly striking when it is introduced as a title, as in the case of the 2001 work *Fury* by the world-famous author Salman Rushdie. Another example is the *Chronicle of Emotions* by the German-speaking, internationally renowned intellectual Alexander Kluge, from the year 2000. Kluge describes feelings in literary form in their relation to society and their shaping by historical events. Then the emotional worlds are considered in terms of their influence on the lives of the members of a society.

Specific emotions are also addressed in exhibitions of the visual arts. In 2005 and 2006, for example, a major exhibition was presented in Paris and Berlin with numerous exhibits on the emotion of melancholy with reference to genius and madness and documented in an impressive exhibition catalogue (Clair 2006).

Another form of thematizing emotions in art and literature are emotionally related genres such as “love story”, “love novel”, “love poem”, “tragedy” or “comedy”. On the one hand, the generic names refer to the content of the artwork or literary text, but on the other hand they also indicate the possible emotional reaction of the reader, listener, spectator or viewer. Thus, the viewer of a love story will react with different feelings than the viewer of a tragedy.

In other types of texts such as letters, diaries, essays, poetic and philosophical treatises, too, there have been discussions of emotions, feelings, affects, moods, etc., from antiquity to the present. Examples include Aristotle’s theory of tragedy, the *Sketch for a Theory of Emotions* by the French intellectual Jean-Paul Sartre ([1939] 1997) or the *Philosophie des Glücks: Von Hiob bis Freud* by the German-born Ludwig Marcuse ([1949] 1972).

Particular attention was paid to the examination of emotions in the philosophy, aesthetics and poetics of the 18th century. The literary scholar Ralph-Rainer Wuthenow speaks of a rediscovery of passions in the age of reason and refers, among other things, to the

theory of affects as early as the 16th and 17th centuries with the ground-breaking works of Giordano Bruno (1548–1600), René Descartes (1596–1650) and Baruch de Spinoza (1632–1677). These were important prerequisites for the developments in the 18th century, which were essentially initiated by philosophers and writers who are still frequently cited today. These include Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712–1778), Denis Diderot (1713–1784), Johann Georg Hamann (1730–1788), Johann Gottfried Herder (1744–1803), Johann Wolfgang von Goethe (1749–1832), Jakob Michael Reinhold Lenz (175–1792) and Jakob Wilhelm Heinse (1746–1803).

Closely related to the philosophical approaches was the examination of the expression of affects in aesthetics, rhetoric, semiotics and affect theory. This led authors such as Friedrich Schiller, Friedrich Hölderlin and Goethe to advance the individualization of the literary expression of affects, among other things in the course of the so-called genius concept (Campe 1990: 491).

If you keep these developments of the 18th century in mind, you also understand one of the most important tendencies of approaching and thematizing emotions: The outlined developments of the 18th century are unthinkable without the above-mentioned philosophical reflection on sensuality as a source of human knowledge. This is the prerequisite for the fact that the focus on the human mind and reason was supplemented by the consideration of the sensory organs and physicality. In a further step, language was then illuminated in its poetic potentials, which had previously been largely reduced to definitions and rational forms of expression by Descartes and Leibniz in the 17th century.

This corresponds to the fact that in recent decades the preoccupation with the body has again received increasing attention. There is talk of a “cultural science of the body and feelings” (Labouvie 2011: 82–83). Thereby, the cultural-scientific occupation with emotions is linked to the mentioned scientific concepts since the 17th century. More recently, questions concerning the interaction of body and mind have also been examined from the perspectives of cognitive and neurosciences, biology and *emotional intelligence* as well as computer science and artificial intelligence (Labouvie 2011: 82–83).

The question why emotions have played such an important role in works of art and literary texts since antiquity and presumably also across the different art and literary traditions worldwide cannot be discussed exhaustively here. But one aspect is outlined: As shown above, it can be assumed that emotions and their expression are subject to social construction and negotiation, that they are historically variable, and that they are perceived, manifested and interpreted in culturally shaped ways. Works of art and especially literary texts, which work with the material of language, are relevant, for example, for (a) the negotiation of norms and rules in dealing with emotions, (b) the further development of, among other things, the emotional vocabulary of a language and (c) the collective evaluation of emotions. Again, Jérôme Bruner should be mentioned here, who emphasizes that storytelling can above all make the unusual and deviant in dealing with emotions understandable. The equally emotional aspect of empathy is of great importance here (Breithaupt 2009: 12).

2.2 The semiotic dimension of production

The semiotic dimension of an artist or of the author of literature or media mediated texts and productions can also be the subject of cultural, art, literature and media studies, at least in principle.

Indeed, a serious problem is that there is not always a sufficiently clear distinction between pure speculation about the psychological dispositions of the artist or author as a real human being on the one hand and cultural, art, literature and media studies approaches with corresponding methodological foundations on the other. It is therefore all the more important to choose an undisputed starting point. One such well-suited starting point is semiotics, which in its three-dimensional orientations connects the concept of a sign with the three categories of a material sign carrier, the sign transmitter (sender) and the sign receiver (recipient). Such approaches are represented, for example, by Charles Sanders Pierce, Charles William Morris and Karl Bühler. For an overview of the semiotics of emotions, see Schiewer (2014, 2008, 2007).

However, the differences in the semiotic dimensions must be carefully considered: For example, a love poem can be distinguished from a writer in love, and the sculpture of an intimately embraced couple from the emotional state of the creator. There is indeed a so-called experience-aesthetic model of emotional communication, which was developed in the 18th century (Anz 2007). According to this model, the emotional involvement of the real author is a prerequisite for the authenticity of the representation and thus also for the intensity of the text's effect on the reader.

But such a *hot emotion*, i.e., the direct emotional involvement on the part of the producer, does not necessarily have to be given. Without a doubt, it is possible to talk about feelings in a state of *cold emotion*, i.e., without direct personal emotional involvement. This is, for example, more often the case with very experienced artists and authors who have learned to control the recipient's emotions in a targeted manner through their text design. This is confirmed by the Czech author Michael Stavarič in several interviews (Schiewer 2017):

The decisive aspect is how much of autobiography is involved. Autobiographical aspects are often linked to emotionality and this may be stronger than in the case of pure fiction, also within the writing process. [...] Literary writing is often born when attempting to process emotions, and the first creative steps often take the form of therapeutic writing (as with a diary). Emotions which are processed in literature often cause the birth of literary writing. Later, this impact is reduced. Self-development takes place during the process of growing up and getting older. The degree of emotional involvement also differs when one is writing autobiographically. (Schiewer 2017: 56–58)

The fact that an author is directly involved emotionally does not mean, however, that he simply gives free rein to his feelings while writing. Rather, an author can proceed in a highly reflective manner, as Michael Stavarič says:

A highly important element of involvement (for example, fear) and an interesting illustration of emotional reactions are observable in literary animal characters. They allow a more powerful depiction of emotions and can be found in all my books. An example is the stallion in 'Stillborn'. At the same time, an emotional area of tension can be created that can serve as a steering mechanism for sympathy. An

example of this could be a serial killer and an animal torturer. In this case, the violation of norms becomes an important instrument. (Schiewer 2017: 56–58)

It should be self-evident that what is said here applies similarly to the visual arts and media of all kinds.

2.3 The semiotic dimension of reception

Let us now look at the emotional involvement of the recipient of art, literature and media, like for example, the emotions of the viewer of a painting, the listener of a piece of music, the reader of a literary text or a newspaper, the viewer of a movie or a television report, the user of social media, etc. Of course, cultural phenomena of everyday life also have a strong influence on the emotional perceptions and imprints of the members of the society concerned; one example is taboos, the breaking of which is usually accompanied by strong emotions such as shame or anger; however, they will only be discussed here in passing for reasons of the limited pages.

In the following, the focus is thus on the interactions between recipient and artwork on the one hand and media reception on the other.

First, the reception of works of art is to be outlined.

To begin with, we should take a look at the investigation of the emotional potential associated with reading, seeing, hearing, in short, the sensory perception of art and literature. There are different approaches and only a few selected ones will be highlighted here:

- a. There is the already mentioned long tradition of aesthetics since antiquity, in which, among other things, the effect of art on the feelings of the recipient is examined; for example, the cathartic effect of tragedies.
- b. In general reading research and the special orientation of Cognitive Poetics, the reading process itself is investigated. Considering the complexity of the reading process, numerous detailed questions can be asked, such as which emotions can occur during reading or in which phase of reading they occur (a distinction is made between a pre-receptive phase, the actual reading process and a post-receptive phase with the manifold effects of the text on the reader) (Czöppan 2012: 66–68).
- c. The neurobiological investigation of aesthetic emotions includes the evocation of emotions such as joy, sadness, fear through music and literature, as well as the aesthetic experience of tension and relaxation and also the supposed paradox of *pleasant sadness*, as the research centre Languages of Emotion at the FU Berlin emphasizes (http://www.loe.fu-berlin.de/en/zentrum/forschung/abgeschlossen/aesthetic_emotions/index.html).
- d. The emotions when listening to music and watching music videos are also highly interesting. The spectrum of possible questions is also broad and the tradition of thinking about these questions is long. They concern, for example, emotions related to certain epochs, composers, directions and styles in the history of music and opera. Other questions focus on the connections between personality traits and preferences in musical taste. For example, rock music has often been studied in relation to rebellion and aggression (Knobloch and Mundorf 2003: 492–493).

- e. Music as a language of the emotions that expresses emotions and evokes emotions is the subject of broad research activities (Juslin and Slovoda 2010).
- f. Studies of experimental aesthetics are carried out by psychologists under the main questions of what is art and whether there is such a thing as universal characteristics (Winner 2019).

In a more general approach to the topic, the Dutch literary scholar, cultural and art historian Mieke Bal describes art in terms of the evocation and transformation of affects as follows. She focuses on the analysis of the effects of a work of art on the recipient. She does not ask what is visible on a painted surface, for example. Rather, she focuses on examining the relationship between the visible and its effects on those who look at a work of art and are affected by it. This is what an affect-analysis according to Bal does (Bal 2006: 7). The term affect makes it possible to subsume various art forms such as painting, film, video, music and exhibition practice under one aspect (Bal 2006: 7–8). According to Bal, the perception of art is linked to a “politics of looking”. By this she means an impulse for action that can result from the perception of art. The concept of affect is so important because it has a strong political component due to the possible impulse for action. It is of course obvious that emotionally induced action impulses not only represent a critical potential, but can also be manipulatively abused even in art, literature and especially the media. This leads to the next aspect, the reception of mass media, which is outlined below.

One can start here with the general question of why people take advantage of media offerings at all and spend time and financial resources on them. In research, for example, the question is then asked why media presentations, such as cinema films, can make people laugh and cry or frighten them. Answers can be found, for example, based on perceptual psychological principles (Schwender 2001: 38–41). The basic mechanisms of emotional participation in media use can in turn be explored under a whole range of detailed questions. Again, only a few of these questions can be mentioned.

- a. Media communication can be examined as a means of organizing the masses if the media messages are considered relevant and therefore receive sufficient attention. These processes can be described on the basis of evolutionary psychology, which goes back to Charles Darwin (Schwender 2001: 312–314). It is inferred from this: “The function of emotion in the perception of media is therefore essential for an understanding of media and the role of media in society today” (Schwab and Schwender 2011: 15).
- b. In this context, the question is investigated to what extent the media can also influence people’s shared emotions. With regard to such collective emotions, it is assumed that the media have an emotional power in the formation of communities (Döveling 2005: 14). Possible types of media-induced communalization can concern, for example: (i) feelings of inclusion, which strengthen the community with primarily positive feelings such as enthusiasm, empathy, gratitude, hope; or (ii) feelings of vertical exclusivity, which weaken the community with primarily negative feelings such as guilt, anger, aversion; or (iii) feelings of exclusionary demarcation from non-group members with primarily negative feelings such as anger, aversion, blame (Döveling 2005: 300–302).
- c. Another field concerns the area of emotions and media use. Here, too, there is an extensive catalogue of possible questions, such as those concerning emotionally relevant

media content or those concerning research into the use and effects of media (Höfer 2013: 402–403).

Even this very brief sketch shows that this is an extremely relevant field of research that must receive even more attention in times of social media such as Twitter and politically increasingly polarized societies. More recently, the embodiedness approach has come into focus and also includes the aspect of emotion (Grodal 2009).

3 Perspectives of research and application fields

In summary, it should be emphasized that the field of research covered in this part of the present handbook on language and emotion is a broad field and demanding in terms of emotion theory. The current state of research can be described in such a way that both historical approaches that go back to antiquity can be profitably used as well as sophisticated current approaches such as cognitive emotion theories. This diversity of possible theoretical approaches should by no means be seen as a disadvantage or weakness, but rather as potential and strength. This is because different theories are accompanied by different research methods, which in turn allows a large number of relevant research subjects and research questions to be identified and addressed.

Finally, possible fields of application are connected with this. It is obvious that especially in the field of media and emotions the application perspectives are not only tangible and numerous, but also of considerable social, economic, political, technical and last but not least, legal relevance.

But also, the cultural, art and literary studies approaches open up a wide range of application perspectives. Finally, we should mention the area of emotions and the art and literature market. There is no question that art and literature are involved in markets in which sometimes very considerable sums are invested. This is the case for when art or first editions of important literary works are treated as objects of investment and speculation or when, for example, banks set up art funds. It is also evident that markets in the field of art, just like other markets, are subject to mechanisms of marketing and sales. It is therefore not surprising that in art and book marketing, the topic of emotions receives just as much attention as in the context of marketing in general.

Some of these fields of research are explored in greater depth in this part of the present handbook.

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XIII Perspectives of cultural studies on language and emotion

Melody M. Moore, Elizabeth A. Martin, and Linda J. Levine

66 Memory theories and research from the perspective of language and emotion

- 1 Introduction
- 2 How emotion enhances memory
- 3 How emotion impairs memory
- 4 How language shapes emotional memories
- 5 The constructive nature of emotional memory
- 6 Remembering and misremembering emotion
- 7 Future directions and conclusions
- 8 References

Abstract: People spend much of their time engaged in mental time travel. They revisit past experiences and imagine how future experiences may unfold. On these travels, emotion is a frequent stop. Memories of past emotional experiences are vivid and come easily to mind. Emotional memories are important for directing behavior, understanding the self, and promoting social bonds. Despite their importance and vividness, emotional memories are not necessarily accurate. This chapter reviews theory and research showing that emotional memories are shaped, and can be misshaped, by people's knowledge, beliefs, attention, and motivation – all processes that are influenced by language. At encoding, people use language as a tool to wrest meaning from sensory experience. At retrieval, people link experiences to form coherent narratives and a continuous sense of identity over time. Sharing these narratives with others further reframes past experiences and can change their emotional tone. Because emotional memories are selective and flexible, they do not provide an indelible record of experiences as they occurred. However, these core features of the memory system make it highly adaptive. Being able to select details from past experiences and flexibly recombine them to form novel narratives makes it possible to simulate and plan for the future.

1 Introduction

Understanding the interaction of emotion and memory is one of the fundamental problems in the field of psychology. People are faced daily with the need to remember information while experiencing a range of emotional states. A voter angered by acts of the opposing party, a patient saddened by a diagnosis, a rescue worker frightened by a disaster, must nonetheless encode and retrieve detailed information accurately if they are to make sound

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decisions. Yet research on the effects of emotion on memory accuracy is replete with conflicting findings. On one hand, people report having vivid, detailed memories of emotional events that happened decades ago. On the other hand, they make egregious mistakes when describing past emotional events that can have disastrous consequences. Mistaken memories of witnessed criminal events are estimated to be involved in 70 % of false convictions of individuals later exonerated by DNA evidence (West and Meterko 2016). How is it that people retain vivid memories of some emotional events for decades, while other emotional memories are riddled with errors? We open this chapter by reviewing when and how emotion enhances and impairs memory. Next, we highlight the role of language in shaping these processes, noting that language does not always produce or maintain veridical accounts of events exactly as they occurred. We conclude with a discussion of the functions of biased memories, presenting evidence that the reshaping of memories can be adaptive, and note directions for future research.

2 How emotion enhances memory

Researchers once claimed that people remember highly emotional events with close to perfect accuracy (Brown and Kulik 1977; James 1890: 670; LeDoux 1992). Unlike memories of everyday events, which fade and can become distorted over time, emotional memories were thought to remain highly accurate for decades. This view was supported by research on flashbulb memories – vivid, detailed memories of the circumstances in which people first learned about surprising and consequential public events. Brown and Kulik (1977) asked participants how they first learned of events such as the assassinations of John F. Kennedy and Martin Luther King. Most participants were able to provide detailed accounts of their experiences, which typically included where they were, who told them the news, what they were doing before and after they learned the news, and how they and others felt. People remembered highly emotional experiences in remarkable detail and with great confidence.

What is special about emotional events, resulting in memories that are vivid and lasting even after prolonged delay? At the earliest stages of information processing, emotional information is prioritized relative to neutral information by capturing attention (Schupp et al. 2006). Electroencephalogram (EEG) recordings, which measure electrical activity produced by the brain, show early selective attention to emotional stimuli (e.g., within approximately 150–300 ms of stimuli), evidenced by larger amplitudes in response to emotional as opposed to neutral stimuli (Hajcak, MacNamara, and Olvet 2010). Emotional information also receives more elaborative, controlled processing than neutral information. The Late Positive Potential (LPP), a neural response occurring at a later stage of processing (beginning around 300 ms post-stimulus presentation), reflects sustained attention. People exhibit larger LPP responses to positive and negative emotional stimuli than to neutral stimuli (Hajcak, MacNamara, and Olvet 2010). Enhanced processing of emotional stimuli has been linked to better memory (e.g., Talmi et al. 2008).

Emotional events also elicit physiological arousal, which activates a cascade of biological processes that result in enhanced encoding and consolidation of memories. During an emotional experience, the release of stress hormones (e.g., cortisol, norepinephrine) leads

to increased activity in the amygdala. This brain structure modulates activity in the hippocampus, resulting in enhanced encoding of emotional events in memory (e.g., Cahill et al. 1996; Fastenrath et al. 2014). Immediately after encoding, however, memories are fragile and transient. Consolidation refers to processes in the brain that transform transient memories into more permanent ones. According to current models, representations of new experiences are initially dependent on information stored in both the hippocampus and neocortex. The hippocampus then guides the reorganization and stabilization of encoded information so that its storage is independent of the hippocampus (Squire et al. 2015). Stress hormones and amygdala activation promote the consolidation of emotional memories (e.g., Roozendaal, McEwen, and Chattarji 2009). In one study, participants first viewed slides of varying emotional content. They then engaged in either a stressful cold pressor task that elevated cortisol levels or in a control task. The opportunity to encode the slides was identical for the two groups. Yet, a week later, participants in the cold pressor task group remembered the emotionally arousing slides better than those in the control group, suggesting enhanced consolidation (Cahill, Gorski, and Le 2003). The rapid-eye-movement (REM) stage of sleep, when cortisol peaks and amygdala activation is greatest, has also been shown to be a privileged window for the consolidation of emotional memories (Maquet et al. 1996; Payne, Chambers, and Kensinger 2012; Payne and Kensinger 2018; Wagner and Born 2008). In addition to capturing and sustaining attention, then, emotional experiences evoke physiological arousal which enhances the encoding and consolidation of memories.

Appraisal theories of emotion help to explain why emotional information receives prioritized processing and enhanced consolidation. Traditionally, emotion and cognition have been viewed as antagonistic processes. In contrast, according to appraisal theories, emotions fulfill essential functions within the cognitive system. People experience emotions when they appraise events as promoting or obstructing their goals or well-being. Once evoked, emotions guide people's attention to information that is useful for responding to changes in the status of goals (e.g., Arnold 1960; Oatley and Johnson-Laird 2014; Scherer 2019). The allocation of cognitive resources to emotional information contributes to enhanced memory for emotional events. Further contributing to mnemonic enhancement, people devote more time retrieving, thinking, and talking about information that is relevant to their goals (Levine and Edelstein 2009). Thus, experiences that elicit emotion benefit from privileged handling at every stage of information processing, resulting in memories that are vivid, detailed, and lasting.

3 How emotion impairs memory

Despite early theorizing and demonstrations of vivid and lasting flashbulb memories, subsequent research has shown that emotional memories are far from error-free. In 1986, the US spacecraft Challenger exploded 74 seconds after take-off, killing all eight passengers. To test the accuracy of flashbulb memories, Neisser and Harsch (1992) conducted a longitudinal study, asking 106 college students to describe the experience of learning about this devastating event. Within 24 hours of the explosion, researchers prompted participants to

describe when they learned the news, who told them, and where they were. Two and a half years later, forty-four of these participants returned to the lab and again described how they first learned of the disaster. Most participants' memories of how they learned of the disaster contained multiple inaccuracies, yet they expressed high confidence in the accuracy of their memories. These findings illustrate that richly detailed and compelling memories of emotional events are not always accurate, even when people feel confident they are giving a veridical account.

Given that cognitive resources are disproportionately allocated to emotional information, why are errors found in people's memories of highly significant, emotionally charged events? Emotional memory is selective: not all information encountered during an emotional event is subject to memory enhancement. Instead, memories of emotional events and stimuli are characterized by memory narrowing – enhanced memory for information that is central to the event and poorer memory for peripheral details (Christianson and Loftus 1991; Waring and Kensinger 2011). For example, the weapon focus effect refers to the tendency for an eyewitness to a crime to focus on, and subsequently remember, the weapon used to commit the crime at the expense of details such as the perpetrator's face and clothing (Steblay 1992). In the presence of a life-threatening weapon, the weapon becomes the central focus of people's attention because it is most relevant to their goals of safety and survival. Details about the facial features and clothing of the perpetrator do not serve immediate survival goals. As a result, people remember the weapon with greater accuracy than details that would allow them to accurately identify the perpetrator of the crime.

Memory narrowing has also been demonstrated with emotional images. In one study, participants viewed a series of images that contained neutral objects (e.g., chipmunk) or negative objects (e.g., snake) superimposed onto a neutral background (e.g., river). Later, participants' memory was tested for both the objects and their backgrounds (Kensinger, Garoff-Eaton, and Schacter 2007). Participants were better at remembering negative objects than neutral objects but were worse at remembering the background scenes that were paired with negative objects. Thus, features of objects that are intrinsic to emotional stimuli tend to be well-remembered at the expense of peripheral features. This trade-off occurs because cognitive resources such as attention and working memory have a limited capacity, leaving fewer resources available for encoding nonessential information during emotional events. Despite the increasing likelihood of errors in memory for neutral information, this narrow attentional focus promotes adaptive behavior by increasing the odds that goal-relevant information is remembered. In summary, surprising and consequential events often produce vivid and lasting memories, but these memories are selective and are not characterized by photographic accuracy.

One mechanism that drives the enhancement of emotional memory can also lead to impairment – physiological arousal. At extremely high levels of arousal, emotion can impair memory more generally. To study the effects of extreme stress on memory, researchers have turned to military personnel completing survival school training. Participants were interrogated by an instructor for 30 minutes and later asked to identify their interrogator (Morgan et al. 2004). In a high-stress condition, participants experienced physical confrontation during their interrogation whereas the low-stress condition did not include physical threat. Across a variety of identification assessments, less than half of participants in the

high-stress condition accurately identified their interrogator (live lineup, 30%; photo spread, 34%; sequential photo, 49%). In contrast, participants in the low-stress condition showed much higher levels of identification, ranging from 62% to 76%. These findings suggest that, when arousal reaches sufficiently high levels, people's attention may be wholly diverted away from the emotion-eliciting event and toward coping with the event and regulating their response. Because information that is not attended to is unlikely to be encoded (Craik et al. 1996), arousal does not always enhance memory accuracy – it can also impair it.

Memory impairment can also occur long after an emotion-eliciting event has ended and the memory has been stored. Memories often include material from many sources. One source is sensory information encoded when a person first experienced an event. But memories may also, or instead, include information gathered from subsequent experiences, news media, conversations with others, or imagination. Source monitoring refers to the processes involved in determining the origin of memories (Johnson, Hashtroudi, and Lindsay 1993). When experiences are stored in memory, they are not tagged with information indicating their source. Instead, the source of information retrieved from memory is inferred based on a series of heuristic judgments which take into consideration the phenomenological quality of the memory (e.g., ease of retrieval, vividness, level of detail) and beliefs about the world. Source-monitoring errors, such as misattributing the source of a memory to personal experience when instead it was encountered in the media, can contribute to richly detailed but false autobiographical memories for highly emotional experiences.

In summary, emotional memories are generally vivid and lasting but are far from error-free. Many of the processes that enhance memories of emotional experiences (e.g., capturing attention, amygdala activation) and the processes that impair them (e.g., attention narrowing, extreme arousal) characterize memory both in human and non-human animals (e.g., LeDoux 1992; Rozendaal, McEwen, and Chattarji 2009). But humans are uniquely sophisticated in their use of language. The ways emotional memories are encoded, stored, and retrieved are susceptible to the influence of language. Therefore, in the next section, we describe how language shapes both the mnemonic enhancement and impairment processes we have outlined thus far.

4 How language shapes emotional memories

Language exerts a powerful influence on the ways in which emotional events are remembered. Emotional experiences are characterized by sensory input from the body, sensory input from external stimuli, and cognitive evaluations (Oatley and Johnson-Laird 2014). Concurrent with perception, language can enhance memory by providing categories and labels that organize and wrest meaning from this sensory information during encoding (Barrett, Lindquist, and Gendron 2007). Across a variety of research paradigms, with both children (e.g., Loewenstein and Gentner 2005) and adults (e.g., Souza and Skóra 2017), researchers have demonstrated that pairing language, such as object names, with visual stimuli strengthens memory for those stimuli. Memory is further enhanced when events

are described in a narrative structure that provides a context for understanding why an event occurred (Pillemer, Picariello, and Pruett 1994).

Language can also bias memory. In one study, participants viewed ambiguous emotional expressions (i.e., happy-angry blends) but labeled each expression using a single emotion term (happy or angry). Faces labeled angry were later remembered as angrier than they actually were, whereas faces labeled happy were later remembered as happier than they were (Halberstadt and Niedenthal 2001). This effect was strongest when participants were also asked to provide a narrative explaining why the person felt angry or happy. Thus, verbally categorizing a facial expression of emotion influenced people's memory for the expression, especially when they considered the context and reason for the emotion.

Affective labeling, or putting feelings into words, has been shown to influence people's emotional responses to negative stimuli in the laboratory. Participants who were instructed to label negative emotions reported less intense emotions than those who were not instructed to use affective labeling (Torre and Lieberman 2018). Reduced emotionality appears to result from disruption of the limbic system activity that typically occurs during emotional experiences. For example, participants exhibited decreased amygdala responses to images of negative facial expressions when asked to label the emotion expressed by the image (Lieberman et al. 2007). Amygdala activation did not decrease when participants labeled the facial expressions by gender. Thus, even without the explicit goal to regulate, affective labeling was an effective emotion regulation strategy.

People also put feelings into words to regulate their emotions in daily life. Across cultures and genders, emotionally intense experiences are frequently discussed with others, often within 24 hours of their occurrence (Rimé 2009). Positive and negative events are shared at roughly equal rates (Rimé et al. 1991), and events of greater emotional intensity are discussed more frequently (Luminet et al. 2000). Although talking about emotional experiences decreases over time, people talk about memories for as long as they continue to elicit emotion (Rimé et al. 1998). People report that a primary reason for mentally rehearsing autobiographical memories is to be able to tell others about them (Walker et al. 2009). Talking about memories is a social (Rimé 2009) and elaborative (Tulving and Craik 2000) form of rehearsal that can strengthen memories.

In addition to strengthening memories, talking with others helps people regulate the emotional responses evoked by memories. Talking about the past maintains the good feelings associated with positive memories and diminishes the bad feelings associated with negative memories (Walker et al. 2009). In one study, college students who received a desirable grade on an exam were asked to report their feelings on the day they learned their grades and again the following evening (Hovasapian and Levine 2018). Most participants engaged in social rehearsal (67 %), often immediately (49 % within 15 minutes), and reported sharing with several social partners (on average, between two and three people) over the course of two days. Even adjusting for the initial strength of their emotional response, participants who engaged in social rehearsal reported that their positive feelings lasted longer than those who did not share. The more people participants shared with, the longer their positive feelings lasted. Sharing memories can lead people to reappraise past events. Indeed, the association between sharing and the duration of happiness was greatest for participants whose sharing partners led them to appraise their grade as more important and remarkable.

The efficacy with which social sharing of memories regulates emotion varies based on individual traits such as negative affectivity and linguistic factors. Narrative interpretation of a negative event as central to an individual's life story has been associated with lasting distress (Rubin, Boals, and Hoyle 2014), whereas narratives that contextualize a negative event in the past, and lead to positive meaning-making, are effective at reducing distress (Pasupathi et al. 2017). The use of past tense language requires people to psychologically distance themselves and view the event from a perspective of resolution. This may provide a sense of closure. Similarly, researchers have speculated that positive meaning-making may reduce distress because it requires reappraisal and viewing events from a new perspective (Pasupathi et al. 2017). Thus, the act of narrating memories, a component of many cognitive-behavioral therapies for disorders such as post-traumatic stress disorder, can alter emotions by changing the way people appraise remembered events (LoSavio, Dillon and Resick 2017).

Although social sharing can regulate emotion and maintain autobiographical memories through rehearsal, it can also lead to memory distortion. Conversation with others is a potent context for reshaping memories because remembering occurs on a dyadic rather than an individual level. During social rehearsing, people attempt to regulate not only their own emotional responses but also those of the listener. As a result, people sometimes activate goals, such as receiving sympathy or entertaining the listener, that are not compatible with accuracy (Marsh and Tversky 2004). To accomplish these goals, people use specific linguistic patterns (e.g., exaggerating, minimizing, or omitting information) that distort the past, and these distortions have downstream influences on memory.

A seminal study showed that the words chosen to describe an experience can bias memory. Participants watched a film depicting a car accident and answered questions later about the details of the collision. Participants who were asked, "About how fast were the cars going when they *smashed* into each other?" recalled the car as having gone faster than those asked the same question with the verbs *collided*, *bumped*, *contacted*, or *hit* instead of *smashed* (Loftus and Palmer 1974). Moreover, participants exposed to the word *smashed* were more likely to report having seen broken glass at the scene of the accident, which was not present in the film. Poor source monitoring contributes to these memory errors. People are poor at distinguishing whether the details that come to mind about a past experience originate from their initial experience of the event or from information they were exposed to after the fact (e.g., the high speed implied by use of the word *smashed*). This study suggests that, during conversations about past experiences, word choices and question framing on the part of listeners can shape the memories of narrators.

The potential of language to reshape memory is not limited to slight alterations of events based on the use of single words. Simply through reading or hearing misinformation, people sometimes come to remember emotional events that they never experienced. Exposure to inaccurate or misleading information can lead to the formation of highly emotional but completely false memories (e.g., Loftus 2005), particularly when the misinformation is consistent with their goals and beliefs (Freuda et al. 2013). Murphy et al. (2019) presented voters in Ireland with true news stories and plausible but false news stories one week before the 2018 referendum on whether to repeal the country's constitutional ban on abortion. The fake news depicted campaigners on either side of the issue engaging in ille-

gal or inflammatory behavior. Participants were asked whether they remembered hearing about each news story and, if so, where they learned about it and how they felt about it. Nearly half of the participants (48 %) reported a memory for at least one of the two fake news stories, showing that exposure to misinformation resulted in the creation of false memories. Participants were especially susceptible to forming false memories of fake news that aligned with their political beliefs. They remembered more fake scandals that were ideologically congruent with their position, depicting poor behavior by members of the opposing campaign. False memories of immoral actions of opposing political groups may have served to bolster confidence in the superiority or correctness of their own political beliefs. Thus, emotional memories can be created based on entirely false information.

Researchers have also created false memories of autobiographical emotional events. Shaw and Porter (2015) told college students that they had committed a crime during early adolescence that was so serious the police were involved (theft, assault, or assault with a weapon). Parental surveys confirmed participants had no such contact with police during this period, thus any memory of the criminal act was false. Over a series of interviews, participants were asked to recall details concerning true events and concerning the alleged criminal act. The interviews incorporated supposed corroboration by a family member, repeated suggestions, and instructions to vividly imagine how the crime might have occurred. Remarkably, by the end of the third interview, 70 % of participants had falsely recalled committing a serious criminal act that led to police contact. Participant's false memories contained high levels of detail and multiple sensory components. Thus, susceptibility to constructing false memories of emotional events is not limited to events in the news but can occur for autobiographical memories. Moreover, false memories can rival true memories in terms of vividness and level of detail (Shaw and Porter 2015).

A subtler mechanism through which language shapes memory is decreased accessibility for details that go unsaid. Social rehearsal involves making decisions about the parts of an event people want to share. Attentive or distracted behavior on the part of the listener during conversation can facilitate retrieval of certain information and inhibit retrieval of other information (Pasupathi and Hoyt 2010). Details that are discussed are reinforced in memory while details that go unmentioned show greater decay (Hirst and Echterhoff 2012). Upon retrieving information of interest, people often inhibit retrieval of other relevant information, and this inhibition results in worse memory for details that go unmentioned above and beyond typical memory decay (Anderson, Bjork, and Bjork 1994). This effect has been termed retrieval-induced forgetting (RIF) and has been shown to alter the memories of both the speaker and the listener (Stone et al. 2013). Overall, then, the language used to construct memories, particularly in a social context, plays a critical role in shaping how people come to think about and remember emotional events.

The life story is a special case that illustrates how language and emotion reshape autobiographical memories. Life stories are a linguistic product that results from integrating perceptual, sensory, and event information into a narrative structure (Habermas and Bluck 2000). In constructing life stories, people prioritize past events that support emotional themes because they provide insight into their thoughts and motivations. As in conversational remembering, life stories are sensitive to the desires and interests of the audience (McAdams 2008) but are also used to reinforce people's views of themselves. For example,

people are strongly motivated to perceive themselves as good, and autobiographical memories can be used to bolster this perception (e.g., Sedikides and Green 2000). To this end, people rehearse memories of their moral acts, thereby strengthening these memories, while actively attempting to forget immoral behavior (Stanley and De Brigard 2019). Further, when immoral behavior is remembered, people are motivated to distance themselves from the past self who committed the act and develop a theme of moral improvement over time. In this way, people use autobiographical memories to establish continuity between the current and the past self, and when necessary, people use memories to provide context to explain discontinuity from an immoral past self (Bluck and Habermas 2000). Thus, life stories are not indiscriminate retellings of past events. These stories are used to reinforce people's goals and, in this process, reshape their memories.

5 The constructive nature of emotional memory

The selectivity of emotional memory, the ease with which people can form false memories of emotional events, and the formative role of language all highlight an unsettling fact about the nature of remembering: it is a constructive process. Rather than veridical recordings of events “as they were”, memories are cobbled together through the flexible recombination of bits and pieces of the past (Bartlett 1932; Schacter, Norman, and Koutstaal 1998). Importantly, this act of construction leaves memories subject to influence by attitudes, beliefs, and knowledge acquired after the remembered events took place (e.g., Murphy et al. 2019). A memory system that records events precisely as they occurred may intuitively seem to be more desirable than a constructive system, especially given that errors (e.g., in the legal system) can have devastating real-world consequences (West and Meterko 2016). Yet, it has been argued that memory’s “sins”, including transience, misattribution, suggestibility, and bias, are inevitable consequences of a system that is fundamentally adaptive (Schacter 1999; Schacter and Addis 2007). The ability to incorporate post-event information into memories permits learning, allowing people to update limited representations as new information is acquired and correct initial misapprehensions (Loftus 2005). Moreover, the malleability of memory is a central facet of a constructive system that supports people's ability to plan for the future. By bringing to mind and piecing together memories of relevant past events, people can engage in mental time travel. They can project themselves into the future and mentally simulate how events that have not yet happened may unfold (Schacter and Addis 2007).

Early evidence of the essential connection between prospection, the ability to envisage the future, and memory came from observations of patients with amnesia. People with deficits in their ability to recall their personal past often exhibit corresponding deficits in their ability to imagine their future. For example, patient K.C., a 36-year-old man with retrograde and anterograde amnesia was incapable of describing his recent past (e.g., what he did yesterday), and showed the same inability to generate responses to prompts regarding what he would do in the near future (Tulving et al. 1988). In healthy populations, researchers have found considerable overlap in the neural circuitry activated when recalling past experiences and imagining future ones (Race, Keane, and Verfaellie 2011; Schacter

and Addis 2007). Like recalling the past, imagining the future requires retrieving information from memory. Because the future is uncertain, rather than retrieving a single episodic memory, mental time travel requires flexibly combining relevant representations of the past.

Experimental studies using episodic specificity inductions provide further evidence of the close connection between remembering the past and anticipating the future. In one study, participants were trained to increase the specificity of details recalled from a video by using mental imagery (Jing, Madore, Schacter 2016). Compared to a control condition, in which participants simply described their general thoughts about a video, participants in the episodic specificity condition were later able to generate more potential positive future outcomes associated with negative events. Participants in the episodic specificity condition also rated generating future alternatives as less difficult than control participants. Thus, training people to retrieve more specific and detailed memories of past events influenced the specificity and ease with which they could imagine future events. In sum, autobiographical memory supports time travel into the future. Imagining an uncertain future requires pulling apart memories of the past and combining them in novel ways. Because it supports this function, a constructive memory system is ultimately adaptive, facilitating goal-achievement in spite of the potential for errors.

6 Remembering and misremembering emotion

Is it possible for people to make good plans for the future when they are working with inaccurate information about the past? We will close this chapter by discussing memories of past feelings and how bias can sometimes promote beneficial outcomes. Memories of emotion are particularly important for guiding people's plans. Whether people are deciding if they should buy tickets to a particular concert, change careers, or get married, they try to remember how they felt in related circumstances in the past in order to envision how the outcomes of their decisions will make them feel (Miloyan and Suddendorf 2015). But these memories can be inaccurate (Levine and Safer 2002; Robinson and Clore 2002). Research shows that, as time passes and memory for emotion fades, people draw on their current appraisals of the event that evoked emotion to help them reconstruct how they must have felt (Levine 1997; Levine et al. 2020). For example, college students reported how anxious they were feeling immediately before they took their midterm exam, and recalled their feelings a week later (Safer, Levine, and Drapalski 2002). In comparison to students who had not yet learned their grades, those who learned that they had done well on the exam underestimated how anxious they had felt before the exam, whereas those who learned that they had done poorly overestimated how anxious they had felt. Thus, changes in students' appraisals of the exam biased their memories for how they had felt. Students' memories in turn predicted their future plans. Even adjusting for the grade they received, the more students overestimated their pre-exam anxiety, the more they planned to study for the final exam. Thus, anticipated emotions can motivate adaptive plans even if based on inaccurate memories.

The strategies people use to regulate emotions during stressful events can also alter how they later appraise those events, resulting in bias in memory for emotion. Students in Florence and Turin, Italy, who were in the midst of preparing for their high school exit exams reported how they were feeling and the strategies they were using to regulate their emotions (Levine et al. 2012). After the exam, they were asked to remember their pre-exam feelings. The more students had engaged in positive reappraisal to cope with their pre-exam distress (e.g., trying to reframe the exam as an opportunity for growth), the more positively they came to appraise the exam preparation experience over time. In turn, the more positive their appraisals became, the more they overestimated positive emotion and underestimated negative emotion when later recalling their feelings. Use of emotion regulation strategies that did not alter appraisals – distraction and emotion suppression – was not associated with memory bias. Bias and distortion in memory can be problematic. When it comes to emotion, however, the primary function of memory may not be to keep an exact record of past experiences but instead to guide people's current behavior and plans for the future (Levine 1997; Levine et al. 2020). The fact that people's current understanding of the emotion-eliciting situation informs their memories makes memory a more useful guide. For those engaged in reappraisal, misremembering past stressful experiences as "not so bad" may encourage them to seek out challenging, and ultimately rewarding, situations in the future. In other circumstances, overestimating the emotional impact of past events serves as a powerful source of motivation (MacLeod 2016). Thus, memory bias is not always maladaptive.

7 Future directions and conclusions

Emotional experiences often feel as if they are etched permanently into memory. However, subjective feelings of confidence, ease of retrieval, and rich detail are not always harbingers of accuracy. Emotional memories are selective, subject to fading and bias over time, and can even be entirely false. Many questions regarding how language and emotion interact in the formation of false memories remain unanswered. For example, although we know that people are susceptible to creating false memories of events that are consistent with their goals and beliefs (Murphy et al. 2019), false memory studies to date have not compared the effects of specific emotions. It remains unknown whether people are at a greater risk for developing false memories when misleading narratives elicit anger versus fear – emotions commonly targeted by political campaigns (Dunn and Tedesco 2017). This line of research is a natural progression from decades of study on the role of arousal in emotional memory enhancement and a timely application of psychological science to the real-world issue of addressing misinformation in news and social media (Ecker, Hogan, and Lewandowsky 2017; Rich and Zaragoza 2016).

In conclusion, the present is fleeting and much of people's mental life consists of revisiting past experiences and anticipating future ones. On these mental time travels, emotion is a frequent stop. Emotional memories carry information, not only about what happened in the past, but also about people's goals, values, and beliefs. In this chapter, we have reviewed mechanisms by which emotion enhances memory. Emotional events benefit from

greater attention, enhanced encoding and consolidation, frequent retrieval, and mental and social rehearsal. Together, these processes promote vivid, detailed, and lasting memories. We have also reviewed mechanisms that lead to memory inaccuracies including the language people use to describe past experiences. Rather than viewing vulnerability to revision as a flaw, we aimed to show that the constructive nature of memory allows it to serve many important functions outside of providing an exact record of events. These purposes include social bonding, providing an enduring sense of identity, and enabling prospection and planning. A constructive memory system is error-prone but allows for updating emotional memories to reflect people's changing understandings of the personal significance of past events. Creative recombination of emotional memories allows people to simulate and plan for an uncertain future. Thus, emotional memories provide the foundation for plans and actions designed to bring about a rewarding future.

8 References

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67 Autobiographical memory and emotion

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Abstract: Remembering the important events of our lives, such as a graduation or wedding day or the loss of a loved one, invokes both emotional and linguistic processes. Even the most emotional events of our lives are not recalled as verbatim records of those events, but rather reconstructed at the time of retrieval. In this chapter, we will explore the links between emotional autobiographical memory and language, with a special emphasis on how personal episodes are narrated during this process of memory reconstruction. We will first adopt a developmental perspective to illustrate how the emergence of language, narrative, and autobiographical memory are intertwined in the early years of life. We also will consider how these processes continue to interact throughout adulthood, specifically by highlighting evidence from cross-cultural and gender differences in narrative recall. Finally, we will explore the ways in which affective disorders such as post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) may influence memory narratives, as well as how changing the language in those narratives might serve an emotion regulation function.

1 Introduction

Imagine being asked to reflect upon your life. The events that stand out are likely emotional in nature, containing vivid sensory and perceptual details (such as recalling the bright red color of your high school graduation gown) and eliciting a powerful sense of reliving. Autobiographical memories are the stories of our lives, and as such their recall serves important functions across the lifespan (Bluck et al. 2005). Recalling autobiographical events allows us to maintain a coherent sense of self and personality across time (Bluck et al. 2005), to build and maintain social relationships (Bluck et al. 2005; Fivush, Haden, and Reese 1996), and to guide decision-making and behavior (Pillemer 2003).

The term *autobiographical memory* encompasses memory stores for personally relevant semantic information (e.g., the name of my hometown) as well as episodes (e.g., high school graduation; see Holland and Kensinger [2010] for review). Although pinpointing an

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exact definition for such a vast database of personal information is difficult, there are generally agreed-upon features of autobiographical memories. Emotional events elicit vivid sensory details (Rubin 2005; Talarico, LaBar, and Rubin 2004) and high levels of confidence in their accuracy (Phelps and Sharot 2008). Autobiographical memories frequently are shared as narratives, pointing to the central role that language plays in retrieval (see Rubin [2006] for a discussion of the distinction between language and narrative). Well-developed narratives are coherent stories that include temporally ordered details and reflections upon or evaluations of those details (Fivush 2011; Rubin 2006). Throughout early development, children and adolescents hone their ability to generate adult-like narratives. Ultimately, narratives may be linked together to form a *life story* (see review by McLean [2017]). Though autobiographical memories for specific events are not entirely language-based (e.g., re-experiencing the vivid red color of one's graduation gown does not necessitate language), narrative provides a critical organizational framework by which autobiographical memories can be shared with others and contribute to our own self-identity across time (Fivush 2011; Singer and Blagov 2004). Interestingly, the mere act of narrating an autobiographical memory may lead to an increased use of emotional language as well as the inclusion of a greater number of complex emotions in event descriptions (Fioretti and Smotri 2015; see also Smotri and Fioretti 2016), perhaps reflecting what Tilmann Habermas (2015: 270) has called the "intricately parallel processes" of narrative and emotion.

Despite being associated with high confidence and sensations of reliving emotional events, autobiographical memory retrieval is a constructive process; in other words, personal narratives are not recalled as verbatim scripts of an event's occurrence (see Holland and Kensinger [2010] for review). Indeed, even highly emotional events are subject to reinterpretations, inconsistencies between multiple tellings, and biases (Holland and Kensinger 2010). Variability in how the same event may be recalled arise due to both short-term states (e.g., emotion regulatory goals [Holland, Tamir, and Kensinger 2010]) as well as long-term traits (e.g., gender [Bauer, Stennes, and Haight 2003]) and cultural factors (Wang 2013). In this chapter we will explore the role of language and narrative in autobiographical remembering, particularly for those events that are emotional in nature. We will take advantage of the protracted development of both language and autobiographical memory narrative skills as a way to explore the links between language, emotion, and memory. Additionally, we will consider how the variability that arises in narrative skills as a result of differences in gender, culture, and clinical disorders can shed light on the relation between these processes. Finally, we will consider how reconstructing events by changing the language used to describe them may serve to subsequently reduce their emotional impact.

2 A developmental perspective on autobiographical memory, language, and narrative

The development of language, emotion, and autobiographical memory are intimately intertwined early in life, making the early years a particularly fruitful stage to consider how these processes interact. Language is not a necessary prerequisite for memory; memory for

complex events, such as temporally ordered actions that are presented in the laboratory, is present even in preverbal infants by the end of the first year of life (see, e.g., Bauer [2015] for review). However, the onset of language and narrative capabilities is meaningful for the ability to remember and share personal memories. For instance, in newly verbal toddlers, there is evidence of spontaneous recall and sharing of personal episodes (Fivush 2011), and children at 5½ years old show evidence for remembering events that occurred when they were as young as 1½ (Cleveland and Reese 2008).

Therefore, infants and children are demonstrably capable of recalling information. However, adults subsequently experience amnesia for autobiographical events that occurred during this period of time (referred to as infantile amnesia). More specifically, adults (at least in Western cultures) report a relative lack of memories from before the ages of 3–4 years old, followed by fewer events from between those ages to 7 years old than would be expected based on the traditional forgetting curve (see Bauer [2015] for review). Infantile amnesia is likely due to a number of psychological and neural factors (see Bauer [2015] for a comprehensive account), but the onset of language may play a particularly significant role in its existence. Events that are experienced and encoded into memory prior to full verbal development (i.e., details that are encoded visually) may be rendered inaccessible once verbal skills are fully in place (Bauer 2015). Linguistically based explanations of infantile amnesia generally point to the overlap in the offset of at least the first stage of infantile amnesia and a period of intense language development (see Simcock and Hayne 2002).

In support of the linguistic accounts of childhood amnesia, one study had 27-, 33-, and 39-month-old children experience a unique event (a game with the “Magic Shrinking Machine”) with an experimenter (Simcock and Hayne 2002). The children were asked to re-enact the event following either a 6-month or 1-year retention interval, and their language skills were assessed at both time points. Children of all ages and across both retention intervals demonstrated evidence for successful memory of the unique event. However, even though language skills improved for all ages, no child used language acquired after the initial encoding of the event to describe the event’s details (Simcock and Hayne [2002]; but see Bauer et al. [1998], Morris and Baker-Ward [2007] for evidence that some preverbal memories may later be expressed verbally).

The ability to linguistically encode the details of an experience as it is occurring may lead to the creation of stronger memory traces (Haden et al. 2001; Simcock and Hayne 2002), especially during the preschool years (Cleveland and Reese 2008). Critically, however, linguistic ability alone is insufficient for autobiographical memory development; rather, it is the use of language to form coherent narratives that creates the organizational framework necessary for future recall (Fivush and Nelson 2004; Morris, Baker-Ward, and Bauer 2010; Wang 2003). For example, preverbal toddlers who were incapable of providing a narrative account of an emergency room visit also were unable to provide long-term verbal recall two years later, in contrast to older toddlers who demonstrated narrative skills at the time of the visit (Peterson and Rideout 1998). Even for older children (5–7 years old), the ability to encode ongoing events in a narrative format enhances episodic memory over a 6-month delay (Wang, Bui, and Song 2015). In addition to providing benefits at the encoding stage of memory, language may act as a powerful retrieval cue for those experiences (Hayne 2004) by providing an organizational schema for event details (Reese 2002).

Children's event descriptions often reflect missing linguistic components that would make for a complete narrative as previously described (Bauer 2015). The ability to generate coherent, structured narratives that include features like temporal ordering markers and evaluations of events improves across the preschool years (Fivush, Haden, and Adam 1995) as children gain temporal and self-referential language (Fivush and Nelson 2004; Uehara 2015). Indeed, Nelson (1993) argued that true autobiographical remembering develops in concordance with the onset of the ability to verbally represent those memories (see also de Paula et al. 2018; Reese 2002). Even when verbal abilities are in place, caregivers still provide linguistic scaffolding in the early years of life, offering a way for children to organize the verbal details of an event into coherent narratives (Fivush and Nelson 2004; Sutton 2002).

The effects of variability in caregiver scaffolding styles provides further evidence for the powerful role that language and narrative play in autobiographical remembering. More specifically, mothers (the typical caregiver studied in the research laboratory) vary in terms of how elaborative they are in discussing past events with their children. High elaborative mothers provide a good deal of event detail during joint reminiscing, including temporal orientations and emotional evaluations; their children ultimately provide more detailed narratives of past events (Fivush and Nelson 2004; Larkina and Bauer 2010), including in cases when mothers have been specifically trained to use a high elaborative reminiscing style (Peterson, Jesso, and McCabe 1999). In contrast, low elaborative mothers provide fewer event details and more repetitive lines of questioning during joint reminiscing; as such, their children ultimately provide less detailed narratives of past events (Fivush and Nelson 2004). These findings hold true in an ethnically and socioeconomically diverse population (Langley, Coffman, and Ornstein 2017). Taken together, the emergence of autobiographical memory (and perhaps the offset of infantile amnesia) seems to be supported by caregivers' linguistic scaffolding. Critically, the relationship between autobiographical reminiscing and language development is reciprocally beneficial: Not only do language and narrative development increase autobiographical memory skills, but autobiographical memory and joint reminiscing benefit several aspects of language development (see Salmon and Reese [2016] for discussion).

3 The role of emotion in autobiographical memory, language, and narrative

To this point, much of the reviewed research pertains to neutral, everyday types of events. To fully understand the links between autobiographical memory, language, and narrative, it is critical to consider the role that emotion plays in how events are narrated. Indeed, emotion (even more than age) is an important predictor of how long events are likely to remain accessible in memory for 4- to 13-year-olds (Peterson et al. 2014) as well as for adults across the lifespan (see Holland and Kensinger [2010] for review). Including emotion words in narratives is a fundamental component to autobiographical remembering (Fivush 2014; Reese et al. 2011), so much so that an inadequate understanding of emotion during

development may contribute to the infantile amnesia period (reviewed by Bauer 2015). As with neutral events, memories for emotionally charged events are influenced by joint reminiscing with caretakers. The link between mother-child interactions and emotional development may be bidirectional: the quality of narrative and social interactions increases with a more developed understanding of emotion, and an understanding of emotion develops as a result of narrative and social interactions (Fivush, Haden, and Reese 2006).

When discussing a traumatic event (e.g., a tornado), as well as non-traumatic emotional events, caregivers' use of emotional language is predictive of their children's own use of emotional language when reminiscing about those events in the future (Bauer et al. 2005; Fivush et al. 2009; Sales, Fivush, and Peterson 2003). Additionally, the children of mothers who provide a greater number of conversational deflections to them when discussing negative events provide more contributions and more elaborative interpretations of the event (Burch, Austin, and Bauer 2004). The positive benefits of talking about emotional events are evident not only in caregivers who show a natural tendency to be more highly elaborative in their reminiscing style (see Fivush [2007] for review), but also in mothers who have been trained to use a highly elaborative style that includes emotional language (Bergen et al. 2009). There are interesting differences in the language used to discuss events depending on their valence: Parents generally use a greater amount of emotional language when discussing positive events, but a greater amount of causal language and open-ended questions when discussing negative events (Sales, Fivush, and Peterson 2003). Discussions of events that may be traumatic in nature include more internal states language and more coherent narratives (Ackil, Van Abbema, and Bauer 2003).

Caregiver scaffolding in generating narratives about emotional, and potentially traumatic, events may be especially critical as children seek to make meaning of and process these events in relation to their burgeoning sense of self (reviewed by Fivush, Haden, and Reese 2006; Laible and Song 2006; Salmon and Reese 2015; Salmon and Reese 2016). For example, 5- and 6-year-old children who participate in negative memory co-constructions that include richer elaborations of the causes and consequences of their negative emotions have a more consistent self-concept across time (Bird and Reese 2006). Additionally, children who experience chronic stressors due to asthma have better emotional well-being when their mothers include a greater amount of emotional and causal explanatory language in their co-constructions of asthmatic episodes (Sales and Fivush 2005). Further, the quality of narrative recall in terms of the co-construction of meaning about negative events at 42 months of age positively predicts several components of socioemotional development 6 months later, including children's emotional understanding and level of empathy (Laible, Panfile Murphy, and Augustine 2013). The implications of co-constructing narratives about emotional autobiographical memories extend beyond the early years of life and into pre-adolescence, when collaborative family discussions about emotional (particularly negative) events predict self-perceived competency and self-esteem (Marin, Bohanek, and Fivush 2008). Additionally, the ways in which caregivers discuss emotional experiences during early childhood predicts how their children discuss their own emotions as adolescents (see McLean [2017] for discussion).

4 The influence of gender and culture on autobiographical memory

It is important to note that many of the developmental findings discussed so far are specific to data collected with caregivers and children of Western descent. The constructive nature of autobiographical memory allows for variability in narrative recall. We can take advantage of memory differences across genders and cultures to further explore the links between language, narrative, and memory. Both gender and culture appear to play a role in the age of earliest reported autobiographical memory from an adult perspective (e.g., MacDonald, Uesiliana, and Hayne 2000). For example, women are more likely to report earlier first memories than men (Kingo, Berntsen, and Krogaard 2013). This difference may be attributable to the linguistic scaffolding that primary caregivers provide to their daughters versus sons during the early years. Although not all experiments have revealed gender differences in parent-child co-constructions of emotional events, others have found that mothers spend more time discussing emotions with their daughters than their sons (e.g., Fivush et al. 2000). Further, girls in the Fivush et al. (2000) study spent more time discussing emotions and using emotion words in their narratives, especially for scary events, suggesting that the effects of socialization during parental reminiscing are already evident in autobiographical memory during the preschool years (Salmon and Reese 2015).

The types of gender differences in emotional autobiographical memory narratives that are first evident in the preschool years may extend and persist into the adult years. Though gender differences are not always detected (Rubin, Schuklind, and Rahhal 1999), several studies have found that women are superior in autobiographical memory recall by the measure of several variables. Importantly, these differences seem to be driven by gender identity, in line with the early gender socialization effects that are sometimes present in parent-child conversations (see Fivush and Nelson [2004]; Grysman and Hudson [2013] for reviews). Women include a greater number of details when describing past events (e.g., Bauer, Stennes, and Haight 2003; Seidlitz and Diener 1998), a difference that persists into older age (Pillemer et al. 2003). Additionally, women's narratives are sometimes rated as more vivid and include a greater amount of affective language than men's (Bauer, Stennes, and Haight 2003; see Piefke and Fink [2005] for review), even when men and women reminisce about identical events, such as a first date (Ross and Holmberg 1992).

Several possibilities for these gender differences in adulthood exist, including that women experience a greater amount of affect and therefore by proxy a greater emotional memory enhancement effect, or that women engage in a greater amount of elaborative rehearsal of emotional memories (see Andreano and Cahill [2009]; Piefke and Fink [2005]; St. Jacques, Conway, and Cabeza [2011] for discussion). Indeed, women report engaging in and valuing reminiscing more than men, especially for social purposes like maintaining relationships (Bluck and Alea 2009; see Grysman and Fivush [2016] for similar discussion). Reported gender differences in emotional autobiographical memory recall may also be related to females' superior performance on verbal tasks (the primary mechanism of eliciting autobiographical memories in the laboratory), compared to males' superior performance on spatial tasks (Andreano and Cahill 2009). Indeed, gender differences in the phenomenological experiences of autobiographical recall are attenuated when rich, visuospatial,

rather than verbal, cues are used to elicit memory retrieval (St. Jacques, Conway, and Cabeza 2011).

From a cross-cultural perspective, American adults tend to report earlier first memories than Chinese adults (e.g., Wang 2001), and parent-child conversations about past events may be particularly well-developed in families of European descent (Wang 2013). Moreover, the first memories reported by American adults tend to be longer, more emotionally elaborate, and more self-focused when compared to the first memories reported by Chinese adults, which tend to be shorter, neutral, and have a more collective focus (Wang 2001). Similarly, in the Maori culture in New Zealand, narrative and the intergenerational transmission of memory is especially emphasized. Consequently, adults report earlier childhood memories than New Zealand adults of European or Chinese descent; Maori mothers are more highly elaborative in their discussions about past events; and their children demonstrate enhanced memory for events (Reese and Neha 2015).

There also is cross-cultural variability in how emotional events are narrated. This variability may arise because cultural factors have a substantial effect on what is deemed as “ideal affect”, or the preferable affective state (Tsai 2007: 243). This in turn may influence which details are narrated upon and subsequently remembered. Ideal affect, from the North American perspective, can be described as *high arousal positive*, an excited and elated state of being, whereas East Asian outlook aligns with the *low arousal positive*, or a peaceful and relaxed disposition (see Tsai [2007] for review). Indeed, American mothers are more elaborative than Chinese mothers in their discussions of positive and negative events. American mothers also are more likely to model cognitive emotion regulation strategies in their discussions by focusing on the causes of emotions, whereas Chinese mothers are more likely to discuss the importance of behavioral conduct and discipline in social contexts (Wang and Fivush 2005). These findings nicely align with the American cultural focus on independent-oriented self-construal and self-enhancement versus the Chinese cultural focus on interdependent-oriented self-construal and modesty (Wang 2001; see also Han, Leichtman, and Wang 1998).

5 The clinical relevance of language in autobiographical memory

The language (especially in the form of narrative) used to describe emotional autobiographical memories may have important consequences not only for how those events are remembered, but also for emotional well-being. Narrative differences are often evident in clinical and affective disorders compared to healthy control populations. Post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) in particular has been a focus for autobiographical memory researchers, as the narratives and phenomenological qualities of traumatic experiences may be fundamentally different from the recall of ordinary autobiographical events (see O’Kearney and Perrott [2006] for review). More specifically, trauma narratives are sometimes characterized as being disorganized and fragmented (i.e., lacking cohesion and coherence [Brewin 2007; Conway and Pleydell-Pearce 2000; Hellawell and Brewin 2002; but see

O’Kearney and Perrott 2006]), with an emphasis on emotionally intense and sensory-dominant details (Berntsen, Willert, and Rubin 2003; Ehlers and Clark 2000; Ehlers, Hackmann, and Michael 2004; Hellawell and Brewin 2004; Rubin, Feldman, and Beckham 2004) compared to the orderly, coherent narratives that are associated with ordinary autobiographical events (O’Kearney and Perrott 2006). A review of PTSD narrative studies found that the extent to which trauma narratives are dominated by emotional and sensory language is positively correlated with flashback experiences (O’Kearney and Perrott 2006; see also Rubin, Dennis, and Beckham 2011). It seems that one of the defining features of PTSD (vs. trauma exposure that does not result in PTSD) is an increase in how integrated emotional and cognitive details are when remembering emotional events; in other words, cognitive-emotional distinctiveness is decreased when individuals with PTSD recall emotional (including both traumatic and positive) events (Boals and Rubin 2011; see Conway and Pleydell-Pearce 2000). Additionally, for individuals who develop PTSD, the traumatic event becomes central to self-identity (Berntsen and Rubin 2006; see Boals, Schuettler, and Southard-Dobbs [2015] for review).

Indeed, the language used to narrate emotional autobiographical events may be a powerful predictor of clinical and health outcomes (Boals, Schuettler, and Southard-Dobbs 2015). Holocaust survivors who use a greater number of cognitive (especially insight-related) words when describing Holocaust-related events demonstrate more adaptive coping, evident in lower visceral emotional reactions and better physical health (Boals and Perez 2009). On the other hand, a greater number of negative emotion words and fewer cognitive-related words predicts greater avoidance of coping with a failed romantic relationship (Boals and Klein 2005); the ability to create a coherent narrative about a stressful event, such as divorce, may facilitate or be indicative of emotional recovery (Bourassa et al. 2017; but see Sbarra et al. 2013).

If the language associated with autobiographical narratives is potentially significant for clinical disorders and their outcomes, then it stands to follow that changing those narratives may have important implications for emotion regulation. Emotion regulation is a broad term that encompasses many strategies for changing the emotional impact of an event (Gross 1998). Critically, the ability to coherently discuss and process the emotions associated with autobiographical memories is a fundamental component in the development of self-regulation (Leyva and Nolivos 2015) as well as emotion regulation skills early in life (Goodvin and Romdall 2013; see Salmon and Reese [2015] for discussion). Indeed, much like autobiographical memory skills, emotion regulation skills may be learned and supported through social interactions (Reeck, Ames, and Ochsner 2016). Parents report that an important goal of joint reminiscing is to help their children manage their emotions (Kulkofsky and Koh 2009), and the narrative quality of negative event discussions in particular are associated with higher levels of socioemotional development during the preschool years (Laible 2011).

The links between autobiographical memory and emotion regulation may be especially evident in the later years of life (Holland and Kensinger 2010). Older age is unique in that individuals appear to prioritize emotional satisfaction and regulation, as well as meaningful interpersonal relationships, over the information-seeking goals of young adulthood. The differences between older and younger adults seem to be due to increasingly limited time

perspectives; these changing emotional goals have been summarized in Socioemotional Selectivity Theory (SST [e.g., Carstensen 2006]). In line with SST, aging is associated with an increase in positive emotions while jointly reminiscing (Comblain, D'Argembeau, and Van der Linden 2005; Pasupathi and Carstensen 2003) as well as a decrease in the number of negative involuntary autobiographical memories (Schlagman, Schultz, and Kvavilashvili 2006). Aging is further associated with a greater tendency to forget the emotional intensity associated with negative events (Levine and Bluck 1997; see also Mather and Carstensen [2005] for review) and an increased focus on the positive elements (the “silver lining”) of negative events (Ford, DiBiase, and Kensinger 2018). The effects described by SST are evident in the language that older versus younger adults use to describe their emotional autobiographical memories, as well. Older adults use overall fewer emotional terms when writing about negative and positive autobiographical memories (Robertson and Hopko 2013; see also Löckenhoff, Costa, and Lane 2008) as well as about memories relating to their self-concept (Rice and Pasupathi 2010). These age-related changes in autobiographical narratives may serve an emotion regulation function by allowing older adults to maintain a fairly positive affective state.

Bilingual individuals also present a unique population for understanding autobiographical memory narratives and emotion regulation. For bilingual individuals, the language of inner speech is the language employed at encoding (Schrauf and Rubin 2000). Retrieval, however, may take place in either language of the bilingual individual; whether the languages of encoding and retrieval match has consequences for the content and phenomenological aspects of recall, perhaps reflecting a state dependent memory effect (see also Caldwell-Harris 2014; Javier, Barroso, and Muñoz 1993; Schrauf 2000; Schrauf and Rubin 1998, 2000). For some bilingual individuals, emotion processing is enhanced in the context of a native, or first, language (L1), and reduced in the foreign, or second one (L2) (see also Caldwell-Harris 2014; Dewaele 2004; Pavlenko 2012). For example, in L1, compared to L2, there is evidence of increased amygdala activation when reading emotion-laden passages (Hsu, Jacobs, and Conrad 2015); increased fear conditioning (García-Palacios et al. 2018); and increased skin conductance response to taboo words (Harris, Ayçiçeği, and Gleason 2003; Harris, Gleason, and Ayçiçeği 2006). These findings raise the possibility that L2 may be used in such a way as to reduce the emotional impact of autobiographical narratives. One frequently observed clinical phenomenon is the *detachment effect*, in which the second language of a speaker serves as a linguistic protection that could facilitate the discussion of highly emotional experiences (Marcos 1976; see also Altarriba 2002). Evidence from clinical case studies of bilinguals in therapy seems to suggest that bilingual patients frequently begin therapy in L2 (English), “refusing” to switch to L1 even with a therapist who speaks their native language, as they feel “safe and distant” by discussing their experiences in L2 (Pavlenko 2008: 156; see also Oquendo 1996). However, the switch to a patient’s native language is accompanied by a “breakthroughs or emotional outbursts” (Pavlenko 2008: 156). Byford (2015) suggests that L2 usage in psychotherapy may not only be a defensive mechanism, but also may be employed to allow clients to become a distanced third-person observer from events; therefore, L2 may serve an emotion regulation function (see also Dewaele and Costa 2013; Terrazas-Carrillo 2017).

6 Summary and future directions

Although language and narrative are not necessary for remembering all autobiographical memory details, they are fundamental and critical features of recalling and sharing the events of our lives. The overlapping emergence of language, narrative, and autobiographical memory skills throughout development, as well as the individual variability in these skills that arises as a result of differences in caregiver-child interactions, are a powerful demonstration of how intertwined these processes are. The constructive nature of autobiographical remembering leads to narrative variability that persists throughout the adult lifespan; narratives may vary depending on gender, culture, and the presence of clinical disorders. Indeed, the language used to describe past events may even be adjusted in the interest of changing or regulating one's emotional states. The work reviewed in this chapter reveals the intricate overlap in autobiographical memory, emotion, and language/narrative processes; however, there remain several aspects of this overlap that would benefit from additional research. Here, we highlight two broad domains that we believe would be especially valuable to consider.

First, as noted earlier, the development of autobiographical memory and narrative skills is relatively protracted across the early lifespan; however, much of the extant literature focuses on early childhood development when those skills are first emerging. It would be fruitful to explore how autobiographical narratives are constructed during later childhood, adolescence, and adulthood, especially for the emotional events that tend to be linked together to form one's life story. It will be additionally important for future research to consider how factors like gender and culture influence the construction of autobiographical narratives at these later timepoints. For example, recent evidence suggests that levels of parental elaborativeness are associated with neural differences in school-aged girls' autobiographical remembering for negative (vs. positive) events; these differences may reflect the socialization of emotions throughout childhood (Leventon, Merrill, and Bauer 2019). Longitudinal work could track the "fates" of autobiographical narratives to better understand how the sociocultural effects of early socialization influence the information that is recalled during these different lifetime periods.

Factors like gender and culture likely have pervasive influences on emotional autobiographical memory. A second critical avenue for future work would be to consider how short-term goals also might influence narratives across the lifespan. More empirical work should investigate how emotion regulation goals influence autobiographical narrative construction (see also Holland and Kensinger 2010). For example, intentional changes to autobiographical memory narratives (such as those that might occur during psychotherapy) might influence the emotional experience of recall, both as those changes are instructed and after a delay period. Additionally, the findings of reduced emotional experience when recalling events in a second language warrants further exploration, particularly with respect to how differences in L2 proficiency relate to emotional experience as well as how using L2 might affect which event details are recalled.

As we noted at the outset of this chapter, the process of reflecting on one's personal history serves several important self- and social-related functions. The constructive process of recall is open to influence, for example by sociocultural factors and emotion-related

goals. We believe that these areas of research will continue to be fruitful in revealing the intricate ways in which sharing the stories of our lives relies on memory, emotion, and language systems.

7 References

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XIV Affect theories in arts and literary scholarship

Simone Winko

68 Literature and emotion

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Abstract: In literary studies different theories about the relationship between literature and emotions are discussed and are used as a basis for different kinds of research. This article will provide an overview of the broad spectrum of these theories. For heuristic reasons the theories are grouped according to which element of literary communication they place at their centre: (i) production-oriented theories are interested in the function of emotions in writing literature; (ii) reception-oriented theories focus on emotions as the effects of literary texts; according to them the analysis of emotions and literature has to be empirical; (iii) text-oriented theories understand emotions as potential effects (*Wirkungspotenziale*); they focus on the emotions literary texts speak explicitly about as well as on emotions that are expressed in and with literature; (iv) context-oriented theories conceptualize the relationship between historical discourses on emotions and literature. Even if not all theories on literature and emotion can be assigned to one of these elements exclusively, the four categories help to provide a systematic overview over the different approaches that literary scholars have to deal with. The article briefly introduces important theories and illustrates them by referring to exemplary analyses of literary texts or phenomena.

1 Emotions as a subject area in literary studies

There is no doubt that emotions play an important role for readers of literature. Emotions can be triggered by reading, for instance, when readers are happy about the happy ending of a conflict-laden drama or feel sad about the death of their hero in a novel. Emotions can be at play in even two respects when readers enjoy the feeling of the shiver that a horror story evokes in them. Poetological texts, too, have long seen literature as an art form in which feelings can be ‘tested’ without danger and without the pressure of real action. Literature is also seen as an art form that makes it possible to drive culturally acceptable practices of representing or expressing emotions to their socially negotiated limits and beyond. Although they undoubtedly represent an important component of literary communication, emotions have only become the subject of in-depth and increasingly broad research in literary studies since the late 1990s. Above all, due to the achievements of cognitive

research and in the course of re-conceptualizing as well as reassessing the interrelation between cognition and emotion, emotions became the subject of broader scientific interest. As in other disciplines, emotion research in literary studies advanced around the turn of the millennium to become a particularly lively and diverse field of research. Its significance becomes apparent, among other things, in the number of scientific papers, third-party funded projects and handbooks on emotion. This article provides an overview of various approaches to emotions in literary studies. In addition to summarizing important areas of research, this article pursues a second objective: it also includes the manifold studies on literature and emotion from German-speaking countries, which are hardly read in the English-speaking world.

In the years before the ‘discovery’ of emotions as a subject area relevant to literary studies, emotions and related phenomena were already included in interpretations when, for example, depictions of love were examined in the works of Emily Brontë or Goethe. Reference to emotions, however, was predominantly based on the unproblematised assumption that the phenomenon could be accessed directly and without preconditions; explicit reference theories and methodological instruments were often lacking. In literary historical studies, e.g., on poetics, emotions were dealt with alongside other objects of study, but had no function for the theoretical frame of the approaches. One exception were psychoanalytically oriented studies. Apart from that, emotions were widely regarded as uninteresting or even unscientific objects. There are several reasons for this attitude related to the history of the discipline; the first of them applies above all to the German-speaking countries, the second to the English-speaking ones. Firstly, up to the early 1970s feelings were an important point of reference for the ‘work-immanent’ school in literary studies (*Werkimmanente Literaturwissenschaft*), which was dominant at the time. In what is probably the most prominent variant of this school, represented by Emil Staiger, the reference to feeling was postulated as a criterion of interpretation (cf. Martus 2007: 113–117). As a consequence of the attempts to make literary studies more scientific, such criteria were sharply attacked and criticized as not being scientifically satisfactory. Secondly, the warning against the so-called affective fallacy was one of the central elements of New Criticism. William K. Wimsatt and Monroe C. Beardsley (1949) claimed in their essay “The affective fallacy” that interpreters commit an affective fallacy if they mistake a work for its subjective effects. Literary works should neither be interpreted nor evaluated in terms of the readers’ subjective reactions; those who disregard this rule will fail to understand the essence of the literary work itself. Thirdly, there is a long tradition in literary studies of privileging ‘cognitive’ topics; for example, literature is particularly often examined in its references to philosophical theories or different sciences of its time. Only when – as a result of research in cognitive science – the simple binarity ‘cognition versus emotion’ was dissolved and emotional phenomena were revalued at the same time, did they become more interesting as objects of literary studies. Discourse analysis has also contributed to the revaluation of the topic, above all by broadening the contexts considered relevant to literature.

2 Terminology

It is characteristic for literary theory that concepts from other disciplines are adopted in order to conceptualize phenomena which do not occur exclusively in literature or in dealing with it. These phenomena also include emotions. Since emotions can be interesting in literary studies from different perspectives – for example as emotions in reading or as a topic dealt with in the texts – scholars refer to different disciplines when they are defining the concept of emotion they are working with. Literary scholars therefore necessarily take an interdisciplinary approach when investigating emotions, but they do so to varying degrees. Their reference disciplines are psychology, especially the psychology of emotion as part of cognitive psychology, evolutionary biology, linguistics, sociology and philosophy. Since not only the disciplines differ in their approaches, but also different approaches exist side by side within the disciplines, it is not surprising that different concepts of emotion are used in literary studies in both theories and historical studies.

As with most theoretical concepts in literary studies, there is no terminological agreement in the use of the concept of emotion. However, a kind of minimal consensus can be formulated. An emotion is usually understood as a psychophysical state that is connected with cognitions and in which a person relates to an object in the broad sense. Although emotions belong to the biological equipment of man, are anchored in evolution and are perceived (felt) in a subjective and direct way by individuals, they are at the same time culturally shaped to a high degree and in different ways. The components of this very general and rough definition can be described differently in terms of content as well as weighted differently in different approaches: In studies from the field of empirical research on literary reading, the focus lies on emotions as a mental state of recipients, influenced by several variables, and as a factor in the processing of literature. In approaches based on evolutionary biology, the aspect of emotion as an evolutionarily acquired program dominates (cf. Mellmann 2007). Whereas in text- and context-oriented approaches, the semiotic perspective dominates, according to which emotions, for example, constitute a code of their own and are at the same time culturally coded (cf. Winko 2003: 108–109). The assumption of coded emotions can be explained in different ways, e.g., with reference to sociology (Luhmann 1982: 21–39; Vester 1991: 69–97) or cultural anthropology (Lutz 2007). Keith M. Opdahl (2002: 97) also speaks of an “affective code” but understands it to mean a specific mode of processing literary texts. Knowledge in a culture includes knowledge about the nature of emotions and the prototypical scenarios in which they arise and develop in certain phases, as well as knowledge shaped by cultural norms about which emotions a person should feel in which situations and which form of expression is considered appropriate. This knowledge is discursively conveyed and determines not only the articulation but also the subjective perception of emotions.

Language is considered to be the most important medium to articulate emotions, even if it is often perceived as a deficient one. It can be used to speak more or less rationally about feelings, to *thematize* them, but it also has numerous means by which emotions can be *expressed* or *presented* (focusing on theories about the fundamental connections between language and emotion, see Lindquist, Gendron, and Satpute [2016]; Shanahan [2007]; fundamental for the German language and with focus on the variety of linguistic

means, see Fries [2007, 2009]; Schwarz-Friesel [2007: 134–209]). Both aspects come to bear in literary texts: for example, emotions are thematized when, in a novel, two characters talk about their love relationship or the narrator reveals and comments on the hidden envy of the protagonist that drives his actions. A variety of means can be used to express emotions. To give just three examples: In a drama, a character's monologue can suggest that she is angry without her saying it explicitly. In a narrative text, merely describing the physical gestures of a character can in some cases suffice to indicate that he is sad, even if the narrator does not explain this. In a poem, a nature scenario with connotations of joy can suggest a corresponding emotion of the speaker. All the means available in everyday language to articulate emotions can also be used in literature; beyond this, however, it has other means at its disposal which are perceived as specific, or at least typical, for literary texts, e.g., the metric structure of poems and the increased use of creative, 'bold' metaphors.

Even though a minimal consensus was formulated above, there are positions that define the basic concept differently and even name it differently. By choosing the term *affect*, researchers can signal that they are part of a long philosophical tradition that has been speaking of 'affects' since antiquity. But it can also indicate a fundamental theoretical decision and thus the affiliation to a certain theoretical approach, whether the phenomenon investigated is described as 'emotion' or as 'affect'. An example of this are various theoretical positions which are subsumed under the term *affective theory*. Some literary scholars argue for the use of a comprehensive concept of affect that avoids theoretical problems of the concept of emotion, referring to Brian Massumi's and Eve Sedgwick's Social or Political Philosophy and Performativity Theory on the one hand (cf. Massumi 1995), and to earlier poststructuralist theories on the other. Scholars who pursue this approach can, for example, refer to two long traditions of theories, ranging from Descartes to Althusser and from Rousseau to Phenomenology, and combine them with more recent neuroscientific and evolutionary research (in summary cf. Wehrs [2017: 34–41]). In this context, 'affect' is established as a concept that requires neither a strong notion of subject nor problematic concepts such as *representation*. Structurally, the same subversive status can be attributed to it that was ascribed to language in theories of the 1970s: "Affect is treated as a prime site or engine of liberating subversion, or as a place where oppressive 'nurturing' does its work" (Wehrs 2017: 3). If such a function is attributed to it, the concept of affect becomes a broad and 'highly charged' concept. In papers of other directions of scholarly research, however, the terms *emotional* and *affective* can also be used side by side and differ either only in semantic nuances or not at all, i.e., they can be used synonymously. In these papers it is usually the concept of emotion that is used as the central term, in the sense outlined above. This is also the case in this article.

Furthermore, it should be emphasized that literary studies not only analyse emotions in the sense outlined above, but also address related phenomena, such as 'moods' or the 'atmosphere' of literary texts, which cannot always be clearly distinguished from emotions (e.g., Gumbrecht 2012). For reasons of space, I will only refer to these positions here, without being able to go into them in more detail.

3 Approaches to literature and emotion: An overview

Today one can find numerous literary scholarly contributions in the field of literature and emotion. For reasons of clarity, it can be divided according to which element or perspective of literary communication is placed at the centre:

1. Production-oriented theories look into the role emotions play during the writing of literature.
2. Reception-oriented theories concentrate on emotions as effects of literary texts; supporters of these theories often apply empirical methods.
3. Text-centred theories understand emotions as potential effects of literary texts and ask about the emotions that are thematized in literature and expressed in or with it; or they examine different groups of literary texts from an emotion-analytical perspective.
4. Context-centred theories conceptualize the relationship between literature and historical discourses on emotions.

Even if not all approaches fit neatly into one of these categories, they help to give an overview of the different approaches that exist in literary studies today.

3.1 Production-oriented theories

The inquiry into emotions as factors in the production of literature is probably the area in recent emotion research for which the smallest effort has been made, although it is widely assumed that emotions play an important role in the production of literary texts. This assumption may be justified by the fact that emotions are among the factors which contribute to the authors' knowledge and experience and can thus influence literary writing. Several author-philological studies work with this assumption and manage without an explicit theoretical framework. They prove, for example, that specific emotions or, more generally, the state of mind of an author determine or at least influence certain works or creative phases. It depends on the state of the textual material in the individual case whether this connection can be made plausible or not.

However, there are literary theories in which the productive function of affects belongs to its basic assumptions. The spectrum of production-oriented theories is quite broad. They can be centred on the author and assume some kind of connection between the life or experience of an author and his writing. But they can also focus on writing as a semiotic process and ask about the importance of emotions in this process without focussing on the author.

For a long time, psychoanalytical contributions following Sigmund Freud dominated among the author-centred theories, one of whose theoretical premises was the assumption of a productive function of affects. The relationship between the production of literary texts and the author's affects can be established through Freud's analogization of literature and daydream (cf. Freud [1907] 2000: 41–45). Like the fantasizing person, the poet indirectly fulfils an unconscious, tabooed desire. This is made possible by the literary form and its various transformations: In its literary form, desire becomes acceptable – both for the au-

thor and for the reader – and the negative emotions actually ‘socially appropriate’ towards the tabooed subject are replaced by pleasure. Psychoanalytical literary studies, including those that go beyond Freud, have so far provided neither a comprehensive theory nor a method for the analysis of emotions (Lyons 1980: 25). Even the important question of what exactly are the psychological and aesthetic strategies in which affects would be reflected in the work of art is still waiting to be answered (Angeloch 2016: 118). Nevertheless, there are many interpretations of literary texts that argue psychoanalytically and in which, among other things, attention is paid to emotions. They generally combine the theoretical framework of psychoanalysis with close reading of texts and context documents, without using an analytical procedure specific to the subject ‘emotion’.

Since the 2000s, theories of cognitive psychology and evolutionary biology have gained importance in literary studies. Even though the studies that use these theories or adapt them to literature as subject usually focus on the reception of literature, some of them also deal with the perspective of production. The framework theories can usually be spelled out for both key elements of literary communication, for authors and readers of literary texts. On an evolutionary-biological basis, it is assumed that specific emotions such as fear, which is particularly ‘firmly anchored’ by evolutionary processes, and social emotions are among the motives for the production of literature (cf. Mellmann 2016: 162, 167–168). Literary works – like other works of art – are conceived as a way of solving a problem that can be explained by evolutionary biology: the necessity of clarifying emotional concepts and patterns of experiencing emotions repeatedly and in an intersubjective way (Mellmann 2016: 167). Considering the general question why people spend so much effort on artefacts like literary texts at all, pleasure as an affective phenomenon has an important explanatory power: In the *pleasure mode* (which extends the *organizational mode* in the model of John Tooby and Leda Cosmides [cf. Tooby and Cosmides 2001: 16]) on the one hand, various human skills are tested in a ‘free of purpose’ way; on the other hand, however, at the same time a physiological purpose is achieved (cf. Eibl 2004: 39–44). In studies that refer to cognitive psychological theories, there are assumptions about emotional pre-conditions on the part of the authors. In her work on empathy in literature, for example, Suzanne Keen assumes that “[a]uthors’ empathy bears on fictional worldmaking and character creation” (Keen 2013: paragraph 7). Empathy thus probably has an effect on the structure of the fictional world, the design of the characters, and the overall choice of linguistic means. Patrick Colm Hogan, for example, ascribes an important function for the production of literature to emotional references under the collective (cf. Hogan 2018: 62–79) as well as under the individual aspect (cf. Hogan 2018: 80–95).

Production-oriented approaches also include studies that describe the emergence of literature in an author-sceptical mode, i.e., without the assumption of a ‘strong’ author (cf. the summary in Knaller [2017]). Various concepts of ‘writing scene’ (*Schreibszene*), for example, can be assigned to this direction. They define writing as a dynamic relationship between, among other things, the body, media and technical conditions and genre conventions, as well as a reflection of this relationship. The far-reaching assumption of an “inevitable coupling of writing and emotion” (Knaller 2017: 25) must not, however, hide the fact that the postulated connection between literary writing and emotions has so far neither been systematically investigated (cf. Knaller 2017: 23) nor empirically founded. Creativity

research has emphasized the function of emotions for creative processes in general and their significance for the establishment of a creative situation in particular (see as an early example Brodbeck [1999]), as it also characterizes literary writing. But even the seemingly obvious assumption of the productive effect of author emotions cannot be considered empirically well researched if it goes beyond general statements to specific effects. Only a few studies have been carried out that empirically test the general assumptions (cf. Alfes 1995: 123–131; also the approach in Schiewer [2017]). The lack of such studies could be related to the fact that the category ‘author’ has been heavily problematized in literary studies and that in the course of this it may have seemed unattractive to consolidate the ‘evident’ interrelationships in elaborate investigations. There is still fundamental work to be done regarding this perspective on the field of literature and emotion.

3.2 Reception-oriented theories

Emotions, as factors that play an important role in the reception of literature, have traditionally been the subject of rhetoric. The effect of texts and thus also the feelings triggered by them were dealt with in the theory of affects. In literary studies, concepts and procedures of rhetoric were primarily used as a context to reconstruct the knowledge of authors and to shed light on their texts, rather than to reveal the actual impact of texts and the importance of feelings for readers. In the 1970s, Reception Aesthetics helped to draw greater attention to the reader of literary texts and thus potentially to his or her emotions. The same applies to Roland Barthes’ (1973) plea for a pleasure-oriented professional approach to literature. However, it was not these older theories that caused the rise of reader-related emotion research in literary studies, but evolutionary biology and, first of all, the various theories of cognition. While on an evolutionary-biological basis the functions of literature were redefined, with consequences also for the understanding of author and reader (cf. 3.1; Carroll 2008: 118), cognitive models and findings provided the foundation primarily for the empirical and experimental investigation of the field of reading and emotion. In addition to theoretical drafts based on cognitive psychology, numerous empirical studies from this field of research were presented.

A dominant interest in the reader characterizes empirical emotion research, in which objects and questions of literary studies are brought together with various methods of (reader) psychological approaches. As early as 1968, Norman N. Holland proposed a psychoanalytic theory of literary reception, which he later tested empirically (cf. Holland 1975). He claims that “readers respond to literature in terms of their own ‘lifestyle’ (or ‘character’ or ‘personality’ or ‘identity’)\”, i.e., “an individual’s characteristic way of dealing with the demands of outer and inner reality [...] grown through time from earliest infancy” (Holland 1975: 8). Most of the more recent empirical studies on the correlation between emotion and literature, however, refer to theories of cognitive psychology. These studies have been carried out since the 1980s, but increasingly since the 2000s, and their broad spectrum can only be briefly indicated here (cf. Miall 2007). A heuristic distinction made by David Miall and Don Kuiken (2002: 223–225) illustrates the wide range of aspects of emotion that are examined. They distinguish four areas in which feelings are important in the reception of

literary texts: “evaluative feelings”, which evaluate the text read, e.g., the joy or the feeling of disappointment when reading a novel; “aesthetic feelings”, which arise from the effect of formal elements, e.g., being touched by an apt formulation; “narrative feelings”, which readers develop in relation to elements of the fictional world, e.g., empathy with a character or a correspondence with the mood or atmosphere expressed in the text; and “self-modifying feelings that restructure the reader’s understanding of the textual narrative and, simultaneously, the reader’s sense of self” (Miall and Kuiken 2002: 223). Empirical studies have been carried out in all four areas.

A series of studies is devoted to the question of how emotional attitudes influence reading motivation and understanding literature. Some of them focus on readers and their system of prerequisites (“Voraussetzungssystem” [cf. Rusch and Schmidt 1983: 16–38]), i.e., on the cognitive and social conditions that influence readers’ response to literary texts. This is the case, for example, if the relevance of their emotional knowledge for the process of understanding is examined. For example, several studies analysed the nature and extent of the knowledge that needs to be activated in the process of text comprehension in order to capture the emotional state of characters. To this end, readers apply emotion-related knowledge that they have gained from both life experience and reading experience (cf. Gernsbacher 1995; Graesser and Zwaan 1995: 120–122). Some of them put a stronger focus on the text and on examining the effect the emotions addressed in the text have on understanding. It has been shown that emotions of the characters can have a positive or negative influence on the understanding of a fictional text relative to its degree of complexity and depending on the reading purpose (cf. Dijkstra et al. 1994).

In addition to studies devoted to emotional attitudes as prerequisites for reading and understanding literature, studies on the emotional experience when reading literary texts have produced a wealth of interesting results (cf. van Holt and Groeben 2006). These papers explore emotions as text-induced effects. On the one hand, effects have been investigated that cannot be assigned to specific emotions but form general affective effects when reading literary texts, such as the much-discussed flow experience and immersion (often discussed for films). More recent studies on immersion are available, which experimentally investigate the phenomenon using cognitive neuroscience (e.g., Jacobs and Lüdtke 2017). The studies are embedded in a model of literary reading that in an integrative way combines the results of neurocognitive research with positions in both psycholinguistics and various literary theories. On the other hand, the so-called artefact emotions are analysed, which refer to the literary text as an aesthetic object or to its style. Here, for example, the effect of stylistic and structural means such as metre and rhythm in poetry, which for a long time have been regarded as specifically poetic, is examined. To give just one example: An experimental study has shown that metre and rhyme influence the cognitive processing of poems as well as the aesthetic and emotional reaction to them (cf. Obermeier et al. 2013).

Several studies are available on different types of fiction-related emotions. So-called fiction emotions, which correspond to the above-mentioned “narrative feelings” in Miall and Kuiken (2002), are related to the world depicted in the text, especially to the characters and events. Even though they are primarily felt for entities of the fictional world, readers can also transfer them to reality and relate them to other people or their own person (cf. van Holt and Groeben 2006: 116–118; Miall and Kuiken 2002: 220–230, 233–238). Among

other things, these studies examine the conditions under which readers can build up specific mental representations of the protagonists' emotions in texts (on the basis of short narrative texts written for experimental purposes; see Gillioz and Gygax 2017).

Regarding fiction-related emotions, a controversy on the so-called "paradox of fiction" is being carried out in literary studies as well as in aesthetic theory (cf. Köppe 2009). In simplified terms, it concerns the fact that recipients, conscious of reading a fictional text whose characters do not exist in reality, can nevertheless experience feelings that they consider to be real. Some scholars, following positions of Analytical Aesthetics, classify these literature-induced feelings as merely imagined, at best as analogous to real emotions; in contrast, other scholars, drawing on empirical studies, assert that these are the same emotions that people also experience in their everyday lives (cf. Mellmann 2016: 159). The question of what induces emotions is also controversial. For Noel Carroll, a representative of "thought theory", for example, readers of horror literature "can be moved by the content of thoughts entertained" (Carroll 1990: 88), i.e., their feelings are triggered by the thoughts, suggested to them by the text (cf. Carroll 1990: 82–88).

Among the research on fiction emotion, the studies on the role of empathy in understanding literary texts form a particularly extensive and lively group (cf. the overview in Koopman and Hakemulder [2015]). Many studies seem to support the proposition that reading literary texts has positive effects on social skills, especially on the understanding of others (see, e.g., Oatley 2016). This effect is explained, among other things, by the fact that readers who become involved in a story are emotionally engaged and induced to draw inferences, and that fictional texts encourage them to deal with particularly complex characters and situations that do not occur in everyday life (cf. Oatley 2016: 618). Against this, other scholars doubt that such far-reaching causal conclusions can be drawn from the studies (cf. Koopman and Hakemulder 2015: 86–87). The fact that empathy plays an important role in understanding literature, however, is well documented. The same applies to the close connection between empathy, which "involves sharing feelings as well as sensations of immersion" (Keen 2013: paragraph 5), and emotions in literary texts. Brigitte Scheele (2014) has presented a model of the interplay of empathy and sympathy that considers both the reader and the text and its composition as important factors.

Synthesizing studies such as the monograph by Michael Burke (2011) are particularly effective among non-empirically interested experts. Burke integrates various empirical approaches and results in order to describe literary reading more precisely, and with the image of the "oceanic mind" he has found a memorable formula for the close interaction of cognitive and affective processes in the reading of literary texts. He attributes the highly emotional reaction that readers can show, for example, when reading a novel and even after having read it, to various factors, above all to personal experiences remembered and previous reading impressions that affect what they have just read. He assumes an ongoing "literary reading loop" (Burke 2011: 153), which, among other things, ensures affective continuity.

An influential philosophical position that ascribes high social relevance to literature also has an integrative effect: From the perspective of moral philosophy, Martha Nussbaum claims that a literary text "can be a paradigm of moral activity" (Nussbaum 1985: 516). As she shows for a novel by William James, it "offers us, by the very fact that it is a novel,

training in a tender and loving objectivity that we can also cultivate in life" (Nussbaum 1985: 527). Emotions thus play an important role in the literature-induced process of improving the reader's ability to judge morally: Readers become emotionally involved without being under pressure to act and can thus 'play through' decision-making situations in a free manner.

The emotional effects of literature can, however, not only be analysed empirically, experimentally or through philosophical reasoning, but also through the interpretation of historical reception documents. The aim is to find answers to questions such as: With what emotions have readers of past historical epochs responded to literary works? With what expectations of emotional effects did they read the texts at all?

3.3 Text-oriented theories

Under the third perspective, emotions are examined as textual phenomena. Two general directions can be distinguished: Representatives of the first direction are convinced that it would be fruitful to improve the tools for analysing and interpreting literary texts by systematically adding emotion-related categories to the well-established categories. The aim is to be able to describe the relevant emotional phenomena in literary texts more precisely and thus to gain a broader understanding of literature. For this purpose, genre-specific methods of analysis have been developed.

The other direction draws directly on 20th-century emotional theories to gain new insights into a literary text without transferring these theories into an analytical technique specific to literature. They are usually used to describe or explain the mechanisms of the fictional world, especially the actions of characters. Theories from psychology of emotions or evolutionary biology thus expand the arsenal of context theories, 'in the light of which' a literary text can be read. This procedure can be justified in different ways. A guiding premise can be, for example, the assumption that a new theoretical, fundamental concept of affect leads to the production of "new understandings of what texts (especially literary ones) do and are" (Wehrs 2017: 41). In practice, this means that, for one, new questions are posed to literary texts and, for another, emotion-theoretical texts are included in the analyses *ad hoc* and provide the categories of investigation. Under this condition, it is possible, for example, to use 20th-century emotion theories to explain the narrated world of a 19th-century novel (Hogan 2011: 29–68) or to "(re)assess" William Wordsworth's "affective poetics" (Bruhn 2017: 671). Another, more mediated justification is to focus on author and reader as actual communicating instances, which makes it plausible to use recent theories about human cognition to explain their communication. These cognitive and evolutionary theories provide "reliable concepts to describe the human behaviour that comes to bear on the reception of literature" (Müller-Wood 2014: 156). They can become relevant for literary studies under two premises: It is assumed, on the one hand, that some emotions can be regarded as universal (cf. Carroll 2008: 112, 122) and, on the other hand, that these universal emotions are used as a means of communication between author and reader in literary texts. Under these conditions, single texts and text passages can be interpreted in a way that they aim for example – using a "psycho-poetic effect" (Mellmann 2010: 423–427) – at

the emotional identification of the reader with the protagonist, even if there are no explicit signals in the text that would suggest this (cf. Müller-Wood 2014: 148–153).

Among the text-centred approaches, there are those that focus on the analysis of individual texts (3.3.1) and others that analyse groups of texts of different dimensions under the guiding question of their reference to emotions (3.3.2).

3.3.1 Approaches related to single literary texts

The way of speaking of emotions as textual phenomena has caused irritation, since it cannot make sense to attribute emotions to a text. This way of speaking is, however, an abbreviation for the assumption that there are different components in literary texts that possess the ability to activate emotional knowledge and evoke emotions. In a text-oriented approach, emotions are studied under three interrelated guiding aspects, which can be combined with three guiding questions: Firstly, the analysis focuses on the question of how emotions are articulated in literature. The focus is on the way in which emotions are thematized and expressed or presented in literary texts. Various proposals have been made to specify and describe more precisely the thematization and expression of emotions (e.g., they can be combined with Bühler's language functions [cf. Schiewer 2007]). They relate to the emotions in the fictional world, above all the emotions of the characters, which motivate their actions, which they articulate in their speech and express in their behaviours, or which a mediating authority such as the narrator attributes to them. The second aspect, related to the first, focuses on the question of what emotional knowledge is needed to understand a given literary text in general. This knowledge is historically variable. 'Understanding' in this respect covers processes of varying scope: from elementary text comprehension to the understanding of complex literary mechanisms. Among other theoretical assumptions, text linguistic models are adopted as reference theories and are modified for the domain of literature; models in which emotional knowledge belongs to the knowledge types necessary for language comprehension (e.g., Scherner 1994: 334). On this basis, thirdly, the potential of a literary text to induce emotions is analysed. In focus are the strategies which serve this purpose, and thus the question which linguistic expressions, images, elements of action and other means the literary text presents are capable of evoking emotions and of conveying certain (and not any) emotions to the readers (cf. "Emotionalisierung" [Anz 2007: 217]). The point here is not whether readers actually do react emotionally in the reconstructed way, but rather to systematically analyse the emotion codes and strategies of 'emotional design' that can be identified in the text and have the potential to induce certain emotions.

Studies with this text-analytical focus use the cognitive-theoretical concepts of empirical research to form a model of emotional text processing that can serve as a basis for detailed text analysis. They are based on the conviction that hermeneutic studies should integrate the results of recent research on text comprehension. The second important reference discipline is linguistics: concepts as well as results of text linguistics and linguistics of emotion are included (especially for German-language texts [cf. Fries 2007, 2009; Schwarz-Friesel 2007]) in order to understand the specific literary features of thematization

and expression or presentation of emotions better and to improve textual analyses which must consider the historical and cultural variability of linguistic means. Emotion-related methods of analysis, which give particular consideration to the genre-specific characteristics of literary texts, have been developed for poetry (Winko 2003), narrative texts (Hillebrandt 2011) and plays (Schonlau 2017). The structural characteristics of a poem differ from those of a narrative text, and a novel uses other formal means than a tragedy. These genre-related differences are reflected in the way emotions are expressed or presented, in part even in the way they are thematized. While in poems, for example, rhythmic and sound qualities can be used to emotionalize, prose texts use, among other means, several narrative techniques to direct sympathy, and dramatic texts use the characters' speech and the relationship between main and secondary text.

3.3.2 Approaches related to groups of literary texts

Even though the aim of the approaches just mentioned is to examine individual literary texts in detail, text groups can also be approached from a text-centred perspective. Some studies focus on genres, especially on those whose prototypical properties include certain emotional effects. First of all, genre literature should be mentioned, such as crime novels, to which the production of suspense is attributed, or horror literature, for which shivers or *Angstlust* ('thrill') are typical. Also to be mentioned, although less relevant from this point of view, are comedy, which functionalizes humour to varying degrees (cf. Kindt 2011: 139–158), and tragicomedy as a mixed form. The concepts that are included in the definition of genre are partly controversial. For example, the concept of suspense can have different meanings; it can denote the cognitive suspense of mystery-solving, but it can also denote the affective tension that is directed at the question of how the story might end (cf. Mellmann 2016: 166–167). In a study with a broad historical range, Burkhard Meyer-Sickendiek proposed to write the history of literary genres as the history of various 'leading affects' ("Leitaffekte" [Meyer-Sickendiek 2005: 39]) and their changing; he identified certain key scenarios (Meyer-Sickendiek 2005: 46) for the genres, each of which is associated with one emotion, and in some cases with several emotions. From a text-centred perspective, it is interesting to see which means the texts assigned to these genres or sub-genres use to achieve emotionalizing or emotion-mediating effects, and which creative scope is used.

In addition to those works that are interested in emotion-related genre specifics, there are attempts to group literary texts in other ways using theories of emotion. For example, the search can be focused on cross-cultural patterns of stories that are marked by emotions (cf. Hogan 2003: 83–96), be it love stories, stories that are driven by anger or hatred, or stories in which conflicts arise from the feelings of envy of the characters and intrigues that result from this emotion. Patrick Colm Hogan has shown three "universal narrative prototypes" for narrative texts: "heroic, romantic, and sacrificial" (Hogan 2011: 19). He explains the fact that they "recur across cultures" by assuming "that these prototypes derive from particular emotion systems" (Hogan 2011: 19). He supposes that he can use the knowledge about emotional patterns gained from affective sciences to explain narrative patterns in literary texts, and that at the same time he has a tool which helps to better understand the texts as individual works (Hogan 2011: 6).

Works from the field of digital literary studies also examine larger groups of texts. They adopt quantitative methods of sentiment analysis and develop them further in order to investigate emotional speech in literary texts on the basis of words, themes, linguistic images and other parameters. The advantage of these approaches lies in the fact that they can examine the emotional structures in a large corpus of literary texts and do not have to be limited to one single text or a few texts that are regarded to be representative. Thus, they can provide well-founded statements about developments in the literary thematization and presentation of emotions over a longer period of time or in the comparison of large corpora, for example on the distinctive use of emotional information (especially the thematization of emotions) in different literary genres (Kim, Padó, and Klinger 2017). Restrictions that arose because the affective lexicons were only available for contemporary language and could hardly be used for historical studies, have been removed in the meantime (cf. Buechel, Hellrich, and Hahn 2016). The analysis of emotions seems to be a particularly rewarding, but also difficult field for digital literary studies, in which there are still numerous open questions to be answered.

3.4 Context-oriented theories

Studies on emotions as a relevant contemporary context for literature already existed before the rise of emotion research in literary studies. In the numerous studies that examine the relationship between literature and contemporary assumptions about emotions, different theoretical approaches can be used; above all, references can be found to social history, discourse history, intellectual history and history of knowledge as well as to cultural anthropology. Using these theories as a reference, speaking about feelings in a culture is reconstructed by analysing non-literary documents or describing real-world practices in order to understand their effect on and relationship to literary texts (e.g., Schlaeger and Stedman 1999). Literature can even be understood as a particularly important source for a history of emotions (e.g., Benthien, Fleig, and Kasten 2000). For context-oriented literary studies on emotion, it is even more important than for the other three perspectives to consider the terminological diversity used to describe the phenomena under investigation. This diversity results, among other reasons, from the fact that in the course of literary history different terms have been used to denote emotional phenomena. One finds terms like ‘affect’, ‘passion’, ‘sensation’, ‘feeling’ etc., which even can have different meanings at different times. Historical semantics is a particularly important reference here.

Poetological, philosophical or scientific texts about emotions are the preferred contexts. In poetics, emotional phenomena have played a role since Antiquity. Best known are the effects caused by tragedy mentioned in Aristotelian Poetics: *eleos* ('wailing or pity') and *phobos* ('shuddering or fear') whose function is to 'purge' the audience of negative affects (*catharsis*). The classification of literary works according to their cognitive and emotional effects (*docere, movere*), attributed to them in poetics of the Enlightenment, should also be mentioned here. Since in literary studies poetics and other literary programmatic texts are frequently used as particularly obvious documents for contextualizing literature, emotional phenomena are best known from this perspective (e.g., it dominates in the hand-

book by von Koppenfels and Zumbusch [2016]). With the revaluation of topics related to the human body in literary studies, caused by discourse history, the spectrum of cultural contexts considered relevant has been expanded. Everyday documents, medical, anthropological and psychological texts concerning emotions as well as moral narratives or behavioural treatises are used to contextualize literature or to reconstruct the emotion discourse beyond the boundaries of various institutions (cf. the contributions in Schlaeger and Stedman [1999]). Context-centred approaches also include works that analyse historically comprehensive theses and relate them to literature. These include, for example, the description of an epoch by means of its programmatic preference for certain emotions or for an emotional capacity in general as a particularly important criterion, e.g., Sentimentalism (*Empfindsamkeit*) (cf. Bell 2000; Wegmann 1988) or, on the contrary, by means of its decided renunciation of feelings, e.g., New Objectivity (*Neue Sachlichkeit*).

3.5 Emotions and literary evaluation

There are practices that cannot be sensibly integrated into the classification chosen above. This includes the evaluation of literature. Literary theories and methods that aim at the aspect of emotions or affects not only lead to new approaches to the analysis and interpretation of literary texts but can also be reflected in the evaluation of texts. Thus, the consideration of emotional factors for the evaluation of literary texts can cause a change of perspective to other criteria than those currently applied in literary studies, but also in literary criticism. For example, the emotional impact on readers could be used as a measure to assess the quality of a literary work. The central question then would be: "How powerfully does a literary work *move us?*" (Shanahan 2007: 227; original emphasis). The 'emotional performance' of literary works is used as a criterion of evaluation, a criterion which, at least in the German-speaking world, has long been regarded as an indication of triviality by literary experts and has not been used to evaluate highbrow literature. However, none of the different approaches has been sufficiently spelled out or systematically tested. A different, implicit practice is to transfer highly valued assumptions of one's own theory to the object of investigation and to regard those literary texts as particularly valuable in which these assumptions can be identified. This practice of evaluation, recurrent in literary studies, can also be found in emotion-related literary research.

4 Conclusion

The four perspectives of research on emotions (3.1 to 3.4) are more of a heuristic tool. In fact, most studies combine two or more of them. For example, empirical reader research (3.2) to a certain extent has to describe text structures that trigger or modify emotions. And the proposals for a methodically guided emotion-related analysis of literary texts, as already mentioned in (3.3), include findings from empirical research as well as theories of cognitive psychology. Some attempts to make psychoanalysis fruitful for emotion analysis also focus on all four perspectives (cf. Angeloch 2016: 109–115). In general, the interaction

of the various factors is considered particularly important for an appropriately comprehensive analysis and interpretation of literary texts (e.g., Nünning 2017: 30). Thomas Anz (2012) has proposed an integrative model of emotional communication with and through stimulus configurations (“Reizkonfigurationen” [Anz 2012: 158]) in artefacts. He argues in favour of combining the research perspectives, which so far have been too one-sided. According to Anz, not only the emotional reactions to literary texts examined by psychologists but also the linguistic strategies of emotionalization analysed by text-oriented literary scholars contribute to a complex emotional communication. Beyond this, various factors have to be considered on the side of the producers: they range from the intentions of emotionalization to culturally coined assumptions about the dispositions of the addressee (Anz 2012: 167).

On the whole, the manifold analyses of emotions in literary studies have contributed to the fundamental research of the discipline and provided a multitude of insights both into the reception of literary texts as well as into their strategies of emotionalization and into the literary ‘design’ of individual emotions such as love and jealousy, fear and mourning (to mention only two anthologies of many: Brennan [2003]; Plotke and Ziem [2014]).

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69 Emotional creativity

- 1 Introduction
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- 5 Creativity, art, and emotion. An interdisciplinary approach
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Abstract: As a multifaceted activity central to the human experience, any discourse on Art must take an interdisciplinary approach. Intuitively, art, emotion, and creativity are interconnected: Emotion both drives the creation of art and is evoked by the artwork itself. Despite this intuitive relationship, past and current research on art, emotion, and creativity as separate and linked topics has failed to provide all-encompassing definitions, explanations, and interpretations; what they are, why they exist, and what they mean as objects and experiences are undoubtedly vast and complex questions. Moreover, entrenched disciplinary silos have until recently prevented empirical integration and thus a holistic perspective on how they feed into one another. As a chapter within a section on affect theories in arts and literary scholarship, the overarching issue of language and emotion is addressed through the lens of the literary text and specifically considers text, readers, and interpretation a dynamic creative process. The resulting experience, moreover, is the conscious appraisal of dynamic searches and emotional exchanges across personal meaning and social context. Merging the humanities with the cognitive sciences, this chapter discusses the core questions and inherent characteristics that make artistic activity such a uniquely personal experience for all.

1 Introduction

It is widely acknowledged that art has the power to move us, transport us, transform us. That art can provide us with comedy and tragedy and elicit the entire gamut of human emotion and experience is undeniable. Whether we are the reader/spectator/user and/or the creator/designer, art plays a fundamental emotional-sociocultural role in our daily lives. From the lullabies sung to us in infancy and the imaginary characters we created during play as toddlers to the live concerts we listen to or perform in, the page-turning stories we read or write, the films we watch or direct, or the architectural works we inhabit or design, art is a part of our human existence. Further yet, “all human life is filled with works of art of every kind – from cradlesong, jest, mimicry, the ornamentation of houses,

dress, and utensils, up to church services, buildings, monuments, and triumphal processions. It is all artistic activity” (Tolstoy 1925: 51). Art and artistic activity are so much a part of our life experience that a world without them is hard, if not impossible, to imagine. Yet explaining the experiences of art and the processes of artistic activity in all their multisensory richness is a daunting one. How can particular arrangements of colors and forms and sound waves and words, for example, elicit such powerful discrete and mixed reactions in us? Are there universal elements within such creative arrangements or is it all a matter of personal interpretation as determined by one’s history and taste preferences? Why do we create and engage with art? Are we all creators of art in a world seemingly filled with a range of artistic activities? While these questions will not be definitively answered, this chapter will touch upon the various interconnected components of the artistic experience – i.e., the artistic object, the perceiver/interpreter, and the creator – in order to paint a more cohesive picture of what leads to such a unique and dynamic experience for all involved. Three keywords stand out: Art, Emotion, and Creativity. A discussion on the intersection between art, emotion, and creativity inevitably invites the need to address the hotly debated questions “what is art”, “what is emotion”, and “what is creativity”. While all three questions have long histories of debates and various definitions across cultures and a variety of disciplines, I will take a contemporary and merged perspective on each for the purpose of uniting them and focusing on their core interconnected aspects. Specifically, the current analysis will focus on the literary arts and literary theory from a Western stance to address the handbook’s larger theme of language and emotion. Accepting the notion that emotional linguistic labels like “happy” or “sad”, for example, refer to a speaker’s experience (e.g., Davitz 1969), the literary text stands as an exemplary form from which to dissect the context of the experience in question. This approach to a discussion on language calls attention to the dynamic nature of the experience as it results from the narrative flow on the page, the reader’s mind, and/or in the interpreter’s actions on the stage. By a contemporary and merged perspective I refer to an interdisciplinary approach that is informed by current thought within the humanities and the cognitive sciences and that weaves the “two cultures” of art versus science, as they currently stand, back into one seamless narrative. The intent is to offer a holistic appreciation of how art, emotion, and creativity interrelate and what can be done to move forward in our understanding of being human and the humanistic experience within academic scholarship and beyond.

2 Art, literary arts and literary theory with respect to language

Beginning with “what is art”, we can ask the following more specific question: what is it that constitutes a thing or event or sequence of either to be labeled as such? At first glance, the word art is used to refer to architecture, drama, literature, music, painting, poetry, sculpture, or any other object or activity that has been made and/or performed by a highly practiced and lauded expert or group of experts. Such works are usually exhibited or performed within a cultural institution as a private estate, museum, or concert hall. Prior to

opening night or a world premiere, critics – or those endowed with the authority and respect to opine – are given exclusive access to rate the work's original, aesthetic qualities. The more the work's virtues and its creator's credentials are extolled, the more revered by educated audiences and upmarket collectors alike. This perspective of what constitutes an artistic object/event, however, is only of one kind. A second more historical and global glance beyond this Eurocentric landscape of classical and fine art (or *beaux arts*) reveals that Art as exclusive, untouchable, singular, and unbreakable is hardly all encompassing (e.g., Brown and Dissanayake 2009; Goguen 2000;).

From the late 19th century to at least the year 2020, the world of artistic representation is replete with examples of art movements and their respective artworks redefining the very notion of what art is, can, and should be. A partial chronological rundown through movements – Impressionism, Post-Impressionism, Art Nouveau, Cubism, Dada, Bauhaus, Surrealism, Abstract Impressionism, Kinetic and Op Art, Pop Art, Performance Art, Minimalism, Conceptual Art, Environmental Art, Mass Media Art, Transdisciplinary Art, BioArt, Artificial Intelligent Art, ... to be determined – highlights the constant rule-bending and complete breaking of expectations surrounding predefined artistic purpose, experience, and practice. Whether for personal, political, scientific, sociocultural, and/or technological reasons, artists from all classes of educational and cultural backgrounds have explicitly rejected many norms, challenging a myriad of expectations: the traditional inherited techniques of visual, literary, musical and performance styles, the representation of nature, truth and reality, the status quo of objects, the usage of materials and methods, the meaning of space – the external world, the internal body and their intersection, the blending of genres, the purpose of artistic activity and practice, and even the criteria of the artist or category of creators of art themselves, to name a few. Such questioning and straining of rules and the very foundation of a given framework range from combining, separating, and reforming information piece by piece, to radically transforming information with dramatic imposition of intellectual and cultural change.

What these responses to established standards and categories and schools of thought reveal is a tight cognitive-behavioral relationship to our environment. Everyone experiences their various environments during childhood and adulthood in such vastly different ways that, from a cognitive perspective, anyone's expressive reaction is equally as valuable as the next. In fact, such diversity of experience is essential to building a holistic understanding of how the mind/brain develops, matures, and further changes along the human lifespan. As to the value of one experience over the other, given assumptions need to be examined: who is to determine that a particular artist's poetic license in one context is superior or inferior to another's in another context? Or that one playwright's dialogue is more aesthetic than another's? Why is one representation, experience or interpretation of the world more valuable than the rest? Whose interpretation of an artwork is the "correct" one – that of the artist, the perceiver (expert or non-expert), the target audience for which the artwork has been made, or the collective that is society at large? What is gained by declaring a "correct" way to interpret an expressed experience? More precisely, when shedding community-built and community-led elitist notions and academically determined standards of judgment of what should be when and where and by whom, artists' or any human being's responses offer a plethora of examples of humans reacting most differently,

creatively, and innovatively to their local and global worlds. In other words, such reactions can be seen as humans' efforts to understand themselves, others, and their changing surroundings in an adaptive way irrespective of whether one or many individuals react "more sensitively and intelligently than others" (Brooks 1979: 600), as professed by some. Crucially, all of these reactive differences are a goldmine of data points for understanding the complexity of perception and cognition of the human mind/brain. To focus on a single group, single mindset – i.e., WEIRD or Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich, and Democratic societies – is to erroneously categorize and explain so-called universal human phenomena (Henrich, Heine, and Norenzayan 2010). More variety in a sample is fundamental to building a more inclusive theory of the human experience.

Further stepping away from the mostly Western-born and influenced movements mentioned and turning to non-Western examples of artistic functions, experiences, and practices provides an even more diverse and comprehensive view of what the arts – lowercased to be all inclusive – as a psycho-behavioral activity mean to humanity at large. For example, not all societies (i) make a distinction between art, crafts, and artifacts; (ii) require specialization, training, and/or established skill to be able to engage in productive and effective artistic expression; (iii) leave art making to untouchable performers while others experience it in silence and/or from afar; (iv) separate rituals, ceremonies, and religious activities from artistic expression; (v) appreciate highly complex visual representations; (vi) perceive art as expensive, extravagant and exclusive; and/or (vii) share the same concept of or classification system for identifying beauty (Dissanayake 2008). Moreover, as also seen with Western-influenced definitions and classifications of music and musicality (i.e., the capacity for music), "the folk-theoretic conceptions that appear to underpin much cognitive and neuroscientific research into music [...] may be wholly inadequate when addressing the forms in which music and musicality may manifest themselves in mind and action in many non-Western societies" (Cross 2012: 669). Crucially, cross-cultural studies matter but they must be conducted in an unbiased way to be genuinely revealing (Thompson and Balkwill 2010). Studying another group's way of thinking, for example, with one's own way of thinking defeats the very point of cross-cultural work. What the above examples (and consequential empirical failings) suggest is that art as a complex behavioral output is something much more. Art is something which encompasses the behaviors leading towards and the consequent experiences evoked from a variety of possibilities: be it from displays in a marbled hallway and narratives unfolding through time and voice in a grand hall to Paleolithic cave paintings and collective dancing within a shared space for community members.

What is it, then, that unites experiences resulting from art if we are to use the word art as a label? Does it amount to the emotion experienced during and after sensing (e.g., viewing, listening, touching, smelling), participating, and/or creating an object or event? Is it the resulting group bonding formed from making and engaging in a shared experience? Is it its communicative power to express what every day linguistic encounters cannot? Is it its transformative power to offer alternative possibilities, imagined realms? Is it ultimately the experience of "exploring the possibilities of being, of becoming in the world. [...] in pushing forward the boundaries of what can be experienced?" (O'Sullivan 2001: 130). From an evolutionary perspective that examines where, when, and why human behaviors arose,

art making is a universal, biologically rooted behavior that does all the above. Specifically, it is the product of making the ordinary special: “in all instances of this behavior, in all times and places, ordinary experience (e.g., ordinary objects, movements, sounds, utterances, surroundings) is transformed, is made *extraordinary*. [...] making special is the ancestral activity or behavior that gave rise to and continues to characterize or imbue all instances of what today are called the arts” (Dissanayake 2008: 14–15, emphasis in the original). From dance to poetry to our actual bodies, we take the very elements we use daily like movement, rhythm, intonation, and our natural physiology, for example, to exaggerate, embellish, reorder, repeat, and shape anew. The result is an amplified, complex, and novel awareness of our environment otherwise unachieved by other means. Furthermore, it is critical for social understanding, cohesion, and transformation and our successful survival as a species. Under this proposal, artistic expression evolved to make particular events more salient, pleasurable (or disagreeable), and memorable, and any expression that results in such can be identified as art. Art, therefore, is human experience enhanced. Extending this perspective further, we are all, in fact, artists reacting to our world in unique ways. The copious number of art movements created, those in the process of developing and yet to be discovered, and those to be of the future, support the notion that artistic expression is influenced by the environment in which it is created. As such, many perspectives simply cannot be reduced to a singular reigning voice, nor should any one voice dominate academic scholarship or the limelight. The upshot of this reality is that investigation in anything arts related becomes exponentially more complex.

While all formats of expressive representation can be argued compatible for enriching and questioning saliency, pleasure, and memory for a specific outcome, I will zoom in on language and text because of the overall focus of this handbook. Language stands as a unique human symbolic system to characterize most sharply because of its relationship with – but not necessary function in (Fedorenko and Varley 2016) – thought and its productive point to communicate information and knowledge from one person, or a set of persons, to another. Moreover, artistic uses of language in which imagery and sound are transformed in non-standard ways to evoke deeper meaning, enhanced emotions, and/or greater reflection stand as an intriguing window into the role of textual objects as devices for interpreting, imagining, and creating representations of our existing or non-existing environment for better or for worse.

2.1 The compositional nature of the literary text

Start with the following hypothesis: to read a literary text is to compose a literary text. What textual objects represent and mean and why they exist are long-standing questions of debate. Typical questions are (e.g., Figlerowicz 2012; Fish 1976; Hogan 2016; Iser 1972; Oatley 1994, 2011): Does a text originate in the writer’s mind? Is text the outward representation of a writer’s thoughts and feelings? If so, what is shared through text? Is a text a writer’s finished, polished product as defined by the writer herself and/or the editor/publisher? Or does it begin with the writer’s initial idea and then unfold with the consequent transformations of that idea? Or should we move away from the writer and take the position

of the one who reads/interprets/perceives the text? Does a text stand independent from its originator? Does a text (re)originate in the reader's mind? Can a text ever be completed if it originates anew with every reader? While the physical text must exist in order to read, is a text realized, in terms of its purpose and meaning, during reading and/or after a reader has interpreted it entirely from start to finish? What does it even mean to interpret a text? In line with Western notions of expertise and scholarship (e.g., checklist of educational accomplishments), must the reader be learned and from a particular school to interpret a text? And what constitutes enough knowledge to be an expert interpreter and to then endow recognition of expertise in another for the sake of propagating an interpretation and a theory of interpretation of a text? The core question of what validates a particular reading or an interpretation of a text also has its own sizable and controversial history of perspectives. As we can ask what constitutes art or artistic activity in our discussion above, we can also ask what constitutes an experience of art or of a textual object. Considering literary texts examples of artistic expression, a brief summary of particular developments within Western literary theory from the past second half of the 20th century in regards to the analysis of readers and reading underscores a path of twists and turns with an eventual underlying trend: experiencing a text is a kind of creating.

Beginning with the *new criticism* approach of the post-war period, emphasis was placed on the words and structural elements of the writing itself as a means to read and understand poems and novels. As such, the writer's history, social milieu, personal intentions, and/or purpose for writing the text – otherwise known as “peripheral” or “secondhand” information, or “extrinsic” criticism – were kept out of the analysis of the text. The argument held was that text – full of self-containing literal and figurative meanings – stands autonomous, immune from the baggage of external information surrounding it from outside the page, be it from the writer and/or the reader. One of the more extreme views considered text so self-sufficient that even emotion derived from it was the direct result of a set of precise, identifiable forms. Thus, text expresses in a predetermined formulaic way not only characters, experiences, and narratives, but evokes very specific emotions in the reader: “The only way of expressing emotion in the form of art is by finding an ‘objective correlative’; in other words, a set of objects, a situation, a chain of events which shall be the formula of that *particular* emotion; such that when the external facts, which must terminate in sensory experience, are given, the emotion is immediately evoked” (Eliot 1921: 92, emphasis in the original). This claim makes the implicit assumption that specific emotions are representable by an exact equation, and if written out correctly (and presumably teachable for reproducible gains), the representation will unquestionably lead to the evocation of such emotion(s). What this suggests is a fixed correlative relationship between specific events in life, particular linguistic forms, and certain emotional reactions. Perhaps in life-defining events shared across all human cultures irrespective of age, geography, and time, like death, the claim is uncontroversial. That is, it is quite possible to imagine that the loss of a loved one widely leads to pain, grief, and mourning. While such an emotional reaction is, naturally, a result of the level of significance a particular event has on an individual and her consequent appraisal of it as it factors into her worldview, “emotions tend to be elicited by particular types of event[s]. Grief is elicited by personal loss, anger by insults or frustrations, and so forth” (Frijda 1988: 349). But the textual representation of emotion as

formulaic is too narrow a concept. Given the variety of life events possible, the diversity in which cultures express, represent, and appraise basic and complex emotions (e.g., Mesquita and Frijda 1992), and the vast array of possible and unique ways in which humans perceive and engage with their environment(s), the argument is unstable. The argument is perhaps reflective of a particular population within a particular context. To argue for an all-encompassing formula despite the variety possible within the human experience, however, demands empirical validation.

In a way, the new criticism perspective was the fortuitous result of a teaching circumstance whereby “students, many of whom had good minds, some imagination, and a good deal of lived experience, had very little knowledge of how to read a story or a play, and even less knowledge of how to read a poem” (Brooks 1979: 593) and none of those labeled as “new critics” specifically intended to engender an entire critical discipline (Brooks 1979). Whether for purely pedagogical reasons or greater literary influence, to claim a possible reader has “very little or even less knowledge of how to read” a story, play, or poem, implies that (i) artistic qualities and artistic valuation of a text are quantifiable; (ii) the meaning of a text lies within its form: letters and punctuation, (iii) there is a correct way to read/interpret a text to extract its literal and symbolic meanings; (iv) correctly reading/interpreting a text requires a particular set of skills; and (v) a particular education can teach the necessary skills. Academically minded in nature, new critics did not, however, neglect the role the reader retains as “essential for ‘realizing’ any poem or novel” (Brooks 1979: 598). In the end, text sitting on a page remains text until a reader lifts it away from the page, method notwithstanding.

2.2 A dynamic relationship between text and reader

Critical response to the new criticism movement beginning in the late 1960s and developing most significantly during the 1970s and early 1980s became known as *reader-response criticism*. The claim was clear in its name: literary texts and their meaning(s) are not autonomous because they cannot be dissociated from the role the reader has as a responder of the text while she interprets it based on her own life experiences, personal desires, passions, ideas, and the like. Meaning of a text, therefore, is created through the act of reading and does not simply sit on the page unaltered for the right (educated, by socially accepted standards) interpreter to see and draw out with method like a surgical dissection. Instead, real-time conflicts arise between meanings of different types as a holistic meaning is identified from understanding a text’s relationship with its environment, textual or otherwise, and the reader’s own viewpoint, be it a different reader or even the same reader but with new life experiences. Hypothetically, the same word or set of phrases could prompt, for example, meaning *x* in reader 1 and meanings *x* and *y* in reader 2 and over time prompt a meaning *z* in reader 2 after a second reading years later that resulted from merging meanings *x* and *y*. With this approach, attempting to determine a correct reading/interpretation is as fruitless as attempting to identify all potential readings/interpretations given the number of possible readers/interpreters and life experiences. Moreover, interpretation of a text and consequent meaning determination is a dynamic process: “As the reader uses the vari-

ous perspectives offered him by the text in order to relate the patterns and the ‘schematised views’ to one another, he sets the work in motion, and this very process results ultimately in the awakening of responses within himself” (Iser 1972: 280). By further implication and in contrast to Eliot’s (1921) concept of emotion transmission from author to reader, emotion elicited in the reader is not reducible (or reproducible) to a single formula. Instead, emotion elicitation is a multilayered, merged result: the text itself with its particular words, phrases, characters and narratives suggesting/representing an emotion or many emotions as created and expressed by the writer and the reader’s understanding of such text as she retrieves meaning from the words and phrases present and those evoked, and compares, contrasts, matches and/or interweaves her personal narrative within the text. As such, the reader’s experiencing of the text is at the heart of interpretation because

the reader’s activities are at the center of attention, where they are regarded, not as leading to meaning, but as *having* meaning. The meaning they have is a consequence of their not being empty; for they include the making and revising of assumptions, the rendering and regretting of judgments, the coming to and abandoning of conclusions, the giving and withdrawing of approval, the specifying of causes, the asking of questions, the supplying of answers, the solving of puzzles. In a word, these activities are interpretive [...] and because they are interpretive, a description of them will also be, and without any additional step, an interpretation, not after the fact, but of the fact (of experiencing). (Fish 1976: 474, emphasis in the original)

Such value placed on the reader’s active engagement with – and in essence transformation of – a text as it is personalized in the moment takes elitism out of artistic appreciation and its selectivity of a few, and democratizes it by acknowledging the subjective nature of interpretation and the potential enjoyment by all. Enjoyment, or pleasure from actively interpreting a text, can lie along a continuum of types whereby those types are motivated by different reasons. Such reasons could include personal experiences of the moment and/or social norms implicitly pervading our perception of the textual world.

The question now becomes one of scholarly preference, if not one of continued dispute: is it essential to identify the correct interpretation (assuming the existence of such to begin with and fully agreed upon standards for identification, if even possible)? Or is it more valuable to understand how and why a single linguistic form can lead to a plurality of interpretations? Or the reverse as well: a single emotional experience can be expressed a multitude of ways. The search for every possible interpretation is not an endless scrabble among potentially infinite outcomes. As Fish (1976) argues, we all fall within some sort of *interpretative community* in which we share the same reading strategies as a result of shared educational and sociocultural experiences. Essentially, much of our experiencing of artistic activities is learned and defined by the environment to which we are exposed. We are taught how to perceive, appraise, and respond to our environment and accordingly receive praise or rebuke in return. As a result, the environment is what defines our general and particular mental schemas of the world and allows for empathy of others who come from within our same communities. Thus, shared (or at least recognition of similar) experiences, comparable modes of expression, and consequent relatable interpretations will arise. Identifying as many interpretative communities as possible, therefore, becomes essential. It is the entirety and complexity of the environment and how mental schemas form and transform over time that necessitates empirical attention.

2.3 Emotion as part of the interpretive experience

While the 1980s and beyond have seen ever more nuanced breakdowns of the role of literary text from a myriad of voices to engender, navigate, scrutinize and/or challenge power, gender, racial and/or status relationships across time and geography, for example, the underlying contemporary premise has remained: The relationship between text and reader is dynamic and a part of that relationship is defined by emotion. An extreme argument could posit that the emotional investment a reader/interpreter has with a text is the very reason for the dynamism involved. Whether a poststructuralist viewpoint of what comes first (i.e., the text or the reader), or a deconstructionist approach whereby, paradoxically, text remains both text with its unaltered patterns of meanings functioning independently of a reader and yet particular to and changeable by a reader with her personal voice, the back and forth between ever-hierarchical hypotheses of what a text is, can, should, and could mean is to further feed extremist theories of literature à la de Man (1971) as a medium with impossible meaning. Either way, a literary work depends on a reader in its most basic sense as it must first exit the writer's mind and then be known by others outside the writer herself. Only then can a narrative "run on the minds of the audience, as a computer simulation runs on a computer" (Oatley 1994: 66) or otherwise the writer finds herself "archivando sus obras en el armario oscuro de su mente hasta finalmente morir con todo clausurado" [filing away her works in the dark closet of her mind until finally dying with everything locked up] (López-González 2014: 119) and running her own internal simulations without ever expressing them textually and publicly. Whether a string of words as determined by the author or a set of imagined personal reflections as evoked in the mind of the reader, or an indissociable mix of both as words and images intersect, the following question arises: what do we make of the observation that literary text – or any artistic object/activity for that matter – can describe, evoke, and alter emotional states in such an intuitively different manner than the day-to-day activities that incite liking and aversion and the whole gamut of human emotion and affective experiences? As an aside, this question is different from asking whether art has as its purpose to reflect, express, and/or evoke emotion and whether the arts are, in a mimetic and Aristotelian sense, valuable imitations or representations or simulations of reality and thus narratives of the real world (Butcher 1902).

That literary text can describe, evoke, and alter emotional states sets up a particular reactive chain of events between an artwork and its perceiver/interpreter: the presented narrative is built in a particular way that, among other things, arouses an emotional response or array of responses in a reader/interpreter as she reads through the text and imagines the narrative in her mind. Moreover, the emotional response is subject to change as the reading progresses and the narrative evolves in both the text *per se* and the reader's mind. Meaning is confirmed, disputed, and/or questioned as text flows across the page like music across time. In music, emotional responses are to an extent the result of the fulfillment and violation of implicit and explicit musical expectations; patterns of fulfillment and violation are what arouse an emotional response (Meyer 1956). Fulfillment and violation are not constrained to expectations regarding physical musical patterns, but may also arise in reaction to the thoughts and memories triggered by the music. The dynamism between

text and reader/interpreter discussed above is, in part, an emotional one and depends on a positive one at the very least for the reader to continue reading and not withdraw from the activity with disinterest and/or aversion. Positive interest is sustained as the likelihood of an outcome is assessed across time, feeding curiosity, suspense, and potential reward of satisfaction for following the narrative through to its end. Thus, reading/interpreting of a text could, hypothetically, be an entirely emotional activity. Mood-management theory proposes that readers, viewers, and listeners deliberately choose the media with which they engage with the hedonistic goal to sustain their good mood, positively lift their current mood if not good enough, or eliminate any bad mood altogether (Zillmann 1988). While an interesting proposal, choice in media is probably also guided by contextual factors and current goals like availability of media options and selection decisions made for research, pedagogy, and/or entertainment, for example. Irrespective of the reader's ultimate goals with media selection, two key words stand out: emotional response.

As with any discussion on art, beauty, and/or the aesthetic experience and their inter-relationship (or lack thereof), emotion and response are indispensable factors to consider. The questions are: What exactly is emotional and by what means do emotions arise? Is it the text itself with its characters' lives and storyline? Is it the textual narrative as interpreted by the reader? Is it the imagination evoked in the reader of "what could be, if and only if, for not only the character(s) in the narrative but for me as well?" And/or is it the act of reading about an alternate world separate from or similar to the reader's own? Can we even separate the two (i.e., the text as an object from the reading of the text as an action)? As suggested by Oatley (1994), a difference of sorts can be made between a reader who remains outside the artwork and a reader who enters into it. In a sense, there can be an external-type observer and an internal-type observer. While the external observer is receptive to an artwork but stands psychologically apart from its narrative, the internal observer figuratively enters the narrative and engages psychologically with its characters and settings. This motivates the next set of questions: What types of emotions are involved when remaining detached from or engaging with the literary world? Are they of the same type? Is emotional engagement necessary to understand the narrative? This is a particularly intriguing sub-topic because it strikes at the core of whether or not literary fiction – or any artwork more generally – is capable of arousing actual, real emotions as those encountered in real life or simply imagined, simulated emotions that mimic real ones (Gaut 2007). In other words, does the reader genuinely feel emotion and have an emotional experience as she would in her daily life (whereby "feel" means physiologically instantiated and thus her behavioral expression through laughter, sweating, tears, etc.)? Do the feelings then activate a series of real, behavioral outcomes within the reader's day-to-day? Or does the reader recognize emotions but not actually feel them and remain emotionally distant but intellectually engaged (i.e., no physiological consequences, at least not consciously)? Does the sympathetic recognition of a character's plight within the narrative, for example, imply the reader has not experienced emotion in the physiological sense? Is empathy required to experience a real-life emotion? There are no concrete answers to any of these questions. The very same questions plague the study of music-induced emotions with empirical behavioral and neural evidence supporting both emotivist and cognitivist positions arguing for the evocation and presence of genuine and non-genuine emotions, respectively (see

Hunter and Schellenberg 2010). To complicate matters even further, to what extent is conscious awareness of an emotional experience during reading relevant to substantiating whether an emotional experience is real or imagined? Does it even matter what is real or imagined if the act of reading and the intellectualization of a narrative produce a pleasurable feeling or recognition of satisfaction? This is significant given that an emotional response and its physiological outcomes can occur without awareness (e.g., Tsuchiya and Adolphs 2007). James Joyce's *Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man* (1916) stands, for example, as an exemplary case in modern Western literature of the increasingly complex use of language and form to progressively illustrate the development of its lead character and, as proposed, the subconscious shaping of readers' emotions throughout (e.g., Jones 2017).

This discussion draws attention to four major points: First, an emotional interest and attachment of sort arises when reading and interpreting a literary text. This could be said not only for the reader during and after reading, but for the author as well before, during, or after writing the work. If not yet empirically determined or entirely clear as to whether any true causal relationship exists, folk intuition contends that emotional tensions or dissonances between the creator and their environment can be an impetus to artistic development and expression. Second, text and reader cannot be dissociated when examining what experience and interpretation of a text entails. Not only are meaning and interpretation intertwined, but any emotional response is also as much the result of the writer's character(s) described in the narrative as the reader's interpreting, transforming, and in a mental way – unless also enacted out in the reader's life outside of the act of reading – vicariously living through the narrative or running through a simulation in her mind. Third, pushing the argument further, because the reader is as much a part of the text by interpreting it as the writer is in initially composing it, a literary text is constantly being (re)written. (Re)writing of a text is not bound to figurative composition in the mind of the reader, as it can also be literal and manifested in a multitude of ways. Shakespeare's plays are a well-established case in point. Although written during the late 1500s and early 1600s, they continue to be the subject of much (re)interpretation by producers, directors, and actors alike in a variety of artistic media, languages, and locations, catering to ever-changing worlds, audiences, and viewpoints ravenous for the next-best (re)interpretation or at least one that caters to their personal perspective of the world. In WEIRD cultures where originality and newness – whether genuinely achieved or not – are lauded with pomp and circumstance, popularity with the masses of a (re)interpretation goes a long way. Moreover, such dynamic, creative relationship between reader/interpreter and text is initiated every time the reader/interpreter engages with the text irrespective of how often she engages with it. Unless a reader is afflicted with a cognitive impairment that prevents retention and integration of information, the initial reading and consequent readings continue to build upwards from interpretation to interpretation to create an entire mental edifice of interpretations of interpretations. Expanding further to other artistic activities, theatre, musical theatre, and the performing arts more generally, are self-evident examples given their live performance characteristics of bodies and voices in perpetual movement and the changes arising both within and between the performers onstage and within the audience members as well: Every single performance is by definition unique. Every rehearsal, every public performance is a new interpretation (un)consciously integrating the known past with the present

and unknown elements of the moment and predictions of the immediate future. Fourth, the above three points underscore the progressive state of artistic expression and its dependency on a variety of elements. The original writer, the text itself, and the reader are an interconnected emotional network.

3 Emotion. History of debates and contemporary perspectives

Moving forward with the very question posed in 1884 of “what is an emotion?” (James 1884), we enter into uneven terrain. Despite its entrance into the empirical behavioral and psychological sciences in the late 19th century and a notable amount of ink and digital space dedicated to its understanding – from its meaning, role, and function to its characterization, activation, and regulation – there is undeniable agreement among researchers that there is still no consensus on what an emotion is (Izard 2010). Some have gone as far as to suggest its elimination altogether (Dixon 2012). As described, it is a “keyword in crisis” (Dixon 2012: 338) and belongs to the “I know it when I see it” category (Stewart 1964), whereby an indescribable intuition evades clear definition with language. The same can be said with the word *affect*, which in many instances has been blurred with the word *emotion*, falling in and out of favor depending on disciplinary study (e.g., philosophy or psychology) and locus of focus (e.g., the individual or society, the internal or external, the indissociable link between self and all). In cultural disciplinary circles it all fits under the more general umbrella of “critical emotion studies” or CES (Trainor 2006), which refers to the “various disciplinary forays into the relationship between emotion and whatever it is that a particular discipline studies, from brain chemistry to teacher education to election results” (Trainor 2006: 645). To not enter into the endless debate of whether a “new ‘new’ in rhetorical/cultural studies” (Rice 2008: 202) that has become known as *affect studies* is needed and all its possible societal applications (for which there are many), a short summary of affect and emotion will suffice.

The general term *affect* is used to refer to emotional experiences. CES, therefore, is the academic study of affect and its evocation, purpose, function, and effect on everyday life. Emotional experiences are broken down into mental and somatic activities. Such activities are often measured against two-dimensional models that include a valence scale from negative to positive and an arousal level from low to high intensity. Arguments continue against the insufficiency of such models for explaining the complexity of emotion and instead posit four dimensions: evaluation-pleasantness, potency-control, activation-arousal, and unpredictability (e.g., Fontaine et al. 2007). From a biological standpoint, emotional experiences are the result of emotions or adaptive responses meant to increase the chances of survival. Moreover, emotions arise as a result of motivated behavior to preserve or alter a current situation (Hogan 2016). As such, many researchers believe a trigger of some kind is necessary for emotions to arise. The trigger can be external as in a physical object or event, or internal as in thoughts or memories. While the trigger is cognitively appraised and identified in regards to its meaning, physiological manifestations like heart rate changes,

laughter, shivers, sweat, tears, etc., occur to collectively lead towards a beneficial behavioral output or action. Emotions typically fall under a category. Categorization supports the idea that there are basic or universal emotions (i.e., anger, fear, sadness, enjoyment, disgust, and surprise), each with their own adaptive function (e.g., Ekman 1992) and cultural manifestation. Another term used to describe emotional experiences is *mood*. Moods, in contrast to emotions, appear to not require a particular trigger to arise, often occur with less intensity, have a gradual onset, last for longer periods of time, and seem more difficult to describe (e.g., Beedie, Terry, and Lane 2005). While both emotions and moods influence behavior for the general purpose of adapting and surviving in an ever-changing environment, emotions are thought to bias (immediate) action while moods are thought to influence cognitive processes like memory and decision-making within long-term contexts.

If emotions are adaptive responses of the mind/brain and body to circumstance, how then do we classify real or simulated emotions evoked by literature? Are they, too, adaptive responses? If so, for what purpose? In other words, is it beneficial from a survival perspective to enter and engage with the narrative world of a text whether as writer or reader/interpreter? Firstly, literary texts must be considered proper environmental triggers. Although initially disregarded, fiction has taken on more value by cognitive psychologists since the 1980s as a veritable object of study, particularly one on human nature. Fictional (and non-fictional) texts are a way to better understand other human beings because they provide an ecologically valid window into others' worlds, lives, perspectives, and experiences. Effectively, momentarily following along with the intentions and interactions of others different from oneself opens the door to a world of unforeseen alternatives. Studies have shown that the act of reading and figuratively entering the worlds of others has a positive effect on social skills; empathy is built and social aptitude improves (Oatley 2011). A second observation now arises: emotional experiences resulting from the reading/interpreting of text are valuable experiences (be they physiological or not). Whether to empathize and understand the various points of the narrative, to compare and contrast the characters' narrative with one's own, or simply to transport oneself intellectually to a world outside of one's own as created by someone else and oneself in the heat of the moment, "we internalize what a character experiences by mirroring those feelings and actions ourselves" (Oatley 2011: 66). And yet the question of "what is going on" persists: What is the trigger that leads to such evocation of imagination and resulting emotional experiences? Where is, in effect, the locus of emotion? Can it even be reliably located? Many argue language itself is the trigger with its stylistic features (or lack thereof) like alliteration, ellipsis, foregrounding, inversion, irony, metaphor, rhyme, etc., as gleaned from studies testing the role of such features in reader's reading times and affect ratings (e.g., Miall and Kuiken 1994a, 1994b). Or perhaps it lies at the general level whereby the (dis)trusted narrator and unraveling plot altogether elicit acceptance, hesitation, curiosity, hostility, anticipation, and the like at various points in time. Or perhaps it is the reader's/interpreter's real-time interpretive response to the writer's proposed simulation she has entered and recreated in her mind, one where she will appraise words, meanings, contexts, and worlds all biased by her personal state of mind. As Booth states, fiction is "the art of communicating with readers" (Booth 1961: xiii) and writing and reading a novel is an interactive process between writer, text, and reader/interpreter. Such interactive process, I posit, is by nature emotion-

al. But can we thoroughly explain this emotional evocation? The nature of images – e.g., visual, aural – evoked during reading/interpreting are unknown. Although brain imaging has begun to support the intuition that “reading fiction invites for mind-wandering and thinking about what *might* have happened or could happen” (Altmann et al. 2014: 26, emphasis in the original) compared to non-fiction reading which engages an action-based reconstructive approach to events, cognitive neuroscience has yet to shed any light on the neural correlates of the development of literary experiences (Jacobs and Willems 2018). Considering the literary experience a creative one, experiencing a text is a kind of creating which is an emotional journey.

Return to the earlier stated hypothesis: to read a literary text is to compose a literary text. The following question now arises in this dynamic relationship between text and reader: In what way exactly is the reader a composer/creator? More specifically, is the reader a creator in the sense of using her personal perspective and imagination to interpret and transform the literary object presented before her? Is the reader being creative in the same way the author was creative in (re)experiencing, (re)imagining, and (re)writing the narrative of a literary text? Put another way, in the absence of a physical, tangible outcome resulting from the activity of imagining, transforming, and abstractly experiencing a literary text as a reader/interpreter, is the reader’s creative response from interpreting a text equivalent to the creativity involved in writing the actual text? Additionally, where and how does emotion fit into this process of interpreting/creating? A discussion on “what is creativity” will aid in unraveling the meaning of *creator* and lead to the conclusion.

4 Creativity. Definitions and conceptions

Creativity is a fascinating topic because it embodies so many aspects of human intelligence. Any discussion on creativity immediately brings up a set of questions (by no means exhaustive) – as with art and emotion, I list them to underscore the multifaceted nature of the topic: How do we define creativity? Are there various types of creative behaviors and processes? Is creativity a persistent and long-term process? Or is it one that is spontaneous and short-term? Or both? How does creative ability arise? Is it innate, learned, or a mix of both? Is intention and purpose a prerequisite for creativity? How does emotion affect creative output? How does creativity arise within a collaborative group setting? How do we effectively test for creative ability and the process(es) leading to creative outcomes? Do creative outcomes necessitate functional value and societal appreciation to be considered creative? The simple answer to these questions is that there are many answers and, as expected, they remain inconclusive and incomplete.

Fundamental to survival is our innate ability to problem-solve by finding new, alternative solutions to progress further as a species (Csíkszentmihályi 1997). A glimpse at the archeological record of Paleolithic technology provides provocative evidence suggesting a direct correlation between tool making and function with the evolution of complex mental capacities (such as natural language) exclusive to humans (Ambrose 2001). Neuroscientist Suzana Herculano-Houzel proposes that the developed cognitive capacities in humans are the result of a greater number of neurons in the cerebral cortex as compared to other ani-

mals (Herculano-Houzel 2016). That is, a larger number of cortical neurons leads to greater information processing capacity. A wider glance of human history, say, from the Age of Enlightenment to the Industrial Revolution to the Digital Age to the Artificial Intelligence Revolution of the 2000s, reveals our consistent progressive drive as a species. As a mental phenomenon that coalesces a multitude of cognitive processes – from attention, memory, and emotion to reasoning, evaluation, and reflective decision-making – the process of creativity can be thought of as an optimal mode of intellectual functioning that leads to the generation of unconventional, novel and useful solutions to problems (e.g., Boden 1998; Dietrich 2004; Ward, Smith, and Finke 1995). While folk intuition entertains the idea that artistic expression is the premier example of human creativity, we can turn to everyday use of natural language and conversation (prior to enhancement or complex elaboration thereof) to begin to grapple with what creative behavior within a conceptual space entails. From a finite set of elements, speakers of any language can produce an infinite number of novel expressions to communicate a vast range of ideas. Consider your most recent conversations and notice how incredibly different they were from one another, even if they addressed the same topic and were had with the same interlocutors. Now think further to all the dialogues you have read or heard in novels, plays, and movies; maybe a few repetitions here and there following social conventions and idioms, but overall an enormous amount of uniqueness. In effect, “creativity is not the exclusive preserve of the individual genius, [...] creativity is also a matter of dialogue with others” (Carter 2004: 11). In a similar vein, consider music, another hierarchical and combinatorial system that relies on rules, is equally expressive, and combines a finite set of notes and rhythms to produce an infinite range of musical phrases within a given musical idiom (e.g., Berkowitz and Ansari 2008; Mithen 2005). From the radio’s playlist of pop songs to the concert hall to the intimate jazz club, for example, every musical experience is without question vastly distinct. Language and music not only exemplify the constant refashioning and recontextualization of linguistic and musical resources during communication, but also most importantly highlight the generative and novelty-seeking nature of an adaptive system such as us.

Adapting behavior to a specific situation is essential for getting things done. Adapting behavior within the context of a conversation means anchoring dialogue on the shared interlocutor’s representation of the topics in the subject matter at present (Pask 1976) and reaching a maximal, effective exchange of information through cooperation (Grice 1975). Key to the conversation or task at hand is our ability to consider the elements within our surrounding environment, throw options back and forth as in a tennis match, evaluate and filter them by choosing an optimal option (or one believed to be most optimal under the current circumstances) in response to emotional and/or intellectual reasons, and integrate it within the task being performed. Choosing and evaluating between possible moves and knowing what constitutes an optimal one is possible because perception and meaning are bound by both the subjective experience and the subconsciously learned customs and norms resulting from enculturation since birth. Information as an object and information processing, selecting, and transforming as actions are not emotionally neutral things and activities. To put it another way, “internalized emotional guidance systems are not entirely private subjective states, but are learned within a cultural context that accounts for the ability of one individual to construct an insight, an intelligent event, that is recognized and

appreciated by others” (Radford 2004: 63) and thus regarded as a novel act. Extending to the role of the reader/interpreter in reading/interpreting a text, the actions taken are equally interactive and emotionally guided – absorption of the lines of words and making sense of their various meanings as determined by the reader’s knowledge of the language, culture, time, etc., within and outside the narrative and her own (in)experiences with the content of the text, and continual appraisal of the text’s past and unfolding events in real time.

4.1 Breaking down the what and how of creativity

As with any complex human cognitive phenomenon, defining, pulling apart, and modeling the nuances of the creative process continues to be a line of inquiry ripe for ingenuity and advancement. There has been an array of theoretical and empirical work on the what and how of creation from disciplines such as art history and philosophy to computer science and neuropsychology (e.g., Bastick 1982; Berliner 2009; Bergson [1896] 2012; Bunge 1962; Calvin and Bickerton 2001; Chatterjee 2004; Collins 2005; Csíkszentmihályi 1975; Finke 1996; Gardner 2011; Gero 1996; Guilford 1950, 1956, 1957; Jung et al. 2010; Miller and Hou 2004; Ness 2013; Simonton 2000; Sloboda 1988), with current trends, for example, in psychological research applying the findings to innovating strategies within the workplace to improve stagnancy (Zhou and Shalley 2011) and within the classroom to increase idea generation and problem synthesis and analysis (e.g., Cropley 2017; López-González 2017b; Pang 2015) and to encourage and prepare next generation interdisciplinary thinkers and doers (López-González 2017b). Computational models have also been building ever more sophisticated software, questioning the very essence and value of human creative behavior through the invention of an artificially intelligent (AI) professional visual artist known as The Painting Fool (Colton 2008, 2011) and the composer program Emmy (Cope 1992, 2005). Further advancement has led to the creation of robot musicians jamming with humans (e.g., Bretan and Weinberg 2016) as well as to the use of AI software as a complementary compositional tool within the popular (e.g., Deahl 2018) and broader musical worlds. Such options have enabled musicians with creative possibilities, not replaced them.

The way in which the study of creativity has been approached by multiple disciplines lies in its empirical origins. The systematic cognitive psychological study of creativity received significant attention in 1950 when American psychologist Joy Paul Guilford made it the focus of his now classic presidential address to the American Psychological Association. His first statement set the stage, revealing a particular mindset at the time: “I discuss the subject of creativity with considerable hesitation, for it represents an area in which psychologists generally, whether they be angels or not, have feared to tread. It has been one of my long-standing ambitions, however, to undertake an investigation of creativity” (Guilford 1950: 444). The subsequent surge in empirical work on a mental phenomenon oftentimes considered intangible – Plato assigned creative poetic output to the Gods of the Muses (Plato [380 B.C.E.] 2008) – most likely occurred because this investigative appeal came at the right place at the right time. Computer scientist Alan Turing had already foreshadowed his imminent “can machines think” seminal discussion on the behavioral and

algorithmic possibility of machines being able to think like humans (Turing 1950) during World War II. Simultaneously, the cognitive revolution was responding to the dominant behavioristic approach of psychology and its theories about stimulus-response associations with arguments for the existence of innate modules and mental representations to fully characterize the complexity of human behavior (e.g., Chomsky 1959). Under this *creative cognition approach* (Finke, Ward, and Smith 1992), which developed more extensively in the 1990s and continues to this day, creativity is not only an essential phenomenon of human intelligence but an accessible and testable behavior amenable to the methods of the empirical cognitive sciences and capable of being successfully, and ultimately completely, modeled by computers (Boden 2009). As such, an array of neural experiments has also been conducted since the advent and mass availability of brain-imaging techniques in the 1990s to establish a structure-functional link between creative (artistic) behavior and particular brain networks (e.g., Amedi et al. 2008; Aziz-Zadeh, Liew, and Dandekar 2012; Beeman et al. 2004; Bengtsson, Csíkszentmihályi, and Ullén 2007; Berkowitz and Ansari 2008; Donnay et al. 2014; Fink, Graif, and Neubauer 2009; Howard-Jones et al. 2005; Jung- Bhattacharya and Petsche 2005; Limb and Braun 2008; Liu et al. 2012; Ludmer, Dudai, and Rubin 2011; de Manzano and Ullén 2012; May et al. 2011; McPherson et al. 2016; Sandkühler and Bhattacharya 2008; Shah et al. 2013; Solso 2001).

Despite the overwhelming amount of dedicated time and space, the field as of the year 2020 finds itself in a two-fold empirical gridlock. Firstly, more interested in being a first within a particular artistic medium and experimental paradigm, studies have begun to repeat themselves without actually replicating and cross-validating experiments. Secondly, fundamental integrative questions still abound. Most notably, we do not have clear answers for why some individuals are more creative than others (e.g., to what extent are capabilities dependent on genes and/or environment), or when, where, and how the mind/brain precisely integrates its multi-sensory environment to combine, explore, and/or, more dramatically, transform ideas to create new ideas. Granted, the difficulty with studying creativity is perhaps due to its very DNA. Creative outputs are by definition novel, unrepeatable, consistently different, functional, time-consuming in effort spent, dependent on a solid knowledge base, and in some cases, spontaneous and serendipitous. What this suggests is that the very process of creative thinking and the resulting outcomes do not adhere to an established *a, b, c, d* paradigm and are not predicted by strict adherence to the scientific method (López-González 2015b, 2016b, 2017a). This, I propound, is the red flag in a desert of conformity and a further appeal to a revision of methods to acquire new data. Without innovation in how we test and expound on creative behavior, the line of inquiry between readers' interpreting and creative performance will not flourish. What follows is a discussion of various empirical approaches, results, shortcomings, and new cross-disciplinary, literary-music work that paves the way to further investigation.

4.2 One problem, many solutions

Delineated in Guilford's (1950) address was the current problem with methodology:

To provide the creator with the finished product, as in a multiple-choice item, may prevent him from showing precisely what we want him to show: his own creation. [...] [T]he quest for easily objectifiable testing and scoring has directed us away from the attempt to measure some of the most precious qualities of individuals and hence to ignore those qualities. (Guilford 1950: 445)

If creativity is characterized by the novelty of a solution to a problem, then an efficient way to study the emergence of creative solutions is to provide problem-solving tasks that offer an array of possible outcomes. Under this assumption, creative ability is measurable in terms of divergent production, or the quantification of varied outcomes in response to specific stimuli (Guilford 1950, 1956). Unafraid to accept the unknown and taking advantage of the unpredictability of emergent solutions, Guilford (1950), among several experimental proposals, makes note of the *frustration test*. Named as such because participants reportedly found it frustrating to complete, the test gave the most general of instructions with regards to a set of items in hopes of obtaining maximally different results: "do something with each item; whatever you think should be done". Continuing forward with this paradigm and exploring the emergence of insight as a result of mental imagination, others had participants engaging in a range of mental tasks: from (i) visualizing the superimposition of sets of letters, numbers, and/or geometric forms in novel ways to discover new, emergent forms and patterns, to (ii) imagining an entirely new image using a set of unalterable, familiar items to create new items. Participants' verbal reports revealed the emergence of new forms otherwise not known, and the invention of familiar items with new parts that may or may not have had functional value but were nonetheless alterable during a subsequent exploratory process that imposed particular functional or categorical criteria on the emergent forms (Finke 1996; Finke, Pinker, and Farah 1989). Although simple in their set-up, the studies consistently revealed adeptness at not only recreating familiar forms with new sets of items (also known as *combinational creativity* [Boden 1998]), but also inventing entirely new forms without any immediate or obvious functional value. Furthermore, regarding participants' awareness of their new insight, the studies revealed that some preliminary exploratory manipulation with the pre-inventive forms was a requisite precursor to the suddenness of that insight. Insight does not come out of nowhere.

But in what context does insight emerge? In more complex experiments where new shapes are generated from predetermined sets of object parts, results have revealed that the creative thinking process is most likely a combination of two types of cognitive qualities with one type more involved than the other depending on the creator's goals (and perhaps even personality traits, a correlational issue also questioned and explored by Guilford in his [1950] article): spontaneous/unstructured (or chaotic thinking) and intentional/structured (or ordered thinking). In the former type, novel forms rapidly arise unplanned without any explicit conscious deliberation and usually incorporate unexpected associations; the lack of a defined end goal, the open-mindedness to be surprised, and I would add the motivation to break established rules within the conceptual space, leads to remarkably ingenious innovations. In the latter type, novel forms are generated in a controlled, system-

atic manner (under perhaps, using Guilford's [1950] terms, an inflexible mindset that is insensitive to problem recognition) and are influenced by prior knowledge, preexisting categories, and even familiar ideas resulting in outcomes not as novel as those resulting from spontaneous/unstructured thinking (Finke, Pinker, and Farah 1989). That distinct ways of thinking and differences in personality can affect creative behavior and output invites the hypothesis that emotion and creativity are tightly coupled. What kind of emotion is needed for creativity to flourish? A merging of popular conception and an overall fascination in the lives of grand thinkers and doers like the "mad scientist", "tortured artist", and "child prodigy" have not waned – see, for example, Stiles (2009), Kopiez (2011), and Zara (2012). Obsessive traits, recurring maladies, and spurts of brilliance, among other things, tickle people's insatiable desire to know more about the lives of others and the entertainment industry does not shy away from accentuating the emotional ups and downs many times correlated with genius accomplishment. As studies have continued to show, however, "the relation between emotions and creativity remains fraught with ambiguity" (Averill 2004: 230). While current overwhelming evidence points towards greater cognitive flexibility and thus more creative problem-solving capabilities as a result of positive affect, studies have shown that positive and negative emotions and moods both facilitate and inhibit creative pursuits and outcomes (e.g., Baas, De Dreu, and Nijstad 2008; Conner and Silvia 2015).

Expanding upon these behavioral observations, Dietrich (2004) has proposed that these two basic types of creative processing modes (deliberate and/or spontaneous) can be further broken down with each projecting computations to cognitive and/or emotional structures to lead to the following four types: (i) deliberate-cognitive that Newell, Shaw, and Simon qualify as "requiring high motivation and persistence: either taking place over a considerable span of time (continuously or intermittently), or occurring at high intensity" (Newell, Shaw, and Simon 1962: 65–66) (i.e., insight as a result of sustained, focused work as in the years of preparation George Eastman, Founder of the Eastman Kodak Company, endured prior to patenting the first film in roll form in 1884), (ii) spontaneous-cognitive (i.e., a *Eureka!* moment as in the claim of Isaac Newton synthesizing the basics of gravity upon witnessing an apple's fall from a tree), (iii) deliberate-emotional (i.e., an *Aha!* moment as in discovering Waldo during a frantic search in Martin Handford's illustrated *Where's Waldo?* books), and/or (iv) spontaneous-emotional (i.e., an epiphany as in Joaquín Rodrigo's response, in part, to the devastating miscarriage of his wife's first pregnancy with his guitar *Concierto de Aranjuez*). All of these modes hypothetically interact during creative thinking and potentially share the same final neural pathway to arrive at an outcome (Dietrich 2004). These quick, temporary bursts of types of mental states reveal once again the essence of creative thinking: the constant exploration of both problem and solution and the not always visible, yet ever-present, element of affect as motivator, trigger, and/or sustainer. As Boden (2009) mentions, much of human history's greatest achievers were adept at ordered, exploratory creativity and only sometimes, under a variety of aligning circumstances, reached chaotic, transformational heights leading to historical, ground-breaking creativity. This type of creativity whereby a newly discovered object, concept, and/or theory laid the foundation for far-reaching innovations and societal changes was achieved by such Science-Art polymaths as Santiago Ramón y Cajal (1852–1934), Arthur Conan Doyle (1859–1930), Max Brödel (1870–1941), and Zaha Hadid (1950–2016), for example, who all forged

ahead despite academic, financial, and/or personal setbacks of all kinds. Following this line of thinking regarding creative outputs and outcomes, the creative level of the literary text (i.e., from minimal to extreme novelty and innovation) could be argued to be fundamental for engendering a range of alternative and transformational interpretations. Specifically, the more likely a literary text is to evoke a wider range of interpretations per reader, the more creative the literary text. The creative text can be measured by its linguistic form, structure, and context and its capacity to stimulate, intrigue, entice, inspire – all triggers of affect – “if-then” possibilities depending on each reader’s own personal history. Creative text by the author and creative simulation in the reader’s mind are mutually dependent. The creative process is, therefore, an emotional process.

4.3 Prefrontal cortex and beyond

The primary goal of cognitive neuroscience research is to find correlations between neuroanatomical structure and psychological function. Studies in the neuroscience of creativity essentially ask the following: What parts of the brain are involved during the act of innovative production? A simple enough question until we consider more succinctly the complexity of creative thinking, as everyday conversation intuitively reveals and behavioral experiments have shown. Duch (2007) summarizes the three key elements most clearly: (i) neural space capable of supporting complex states or availability of a rich associative network acquired through knowledge; (ii) imagination or the ability to combine in many ways local brain activations into larger coherent wholes; and (iii) a filtering/decision-making/evaluation system that selects from working memory the most interesting products of imagination. We know in a general sense that at the core of insight recognition, evaluation, and expressive realization is the prefrontal cortex (PFC) and its functionally divided aspects: the ventromedial (VMPFC) area which is connected to the limbic system and implicated in emotional and logical evaluation of behavior (Damasio 1994) and the dorsolateral (DLPFC) area which (a) receives input from the posterior occipital, parietal, and temporal sensory and association cortices, (b) sends output to motor areas for action, and (c) is implicated in key cognitive functions such as sustained and focused attention (Posner 1994), temporal integration (Fuster 1995), and working memory (Baddeley 1996). As a result of this complex network, real-time decision-making relies most importantly on a working memory information buffer in the PFC to hold, rearrange, and restructure relevant knowledge for solving a particular problem (Damasio 2001). Moreover, activating, instead of deactivating, mood states comes with greater motivation, higher levels of neurotransmitters such as dopamine and noradrenalin, and enhanced working memory capacity. The assumption is greater cognitive flexibility, abstract thinking, processing speed, and access to long-term memory (Baas, De Dreu, and Nijstad 2008). One of the better-documented examples of the four hypothesized processing modes has been the investigation of the *Aha!* moment in which brainwave electroencephalogram (EEG) data (Jung-Beeman et al. 2004) and blood flow data from functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) (Bowden et al. 2005) were used to study subjects as they created common two-word compound phrases from single words. Jung-Beeman et al.’s (2004) study revealed that the brain prepares for the oncoming break-

through: the conscious suddenness of insight is preceded by a burst of gamma activity whereby the anterior superior temporal gyrus (aSTG), a structure involved in auditory and language processing, in the right hemisphere becomes unusually active 300 ms before the insight as integration of information occurs. This process has been further dissected and observations include (i) a neural correlate of mental impasse, or blank state whereby the problem-solver struggles to find a solution despite extreme focused attention, in parietal-occipital brain areas, (ii) a correlation between the right PFC and conscious restructuring of the problem, and (iii) higher activity in posterior regions within the parieto-occipital area during significant problem understanding and final, sudden retrieval of a solution (Sandkühler and Bhattacharya 2008). Additional studies have shown that sudden insight is also correlated with significant activity in the emotion learning areas of the amygdala (Ludmer, Dudai, and Rubin 2011), highlighting the positive emotions experienced during identification of a working solution. The reader/interpreter, in her voyage through the simulation she has created and continues to work through as she reads/interprets, we can hypothesize, is emotionally invested in her eventual arrival to narrative insight and affective fulfillment.

While these experiments have focused on relatively common verbal complexities typical in a variety of linguistic contexts, brain studies, like behavioral experiments, have turned towards art professionals and their capacities in an effort to capture the highly skilled brain during quick, simplified, controlled moments of artistic creation. The focus on art and not other equally creative activities within other disciplines is perhaps due to both an ignorance of other fields and how innovation emerges and to the arts' evolutionary adaptive value to humans and its insatiable response to and power to elicit "novelty, surprisingness, incongruity, complexity, variability, and puzzlingness" (Dissanayake 1974: 214). This particular focus makes three primary assumptions about artists (and subsumes the Western viewpoint discussed earlier of training and professional status as a sign of artistic proficiency): (a) they are experts at creating novel items, (b) they are immune to experimental constraints and can readily adapt to performing in-the-moment highly original, generative tasks (in comparison to novices who may struggle to innovate because their command of the basic skills, lexicon, and rule-based knowledge necessary for fluency in the artistic domain remains incomplete), and (c) their cognitive processing stages differ significantly enough from non-artists that differences can be observed in their functional neuroanatomy. These criteria should be, in theory, applicable to other creative activities not related to art making.

Results are at best partially descriptive and not nearly explanatory. Studies of visual artists and non-artists as they sketch novel drawings reveal that there is greater neural activity in PFC regions in the artists' brains than in the non-artists (Amedi et al. 2008; Bhattacharya and Petsche 2005; Solso 2001). Interestingly, greater cortical thickness in the left lateral orbitofrontal cortex has been significantly linked with higher overall creative achievement (Jung et al. 2010). These data, of course, do not explain whether the higher level of creativity is a product of an increase in gray matter or general greater mass of gray matter in particular brain regions. Other artistic mediums such as story generation (Howard-Jones et al. 2005), improvisational and imagined dance (Fink, Graif, and Neubauer 2009), choreographed movement imagery (May et al. 2011), and creative brainstorming and

writing (Shah et al. 2013), to name just a few, have also received attention and have all similarly reported activation in orbitofrontal and dorsolateral prefrontal cortices during performance of the artistic task. In the musical arts, studies with musicians improvising simple, single-handed musical sequences have unsurprisingly observed activation in relevant cortical areas associated with rapid output of auditory-motor sequences, language production and comprehension, and top-down processing (e.g., Bengtsson, Csíkszentmihályi, and Ullén 2007; Berkowitz and Ansari 2008; Donnay et al. 2014; Liu et al. 2012; de Manzano and Ullén 2012). In sum, the spontaneous generation of ideas can be understood as a perception-action feedforward-feedback cycle that includes mind-wandering and cognitive control processing (Loui 2018). Emotion was not a target of interest. In the case when highly simplified positive, negative, and ambiguous facial expressions were the emotional targets for musical improvisation, emotion was seen to modulate limbic, reward, and prefrontal brain areas, with significantly greater hypofrontality and deeper flow states with the positive emotional targets (McPherson et al. 2016). Furthermore, an interesting finding in one of the jazz studies observed both deactivation in the DLPFC and activation in the medial PFC in the task where most improvisational freedom was allowed and musically observed; a mental state the investigators suggest is potential neural evidence of creative flow (Limb and Braun 2008), or a balance between attenuation of awareness and intense acuity of self-expression. The term *flow* was originally coined in the 1970s to describe an optimal experience that occurs during a highly motivated, intense, enjoyable, and creative (but not necessarily artistic) act by the individual in question (Csíkszentmihályi 1975) and, as more recently documented, possible in all members within a collaborative-creating context (Berliner 2009; Sawyer 2003, 2011). To reemphasize, highly creative thinking and doing involves intense pleasure and joy; again, affect as motivator, trigger, and sustainer. While the dissociative neural state in the above study has yet to be cross-replicated in other musical, artistic, and non-artistic creative acts, it stands as a temporary provocative finding for two reasons: (i) altered states of consciousness – (day)dreaming, drug-induced states, endurance running, hypnosis, and meditation – whereby various similar distortions occur with respect to time perception, adherence to social constraints, and focused attention, tend to exhibit a transient decrease in PFC activity (Dietrich 2003). The finding suggests a neurological similarity to creative thinking states. And (ii) because the very premise of the Surrealist art movement of the 1920s was founded on the idea that creative invention “soit verbalement, soit par écrit, soit de toute autre manière, le fonctionnement réel de la pensée. Dictée de la pensée, en l’absence de tout contrôle exercé par la raison, en dehors de toute préoccupation esthétique ou morale” [proposes to express, be it verbally, or written, or by whichever method, the actual functioning of thought in the absence of complete control as determined by reason, and exempt from all aesthetic or moral concern] (Breton 1924). Such a neural observation may be modern technology’s answer to a century-old proposition. Essentially, flow is letting go, moving along with the pleasurable moment of unfolding accomplishment.

5 Creativity, art, and emotion. An interdisciplinary approach

Whether neuroscience as it stands today in 2022 can add anything substantial other than the creative process of invention involves both cerebral hemispheres and default and executive networks in some way or another, the results offer objective evidence to support the claim that artists (and highly creative individuals not necessarily artists) engage in more top-down processing than non-artists (and less creative individuals not necessarily non-artists). In a behavioral priming experiment testing differences between word associations (Gruszka and Nęcka 2002), the more creative participants revealed a greater ability to notice associations, and particularly more complex ones, than less creative participants. Part of the claim is that noticing associations is an effect of having access to a “wider ‘fan’ of activation of their semantic network” (Gruszka and Nęcka 2002: 204). What this means is that a wider and more advanced knowledge and representation space as well as an openness to uncertainty helps with the unconventional pattern searching and problem restructuring necessary for a distinctly different and novel solution to be found. Extrapolating beyond professional artists and considering any profession, characteristics in a creative individual therefore are: openness to the unknown, to challenge, and to learning → behavioral activation to acquire new knowledge → access to bigger knowledge space → generation of more complex network of connections within the knowledge space → greater ease and agility with immediate future unknowns → more options (e.g., remote alternatives) in view → more creative outcomes.

Returning to the how of insight and emergent behavior, a proposal highlights a set of hierarchical steps to the design process. As new variables and consequent new conceptual schemas are integrated and the current design space is transformed, a novel design emerges (Gero 1996). This presumably entails that the *problem space* (from Newell and Simon 1972) continually alters its shape with every novel idea until the most appropriate design for the intended goal is achieved. In a similar vein, the malleability of compositional goals as the composer moves back and forth generating solutions while she shapes and reshapes her composition is common during the long-term compositional process (Collins 2005). Insight, therefore, is neither linear nor discrete but a dynamic multidimensional state that depends on both recent past and near future information, ideas, and solutions and the motivation and perseverance to persist. Narrative insight while reading – or the reader’s engagement with and understanding of the characters’ lives, actions, feelings, etc., in the text as a result of their interpreting the text and bringing it alive within their mind’s simulation – functions much in the same way as a composer composing. As a composer works through ideas that each shape the next idea and the composer herself until a final cohesive one is chosen, the reader dynamically selects, organizes, interprets, and synthesizes the text as an active participant moving through past, present, and future experiences (Rosenblatt 1985). By virtue of transforming the text before her, the reader has changed her cognitive outlook. Additionally, every time the same text is re-read, the experiencing of it is different. Different expectations arise, distinct motivations emerge, new interpretations materialize, and old and/or new emotional states change.

But past and future solutions are loaded concepts. While Gero's (1996) model can explain how novelty evolves from preexisting forms and Collins's (2005) compositional case study implicitly captures the role of bigger picture societal expectations, they do not explicitly consider integration of the important, and fundamentally inevitable role ever-changing contexts – as in personal, cultural, and social – play in evaluative and consequent implementation processes (Glaveanu et al. 2013; Mumford et al. 1991). Bringing to the forefront both the creator's mind and physical state within their environment and the environment's acceptance of and response to the creator offers an even larger contextual perspective of the creative process within various artistic mediums. Such approach on the creative process affirms that internal cognitive, emotional, and motivational elements of the creator indeed are inseparable from, and in constant dynamic feedback with, external expectations, interpretations, and reactions from society (Glaveanu et al. 2013). Much in the same way a text's meaning depends on its reader/interpreter, a creator's creation depends on the milieu in which it is being created – creation and interpretation do not happen in a vacuum. As Dewey remarked, "the external object, the product of art, is the connecting link between artist and audience. Even when the artist works in solitude all three terms are present. The work is there in progress, and the artist has to become vicariously the receiving audience" (Dewey 1934: 106). From this perspective, artistic creativity is hardly a singular experience. Rather, it brings to the forefront the inevitable inclusion of societal expectations regarding, for example, aesthetic qualities and cultural norms to the creative development process and resulting creative outcome. Rejecting societal expectations is to consider them in order to break them. In line with Booth's (1961) discussion on the voice and role of the author, the creator's judgments, observations, and opinions about the world they live in are inextricably woven into their work. Creator, created object, and interpreter – whose judgments, observations, and opinions about the world she lives in are also inextricably woven into her interpretation – are all interconnected and depend on each other for meaning, both old and reinforcing and new and enlightening. The creator cannot isolate herself from the society in which she lives – to which the interpreter also belongs – as much as her creation cannot be dissociated from her. The paradox is inevitable: to isolate herself from societal wants and desires is to make the emotional choice of shunning herself from emotion.

5.1 Improvisatory interpretations

Under this umbrella of sociocultural psychology, it is imperative to also consider what live collaborative, or group, creativity may reveal about the process, the individuals involved, and the resulting outcome. Given the real-time exchange of ideas within conversation or on stage among jazz musicians or improvisational theatre actors, for example, group creativity becomes a product of *interactional synchrony*. Interactional synchrony is when all engaged parties listen and react to one another and maintain group coherence (Sawyer 2003, 2011). This synchrony characteristic within a group highlights the importance of partners within the group identifying each other's spontaneous insights in the moment and then negotiating with each other in search of a unified goal for conversational fluidity and innovation. Understanding live interactional synchrony between various voices has motivated the criti-

cal empirical position to explore the ecological realness of creative-interpretive behavior within theatre and its greater theoretical and societal implications (López-González 2014, 2015a, 2015b, 2016a, 2016b, 2017a, 2017b, 2018a). Ecological realness is paramount because it signifies accepting and incorporating complex, multivariate environments full of interconnected sensory information such as language, music, emotion, body language, scenography, and color. As a result, multiple layers of interpretation can coexist in the moment and their coalescing in real-time, given the context of live theatre, become the performance itself (López-González 2015b, 2016b, 2017a): actors responding to the text and to each other, musicians responding to the actors and to each other, and the audience responding to the actors and to the musicians. From an experimental standpoint this requires adopting a more open-ended and spontaneous approach to scientific inquiry within cognitive psychology, neuroscience, and theoretical modeling, and to artistic purpose through artistic practice. Moreover, it means accepting that Art and Science disciplines as most creative and enduring methods for crafting our human story can directly inform and shape each other (e.g., López-González 2018b), leading to a more unified theory of human cognition.

Knowledge is gained by continuously interacting with others through exchanges, be they linguistic or non-verbal (Pask 1976). Taking this interactional learning a step further, what does this learning consist of within the real-time conversation between text, actors, and improvising musicians? Improvised music to fully scripted film and dramatic works is a reservoir of invaluable data points. Such data reveal how visual information and narrative language are interpreted and translated in-the-moment into musical language. Most significantly, and in relation to our discussion throughout, it spotlights the dynamic nature of interpretation between text and interpreters of music and language, a dynamism filled with the immediacy of searches and choices. As mentioned earlier, music and the visual and performing arts' worlds are prime environments for study because of their (a) live, integrative multisensory experiences, (b) rich storytelling narratives for experimentation outside the traditional laboratory setting, and (c) openness to public engagement.

While music may seem more abstract than language with alternative interpretations more vastly prominent, a longer glance at the core of musical interpretation reveals otherwise. In describing what music is essentially capable of expressing, composer and philosopher Leonard B. Meyer writes: "Music does not, for example, present the concept or image of death itself. Rather it connotes that rich realm of experience in which death and darkness, night and cold, winter and sleep and silence are all combined and consolidated into a single connotative complex [...] which then becomes particularized in the experience of the individual listener" (Meyer 1956: 265). So what does this mean for live, improvised music in theatre? Just as particular sounds combine to have shared and learned meaning in natural language, music, too, albeit not as semantically specific, has a similar capability. Breaking down Meyer's (1956) example, if death has a set of universal physical characteristics, e.g., collapse, stillness, and silence, then combining musical variables (e.g., rhythm, tempo, and loudness) in any number of ways can onomatopoeically mimic those recognizable physical features and consequently elicit an image of death in the interpreter and listener. Music, given its lack of semantic specificity, then, functions as a communicative medium expressing concepts and emotions via connotative representations. Philosopher Peter Kivy further posits that music's expressiveness results because "various features of

music, such as tempo, mode, and melodic patterns, display a ‘structural resemblance’ with features of human behavior [such as vocal and bodily expression] that are expressive of [specific] emotions” (Thompson 2009: 129). In effect, when tasked with interpreting text, voices, bodies, and scenes with intense emotional changes, musicians mimic the nuances of the target emotion and represent the surrounding narrative environment via various combinations and recombinations of musical variables (mode, pitch, rhythm, sound level, tempo) (López-González 2015b). In the absence of clearly marked emotional linguistic targets, the improvising musician focuses on identifying a global narrative emotion within the particular dialogue sequence and creates matching musical phrases that reflect the expected physiological reaction(s) to such emotion (e.g., emotional agitation expressed via disjointed rhythmic sequences and a mix of half and whole steps). Every new emotion identified is musically represented via different combinations and recombinations of musical variables (López-González 2016b). When multiple musicians are involved, analysis of the improvised music reveals an in-the-moment improvisatory synchrony between the physical rhythm between the actors moving on stage with the question-answer-response rhythm between the musicians, the words and phrasings of the actors with the notes, pitches, and phrasing of the musicians, the emotional intent of the actors with the enhanced, emotional interpretation/translation by the musicians, and the inclusion of sound effects to mimic event descriptions mentioned by the characters/actors. The overall setup creates a unified music-language quartet of voices, bodies, and instruments dynamically expressing meaning and engendering, exchanging, and merging ideas to produce a cohesive narrative whole (López-González 2017a). In these live and unique contexts, interpretation is creation and creation is emotional in both purpose and outcome.

Several crucial differences must be noted, however, between a single musician and several musicians tasked with interpreting text and producing an optimal coherent artistic experience (i.e., positive outcome) (López-González 2018a):

1. Different personalities are present versus one type of personality. Participants of a group collectively bring various musical and negotiation styles to the task. This entails the inevitable introduction of a variety of possible interpretations that must be whittled down to one agreed upon kind.
2. Different knowledge of and experience with established rules and norms in music and in performance versus one set of such knowledge and experience. Participants of a group also collectively bring various instrumental characteristics and musical negotiation strategies to bear on the task at hand. A variety of possible interpretations are traded and converged into one cohesive selection.
3. Different internal emotional states are present versus one set of emotional states. A group entails various personal emotions and various expression strategies that will inspire, inhibit, and modulate the task at hand.
4. Collaboration and therefore negotiation of actions are necessary through real-time self versus group feedback. Feedback to and from others moves center stage as musical compromises are made: (i) behavioral risk is assessed (i.e., how much to break away from expectation to reach novelty) in comparison to others. Others may increase or decrease risk-taking with specific cues; (ii) personal styles may or may not be kept in check. Others may constrain or encourage personal style with specific cues; (iii) per-

sonal emotional states are tested in comparison to others. Others may agree with or contradict emotional state(s) with facial or musical cues; (iv) behavioral predictions are defined by the call and response actions of others (i.e., cues to lead or to follow); and (v) creative ability is revealed as compared to others. Others may be faster or slower to ideate novel sequences and encouraging or discouraging towards novelty.

In sum, the core of narratives is emotion and these studies suggest that interpretations are traded emotions.

6 Conclusion

This research has discussed and integrated three key concepts fundamental to the understanding of the artistic experience: art, emotion, and creativity. Exploration of these concepts has uncovered a plethora of interpretations regarding their definition, explanation, and representation. The consistent increment of interpretations throughout decades of academic scholarship reveals the difficulty and complexity of defining and interpreting each of these concepts, let alone their integration. I began this chapter with a broad discussion on art, focused on the dynamic nature of literary text, and ended with insights from the empirical analysis of the live integration of text and music. The borders of artistic genres were crossed, and various questions permeating interpretation and creation were merged. Clear-cut answers, however, remain elusive.

Emotion and creativity were presented in separate sections to better highlight current research and findings. Furthermore, the contemporary perspective presented here sought an interdisciplinary approach, weaving knowledge within the humanities and the cognitive sciences to not only bridge the gap still existent in academic scholarship but to fortify and better understand their intrinsic link. The various sections have also revealed that research on each of the disciplines is inconclusive. The many interpretations and arguments discussed remain unstable and the manner in which they have been approached raise more questions, many of which I present to reiterate the complexity of the topics at hand and to ignite alternate ways of thinking. Part of the problem begins with the fact that art – literary text as the focus within the umbrella topic of language and emotion – has been studied by many academic schools of thought, establishing categories, standards, and rules of their own. Such characterization of art, however, has not provided empirical evidence regarding the endowment of authority, capacity, knowledge, and/or experience to define, characterize, and validate the so-called correctness of what art is. This reality, unfortunately, is the result of insufficient cross-cultural studies and their consequent integration.

Art and artistic activities are products of the human mind/brain. Art is not only about academic knowledge and/or education but activities and outcomes that encompass personal experiences as defined through the lens of cultural factors, environmental determinants, and overall human behavior. Affect and its expression, which can be evoked or suppressed, are about experiences felt, imagined, expected, simulated, transformed, created, and revealed (in no particular order). Creativity is a human ability fundamental for survival and drives the continuous development of mental capacities and behavioral action. We prob-

lem-solve, strategize, and search for solutions to get things done in our daily lives. Emotional expression through artistic activity is one route for imagination and creative thinking and doing. Any simplistic, isolated, and single perspective on what art is without integrating the evocation, function, and processes of affect and creativity in an interdisciplinary and holistic manner cannot provide concrete answers towards how any of these concepts should be defined and interpreted.

In regards to creativity, its definition and interpretation have also remained elusive in spite of decades of research dedicated to the topic. Research on creativity has, unfortunately, persisted with experimental reductionism and repetition (at both behavioral and neurological levels) without consistent validation or ecological validity, hindering our understanding of human creative capacity in all its multisensory, emotional, and intellectual richness and the various ways creativity is expressed by different individuals in diverse contexts. Even when art is the focus of study, it deserves to be realistically represented. That is to say, a real-world approach to studying art outside of sterile laboratories is critical. Artistic expression is inconsistent, unpredictable, and irreproducible. To ignore internal (e.g., motivational) and external (e.g., expectations) factors or to sacrifice one for the other in light of the scientific method is to isolate the mind/brain from the very environment on which it depends and flourishes. Only an interdisciplinary approach that integrates questions, theories, methods, and data from the cognitive brain sciences (regarding language, affect, music) with questions, theories, methods, and products/experiences from artistic practice and the humanities and unites them into a hybrid discipline will be able to shed light on how to characterize and define the processes of creative thinking and doing and the resulting array of interpretations of this world. The live interactional synchrony observed within group theatrical creativity, for example, is a step forward in challenging how and what to study by redefining the core of empirical investigation and broadening the goals of research. Moreover, considering a more fluid connection between art forms encourages the acquisition of multiple data points. Essentially, interpretation of text between musicians within a theatrical space highlighted the real-time musical negotiation of individual textual interpretations and their resulting musical interpretations to yield a unified musical outcome. Interpretation, therefore, embodies a complex system of dynamic searches and emotional exchanges and the word “experience” is the label we use to denote our conscious appraisal of such. Although not explored here but open to future study is the recognition of the utility of these studies for expanding interdisciplinary methods and implementing consequent innovations within industry. One very specific example, as discussed in López-González (2018a, 2019, 2020), is the application of cognitive behavioral models of human creativity to the autonomous vehicle space as a way to improve the intelligence capacities of driverless car technology in a world where human drivers and machines are intended to interact with each other.

What this discussion affirms is the richness of perception and the impossible nature of reducing art or an artistic activity/experience to any one perspective, any one emotion, any one aspect of the experience itself. In focusing on the literary text as a medium for illustrating the dynamic nature of interpretation, the multifaceted nature of language is critical to engendering the reader’s creativity: language expresses emotion, language reflects cultural knowledge, language communicates narrative, and language generates interpretation where-

by emotion, cultural knowledge, narrative, and interpretation are all individually and collectively open to the numerous possibilities of our mind's capabilities. As a result, there is no benefit to narrowing down perspective to a one and only one. Let alone a presumed correct perspective when the richness of experience is what ultimately counts for the artistic medium to survive beyond the ivory towers of academic institutions. We should acknowledge and celebrate diversity as the very result of our evolutionary history and the core of our humanity. New artistic activities will emerge; new frameworks to interpret such activities will arise; new language will be created; new interpretations will follow. The creative capacity of humans does not allow for validating one interpretation over another because as many minds/brains existing and to be, as many interpretations possible and to come.

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70 Emotion and language in aesthetic experiences

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Abstract: What we call art has continuously been questioned, renewed and differentiated, yet its link to affect and emotion has been persistently confirmed since the very beginning of modernity. In this chapter we answer the question of how art affects us, beginning with a historical overview of the most important theoretical positions. We present discussions of aesthetic phenomena as varied as abstract emotion, aesthetic pleasure, catharsis, empathy, flow experience, and perceptual dynamics with a point of departure in phenomenological psychology and discuss the nature of affect, language and perception based on selected accounts of aesthetic experience. We rely on the theoretical framework of the French phenomenologist, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, and show how language is fundamentally embodied. How art affects us depends on the kind of perception in question as the different art forms appeal to their respective sense modalities. Differences in art experiences, however, are also based on amodal parts of experience, such as movement, affect and language. It is concluded that to language dynamic experiences are much more demanding than naming objects and consequently language in its narrow sense is not a possible foundation for aesthetic experience. Using the concept of language in a broad sense shows how the most common language of art is affect and emotion.

1 Introduction

Art has been linked to affects, emotions and feelings from the very beginning of aesthetics. When Alexander Baumgarten ([1735] 1954) initiated the field in modernity it was exactly in order to emphasize the central role of sensing, affect and emotion. Poetry, he argued, awakens affect, particularly feelings of pleasure and displeasure. Art, or experience with art, however, is not only linked to feelings but also to language. That art is related to language is self-evident in the sense that language in the form of literature and poetry is also art.

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But just as there are innumerable ways to conceptualize the nature of emotions and feelings, there are many ways to conceptualize the relations between art and language. In this regard, Nelson Goodman (1968) has provided us with a celebrated theory. He grants feelings and emotions a role, albeit a secondary one, as their central role is not *as* understanding, but to *aid* understanding. Although Goodman discusses both language and understanding in a broad sense where language is that which is symbolic and understanding is more than knowledge, it is a cognitive theory with focus on symbols in the work of art.

Similar to Goodman, we will use a broad definition of language. There are different, general definitions of language: one narrow where language refers to natural languages (speaking, hearing, writing and reading), and a broader view where language is identical with sign systems (in accordance with semiology and semiotics, for instance). When sign systems are understood as language, then art and bodily expressions are language, too, as they actively signify meaning. In contrast to Goodman's theory, however, we will discuss the relations between language, affect and art primarily in relation to how they appear in the experience of art. The study of aesthetic experience is a broad and heterogeneous field, and we will narrow it down by writing from the point of view of phenomenological psychology. Phenomenological psychology has a long and complex tradition, yet it currently exists on the margins of psychological thought. Much psychology today focuses on measuring aspects of the mind from a more natural scientific point of view. When we use phenomenological psychology, it is because of its focus on description instead of measurement. Simply put, phenomenological psychology emphasizes qualitative descriptions of experiences, and uses these to develop theories about the phenomenon in question (see e.g. Funch 2003; Giorgi 2009; Roald 2015; Wertz 2010 for further details). At the same time, phenomenology is, or, at least ideally, should be much more than a descriptive method. The phenomenologist Maurice Merleau-Ponty has eloquently compared phenomenology to artistic practice. He wrote: “[Phenomenology] is as painstaking as the work of Balzac, Proust, Valéry or Cezanne – by reason of the same kind of attentiveness and wonder, the same demand for awareness, the same will to seize the meaning of the world or of history as that meaning comes into being” (Merleau-Ponty [1945] 1962: xxiv). This openness is particularly important when it comes to aesthetics. An experience of a work of art is an experiential totality, yet when psychology investigates experiences with art it is often reduced to specific aspects of the work. Thus, the work of art is not treated as an expressive unity.

In this paper, we use phenomenological psychology in its broadest sense, including theories and studies that do not necessarily use the term, but that focus on the nature of experience as it appears. We focus on what and how art communicates to us, in other words, how the perception of the work of art takes place. This necessarily implies a focus on the nature of experience and how language and emotion enter into it. In order to analyze this, we begin with a historical presentation of the view of affect, feeling, emotion, and art within psychology with a focus upon how experiences with art occur as well as its consequences. We use the term affect as an umbrella term, covering both feelings and emotions. Feelings refer to a continuous flow of all kinds of felt phenomena, while emotions refer to intense and rather distinct states (see, e.g., Roald 2007: 16–17, 2015). Then we present specific conceptualizations of language and art, before we discuss the nature of sense modalities in experience as pertains to language and emotion. Since bodily expres-

sion is a form of language (or body language), we conclude that if language is to be understood in its broadest sense, as communication, then the most common language of art is affect and emotion. Using language in its broad sense does not by default ignore the importance of language in conceptualization as the broader definition includes the more narrow definition. The emotion concepts we use certainly have a linguistic foundation in the language we are born into. The experience of emotion, however, is not primarily linguistic, as seen later in our chapter (see also Bonsdorff 2015; Inkpin 2016; as well as Levin 1998).

2 Art and emotion

Experiences with works of art have continuously been associated with emotions. Scholars within the area of psychological aesthetics, however, have neither agreed on what kind of emotions are characteristic for art experiences nor what kind of impact an art experience has on the human psyche. Different kinds of pleasure, such as aesthetic, cognitive, intrinsic, transcendent, and cathartic pleasure, are among those emotional responses suggested, often without specifying their phenomenological characteristics. Aesthetic empathy, aesthetic fascination, aesthetic peak experience, and aesthetic flow experience are among many attempts to describe the emotional aspect of an art experience. Even concepts such as preference, tension, arousal, appreciation, and impression, with some allusion to emotions, are used to describe experiences with art. Aesthetic as an adjective is often used just to indicate an experience with a work of art without specifying whether the feeling of pleasure is different from the pleasure of, for example, eating a delicious meal, having an orgasm, or other occasions of pleasurable feelings. The psychological impact of these emotional responses seems to span from momentary experiences of pleasure to an existential life change.

In the following we will present a brief overview that will illuminate the complexity and variation that exist in terms of how the work of art affects us when it comes to our emotional life. In this regard, the work by Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten (1714–1762) is a landmark in the history of aesthetics, not only because he coins the concept of aesthetics but also because he makes it clear and explicit that art appreciation is fundamentally different from logical reasoning. With reference to the Greek philosophers and the Church fathers he distinguished between *things known* and *things perceived*. The things known are understood by the “superior” faculty, i.e., the intellect, and belong to the domain of science. The things perceived are known through the “inferior” faculty of sensation, and this is what he called the science of aesthetics (Baumgarten 1954: 78). When a discourse is made up by sensate representations, Baumgarten talked about *sensate discourse*, and he maintained that “a sensate discourse will be the more perfect the more its parts favor the awakening of sensate representation” (Baumgarten 1954: 38). In defining sensate representation he used the term cognition, which easily leads to an understanding of art appreciation as a cognitive ability with an emphasis on sensation rather than logical reasoning. He did, however, also connect it to feelings, in particular feelings of pleasure and displeasure.

2.1 Aesthetic pleasure

Within psychology, aesthetic pleasure has since the early time of psycho-physics been associated with an experience of art. Pleasure as opposed to displeasure was considered as a core dimension of emotional life, and therefore, pleasure was viewed as an aspect of positive emotions in general, including the experience of beauty. The principal endeavor of psycho-physical studies was to identify the physical properties of beauty with the assumption of a direct correspondence between the physical stimulus and the psychological response. Gustav Theodor Fechner was the first to carry out systematic empirical studies within the area of aesthetics. Inspired by Adolf Zeising's (1854) detection of the so-called golden section in nature, Fechner (1876, 1: 193) carried out an experimental study of the proportions of a rectangle and found a preference for the rectangle with the golden proportion. It refers to a specific, symmetrical proportion in a rectangle or a triangle, for instance, where the proportions between two sections are about 8:5. It has been assumed to be the physical structure facilitating for the experience of beauty (see more in Funch 1997). Fechner's results have been replicated in numerous subsequent studies and some confirm his observations (see Benjafield 1976, 1985; Berlyne 1971; Zusne 1970), but they are also seriously refuted in a study by Holger Höge (1997). The point here, however, is that aesthetic pleasure was seen to correspond with formal beauty in such a way that the more beautiful an occurrence, the more pleasure it provides. Based on this hypothesis countless preference studies have been carried out on works of art.

Experimental aesthetics, having evolved out of psycho-physics, gives the impression that Fechner's theory is deterministic, with aesthetic preference being a physiological response to beauty. Fechner, however, was more sophisticated than that. He recognized taste as a power of like and dislike which influences art preferences. Taste, in his view, is biologically based, but influenced by living conditions and education. He claimed that good taste brings well-being (Fechner 1876, 1: 264), a claim that is hardly ever acknowledged. One of the most recent approaches to aesthetic pleasure reduces pleasure to a consequence of only one function, namely fluency in decoding the object. Reber, Schwarz, and Winkielman (2004), for instance, plainly conclude that "aesthetic pleasure is a function of the perceiver's processing dynamics: The more fluently perceivers can process an object, the more positive their aesthetic response" (Reber, Schwarz, and Winkielman 2004: 364).

2.2 Aesthetic catharsis

The concept of catharsis was first used in art experience by Aristotle ([c. 335 BCE] 2013) in his study of Greek dramatic art. The aim of tragedy, Aristotle claimed, is to arouse sensations of pity and fear, and to purge these emotions so that the audience leaves the theater with a feeling of being cleansed and uplifted. This is what he calls *catharsis*, meaning 'purification' or 'cleansing'. The term catharsis was adopted much later in psychoanalytical theory. Josef Breuer and Sigmund Freud ([1895] 1955) used the term to convey the emotional relief that some of Freud's patients, diagnosed with what he called hysteria, experienced after recalling traumatic experiences previously repressed and forgotten. One of Breuer's

patients called it “chimney sweeping” and “the talking cure” upon recounting her day-dreams for him (Breuer and Freud 1955: 30). To his surprise, Breuer realized that when his patient recalled previous traumatic experiences, associated symptoms of hysteria dissolved. This heralded the beginning of psychoanalysis as a therapy.

The feeling of catharsis was later associated with experiences of art. Without going into detail about Freud’s psychoanalytical theory, it is important to note that he considered libido, a sexual drive and energy, to be a motivating force behind all human activity, and whenever prevented from satisfaction, he argued that the psyche creates ways for the libido to express itself. He viewed creativity as well as art appreciation as examples of how the psyche may respond to repressed libido. In other words, the assumption is that if libidinal wishes are frustrated by external obstacles or moral inhibitions, they are repressed and kept out of consciousness. However, they could be fulfilled in imagination or fantasy. Since the primary processes, according to Freud, do not differentiate between reality and imagination, drive satisfaction is just as genuine through the illusions of art as it would be through actual behavior. Art is, as Freud stated, “a conventionally accepted reality in which, thanks to artistic illusion, symbols and substitutes are able to provoke real emotions” (Freud [1913] 1955: 187). This specific process of finding satisfaction for repressed libido is, in psychoanalytic terminology, called sublimation, and the feeling of catharsis associated with art appreciation is a result of it.

2.3 Perceptual dynamics

Rudolf Arnheim (1974), one of the leading scholars within psychological aesthetics, suggested tensions rather than emotions to be the defining characteristic of art experience. Arnheim, a Gestalt psychologist, argued for the structuring powers of the mind. For this reason, he saw dynamic perception to be the very basis of aesthetic experience. Arnheim (1974: 10–18) demonstrated with a simple visual design of a dark disk on a white square how the perceived dynamics change as he moved the disk into different positions on the white square. When the disk was moved off center, for example, it appeared as if there was something restless about it. One got the impression that it came from the center and wanted to return. These pulls and pushes he called *visual forces*, experienced as genuine properties of the design. He recognized visual forces as an inherent part of any stimulus pattern just like size, shape, and color, arguing that they are spontaneously recognized. Arnheim claimed, “[v]isual perception consists in the experiencing of visual forces” (Arnheim 1974: 412).

Compositions in art are often complex, structured of different and often contradictory visual forces, but Arnheim demonstrated in his analyses of works of art that these compositions, in the best case, contribute to a dynamic whole and accentuate the subject matter, whether it is figurative or abstract. In other words, he argued that great works of art represent a unity of visual forces that transmit their expression directly to the viewer. Visual forces’ counterpart is psychological tension. Arnheim (1974: 17) assumed, as do Gestalt psychologists in general, that the inherent dynamics of perception have their physiological counterpart in the nervous system. He claimed that the human mind exercises two kinds of striving, one tension reducing and the other tension heightening. The first is a striving

towards orderliness in an attempt to understand and accept one's living conditions, a prerequisite for survival. The second prevents stagnation and boredom and is important for psychological growth. Works of art stimulate both strivings in concert with its subject matter. Experiencing the visual forces in a work of art may lead to a feeling of pleasure, but Arnheim (1969) argued that the spontaneous response to expressive qualities in art is the distinctive feature of art appreciation. He saw this experience as a precondition for a comprehensive process of understanding the work.

2.4 Aesthetic empathy

Most scholars within psychological aesthetics agree that pleasure is a general characteristic of an art experience. Theodor Lipps (1903a) went a step further by claiming that aesthetic pleasure had its own distinguished quality in every individual encounter with a work of art. According to his understanding, aesthetic pleasure is a result of empathy or, more precisely, aesthetic empathy. Empathy is the standard translation of the German word *Einfühlung*, which in verbatim means 'feeling into'. Unlike other feelings, empathic feelings are the experience of one's own feelings as belonging to someone or something else, be it the expressive content of a work of art or another person's feeling of grief, for instance. Although empathic feelings are usually associated with other people, Lipps maintained that they may also arise from the appreciation of works of art. He defines aesthetic empathy as a special kind of empathy that takes place during 'pure aesthetic contemplation' ("reine ästhetische Betrachtung") (Lipps 1906: 34). Attention during aesthetic contemplation is concentrated exclusively on the object in such a way that the usual differentiation between viewer and work of art is suspended. Lipps (1903a) claimed that aesthetic pleasure, characterized by a remarkably sublime, pure, and free quality, is spontaneously felt and appears in experience with its own reality. Knowledge and life experiences are an integral part of aesthetic contemplation, but not manifested during aesthetic empathy.

Lipps (1903b: 224) assumed that aesthetic empathy relates to the form rather than the subject matter but did not view the form as such as what made the work of art beautiful. Rather, the form is beautiful if it is perceived to contain an object full of life. Lipps traced the vivacity of form back to the movement of the line or contour when it was originally created (Lipps 1903b: 226).

Lipps's theory of aesthetic empathy had great influence on contemporary scholars such as Herbert Sidney Langfeld, Vernon Lee, and Wilhelm Worringer. Whether aesthetic empathy was based on movement has been a subject of dispute. Vernon Lee and Clementina Anstruther-Thomson ([1897] 1912) claimed,

We cannot, for instance, satisfactorily focus a stooping figure like the Medicean Venus if we stand before it bolt upright and with tense muscles, nor a very erect and braced figure like the Apoxyomenos if we stand before it humped up and with slackened muscles. In such cases the statue seems to evade our eye, and it is impossible to realize its form thoroughly, whereas, when we adjust our muscles in imitation of the tenseness or slackness of the statue's attitude, the statue immediately becomes a reality of us. (Lee and Anstruther-Thomson 1912: 218)

Lipps's (1903b: 126) conviction, on the other hand, was that aesthetic empathy is something original and fundamental to the human psyche and not derived from something else.

The theory of empathy has recently been revived within a neurological perspective by David Freedberg and Vittorio Gallese (2007). They write that “[w]hen we see the body part of someone else being touched or caressed, or when we see two objects touching each other, our somatosensory cortices are activated as if our body was subject to tactile stimulation” (Freedberg and Gallese 2007: 201). Freedberg and Gallese propose that similar embodied stimulation takes place in aesthetic experience in relation to the representational content of the work or in terms of the visible traces of the artists' creative gestures, even when they are implicit in the marks of the work. Their study is primarily a neurological contribution to the theory of empathy, maintaining that empathetic feelings are located in specific areas of the brain. From a philosophical perspective, however, Derek Matravers (2017) discusses the nature of empathy in aesthetic experience, and argues that since aesthetic experience is more about contemplating a given work rather than constituting of one's own world, empathy plays a limited role. Against this, Roald (2015) has shown how aesthetic experience can be about constituting your own world through the contemplation of a work of art. Empathy is such an important topic as it basically relates to how we understand others and the world around us, and is as such discussed by both philosophers and psychologists (see, e.g., Englander 2019; Eriksson and Englander 2017; Hansen and Roald in press; Hansen and Roald 2022; Sheets-Johnstone 2008; Zahavi 2014; Zahavi and Michael 2018; Zahavi and Rochat 2015).

2.5 Aesthetic flow experience

No one would question the fact that emotions vary in intensity from one art encounter to another. Nevertheless, few scholars within psychological aesthetics have shown much interest in the phenomenology of these variations. Several contemporary studies have focused on people's preferences for one work of art over another without scrutinizing the importance and variations of the emotional aspect. A few studies, however, have singled out an exceptional transcendent art experience, describing the process as “being gripped and stirred to the depth by archetypal atmosphere” (Neumann [1959] 1989: 188) or in terms of *ecstasy* (May 1985: 209).

In a study by Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi and Rick E. Robinson (1990), based on interviews with 57 museum professionals, the characteristics of the aesthetic experience are summed up as follows:

Many characteristics have been described over the centuries. In a recent review Monroe Beardsley (1982) singled out five recurring themes, suggesting that any aesthetic experience must inhibit the first one and at least three of the remaining four. It is possible to paraphrase Beardsley's five criteria as follows: (1) object focus: the person willingly invests attention in a visual stimulus; (2) felt freedom: he or she feels a sense of harmony that preempts everyday concerns and is experienced as freedom; (3) detached affect: the experience is not taken literary, so that the aesthetic presentation of a disaster might move the viewer to reflection but not to panic; (4) active discovery: the person becomes cognitively involved in the challenges presented by the stimulus and derives a sense of exhilaration from the

involvement; (5) wholeness: a sense of integration follows from the experience, giving the person a feeling of self-acceptance and self-expansion. (Csikszentmihalyi and Robinson 1990: 7)

Descriptions such as “felt freedom”, “a sense of harmony”, “detached affect”, and “sense of exhilaration” give prominence to the emotional aspect in the aesthetic experience of art. Over ninety percent of the respondents in Csikszentmihalyi and Robinson’s survey report “an appreciable level of emotional involvement” (Csikszentmihalyi and Robinson 1990: 34), which was the primary response type for nearly a quarter of respondents. A variety of emotions were reported, including positive emotions such as joy, delight, inspiration, and love as well as negative emotions such as anger, hate, and frustration. Comfort, nostalgia, tension, lust, excitement, and intrigue were also among the many descriptions of the emotional aspect of art appreciation.

Certain varieties of art experiences were hardly ever investigated before Csikszentmihalyi and Robinson defined and delineated the optimal experience with art as being equivalent to a flow experience. They write, “[w]hen this heightened state of consciousness occurs in response to music, painting, and so on, we call it an aesthetic experience. In other contexts, such as sport, hobbies, challenging work, and social interactions, the heightened state of consciousness is called a flow experience” (Csikszentmihalyi and Robinson 1990: 9). They conclude that the aesthetic and the flow experience may, in reality, be indistinguishable from one another. The heightened state of consciousness they refer to is an awareness fully focused on a limited stimulus field in such a way that action, whether physical or mental, merges with complete attentiveness. There is no ego awareness, but still a feeling of being in control of action and receiving clear feedback. Csikszentmihalyi and Robinson find that the aesthetic experience is autotelic in nature, meaning that it is intrinsically satisfying without a need for external rewards. Following this line of thought, Chilton (2013) suggests that flow experiences are essential when creating art is used as a part of a therapeutic process. Wanzer et al. (2020) proposes that flow experiences are also important for the reception of art. The results from the studies by Høffding and Roald (2019) as well as Høffding, Rung, and Roald (2020), however, have shown how intense encounters with art begin passively in the sense that the viewer “succumbs” to the work of art. The work of art is experienced as “surprising” and “as a ‘bolt from the blue’” (Høffding, Rung, and Roald 2020: 11), for instance, and in this sense the flow experience of feeling of control and active discovery is limited to later parts of the receptive process.

2.6 Abstract emotion

Csikszentmihalyi and Robinson’s approach to the study of aesthetic experience is expanded upon by an extensive study of psychological aesthetics by Bjarne Funch (1997). He demonstrates that studies within different schools of thought deal with different types of art appreciation, and he identifies and describes five categories, ranging from a spontaneous preference for a work of art to a blissful experience of transcendence. His principal aim is to describe the most personal engagement an individual can possibly have with a work of art and how such an aesthetic experience contributes to the viewer’s existential well-being. This type of art experience is described as one that transcends the ordinary stream of con-

sciousness and is characterized by exceptional vividness, profound emotionality, and complete focus on the work of art appearing as a united whole with remarkable lucidity and eminence. Some of those aspects are further illuminated in a description by the Dutch literary scholar Ernst van Alphen's experience of Francis Bacon's paintings. Van Alphen (1992) writes:

Seeing a work by Francis Bacon hurts. It causes pain. The first time I saw a painting by Bacon, I was literally left speechless. I was touched so profoundly because the experience was one of total engagement, of being dragged along by the work. I was perplexed about the level on which these paintings touched me: I could not even formulate what the paintings were about, still less what aspect of them hurt me so deeply. (van Alphen 1992: 9)

Another example, taken from an interview with the Danish artist Per Kirkeby, expounds on the same subject:

Earlier today I went to see an exhibition at the Museum of Prints and Drawings showing Botticelli's drawings for Dante's *Divine Comedy*. Then you don't need many constructions. It is just to put on your glasses. When something really important touches me, I can get quite emotional. My tears flow freely when I look at Botticelli's small drawings for the *Divine Comedy*. The way he sat very meticulously and drew with a fine pen – it is as if the line touches me. Twenty seconds pass where I feel I know why I am alive. At this point in time everything flows together into one and becomes a harmonious moment of experience which justifies an entire course of life. (Johnsen 2000: 9)

Based on testimonies such as the ones quoted above, Funch (1997) identifies two emotional dimensions of the aesthetic experience: The first is a unique and penetrating emotional quality that relates to an existential theme that has been prompted by the individual work of art. In spite of the overpowering presence of the emotional quality, it is usually not identifiable for the viewer him- or herself and therefore named an *abstract emotion*. The second emotional aspect is a simultaneous feeling of enlightened or transcendent pleasure, or a feeling that is "intrinsically enjoyable" as Beardsley (1982: 287) describes the same aspect.

The aesthetic experience, according to Funch (1997, 2007), is recognized as a blissful realization which results in a sudden reordering of the viewer's emotional life. It is suggested that an aesthetic experience provides a distinct form to an existential theme in the life of the viewer. A phenomenological model of consciousness serves as a basis for an understanding of how a momentary experience of a specific work of art, on rare occasions, exerts an extraordinary influence on the psyche and existence by constituting an emotional quality. Funch concludes that art provides a supreme option for constituting fleeting emotions caused by previous or current existential circumstances. It is this emotional constitution that, as Funch states, contributes to existential well-being.

Funch's theory is the one with the perspective where art shapes our emotional life most significantly. Yet, all of the theories are prominent suggestions as to how art affects us, ranging from merely eliciting aesthetic pleasure to a reordering of aspects of one's emotional life. None of the theories, however, explicitly discusses the role of language in experiences with art.

3 Language and art

Goodman's (1968) book, *Languages of Art*, is a classic treatise on the topic. In it, he established a deep connection between language and art. Art is language, he argued, because language is comprised of symbols. Since art uses symbols, it is a form of language (here the concept of symbols should be understood broadly, as symbols can, for example, refer to imaginary ones). The languages of art are dense, and how art, or the languages of art, affect us, depends on the symbols in play. Goodman's focus is not on the kind of experiences that art elicits, but on establishing the nature of art as symbolic and, therefore, linguistic. He used the concept of language in its broadest sense, comprising not just the formal languages but all forms of symbolic communication manifested in the content and form of the art work. But as part of his complex theory, he investigated not only the art work but also how the languages of art influence our understanding, which he viewed as a cognitive process because of its symbolic function. In other words, although we know from phenomenology that the cognitive and affective are deeply intertwined, his focus on the language of art is on the side of the cognitive rather than the affective: to perceive a picture, he argued, is a linguistic act through which the perceiver decodes the artwork's symbols where some of these symbols are feelings and emotions. How art affects us, or in Goodman's terminology – the quality of art – depends on its density or eloquence in the use of symbols. This symbolic density should lead to alterations of our way of perceiving and being in the world. He does not really investigate in depth how this happens – how art affects us or changes our way of being in the world. But he also sees the possibility for emotions to be a part of the perception process through feeling the artwork's content. This feeling, however, aids our understanding of the work of art, and priority is given to art improving our understanding rather than our emotional life. This aspect of his theory becomes even clearer as he also argued that when art attempts to represent emotions, it is "a poor substitute for reality" (Goodman 1968: 246). Therefore, although "understanding" is what the density of art provides us with, what is important for us in this context is that Goodman establishes a deep or dense connection between language and art through seeing art as symbolic and language as the communication of symbols.

Ann Richardson (1982), in her short but eloquent essay "Art means language", goes further than Goodman in her focus on the relation between art and language. She claims that art can not only be viewed as language; it "extends and completes language" (Richardson 1982: 12). She reasons that whether or not we define language broadly or narrowly, we know that "visual images are a viable channel of communication. Their impact is immediate and often intense" (Richardson 1982: 10). A difference between formal language and visual art is, therefore, time. The perception of visual art is direct while "[w]ords are cumulative in effect" (Richardson 1982: 10). It is therefore an error to equate formal language and art, as she argues that "to use language as a metaphor for art is inaccurate; such a statement does not take into account the immediacy and strength of the visual image. Instead, art should be acknowledged as a form of communication that must be understood" (Richardson 1982: 11). In other words, visual art communicates, but it communicates with an intensity that formal language rarely captures because of its extension in time. She does not mention, however, that the subsequent interpretation of the meaning of the experience,

whether linguistic or visual, is affective and depends on the depth of that which is expressed and how it resonates with us over time. Mark Johnson (e.g., 2007, 2015, 2018) argues that a depth of meaning in art lies beyond formal language as art can be experiences without propositions and concepts. Art reveals bodily intense meaning (and therefore relies on language in its broad sense).

These themes of resonance, affect, language, and art are found in the works of the classical phenomenologists. In this regard, one of phenomenology's most important results is its broad understanding of consciousness through discussions of pre-reflective experience where phenomenologists have shown that pre-reflection gives rise to reflection and language. Pre-reflective experience comprises bodily and affective experience that has ontogenetic priority. In difference to both the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis that language is primarily what creates experience, at least at a conceptual level, as well as the “experience vs. language debate”, phenomenology reveals an intricate relationship between bodily being, experience, and language where experience embodies language.

3.1 Embodied language

The French phenomenologist Maurice Merleau-Ponty is credited with showing how the experience of one's own body is the primordial relation to the world through which subjectivity and intersubjectivity is constituted. Experience, he argued, begins with the experience of one's own body in relationship to its environment. The philosopher Michel Henry (1965) later described this auto-affective bodily experience as an internal bodily quivering. It is auto-affective in the sense that, when conscious, it is affective, as the body is one's own moving, living body and, as such, felt with an internal bodily trembling. This trembling should not be viewed as happening to a self-enclosed entity, as it is constituted through the intersubjective field or social situation in which we move. In other words, we movingly initiate affect as a response to the phenomenal field (or existential situation), just as our emotional life initiates movement. Movement reveals our bodily being as affective: it is through perceptual and affective openness that we respond, move, and acquire a world of meaning. Perception is not atomistic, but meaningful in its experiential entirety. The mind does not synthesize discreet impressions into representations that, then, give meaning. Perception, according to Merleau-Ponty (1962), functions by a direct meaningful appropriation of the intersubjective field, occurring in affective movement.

Following this line of thought, to understand how meaning, language, affect, and emotions are created, we have to look at the experiential situation with its existential density, beginning with the experience of one's own body. Meaning is therefore not connected, primarily, to language, but begins with the sensing infant in its world. Movement and affect, not language, is the beginning of meaning. “To move one's body is to aim at things through it; it is to allow oneself to respond to their call, which is made up independently of any representation” (Merleau-Ponty 1962: 160–161). To move is intensely meaningful, albeit not primarily in a linguistic sense.

The body expresses a unity, a bodily intentionality, from which language arises (as a gift, but not merely). To argue this, Merleau-Ponty positioned himself as opposed to what

he called “empiricist” and “intellectual” theories of his day where language is seen as an extension of thought and where thought comes before language. These theories viewed speaking as occurring between people who think. The transition into language happens through cognitive operations that need to be decoded to become thought. Such views on the nature of language and thought are in error, according to Merleau-Ponty, who argued, through his focus on existential aspects of language, that language “accomplishes” (Merleau-Ponty 1962: 207) or actually is thinking. In the act of naming, objects gain meaning and become thought. Here Merleau-Ponty made an important distinction between “originating speech” (Merleau-Ponty 1962: 453) and “second order expression” (Merleau-Ponty 1962: 207): “There is, of course, every reason to distinguish between an authentic speech, which formulates for the first time, and second-order expression, speech about speech, which makes up the general run of empirical language” (Merleau-Ponty 1962: 207). The latter is our common language when used in traditional ways while originating speech begins with open perception, where new meaning can be articulated. Art, for example, is an example of originating speech.

Merleau-Ponty argued that originating speech or language begins with gestures. The process of naming, too, begins with gestures, and therefore gestures are foundational for second-order expression. Since language begins with bodily gestures, it begins affectively. “The spoken word is a gesture, and its meaning, a world” (Merleau-Ponty 1962: 214). Language, however, does not just begin with gestures, he contends. It is in itself a gesture, a way to signify the world. Although abstract or virtual, it is emotional in the same way as concrete bodily gestures. Bodily gestures, Merleau-Ponty argues, inherently portray our affective life. An emotion is the gesture. “[...] I do not see anger or a threatening attitude as a psychic fact hidden behind the gesture, I read anger in it. The gesture does not *make me think* of anger, it is the anger itself” (Merleau-Ponty 1962: 214). Gestures and emotions (and thereby language), to Merleau-Ponty, are not stable or fixed entities based on a biological or mechanical body, but expressions, or ways of appropriating a world, which take place in the intersubjective field or existential situation. This happens through the sedimentation of habits in their cultural context as well as transcendence (an existential opening that is our freedom to act, despite habits). Experience, and with it, language and emotion, has a basis in the biological body, yet continuously transcends it. One of Merleau-Ponty’s finest analysis shows how much more expansive the field of bodily experience is than previously thought. The body penetrates the mind; the mind is pregnant with the body. The psyche exists in the body as a bodily intentionality, and the body resides in language.

This seminal insight has been intensively studied by linguist George Lakoff and Mark Johnson (e.g., 1980, 1999) in their now classical works (see also Johnson 2018; Lakoff 1987). They have shown how the body is present in language, especially in our use of metaphors. Our ways of moving and experiencing our body take part in shaping the content of thought. For instance, how the body is felt in anger is revealed in how we talk about it, as when we say “you make my blood boil” (Lakoff 1987: 382; see also Roald 2007). This does not mean that language (or metaphors) have a closed structure, and Fauconnier and Turner (2002) for instance show how the development of new metaphors can occur. Merleau-Ponty portrayed an existential openness of language as a continuous process where we acquire new

meaning – “originating expression” – through a freedom in perception. Language also escapes the body, however, since the relation between the signifier and the signified is most often arbitrary. Nevertheless, pre-reflective life (bodily and affective life) gives rise to that which is said.

From a critical cognitive perspective, such a view on language and emotion is imprecise. Schwarz-Friesel, for instance, argues that emotion is a part of the “evaluative mental system within our cognitive apparatus” (Schwarz-Friesel 2015: 157), and that “[f]eeling a certain emotion means being conscious of a specific mental state that is determined by the conceptual representation, e.g., being in love is experienced through the concept of LOVE” (Schwarz-Friesel 2015: 161, emphasis original). In other words, it is not our bodily and affective life that determine the experience, but our concepts of it. Phenomenology, however, does not adhere to this critique. Firstly, affect and emotion are not subsumed to our cognitive apparatus. As we have shown earlier (Roald and Køppe 2015), it is a consequence of the enlightenment, or the rationalist paradigm, when we see affect, feeling and emotion as a part of cognition. Although, Schwarz-Friesel stresses the importance of the recent turn to emotion, the turn is not, according to phenomenology, strong – or critical – enough, and remains within a cognitive paradigm. From a phenomenological point of view, there is no reason to prioritize cognition. If anything, cognition could just as well be seen as a part of our affective-bodily dimension. We are given a felt, moving body that is cognizant. There is no reason to prioritize the one before the other (see also Colombetti 2014; Roald 2007, 2015).

Secondly, a central difference is the focus on the role of concepts in experience. From a phenomenological point of view, experience is not determined by concepts. The experience of love, for instance, is influenced by the entirety of our existential situation (see Sköld and Roald 2021). The concepts are developed on the basis of experience, not vice versa. Experience can also entail language, but experience is first and foremost a bodily felt situation of dense meaning (that is also pre-reflective and pre-linguistic). The concepts we use to describe experience can help us understand it, but they do not create or determine the experience in and of itself. The experience is formed through our previous pre-reflective experience of being loved or loving (or not) with an openness in perception that allows for a transcendence of our history to form new experience. We can agree with Schwarz-Friesel that “[t]o express a certain feeling as *love* means having classified and identified this mental state or process as LOVE” (Schwarz-Friesel 2015: 162, emphasis original). The experience of what we call love, however, is prior to this classification or naming and is the reason for why we have a name for it in the first place. As Johnstone (2012) argues with reference to Husserl,

[...] it is possible to experience feelings at two distinct levels, one “living,” the other “reflective.” At the living level, one is immersed in the feeling, the rapture, fear, or despair, simply letting it arise and take its course while making no judgement about it [...] The reflective level is grounded in affective experience rather than being a prerequisite for it. Such is necessarily the case in any cogent aesthetic evaluation: I do not feel moved because I know something to be lovely; I know something to be lovely because I feel moved by it. (Johnstone 2012: 189)

Thus, Schwarz-Friesel’s claim that “[i]t is language that enables us to communicate our emotions to other people” (Schwarz-Friesel 2015: 164) is only correct from a phenomenolog-

ical perspective if language is used in its broadest sense, as expressions. It is our expressive acts (which can include formal language) that is the basis for communication. The cognitive linguist Zoltan Kövecses arrives at a similar point of view when he argues that it is “the functioning of the human body in emotion, especially our physiology, that appears to constrain the language we use to talk about the emotions and the emotional experiences (the conscious feelings of emotion) that we can have” (Kövecses 2003: 190). He also stresses the unity of lived experiences, not just the physiological or mechanical body, but the body as a part of a greater situation that also is social and linguistic, in other words, the lived body, similar to Merleau-Ponty’s conception.

Merleau-Ponty was inspired by Edmund Husserl and both of them emphasized pre-reflection, or pre-linguistic experience, as prior to formal language. Yet as Husserl so eloquently observed, pre-reflective experience is succumbed or veiled in language. It is self-evident for Husserl that “in every individual life from childhood up to maturity, the originally intuitive life which creates its originally self-evident structures through activities on the basis of sense-experience very quickly and in increasing measure falls victim to the *seduction of language*” (Husserl [1936] 1970: 362, original italics). Language seduces because of its obvious way of relating meaning. We thereby forget the meaning that resides in pre-reflective experience. But although language in itself is not the primary origin of experience, it certainly alters and shapes it. Yet within phenomenology, formal language has been considered limited.

In Sheets-Johnstone’s (2009) essay “On the challenge of languaging experience” in the book *The Corporeal Turn*, she argues that language is much more apt at naming objects than at framing dynamic experience. She shows how dynamic experiences of movement and emotion are the ontological and ontogenetic bedrock for subjectivity as movement and emotion are dynamic and congruent features of experience, though not identical. Movement creates emotion, emotion creates movement. Infancy – but also adulthood – attests to experiences of interiority. This interiority begins with movement and emotion (or affect), and gradually moves toward a dynamic incorporating language. Since experience, with movement and affection, is dynamic, we experience great challenges in *languaging experience*. This is because it is easier to name what is stable and continuous rather than what is fleeting and transient. Interviewing people about their experiences with visual art, for instance, reveals how much easier it is to describe the art object instead of one’s own dynamic experience of it. Sheets-Johnstone writes of artists who seek to transcend this problem of languaging experience by capturing such dynamics in their art. But what lies at the heart of dynamic experience, besides movement and affection? In other words, what integrates dynamic experience?

4 Sense modalities and art

Phenomenology has dealt extensively with the nature of the sense modalities and “sensus communis”, the synthesis of the sense modalities, movement and emotion. It began with the principle that an empty consciousness is not possible. Consciousness has to be con-

scious of something, and when we are conscious, we continuously ascribe sense or meaning to a situation. We often think of meaning as a cognitive and amodal construction, “at the top of” secondary processes, a sort of undetermined free creation which synthesizes different sorts of information from our five sense modalities. As modalities of meaning or sense-creation, the five sense modalities are not sufficient, because we also have movement (kinesthesia and proprioception), affect or emotion and of course language. The five sense modalities are obvious as meaning-creating elements, but so are the other three. Movement, for instance, which, since the beginning of the 18th century, relied on a concept of motor sense, lost status as a sense modality and was renamed kinesthesia and proprioception toward the end of the century (Bennett and Hacker 2002). It was first in the 19th century, with the advent of phenomenology and embodiment theory, that movement regained its status as sense and meaning-producing.

We have, thus, five standard sense modalities and three other “modalities”: movement, affect, and language, all essential to the process of meaning-creation. The last three modalities contrast the standard five, as they are not based on sense organs. Other differences are more complex as all modalities are qualitative and non-reducible. It is not possible, for example, to “translate” the visual sense into the auditory sense, nor any other sense modality, for that matter (see also Roald and Køppe 2015). But the relation beyond this has other important aspects: language (in the narrow sense) is the only modality that can be used to directly discuss, describe, and reflect upon the other modalities. It is not possible to transfer content from one modality directly to another, but via language we can describe some of the content present in the sense modalities. Affects and emotions are also able to “comment” on other sense modalities, but in another way than language, and there is less subjective autonomy involved because the affects manifest themselves prior to conscious reflection (see also Streri 2012). Movement is a modality that is necessary for the other sense modalities to function properly, but as, for example, Stern (2010) has shown with his concept of vitality forms, movement in itself expresses many vitality forms, and the dynamic primary basis for vitality is in many ways identical with movement (Stern 2010).

As indicated, sense or meaning is structured in different modalities, which materialize meaning in different qualitative ways since the modalities are qualitatively irreducible. Different art forms prioritize these modalities differently: painting – visual, music – auditory, sculpture – movement, etc. Every art form insists on its modality. Nevertheless, as we constantly move, it is not possible to be in only one modality at a time (see, e.g., Bremner, Lewkowicz, and Spence 2012). We are, so to speak, tied to different modalities – or our consciousness is. The relations between modalities have been analyzed for millennia, and Aristotle defined *sensorium commune* as a sort of perceptual function, which unites the sense modalities (Køppe 2016). If we were not able to unite the sense modalities we would function in five different worlds, each separated from the other (perhaps the infant experiences the world in this way – before object constancy is established).

A consequence of this delineation is that the experience of art is not reducible to emotions. Emotions are a synthesizing factor, but it has in the experience, so to speak, an exchange with the amodal features generated by the art, such as tensions in the composition of color or form. Because experience involves intensity across different modalities, aesthetic experience has a tendency to absorb the subject in the presence, and manifests a concreteness that is different from the conceptual abstractions in natural language.

There are many other differences between sense modalities and qualitative distinctness, just as there are many ways modalities can be combined. There are not many similarities between a painting and a movie or play. In this regard, one of the obvious differences is the narrative structure of the more complex combinations of modalities. Narratives add a more complex layer of meaning, but at the same time place constraints on the appearance of the sense experience. Another primary difference is time. Time is a condition for the function of consciousness, and has, according to Husserl, a relation to the past (retention) and the future (pretension). This is most obvious in relation to music, which uses the auditory sense modality, which, in turn, is most dependent on time. The utilization of time in music is necessary, as retention is a key factor in recognizing rhythm and melody, which are, in themselves, time-based. Narration is also a sort of time structure consisting of specific storyline(s). Both music and narration are dependent on representation that unfolds in the affect-based synthesizing of the art experience as the affects are a carrier wave for the synthesizing process. Even if affects are transient, the process gives rise to amodality, and this is one of the ways in which it is possible to talk about an affective understanding. For future research, it would be fascinating to trace such affective understanding across artworks as well as art forms, and investigate the possible variation in the role of language in describing the meanings of these experiences. How far pre-linguistic experience reveals itself in language is still an open question.

5 Conclusion

From the above exposition, we can see that affect and emotion are central in all levels of processing works of art. Since not all aspects of the experience with a visual work of art are linguistic, it must be contended that there is an affective primacy in aesthetic experiences. The relationship between language and emotion/affect is different in the narrative art forms, but since affects, and with it emotions, also carry a foundational synthesizing as well as existential meaning in these situations, they still have an essential function. Also, as we have shown along the lines of the phenomenological tradition, experience (and language) begin with one's own bodily situation, which is necessarily an affective situation. Language serves, of course, an important function in giving the experience linguistic meaning. This comprises a further processing of the experience, which also makes it more explicitly intersubjectively available. Making aesthetic experience linguistic, however, involves a transition which can be problematic, as we can concur with Husserl that it can become “victim to the *seduction of language*” (Husserl 1970: 362, original italics) where we can forget the affective, experiential situation in sense experience and its importance in the creation of meaning. The variations of emotional meaning in the aesthetic experiences, as we have seen, are not primarily linked to language or combinations of language and affect. Although language also can shape our emotions, the variations, including aesthetic pleasure, catharsis, perceptual dynamics, empathy, and abstract emotions as responses to works of art are distinctly minimally linguistic. They are linguistic if the art object is linguistic, but otherwise this process – when it comes to the work of art – combines variations

in sensing, affect and emotion. For these reasons, we can conclude that if we use language in its broadest sense, as communication, then the most common language of art is emotion.

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Patrick Colm Hogan

71 Narrative genre and emotion

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Abstract: A number of authors have argued that there is a close relationship between emotion and narrative. This relation may go in either direction. On the one hand, emotion has consequences for the organization or structure of narrative, prominently including story genre. On the other hand, narrative – also prominently including story genre – has consequences for emotion. Specifically, we may explain certain story genres by reference to the emotion-defined goals of characters and the intensification of characters' emotional responses. The most obvious way in which genre affects the emotion of real people is through the “guided simulation” of fiction, when our imagination is directed by the story in a literary work. More significantly, a person's response to real-life events may be affected by the emplotment of those events (that is, the selection and organization of events into a story) – as they occur, are anticipated, or are remembered. The following chapter first discusses how human emotion guides the development of cross-cultural story genres. It goes on to consider how story genres might affect a person's emotional response to real-world experiences.

1 Introduction

It is important to stress that this chapter is about narrative genre. The area of language study treating narrative – discourse analysis – commonly examines (among many other things) broad patterns in story structure. It may or may not consider particular instances of word choice or syntax, what is often referred to as “literary language”. The focus of the present chapter on story genre, in keeping with this general practice, does not treat such particulars as word choice or syntactic specificity. These would be appropriately considered in, for example, a chapter on “Literary Language and Emotion”.

That narrative and emotion are interrelated would appear to be self-evident. The earliest stories manifest the passions of their protagonists and antagonists – passions that drive those stories. In Greek myth, Zeus lusts after Leda. In Greek epic, Achilles rages against

the murderer of Patroclus. In Sanskrit epic, Rāvāṇa is angered by the mistreatment of his sister and wounded with desire for Sītā; both feelings drive him to abduct Sītā and begin the conflict with Rāma. In Persian poetry, Majnūn is driven mad by his love for Laylā.

The relation of narrative to emotion is of course not confined to characters. Writers since at least the time of Plato and Aristotle have recognized that the emotions of readers and audience members (more generally, recipients) are crucial to narrative. We may follow Plato in taking literature to arouse emotions or we may follow Aristotle in taking literature to release emotions through catharsis (or we may adopt some third position). However, in each case the feelings of recipients are of prime importance. Indeed, it seems clear that the emotions of characters are consequential only insofar as recipients care about those emotions and have emotional responses themselves. Simply put, we are unlikely to keep reading a story if we are indifferent to the characters and their pursuit of goals.

Moreover, a range of authors have argued that narratives – usually, stories or story structures – impact our response to our own lives, including our emotional response. Instances of this span the history of literary criticism and theory and include Plato's *Republic*; various writings by al-Fārābī, Ibn Rushd, and Ibn Sinā; Marxist critiques of literary ideology; and feminist analyses of sexist representations of women. Examples from other disciplines include work in psychoanalysis (such as Roy Schafer 1980) and historiography (such as Hayden White 1973). For example, one responds emotionally to Romeo and Juliet. However, one's response does not stop completely with the final curtain. One's reading of works such as *Romeo and Juliet* has consequences for one's experience of romantic love in one's own life. One might press the idea so far as to say that one's experience of love, grief, anger, fear, and other emotions is in some respects inseparable from emplotment, the organization of experience into stories.

Within narrative, genre has its own, particular relevance for emotion, distinct from other aspects of narrative (such as verbal style, particularity of characterization, or political theme). The point has consequences for both our response to literary works and our (story-mediated) response to the real world. For example, with regard to the former, we tend to expect different sorts of characters, exhibiting different sorts of emotion, in family melodramas (e.g., soap operas) and in action-adventure stories. Aristotle spoke of catharsis not with respect to narrative generally, but with respect to tragedy and the specific emotions it provokes – pity and fear. As to real-world relations, it may be that *Romeo and Juliet* affects one's experience of romantic love in one's own life. However, to some extent, that effect results from the more general principles of romantic stories as a genre, derived only in part from *Romeo and Juliet*.

The present chapter begins by examining some aspects of the first topic – the emotions of characters in the story and the emotions of recipients regarding the story, insofar as these bear on story genre. This topic might be aptly termed *the emotional nature of narrative*. The chapter subsequently turns to the effects of genre on recipients' emotional responses to their own lives, specifically as these unfold in emotion episodes. This second topic might be designated *the narrative nature of emotion*.

2 Genre and emotion: What are they?

Before going on to any of this, however, it is important to make a few preliminary comments about genre and emotion. Genre is any recurring pattern of discourse that serves to guide speakers or writers in producing that discourse and to guide recipients (hearers or readers) in understanding and responding to that discourse (see Pyrhönen 2007: 129). In other words, genre has two properties. First, it is a pattern of discourse. Second, that pattern is not merely an objective feature of the discourse. It is in addition part of the cognition of the producers (i.e., people who write or otherwise make the stories, including novelists, poets, and playwrights) and recipients (i.e., people who read, watch, or listen to the stories). Producers and recipients have some *concept* of the genre. This is not to say that they have a name for the genre or could articulate its properties. A single name is not necessary, and is probably often absent. The possibility of a scientifically adequate articulation of properties is likely to be very rare. Most producers and recipients probably could give some roundabout characterization of genres that they experience, if asked the right questions (e.g., “Are there other works that are similar to this one? What makes them similar?” and so on). However, genre concepts are most importantly the structures that operate in our unself-conscious production and reception of discourse, not our self-conscious labeling of discourse. (The point is parallel to our knowledge of other aspects of language; for example, most fluent speakers of English could not articulate an adequate account of how to form regular plurals, though they are able to form such plurals all the time.)

Narrative genre is a particular sort of genre, most often one relating to stories, though in principle it is possible to distinguish genres on the basis of plot or narration. Stories are what happens in a narrative; plot and narration define how the story is presented (see Shen 2005: 566), roughly what story information is given and when it is given (plot) and who conveys this story information (narration). For example, a romantic tragedy is a type or genre of story, whereas first-person narrative might be considered a type or genre of narration. The present chapter is concerned with story genre.

It is important to stress here that this chapter is confined to the treatment of emotion and genre, particularly story genre. Thus, it does not address a range of topics in the study of literature and emotion. These topics include, among others, the flourishing area of empathy research (see, for example, Keen 2007) and related work on character (such as that collected in Eder, Jannidis, and Schneider [2010]), studies of the effects of plot organization on emotion (as in Sternberg’s [1978] influential treatment of curiosity, suspense, and surprise), or empirical or philosophical studies treating aesthetics (Zeki 2009; Miall and Kuiken 1994; and others). It also does not take up post-structuralist approaches to affect, in part because those have had limited impact on the study of narrative (see Breger 2017).

Story genre may itself refer to several kinds of structure. Two are particularly common. First, it may refer simply to the outcome of a sequence of events, relative to some ideal. In one case, the case where the ending approximates the ideal (e.g., the lovers live “happily ever after”), we have comedy. In another case, the case where the ideal is rendered unachievable and the virtual opposite occurs (e.g., the lovers are separated by death), we have tragedy. Comedy and tragedy are significant as genres in part because there are so many

other possibilities; indeed, in real life, it seems that we rarely experience achievement of an ideal, thus comedy. (Sadly, tragedy does recur as ideals are often foreclosed.)

The second type of structure commonly referred to in genre study concerns the varieties of story action that define the relevant ideals. To understand this, we need to say something about the nature of stories. The concept of a story is more difficult to define than one might imagine. For example, Peter Goldie has given a complex definition of story, involving a range of properties, with particular stress on perspective (Goldie 2012: 2). The present analysis begins with the view that *story* should be understood first of all as a prototype concept. In other words, it is not defined by necessary and sufficient conditions. As a result, not all particular instances of the category “story” are equally “story-like”. Rather, there are degrees to which given stories are better or worse examples of the category. In this way, the word “story” is like most common nouns in ordinary speech, such as “bird”. Some types of birds appear to us to better represent that category than others. To take a standard example, robins are more prototypical birds than are penguins. (For a concise account of prototypes, see Rosche [2011].) Similarly, Samuel Beckett’s *Waiting for Godot* is a better example of a story than this essay, but not so good an example of a story as *Romeo and Juliet*. More precisely, we may give some minimal, necessary conditions for “storiness”. However, we cannot define sufficient conditions in such a way as to make all resulting stories equal. Moreover, even the minimal definition of a story is to some degree stipulative. We use the word “story” in different ways and there is no strictly right answer to what a story is.

Despite these difficulties, it seems reasonable to view stories as minimally a matter of some particular causal sequence. Stories become more prototypical to the extent that this causal sequence involves human or human-like agents (e.g., anthropomorphic spirits or anthropomorphized animals) pursuing goals and to the extent that the causal sequence engages the interest of recipients. (Interest is a minimal condition for engagement with anything, including a story. Its very generality limits its value for understanding narrative and emotion. When it is intensified – for example, in what we call *fascination* – its study is more illuminating, as exemplified by the analyses developed by Baumbach [2015].) Thus, some general laws of pressure dynamics do not constitute a story; the particular causal sequence of a radiator exploding constitutes a story (to take the famous example of Carl Hempel [see Danto 2007]), though as such not a very prototypical one; a more prototypical story locates the explosion in the goal pursuit of an agent (e.g., an assassin targeting a political leader). The last case is likely to engage the interest of recipients, but that interest is not inevitable. If Jones tells her partner what useless junk she threw out from the basement in order to clear some space there, that is a particular causal sequence involving an agent pursuing goals; however, it is not a very prototypical story as it is unlikely to engage the interest of recipients other than Jones’s partner.

This allows us to clarify both common sorts of story genre. The first, bearing on outcomes, is most often a matter of the hero of the story achieving or not achieving his or her goal and the recipient – or the “implied recipient”, the recipient presupposed by the story – favoring or not favoring this result. The second sort of story genre is a matter of the broad category of goal pursuit at issue in the story. Love stories involve the efforts of lovers to be united; revenge stories concern the protagonist’s attempt to harm someone who has earlier

harmed him or her (prototypically by violating some attachment relation – for example, by killing a relative of the protagonist).

As the preceding points suggest, genre is in these cases a function of emotion. The emotion experienced by recipients – or expected of them – defines tragedy and comedy, as well as the degree of story prototypicality. The emotion of characters guides and explains their goal pursuit, which is also key to story prototypicality. This leads us then to the question of just what emotion is.

Like “genre”, “emotion” is not easy or uncontroversial to define. This definition too is in part stipulative. For example, we may wish to include, say, hunger as an emotion or we may not. However, this is not to say that the definition is arbitrary. The assumption of writers in affective science is generally that “emotion” should be defined in such a way as to pick out a natural kind, a causally coherent set of objects or events, where *causally coherent* means (roughly) *subject to the same, distinctive set of explanatory principles*. Though scientific definitions generally aspire to the articulation of necessary and sufficient conditions, many writers agree that emotion is appropriately understood as a prototype concept. (On emotion as a prototype concept, see for example Lakoff and Kövecses [1987]; for an analysis with particular bearing on narrative genre, see Shaver et al. [1987].) The minimal condition for an emotion is that it is the activation of a motivation system (see, for example, Brody 1999: 15), thus a system that functions to inspire or inhibit certain sorts of action – eating in the case of hunger, aggressing in the case of anger, refraining from action and ruminating in the case of sadness. (For the foundational discussion of emotion and action readiness, see Frijda [1986].) That activation becomes increasingly prototypical as it operates for a short period with particular intensity, constituting an “emotion episode”, with the components of eliciting conditions, action readiness, and so on (on emotion episodes, see, for example, Frijda [1993]). The components of an emotion episode will be outlined later in this chapter.

3 Genre and recipient emotion

Perhaps the most straightforward instance of genre-emotion relation comes with recipient response to narrative productions, such as novels or plays. Of course, producers (e.g., novelists) have emotions as well, and they are important. However, even for producers, perhaps the most significant emotions are those they experience as recipients. An author may write something while feeling a particular emotion. However, what is probably most consequential is what he or she feels upon re-reading a draft and deciding whether or not that draft is successful. For example, suppose Smith writes a poem when deeply grieved over breaking up with his girlfriend. He preserves the tear-drenched sheet and reads it again when he has recovered from the apparent trauma. Now, he is approaching it as a recipient. First, he finds it embarrassingly cloying and self-indulgent. Then he realizes that a few changes will turn it into a witty parody of such cloying self-indulgence. Whether or not he decides to make the changes and publish the poem as a parody, it seems unlikely that he will judge the effectiveness of the poem based on his initial, productive emotion rather than these subsequent, receptive emotions.

In influential work, Carl Plantinga (2009) has treated recipient emotion with particular insight. Though Plantinga is discussing narrative film, his general points apply equally to purely verbal storytelling. The continuity between the partially verbal storytelling of film and the wholly verbal storytelling of literature is particularly evident when one takes into account the imaginative processes engaged in by readers (see, for example, Scarry 2001) and the role of embodiment in recipient response to narrative (for a discussion of embodiment and literature, see Gallese and Wojciehowski with Hogan [2018], and works cited therein). Drawing on and somewhat modifying Plantinga's account, we may begin by distinguishing what might be termed *ego-centered* and *empathic* emotional responses of a recipient. Ego-centered – alternatively, direct – emotions are responses that the recipient has on his or her own behalf. If one wishes that a particular novel would not end – or that a particular drama would end – then one is having an ego-centered response. If, however, one hopes that the lovers will be united, then one is having an empathic response. The distinction is not absolute. However, it is useful for indicating the scope and variety of recipient emotion.

Ego-centered responses are generally treated under the rubric of “artifact” emotions. An artifact emotion is an emotional response to a work of art considered as something made by a producer. For example, if one hopes a play will end soon, one is responding to the play as a made thing with a (roughly) predetermined duration. Other responses of this sort include wonder at the complexity of a poem’s formal patterning and delight at the aesthetic nuance of a play’s soliloquy. However, artifact emotions do not exhaust our ego-centered emotions to narratives. For example, some people read stories to experience sexual arousal. They are not reacting to the work as an artifact or empathizing with the emotions of a protagonist. They are, rather, directly feeling arousal at the events as they imagine them, based on the verbal descriptions in the work. Ego-centered emotion can be related to genre. For example, sexual arousal is commonly associated with stories of characters who are themselves motivated by sexual desire. For the most part, however, artifact and other ego-centered emotions seem largely unrelated to genre. We may experience wonder over the intricate plotting of works in heroic, romantic, revenge or other genres; we may experience aesthetic delight in the subtle patterning of works in any genre.

Thus ego-centered recipient emotions have only a limited bearing on genre. The case of empathic emotions is different. We experience empathic emotion when we experience the characters’ feelings. If Smith empathizes with Juliet, he does not long for Romeo himself, but feels something akin to the grief of separation on Juliet’s behalf. Indeed, the point may be extended, keeping in mind Goldie’s stress on different points of view in narrative and the emphasis of Noël Carroll on the “ criterial prefocusing” supplied by genre (Carroll 1999). According to Carroll, a genre gives rise to certain sorts of expectation which lead us to select and interpret aspects of a narrative in particular ways. Given this, we may have certain feelings about a character and his or her circumstances due to our knowledge of genre, even though the character himself or herself does not have these feelings (since his or her perspective does not include knowing that his or her life is unfolding in a romantic comedy or a murder mystery). This response remains empathic since it concerns possible future states of the character and how the character would feel in those states. For example, a woman walking alone at night inspires one sort of emotional response for a murder

mystery and another for a romantic comedy. We think about the darkness differently in the two cases (dangerous versus romantic), and anticipate different events or types of event affecting that character. This is empathic because we are responding to what that character would feel if she were attacked or if she met an appealing young woman to whom she was immediately attracted, both physically and emotionally.

Here, one might ask why we have emotional responses at all in these cases. The character is fictional. It makes no difference in the real world whether the fictional story presents her murder or shows her meeting the love of her life. There is no real person there to feel fear in the first case or love in the second. In fact, the situation is not different in some cases of ego-centered emotion. A person reading an erotic novel is reading about purely fictional bodies. There is no real body there that might motivate his or her sexual arousal. Indeed, the point is even more general, extending beyond fiction to our daily lives. Our emotional responses in life are not confined to real events.

To understand this, we need to take a step back and consider what cognitive scientists refer to as “simulation”. (For an introduction to the concept of simulation and research on the topic, see Markman, Klein, and Suhr [2009].) It is clear that we respond to the emotions of other people as we imagine or *simulate* their experiences. I don’t know directly what Jones was feeling when he read the letter denying him tenure, but I imagine or simulate it, and may feel empathy with him. There are obvious evolutionary reasons for this simulative “mind reading”, as it is sometimes called. It is crucial to social interaction that we be able to understand other people’s points of view. Moreover, even for the most basic sorts of self-interest, it is important that we have a sense of what they will be feeling in certain circumstances – for example, if we behave toward them in a particular way (e.g., when Bill wonders, “How will Ed respond if I suggest we have dinner on Valentine’s Day?”).

That leads us to the larger, motivational function of simulation. We simulate things we might do or might have done and we feel emotions with respect to those simulations. The emotions are crucial in providing motivation. Consider a crude scenario of the sort we often find in discussions of evolution and the dilemmas faced by our ancestors in the environment of evolutionary adaptation. Glug is hungry. She wants to go down to the riverbank where she can pluck a piece of fruit. She imagines going there and, envisioning the place, she recalls that it is infested with alligators, from which she narrowly escaped a few weeks ago. Suppose she abstractly thinks that she will be endangered, and even that she will be afraid, but she actually feels only the continuing hunger. She might well go anyway, and the simulation will not have fulfilled its function. In actuality, however, she is likely to feel some degree of fear at the imagination, and that fear dissuades her from going. (For further discussion of these points, see Hogan [2017, 2013].)

As already suggested, our sharing of other people’s emotions is of the same general sort. Empathic response is at least often a matter of “walking in someone else’s shoes”, which is to say, simulating that person’s perspective. Such simulation fosters our emotional response in the usual way, but in this case the emotion bears on the other person rather than on (a counterfactual or hypothetical version of) oneself. There is, however, a complication in the case of other people. Specifically, one’s emotional response to someone else is mediated by one’s attitude toward that other person. One’s “interpersonal stance” (see Frijda and Scherer 2009: 10) determines whether one’s simulation fosters empathy or antip-

athy. More exactly, one may have a parallel emotional stance toward the other person or a complementary emotional stance. A parallel emotional stance means that one experiences the same general emotion as the other person. If he or she cries, then one feels sad. A complementary emotional stance means that one's emotional response is antagonistic to that of the other person, or at least responds to the other person's emotion only insofar as it affects one's own interests. For example, if the other person cries, one might feel Schadenfreude. Whether one has a parallel or complementary stance toward someone is often a function of identity categories and group divisions. People are generally inclined to have a parallel stance toward members of a racial, religious, national, or other in-group and a complementary stance toward members of corresponding out-groups, when those identity group divisions are salient. For example, in psychological research, test subjects frequently have a more parallel response to people they consider their own race, in contrast with people they consider racially different. (See Gazzaniga [2011: 164], Keestra [2012: 237] and citations therein, Hain et al. [2010: 155], and Klimecki and Singer [2013: 542].)

Emotional response to fictional narratives operates in the same way that simulating other people operates. The functionality of emotional response to simulation does not stop with oneself or particular people one knows. It must extend to a broad range of people – including, for example, unknown passersby. Our emotional response to fiction is simply a consequence of this general, evolved process of simulation, with all that it entails emotionally. The point is related to genre, in part because genre affects our simulation, for example, our expectations (we will return to this last point).

4 The definition of genres

Again, it appears that story genres may be understood by reference to emotion. For example, romantic stories involve protagonists who are motivated by love. More precisely, there are certain story genres that recur across cultures and that tend to have a prominent place in most or all literary traditions. Isolating these cross-cultural patterns or story universals has been based on the procedures for isolating other sorts of language universals (principally in morphology and syntax; see Comrie 1981). These procedures include most importantly the criteria of occurrence across genetically and areally distinct traditions. (For the evidence regarding universals of story genre, evidence drawn from South Asian, European, Middle Eastern, East Asian, African, and Native American traditions, see Hogan [2003] and Hogan [2011a].) Crucially, for purposes of this chapter, the cross-cultural genres appear to be a function of affective processing. Indeed, emotion appears to explain their cross-cultural recurrence.

To treat these genres, we might begin with what they have in common. First, they involve agents pursuing goals. The goals are of course things that the agents believe will make them happy. As Davidson, Pizzagalli, Nitschke, and Kalin explain, “Affect-guided planning and anticipation that involves the experience of emotion associated with an anticipated choice is the hallmark of adaptive, emotion-based decision making” (Davidson et al. 2003: 9). It is also the hallmark of stories. Differences among these genres are principally a matter of the type of goal involved. The type of goal is itself governed by an emotion

system or combination of emotion systems. Heroic stories regularly treat the pursuit of prestige or social status. As a result, their protagonists are driven by pride and anger (at offenses to pride). Romantic stories are defined by the pursuit of union with one's beloved; they are driven by romantic love, which combines sexual desire and attachment, the emotion of bonding that we find most obviously in the relation of parents and small children. (On the components of romantic love, see Hogan [2011b: 76–86]; see also Shaver and Mikulincer [2006] and Fisher [2006].)

Cross-cultural genres involve further patterns as well. First, they generally include not only protagonists, but helpers and opponents or antagonists (often villains). The implied recipient of such stories (e.g., the implied reader) commonly has a parallel interpersonal stance with respect to the hero and, to a lesser extent, the helpers, with a complementary (usually, antipathetic) stance toward the antagonists. Thus, insofar as our response is consistent with the norm of the implied reader, we are (usually) made happy by what makes the hero happy, and sad by what makes him or her sad. The connection between story structure and interpersonal stance is, of course, not accidental. The organization of characters has developed in this way precisely because we respond with parallel or complementary emotions; thus, this recurring feature of these genres is also a matter of emotion. Moreover, just as our interpersonal stance is often a function of identity group divisions, so too the hero is often developed as an in-group member for the target audience of a work – for example, an American in a heroic story (e.g., a war story) aimed first of all at recipients in the US.

It is important to note here that comedy, thus a happy outcome, is much more common than tragedy cross-culturally. Though usually not phrased in this way, the point is clear from scholarly treatments of the relative paucity of tragedy in non-Western traditions (see, for example, Gerow [1985] on Sanskrit drama). The reason for this asymmetry between comedy and tragedy is presumably emotional as well. Sorrowful outcomes are sorrowful for recipients, thus to some degree aversive. This is not to say that there is no emotional gain in tragedy. There is. To at least some extent, this may be explained by research on compassion, which shows that compassion involves reward system activation (see Kim et al. 2009; the reward system is the system governing wanting and liking [see Chatterjee 2014: 309]). Nonetheless, tragedy is presumably more hedonically ambivalent than comedy. Because of this asymmetry, the following comments are focused primarily on comedy.

Beyond the outcomes themselves, the main difference between tragedy and comedy may be that comedy works more consistently to intensify the outcome emotion, whereas tragedy might operate more consistently to make sense of the outcome. In keeping with this, accidents appear to be more common and more acceptable in comedy insofar as they allow for the happy ending. In tragedy, however, accidents tend to be less acceptable, perhaps because tragic outcomes are more aversive when we cannot isolate their causes. (On differences in the degree of necessity in tragedy and comedy, see Frye [1957: 38 and 170].) Put differently, they are more aversive when we cannot understand their sources, thus potentially learning how to avoid such consequences in the future. Martha Nussbaum and other writers have argued that catharsis involves a clarification of emotion (Nussbaum 1986: 388–391; see also Oatley 2012: 173). It seems unlikely that we understand the emotion itself any differently after viewing a tragedy. We may, however, more fully understand the

causes of tragic events. Indeed, if we experience anything along the lines of relief in tragedy, this sort of understanding is what we would expect to be its source, for evolutionary reasons. (On the relation of aesthetic pleasure to understanding, and the adaptive function of this, see Vuust and Kringelbach [2010: 256 and 266].) Moreover, this is in keeping with research showing that “negative emotions are associated with attempts to understand and integrate the situation that induced the feelings” (Brody 1999: 261).

Returning to the common features of the goal-defined, cross-cultural genres, we find next that the hero encounters problems in his or her goal pursuit. Indeed, in the middle of the story, he or she regularly experiences the real or apparent opposite of his or her goal. For example, in heroic narratives, rather than achieving social authority and esteem, he or she may experience social exclusion and shame. This makes these genres prototypically into tragi-comedies (in the sense that the story approaches tragedy before concluding comically). The tragi-comic structure derives from the fact that our emotional response to an outcome is intensified by contrast with what preceded. For example, in the framework of Ortony, Clore, and Collins (1988), the gradient of change from the near-tragic middle to the comic conclusion would combine emotion-intensifying variables bearing on unexpectedness, likelihood, and effort (Ortony, Clore, and Collins 1988: chap. 4). It is good that John and Jane meet, fall in love, and get married easily. However, the outcome is more emotionally intense, more productive of joy, if John and Jane first suffer separation and are forced to work for their reunion. Story structure has developed in such a way as to enhance recipients’ experience of the (comic) outcome emotion.

This intensification of the final emotion includes other recurring features as well. The hero often experiences some sort of exile in the middle of the story. This derives from the emotional organization of space, such that our sense of security and attachment are related to a sense of home (on the nature of place attachment, see Panksepp 1998: 407 n. 93); in consequence, removal from home often fosters a sense of anxiety. A further element of intensification comes with the “familialization” of conflict, the tendency of these genres to make the antagonists into relatives. For example, in heroic stories, the usurper who displaces the protagonist from his or her position of leadership might be a sibling. This intensifies the near-tragic middle in that the pain of conflict is heightened when it involves betrayal of an attachment bond. Finally, it is not only the tragic middle, but also the comic outcome that may be intensified. In keeping with this, the conclusion is often idealized, as when the romantic couple, finally united, lives “happily ever after”.

As characterized in the preceding paragraphs, the cross-cultural genres have a particular form *prototypically*. Like the general concept of a story, our concepts of these genres – that is, the cognitive organization of our production or reception of stories in implicit relation to these genres – is a matter of prototypes, rather than necessary and sufficient conditions. In other words, we do not find that stories cross-culturally have all of these properties, strictly falling into categories with little variation. Rather, we find variation, but the variants converge on average (prototypical) cases. Traditions have many more or less prototypical cases of romantic, heroic, sacrificial, and other stories, rather than rigidly uniform stories of each sort.

We may illustrate these properties by reference to romantic stories. (Parallel points apply to heroic, sacrificial, and other cross-cultural prototypes.) These begin (prototypical-

ly) with two people falling in love. That love faces social obstacles, often due to identity group oppositions (e.g., socio-economic class, nationality, or religion). The identity oppositions commonly lead to familial (e.g., parental) antagonism toward the lovers' union. The lovers are separated, with one often exiled and the other sometimes imprisoned or otherwise confined. A helping character aids the lovers in being reunited. Often this character is admirable due either to his or her social position or his or her qualities (e.g., intellect). This enhances the likelihood that recipients (e.g., readers) will respond to him or her – and, by extension, to the lovers – with parallel emotions. The lovers finally are united in an idealized union.

The preceding features are largely specifications of the features shared by the cross-cultural genres, with the specification determined by the emotion (romantic love) that defines the protagonists' goals. Not all features of the individual genres are of this sort, however. Some are more specific to a particular genre, though these too most often result from the emotions involved in goal pursuit. For example, a recurring pattern of romantic stories is the love triangle. There is often some socially preferred spouse for one of the lovers, as when the parents have made a choice on their son's or daughter's behalf. In this case, the rival becomes another blocking figure and the social preference must be overcome if the lovers are to be united. This may occur in a number of ways. If the rival is preferred due to identity group divisions, these divisions need to be resolved. That may occur most obviously by a challenge to the division itself (e.g., when warring societies reconcile) or by a recategorization of the lovers (e.g., a discovery that the beloved is not an unmarriageable slave, but a free person who was kidnapped as a child). On the other hand, if the rival is preferred due to social success, then the lover may need to achieve superior success (e.g., in acquiring wealth). The love triangle story may involve the helper character and serve to fill in the transition between the lovers' separation (e.g., their exile and imprisonment) and their final reunion.

Complications of the shared story structure, such as the addition of the love triangle, may result from the complexity of the emotions involved in goal specification, especially aversive emotions associated with the central motivations. For example, the negative aspect of emotion that is perhaps most crucial for romantic love comes from attachment insecurity. (On attachment security and insecurity, see Parkes [2006: 13–15]; Mikulincer [2006: 28–29].) Beginning with our earliest childhood experiences, our attachment relations with other people – first of all, our parents – are more or less secure or insecure; that is, we have more or less confidence that they will remain stable and that our relations with the other person (our “attachment object”) will be enduring and functional. Attachment insecurity has two sources – the world and the other person. We feel a certain sort of anxiety over possible interference from the world (e.g., society). This is manifest in the separation-reunion sequence or main story line of the romantic prototype. However, we may also feel insecurity due to the possibility that the beloved will not reciprocate our feelings. This insecurity is most intense in jealousy, which is treated in the love triangle.

Before going on to consider genre and everyday emotion, it is important to note that there are more historically and/or culturally oriented approaches to emotion and literature, some of which bear on genre. As one might expect, some authors on narrative and emotion, such as Herman, argue for more extensive cultural and historical differences. In connection

with this, Herman does make some reference to genre (see Herman 2012: 129). Perhaps less expectedly, there has also been historically and culturally focused work, such as that of Irish (2018), which takes cultural and historical particularities of narrative and emotion to be specifications of cross-cultural properties and patterns, with which they are therefore continuous.

5 Narrative genre and real-life emotion

In the preceding sections, we have considered how emotion and narrative genre are interconnected in our experience of stories and in the development of story prototypes. The precise analysis of these relations is not by any means self-evident and their detailed description and explanation may provide us with novel insights into both emotion and narrative. However, the general idea of such an interconnection is unsurprising. The situation may be somewhat different with respect to genre and emotions bearing on everyday life. A number of writers – including, for example, Goldie (2012) and Haidt (2012) – have argued that emotional response is closely bound up with narrative even outside the experience of fiction. Though they do not frame the issue in precisely these terms, many treatments of politics and narrative implicitly suggest the intertwining of real-life emotion and story structure (for example, this applies to a number of essays in Bhabha [1990]). Particularly insightful treatments of the political consequences of stories may be found in Bracher (2013) and Weik von Mossner (2017), which have clear relevance to the general topic of narrative and emotion. The bearing of narrative on emotion in real life is also entailed by narrative theories of identity (see Kind 2015: chap. 6). Outside of literary study, valuable work has been done on such germane topics as narrative, emotion, and memory (see, for example, Kraft 2004). On the other hand, in all these cases, reference to genre is rare.

Claims regarding the narrative embedment of emotion in real life are perhaps more surprising than claims regarding emotional response to fiction; they are even in some ways counterintuitive. Part of the reason for this unexpectedness is that claims about narrative and emotion are often vague or ambiguous. Consider the idea that emotions are narrative. This may mean only that emotions, as they occur in real life, are particular causal trajectories. There seems to be a commonsense view that emotions are simply feelings. In opposition to this intuition, it is valuable to assert that emotions are in fact complex sequences of events, not static feeling states. They are, as Peter Goldie (2012: 64) says, processes. In principle, there is nothing wrong with referring to these processes as narratives, using the term “narrative” in a very broad sense. However, one must be careful not to draw conclusions about emotions from the more specific properties of narratives. For example, ordinarily we think of narratives as self-consciously selective and in some way represented causal trajectories. We would not ordinarily refer to, say, a conference as a narrative. We would, rather, refer to some verbal or other representation of key elements of the conference (e.g., a summary of its course) as a narrative. Again, if one is clear about one’s meaning, it is perfectly fine to say that an emotion is a narrative process. However, it does not follow from this that emotion is a self-consciously selected and represented causal sequence. Moreover, it is not clear that, in theoretical discussions, much is to be gained by stressing

that emotions are narrative processes; it is already commonplace in affective science to treat emotions as *episodes*. Indeed, the relatively loose use of “narrative” seems to be a step backward from the emotion episode account. This is because emotion episodes are analyzed into specific components (as we will discuss in the following section), thereby going beyond the vague – and arguably misleading – identification of emotions as narrative.

Goldie (2012) does, however, develop a useful connection between narrative and emotion. Specifically, he considers the retrospective construal of an emotion episode and the way that such a construal involves a division in perspectives. Indeed, Goldie’s analysis helps to suggest some of what is at stake in taking narrative generally as an element in our emotional response to the real world. However, his attention is principally on the *narration* part of narrative – narrator’s perspective, voice, and so on. However, “narrativization” or “emplotment” is not only a matter of narration. It also involves story structure, thus story genre. For purposes of the present chapter, the important issue is whether story genres may have significant effects on our emotional response outside of narration.

That does appear to be the case. Indeed, emplotment may be crucial for our emotions in ways that are deeply socially significant. A central argument of *Understanding Nationalism* (Hogan 2009), further developed in *Imagining Kashmir* (Hogan 2016), is that our understanding of and response to various politically important events and situations is to a great extent guided by the way we make stories out of social and historical events and conditions. Specifically, we commonly emplot our political views in terms of the cross-cultural genres – heroic, romantic, sacrificial, and so on. For example, President George W. Bush emplotted the September 11 events using the heroic prototype (see Hogan 2009: chap. 5). This genre-based, narrative construal of the events affected people’s emotional response to the events themselves, and oriented practical responses to those events (e.g., by pointing toward military action, rather than criminal investigation).

Emplotment in these cases is, first of all, an instance of information processing. Whether we are responding the September 11 events or narrowly personal occurrences, we begin with a complex set of experiences. This set of experiences is problematic in two ways. First of all, there is too much to consider. There are infinitely many properties and relations in any set of circumstances. We cannot possibly evaluate all of them – and doing so would be pointless anyway, since most of them would be insignificant or irrelevant to our interests. We therefore need some sort of principled *selection* of information, a way of quickly isolating which aspects of experience will be “encoded”, that is, integrated into our information processing systems. There are many ways in which such selection might occur, and many levels at which it might occur. In part, our perceptual systems select information; in part, emotion or proto-emotion systems such as interest narrow our attention due to novelty or possible threat or opportunity; in part, episodic and semantic memories – thus past experiences and concepts – guide what our minds take to be consequential (due to precedents given in episodic memories) or essential (due to the meanings of some concepts).

The second problem with our experiences is that, in addition to being too extensive, they are also elliptical. In other words, there is a lot that is left out. What we experience is only a fraction of what is occurring at any given moment. Moreover, what we experience lacks certain causal contributors, and of course all future consequences. For example, in

any social event, key concurrent factors include the intentions, emotions, expectations, and other mental states of the people involved. We do not have direct access to any of these mental states. We need to fill them in. Thus, in addition to selecting parts of what we are given in experience, we need to add elements that we are not given. Such addition – alternatively, “completion” – too may occur at various stages of processing. It may be a matter of inference, where we draw conclusions from known facts. Alternatively, it may result from simulation, as when we imagine ourselves in the position of some other agent. Moreover, either the inference or the simulation may be spontaneous and unreflective or effortful and self-reflective.

To some extent, the completion of experience is simply a matter of adding “contents,” filling in things that are not directly experienced (e.g., the goals and emotions of other people). To some extent, however, it is a matter of defining relations, prominently causal connections. Those complex relations must be supplied by cognitive processing. Ideally, they should be supplied in a form that is simple enough to be tractable (i.e., usable in a person’s understanding and responsive action), but nuanced enough to be functional (i.e., sufficiently complex to produce a reasonably accurate approximation to the causal principles and relations at stake).

In summary, our processing of any given set of experiences involves selection, completion, and causal organization. Such processing may be understood by reference to cognitive structures, most obviously to concepts. To take a simple example, if one categorizes something as a machine (e.g., a drone), then one is likely to understand its prior causes and future behavior in relation to the guiding intentions of some person operating the machine. If one categorizes something as a pet dog, then one will understand its behavior as partially guided by an owner, but partially autonomous and a matter of the ways dogs typically respond to certain events (e.g., to strangers running by, if one is out for a run). If one categorizes something as a wild animal, one will understand its behavior as fully autonomous.

It seems likely that different sorts of concepts enter into different stages of processing. To illustrate, we might consider a simple model of such processing in a particular case. Suppose Doe sees someone doing something at a distance. That phrasing already suggests some sort of preliminary selection, completion, and organization. Doe identifies one object as a person and some movement as intentional action. Doe approaches and recognizes a skateboard, then categorizes the behavior as skateboarding. Finally, Doe comes to understand that a young man is skateboarding down a sort of wide, low, concrete slope at the side of a stairway.

This processing is intertwined with emotional response. On seeing the vague action, Doe is curious as to what is going on. On first recognizing that the youth is careening toward a steep drop at the end of the slope, Doe has a sudden gasp of fear as she tacitly anticipates him falling and harming himself. As he repeats the action safely, Doe comes to feel admiration for his skill. In each case, Doe’s emotional response is of course partially a matter of what Doe is experiencing. However, that experience is inseparable from Doe’s larger understanding of what is going on. That larger understanding is itself to a great extent a matter of tacit simulation (of the youth’s intentions, of the likely outcomes of each pass down the slope, and so forth). That tacit simulation results from the application of

concepts (such as “skateboarding”) and from the application of individual precedents in the form of episodic memories (e.g., memories of the youth’s skateboarding a few moments earlier).

We may broadly characterize the sequence of operations here as recurrent processing that selects, completes, and organizes experiential inputs through cognitive structures, such as concepts and episodic memories. This processing produces further cognitive structures; these increase in complexity as the processing advances, incorporating previously structured inputs (e.g., “youth” and “skateboard”) into more encompassing sequences (e.g., “youth skateboarding down a slope”), often represented syntactically. This processing is involved with ongoing, usually tacit simulation (of intentions, outcomes, and so on) and associated emotional response. At a certain stage, some of the structures involved in our processing may very well include narrative sequences. In this sense, our emotional response to real life is often bound up with narrative. Those narrative sequences vary in extent and specificity. Often, they are little more than common causal sequences, observable regularly in ordinary life. In other cases, however, they involve something more like genre structures.

Consider, for example, the Atsumori section from the great, 13th-century, Japanese *Tale of the Heike*. There is a battle between the Tairas and the Minamotos. The Minamoto warrior, Naozane, imagining that “The Taira nobles will be fleeing” to the “rescue vessels” (315), sees a Taira warrior riding toward the Taira ships. (We later learn that this is Atsumori.) He calls out, “It is dishonorable to show your back to an enemy. Return!” (316). This suggests two things. First, it indicates that Naozane feels contempt for the Taira warrior. Second, it explains this contempt by a tacit simulation involving emplotment based on a prototypical scenario. Naozane has implicitly envisioned the Taira warrior feeling fear of the enemy and fleeing the battlefield despite his administrative position. Later, Naozane defeats this enemy and removes that enemy’s helmet in order to decapitate him. However, having done this, he sees that it is a young boy, about the age of his own son. Here completion through simulation again involves emplotment. Specifically, Naozane imagines the boy’s father experiencing deep grief on hearing of his son’s death. In consequence, Naozane suffers (empathic) sorrow himself. Thus, here too we see a brief narrative sequence guiding a person’s emotional response to (for him) real events.

These episodes illustrate how emplotment may be important for real-life emotional experience. However, the case of Nauzane does not itself involve the operation of genre in real-life emotional response. The structures that bear on his processing are much more limited than anything we would refer to as a “genre”. This hardly means that genres never enter into real-life emotions. For example, President George W. Bush’s heroic emplotment of the September 11 violence is a case where genre served to select, complete, and organize extremely complex, real-life events.

For a genre-related example from literature, we might consider a scene in *Hamlet*. Relatively early in the play, Polonius warns his daughter, Ophelia, that she needs to be on her guard in dealing with Hamlet. Hamlet has approached her with expressions of love. Polonius worries that Ophelia might respond naively to his overtures. Specifically, both he and Ophelia must simulate Hamlet’s current intentions and the future course of both his and Ophelia’s actions. Though of course he does not phrase it this way, Polonius indicates that

there are two obvious possibilities. One is a prototypical seduction-genre narrative in which Hamlet impregnates Ophelia and abandons her. As Polonius puts it, Ophelia might “tender me a fool” (have a child), if she fails to understand “When the blood burns how prodigal the soul/Lends the tongue vows” (that is, a young man’s lust will lead him to make false promises [I.iv.109, 116–117]). The other possibility suggested by Polonius is a prototypical romantic-genre tragedy in which Hamlet sincerely loves Ophelia, but is prevented from marrying her due to social constraints. Thus, Polonius later comments that Hamlet suffers “the very ecstasy of love” (II.ii.103), but he “is a prince out of [Ophelia’s] star” (that is, socially beyond her station) and therefore “This must not be” (II.ii.141–142). Polonius in effect suggests that Ophelia is naively simulating her future relations with Hamlet by reference to a simple romantic comedy. In each case, we are dealing with a narrative genre with clear consequences for the completion and organization of life experience and with effects on emotional response and associated behavior (e.g., in Ophelia’s case, accepting or returning Hamlet’s gifts).

Of course, one difficulty with this example is that, in real life, women do get seduced and abandoned. Moreover, princes are often constrained regarding who they can marry. As such, it might seem that we are not really dealing with genres at all, but with simple, statistically defined possibilities. This does not seem to be the case with the political emplotments discussed in *Understanding Nationalism* (Hogan 2009), not only Bush’s response to September 11, but also the views of Gandhi, Goldmann, and Hitler, or those treated in *Imagining Kashmir* (Hogan 2016). One might argue that these cases are different from personal experience, treating large complexes of social events and conditions that go well beyond anything that might enter into the lives of individuals. However, both personal experience and literature indicate that more unequivocal cases of genre may enter significantly into our more personal emotions about real life as well.

An obvious literary case is Gustave Flaubert’s *Madame Bovary*, which not only serves to show the importance of genre, but also points toward another way in which simulation operates on emotion. At least to some extent, Emma’s dissatisfaction with her marriage, and her imprudent involvements with Léon and Rodolphe, are a matter of simulating the possibilities for her life in terms of idealized romantic stories. As is well known, she compares her life as it is with the lives of romantic heroines and her husband, Charles, with the male heroes of these romances. (The general point is widely acknowledged, though there is some disagreement about how we should evaluate the comparison; see, for example, Culler [1974] and Heath [1992].) This comparison would presumably involve a counterfactual simulation of her own life as it would be if it conformed to the genre prototype. This process operates emotionally in a more complex way than the previous cases. Rather than *understanding* her life as an instance of the romantic structure, she *contrasts* her life with that romantic structure. This is the sort of process that gives rise to the tragic middle in the cross-cultural narrative genres. As already noted, the tragic middle serves to enhance the recipient’s response to the conclusion of a work because our emotional response to one set of events is in part a function of emotional contrast with immediately preceding events. Such contrast may involve counterfactual and hypothetical thinking. The point is obvious in the case of regret or remorse, wherein we envision sequences of action that we did not undertake but now wish we would have undertaken. Simulative contrast of this sort is key

to Emma's response to Charles, Léon, and Rodolphe. Again, the development of this contrast relies directly on the guidance of simulation by genre.

Thus, genre structures may impact simulation in emotionally consequential ways. They do this through selection, completion, and organization. However, this does not mean that emotions are pervasively narrative, as claims about the narrative nature of emotion may appear to suggest. First, as discussed above, simulation often does not involve narrative at all, at least not in a sense of *narrative* adequately robust to encompass story genre. Second, even when narrative does enter into simulation, it is not found in all aspects of emotion episodes. We may conclude by considering the basic components of an emotion episode and the degree to which they may be affected by narrative simulation, specifically story genre.

6 Emotion episodes and genre

The first component of an emotion episode is "eliciting conditions", the causes of the emotion (see Frijda 1986: 277–284). These causes are of two sorts. First, there are states of the subject – his or her emotional dispositions, mood, and so forth. Second there are the circumstances to which he or she is responding. Circumstances may affect the subject directly, as in some forms of mirroring and emotion contagion. However, they may also affect the subject by way of simulation, as when someone bumps into you and you respond with fear, after spontaneously simulating an aggressive intent. As this example indicates, simulation may be narrative in a very limited degree. The examples presented in the last section, however, indicate that it may also be more vigorously and extensively narrative, as we select, complete, and organize our experience into what become eliciting conditions. In keeping with this, eliciting conditions are almost certainly the place where genre has its most intense and sustained effects on emotion.

Emotion episodes also involve physiological outcomes, such as alterations in respiration rate (see Frijda 1986: chap. 3). It does not seem likely that genre has much of an impact here. Of course, emplotment may have consequences for respiration rate. However, it will do so insofar as it affects the eliciting conditions; it does not guide the respiration rate directly.

A further component of emotion episodes is phenomenological tone, what it feels like to have a particular emotion. It is difficult to see how emplotment could alter, for example, the feeling of fear or anger. Again, emplotment can certainly change the emotion, and thereby change the feeling, but that is once more a matter of eliciting conditions. The same point would seem to hold for expressive outcomes, our facial, vocal, postural, or other signals that we are experiencing a certain emotion – such as weeping in sadness, screaming in fear, or looking down in shame.

Emotion episodes are characterized by certain sorts of cognitive processing biases, with positive and negative emotions disposing us to different sorts of reasoning procedures (see the essays inForgas [2000]). Here too there does not, in general, seem to be any way that narrative enters here directly. On the other hand, there is one noteworthy way in which processing biases may affect the operation of genre in subsequent emotional response.

Specifically, one processing bias is toward emotion congruence (see Oatley 1992: 201; Kringsbach and Philips 2014: 177). If happy, happy thoughts, memories, and interpretations occur to us. If sad, then it is sad thoughts, etc. It seems likely that happiness makes us more inclined to remember or emplot through comedies or farces, while sorrow makes us more likely to remember or emplot through tragedies or melodramas. If so, these cases suggest a connection between processing bias and narrative. This too confines the effects of genre to eliciting conditions. What is interesting about this case is that the emplotment of eliciting conditions may be not only the cause, but the result of (emotion-triggered) cognitive biases.

The last component of an emotion we might consider is actional outcomes. These are the responses one makes to eliciting conditions in order to alter or sustain those conditions – altering, in the case of aversive conditions; sustaining, in the case of pleasurable conditions. This is an area in which simulation enters in obvious ways. We have broad actional inclinations with respect to emotion episodes (e.g., to approach or to flee). However, we have considerable leeway in just how we specify and enact these outcomes (e.g., how we flee and in what direction). That specification may involve story genre. The case of political emplotment indicates this very clearly. Again, emplotting the events of September 11 in a heroic (war) narrative leads to different responses than emplotting them in a criminal investigation narrative. A similar point applies to Ophelia's emplotment of her relationship with Hamlet, and to Emma's emplotment of her relations with Charles, Léon, and Rodolphe. Thus, actional outcomes, like eliciting conditions, appear to be a component through which genre may enter consequentially into our emotions.

7 Conclusion

In summary, emotion is interconnected with narrative generally and with story genre in particular. Such a connection is most obvious in our emotional response to stories. This is itself a special case of our emotional response to simulations. Emotion is also crucial for the development and regularization of story genres. Agents' goals are defined by emotion systems and genre prototypes develop largely through processes that intensify the emotional response of the agents (or characters) and the recipients (e.g., readers) of those stories. Finally, genre has consequences for the eliciting conditions and actional outcomes of emotion episodes bearing on the real world. In both eliciting conditions and actional outcomes, these consequences result from the way in which simulation may be guided by genre structures in selecting, completing, and organizing experience for understanding and/or evaluation, including contrastive evaluation.

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Natalia Igl

72 Stylistic design elements of literary texts

- 1 Starting point: Being moved by the rhythm
- 2 Theoretical discussion: Stylistic strategies and emotional effects
- 3 Analytical framework: Rhythm as embodiment, *gestalt*, and means of reader engagement
- 4 Outlook: Future directions and the relevance of context
- 5 References

Abstract: Based on current research on the triad of language, literature, and emotion in cognitive linguistics, (neuro-)psychology, and cognitive poetics and stylistics, the present chapter sheds light on specific stylistic strategies and their potential emotive qualities. The chapter focuses on how stylistic devices such as patterns of rhythm and sound in literature are functionalized to evoke *emotional responses* in readers. It thus deals only indirectly with questions of (mimetic) *representations* of emotion and emotionality in literature. The chapter outlines the theoretical discussion and current state of debate in the interdisciplinary field of emotion research and stylistics and argues for a stronger consideration of *mood* as an emotive reader response in its own right. As point of departure for an analytical framework, it takes up a gestalt theoretical framework of poetic rhythm. Drawing on a conceptualization of rhythm as a perceptual category rather than a property of a text as well as an embodied cognition model of reader engagement in literature, the chapter proposes a phonostylistic approach. This means to understand a written text as a potential *phonotext* whose stylistic features of rhythm, accentuation, sound and tone can be seen as crucial with regard to the textual evocation of emotive reader responses.

1 Starting point: Being moved by the rhythm

In his 1929 novel *Berlin Alexanderplatz*, Alfred Döblin manages to literally embody the velocity, polyphony, and stunning stream of signs and images that constitute the modern metropolis at the beginning of the 20th century. He does so in such a way that even a reader of the 21st century – accustomed to the even more radicalized sensory overload of the digital age – is enabled to empathize with the main character's overpowering experiences of navigating the bustling streets of 1920s Berlin and adjusting to the city's soundscapes and rhythm. Döblin's novel does not merely utilize linguistic features to simulate the rhythm of the modern metropolis and evoke this complex space of sensory perception, though. It also makes use of stylistic design elements such as rhythm, meter, and rhyme to evoke certain moods and emotions. The following short sequence is part of the narrator's introductory remarks at the beginning of *Berlin Alexanderplatz*'s second book:

- (1) *Thus let us start off merrily. We want to sing and move about: with our little hands going clap, clap, clap, our little feet going tap, tap, tap, moving to, moving fro, roundabout, and away we go.*
 (Döblin [1929] 1931: 41)

Embedding (extracts of) poetry, lyrics of popular songs, and even nursery rhymes in the narration is part of the montage technique that is characteristic for 1920s modernist and avant-garde novels (cf. Igl 2018: 191–196). When we ask about the specific functionalization of such a sequence as Example (1) with regard to, for instance, the communication scenario presented by the narrator, we may take particular notice of the striking foregrounding of oral performance, bodily movement, rhythm – and the call for a shared sentiment or emotional stance. Literature makes frequent use of the intricate linking of textual features and emotional phenomena to engage and affect readers. In literary studies, it is commonplace practical knowledge – grounded for instance in the rhetoric tradition – that the stylistic design and formal composition of texts plays an equally important role as the content when it comes to emotional engagement of readers. In more recent times, empirical reader response research provides supporting scientific data, showing, for example, how “alliterations, meter, and rhyme affect aesthetic appreciation, intensity of processing and emotional perception of lyrics and poems” (Gittel, Deutschländer, and Hecht 2016: 132; see also Obermeier et al. 2013).

How the metric or rhythmic design of a literary text can evoke or facilitate an affective response on the side of the reader still proves to be a complex question. In search for an answer, this chapter takes up the long-standing notion that movement and embodiment are essential to poetry or versified texts (cf. Lee 2017: 506) from an angle of current research in cognitive stylistics and poetics: Understanding rhythm as an embodied phenomenon on the one hand and reading as an equally embodied, multi-sensory process on the other, the chapter looks into stylistic strategies of making readers feel *moved by the rhythm* in an affective sense.

First and foremost, what is set into motion by means of metric patterns is of course language. However, the play on rhythmic patterns and deliberate deviations from them allows for simulating movement on the intra-textual level by means of the text’s metric design, as we can observe for instance in the case of a poem such as Charlotte Perkins Gilman’s *A Moonrise* ([1893] 1999):

- (2) *The heavy mountains, lying huge and dim,
 With uncouth outline breaking heaven’s brim;
 And while I watched and waited, o’er them soon,
 Cloudy, enormous, spectral, rose the moon.*
 (Gilman 1999: 329)

What stands out with regard to the poem’s rhythmic design is the deviation from the overall metric pattern in the last verse by means of inversion: Since the first iambic foot is turned into a trochee here, the reader has to suddenly adjust the rhythm to get the prosody right. From a gestalt theoretical perspective on poetic rhythm (as will be outlined in Section 3),

the harmonious iambic rhythm of the first three verses and the deviation from the steady rhythmic pattern in the fourth verse can be described in terms of a figure-ground relation. At this, verses one to three evoke the image of a wide and still landscape unfolding itself before the eyes of the beholder; against this *ground*, verse four evokes the *figure* of the rising moon as a distinct entity that is observed in its movement by the poem's enunciator. Adjusting the rhythm of the final verse against the steady overall metric pattern of the poem seems to be a way to give striking emphasis to the relation of the moon as a foregrounded object against the landscape as background on the level of imagery.

As the chapter claims, such stylistic strategies to create or intensify the reader's perception of movement within a textual setting are closely related to stylistic means of affective reader engagement. Beyond the potential to utilize metric patterns and deliberate deviations in rhythm to simulate, for instance, a moving entity against a steady backdrop, the following sections accordingly discuss the potential of literary texts to *emotionally move* their readers by using rhythm, accentuation, sound and tone.

2 Theoretical discussion: Stylistic strategies and emotional effects

When it comes to the complex relationship of stylistic design elements of literary texts and their emotional qualities or (potential) emotional effects, the relevant fields of research and disciplinary perspectives are expansive and of course still expanding – particularly with regard to (neuro-)cognitive research on language and emotion.

While the present chapter focuses on general aspects of the language-literature-emotion triad rather than specific phenomena and traditions of affective reader engagement throughout literary history, it is nonetheless important to keep in mind the historical dimension: As Schiewer (2007: 357) points out, the creative use of language in literary discourse often brings forth new means to express – and to conceptualize in the first place – complex phenomena of emotional and mental states. A historical perspective also proves advisable when it comes to the discussion about an accurate conceptualization of *emotion* and related notions such as *affects* or *feelings*, keeping in mind that human experiences and expressions are not merely phenomena of the mind-body but always mediated through linguistic and cultural practices and artifacts as well (see e.g., Champion and Lynch 2015: xiii). Although philosophical, rhetorical, theological, and medical endeavors to qualify and distinguish (basic) human emotions and the development of affect theories in western culture date back to ancient Greece (cf. Lehmann 2016: 140), there have been paradigmatic shifts in more recent times. Firges and Vogel (2016: 313) point out, for instance, that the idea of feelings and (emotive) sensations as *gradual* phenomena is a product of the 18th century and its increasingly systematized anthropological and aesthetic discourse (see e.g., the 18th century English literary genre of the *sentimental novel* and the corresponding German aesthetics of *Empfindsamkeit*, crucially inspired by Laurence Sterne's [1768] novel *A Sentimental Journey Through France and Italy*). The notion of gradation constitutes a key principle of present-day emotion theories interested in the emotion-cognition interface and

in conceptualizing the broader range of emotive responses and states by means of distinguishing between emotions, feelings or moods.

As a necessary groundwork for discussing the relation of stylistic design features such as rhythm or metrics and emotion, the following sections first give a short overview of the state of debate in the interdisciplinary field of emotion research and stylistics.

2.1 Cognitive interfaces in stylistics and emotion research

Stylistics and emotion research are a good match, and even more so since the so-called cognitive turn within the field. As the “integrated study of language and literature” (Gibbons and Whiteley 2018: 3), the discipline of stylistics or literary linguistics is equally rooted in the tradition of classical rhetoric and the structuralist approach to language in literature of Russian formalism. While stylistic approaches up to the more recent past “used to focus solely on the purely formal, bottom-up properties of style for persuasive ends” (Burke 2005: 186), contemporary stylistics expanded their object of study to include the role of the (individual) reader in their approach to linguistic form and style. By reinventing itself as *cognitive stylistics* (cf. e.g., Semino and Culpeper 2002; Tolscvai Nagy 2005) or *cognitive poetics* (cf. e.g., Brône and Vandaele 2009; Stockwell 2002) at the turn of the millennium, the discipline thus “integrated the insights of the cognitive sciences into an understanding of how we read the linguistic structures that form literary texts” (Gibbons and Whiteley 2018: 5). Against this backdrop of disciplinary traditions and more recent perspectival shifts, the systematic analysis of style or stylistic features in contemporary stylistics accordingly focuses not only on understanding linguistic forms and their corresponding functions and meanings in a literary text, but also on the cognitive and emotional involvement of readers by means of stylistic strategies.

However, to analyze the stylistic strategies in literary texts to represent, appeal to, and finally evoke emotion, we must first clarify what the concept “emotion” refers to. This is not a simple task: The current research on emotion does by no means present itself as a unified field with a common terminology and joint theoretical framework. Instead, studies concerned with conceptualizing and understanding affective phenomena are, as noted, pursued within different disciplinary fields (such as literary studies, philosophy, psychology, cognitive and neuroscience, etc.). Correspondingly, the respective frameworks and conceptualizations are based on different theoretical and empirical traditions that in part involve disparate ontological claims. An extensive discussion of the various approaches is beyond the scope of this chapter; at the same time, it is undue to suggest a homogenized state of emotion research. Thus, keeping in mind the diversity of current approaches to the realm of the affective on the one hand and the present chapter’s aim to contribute to a cognitive stylistics or poetics framework on the other, the following discussion focuses on accounts that address the complex cognition-emotion interplay and the embodied foundation of readerly engagement with literature.

As for instance Schwarz-Friesel (2008, 2015, 2017) argues from a linguistic perspective, cognition and emotion constitute two mental systems that interface both in representational and procedural respect (cf. e.g., Schwarz-Friesel 2008: 277). Drawing *inter alia* on Dama-

sio (1994, 2004), Isen (2004), and Salovey et al. (2004), Schwarz-Friesel takes into account the neuroscientific and socio-psychological refutation of the cognition-emotion divide. Accordingly, she conceptualizes emotions as epistemic and evaluative mental systems (cf. Schwarz-Friesel 2008: 284). As Salovey et al. point out, “[i]t is the emotional system, in this view, that focuses attention, organizes memory, helps us to interpret social situations, and motivates relevant behavior. Accordingly, it makes little sense to place emotions in opposition to reason and rationality” (Salovey et al. 2004: 186; cf. also Schwarz-Friesel 2008: 283).

This reasoning is in line with the shifted paradigm of the so-called second-generation approaches in cognitive sciences (cf. Lakoff and Johnson 1999: 77–78) that no longer understand the mind as a computational apparatus for information processing. Instead, “they converge on a view of the human mind as shaped by our evolutionary history, bodily make-up, and sensorimotor possibilities, and as arising out of close dialogue with other minds, in intersubjective interactions and cultural practices” (Kukkonen and Caracciolo 2014: 261–262).

The second-generation or “4E” approaches – as referring to “the enactive, embedded, embodied, and extended qualities of the mind” (Kukkonen and Caracciolo 2014: 261) – also constitute the foundation of most recent analytical frameworks in the cognitive study of literature. As Kukkonen and Caracciolo note from a literary studies perspective, though, the list of E’s should be expanded to include the notions “experiential” and “emotional”, “since this new paradigm gives experience and emotional responses a much more important role in cognition than first-wave, computational cognitivism” (Kukkonen and Caracciolo 2014: 261).

With regard to the general status of emotion within the increasingly prominent paradigm of “4E cognition” (cf. e.g., Newen, de Bruin, and Gallagher 2018), the crucial interplay of cognition and emotion has for instance been pointed out by Colombetti (2014) in her enactive approach to affectivity. As Newen, Gallagher, and de Bruin state in their introductory chapter of *The Oxford Handbook of 4E Cognition*: “Affect requires a more embodied and situated conception of cognition, and we need to recognize that it permeates cognitive processes, rather than occasionally penetrating them” (Newen, Gallagher, and de Bruin 2018: 11).

2.2 Emotions, moods, and the embodied reader

The emphasis on the “sensory-motor nature of human cognition” (Gallese 2019: 114) and the corresponding notion of embodiment “according to which mental states or processes are embodied because of their bodily format” (Gallese 2019: 115) are also crucial for current cognitive approaches to poetic rhythm as presented in the works of Reuven Tsur (cf. especially [1998] 2012, 2017) and Eva Lilja (2009, 2012). The analytical framework outlined in Section 3 will focus particularly on Lilja’s account of the embodied, motor-sensory experience that poetic rhythm derives from. Before we turn to the field of cognitive metrics, though, a closer look at the concept of the “embodied reader” and its relevance for the language-literature-emotion triad is key to understanding the relation of stylistic design elements and emotive effects of literature.

As Schilhab, Balling, and Kuzmičová state, “the embodiment approach to reading assigns a role to the body in what is otherwise primarily a mental activity” (Schilhab, Balling, and Kuzmičová 2018: “The embodiment of reading”). The notion of the embodied reader can accordingly be understood as referring to “a model of the act of reading which takes into account readers’ embodied responses” (Kukkonen 2014: 367). The “spatio-temporal dimension” of this notion of embodiment in reading relates to what the body does during the act of reading, while the “imaginary dimension” relates to the role of the body in the imagined scenarios we create from what we read (cf. Schilhab, Balling, and Kuzmičová 2018; see also Gallo 2019 on embodied simulation). Against this backdrop, reading is seen as both a process and an *experience* – one that does not simply echo the embodied experiences of a literary text’s character (or enunciator) but also translates these experiences into complex predictive inferences and evaluative judgments on the side of the reader (cf. Kukkonen 2014: 378).

In all, stylistics’ understanding of the process and experience of reading changed significantly in the course of its turn to embodied cognition, as Miall (2014: 424) points out. One key shift in perspective is an increased awareness of the primacy of emotions, i.e., the notion that an emotion is not simply “a reaction to a prior cognitive appraisal of a situation, but an already functioning stance towards the world, interpreting the environment in pursuit of our existing aims” (Miall 2014: 424). This brings us back to Schwarz-Friesel’s (2008: 284) concept of emotions as *epistemic and evaluative mental systems* as outlined above (see Section 2.1).

One relevant step towards a clearer understanding of how stylistic design elements of literary texts can evoke emotional responses in readers is to distinguish between different types of affective reactions. Just as reading is not merely a mental activity but an enactive experience grounded in the embodied condition of readers, affective responses to literature do not merely include consciously perceptible emotions but also such that are less clear-cut and can even remain nonconscious (cf. Frijda 2009: 258) – that is, affective states referred to as “moods”. The distinction between “emotion” and “mood” within emotion research is in general based on the criteria of intensity and duration, with “mood” being understood as an affective state lower in intensity than “emotion” and usually longer in duration (cf. e.g., Burke 2011: 45; Colombetti and Roberts 2015: 1251). When it comes to literary strategies of affectively engaging recipients, texts need not necessarily always evoke a clear-cut emotion on the side of the reader but may rather utilize stylistic features to *create a mood*.

As Gittel, Deutschländer, and Hecht point out, the concept of mood “has played a very important role in the history of aesthetics” (Gittel, Deutschländer, and Hecht 2016: 133). Literature’s potential to emotionally engage readers has, for instance, been utilized in form of the tradition of *Stimmungslyrik*, that emerged in the 19th century (cf. Gittel, Deutschländer, and Hecht [2016: 133], who translate the term as ‘poetry of moods’). The problematic tension of mood as a semantically changing and phenomenologically fuzzy concept on the one hand, and the strong claim throughout literary history of poetry’s ability to convey moods on the other, also constitutes the starting point of their empirical study. While their results somewhat unsurprisingly show that “mood conveyance from author to reader is rather the exception than the rule” (Gittel, Deutschländer, and Hecht 2016: 156), the study generally affirms the relevant role of moods within affective responses to poetry.

Distinguishing emotions and moods as two separate possible affective responses to poetry as Gittel, Deutschländer, and Hecht (2016) do in their study allows us to more precisely model the relation between stylistic design elements and emotive effects. Since their study investigates and compares mood attributions by readers and authors, though, and does not take phonological or stylistic features of the utilized poems into account, their findings however do not readily translate into an analytical application.

Within cognitive poetics research, Stockwell's (2014) account of atmosphere and tone provides a promising framework to address mood as an emotive reader response. Stockwell (2014: 360) takes the often quite vague use of the terms *atmosphere*, *tone*, and *ambience* in academic as well as everyday discourse as a point of departure to address the complex relation between literary features and literary effects from a cognitive poetics and stylistics perspective. As Stockwell explicates, “a piece of writing can be ‘atmospheric’ if the description it presents seems to draw the reader in and engage in the ambient feeling of the world denoted. Crucially, *atmosphere* and *atmospheric* generally point to the world-focused content of the writing, and point to a direct and integrated relationship between the reader and that world” (Stockwell 2014: 361; emphasis in the original). In contrast to that, the notion of *tone* refers to “the authorial or narratorial voice” (Stockwell 2014: 361) and to textual features that draw the reader’s attention not to the storyworld but to the narrating or enunciating instance and their emotional and evaluative stance. Stockwell considers both phenomenal domains “as the global effects of *ambience*” (Stockwell 2014: 365; emphasis in the original), which refers to “the delicate sense of a halo of associations, some barely conscious, some subliminal but coalescing cumulatively across a stretch of discourse. A word, phrase, syntactic sequence, verse placement, poetic form, rhyme or extended varied metaphor (and so on) might all contribute to a sense of ambience” (Stockwell 2014: 365).

While Stockwell’s account contributes to a clearer distinction between different domains of stylistic and narrative strategies of creating a “discernible ambience” (Stockwell 2014: 360) in a particular passage of a literary text, the side of the potential corresponding emotional effects, remains however rather in the background. The notion of mood is mentioned only once (Stockwell 2014: 362), although it seems to correspond quite well to the textual phenomenon of ambience: As Colombetti and Roberts point out, while moods are understood to be “not directed at specific objects (things, people, events)”, they still constitute “pervasive affective states” that influence an individual’s perception and interaction with her surroundings since they “present the world as affectively toned” (Colombetti and Roberts 2015: 1251).

As this outline aimed to show, while the concept of mood as a distinct form of emotive reader response is being addressed within cognitive poetics and empirical reader response research, the concrete stylistics of ‘setting a mood’ still need further elaboration. This is not only relevant due to the important role of mood as a notion throughout the history of aesthetics as cited by Gittel, Deutschländer, and Hecht (2016: 133). It is crucial also with regard to the as of yet underrated analytical potential of mood as an affective reaction utilized by a text to engage the embodied reader in complex cognitive and emotive experiences and reflections. Unlike emotions, moods are not considered to be direct responses to a distinct event. However, they are quite distinct in appearing to lower the threshold “for

mood-congruent event-elicited appraisals and emotions" (Frijda 2009: 258). The potential of meter and rhythm to contribute to a sense of ambience can be observed in cases such as the co-called *hypnotic poetry* that utilizes rhythmical patterns to engage and *attune* the embodied reader (see Section 3.2.)

3 Analytical framework: Rhythm as embodiment, *gestalt*, and means of reader engagement

Our modern notion of embodied cognition and its explanatory potential regarding the question of how literature is able to (emotionally) engage the reader is historically grounded in affect theories since classical and early modern period rhetoric (cf. Koppenfels and Zumbusch 2016: 15–16). Of course, this is not to be imagined as a linear development: the above mentioned *Stimmungslyrik*, for instance, that emerged in the 19th century can be seen as indication of a paradigmatic shift from rhetorical taxonomies of affects towards aesthetic models of emotion (cf. Koppenfels and Zumbusch 2016: 16). Nevertheless, the understanding of poetry – or, more broadly speaking, versified texts that rely on a rhythmical principle (cf. Hopsch and Lilja 2013: 104–105) – as crucially based on movement and embodiment has been prevalent in discussions about literature and emotion long before the foundation of cognitive approaches to literature (cf., e.g., Lee 2017).

Against this backdrop, what does it mean to look at stylistic design elements such as meter and rhythm from an embodied cognition or, speaking in disciplinary terms, a cognitive stylistics or cognitive poetics perspective? First and foremost, it means to understand rhythm as a *perceptional category* rather than a property of a text (cf. Lilja 2012: 52), and metric structure as something that not only activates conventional meaning patterns developed from social practices and cultural traditions but also *internalized bodily experiences* (cf. Lilja 2012: 52, 2009: 274). Lilja explains this conceptualization by tracing back the phenomenon of rhythm to the experience of balance – an embodied experience in the actual sense: "A body in space creates directions and movements. The body moves around its axis, i.e., its point of balance" (Lilja 2009: 281). The interplay of balance and movement – and with the latter also "an inclination toward imbalance" (Lilja 2009: 282) – is what is crucial then: "'Rhythm' might be described as a balanced form heading toward imbalance, or one might define 'rhythm' as threatened balance. No balance at all means chaos, or, in other words, lack of rhythm" (Lilja 2009: 282). The conceptualization of rhythm as a perceptual category based on the interplay of balance and movement is in line with Van Leeuwen's social semiotics description of the "essence of rhythm" as an "alternation between two states: an up and a down, a tense and a lax, a loud and a soft, a night and a day, an ebb and a flow, and so on" (Van Leeuwen 2005: 182). As Van Leeuwen points out, this goes well beyond the sphere of physically verifiable rhythmic structures: "Such alternation between two 'opposite poles' is so essential to human perception that we perceive it even when, 'objectively', it is not there" (Van Leeuwen 2005: 182). A sequence of absolutely identical, evenly spaced click noises will thus for instance be perceived as a regular pattern of alternating stronger and softer clicks, as psychological experiments have shown (cf. Van Leeuwen 2005: 182).

One of the pillars of the embodied approach to poetic rhythm is the so-called figure-ground principle, one of the key notions of gestalt theory. The phenomenon of figure and ground, as initially formulated by early 20th century gestalt psychologists such as Anton Ehrenzweig, refers to the characteristic organization of perception into a figure that stands out against an undifferentiated background (cf. Stockwell 2002: 13–25; Tsur 2009: 238; see also Tsur [2008: 111–154] for a detailed outline of gestalt theory's principles and their application to rhyme patterns and poetic rhythm).

Drawing like Tsur on a gestalt theory framework of poetic rhythm, Lilja argues “that the reading process orders rhythmical impulses into series of perceptual patterns or *gestalts* [...] characterised by force and balance ordered with the help of sensory-motor experiences” (Lilja 2012: 57). Based on the conception of reading as both a process and an experience rooted in the enactive mind-body of a reader, this process of *making sense* of a text's rhythmical pattern also involves the potential of experiencing an affective response based on the respective text's stylistic design.

3.1 A phonostylistic perspective on meter, rhythm, and emotion

If we regard rhythm as a perceptual category rather than a property of a text as Lilja (2012: 52) advocates, our understanding of a text's stylistic analysis inevitably broadens: to include the perceptual domain also means to include the performative dimension of written literature in the analysis. The cognitive turn in stylistics correspondingly not merely shifted the discipline's attention to questions of reader cognition, but in particular to the enactive potential of a text realized during the reading process by the embodied reader. In accordance with this expanded notion of text, a phonostylistic perspective as proposed by Jobert (2014) allows us to understand a written text as a potential phonotext “waiting to be read aloud” (Jobert 2014: 231) – even beyond the genre of poetry with its high affinity for an oral rendering. Against the backdrop of the embodied concept of reading as outlined in Section 2.2, however, the phonotextual level can be postulated to manifest itself even without an actual (sub)vocalization performed by the reader: Texts or textual sequences that for instance deploy verbal and syntactic cues to read them in a rhythmized fashion – again also beyond the realm of poetry, recall the short sequence from Döblin's *Berlin Alexanderplatz* (Example [1]) – may prompt what Kuzmičová (2014) refers to as “rehearsal-imagery”: the reader's experience of an *inner vocalizing*. She also points out the embodied and multi-sensory nature of this phenomenon, which is more than a mere activity of the mind or simulated auditory sensation: “It is literally inner in that it originates in the reader's articulatory apparatus. Thus rehearsal-imagery is not only auditory, it is also, and necessarily, kinesthetic” (Kuzmičová 2014: 286).

Returning to Jobert's outline of phonostylistics, it should be noted that he focuses on the analysis of paralinguistic vocal features encoded in fiction – for example in phrasings such as ‘she said loudly’ or ‘he hesitatingly replied’ (cf. Jobert 2014: 235) – and is thus primarily interested in (mimetic) representations of emotion and emotionality in literary texts. The basic notion of the text as phonotext is nonetheless in line with cognitive stylistics' general orientation towards the embodied and enactive qualities of reading.

Drawing on Tsur's understanding of the contribution of meter and rhythm to emotion in poetry, a phonostylistic perspective on emotive reader response has to model the relationship between sound and emotion based on careful distinctions. In his review of Tsur's (2006) study on the poetic structure, hypnotic quality, and cognitive style of Coleridge's poem *Kubla Khan*, Willett emphasizes Tsur's general warning "that vocal gestures cannot convey specific emotions, only very general tendencies" (Willett 2009: 1070). The simple presence of a rising or falling intonation contour, for example, does not determine our emotional response to a text passage. Regarding the relationship between speech sounds and meaning, Tsur (2012: 431) argues, that no specific properties of meaning – and hence of 'emotive semantics' – can be attributed to speech sounds. Tsur's position is affirmed by results of current empirical research: Kraxenberger and Menninghaus's (2016a) retesting of previously reported empirical findings that suggested an iconic relation between sound and emotional meaning in poetry produced no evidence for phono-emotional iconicity. To the contrary, their study supports the hypothesis that "readers are likely to adjust their prosody – including the prosody of silent reading [...] – to the content of the poem" (Kraxenberger and Menninghaus 2016a: 8). In other words: readers are likely to respond with emotional prosody to the perceived emotional content of a text.

This interpretation of readerly attunement as grounds for a perceived sound-meaning correspondence not only supports Tsur's (2012: 431) position, that no specific properties of 'emotive semantics' can be attributed to speech sounds, but also emphasizes the crucial methodological premise of distinguishing between correlation and causation: "Whenever the critic claims that there is some interaction between sound and meaning, he must make explicit the principle on which he is relying" (Tsur 2017: 10).

Nonetheless, cognitive poetics and stylistics approaches lay emphasis on the relevance not only of poetic rhythm but also sound as a key phenomenon with regard to literature's capacity to induce affective reader responses. In spite of the methodological difficulty of breaking down the phonological features of poetic style based on a usually written text (cf. Jeffries and McIntyre 2010: 35–36), stylistics offers the means for a fine-grained analysis of sound and musical patterns in poetic style. The development of phonetic description since the early 20th century has, for instance, provided the basis to analyze more subtle patterns of consonance in poetic texts "beyond the bald definition of alliteration as 'words beginning with the same letter'" (Jeffries and McIntyre 2010: 37).

With regard to the sound-emotion relation, even modern stylistics' refined possibilities to map sound patterns in literary texts do not readily lead to a mapping of emotional effects to their allegedly corresponding stylistic elements (cf. for instance Kraxenberger and Menninghaus [2016b] for an empirical approach towards the relation between stylistic features and emotion perception in poetry). As Tsur concludes: "While emotional meanings are subject to understanding, emotional qualities are subject to immediate perception. The emotional quality of a poem consists in a structural resemblance between some emotion and a poetic text" (Tsur 2017: 37). In what way stylistic features such as meter and rhythm contribute to this resemblance is outlined by Tsur (2017: 31–35) *inter alia* by the example of prosody in poetry and the emotive functionalization of a so-called 'stress maximum in a weak position'. What does that mean? As is known, rhythmical patterns in literary texts make use of rhythmic elements that are natural to language, such as the alternation of

stressed and unstressed syllables. Poetic prosody is still based on the same fundamental rules as prosodic features in the everyday use of a language. To produce a rhythmical reading of a verse such as “Burnt after them to the bottomless pit” from John Milton’s *Paradise Lost* or the similar “And whelm on them to the bottomless void” from Percy Bysshe Shelley’s *Prometheus Unbound*, as Tsur argues in his discussion of both examples, the reader or reciter “is likely to group together, emphatically, the last four syllables and segregate the group from the preceding context” (Tsur 2017: 32). This segregated group of syllables can be described as a *stress valley*, a well-formed symmetrical shape of two unstressed syllables embraced by two stressed ones – which, in terms of gestalt theory, endows the verse with “an exceptionally strong closure” (Tsur 2017: 32). As Tsur points out, as a *gestalt*, “[t]he stress valley has no semantic meaning, only perceptual dynamics. But this dynamics may generate a combinational potential, that is, a potential to combine with semantic elements that are relevant in one way or other to that dynamics” (Tsur 2017: 34). In the case of Milton’s and Shelley’s verses, the emotional quality and potential emotive effect on the reader can be seen as based on an interaction between the semantics of the “bottomless pit” or “void” and the simultaneous perception of dynamics and closure of the stress valley’s deviating prosody.

The phenomenon of *enjambment* constitutes a further suitable case in point to illustrate the phonostylistic perspective. Tsur describes this stylistic device as “a conflict between the linguistic unit (the sentence) and the versification unit (the line)” (Tsur 2012: 220), leading to a potential ambiguity. He quotes a short poem by the Hebrew poet Rachel (i.e., Rachel Bluwstein 1890–1931) as an example for a text that confronts the recipient with such “conflicting cues” or “ambiguous intonation contours” (Tsur 2012: 218):

- (3) *To life that hastens on before me I lift up my eyes
Calmly. For me, any gladness is unexpected gladness.
Let it be seven times blessed.*
(Rachel, in Tsur [2012: 220])

While the enjambment in the English translation seems to emphasize the notion of calmness and composure, the original version foregrounds the tension between two conflicting emotional states: As Tsur explains, “in Hebrew, ‘I lift up my eyes to’ is an idiomatic expression, meaning ‘I long for’, whereas ‘I lift up my eyes calmly’ suggests ‘I am indifferent to’” (Tsur 2012: 221). Taking this ambiguity of the Hebrew version into account, a plausible interpretation of the poem’s scenario is that “the speaker, consciously and intentionally, claims that she is indifferent to life, that she accepts death; her text, however, suggests, in spite of herself, that she still craves for life, and is far from indifferent” (Tsur 2012: 221). Thus, the text’s stylistic design not only confronts the recipient with the conundrum of two possible interpretations. Instead, the enjambment – or the *pause* as its corresponding paraprosodic feature (cf. Jobert 2014: 234) – yields a double perspective of two equally valid but conflicting readings, comparable, for instance, to the perspectival double coding in the case of irony (cf. Kotthoff 2002) and its functionalization for reader engagement for instance within Romantic literature (cf. Igl 2016, 2019). The ambiguity of the two emotional states expressed by the two different readings thus has the potential to convey a complex

emotion scenario to the reader or listener of the poem. As a (phono)stylistic design element, the enjambment here literally guides the recipient to ‘read between the lines’ to experience the poem’s multilayered emotive quality.

What Tsur’s example also shows, though, is the relevance of *context*. Unsurprisingly, even a theoretical framework built on the notion of universal cognitive and linguistic principles such as gestalt or foregrounding theory (cf. Gibbons and Whiteley [2018: 322] on the distinction and connection of both) has to factor in culturally and historically changing practices and (aesthetic) norms in order to be applicable for actual analysis.

3.2 Rhythm as mind-body interface and the stylistics of ‘attunement’

The gestalt theoretical notion of ‘figure and ground’ and with that the idea of a dynamics of schema and deviation as a formative principle in literary texts is one of the fundamental points of departure in cognitive poetics and stylistics research (cf. Stockwell 2002: 13–14). It should not go unmentioned that Roman Jakobson’s work on linguistics and poetics – condensed for example in his eponymous essay from 1960 – contributed crucially to the notion of the dynamic interrelation between “frustrated expectations” and the formation of new rules and patterns in poetic meter (cf. Jakobson 1960: 363–364). While there is vast research and, for instance within Reuven Tsur’s listed works on poetic rhythm alone, a multitude of cases in point that illustrate the ‘schema/deviation’ dynamics, the complex connection between gestalt principles in literature, reading as an embodied process, and potential emotional effects on the side of the reader still raises questions.

The phenomenon of rhythm constitutes a promising subject to link the different phenomenal domains of textual features, the conditions of embodied cognition, and reading as a process and multi-sensory experience that enable the realization of a text as a phono-text. Van Leeuwen (2005) emphasizes this link from a social semiotics point of view. As he points out, rhythm as a basic biological given and profoundly bodily experience has the power to not only co-ordinate human action, but also to synchronize human interaction: “The rhythms of our actions become as finely attuned to each other as the parts of different instruments in a musical performance” (Van Leeuwen 2005: 181). This potential to synchronize and ‘attune’ makes rhythmical structures in literature a powerful tool of reader engagement and immersion. Literature’s ability to convey emotions and moods is equally grounded in the readers’ embodied cognition as well as them being part of physical and social environments as observed within the concept of 4E cognition (see Section 2.1). As emphasized above, it is thus not simply the reader but the *embodied* reader who is ‘moved by the rhythm’.

The mind-body interplay is also crucial within Mellmann’s (2006a, 2006b, 2016) analytical framework, who examines the relationship of literature and emotions from an evolutionary psychology perspective and sees the emotive potential of literary texts as based on “surrogate (or, stimulus model) effects” (Mellmann 2006b: 145). Drawing on the understanding that literary texts present stimuli to the reader that resemble ‘real’ extra-textual stimuli, Mellmann (2008) sheds light on metric gestalt principles and the ‘ideal’ structure of the tetrameter. Against the backdrop of the universalist premise, Mellmann’s notion of

the tetrameter as general pattern – and not, for instance, specifically the *trochaic* tetrameter – is only seemingly underspecified. As has been already pointed out by Burling (1966) in his cross-linguistic study on nursery rhymes: in considering the ‘(four times) four beats’ pattern as a potentially general ‘pan-human’ and by that ‘pan-linguistic’ feature of verse (Burling 1966: 1435), we must keep in mind the different cultural and linguistic characteristics that regulate the concrete realization of such a general pattern.

In her account on poetry’s possibilities to engage readers by playing with gestalt expectations and deviations based on metrics and rhythm, Mellmann (2008) in particular puts Tsur’s claim to the test that the occurrence of deviations from metric regularity in the penultimate verse of a stanza is a usual closure device utilized to “arouse a feeling of *requiredness*” (Tsur 1998: 66; emphasis in the original). She does so by analyzing the metric structure of Erich Kästner’s (1929) tetrametric poem *Sachliche Romanze* (translatable as ‘objective’ or ‘matter-of-factly romance’) about a couple’s recognition that they have – in passing, as it were – fallen out of love. As the analysis demonstrates, the last stanza makes use of an intricate alternation of schema and deviation with regard to its metric structure (cf. Mellmann 2008: 269–271). The back and forth of ‘promise and delay of closure’ (cf. Mellmann 2008: 271) on the stylistic level corresponds with the content level and scenario that is presented to the reader: a parting couple not yet ready to part ways, sitting in a café, stirring their cups in mutual silence and disbelief.

In the case of so-called hypnotic poetry, poetic rhythm’s power of engaging the embodied reader and creating an experience of attunement can be observed in an exemplary fashion. As Tsur (2017: 24) outlines, one of the distinguishing marks of hypnotic poetry such as Edgar Allan Poe’s *The Raven* or Coleridge’s *Kubla Khan* is its “obtrusive rhythm”, produced through a highly regular metrics and a “special combination of weak and strong gestalts” (Tsur 2017: 16). It is not only in the specific case of hypnotic poetry, however, that poetic discourse manages to highly engage and emotionally attune the reader. Drawing on Wolfgang Iser’s notion of the active role of the reader, Muth and Petrovic (2012: 302) emphasize the performative interplay of text and reader from a classical studies perspective. As they demonstrate using the example of an ancient Greek tomb statue of Kroisos (around 530 BC) and the appurtenant inscription – a lament in form of an epigrammatic distich –, ancient readers had to decipher the inscription’s metrics and meaning by (re-)reading it aloud due to the contemporary custom of not marking (all) word boundaries and endings of sentences (cf. Muth and Petrovic 2012: 302–303). By inevitably enunciating the tomb statue’s inscription, the readers not only deciphered its meaning and metric composition but at the same time *performed* the act of lamenting over Kroisos’s death (cf. Muth and Petrovic 2012: 303).

As this example illustrates, the potential of poetry or versified text to yield an emotional reader response by means of rhythm is rooted in embodied cognition, more specifically in the embodied and enactive process and experience of reading. The Kroisos example also stresses the relevance to distinguish between historically changing textual features and practices as well as the ‘malleable’ dimension of social cognition on the one hand, and the general principles of embodied cognition as conceptualized within the notion of 4E cognition that are deemed to be highly stable throughout human evolution. While the particular performative quality and level of bodily reader engagement of the Kroisos epitaph are of

course based on historically specific semiotic and material practices – the ancient reader had to not only enunciate the inscription but also bow down in front of the statue in order to read it–, the emotive potential is first and foremost based on the intricate interplay of language, cognition and emotion as outlined in Section 2.1.

4 Outlook: Future directions and the relevance of context

As the present chapter outlined, the notion of a close linkage of cognition and emotion constitutes a cornerstone of contemporary cognitive approaches to literary analysis. Although “literary works are social artifacts that serve many functions” and “not simply governed by emotional effectiveness” (Hogan 2015: 276), literature and emotion unquestionably constitute an “inextricable symbiosis” as Schwarz-Friesel (2017: 351) puts it. Hogan (2015: 275) equally argues for the place of literature in affective science, pointing out the potential of a literary work to produce a complex emotional experience in the reader that does not stand back behind ‘real life’ situations (see also Hogan 2018).

As Gibbons and Whiteley’s (2018) recent textbook on contemporary stylistics shows, current models in cognitive stylistics and cognitive poetics provide a solid framework to describe and analyze the emotive potential of textual features, spanning from the phonetic micro- to the textual macrostructure. Studies in the seminal field of empirical reader response research shed more and more light on the specific interplay of literary stylistics and emotional effects (see, for instance, Kraxenberger and Menninghaus 2016b). However, there hardly is a prospect of a universal register that annotates specific stylistic design elements such as rhyme and meter, parallelism and repetition, enjambments or conjunctions of verse and syntax, etc., and their particular emotional effects on readers. Aiming to create a ‘periodic table’ that groups and lines up elements based on similarity of structure and ‘emotive valence’ would dismiss the fact that literature’s potential to evoke emotion is not just grounded in embodied cognition and the embodied reality of readers, but also always realized within historically and culturally specific constellations.

This perspective is in line with the demand for a ‘contextualized’ or ‘situated’ form of stylistics that takes into account the socio-cultural background and context of texts as well as the socio-cultural backgrounds and cognitive dispositions of readers (cf. Gibbons and Whiteley 2018: 327). Applied to empirical studies of emotional responses to literature, a ‘situated stylistics’ approach could thus also further a more fine-grained understanding of how real readers experience and evaluate emotional qualities in literature (cf. Gibbons and Whiteley 2018: 327–328). For a clearer picture of how stylistic design elements are functionalized to evoke emotive reader responses, the present chapter also argued for a closer look into the role of mood as an affective reaction utilized by a text to engage the embodied reader in complex cognitive and emotive experiences and reflections.

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73 Love and rhythm in poetry and music

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Abstract: Language is a system of symbols, via which we express thoughts and emotions. Therefore, study of feelings and emotions through poetic texts requires a thorough analysis of text semantics. Music expresses any emotional state with the help of melody, harmony, rhythm, etc. The latter brings clarity to verbal manifestations of emotions and feelings. Thus, music and speech are rhythmically different but may function simultaneously to deliver emotions and meaning. The object of this study is love in terms of its expression in poetry and music. The data are represented by 120 poetic texts that depict love and emotions connected to it. The present research offers a contrastive analysis of linguistic and musical means of expressing emotions and feelings and their verbalization in speech and manifestation in music. Rhythm in poetry and music contributes to relevant imagery and emotional colouring. Rhythmic patterns and figures intensify emotions implied in poetic texts, facilitating additional textual information extraction. It makes rhythm a non-verbal means of forming an emotive and content-semantic type of subtext leading to a holistic perception of artistic reality. The research results also demonstrate how musical expressive means help create female and male images and display gender-related ways of emotive manifestation.

1 Introduction

Language stores many feelings and emotions decoded in words. Its study allows us to trace changes in the rhythmic organization of lines for the transfusion of a certain emotional state of love with varying degrees of intensity and shade. A particular atmosphere is created within and by poetic texts, especially by verse and song. Rhythmic patterns, together with lexical units, contribute to the necessary effect of conveying different emotions and emotive states.

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Emotional experiences fall within the psychoemotional scope of the person and are important components of human cognitive activity, behaviour, communication with the outside world and other people. Emotions and feelings are a response to situations and events which take place in our everyday lives. The emotional sphere of the person is the subject of deep and detailed analysis done not only by psychologists, but also by philosophers, musicologists, and, of course, linguists.

Psychologists and linguists from different countries have made a considerable contribution to the creation of the theoretical and methodological study of the basics of feelings and emotions. Scholars have described the essence of emotions (Ильин 2001; Ekman 1994; Fontaine et al. 2007; Plamper 2015; Reisenzein 1994; Scherer 2005), explained the laws of emotions (Frijda 2007; Sand 2016), made their classification (Ильин 2001; Лук 1972), described some of them in detail (Сарбаш 2008; Panasenko 2013b; Tissari 2010a; Tissari, Vanhatalo, and Siiroinen 2019), showed their relevance for language and linguistics (Foolen 2012; Lüdtke 2015; Mackenzie and Alba-Juez 2019; Ortony and Clore 1989; Panasenko 2012; Pinich 2017; Tissari 2017), studied their cognitive structure (Clore and Ortony 2000; Ellsworth 1991, 2013; Frijda 1993; Grandjean and Scherer 2008; Lazarus 1991; Mondal 2016; Ortoni, Clore, and Collins 1988; Roseman 2013), cultural aspect (Ellsworth 1994; Frijda and Mesquita 1994; González 2016; Keltner and Haidt 1999; Guyer and Erni 2016; Ogarkova, Panasenko, and Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk 2013; Panasenko et al. 2012; Russell 1991), means of their expression and perception (Bradley and Lang 2000; Ewert 1970; Flam and Kleres 2015; Juslin, Gonçalo, and Tuomas 2015; Lerdahl 2013; O'Rorke and Ortony 1994; Resnik 2018; Salmela 2011; Scherer 2004), and many other aspects.

In reality, speech and music have always been perceived as separate spheres unless it relates to a song melody. Even in this case, it rather concerns their common effect on the listener. In theory, these two domains interact partially: linguistics focuses on speech and has lyrics as research material (Сташко 2016a), while musicology investigates sound effects overlapping with music or intensified by it (Вашкевич 2006).

Speech is rhythmically different from music. Functioning simultaneously, though, each playing its own part, speech and music are like instruments in an orchestra (Сабанеев 1923; Asaridou and McQueen 2013; Lerdahl 2013). When combined and synchronized, speech and music are used to communicate emotion and deliver meaning (Васина-Гроссман 1978; Ручьевская 1960; Leeuwen 1999; Majid 2019; Panasenko 2014; Patel 2008).

This research offers a comparison of linguistic and musical means of expressing emotions and feelings, i.e., contrasting speech and music, taking into account previous studies (Панасенко 1985; Сташко 2016a; Panasenko 2014) to analyse how emotions and feelings are verbalized in speech, how they are manifested in music and to specify how love is expressed in poetry and music. The first question that comes to one's mind is what the main differences between speech and music are. To answer this question, we will use the words of the outstanding Russian scholar Teplov (Теплов 1947: 13), who claims that in music mainly the feelings of the person are reflected. However, they can, though with less completeness and adequacy, also be reflected in speech. The main difference between speech and music should be looked for in *how and in what way* they reflect the contents. In speech, the content is retold through *word meaning*, in music it is directly *expressed in sound images*. The main function of speech is *designation*, whereas the main function of music is *expression*. Let us analyse how emotions and feelings are verbalized in speech and how they are expressed in music.

2 Emotions in speech/language and music (emotions vs. feelings)

Here we would like to make some comments concerning the relations between speech and language, because this research examines their role in the verbalization of either feelings or emotions. Language is considered to be a system of symbols, via which we can communicate our thoughts and emotions to others and at the same time understand others. Thus, language is a means of human communication. Characteristic features of language are the high degree of abstraction and, related to this, the stability, wide combinability, high degree of internal organization and orderedness of its elements, to mention only the most important. Language is essentially a general human semiotic system.

On the other hand, speech is the means of the functioning of language. Speech is the realization of the semiotic system by biological means, i.e., the material reality of the acoustic vibrations produced by the articulatory organs and perceived by the hearing organs of man are stimuli that can be grasped by the brain centre. Thus, speech is that form of language that can be produced by our articulatory organs and perceived by our senses. And perhaps we are not far from the truth if we think of the relationship between language and speech in terms of the relationship between content and form, as well as of that between the general and the particular.

Linguists mainly concentrate on linguistic means proper, which belong to different levels: phonetic (segmental and suprasegmental); morphological; lexical (expressive vocabulary, vulgarisms, colloquial neologisms, emotionally charged words, etc.); syntactic (aposiopesis, emphatic constructions, exclamatory sentences, different types of repetition, etc.); stylistic (metaphor, simile, personification, euphemistic periphrasis, litotes, hyperbole), and some others. Very often linguists treat emotions and feelings as emotional concepts, linguocultural concepts, and conceptual domains (Панасенко 2009).

Foolen (2012: 349) considers that the relevance of emotion for language and linguistics may be considered from three perspectives: the conceptualization of emotions, the expression of emotions, and the grounding of language. The author claims that there are four types of relation between language and emotion: there is no direct connection between language and emotion; language has a direct connection to emotion; language has both a direct and indirect link to emotion; the relation between language and emotion varies, depending on the type of emotion (for details, see Foolen 2012: 349–350).

The empirical data testify to the fact that the means of expressing feelings and emotions depend on the text type (poetry, prose, play) and its volume (short verse – poem; short story – story – narrative – novel). Each text contains a specific, very often author-specific system of rendering characters' feelings and emotions (Панасенко 2009). It is going to be proven by analysing lyrical poetic texts, paying attention not only to their vocabulary and stylistic devices but also to such specific means of expressing emotions as rhythm.

Pondering about the nature of emotions and feelings makes it possible to say that there is no unanimous opinion on this point. In particular, Fontaine and Scherer write as follows: "Emotions and feelings are considered inextricably linked with one another. There is a consensus that feelings play a key role in emotions, but confusion looms large about their defining and differentiating characteristics, as well as about their role in the emotion pro-

cess" (Fontaine and Scherer 2013: 129). They explain that "according to the Component Process Model, an emotion process consists of synchronized activities between five emotion components, namely the Appraisal, the Bodily reaction, the Action tendency, the Expression, and the Feeling component" (Fontaine and Scherer 2013: 129). It becomes clear from this thesis that the feeling component is part of an emotional process. We respect this opinion, but the current research is based on the understanding of this problem by Ilyin, who writes: "Feelings are expressed by definite emotions depending on a situation, in which the object, to which a person undergoes a feeling, is. One and the same emotion can express different feelings; one and the same feeling is expressed by different emotions. A person can hide their feelings not displaying emotions vividly" (Ильин 2001: 288).

The object of this study is love, a complex feeling uniting different emotions and emotive states. Love has many a time been the focus of scholars' research (Воркачёв 1995; Kövecses 1988; Panasenko 2012, 2013b; Panasenko et al. 2012, 2013; Tissari 2003, 2005, 2010b). However, this time the attention will be focused on happy, shared love; thus, we suppose that in lyrical songs and poems its components will be meeting/dating (joy, happiness), courting (expectations of positive results), temporary separation (sadness, grief) as well as sympathy, affection, friendship, keenness on somebody, self-sacrifice, tenderness, liking, ardor, passion, etc. We will compare how these components are expressed in speech by rhythm and in music by its expressive means and rhythm.

In so far as we are going to discuss love, the hypothesis suggests that the scripts of human behaviour depend on many factors: (i) types of love (happy/shared vs. unhappy/unshared, romantic, tragic, common, adultery, etc.); (ii) number of participants (happy love – only two people + children in future; unhappy love – ménage à trois; adultery – three or more people); (iii) other feelings and emotions, which accompany love according to its type and participants; (iv) stages of love (acquaintance, courting, dating, temporal separation, meetings, wedding, or separation); (v) cultural-historic context, and others (Panasenko 2012).

Coming back to the comparative analysis of speech and music, it is important to mention that they are means of communication between people (the communicative function of language and art) and have definite contents (the semantic function of language and art). Deep similarity between speech and musical intonation is based on the expressiveness of music and speech as well as their ability to influence the listener (Назайкинский 1972: 248).

Speech and musical intonation have functional and structural identity, which is revealed in pitch means (tonal and accentual characteristics, main accents localization), in temporal coordinate (tempo) and in timbre characteristics. The analysis of expression of various human feelings and emotional states in speech intonation and musical images helps understand the interrelation between the features of maintenance of music and speech (Панасенко 1985: 5).

It is necessary to point out that the human psycho-emotional sphere is often connected with modality, i.e., a person's attitude towards something, somebody, and towards oneself. Therefore, human feelings can be associated with different modal meanings (Панасенко 1985). The analysis of musical modality in the diachronic plane shows stages of the cognition of the world and of the external environment by a person. The antique musical aesthe-

tics reflects ideas of the universe, relationship between a person and the environment, and the value of art in human life. The bases of the “musical mode” notion, which is widely used in the theory of ethos, are formed. The essence of this theory is that any piece of music could – with the help of certain means (melody, rhythm, harmony, etc.) – express any specific emotional state, transferring in various parts of composition its shades and gradation (Булгачевский and Фомин 1974). Definite modal meaning (feeling) was attributed to each interval, harmony, tonality and other components of intonation. Without any doubt, the priority belongs to the melodic component of intonation (Panasenko 2013a, 2014) and the phonetic aspect of language and speech (Stashko 2016b, 2017b; Zabuzhanska 2017), but the rhythmic component is also important and we will try to prove it when presenting the results of this research.

3 Rhythm: Definition, types, and functions

Since speech rhythm and rhythmic patterns, as well as musical rhythm, contribute to the background idea of the emotion itself, it makes sense to give several key definitions of the point.

3.1 Definition of rhythm in linguistics

The word *rhythm* is derived from the Greek word *rhythmos*, which means ‘measured motion’. Collins Dictionary interprets rhythm as a flow, movement, procedure, etc. characterized by basically regular recurrence of elements or features, as beat, or accent, in alternation with opposite or different elements or features (*Collins Dictionary* n. d.).

In phonetics, rhythm is the sense of movement in speech, marked by stress, timing, and quantity of syllables (Zabuzhanska 2017: 447). In poetry, rhythm is the recurring alternation of strong and weak elements in the flow of sound and silence in sentences or lines of verse. In music, rhythm is usually produced by making certain notes in a sequence stand out from others by being louder, longer or higher.

Thus, it may be stated that rhythm is a literary device that demonstrates long and short patterns through stressed [1] and unstressed [0] syllables, particularly in verse form. Each of these patterns makes up a unit known as a foot.

3.2 Functions of rhythm

The use of rhythm in poetry acts as the beat does in music, which helps express some words more powerfully and emphatically than others, having stressed them for a longer period of time. Therefore, the repeated use of rhythmical patterns produces rhythmical identifiable effect, which sounds pleasant to the mind as well as to the soul. Furthermore, rhythm captivates the audience and readers alike by giving musical effect to a speech or a literary piece. As Roach writes, “[it] helps us to find our way through the confusing stream

of continuous speech, enabling us to divide speech into words or other units, to signal changes between topic and speaker, and to spot which items in the message are the most important” (Roach 2001: 37).

Being “the engine that drives the sonorous and meaningful activity of a poem, the continuous motion pushing spoken language forward” (Attridge 1995: 12), rhythm performs various functions within a poetic text. Among them we distinguish:

- the function of consistency and unity – owing to rhythm, which by no means acts hand in hand with imagery, a poetic text can be perceived as a single entity. Moreover, rhythmical meaning adds something to semantic meaning, shaping a narrative of its own (Lilja 2009: 275);
- the function of forward movement and final closure that presupposes the following: rhythm in the course of a poetic text moves forward and, when the poem ends, it reaches a culminating point of finality;
- the function of memorability, when poetry stores itself in the brain more easily than prose due to the presence of rhythm, especially when poetry is rhymed;
- the function of mimetic suggestiveness, which implies the idea of some sort of parallelism between the rhythmic forms and the subjects of a poetic text. In other words, fast rhythm is predominantly applied to convey quick subjects which a poetic text holds, while slow rhythm, as a rule, correlates with depressing topics. This function is mainly observed in free verse;
- the function of emotional suggestiveness that surmises a certain emotional colouring, which is always implied via a certain rhythmic form;
- the function of literary associations is based on metre traditions: rhythm of a poem serves as “an allusion to either a peculiar poem or group of poems, as well as the entire tradition of poetry” (Забужанська 2016: 30).

3.3 Types of rhythmic patterns and figures

In order to link rhythmic patterns and figures with the relevant emotions they can portray, we have selected and analysed 60 folk songs and 60 poems (see Appleby and Stone 1991; A teraz tutto... 2004; Já & písnička 3 2011) that depict love and emotions connected to them.

First and foremost, there exist five main types of rhythm:

The first type of rhythm is Iamb [01], which is most commonly used and consists of two syllables, the first of which is not stressed, while the second syllable is stressed:

- (1) *Shall I compare thee* [01 01 1]
To a summer's day? [001 01]
 (William Shakespeare, “Sonnet 18”)

In this sonnet, Shakespeare presents us with the description of his beloved woman, thus giving an idea of what his love was like. The usage of the iambic foot contributes to a strong rhythmical effect from the very beginning, highlighting the words *I* and *thee*, which seems to emphasize the union of souls.

Another bright example is a poem about love:

- (2) *I shut my eyes and all the world drops dead;* [01 01 01 01 11]
I lift my lids and all is born again. [01 01 01 011]
I think I made you up inside my head. [01 0100 01 01]
 (Sylvia Plath, “Mad Girl’s Love Song”)

The author uses a smaller number of iambs or beats per line (6–5–4), giving the poem an irregular descending rhythmic flow. This irregularity functions as the wave-like spirit of a woman in love and repeats her thrill and heartbeat. The first two lines have spondee feet “tails” to keep the suspense, while the last line is purely iambic, which again returns the heartbeat to a tranquil pace.

The second rhythm is Trochee [10], which has two syllables, the first of which is stressed, while the second syllable is unstressed:

- (3) *There’s a yellow rose in Texas,* [10 10 10 10]
That I’m going to see, [11 10 01]
No other darky knows her, [110 10 10]
No darky only me. [110 10 1]
 (“The Yellow Rose of Texas”, traditional American song)

This rhythmic pattern intensifies the emotion of intention and sounds a bit aggressive and agile. It contributes to the idea of a man who wishes to prove his love and is full of excitement to fight for it. Besides, men tend to give promises whereas women don’t, which is also depicted in the analysed poetic texts, and in folklore in particular (see Сташко 2016а).

The third rhythm is the rhythmic pattern Spondee [11], which is a poetic foot that has two consecutively stressed syllables:

- (4) *How odd the girl’s life looks ...* [01 0111]
... I’m wife! Stop there! [01 11]
 (Emily Dickinson, “I’m Wife”)

This pattern sounds challenging and triggering, confirming and finalizing, doubtless and firm at the same time. It allows no hesitation as its beat is too intensive to let the listener stay aside. Everyone is involved: both the listener and the author, and the character as well.

Dactyl [100] is the fourth pattern, which is made up of three syllables. The first syllable is stressed, and the remaining two syllables are not stressed, such as in the word “ecstasy”:

- (5) *Eyes of ecstasy,* [10 100]
Always haunting me, [10 100]
Always taunting me [10 100]
With your mystery! [10 100]
Tell me tenderly, [10 100]

You belong to me [10 100]
For eternity, [10 100]
Dark eyes, talk to me! [10 100]
 (“Dark Eyes”, traditional American song)

The focused words with this pattern show trochees and dactyls in each line with two beats per line. The atmosphere created by this combination seems to confirm feelings rather than doubt or question them, which is intensified by the descending final elements.

The fifth rhythm is Anapest [001], which is like dactyl and has three syllables. However, here the first two syllables are not stressed, and the last syllable is stressed:

- (6) *I dreamed that you bewitched me into bed* [01 00010 001]
And sung me moon-struck, kissed me quite insane. [010 11 10 001]
 (Sylvia Plath, “Mad Girl’s Love Song”)

In a reverse way, the rhythmic pattern given above shows a challenge similar to the spondee foot, but it does not sound aggressive but rather intriguing.

However, Cheremisina-Enikolopova (Черемисина-Ениколопова 2013) offered a different, broader approach, taking into consideration the syllabic character of phonetic words that constitute a syntagm. Following this approach, the syntagm has a sufficiently clear rhythmic structure and forms a certain rhythmic figure. This approach is quite acceptable for studying the rhythm of prose and free verse as well. The core concept of rhythm here is to be specified in accordance with metrical tradition (Lilja 2009).

Thus, among rhythmic figures, we can single out three as basic:

- accentual uniformity, or balance (offered by Lilja), which occurs when phonetic words are sequentially arranged, having a stress on the same syllable:
- (7) *I think that earth seems so.* [01 01 11]
 (Emily Dickinson, “I’m Wife”)
- growing (rising) accent series – consistent and gradual increase in the number of unstressed syllables, which go before the stressed one:
- (8) *If I can’t love my Cindy,* [01 01 010]
I’ll have no girl at all. [01 01 01]
 (“Cindy”, traditional American song)
- falling accent series – with the reverse arrangement of the stressed syllables:
- (9) *Get along home, Cindy Cindy* [100 1 10 10]
 (“Cindy”, traditional American song)

or

- (10) *Daisy, Daisy* [10 10]
Robert, Robert [10 10]
(Harry Dacre, “Bicycle Built for Two [*Daisy Bell*]”)

It should be mentioned that there are cases when it is impossible to single out any of the aforementioned rhythmic figures, i.e., there is a combination of basic ones, e.g.:

- (11) *Never try to trick me with a kiss* [10 1 010 001]
(Sylvia Plath, “Never Try to Trick Me with a Kiss”)

This is found in all the free verses of modern and postmodern American poetry under analysis. The reason for this may lie in the disregard of metre traditions (99% of all the analysed poetic texts) and the absence of rhyme (97% of all the analysed poetic texts) (Забужанська 2016: 78) in works by modern poets. At the same time, the analysis shows that such deviations and combinations seldom occur in traditional American folk songs. Zabuzhanska (2017: 168) claims that the arrangement of rhythmic figures serves as a signal, i.e., author’s preferences in the choice of rhythmic figures and ways of their combination indicate the idiom of the artist’s words.

The accentual uniformity gives the poem some monotony, with the help of which the poet conveys the impression of a monotonous life. Such rhythmic monotony may also correspond to the continuous infinity of events in the life of the main character of the poem. Consider the example “I’m Wife” by Emily Dickinson, in which she presents a cynical outlook on marriage, seeing it as an unequal state, where women suffer a range of deprivations:

- (12) *How odd the girl’s life looks* [01 0111]
I’m wife! Stop there! [01 11]
(Emily Dickinson, “I’m Wife”)

In the presented example, the choice of the rhythmic figure is made to convey the monotonous marriage life.

The growing (rising) accent series is in general used to depict the rising melody of a poem; therefore, it can correlate with positive emotions the author expresses in his/her poem:

- (13) *I lift my lids and all is born again.* [01 01 01 011]
(Sylvia Plath, “Mad Girl’s Love Song”)

In the poem by Sylvia Plath, “Mad Girl’s Love Song”, the author portrays a crying woman with ruffled up hair, who is sitting at the window, despondent of her lost love. Though the poem is a love song of despair, it still expresses the idea of hope.

Besides, the falling accent series corresponds with the falling melody in songs (see the aforementioned example from “Bicycle Built for Two”). However, in free verse and prose it

is mainly applied when there is need to depict negative feelings of the main characters. Consider a bright example from Sylvia Plath's "Mad Girl's Love Song":

- (14) *And arbitrary blackness gallops in.* [01000 10 10 1]
 (Sylvia Plath, "Mad Girl's Love Song")

The brokenhearted woman closes her eyes in despair and sees the abrupt darkness that is like a veil upon her eyes. This rhythmic figure, which goes hand in hand with the imagery of the text, creates the atmosphere of the lack of a promising future with the beloved man.

It has been found that musical notation can be useful in identifying the role of rhythm in poetry. It gives an opportunity to decode additional information hidden in a text. This is a fragment from the poem "Stopping by Woods on a Snowy Evening" by Robert Frost:

- (15) *The woods are lovely, dark and deep,
 But I have promises to keep,
 And miles to go before I sleep,
 And miles to go before I sleep.*
 (Robert Frost, "Stopping by Woods on a Snowy Evening")

Here the following rhythmic pattern is observed:  – smoothness, softness at a slow speed. It may be somehow connected with the smoothness of deep snow, serenity, meditation. Changing the tempo changes text and rhythm modality. The horse urges its owner to move forward and to move faster with the purpose of reaching home earlier:

- (16) *He gives his harness bells a shake
 To ask if there is some mistake.*
 (Robert Frost, "Stopping by Woods on a Snowy Evening")

When the tempo is fast, this rhythm expresses the sharper feeling of a gallop, alarm. Definitely, the horse and narrator will ride faster to arrive home. Here we also have the growing (rising) accent series: 01 01 01 01 – imitation of hooves clattering, i.e., an agile movement ahead.

Not only musical rhythm, as seen in the example above, but rhythmic patterns can also serve as tools for extracting additional information. Thus, the iambic foot mostly presents wave-like emotions of a person's thrill and heartbeat, which create a certain suspense and rhythmicity. It is used to convey positive emotions of inspiration, praying for love and waiting. On the contrary, the trochee rhythm appears more aggressive and may show readiness to act in the name of love. Similar emotions but with an intriguing effect can be created by the anapest rhythm. To illustrate a conclusion of any emotion or feeling, the spondee or dactyl rhythmic patterns may be considered relevant. All the mentioned patterns may be both falling and rising in terms of their accent series, which, in their turn, contribute to the background idea of the emotion itself.

Therefore, in our opinion, rhythm is a non-verbal way of forming not only an emotive but also content-semantic type of subtext leading to a holistic perception of artistic reality.

Rhythm in poetic texts attributes some additional shades to the semantic meaning and brings clarity to verbal manifestations of emotions and feelings.

The research has also shown characteristics typical of any poetic text: it usually possesses a bunch of rhythmic patterns within a couplet/passage/stanza/verse. Thus, it could be claimed that such a phenomenon is meant to produce a higher likelihood that the underlying idea is correctly interpreted with maximum pushing of hot button issues.

3.4 Rhythm in music

The synergy of musical rhythm and word is one of the fundamentals in the theoretical explanation of music of different countries and peoples both in ancient and in present times, both in the West and in the East (Холопова 1983: 12). Musical rhythm is often compared to the pulse of a living organism (Нейраз 1961: 44); therefore, it plays a significant role in the display of emotions and feelings.

What makes musical rhythm different from speech rhythm and what do they have in common? The answer to this question may be found in a book on Russian musical rhythemics. Kholopova (Холопова 1983: 4–5) writes that musical rhythm should be treated not as a dead scheme of values on paper but as a live system of impulses of expressiveness developing over time. Of course, rhythm absorbs into itself currents of expressiveness of a melody and harmony. Rhythmoformulae can be identified with rhythmointonations, which are a type of “lexical unit” in musical language, whereas musical rhythm analysis has the character of semantic analysis of music.

In the 12th and 13th centuries in Europe, modal rhythemics or the system of rhythmic modi was widely used and it was obligatory for the author of poetic texts or a piece of music to follow it. In the 20th century, not only were forms of rhythmic expression transformed, but there was a basic strengthening of musical rhythm as an element (Холопова 1983: 17).

A thorough study of specialized sources on musical rhythm gave an opportunity to classify musical rhythm in the following ways:

1. Free (asymmetric) and connected (asymmetric);
 2. Even (dotted), at which the sum of values is equal to two – .
- The following time: $\frac{2}{4}$; $\frac{3}{4}$; $\frac{5}{4}$ and an odd time, which has stronger smoothness of verges and continuity of development; elementary expression of oddness is a combination of .
3. Accentual: (a) emphasis by a value correlation; (b) emphasis by means of the melodic line; (c) emphasis by voices’ correlation; (d) emphasis by facture’s means (Панасенко 1985: 75).

We share the opinion of Ruchyevskaya, who writes that “text rhythm in music can vary only in a certain framework; under all circumstances, the main semantic accents of the text in a melody are always perceived by us as natural and even necessary since they are caused by artistic design and open figurative contents of the text” (Ручьевская 1960: 27).

Of course, a number of sources have been studied (see Section 1), and many of them have formed the background of the present research. However, speaking about musical rhythm, its expressiveness and possibility to manifest different emotions and feelings taken separately as components of musical intonation, the book by Sabaneyev, *Speech Music* (Сабанеев 1923), occupies a special place in this study, though it was published a very long time ago. The author writes that musical life of a word, i.e., “speech music”, includes mainly all sound structures of a word and speech, the whole world of sound rhythms of poetry and the literary word in general, all harmony of sound euphony, all games of timbres, sound dynamics, accentuation and metric links. We express the world of our emotions by sounds; there is a complex and mysterious dependence between sounds of our speech and subconscious hiding places of our mentality. Out of the sense of speech, out of its ideography, we are able to understand a special language – the language of sound emotions – even in languages unfamiliar to us (Сабанеев 1923: 15).


The author describes hidden emotions in various types of musical rhythm in detail. He gives a lot of examples of different types of time (double, triple, quadruple, quintuple) accompanying them with other significant components of musical intonation (Сабанеев 1923: 145–146). Below are only those examples which are most important for the research in question.

Duple time

At a slow speed, the rhythm itself expresses indifference and the narrative; at a fast speed – anxiety, easy jogging (a typical trochee): 

At a slow speed, the rhythm itself expresses tranquility, greatness (a slow trochee); at a fast speed – a gallop, alarmed, rapid run: 


At a slow speed, the rhythm itself expresses majestic smoothness, softness; at a fast speed – “sharp” feeling of a gallop, alarm: 


Determination, hardness is expressed in such a way: 

At a slow speed, the rhythm itself expresses solemnity; at a fast speed – cheerful running, dancing, joyful emotion: 

A quiet, gentle emotion is expressed as follows: 

Triple time

Persistent tenderness is expressed in this way: 

Determination, courage is expressed in such a way: (mazurka rhythm): 

Quintuple time

Restless, disturbing emotion is expressed like this: 

Persistent alarm is expressed in such a way: 

This analogy gives straight correct contours of compliance of two great areas of rhythmically changed sound – poetry and music. Sabaneyev presents these compliances as shown in Table 73.1.

Tab. 73.1: Common features of music and speech (after Сабанеев 1923: 167).

Music	Speech
musical melody	speech intonations
musical metres (measure)	basic metre-dynamic net
thematic formation	themes
harmony and tone colour	vowel world
cadences	conclusion of subjects, caesural groups (of verses)
sequences	intonational themes' movements – “sequences”

Let us illustrate the role of rhythm with some examples. We will start with a folk song “Ej, vrt sa, dievča, vrt sa” ('Hey, do a whirl, girl, do a whirl') that comes from the ethnographic region Dolnácko, which is located in South-East Moravia, and connects the Czech Republic and part of Slovakia. Judging from the text, it is its Slovak version. This song is performed at a fast tempo. The text can be analysed as shown in Table 73.2.

Tab. 73.2: Functions of musical rhythm in a folk song (source: own processing).

Text	Types of rhythmical patterns	Interpretation
Ej, vrt sa, dievča, vrt sa (‘hey, do a whirl, girl, do a whirl’)	(a)  (b) 	(a) manly, epic emotion (b) tender, joyful emotion 01 01 010
Ej já sa budu dívat (‘hey, I will look at you’)	(a)  (b) 	01 01 010
Ej jak sa ně zalúbíš (‘hey, if you do not fall in love with me’)	(a)  (b) 	01 01 010 – growing (rising) accent
Budu k vám chodívat (‘I will visit you regularly’)	(b)   (c) 	(c) galloping, overanxious, rapid running 10 10 10 – descending trochaic rhythm, insistence on the verge of aggression

In a folk song containing narrative or description, the content may manifest different emotions, either positive or negative, though the rhythmic pattern is identical. Other musical means are also employed: changes of tonality (from major to minor key), appearance of pauses, etc. Pieces of music written by composers (orchestra music, songs, etc.) usually have a more complicated structure and a complicated system of various expressive means. Below are some examples.

Concerning this Czech/Slovak song (“Ej, vrt sa, dievča, vrt sa”), its content is enhanced by rhythmic patterns. The narrators are the young man who is very insistent in his courting (manly, epic emotion rendered by the rhythm) and the girl who enthusiastically accepts his courting (*Ej chodívaj chodívaj / ej mé srdénko věrné / budem ti otvírat / okénečko skelné* – ‘Hey do visit me / my devoted heart / I will open for you / a glass window’).

The tempo of this song is marked as $J = 120$, which corresponds to Allegro (fairly quick speed). The lyrics contain verbs of motion (*vrt sa* – ‘do a whirl, turn around’ and *chodívat* – ‘to go, to visit regularly’), which are repeated several times. Movements done or described by the young man and the woman in the text are accentuated by rhythm (galloping, over-anxious rapid running).

Only one component of musical intonation – rhythm – has been described above in detail; in fact, music has a wide scope of expressive means, which not only render different emotions and feelings but also create images and a specific atmosphere.

4 Emotions and feelings in music

Music is capable of transferring many physical characteristics of emotional speech with high accuracy. Medushevskiy (Медушевский 1976) writes that music does it with the help of the following means: length of phrases; rhythmic organization (smooth or interrupted, uneven, saturated with pauses); tessitura (the most aesthetically acceptable and comfortable vocal range for a given singer; the range in which a given type of voice sounds best) (Wikipedia s. v. “Tessitura”, n. d.); pitch line with its rises and falls; sharpness or softness of an accent; timbre – and finally, by the combination of all these means to reproduce an emotional state. For example, tempo serves as a means of emotional excitement display. Sharply accentuated sounds are associated with strong and resolute movements; unaccentuated but short sounds are associated with timid and uncertain movements.

The comparison of speech and musical intonations requires a detailed study of their tonal, dynamic, and temporal characteristics (see Table 73.3).

Tab. 73.3: Common and different features of speech and musical intonation (Panasenko 2013a: 145).

Speech intonation	Musical intonation
A. Tonal characteristics	
melody	melody or tune
pitch range	the main tonality of a composition
interval	interval
tone color or timbre	tone color or timbre
–	harmony
–	key (major or minor)
B. Dynamic characteristics	
loudness of speech	loudness of music
–	dynamic nuances
logical stress	accent
C. Temporal characteristics	
speech pause	musical pause
tempo	tempo
rhythm	musical rhythm
emphatic length	value of a note or a pause

Let us start with the tonal characteristics because intonation of any kind is important in rendering the emotional part of speech; the domain of emotional experience and human feelings constitute a specific area of music and, to a greater degree, melody (Ручьевская 1960: 4).

Having collected information from different sources (Вашкевич 2006; Волконский 1913; Медушевский 1976; Островский 1970; Способин 1958; Panasenko 2013a), it is possible to speak about the interval as the intonation basis, as a basis of a musical phrase. Intervals can be melodic and harmonic. The description of some of them can be found below.

Melodic intervals can be major, minor, wide, and narrow. Major intervals (major second, major third, major sixth, and major seventh) are related to major keys; they are characterized by open space and movement to light; minor intervals, on the contrary, have the meaning of melancholy. “Wide” intervals (fifths, sixths, sevenths, octaves) render openness of a statement and sincere revelations, whereas “narrow” ones reveal inner worlds of feelings and emotional restraint.

The functions of other intervals are as follows: a minor melodic second is the interval of sensuality and sentiment; it is the basis of the majority of trochaic intonations of lyrical music: intonations of grief, plaint, and sad thoughts. Its descending form is a figure of lamentation. A major melodic second is attributed the meaning “firm, strong, inducing, full of hopes”. A third and a quint in a question serve to express surprise and impatience, when used in a stressed position – surprise and delight with a shade of doubt and meditation. A melodic fourth corresponds to decisiveness and assurance. Medushevskiy (Медушевский 1976) calls a fifth tone the most “flying” sound in a chord; it is heavenly, transparent, and directed to purity. A melodic sixth, especially an ascending one, initially declares the emotional and psychological atmosphere: light major or sad minor state of mind. An octave in an interrogative sentence shows the greatest degree of surprise, in a stressed position – surprise, delight, puzzlement.

An interesting example of the role of intervals in manifesting emotions and feelings is the song “If You Go Away (Ne me quitte pas)” by Jacques Roman Brel and Rod McKuen (see Figure 73.1).

Fig. 73.1: The song “If You Go Away” by Jacques Roman Brel and Rod McKuen, 1966
(source: <https://www.virtualsheetmusic.com/score/HL-2215.html>, accessed 28 September 2022).

This ballad about love can be divided into three parts. The first part contains despair: *If you go away on this summer day, / Then you might as well take the sun away /.*

In the first part, we see a gradually descending melodic contour: it starts with G and ends with C. In this descending movement, we have the leading notes: G, F, E, D, C, and there is no melodic development at all (Figure 73.2):

The musical score shows a single staff in Am major. The melody is composed of eighth-note chords. The first four chords descend from G to C. The fifth chord ascends back to G. This pattern repeats three times. The lyrics are: If you go a-way — on this sum-mer day, — then you.

Fig. 73.2: The song “If You Go Away” by Jacques Roman Brel and Rod McKuen, 1966
(source: <https://www.virtualsheetmusic.com/score/HL-2215.html>, accessed 28 September 2022).

If we have a look at the intervals, we will see that all of them are narrow and no larger than a second and in their descending movement, the seconds have the meaning of lamentation.

The second, the central part of the text, represents hope combined with great love expressed by hyperbole and metaphors:

- (17) *But if you stay, I'll make you a night
Like no night has been or will be again.
I'll sail on your smile, I'll ride on your touch,
I'll talk to your eyes that I love so much.*
(Jacques Roman Brel and Rod McKuen, “If You Go Away”)

Of course, such opposite emotions and feelings cannot be expressed by identical melody. The register is one octave higher, wide ascending intervals appear (a third, a fourth, and a fifth – see their meaning above) with the leading notes. However, it does not help and we proceed to the third part containing sadness and despair enhanced by the hyperbole and the repetition of the word “empty”, which is a logical attribute in the first two cases and an epithet in the third one:

- (18) *If you go away, as I know you must
There'll be nothing left in this world to trust.
Just an empty room, full of empty space
Like the empty look I see on your face.*
(Jacques Roman Brel and Rod McKuen, “If You Go Away”)

There are different types of melody development, such as repetition, modification, sequence, and leading notes (leading tone) (Васина-Гроссман 1978: 104). Repetition of melodic elements evokes the feeling of insistence, and falling melodic contour with sequence (a melodic pattern repeated three or more times at different pitches with or without modulation) expresses regret and sympathy. Melodic motion can be ascending; descending; undulating; pendulum; tile, terrace, or cascading; arc and rise (Wikipedia s. v. “Melodic motion”, n. d.). Ascending motion can be “up by step or up by leap” and descending can be

“down by step or down by leap”. The meaning of the intervals, which create the step or the leap, has already been described above.

While speaking about tonal characteristics, we must mention the role of keys and tonalities in expressing emotions and feelings. Major and minor modes are traditionally associated with positive and negative emotions. Different tonalities serve to express nuances of feelings, human spirit, and aspiration. Some composers and musicologists consider that the tonality D-dur represents energy, bright color, and triumph; tonalities E-moll and H-moll cause the feeling of deep, sublime grief (Мильштейн 1967: 33). Vashkevich (Вашкевич 2006) together with his students carried out an experiment on the semantic meaning of tonalities and offered short attributive characteristics of each major or minor tonality, like: A-moll – light, Fis-moll – excited, Gis-moll – tense, F-moll – sad, C-dur – decisive, A-dur – joyful, etc.

Of course, all elements of intonation work together and their set depends on the intentions of a composer, a piece of music composition, genre and types of emotional colouring. For example, joyful emotions in music are more often expressed by temporhythmic than by intonational features, by a trochaic, “dancing” rhythm that is also connected with primary phenomena – motive reaction of the person to this or that joyful impression (Васина-Гроссман 1978: 30).

Now in the two following examples we will show how all the expressive means mentioned above work in displaying different stages of love relations. The first example is a well-known song “I Know Why and So Do You” (lyrics by Mack Gordon, music by Harry Warren):

(19) *Why do robins sing in December*

*Long before the springtime is due?
And even though it's snowing,
Violets are growing
I know why and so do you.
Why do breezes sigh every evening
Whispering your name as they do?
And why have I the feeling
Stars are on my ceiling?
I know why and so do you.*

(Mack Gordon and Harry Warren, “I Know Why and So Do You”)

If we analyse the extract from this song, we will see that it shows amorousness, love or even infatuation. The text is based on metaphor and hyperbole (robins sing in December, violets are growing in the snow, stars are on the ceiling) combined with personification (breezes sigh and whisper the girl’s name).

The musical means are also various. There exist different variants of this song but all the tonalities are major: Es-dur, G-dur, F-dur (Figure 73.3).

If we have a look at the melodic movement of the whole song, we will find the following types: smooth ascending, descending and wave-like movement. In some versions of the song, the last is accentuated by numerous ties, which look like waves themselves (Figure 73.4).

The musical score consists of two staves of music. The top staff starts with a F major chord (F, A, C) followed by a Dm chord (D, G, B). The lyrics "Why do rob-ins sing in dec - emb - er?" are written below the notes. The next chord is Gm (G, B, D), followed by C7 (C, E, G, B), Am (A, C, E), and Dm again. The lyrics "long be - fore the spring time is" continue. The bottom staff begins with Gm, followed by C7 and B♭. The lyrics "due. And e - ven though it's sno - wing," are written below. The next chords are Am, Gm, and F. The lyrics "vi - o - lets are grow - ing." follow. The score then continues with a section labeled 1 (Gm, F) and 2 (Gm, C7, Gm, C7, F, F, Dm). The lyrics "I know why and so do you." are repeated for both sections, followed by "When you".

Fig. 73.3: The song “I Know Why and So Do You” by Mack Gordon and Harry Warren, 1941
(source: <https://musescore.com/user/35437911/scores/6227117>, accessed 28 September 2022).

This musical score shows a single melodic line in G major. The chords shown are F, Dm, Gm, C7, Am, Dm, Gm, and C7. The melody consists of eighth-note patterns, with some notes connected by ties to show smooth transitions between notes.

Fig. 73.4: The song “I Know Why and So Do You” by Mack Gordon and Harry Warren, 1941
(source: <https://musescore.com/user/35437911/scores/6227117>, accessed 28 September 2022).

Ties indicate that “musical notes are played or sung smoothly and connected. That is, the player makes a transition from note to note with no intervening silence” (Wikipedia s. v. “Legato”, n. d.).

The range of this song is moderate: 1.5 octaves. The tonalities, as we have mentioned, are different but all are major. If we take into account modalities attributed to different tonalities (see, e.g., Ващкевич 2006), we will have additional meanings hidden in them: G-dur (is said to evoke joyful spirit); Es-dur (grand, imposing tonality); F-dur (courageous tonality). The culmination occurs at the end of the refrain and is reached by gradual movement and a chain of active steps.

The song “I Know Why and So Do You” also has specific rhythmic patterns. The rhythm is connected, symmetric; accentuation is done here by the correlation of note values and by the correlation of melodic lines. In this case, the assurance of the man in his love dominates and dictates the use of other musical expressive means: melodic contour, which is smooth and wavy; tonality Es-dur (grand, lofty, imposing) combined with wide ascending and descending intervals and other musical expressive means make this song a classical sample of love lyrics.

Musical expressive means displaying an emotive state of a person can be found in the classical poem “My Heart” written by Alexander Pushkin (translated into English by

P. Pierse). The music to it was written by the outstanding British composer Benjamin Britten. One can also find other versions of this romance written by Russian composers. Both versions – the original and the translation – are given in Example (20).

- | | |
|---|--|
| (20) 1. Я думал, сердце позабыло
2. Способность легкую страдать,
3. Я говорил: тому, что было,
4. Уж не бывать! Уж не бывать!
5. Прошли восторги, и печали,

6. И легковерные мечты...
7. Но вот опять затрепетали

8. Пред мощной властью красоты.
(Benjamin Britten, "Poet's Echo") | 1. My heart, I fancied it was over,
2. That road of suffering and pain.
3. And I resolved: 'Tis gone forever,
4. Never again! Never again!
5. That ancient rapture and its yearning, and
its yearning,
6. The dreams, the credulous desire... desire...
7. But now, but now the old wounds have
started burning
8. Inflamed by beauty and her fire. |
|---|--|

The comparison of these two texts indicates that in the English version some words are repeated twice: *and its yearning, desire...* (epiphora) or *but now* (anadiplosis or catch repetition). The function of repetition of any kind is to focus the attention of the reader on some important pieces of information. The translator has managed to preserve poetic rhythm; in most sentences, it is identical in both versions: trochee rising rhythm:

- (21) Я думал, сердце позабыло [01 01 01 010]
My heart, I fancied it was over [01 01 01 010]
 (Benjamin Britten, "Poet's Echo")

The text can be divided into two parts: the past and the present. In the past, the lyrical hero has undergone some unhappy moments (*That road of suffering and pain*) – disillusionment – leading to the decision to stop thinking about love (*'Tis gone forever, Never again! Never again!*). But a beautiful woman appears in the man's life and everything starts from the very beginning (*Inflamed by beauty and her fire* – metaphor). The past is associated with unpleasant feelings and the present, with love. From despair and disillusionment, the man moves into an amorous state. Owing to the music, all these things are foregrounded.

As for the melodic contour, it is wavy, which is obviously connected with the smooth consequent change of time. The tonality at the beginning is D-dur, though the romance ends with Fis-dur. The climax of the melody development in the first stanza is on the words "rapture" and "its" (belonging to "rapture"), and in the second stanza it is the very end of the song – "fire". Moreover, the very last interval is a perfect fourth. The scholars (Вашкевич 2006; Волконский 1913: 105–114, and many others) claim that a melodic fourth is the base of affirmative intonations; it has the meaning of decisiveness and assurance; it is the interval of the beginning of many patriotic songs, especially if it is an iambic ascending fourth, as shown in our case.

In Table 73.4, you can find such dynamic characteristics as loudness of music and dynamic nuances. This aspect is so important in this song that it needs detailed analysis.

Tab. 73.4: Dynamic nuances in the romance “My Heart” by Benjamin Britten.

1. <i>p</i>	2. <i>p</i>	3. crescendo	4. <i>mf</i> diminuendo
5. <i>p</i> crescendo diminuendo	6. crescendo diminuendo	7. <i>p</i> crescendo and animando	8. crescendo <i>f</i> crescendo

The beginning of each line is marked with a number to show what different dynamic nuances they have.

The music is based on constant alternation between almost whispering (***p***) to a speaking voice (***mf***) and finally to the level of a loud voice (***f***). These changes of loudness are marked with the help of crescendo (<) – increasing the loudness and diminuendo (>) – lowering the loudness of voice. The protagonist starts telling his story in a whisper, then, when he falls in love, he cries with joy.

Temporal characteristics are also very important in this piece of music. There are many pauses in it: ♫ – crotchet rest – 3; ♩ – quaver rest – 11; ♪ – semiquaver rest – 17; in total, 31 pauses. This abundance of pauses makes the narrative broken and produces the feeling that it is difficult for the character to speak; he needs some time to think it over: practically every musical phrase starts with 1–2 pauses.

The tempo of this romance is adagio, which means ‘easily, unhurried’. In metronome counting it will be ♩ = 48–56 (in the Czech/Slovak folk song analysed above it was 120).

And now let us discuss musical rhythm, which is the object of this research. Here there are two kinds of rhythm: connected odd and free mixed. We see a strict alternation of time ($\frac{2}{4}$ and $\frac{3}{4}$): $\frac{2}{4}$ – 6 measures; $\frac{3}{4}$ – 1 measure; $\frac{2}{4}$ – 5 measures; $\frac{3}{4}$ – 1 measure; $\frac{2}{4}$ – 4 measures; $\frac{3}{4}$ – 1 measure; $\frac{2}{4}$ – 6 measures. All these alternations show the deep emotional state of the man, his reasoning about the unpleasant moments in his past.

Having analysed 60 songs, it is possible to state that the research results vividly show a great potential of musical expressive means in creating female and male images and displaying male and female ways of emotive manifestation.

5 Love and gender

We all believe love is a positive feeling between two people who share tenderness, softness, caress, respect, romance, and support. The Merriam-Webster online dictionary describes it as “strong affection for another arising out of kinship or personal ties; affection and tenderness felt by lovers; attraction based on sexual desire; affection based on admiration, benevolence, or common interests” (Merriam-Webster n. d.). The given variety of interpretations of this romantic relationship is finely represented in the analysed poetic texts with love in focus and certain specific aspects can be thus traced.

Regarding the issue of gender, another view is connected with rhyme schemes, according to which they can be masculine or feminine. The rhyme scheme is masculine, when the rhymes land on the stressed second beat of the iamb or on the last syllable in the line. Iambs, spondees and anapests are therefore masculine, which may mean a male behaviour

and tempo of emotional evolving. Surprisingly enough, the majority of such love stories are described by women (76%). They are typical of free verse, especially in poems describing past relations or hypothetical partners-to-be. Moreover, the analysed poems contain images of strong women who appreciate freedom and the right to choose what they wish to do. This style is contemporary and new, and so is free verse. In contrast to this, the feminine rhyme scheme (trochee, dactyl) is wholly appropriate to depict men's emotions and feelings. This style and mode are accurately preserved in folk songs, where 95 % of songs with a masculine rhyme scheme are delivered by a man depicting a woman (Сташко 2016а: 89), which may be considered a sign of split zones of influence and interest when it comes to traditional perceptions of a person's role in the family and in the society. However, the lines, in which the author addresses his woman bear a feminine rhyme scheme. The latter contributes to tender and soft image detail (Сташко 2016а: 89).

Men tend to be more reluctant to express their feelings and show their emotions in real life, though they are eager to do it voluntarily in poetic texts as shown in these survey results. We may suppose that men are less flamboyant or talkative but they are anyway ready to show their romantic feelings.

On the other hand, it has been discovered that the majority of the analysed folk songs (92%) tend to be a man's part, i.e., when a man sings about a woman or about his feelings for her. In the former case, a man usually highlights a woman's beauty directly, while in the latter case he displays his feelings and emotions indirectly. For instance, in the Czech/Slovak song ("Ej, vrt sa, dievča, vrt sa") love is expressed not only rhythmically but also lexically and stylistically. Here we cannot but mention that with the help of diminutives (srdénko 'heart' + dimin. suff.; okénečko 'window' + dimin. suff.) and metonymy (mé srdénko věrné 'my devoted heart') the notion of happy mutual love is rendered.

Bearing in mind the previous points, it is generally considered that semantically there seem to be more evident ways to convey love-related emotions. Surely, metaphors, similes, epithets, synonyms, hyperboles, etc. are handy stylistic devices and easy tools to illustrate love. For example, the results regarding poetic texts prove that the epithet appears to be the most recurrent device and predominantly shows taste (sweet smile, sweet voice) and colour aspects (ruby lips, gold hair) connected with a woman's appearance and her beauty in particular regardless of a man's treatment of his woman or the stage their love is at. Some earlier studies (Сташко 2016b; Stashko 2017a) showed that when describing a woman to portray positive love-related feelings to her, it is appropriate to use epithets that depict her beauty directly. In the creation of female images, the most commonly used epithets refer to body parts, that is to eyes (curly eyes, dark eyes), lips (ruby lips, red lips), cheeks (rosy cheeks, red cheeks), etc.

There are more examples to demonstrate how stylistic devices may convey emotions: "**Eyes like a morning star, / Cheeks like a rose;** / Laura was a pretty girl, God almighty knows." ("The Colorado Trail", American folk song) – love + sympathy + admiration expressed by similes; "*I can see the sun when it's raining / hiding ev'ry cloud from my view. / And why do I see rainbows when you are in my arms? / I know why and so do you.*" ("I Know Why and So Do You" from "Sun Valley Serenade") – love + admiration + assurance expressed by hyperbole and emphatic 'do'.

It is worth noting that metaphors also artfully display both backgrounds to emotions and emotions themselves. There are especially many bright examples to illustrate phyto-

nymic metaphors (Panasenko 2014; Stashko 2016a) already in the titles of American folk songs, such as “Lily of the West” or “The Yellow Rose of Texas”. It is noticeable that the idea behind such metaphors is to create romantic images, where the word-identifiers (*lily*, *rose*) bear a positive meaning and evoke feelings of love and tenderness, similar to those we have when gazing at beautiful flowers.

It has also been found that a man typically appeals to a particular woman by name (though it is not so when a woman appeals to a man), if his love is very strong. This tendency is traced in all types of poetic text. Perhaps this is an indicator of respect and pure love only to this woman. A bright illustration of this is a traditional song by Francis Hopkinson, “Enraptured I Gaze”:

- (22) *Enraptured I gaze, when my Delia is by,
And drink the sweet poison of love from her eye;
I feel the soft passion pervade ev’ry part,
And pleasures unusual play round my fond heart.*
(Francis Hopkinson, “Enraptured I Gaze”)

First of all, direct descriptions of a woman’s beauty are the best to quickly accept and decode the imagery. On the other hand, a man’s inner emotions are well exhibited indirectly through onomatopoeia, i.e., sound symbolic clusters, which resemble sounds of nature. For instance, the whirling and whistling of winds (*whirl*, *howl*, *wail*) may symbolize despair in love relations or their final parting, while murmuring sounds of peaceful waters or tree leaves (*murmur*, *whisper*, *purl*) convey emotional tranquility, romance or even the beginning phase of love.

Evidently, certain feelings and emotions are not present, but they are conjured in the imagination due to rhythm, tones, pauses, sound symbolic clusters, and other intangible but essential means to convey them.

Considerable attention must also be paid to the components of love, i.e., happiness, keenness, tenderness, passion, affection, sympathy, grief, sadness, etc. In most cases, no matter what love brings – passion or liking, despair or tenderness – it is illustrated by a medley of stylistic devices. Rhythmic patterns intensify any emotive state with no clear dependence on any of them. A positive feeling of happy love often goes into the frame of negative feelings, such as regret or sadness due to a temporary separation, for instance. Thus, this fact demonstrates a unity of integral elements, which work when properly combined to convey the spirit.

Turning now to the issue of text volume, it is worth noting that the shorter the text is, the more concentrated in terms of emotional background it appears. It may contain only several stylistic devices intensified by rhythmic patterns and convey multiple meanings and variants of its perception. As far as free verse is concerned, its short volume requires the biggest concentration of devices, but the author here functions as an interpretation link. Moreover, the focus on folk songs shows an even more diverse combination of stylistic devices, enhanced by rhythm, melody, and cultural background. Therefore, the key aspect in this “volume” argument is the interdependence of devices and means in properly conveying the author’s message. When any poetic text becomes popular, it can be decoded by

the public regardless of the presence or absence of devices, which are able to facilitate this process.

Alternatively, the longer the story is, the more stages of love or any other feeling or relationship it may depict. Some American folk songs (“Frankie and Johnny”, “Wait for the Wagon”) describe a cycle of stages, while most free verse texts show the final emotion (Emily Dickinson, “I’m Wife”). Additionally, the volume does not seem to be a marker of shared feelings either. It is not always clear whether love is mutual. Supposedly if a person is inclined to love an ideal image, and not someone real, they are ashamed to admit that their love is unshared.

To sum up, it is noticeable that women are treated with love and care by men, and men are empowered by their love to women, inspired to confess it in poetry and music, as in most real-life scenarios they are either helpless or too shy to say “I love you”. Alternatively, modern types of poetic text tilt to more aggressive demonstrations of feelings and emotions from women towards men, which can be explained by democratic views and equal gender rights in modern society.

6 Conclusion

The research in question started with the definite aim of specifying how love is expressed in poetry and music, concentrating our attention on such an important part of speech/musical intonation as rhythm.

Rhythm is a specific means of expressing emotions, which can be defined in a narrow and broad sense. It is formed on the phonetic level, as speech rhythm is regarded as a roughly alternating pattern of stressed and unstressed syllables. However, various repetitions on morphological, lexical, and syntactic levels significantly add to rhythm formation and perception.

It becomes clear from the above that being a multifunctional phenomenon, speech rhythm serves as a means of emotional suggestiveness. The latter presupposes a certain emotional colouring implied via a certain rhythmic structure. Thus, either a whole verse can express a certain emotion due to its rhythm, or single lines/stanzas, organized rhythmically, can enhance those feelings expressed verbally.

A poetic text bears codes of expressed feelings and emotions, and love is one of the most powerful among them. Each literary piece is rhythmically different and similar at the same time. Love is effectively reflected in pattern type application. To put it another way, mid-line stress patterns convey development scenes, whereas final stressed syllables add clarity to the general idea. Iambic patterns with descending rhythmic flows help show stability and tranquility as they resemble heartbeats. Suspense is conveyed by the trochee rhythmic pattern, which intensifies aggressive emotional intentions of will and action. Spondee patterns sound excitedly challenging, while dactyl ones are mostly confirming, and anapest patterns are intriguing and very lyrical. Generally speaking, love messages of various implication, due to the usage of rhythm to convey images as well as the feelings and emotions created by them, can be perceived as single entities.

Gender issues may also be observed through rhythm realization. It is possible to conclude that masculine rhyme schemes dominate, supposedly because of the emotionality typical of the feeling of love and because men naturally act as the initiators. Men are inspired to action, which is better and more “safely” displayed through poems, songs, and music, where all the most important messages are easily spotted.

Gender aspect is very significant if we speak about lyrical songs. Some songs are written for women, some for men; there is even sometimes the division between different male and female voices (soprano, alt, baritone, bass, etc.). Some songs are “universal”, like “If You Go Away” by Jacques Brel performed in French and English by Frank Sinatra, Patricia Kaas, Dusty Springfield, Shirley Bassey, Neil Diamond, and many other outstanding singers. In such a case, we must keep in mind its performance when something personal is added to the expressive musical means.

Music has a great variety of expressive means: harmony, melody, rhythm, as well as texture, timbre, dynamic nuances, and many others. All these means form three groups. The first one, tonal characteristics, is the largest. Emotions and feelings in music can be manifested by the following means of expression: character of the melodic development, localization of culmination development of a melody, by different tonalities and specific intervals, by the change of the register of the piece of music, by the stretching of melodic intervals, etc. The second group includes such dynamic characteristics as loudness marked by specific symbols and dynamic nuances.

Temporal characteristics are presented by musical pauses of different duration or by their total absence, by fermata, which stops or slows down the melodic motion; by musical tempo, which has specific gradation (presto, largo, andante, etc.) and, of course, by rhythm.

Usually all these expressive means work together to create the musical texture, but even taken independently they successfully perform their main function: manifesting different emotions and feelings.

It is obvious that it is difficult or even almost impossible to mention all the linguistic and musical means manifesting love. First of all, we consider love as a complex feeling, which includes other feelings, emotions, and emotive states. This set depends mainly on the type of love: happy, unhappy, etc., and its stages: the first meeting, courting, amorousness, wedding, disillusionment, separation, etc. For each of this stage, various combinations of emotions and feelings have been found: love + sympathy + tenderness; love + joy; love + assurance; love + disillusionment + regret + new love + happiness, etc.

How can we specify these combinations? The priority is given to language, mainly, to different stylistic means. The word ‘love’ may not be found in the text but everyone understands that it is a poem/song about love. Semasiological stylistic means (epithet, metaphor, hyperbole, personification, simile, etc.) create specific atmospheres in the text.

From the examples presented above and from others that are not included in this chapter, we may claim that for each combination of emotions and feelings there is a leading expressive means. It may be a melodic contour, sequence of motions between notes of a melody, a type of melodic movement, the use of specific intervals, loudness and, in some cases, rhythm.

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74 The role and symbolic meanings of emotion in literary language

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Abstract: This chapter explains the different Chinese intellectual backgrounds, basic notions, describes some specific phenomena and categories, and refers to some literary works. Part 1 deals with basic notions, while parts 2 and 3 offer a survey of the moral and philosophical elaborations on emotions (in a broad sense, such as emotional sphere and states of mind) and their influence on literary production and criticism. Part 3 focuses on the rehabilitation of emotions and desires in literary works from the late Ming to the Qing. Part 4 presents some features concerning the description of love and anger in literary works, especially through symbolic language, typologies, description of conventional and peculiar manifestations. The last part is dedicated to the aesthetic theories concerning the arousal of emotions in relation to scenery and their poetical transmission. Language is the best witness – together with iconographic materials – of the representation of emotions, and thus of the constructed reality of a certain society, thought, beliefs and psychology. Textual analysis can contribute to an interdisciplinary re-reading of documents; the focus on the representation of emotions is useful for uncovering the affective codes embedded in the language. These codes reflect the universality of human experiences but also the specificity of each culture. Together with this analytical method, the study of the symbolic language, metaphors and myths, uncovers the relationship between the world of emotions and their expression. For instance, we can talk of a mental structure in late imperial China, which includes a variety of approaches, from the orthodox evaluation of affective sphere to the different perspectives in counterculture circles. Thus, the mental structure emerging from textual analysis, accompanied by the examination of the cognitive value of figurative language, offers elements of the perception of the self, the system of moral emotions and values, belief systems, collective imagery, memories, and symbols (Santangelo 2003, 2013: vol. 2: 1225–1283, and 2014: vol. 1: 44–105).

1 Cultural background and basic notions concerning the idea of “emotions”: A short description of Chinese terms of emotion

The word “emotion” is not a lexical universal as it is culture-bound, rooted in the modern Anglo culture; its meaning and range of uses do not match exactly with similar apparent ‘equivalents’ even in some other European languages. It is originally based on Latin *emo-vare*, from *e-* ‘out’ + *move-re* ‘move’, but its contemporary use is influenced by the experimental methodology of modern sciences. It is still used however with meanings which are near to other terms of Latin origin, such ‘passion’ (from L. *pass-*, *pati* ‘suffer’), ‘sentiment’ (from L. *sentire* ‘feel’) and ‘affection’ (from L. *affectus* ‘disposition’). Emotion indicates complex, contradictory, ambiguous and diffused experiences. It lacks an established, *intra*- or *inter*-disciplinary definition. Wallace and Carson (1973) have shown that there is considerable variation in the content and structure of the vocabularies concerning emotions even among psychiatrists. Different theories of emotions depend on the emphasis stressed on one or another of their elements, physical and neurophysiological responses, their cognition-based nature, and their construction within socio-cultural contexts (duration, complexity, basic emotions, etc.). Nevertheless, the English term “emotion”, although different from words such as ‘feeling’, ‘affect’, ‘sentiment’ and ‘passion’ (Cléro 2014: 339–341; Dixon 2012; Besnier 1990: 419–451; Irvine 1990: 126–161; Oksenberg Rorty 1982: 159–172; Rosch 1976: 659–660; “Feeling” in *Merriam-Webster’s Dictionary of Synonyms* 1984: 331; Scherer 1988: 79–100; or Osgood, May, and Miron 1975; see also *Handbook of Emotions*, Feldman Barrett, Lewis, and Haviland-Jones 2016), contributes with them to the concept of a system of experience and communication that we may call ‘emotional sphere’, even if from different perspectives (Ricci Bitti and Caterina 1993: 287–303). We can deduce a general broad concept which more or less is supposed to be present in every culture and includes not only basic emotions, but complex emotions, and other states of minds. This *experience-language system* is not only a linguistic phenomenon which concerns the semantic domain governing the patterns of discourse: it is also a representational system, whose schemata operate in response to emotional events in the form of feeling, reactions, cognitive or behavioural modalities and propositional attitudes. Such cognitions – which influence the motivation to react in a certain manner – are influenced by cultural and individual variations. This system of experience and communication refers to an *abstraction* from a sequence of a dynamic process, certain moments of the stream of consciousness (hedonic reaction, moral values, aims and projections, aesthetic attitude, regressive memory), and includes eliciting conditions, cognitive evaluation, psychological activation (de Rivera 1977), changes of action readiness (Frijda 2007), physiological activity (Ax 1953), bodily expression (Ekman 1994) and behaviour.

When we talk of emotions in a comparative approach we take into account social, cultural and linguistic differences. Worth noting is Lutz’s caveat (1986) against the unwitting importation of Western concepts and cultural assumptions into analyses of other cultures, warning that they do not share Western dichotomies such as mind/body and reason/emotion, nor the Western bias towards individual autonomy and private experience. Thus,

although there is no exact equivalent of our current English terms for emotions in traditional classical and vernacular Chinese, various Chinese characters contain similar elements, provided that the semantic content of emotion words is not identical (Wierzbicka 1996: 313–343), and categories and psychological structures are not the same (Athanasiadou and Tabakowska 1998; Marks and Ames 1995; Bamberg 1997).

Some keywords need to be explained: the notions of the ‘heavenly principle’ (*tianli* 天理), ‘cosmic psychophysical and humoural personal energy’ (*qi* 氣), ‘mind-heart’ (*xin* 心), ‘emotions-inclinations’ (*qing-zhi* 情-志), ‘desires’ (*yu* 欲), and above all the notion of ‘the various emotions and desires’ (*qiqing* 七情) and ‘reaction’ (*gan* 感). *Qi* 氣 is the dynamic substance that fills and constitutes the universe, including objects and material energy as well as the vital force in each being, spirits, etc. It can be more or less pure in the constitution of one thing or man, and it is in continuous transformation through the process of condensation and disintegration. In these cases, *qi* can be rendered with ‘cosmic energy and psychophysical personal humour’, although it is a polysemous term, whose meanings vary according to the contexts and disciplines – ranging from its medical to aesthetical uses. Moreover, it could denote temperament, attitude and ‘irascible soul’, but also the moral atmosphere, the influence of the natural and human environment upon man. In the Neo-Confucian context, it was often contrasted with ‘principle’.

Heavenly principle (*Tianli* 天理) is the ‘universal’ present in every being, which takes the name of ‘human nature’ (*xing* 性) in the case of the human beings since it is ‘hung’ (*gua* 挂) at the moment of birth. The character *li* 理 is usually translated as ‘principle’ and sometimes as ‘reason’ or ‘norm’. In the course of its long evolution, influenced also by Buddhist debate, this term became one of the linchpins of Neo-Confucian doctrine and may be understood as the universal element present in every being. It is not ‘reason’ in the sense that is used in Western thought, but rather the metaphysical personification of moral and natural order, which is embodied within the unique reality of the evolution of cosmic energy. Thus, it is arduous to liken the contrast of ‘principle’ and ‘psychophysical energy’, *li*-*qi* 理氣, to the Western categories of ‘reason’ and ‘passions’, but also it is uncertain to what extent we can compare such intellectual phenomena (Chaves 1985: 123–150). Wang Fuzhi 王夫之 (1619–1692) explains that “[g]enerally speaking, the term ‘principle’ has two meanings: one is the principle of organization of the all beings that are already formed in the universe. And one is the perfect principle of the vigorous [*yang*] and of the smooth [*yin*] and the five constant virtues that man received from heaven as human nature” (Gernet 2005: 314). Thus, the notion of ‘human nature’, the term *xing* 性, is the morality that is innate in human beings, man’s potential predisposition to achieving correct emotional reactions and behaviour.

The character *xin* 心 can be rendered with ‘mind-heart’. In the Chinese tradition, it would be difficult to find a distinction between ‘mind’ and ‘heart’, ‘reason’ and ‘feeling’, ‘body and spirit’. The mind is the principal seat of the emotions as well as of reason, although a few emotional qualities, such as courage, are located in other organs (on the Chinese “somatisation” of emotions, see Ots 1990: 21–58). As Cheng Chung-ying (2001) writes, “[m]ind is not simply an intellectual entity or a mechanism for thinking or reasoning. It is rather an inter-linked entity of sensibility, feeling, awareness, thinking and willing as testified by the common experience of reflective subjectivity of the self identified as the

‘I’ [...]” (Cheng Chung-ying 2001: 79). Cheng argues that the sensorial functions and the volitive/purposive decision-making power of the mind all belong to an internally and organically interrelated unity which can be self-reflectively testified by the individual (Cheng Chung-ying 2001: 79).

‘Sensitive and physical perceptions’ (*gan* 感) are neither separate from ‘emotions’ (*qing* 情) nor from ‘thoughts/longing’ (*si* 恂) and ‘inclinations’ or ‘determination-will’ (*zhi* 志). But *gan* may express the reactive arousal of the emotion, meant as inner motion (*dong*) or interpersonal interaction.

Zhu Xi 朱熹 (1130–1200), the main thinker of the Neo-Confucian School of principle, stated that human nature and emotions are both born in the mind, therefore the mind is capable of uniting/ruling them: “Humaneness, justice, fairness and wisdom constitute human nature. Compassion, shame, modesty and conscientiousness are basically emotions” (*Zhuzi yulei* 朱子語類 5:92–93, 96, 53:1285; *Zhuzi quanshu* 朱子全書 45). They are influenced by and influence the very essence of people and their essential energy (*jingqi* 精氣). Psycho-physical and humoural energy (*qi*) is expressed in the temperament and those experiences we can render as emotions in the broad sense (*qing*), which are nothing other than the ‘movement’ or ‘response’ of the mind to external phenomena. At the same time, nevertheless, it must be remembered that the natural order is not an abstract, objective, universal and ontologically independent scheme to be conformed to, but the appropriate arrangement of concrete activities and personal dispositions – corresponding to the unique nature of each person and each situation (Ames 1985: 38–50). The question concerning the evaluation of human emotions is one of the central arguments of the second millennium and concerns the great debate about the difference between ‘human nature’ and ‘emotions’.

In conclusion, the most common terms for emotions are *qi* 氣 (when used in the humoural sense), *zhi* 志 (in the meaning of frame of the mind, tendency) and *qing* 情 (in the meaning of emotion, desire). In the “Commentary of Zuo” – an ancient narrative history that is traditionally regarded as a commentary on the Chinese chronicle “Spring and Autumn Annals”, a classic of the 5th–4th century BC (*Chunqiu Zuozhuan* 春秋左傳) – we can find the above-mentioned terms of *qi* together with *zhi* for two aspects or phases of the same affective reactions, both as humoural impulses and arousing manifestations: “People feel love and hatred, pleasure and hunger, sorrow and happiness, produced by the six moods. Therefore carefully [rites have been established] accordingly, in order to regulate the six emotions/inclinations” (*Chunqiu Zuozhuan*, Zhao Gong, 25th year 昭公二十五年).

And *zhi* is used in the well-known sentence: “poetry expresses inclinations”, *shi yan zhi* 詩言志 (“Classic of Documents”, *Shujing* 書經). According to the Confucian classic “Memory of Rites” (*Liji* 禮記, composed between the 4th and the 2nd century BC), *qing* means any of the basic emotions which are supposedly innate: “joy, anger, sorrow, fear, love, hate and desire; the human being is capable of these seven experiences without learning”. What makes the matter more complex is that the polysemous character *qing* has a range of meanings from “authenticity-genuine” (mainly in texts before the 3rd cent.) to “feeling or affective state of mind” and “inclination or affection or desire”, but also “circumstances”, and “human interrelation”. Various opinions have been proposed by several sinologists, A. C. Graham, Chad Hansen, Michael Puett, Christoph Harbsmeier, from ancient philosophers to Neo-Confucian thinkers. In the late traditional medicine texts, seven emotions (*qiqing*) are

listed (see *The Classified Canon, Lei Jing* 類經, by Zhang Jiebin 張介賓, 1563–1640). The five organs correspond to the basic emotions: liver to anger 肝=怒, heart to joy 心=喜, spleen to longing 脾=思, kidney to fear and fright 腎=恐, lung to grief/worry 肺=憂. Studies on the symptomatology of Chinese patients demonstrate a culture-specific conceptualization of body that transcends the distinction between somatic changes and emotions and any dichotomised view of mind and body (Ots 1990: 21–58). The ancient Chinese medical treatise “The Yellow Emperor’s Inner Canon”, *Huangdi neijing* 黃帝內經 (composed between the late Zhou, 475–221 BC, and the Han dynasty, 206 BC–220 CE), shows a clear consciousness of interaction between physical and emotional spheres and emphasises the intimate connection between moral and physical pain, and the reciprocal influence of emotions and bodily sensations. According to the traditional medicine, emotions are presented as bodily processes like sensations, *qi* flow processes, which are rooted in the continuous movements and changes of the various body fluids. As Angelika Messner (2006) notices: “Emotions like joy, anger, sadness, fear and bodily sensations like hot, cold, fatigue and pain as presented in various *Huangdi neijing* passages are processes or temporary states (Befindlichkeiten) which are clearly described in bodily terms, in contrast to earlier models of explanation where they mostly appeared as ‘outer atmospheres seizing men abruptly’” (Messner 2006: 58). Chinese medical conceptions used to describe basic bodily and emotional states’ and movements’ dimensions on the basis of the *qi*-flow. In fact, ‘physical appearance’ (*xing* 形) and ‘emotions/mood/feeling’ (*zhi* 志), and ‘spirit/vital force’ (*shen* 神) are all related to changes of *qi*-flow, both emotional changes and bodily sensations, as emotions had nothing to do with individualistic private states within one single ‘place’, such as a ‘soul’ or a ‘psyche’.

Description of affections’ origin, motivations, physiological, gestural and behavioural manifestations are present in the ancient Confucian Classics, especially the “Memory of Rites”. A sentence became the basis of debates concerning moral responsibility, emotions and self-cultivation states: “The condition before the feelings of enjoying, anger, sorrow, and happiness are aroused is called *equilibrium*. When those feelings are aroused in due measure and degree it is called *harmony*” (Section “The Doctrine of the Mean” *Zhongyong* 中庸, emphasis added). This proposition distinguishes the status before and after emotional arousal, stressing the condition of quiet, equilibrium, and harmony.

Finally, in China, too, sight was recognised as the main channel by which the emotional message is transmitted and received. Particular attention was given to the language of gesture, smile, and above all of the eyes, the dialogue of looks, smiles (*qiaoxiao* 巧笑), and frowning (*pin* 翳). The feminine shoes and footbinding fetishism have been the object of studies; as Dorothy Ko (2005: 182) points out, in the feminine traditional literature emerges the pride of gentry women who celebrated their dignity, identity and distinction through these symbols.

The relationship between ethics and “psychology” in traditional China is not limited to the so-called moral emotions and self-conscious evaluative/self-attention emotions (satisfaction, pride, shame, guilt). Whenever affections are the object of reflection, they are evaluated on the basis of ethics, and belong to the moral system: arousal of emotions is considered at the origin of the manifestation of one’s good or evil. Moreover, literary production has been strongly conditioned by moral Confucian rules. The early Confucian think-

ers developed the vision of a net of social duties in a world based on a hierarchical structure and family system. A series of internalised rules of conduct aimed at establishing harmony among the various roles, from the family context (relationships between father and child, husband and wife, elder and younger siblings) to the socio-political sphere (relationships between sovereign and subject and between friends). On the whole, apart from some ontological concepts, attention was focused on specific, concrete cases within the sphere of social life. The problem of evil does not seem so all-embracing and dramatic in China as it does in the Christian-Judaic-Iranian tradition, and Chinese civilisation also differs from many Western cultures concerning manifestations of the sense of the tragic. Significant factors affecting the different conceptions of good and evil in China are the absence of the monotheistic vision, of a personal god or spirit-matter dualism. Another type of polarisation in China consists of the complementary dualism of yin and yang, in which either pole contains the principle of its opposite. From the above, it is evident that emotions play a fundamental role in aesthetics and literary criticism, together with ‘method-rule’ (*fa* 法), ‘Way’ (*dao* 道), ‘principle’ (*li* 理), ‘style’ (*ti* 體) and ‘case’ (*ge* 格) (Wang Yonghao 2008: 88–94).

2 Evolution of the representation of passions

Let us consider the term *qing* – sometimes interchangeably used with such words as *zhi* 志 – when it can be rendered with ‘passion’ or ‘feeling’. It is related to propensity, inclination towards something, or to human original character and nature, but lacks any opposing idea of “rationality” as in the prevailing definition of emotions and passions in Europe. Its basic meanings range from ‘affective state of mind’, ‘inclination or emotions or desire’ to ‘circumstances’, ‘authenticity’, and ‘human conditions’. It expresses a semantic content different from the English equivalents. To sum up, *qing* is a complex notion that accounts for “human sentiments, obligations, personal relations and social ties” (*renqing* 人情), as well as for “specific circumstances that generate special ‘sentiments’” (*qingkuang* 情況). *Qing* has a social dimension that implies its continuous reference to human relations, customs, and laws, and is different from the more intimistic perception of the subjective experience of sentiments and emotions of the West. Even if we focus on its emotive meanings, *qing* is usually understood as a reaction influenced by specific circumstances and social connections, more or less respectful of social needs and harmony. Modern psychology may be useful to understand this complex concept. Emotions are not only internal experiences but are also outwardly related to the social structure. Recent studies have dealt with “relational cohesion” to demonstrate how dependence and interdependence through frequent exchanges may generate positive emotions, and consequently “productive exchange” with relational cohesion and commitment behaviour (see for instance Lawler, Thye, and Jeong-koon Yoon [2014], “Emotions and group ties in social exchange”).

First, we should consider that the concept of *qing* transcends the concept of *erlebnis*, and tends toward a remarkable social direction, as the close relationship existing between emotions and morality lies in the conformity to internal and external, psychological and social harmony. Special attention was devoted to “good sentiments” (educated, moral, and lasting emotions) and virtues, confirmed by the Mencian theory (4th century BC) of the

‘four seeds’ or ‘four origins [of the basic virtues]’ (*siduan* 四端), where emotional responses are based on innate moral tendencies (*Mengzi* 孟子, *Gong Sun Chou*, I 公孫丑上). Among them, compassion was the first, the source of benevolence or humaneness (*ren* 仁), derived from the apprehension of others’ suffering and quest for assuaging it. Even ritualisation was often perceived as a manifestation of emotion, so that from Confucius (551–479 BC) to Li Gong (1657–1733), ritual wailing reveals a *hierarchy* of emotions which corresponds to the hierarchy of relationships (Lu Weijing 2013: 236).

But *qing* is also ‘desire’: stressing the relationship between *qing* and *yu* 欲 (‘desire’), in literary and philosophical texts, Martin Huang (1998: 153–184, 2001a: 24, and 2001b: 43) has emphasised how this dichotomy served as the basic framework for most debates on the rehabilitation of desires in traditional literature.

Originally *qing* is very close with the notion of human nature, *xing*, a kind of its manifestation (性→情) that implies a naturalistic approach based on the justification of life and social necessities. The divarication of these two notions starts in the Western Han dynasty (206 BC to 9 AD) and is evident with Dong Zhongshu 董仲舒 (ca. 179–104 BC): “Human nature originates from yang, while emotions from yin. Negative energy (yin) is vulgar while positive energy (yang) corresponds to the virtue”, and “one has both nature and emotions, like heaven has yin and yang” (Dong Zhongshu, *Chunqiu fanlu* 春秋繁露, *Shencha minghao pian* 深察名號篇; see also Wang Chong 王充, 27–97 AD, *Lun heng* 論衡, *Benxing pian* 本性篇). Matching *qing* with negative pole (情=陰氣) the contrast with human nature, the moral origin, was emphasized. The disjunction of human nature and emotions was certainly influenced by the growth of Buddhism.

The “Romantics” during the Wei and Jin dynasties (220–420) bring us back to the original meaning of *qing*, ‘genuine’, ‘essential’, and the relationship between *qing* and the concept of *xing*, ‘human nature’, undergoes a radical change. What is genuine is not in opposition to, but rather an expression of nature in the sense of “natural drive” – expression of the primary needs rather than the “moral nature” of the Confucians. Many Daoists took up the principle of ‘abandonment’ (*fang* 放) of the Confucian social norms, opting for a form of behaviour free from conventions but conforming with individual needs and inclinations, and a certain cult of *qing* (唯情, 尊情, 尚情) was developed, together with the growth of a kind of cult of self. The *Shishuo xinyu* 世說新語 (New Tales of the World, ca. 430) describes aristocrats and literati who abandoned themselves to every kind of pleasure and to drinking wine. These accounts are not in contradiction with Zhuangzi’s famous “doctrine of non-emotion” (*wuqing shuo* 無情說), as, instead of self-restraining, it enables scholars to express emotions freely, and offers direction in transcending them: writing poetry is one way the poet has to free himself from the harm due to likes or dislikes and to transform uncultured emotions until he transcends them in the highest level of self-cultivation (Lehehan 2013: 340–354).

From the Tang dynasty (618–907) and especially later, with the development of Neo-Confucian schools, all debates on human nature (*xing*), on the relationship between principle (*li*) and energy (*qi*) at the ontological level, and between moral mind-heart and specific concrete mind-heart, at the personal and ethical levels, involved the representation and evaluation of emotions. For the poet Su Dongpo 蘇東坡 (1037–1101), emotions are manifestations of the same human nature. They must be regulated but not replaced by the rites and

moral rules; they are just sources of virtue for the wise and of vice for the worthless. A man devoid of emotions would no longer be a living man (Murck's transl. 1983: 277–280).

Based on the Cosmologists' elaboration – who gave a universalistic framework to Confucian ethics, drawing upon religious Neo-Daoism and the Buddhist metaphysical tradition – the writings by the Cheng brothers, Cheng Yi 程頤 (1033–1107) and Cheng Hao 程顥 (1032–1085), and Zhu Xi led to the identification of the concept of principle (*li*), both general and specific, natural and moral rule: in every being this principle was related to and contrasted with another concept, the psychophysical energy and vital force (*qi*) of which the universe consists and whose condensation or disintegration determines the continuous becoming of reality and phenomena. The birth of man, as of every other being, depends on the combination of principle and energy. Men differ from one another according to the purity or opacity of the *qi* possessed by each individual, to which the principle (i.e., human nature in men) is attached. More generally speaking, in practice, it is the difference in the quality of energy that determines the different kinds and types of beings. Because of the imperfections of energy, the principle cannot manifest itself completely. This gives rise to differences such as those between human beings and animals and those among human beings. The wise, the common and the wicked appear as a consequence of the greater or lesser purity of energy. Neo-Confucianism inherited the two Cheng brothers' emphasis on the opposition of principles and desires: "Selfish desires of the human mind are dangerous, while heavenly principles of the moral mind are very fine: extinguishing selfish desires thus is making bright heavenly principles" (滅私欲則天理明矣). Zhu Xi warned to preserve heavenly principle and exterminate human [egoistic] desires (with the famed proposition 存天理、滅人欲), but he did not condemn all emotions and desires and expressed a moderate opinion.

The mentioned Mencian "four seeds" [of the virtues], *siduan*, taken up again by Zhu Xi, are emblematic as regards this twofold character of the mind and the emotions. *Siduan* are composed of the sentiments of 'compassion' (*ceyin* 憐隱), which corresponds to the virtue of humaneness (*ren* 仁), 'shame' (*xiuwu* 羞惡), the virtue of justice (*yi* 義), 'modesty' (*cirang* 辭讓), the virtue of righteousness (*li* 禮), and 'awareness' (*shifei* 是非), the virtue of wisdom (*zhi* 智). In other words, they are considered the origin of their respective virtues when the emotive reaction of the mind comes about in a correct, moderate fashion, and at the same time belongs to the category of the emotions. Thus, while the virtue of humaneness is the expression of human nature, the corresponding compassion is an emotion and must spring from the mind. Besides these virtuous sentiments, there are the 'seven emotions', *qiqing*, which in turn had been mentioned by the Confucian classic "Memory of Rites" (joy, anger, sorrow, fear, love, hate and desire). By this systematisation, Zhu Xi attempted to establish a relationship between the ancient concepts of the "four seeds" and the "seven emotions": the former, being the functions or manifestations of the principle, that is human nature; the latter, the functions or manifestations of cosmic energy and of personal humour as embodied by the individual. The four seeds thus are always good, manifesting themselves as natural and spontaneous, whereas the seven emotions can be good or bad, and if they are not manifested correctly and appropriately, they create "partisanship" and disorder. Thus the mind participates both in the purity of human nature and in the influence of the (seven) emotions: "love and hatred are emotions (*qing*), while the love

of goodness and hatred of evil constitute nature (*xing*)” (*Zhuzi yulei* 13:230). Hence the twofold character of the emotions and the desires, a potential source of vice and all obnubilation of the mind, but also the origin of the greatest virtues in which human nature expresses itself in extrinsic form. This topic originated a dispute – which reached its fiercest form, especially in Korean Neo-Confucian circles – over the four (*siduan*) and the seven (*qiqing* 七情) (Santangelo 1990: 234–270).

The *superiority of principle on desires* was reflected not only in the moral order but also in the status hierarchy. Another not secondary element of Zhu Xi’s doctrine was the relation of the different purity of psychophysical energy with gender roles and the hierarchy of beings in the universe. A moral and social hierarchy was legitimated, animals above plants, plants above minerals; humans, superior to any other beings, were divided in different categories, with literati at the top of the ladder, followed by peasants, merchants, etc., and women were considered anyway inferior to males.

During the Ming dynasty, a turning point started with Wang Yangming (1472–1529), who identified human nature with mind-heart and with principle. This assertion has revolutionary consequences in that the mind-heart becomes the source of ethics, and while the human and subjective origin of the principle does not impair its absolute nature, it does contribute to the devaluation of official commentaries and interpretations, and the Classics themselves. Wang Yangming went so far as to compare egoistic desires with bandits and mountain rebels, against whom he was directly involved, stating that it was more difficult to struggle against the former than the latter. But many of his followers regarded conventional precepts as “artificial” and “relative”, and considered emotions and desires like principles. For numerous members of the Taizhou School, the view of the mind-heart as the sole source of moral truth devalued every constituted moral system and conferred validity on the spontaneity dictated by the transcendental mind-heart. As Haiyan Lee (2007: 35) notices, this operation located the moral source of human actions in an immanent notion of ‘innate conscience’ (*liangzhi*) rather than in the transcendent ‘heavenly principle’. This “relocation” impelled the cult of emotions to invert the principle-emotions relations and reduce the rigorous diffidence towards emotions and desires.

Wang Yangming’s theory of “innate conscience” had profound effects also in the literary field: if any man is endowed with cognitive-moral attitudes from his birth, the assumption of the superiority of the ancients over the modern falls. This means that every period and every writer has an intrinsic value and that the expression of popular emotions is not less important than classical literature.

3 The cult of *qing*

Wang Yangming’s legacy was developed by the Taizhou School and influenced writers and artists. The Gong’an literary circle established *qing* as the kernel of self-expression. Gong’an promoted expressionistic tendencies in poetry, associated *qing* with outrageousness and infatuation (*kuang chi* 狂痴) (Wang Ayling 2001: 140–142, and 139–188), focused on the authenticity in expression, enhancement of the peculiarity of each writer and each time, the literary concept of ‘natural sensibility’, *xingling* 性靈 (Lyun 1983: 335–336; Chou Chih-

p'ing 1988: 43–48, 72; Chaves 1983: 341, 353–360, 1985: 123–150). The new trend of rehabilitation of emotions was supported in philosophical elaborations not only by the Taizhou School but also by scholars of different opinions (Chen Que, Wang Fuzhi). 'Emotive nature', *xingqing* 性情, was a concept frequently discussed by the late Ming and Qing writers, like the thinker Fang Yizhi 方以智 (1611–1671), and the poets Chen Zilong 陳子龍 (1608–1647) and Qian Qianyi 錢謙益 (1582–1664) (Yim 2009: 13–78). Even the literary critic Shen Deqian 沈德潛 (1673–1769), who in his poetic theory stressed the four essential elements of purport (宗旨), form (體裁), tone (音節) and spiritual resonance (神韻), balanced *xingqing* with respect of rules (詩貴性情, 亦須論法) but criticised the fixation of dead methods/laws: "Water flows and clouds float, the moon rises and the wind blows: where can you find a dead rule?" (水流雲住, 月到風來, 何處看得死法? Shen Deqian, *Shuoshi zuiyu*: 7). Discussions on *xingqing* were relatively common also in Buddhist writings of the same period, in reciprocal influence with Gong'an literary debates. For instance, the loyalist poet-Buddhist monk Tianran Hanshi 天然函呈 (1608–1685) dealt with the relationship between emotions, the Way, 'genuine cultivation' (*zhenxiu* 真修) and poetry. He states that poetry begins from emotions and ends in the Way (詩也者, 始乎情而終乎道者也) and that perfection in writing is subject to sublime emotions (有至情然後有至文) (Bell 2016: 180, 185–186).

According to some thinkers of the Taizhou School, like Wang Gen 王艮 (1483–1541), He Xinyin 何心隱 (1517–1579) and Li Zhi 李贊 (1527–1602), the self consists first of all of basic drives and desires for natural needs, physical as well as "selfish" inclinations, considered as the motivations of self-improvement and social aggregation. Li Zhi extends He Xinyin's discourse on desires and does not stop short at recognising the basic vital needs. He confirms the positivity of desires and goes on to praise "selfishness", i.e., self-interest, as the starting point of any social process. Associated with Li Zhi's notion of original genuine child-soul, *tongxin* 童心, was Feng Menglong's 馮夢龍 (1574–1646) concept of 'youthful fancy' (*tongchi* 童痴). Feng, too, regarded himself as an 'odd person' 畸人. The revival of the metaphorical use of 'foolishness', 'outrageousness', 'unrestrainedness' (*chi* 痴, *kuang* 狂 and *pi* 瘋, *dai* 呆, *chun* 蠢, *yu* 愚) gained a certain success in intellectual circles as new models of personality. Feng Menglong's life is truly representative of the free intellectual of the late Ming dynasty, and we can notice how this "romanticisation" corresponded to a certain atmosphere linked with the cult of *qing*. Feng Menglong's comments in his "History of Love", *Qingshi leilüe* 情史類略 (abridged as *Qingshi*), and the prefaces of his collections of tales in vernacular, celebrate *qing* (love passion) as the true morality; they are the only efficacious and sincere means of enforcing Confucian virtues. In "Mountains' Songs" (*Shan'ge* 山歌, Preface), however, he supports another kind of *qing*, clandestine love, where authenticity is the fulfilment of desires, and the reversal of values is expressed in the introduction: "borrowing from the genuine love between man and woman as an antidote for the fake medicine of moralistic rules" (*Shan'ge*, Preface). Here the search for a new language to express true and essential feelings leads to an apparent simplification of the phenomenon, an "anti-Romantic Romanticism": purposely avoiding any sublimation and sentimentalism, love is reduced to everyday need, yet a gallery of both heroic and cynical, engaged and ephemeral cases is offered.

Emblematic of the atmosphere of the period is the hedonism of Yuan Hongdao 袁宏道 (1568–1610), who seeks to identify human nature with man's striving for well-being, which

coincides with freedom of one's person. His views are expressed clearly in a letter to his maternal uncle, Gong Weichang (龔惟長), where he identifies five joys: the first consists in the pleasures of the senses and conversation, the second in the company of male and female friends, the third in reading the many books collected in his library, the fourth of travelling with no set destination on a boat together with singers and concubines, and the fifth in freedom from economic interests and living on a day-by-day basis among one's friends and neighbours. He sees this style of life as the only way to live without regrets and to die without corruption.

Tang Xianzu 湯顯祖 (1550–1616) expressed his contempt for the hypocrisy of narrow and pedantic scholars and contrasted it with the ‘sublime essence’ (*lingqi* 靈氣) of unrestrained scholars. In the drama “Peony Pavilion”, *Mudan ting*, Tang Xianzu asserted the legitimation of emotions on the basis of common sentiments and human needs. In an essay on the nature and functions of theatre, he sees emotions not only as the origin of all poetic expression but also as one and the same with human nature. He thus elevates the theatrical genre – frowned upon by Confucian ethics – to the high rank of poetry and moral writings: the value of literature derives precisely from emotions that give rise to dramatic inspiration and trepidation on the part of the spectators. The “Peony Pavilion” may in effect be interpreted as both the glorification of love which triumphs over life and death, and a reaffirmation of the supremacy of society’s values over the dreams and subconscious of individuals through Du Liniang’s 杜麗娘 struggle for *social recognition* of her relationship. The subversive power of emotions could be reconciled with social needs. Liniang combines two irreconcilable scales of values in herself, with her double personality of dreamer and person beyond the dream. Moreover, in refusing to obey her father’s order to leave her lover and go back to the condition of family daughter, Liniang defies the patriarchal system and wins. The apparent ambiguity of the “Peony Pavilion” finds its consistency in coping with the search for the “magic” of love and the need to consider social environment. Liniang is thus an incarnation – even more so than Yingying, the legendary female protagonist of “The Story of the Western Chamber” – of the superiority of amorous passion over society and over life itself. It is for this passion that Liniang dies and returns to life. Fundamentally Tang Xianzu contrasts emotions and principles in favour of the former. After celebrating the exceptional power of love passion, even stronger than death, Tang Xianzu concludes that people cannot understand the affairs of this world if they resort to principle, because principle does not work in this case, and passion is the only way to understand the complexity of the human soul. Tang Xianzu followed his master, Luo Rufang 羅汝芳 (1515–1588) of the Taizhou School, and his metaphysical concept of *qing* as a dynamic vital force in the constant generative process of the universe.

Thus, the late Ming trend was led by Feng Menglong who in “History of Love” attributed an almost mystic value to *qing*; Tang Xianzu who expanded the action of love after death by infusing it with a new transcendent as well as narcissistic spirit; while Yuan Hongdao acknowledged the identity between desires-emotions and human nature. Tang Xianzu’s dramas became a model for theatre and life. This idealisation was carried on during the Qing dynasty – even if in a more problematic and stricken way – by several writers, from Pu Songling 蒲松齡 (1640–1715) to Cao Xueqin 曹雪芹 (1715?–1763?), from Hong Sheng to Jiang Shiquan. In the “Dream of the Red Mansion” the search for an “impossible love”

follows an ideal imbued with melancholy, and based on the rejection of social conventions and lack of faith in the human condition itself; doomed to encounter difficulty and misunderstanding in social relations, this love extends its interior dimensions beyond measure thanks to the world of imagination.

With the new Qing dynasty (1644–1912), a conservative trend became more visible also in the literary field, with a process of change from an emphasis on tension between passions and principles to their mutual accommodation. In the last dynasty's literature, the idealisation of passion was developed in Hong Sheng's 洪昇 (1645–1704) drama “The Palace of Eternal Youth” (*Changsheng dian* 長生殿), where the perfection of love was likened to the virtues of the subject's loyalty and filial piety. Another theatre piece that shares the same sentimentalistic approach is “The Mansion of the Perfumed Ancestors” (*Xiangzulou* 香祖樓) by Jiang Shiquan 蔣士銓 (1725–1784), who confirms the relationship between emotions and virtue, as “the five fundamental social relations all spring from *qing*”. And yet the new sensibility of the late Ming was not interrupted, for the artistic and hedonistic “counterculture” was strong among the wealthy elite of urban residents of major centres (Furth 1990: 187–207). Chen Que 陳確 (1604–1677), like Wang Fuzhi and later Yan Yuan (1635–1704) and Dai Zhen (1723–1777), equated human desires with heavenly principle. Yan Yuan and Dai Zhen, two great thinkers of the Qing dynasty, reacted against the identification of evil with cosmic energy (*qi*) and the natural dispositions. Dai Zhen, in particular, opposed the abuse of Confucianism as a tool of ideological oppression and went so far as to overturn the traditional relationship between heavenly principles and emotions-desires. Dai Zhen worked out a concept that was analogous to Wang Fuzhi's reflection on those “common desires” with which the virtue of humaneness is identified. This equation recalls the analogous thesis by Feng Menglong and other writers of the end of the Ming dynasty: “The desire to [fully] live one's life and at the same time let others live theirs corresponds to the virtue of humaneness” (Dai Zhen, *Mengzi ziyi shuzheng* 3:67).

Even in the conventional genre of the ‘talent and beauty’ (*caizi jiaren* 才子佳人), far from the radical ideas of the Taizhou School, characters are presented with a sense of themselves as individuals, with self-assertion and self-determination. Some authors and editors elaborate an anatomy of individual characters, including heroines, by playing on passions (*qing* 情) and ability (*cai* 才) to single out the unicity of individuals: each individual has his or her own *qing*, a kind of bridge between the private-peculiar and the public-general rule, psychology and morality. According to the individual's *qing* and circumstances, the moral implications of the individual's action and choices are different. While nature (性) is common to all, talent and emotions are grounded on one's individuality and differ from person to person. Thus, talent takes on new importance as a mark of distinction. *Cai* is innate and contains both a distinctly sophisticated sensibility and part of the common nature of human beings.

The works of Yuan Mei 袁枚 (1716–1798) celebrated the all-pervading force of *qing* and identified “sensibility” with “naturalness” or “emotive nature” (*xingqing* 性情/ *qingxing* 情性). This compound – which can be traced back to the Great Preface of “The Classic of Odes”, but in its broader sense to Liu Xie 劉勰 (ca. 466–520), and started to be frequently used by poets and critics in the Yuan dynasty (1271–1368) with various meanings – is formed by the combination of two concepts often contrasted in the Neo-Confucian tradi-

tion, i.e., “human nature” and “emotion”. Yuan Mei’s poetic inspiration always refers to feminine beauty and follows his concept of human nature, which is identified with the tendency towards physical and spiritual pleasures (Zha Hongde 2009: 547–599). In the same period, Shi Zhenlin 史震林 (1692–1778) in “Random Notes from West Green”, *Xiqing sanji* 西青散記 (homophone for “Random Notes for Treasuring Passion”, 惜情散記), celebrates the romantic atmosphere of his literary circles, the peasant woman poet He Shuangqing 賀雙卿, and the passion of her admirers (Ropp 2001).

The evolution and competition of different representations of *qing* are very complex and difficult to simplify, but we can notice the progressive trend from an orthodox contrast between principles and desires (a metaphysical moral sphere and the dangerous emotional sphere) to a moderate reevaluation of emotions and desires. The rise of a cult of passions, with its various forms, the sublimation and idealisation of love through several forms of expression, the crisis of traditional gender roles, a heightening of the aesthetic pleasure in contemplating one’s own “flow of consciousness” are all symptoms of an evolution in the Chinese imaginary world during the last two dynasties, before the advent of western influence. The cult of *qing* was the expression of this new trend started in the middle of the Ming dynasty, whose effects basically remained under the new Qing dynasty, notwithstanding any attempts of restoration. In this process, various writers oscillated between the two extremes, the rigorous upholders of heavenly principles and the strong supporters of love passion and desires, and attributed a variety of meanings and values to *qing*, from a “domesticated and moralized sentiment” to the elaboration of individual spontaneous and genuine aspirations.

Generally speaking, *qing* was not extolled above all values or against society and conventions – as it was in the case of the *fin amour* of the courtly love in Europe. To reinforce its value, in China love was often identified with moral tendencies, even if a distinction was drawn between the psychological nature of *qing* and the normative character of ethical rules. Such difference reflects a divergent cultural background and approach in China and Europe.

Haiyan Lee stresses that “the cult of *qing*” does not effect an epistemic break with Neo-Confucian orthodoxy, patrilineal continuity, ritual propriety, and the social order (Haiyan Lee 2007: 38, 2001: 291–327; id. 2019: 448). It seems that in China social expectations for individual behaviour were ultimately more incisive than the sexual rules of the Christian Church in Europe, notwithstanding their menace of eternal damnation (Ropp 2006: 226; Santangelo 1991: 213–225, 260–270). On the other hand, one should be cautious in underrating the significance of new values and perspectives inherent to the cult of *qing* and its developments in the 16th, 17th and 18th centuries. They did not become a dominant vision of the individual and of love directly opposing tradition and did not aim at pointing out individual autonomy against social conventions. Nevertheless, positing the centrality of emotions, the power of love and beauty, and celebrating the universality of feelings and desires opened the way to alternative anthropological visions.

The cultural, political, ideological and religious context of the growth and development of the cult of *qing* is different from the context from which the Renaissance and later European Romanticism were born and developed. The Chinese did not share the fear for the body and carnal sin of Christianity, but still, they were attentive to inner and outer balance,

hygienic and social rules. Sexual freedom was not a carnal sin but rather a threat to social morality and customs (McMahon 1988 and 1984). We may restrict the analogies to love's "identity with nature, emphasis on the originality and spontaneity, a plea for creative sensibility, and the concept of the urgency and overflow of feeling" (Hung Ming-shui 1974: 2), but we are well aware that the semantic contents of the notions "nature", "spontaneity", "creative sensibility", and "overflow of feeling" do not correspond in the two cultures (Chaves 1985: 123–150). Moreover, the role of religion, the relationship between morality and aesthetics, the hierarchy of values do not match in the two cultures, and thus these conditions influenced the way of perception and evaluation of emotions. In this sense, we can recognize the birth of a real cult of *qing*, but on the basis of ideological and cognitive elements different from those behind the movements developed in Europe.

Various methods have been used in recent studies on literary materials, and among those worthy of mention is the intertextual approach that seems very fruitful for understanding the construction of human reality as a product of texts and discourses through the transposition of various sign systems (for instance, Tan Tian Yuan [2014] on "Peony Pavilion", and I-Hsien Wu [2017] on the "Dream of the Red Mansion").

3.1 Myth and supernatural in emotions

In Chinese dramas and novels, the cult of *qing* conveyed myths and hopes concerning the supernatural. The notions of destiny, heaven and predestination elevate love to a religious dimension and let it transcend life, death and human limitations. The writer Qu You 瞿佑 (1341–1427) extols deep love as an eternal passion ('a predetermined pact', *yinyuan zhi qi* 因緣之契) that transcends reincarnation. Not only does reunion after death makes love's power stand out above and beyond the brief course of human life in collective imagery, but it provides the lovers with the idea of the special role of their relationship, as well as with a justification capable of undermining the severity of social norms. *Qing* is described as a mysterious power that exceeds the boundaries of life and death. The perpetuation of true love is celebrated in various myths that go beyond marital and morally accepted love. The aesthetical and cultural characters of love have been remarked upon by Feng Menglong, who perceives the transmission of the emotional codes through the arts that celebrate the treasure of human sentiments. Unlike instinct in animals, which changes according to seasons, in man – says Feng Menglong – the sentiments are immortalised in poetry and music, which serve to pass on the intensity of a moment from generation to generation (Feng Menglong, *Qingshi* 24:815). Moreover, the difficulties that obstruct the union of lovers trigger that alchemical process that mythicises their relationship, like the case of the "mutual love tree". These trees appear in many stories, and miraculously grow on the tombs of the two lovers who in life had been separated, and unite them by intertwining their branches and roots. This legend is extended from the legitimate conjugal love to any other passionate relationships, including homoerotic love.

This mythical *aura* is rendered also with the "flavour of love", where scent hits the supernatural sphere, and plays the role of sublimation of desire. Fragrance may be sent out by a goddess or other supernatural power, and in the mentioned drama "Peony Pavil-

ion” the sanctification of love-passion lets the beloved Liniang take the place of a saint, and thus she dies and then resurrects with her whole integral and fragrant body. The aroma is a sign of the miraculous body that does not decompose but keeps and manifests heavenly properties, ‘heavenly fragrance’ (*tianxiang* 天香). Similarly, several female immortals in “Strange Stories from the Studio of Liao” (*Liaozhai zhiyi*) have a rare fragrance which derives from their supernatural condition. This sacralisation of desire is concretely experienced by senses, and can also be found in the famous novel “Dream of the Red Mansion”, *Honglou meng* (19:302), where Daiyu’s subtle scent which emanated from her sleeve, her extraordinary and delicate fragrance (異香, 幽香), inebriates Baoyu’s soul, melting the marrow of his bones.

Neither should we neglect ritualisation and liturgy, which became more and more important with the so-called “revival of rites” in the Qing dynasty, and may accompany the manifestation of devoted love. In Chinese civilisation rituals are more than just formal ceremonies or external gestures: acts such as the veneration of a tablet or portrait usually convey a precise emotional involvement. Through theatrical or religious rituals, certain states of mind are evoked, such as the sense that love is eternal or the sense of the ephemerality of youth and beauty (Zeitlin 1993: 127–179; Dorothy Ko 1994: 71, 83).

3.2 The worth of emotions

To sum up the process of rehabilitation of desires and emotions, we can single out the following innovative themes that legitimate them on the basis of morality itself, of cosmological and natural order, but even challenge the traditional relation principle-emotion:

1. *Moral justification of emotion-desire*: *qing* is identified with virtue (humaneness), and promotes it (情 = 仁). *Qing* is considered a source of morality. In the first Preface to the “History of Love”, *Qingshi*, Feng Menglong states that the secret love affair can become universal sentiment, common to everybody and of ‘general interest’ (*siqing huagong* 私情化公). Then, in support of emotions, he stresses the link between them and Confucian virtues: “the son has affection toward his father, the subject toward his ruler, and we can go on from this perspective for any human relation [...]. The “doctrine of love” or “sentimental education” (*qingjiao* 情教) is the way people are spontaneously induced to be virtuous, without any pressure of duty. Feng Menglong observes in the preface to one of his collections, “Ancient and Modern Tales” (*Gujin xiaoshuo* 古今小說), that an audience moved by the words of a storyteller feels every type of emotion, from joy to sorrow, from surprise to courage, more intensely than through a reading of the Confucian Classics: “Though recited every day, the ‘Classic of Filial Piety’ and the ‘Analects’ cannot touch the readers with the same vivacity and profundity as these stories do. Alas! How could they if the common man is not moved?”. The evidence of the new arguments is in the difference between *qing* (emotion) and *ren* (virtue of humaneness): the basis of empathy-emotion is not on rules and Confucian classics, but on the relationship between two persons who feel a reciprocal affection.
2. *Nobility of genuine and naturally moral emotions* (真情). “Genuine love” is the innate and moral link which unites all beings: “Concerning the origin of loyalty, filial piety,

chastity and heroism, acting from morality is necessarily forced while from emotions is genuine and sincere" (*Qingshi* 1:30) and "the basic unity of heaven and man consists of sharing human nature and emotions" (Luo Rufang, *Jinxi zi ji* 近溪子集, *juan yu* 卷御, 124, cit. by Zhang Meijuan/Chang Mei Chuan 2010: 57). The "genuine emotion" corresponded above all to the new ideals of more equal and free relations, and a new language to express the rediscovered essential feelings of human beings. Nevertheless, the reevaluation of emotions and desires is usually promoted under the banner of a more sincere morality. Generally speaking, even those thinkers who are critical against the orthodox priority of principles over desires, argue the true morality of *qing*, 'appropriate' (*qiadaohaochu* 恰到好處) for their benefit to society and individuals.

3. *Vitalistic justification of affections*. The "genuine emotions" might be declined not only in moral direction: emotions convey life (情 = 生). Thus, desires are the roots of life and reproduction in the universe. For Luo Rufang, the concept of *qing* 情 (passion) is inseparable from *sheng* 生 (life, creation and generation). The awareness of the importance of "talking of *qing*" (*jiangqing* 講情) can be traced back to the drama "Peony Pavilion", and the debate surrounding it: this theatrical masterpiece reflects the atmosphere of the Taizhou School, particularly Luo Rufang's and Le Jun's concept, and combines the vitalistic idea of *sheng* (life and creation) with the idea of *qing* (emotion and love passion) (C. T. Hsia 1970: 249–290; Xu Fuming 1987: 42–43, 69; Li Wai-ye 1993: 55, 60–62). Moreover, in the name of the genuine emotions, Feng Menglong, in his collection of "popular" songs, endorses a minimalistic and sexual concept of love. This trend goes on in the Qing period both in the field of ideas and in literary works. For instance, Yuan Mei is convinced that desire is not the dangerous enemy as it is depicted by orthodox Neo-Confucians, but on the contrary, it lies at the foundation of human actions and life: "Love for goods and sexual pleasures is the desire of human beings [...] Without feelings and desires, the human race would have become extinct long ago" (Schmidt 2003: 59–60).
4. *Reversal of values*: a challenge to the social hierarchy and the priority of principle on emotions. Thus the sincerity of *qing* could make a courtesan a paragon of virtue, far better than a wife who simply follows principles and rites.

4 Two emotional cases: Love and anger

For reasons of space we can only examine a few aspects of the representation of "love" and "anger". First, we notice that in Chinese traditional lists of emotions, anger – and not sorrow – is always opposing joy. In the "Record of Music", *Yueji* 樂記, the former is associated with violence and the latter with harmony, and this is very meaningful.

4.1 Love

Literature is the best witness of the negotiation between conformity to conventional rules (chastity for women, wives and widows; strict separation of the sexes; a sense of decency

concerning one's own emotions and feelings, and a good dose of apprehension concerning desires in general; self-control and social relations) and transgression for better freedom (greater sexual freedom, love marriage) even at the cost of *loss of balance and inner peace and loss of social prestige*. Concerning the influence of literary "models" on the elaboration of desires, and their "mediator" function (Girard 1962), young and elder readers were well aware of the messages hidden in novels and poems. This is evident for instance in the conversation between Baoyu and Daiyu told in the novel "Dream of the Red Mansion", after reading "The Story of the Western Chamber" (*Xixiangji* 西廂記), or in Liniang's reaction after the reading of a poem from the "Classic of Odes", in the drama "Peony Pavilion" (*Mudan ting*).

Love passion is encyclopedically described by the collection of short stories already mentioned, "The History of Love", which represents the deepest reflection ever made in traditional China on the phenomenon of love. It covers a wide meaning ranging from love in its various acceptances to sensitivity and emotional life, and embraces pure hedonism, heroic ideal sentiments and various cultural expressions as developed in Chinese culture. This collection is certainly the widest-ranging attempt to trace back the origins of this composite emotion to the reproductive instinct and at the same time to reframe its taming in a renewed morality. Love's multifaceted dynamism is compared with the ephemeral wind, but also its eternity is claimed: "the earth grows old, the heavens collapse and yet love is not extinguished" (*Qingshi* 10:297). We can sum up its basic characters as follows:

1. *Qing* is taken as the measure of all things because love is the basic rule which is common to all beings (23:793);
2. it has a transcendent dimension, common to all humans, spirits, gods and all other beings, even inanimate things (10:308);
3. emphasis is laid on *qing*'s dual creative and destructive potential. Thanks to it the myriads of things and beings in the universe continuously reproduce (Preface), but it can be the cause of great misfortune. In his comments to chapters 6 and 7, the editor warns the reader to be careful of the dangers which may come from love-passions: "death and disasters", as "outside, other people may be damaged, while inside, oneself may be injured"; lives may be destroyed, and even kingdoms may be overthrown.
4. love and desires can and must be domesticated, but cannot be eradicated. Any attempt to eliminate love is wrong; that would be like saying that plants do not need to have sprouted (15:467).
5. distinction is made between love-passion and pure sexual desire (7:187). In 17:537 the writer warns those who are very lustful of the danger of extraordinary calamities.
6. the ideal concept of "genuine" love is identified, which is likened to a thread joining up all things in the universe. It brings the moral requisites of Confucian humaneness into line with those of Buddhist compassion (19:631);
7. *qing* is, therefore, the basis of moral behaviour, the spirit that infuses vitality (*shengyi* 生意) into the teachings of the Classics themselves (Santangelo 2019, 60–61, 116–119, 439–440).

Dream is a powerful metaphor for passions, as it can ambiguously express the illusory nature of joy for success or suffering for frustration, and of subconscious hopes and expec-

tations, not to mention the other meanings that tradition assigns to it. The dream can be an emotion elicitor, like “pleasant dreams” and “scaring dreams”, and it is often connected with strong worries and tensions which torment the mind. Passions, as well as dreams, are – according to Buddhist and Daoist tradition – the projection of illusions and desires inside the mind. It is not by chance that the “History of Love” contains a delightful description of the dream, which underlines its unreal nature, its belonging to the unconscious, its personal and private nature, its close relations with heavenly souls (*hun 魂*), and its connections with the kindling of passions. Moreover, dreams provide the possibility to describe such emotions without censure and allow writers to present fantasies which would not be possible or allowed in everyday reality. In dreams, memories and presages of the subconscious, the deepest emotions and the most secret desires and repulsions emerge. Thus, the dream is meant either as a metaphor of a certain freedom from social bonds, as experience transcendent of moral rules or as allegory of the illusory and flying nature of passions. The “Story of the Western Chamber” of the Yuan Period (1271–1368) ends with the dream of the student Zhang that hints of the vanity of passions, while in the “Peony Pavilion” dream forges the mind, incubates emotions and dominates the behaviour of the characters. The love passion between Liniang and Mengmei, the main characters of the “Peony Pavilion”, is a supreme value, which exceeds even life and death: death too is like a dream, and dream is like death. It is the place where sexual attraction and emotions can achieve a free outlet without social inhibition: it becomes a fleeting liberation in a dimension outside time; liberation for the young woman who in this way escapes the rigid regulations of social life. The “Dream of the Red Mansion” is a clear example of the use of dreams as metaphors for the vanity, obscuration and enlightenment caused by passions, especially uncovering some arcane mystery of love entanglements. Experts have stressed the dialectics between reality and illusion which stands at the basis of this novel (Plaks 1977: 188–192). This novel offers also the most representative and controversial picture of love, which leads the reader from the delicate and suffuse flow of consciousness of the Garden of the Wide Vision to a more severe puritan conception of life in which love is equated with lust and is severely condemned.

The shift reality-dream-reality of love is central in Pu Songling’s thematics, and his multifaceted approach is symbolic and to some extent unorthodox. His “Strange Stories from the Studio of Liao” reflects the contradiction between emotional freedom and repression. Pu Songling 蒲松齡 (1640–1715) shows, on the one hand, an ideal, utopian world where human desires are fulfilled by breaking the current rules of morality, and on the other a world of demon-spirits which embody the fears and guilt feelings of the collective mentality. A special role is occupied by the love affairs with fox-spirits: in the long tradition of love between a man and an immortal being, *seduction* by a female deity assumes an ambiguous nature, between the fulfilment of *desire* and awareness of its *illusory* nature. In this way, Pu Songling contributes to the enrichment of the idea of love. The fulfilment of an intense obsession and desire seems to be proportionate to the faith of the protagonist in the miracle worked by passions, reminiscent of the hallucinatory psychosis of desire described by Freud, in which the phantoms of desire escape all bonds of reality and penetrate the conscious mind. The affective attitude is instrumental in the transformation of external reality (Wai-yee Li 1993: 100–151): the transition from the contemplation of the

object of desire to the love fulfilment, and from enchantment to the end of an illusion is as brief as the imperceptible change in the mind. Pu Songling, in a subtle game of counterpoints, constantly leads the reader from the enjoyment of desire and seduction in the imagination to the imperatives of the real world; however, it is not clear to what extent life consists of the game of illusions or the sudden loss of the object of one's desire. Many love stories reach the acme of happiness and then, for one reason or another, have their end. Pu Songling is a master in describing the transition from the magic of love to the end of the dream.

Feng Menglong, in the tale “He Daqing” (*He Daqing yihen yuanyangtao* 赫大卿遺恨鴛鴦條), published in the collection “Constant Words to Awaken the World” (*Xingshi hengyan* 醒世恒言), mentions the adage “woman's smile capable of destroying a kingdom” to introduce various types of love that differ in moral evaluation, some of them close to the notion of “lust”: from ‘indulgence in feminine beauty’, *haose* 好色, to ‘licentiousness’, *haoyin* 好淫, from ‘legitimate conjugal love’, *zhengse* 正色, to ‘collateral love’, *bangse* 傍色, from ‘dishonest love’, *xiese* 邪色 to ‘disordered love’, *luanse* 亂色. The first two categories are ‘indulgence in feminine beauty’, which induces man to neglect his personal and social duties, and ‘licentiousness’, which is the indiscriminate and spasmodic quest for pleasure, without limit or discernment. ‘Collateral love’ signifies amorous links beyond the strict conjugal relationship but still within the family structure, that is to say with concubines or servants: though this is deemed to be inadvisable, such relationships are nevertheless permitted, while the remaining two other kinds, dishonest and disordered loves, are illicit and dangerous. Nevertheless, the element of judgement, the discriminant between lustful and licit love, does not per se lie on sex, but on excess, unhealthy immoderation or inappropriateness. Illicitness and lust are mainly related to the violation of social norms and health prescriptions that aim at safeguarding personal health and ensuring a continuation of the family line. The warning of saving vital energy – a trace of the Daoist hygienic discipline – was intended both to “tame” passion for the benefit of personal and social harmony, and to strengthen control over sexual functions. In Chinese culture a dichotomisation of spiritual and physical love is not as important as in Western culture; a metaphysics of love, which can be found in rare works like “The Dream of the Red Mansion” or in some “talent and beauty” plays, is certainly different from that which, from Plato onwards, has been developed in Europe.

Another important element is the role of gender, manifested for example in the different freedom of social relations, and the evaluation of jealousy (Yenna Wu 1995). Gender role influences personal identity and emotionality: women are allowed a more explicit manifestation of emotions in comparison with their male counterparts, and female characters usually show a stronger determination to pursue their passions (Guo Yingde 1987: 71–80).

To sum up, the sentiment of love in the literary polyphonic interpretation was gradually enriched over the centuries, with the creation of myths and heroes, the heroism of Sima Xiangru and Zhuo Wenjun, the immortal attachment between Han Ping and his bride, the courage and determination of the two heroines Yingying and Liniang, the delicate and tormented relationship between Baoyu and Daiyu. Even the self-destructive passions of Ximen in *Jin Ping Mei* add a facet to the multicoloured kaleidoscope of late imperial imag-

ery of love. (On the transformation of literary characters into “real” personages, like Lin-ang, see Widmer 1989: 44–45.)

Separation and abandonment may be the object of allegorisation, the projection of the author’s dissatisfaction in career or social conditions. The theme of the abandoned concubine or wife had often been used, initially in poetry but later also in narrative, as a literary device to allow the writer to vent his feelings. By means of this rhetorical convention (‘self-allegorisation’, *jituo* 寄托, and ‘projection’, *zikuang* 自况), the scholar instead used to describe his own frustrations, express his mood directly through the reference to another character (Schneider 1980).

The opposite of love could be *wuqing*, ‘indifference’, ‘absence of passions’, ‘being untouched by love’, often with Buddhist connotations. From the psychological point of view, the emotions of hate and resentment (*hen* 恨, *yuan* 怨), and anger (*nu* 怒) are located at the opposite of love, like ‘frivolousness’ and ‘irresponsibility’ (*qingbo* 輕薄) in contrast with ‘genuine love’, *zhengqing* 真情. Morally speaking, ‘legitimate conjugal union’ (*zhengse* 正色) could be contrasted with a deceitful or wrong feeling-relationship, and, to different degrees, with egoistic desires (*siyu* 私欲), excess (*duo* 多), abnormality (*xie* 邪) or lust (*yin* 淫), unsuitable for gender or social condition.

4.2 Anger

The constructive use of wrath through the licit channels of remonstrance, revenge, political effects and the link with Confucian virtues has been studied (Bailey 2014: 23–44). Indignation is one of the most recurrent emotions, and vengeance and retaliation are very common and are often a basic element of the plot; they are often represented as ways for retribution, both for the individual who suffered a personal or a familial injustice and for the wronged ghost of victims who had faced a violent death.

Various levels of reactions are described as a manifestation of anger-like emotions. Besides the most common physiological manifestations, conventional and peculiar expressions are kept in idiomatic phrases; they take into account the change of facial colour and expression, or the fierceness and threatening mood as expressed in the shape of eyes, mouth and gestures, and describe different physical and psychological reactions, gestures and expressive acts. The face is the first part of the body which expresses this emotion: a change in the colour or look of the face is one of the most frequent phenomena described, followed by “pulling a long face”. Protruded, wide, flashing eyes play a major role, as they characterise the gaze and interplay with the eyebrows. The reaction can differ depending on the gender of the subject. Grinding teeth and gnashing – which can be combined with the expression of the eyes, or hair standing on end – are conventional descriptions for anger-like tension. The position of the mouth, e.g., protruding lips, is another typical expression of an angry mood. Gesticulating with hands or legs is another classic reaction, as disdainfully shaking one’s sleeves or clothes and stamping one’s feet in anger.

Symbolic expressions referred to anger-rage feelings can be grouped into three main images:

- a. Fire and other natural dangerous elements (for instance ‘exploding with extreme anger’ *hongnu* 轟怒; ‘as angry as a thunderbolt’ (雷嗔電怒); ‘roaring like thunder’ (吼如雷)).

Huoqi 火氣 (fire pneuma/humour) in traditional medicine is ‘internal heat’ (as the cause of disease, like mouth ulcer), but may indicate also ‘anger; temper’, ‘fierce air; fierce anger’. ‘Flare-up’, *maohuo* 冒火, is one of many combinations with “fire”.

- b. Uncontrolled power (loss of self-control): overwhelmed by wrath, *nuqi chongtian* 怒氣沖天 (or *chongxiao* 沖霄), towering to the clouds, i.e., it cannot be controlled in any way.
- c. An energy in the body (energy moving inside the body’s organs or harboured in one’s bosom, *cang nu su yuan* 藏怒宿怨). It is said to fill the breast: ‘to be filled with rage and be swollen with indignation’, *nuqitianying* 怒氣填膺, ‘one’s chest is filled with anger’, *numanxiongtang* 怒滿胸膛. Somatisation is very frequent in the representation of all emotions; thus, various inner organs are mentioned for rage, such as the heart, stomach, especially gallbladder and liver. Rage brings a reversal of, and in the long run, a disorder in vital energy. The stomach is the yang organ of the spleen – which is responsible for the harmonic distribution of *qi* within the body. Thus, in case of disorder, the stomach will suffer due to an excess of *qi*, then it will start to hurt. The violence of its manifestation is represented as energy moving in the body or fire and heat. Natural and powerful elements like fire and wind are chosen to represent the disaster which happens inside the individual. Moreover, the loss of self-control expresses the overwhelming power of the passion. If we compare the main figures of metaphors singled out in English by Zoltán Kövecses (2003: 20–22, 142–171), we find that many characters in Chinese literature are similar to the characters found in other cultures, but the ways they are interpreted and elaborated are sometimes peculiar.

5 “Emotion and scene”: Intuition and enlightenment

Psychologists have singled out the so-called “aesthetic emotion”, which differs from mere attraction since it does not necessarily imply that one wishes to possess the object eliciting the feeling, but it has a kind of balancing, relief and self-realisation effects. In Chinese two terms that may express aesthetic emotions are *yue* 悅 and *qu* 趣, ‘delight’ (Valette-Hémery 1982: 100–106, 213–215; Chaves 1983: 341–364; Watt 1987: 1–13; Clunas 1991: 88–89). Any of the sense organs may be affected by this ecstatic feeling, above all sight and hearing: “to find more satisfaction than in a splendid landscape like this, a great pleasure to the hearing and the sight (悅耳娛目), is difficult to find!” (*Jinghua yuan* 20:91). A source of great inner joy, this emotion is generally produced by the contemplation of nature or by artistic enjoyment: “by his house ran a clear stream with rare and magnificent flowers. As he loved that landscape dearly, at sunset he strolled up and down” (*Ershilu* 4103); indeed, “When the mind concentrates on inanimate objects (*wuqing zhi wu* 無情之物) such as mountains and rivers in a landscape, and the spirit is transferred on them, their shapes are impressed upon it” (*Qingshi* 11:312). And again, using the term *wanshang* 玩賞 for ‘enjoying’, “they immediately took two rooms in the Penglai Pavilion where they prepared to enjoy the sea show with its fantastic mirages of underwater cities and palaces filled with dragons” (*Lao Can youji* 1:3).

In the most famous Chinese novel, “Dream of the Red Mansion”, the expression of “true/genuine emotions” is associated with “true scenery”, and a passage explicitly states: “He wrote four poems on the four seasons, which, although they could not be considered exceptional, express true sentiments and true scenery” 他曾有幾首四時即事詩，雖不算好，卻是真情真景 (*Honglou meng* 23:353). Coupling emotions and scenery is not just a literary expression, because the representation of the emotional world is closely connected with the description of nature and objects. The discussion concerns also music and fine arts (for instance, Egan 1997: 5–66; Park 2011: 5–54), but we limit this introduction to literature. In Western literary criticism, Bill Brown (2003: 17) has reconsidered the “sense of things” in American culture, the role material things serve in Western culture, as the mechanism that creates a special relation overcoming the ontological division between material objects and human subjects, a “subjectification of objects that in turn results in a kind of objectification of subjects” (Brown 2003: 17). In Chinese civilisation, the perspective is rather different, and the link scene-emotions can be explained by the strong consciousness that mood influences external perception, just as the latter modifies the former (*Jingshengqing qingshengjing* 景生情, 情生景): “for some – writes Li Ruzhen 李汝珍 (c. 1763–1830), on the basis of consolidated Chinese artistic theories – the sight of scenery is a source of emotions, or it is their feeling that let perceive the surroundings: nothing may be forced because there is nothing that is not created by one’s state of mind” (*Jinghua yuan* 44:210, cited in Santangelo 2003: 450–451). In general, on emotions-scenery relations, cf. Wang Wensheng 2001). This concept is also the common way for expressing the fuzzy relation between the excess in passion and detachment (情多·情盡), their emptiness and involvement (空色) both in Tang Xianzu’s dramas and in *Honglou meng* (Zheng Peikai 1995: 328–345). Probably it is not only the aesthetic reflection that deals with emotional experience, but a conventional reluctance to directly express feelings by borrowing a descriptive language of external phenomena.

The interplay of emotions and scenery is eminent in poetry. The questions on the role of emotions and their expression was originally the preserve of poetry and music. This trend began with “The Classic of Odes” (*Shijing* 詩經) and continued in the course of Chinese history through various poetical forms, despite the moral-civil function imposed upon them by Confucianism (Siu-kit Wong [trans.] 1984: 21–40; Siu-kit Wong 1983: 2, 167; James Liu 1975: 66–72, 118, 126–129). Many arguments stemmed from the interpretation of a statement of the Great Preface to “The Classic of Odes”, “poetry starts from emotions but stops where rites and moral principles forbid”. In this respect, one should take into account the role played by such themes as separation or transience, which were to be taken up by narrative prose itself. The poetic spirit derives precisely from the conflict between dream and reality or from the tension between “public” and “private”. From Lu Ji 陸機 (261–303) and Liu Xie, the natural scenery was considered as one of the stimulating ways to express poetic feelings, and thus a great debate followed on consonance between internal experience and visual reality (*qing-jing* 情景), mainly resting upon how the affective world is expressed. As solidarity of subject and object, inner experience and scene was implied, the philosophical foundation should be traced back to the concept of the inter-resonance of the myriad things that concerns the correlations among humans and between humans and nature. This “emotional interaction with things” is expressed by the term *ganwu* 感物, which explains the origin and nature of emotional and aesthetic experience, and artistic

production. Zhong Rong 鍾嶸 (ca. 468–518), in the introduction to his “Gradations of Poets” (*Shipin*), derives this syntony from the unity of *qi*: “Cosmic energy influences objects and these objects affect human beings. Then, having their emotive nature moved and stirred, humans manifest it in dance and songs” 氣之動物，物之感人，故搖盪性情，形諸舞詠。Consequently, concerning the creative impulse (*xing* 興) or the interaction of emotional and visual experience, the poet’s intuition and the essence of things, these theories focus on the aesthetical identification of the poet’s mind-heart with the principle of cosmos, the intuitive union of the writer and the underlying principles of external things, according to the paradoxical formula “union of self and object” (物我合一) for its boundless selflessness and boundless expansion of the ego. Moreover, natural changes in the four seasons are parallel to life changes. Thus the scene-emotion dialectics was often accompanied by the notion of “natural attitude/naturalness/emotive nature” (*xingqing*). Moreover, there is a recurrent *topos* referring to those particular events or objects that can evoke a previously experienced situation of feeling, or a person met a long time before. The “Poetry on Objects” (*yongwu shi* 詠物詩) is one of the best expressions of the Chinese literary tradition, where the object is a symbol of the poet, his emotions, aspirations, or personal experiences. One can think of the romanticised red leaves, especially the “poem written on the red leaf” (*hongye ti shi* 紅葉題詩), bearing emotions both as sad Autumn “fallen leaves” with their sense of impermanence, and as a means by which to convey a love message and poetic exchange. Other objects with strong emotive meanings are mirrors and fans.

The great debate revolved around the role of emotions, on the one hand, and the sight of external objects and natural beauty, on the other. The answers oscillated from the process of artistic inspiration and creation to self-cultivation for reaching wisdom; they often implied also the more general question of human understanding of reality. We may sum up that the poetic ingredient was often in inverse proportion to moralistic or metaphysical concerns, in the contest between those who emphasized the individual and expressive elements, and those who rather focused on social and ethical functions. But in fact, answers were more complex and could combine both elements, as there are different ways to understand the proposition that “*wen* is a manifestation of *Dao*” (Black 1989: 249–254). Consequences can be seen in the debates on “genuine emotions”, on the interpretation of the *Shijing*, and in any attempts to bridge the gap between poetry and ethics. Furthermore, how far were external sights merely a pretext for the expression of a preexisting state of mind or the catalyst of poetic writing or a way to properly and ingeniously express unutterable inside feelings? Was the inner reaction to external phenomena innate morality or aesthetic emotion?

The traditional formula of ‘feeling and scene mutually blended’, *qing jing jiaorong* 情景交融, exemplifies the creative process of the poet and summarises the scenic descriptions that become the poetic embodiment of a state of mind through the counterpoint of outer reality and inner subjectivity: the latter produces the former and vice versa (Wong Siu-kit 1978: 121–150; Christina Yao 1982: 94–99; Chaves 1985: 123–150). If the state of mind is already existent in the writer, he expresses it through the description of a scene or an object, “relying on an object to talk of one’s emotions and aspirations” *tuowu yanzhi* 托物言志, or the technique of “unbosoming one’s affections by means of simile and imagery in external things” *tuowu yuhuai* 托物寓懷, or again “borrowing a scene to express one’s

emotions” *jiejing shuqing* 借景抒情. For the reader of the poem, it is the direct emotion transmitted by the lines, which “stir” and “affect” him, by a kind of an affective syntony or a moral warning. The above sentences are significative of the style of writers in representing emotions, their indirect way of resorting to allusions, metaphors and allegories as techniques of expression. Again, “harbouring an emotion in front of a certain phenomenon”, *yuqing yujing* 寓情于景, is the intense feeling aroused in the poet at the sight of a scene or image.

Besides the *ganwu* notion, emblematic is the multiple-sensed *xingqing*, 性情, *qingxing* 情性, which mainly concerns artistic creation through the aesthetic experience. Such theories evolved along Chinese history. *Ganwu* is traced back to ancient texts and theories: the “Record of Music”, transmitted as a chapter of the Confucian Classic “Memory of Rites”; the belief of “Interaction of Heaven and Man”; the traditional doctrine of “Yin-Yang Five Elements”; and the theory of tranquillity and equilibrium in relation of external influences are its ideological foundations. The human mind is originally quiet, and when it encounters and perceives an object, it is stimulated to resonate with it by emotions. Thanks to the contributions made by Lu Ji, Liu Xie, Zhong Rong, emotions were seen to play a fundamental role in the creative process of the writer. Liu Xie resorted to the combined two characters for emotion, *qing*, and human nature, *xing*, (*xingqing* or *qingxing*) – originally used in philosophical contexts in the pre-Qin period. In fact, “Expressing restrained feelings by poems” (*Yinyong xingqing* 吟咏性情) was first used in the Great Preface to “The Classic of Odes” (*Maoshi Xu* 毛詩序, different opinions on the date of composition), though with limitations of rites and social duties. This new concept can be rendered as “personal nature”, “naturalness” or “emotive nature”, and refers to one’s emotions, person’s character, disposition, personality, or the reader’s mental state and literary refinement (Jullien 1985: 165, 173; Zha Hongde 2009: 154–155). It depends on talent (*cai*), vital energy/mood (*qi*), learning (*xue*) and practice (*xi*), and operates at the crucial moment of the writer’s response to external phenomena: “Man is endowed with seven emotions, which are moved in response to objects. It is only natural to be moved by objects and sing one’s heart’s intent” (James Liu 1975: 74–76).

Further developments occurred during the middle and late Tang Dynasty, when many writers turned to explore the relationship between emotions and setting. At the beginning of Neo-Confucianism, the method of observing objects and the “reversal of perception”, *fanguan* 反觀, elaborated by Shao Yong 邵雍 (1012–1077), stress the obstacle of subjectivity interposed between observer and object: only becoming things, embodying them, *tiwu* 體物, the eyes of the observer are identified with the eyes of the world, and there is no distinction between subject and object, as things look at themselves (Arrault 2002: 393–403). With the growth of the School of Principle, in the Song dynasty (960–1279), moral didacticism prevailed: by “cultivating one’s *qingxing*” Cheng Yi signified the painstaking effort to “clarify one’s heart and show one’s (moral) nature” (明心見性). Zhu Xi uses this binomial as philosophical terms in Neo-Confucian metaphysics, and recommends a plain style “overflowing of true flavours” (真味發溢), far from any sentimentalism and artificiality. As far as reading is concerned, its aim must be to understand the mind of ancient sages, and textual investigation is a means to apprehend the highest truths and achieve the Way. According to Song Neo-Confucian scholars, *wen*, an aesthetic quality of poetry, is taken to

be synonymous with the moralistic concept of duty (*yi*) and the metaphysical concept of *dao*. Thus, literature was in function of the Way, *wen yi zaidao* 文以载道 (On-cho Ng 2019: 74).

However, some literati, like Yan Yu 嚴羽 (1180–1235) used *xingqing* in opposition to “natural principles”, “moral teaching”, “learning”, and “skillfulness”, and stressed the poet’s *xingqu* 興趣 (aesthetic interest or flair). The Jin dynasty writer Wang Ruoxu 王若虛 (1174–1243) extolled *xingqing* as the authentic sadness and joy (哀樂之真發乎性情) (Zha Hongde 2009: 562, 566–567; Vallette-Hémery 1982: 86). *Xingqing*, started to be more frequently used by poets and critics in the Yuan dynasty (1271–1368) with various literary meanings: “To express one’s natural inclinations by composing, singing or reciting poems” (*Yinyong xingqing* 吟咏性情) indicated songs or poems associated with emotions. Many literati in the Yuan dynasty advocated an individualistic poetry, admired the spontaneous flow of “natural mood” *xingqing*, “natural interests” *tianqu* 天趣, which was attributed to Tang but not Song poetry. For instance, according to Liu Jiangsun 劉將孫 (1257–?), scenery can help the flow of the spontaneous intuition, compared with the Buddhist *Chan* enlightenment, as poetry is the echo of the inner heart stirred by external experience:

Standing atop a high mountain and getting a panoramic view of the far distance will put him into a dreamy state of being, where the history of a hundred generations before him and a thousand years after him seems to be flashing past his very eyes, and then poetry comes to his lips. That would be the ultimate *chan* of a poet. (Zha Hongde 2009: 576)

Some of these writers – like Zhao Wen 趙文 and Yang Weizhen 楊維楨 (1296–1370) – seem to anticipate the Gong’an theories and Li Zhi’s doctrine of child-like heart in favour of the individuality and emotional nature of the artist. If the poet loses his personal character, his poems cease to count as anything poetic. In contrast, when a person neither cares much about career nor money, he will remain a person of moral integrity and spiritual independence (Zha Hongde 2009: 547–585). Wu Cheng’s 吳澄 (1249–1333) “truthfulness of *qingxing*” (*qingxing zhi zhen* 情性之真), and Yu Ji’s 廭集 (1272–1348) “correctness of *xingqing*” (*qingxing zhi zheng* 情性之正) upheld the Way (*dao* 道) at the expense of art (*yi* 藝), and stated the priority of the “Way of Heaven and the Ethical Norms of Humankind” (*tianli minyi* 天理民彝).

While *ganwu* in the early Ming period was maintained under the influence of the School of Principle (*lixue*), in the middle of the Ming dynasty the ‘emotional interaction with things’ was intended against the School of Principle for a return to the ancients (復古) and a voluntaristic approach to reality. Concurrently, the rise of the School of Mind in the late Ming opened the way to a holistic vision (Zhang Dejian 2013: 154–158; Qiu Deliang 2009: 94–95). Jin Shengtan 金聖歎 (1610?–1661) argued that though Tang poems only appear to “project the likenesses of mountains, flowers, trees, sand, grass, bugs and fish, I am reading the innermost hearts (*xintou yandi* 心頭眼底) of the people” (Sieber 2001: 51). According to Jin Shengtan as well as Li Zhi, authentic literature originated from feelings independent of external provocation. This “innermost heart” is the Buddha-nature (*xindi* 心地) for Jin Shengtan, while for Li Zhi it is the “child-like heart” *tongxin* 童心. In his prefaces and essays on “Water Margin”, *Shuihu zhuan* 水滸傳, and the “The Story of the Western Wing”, *Xixiang ji* 西廂記, Li Zhi integrated his original idea, claiming that writers needed to

set their eyes upon a sight and feel stirred in order to be able to unburden themselves and express their deep emotions. The revival of *xingqing* as passionate nature was also advocated by the mentioned Gong'an School, especially by Yuan Hongdao's concept of individual sensibility, *xingling* 性靈: creative natural sensibility is activated by the environment, but only words filled with authentic passions can be moving. In quoting a famous passage from the *Lunyu* (Yong Ye 雍也, 23) -- “[t]he wise find pleasure in waters; the virtuous find pleasure in hills” ('hills-waters' means landscape) -- Yuan Hongdao asserts the true 'genuine addiction' (*zhenshi* 真嗜) and 'authentic nature' (*zhenxing* 真性) showcased by these literati when interacting with things and nature. This passage served as the basis for previous aesthetic theories, but Yuan has given it a different interpretation for he stresses that it is “necessary [to nurture] within one's self the vastness of the mind-heart” (唯於胸中之浩浩) to fully appreciate the beauty of nature and throw one's self deep into the vastness of its oceans and mountains. Yuan Hongdao's individualistic stance lets him appreciate the “excess of original character and independence of expression” (*duo bense duzaoyu* 多本色獨造語), eccentricism and non-conformism (Valette-Hémery 1982: 75–198). These concepts are also reflected in Li Zhi's theories, his polemics against the hypocrisy of Neo-Confucian moralists: to find the true expression of inner temperament, *xingqing*, is not only a literary program, but a philosophy of life and human relations. In his note on prosody (*Du Lüfushuo* 讀律膚說, *Fenshu*, 3:133), Li Zhi argues that spontaneity exclusively emanates from inner temperament (*xingqing*): it is not sufficient to intend to be spontaneous in order to be spontaneous. On the contrary, is not to search for spontaneity the same as forcing and pretending? The way of spontaneity is not a simple word. Lulian Jushi 魯連居士 (1573–1620) was influenced by Li Zhi. In his preface to another author's composition, he praises the authentic feelings of women, love, hate and sexual desires, as they are natural, innocent and free from social conventions (*bense tianzhen* 本色天真) (Richard Wang 1994: 22). This trend was later kept up by Yuan Mei, who celebrated the all-pervading force of *qing* and identified “sensibility” (*xingling*) with ‘genuine passions’ (真情), life taste (生趣), individualist aesthetic character: “[while dealing in the society I cannot isolate myself], when I write poems I cannot not be myself”.

In the Qing Dynasty, further contributions come from other writers, like Wang Fuzhi. He warns that emotions and scene are only names useful for discussion but not to be mistaken as reality and that the state of mind should not distort image; through a psychological analysis, he describes the harmonic interaction of emotions, intentions-meanings (*yi*) and imagery-scene, so that “there is imagery in the emotion and emotion in the imagery”: only by expressing emotions in the spirit of describing a scenery does one succeed in transmitting inner experiences (Wong Siu-kit 1978: 123–150; Black 1989: 254–288). Moreover, the subject-object perspective is one of the keys to understanding the poetics of the novel “The Dream of the Red Mansion”, why “inanimate objects could be even more involved than humans in the entanglement with desire” (Anthony Yu 1988: 16). Again, until modern times, Zhu Guangqian's contribution – nourished by Chinese traditional and modern literary criticism as well as by Croce's thought – comes back to the feeling-scene discussion, stressing the empathy that allows the fusion between subject and object, realized in the reciprocal interaction of feeling, *qingqu* 情趣, and image, *yixiang* 意象, expressed through a simile, *biyu* 比喻 (Sabattini 2005: 1010).

There is an obvious difference between the introspective and reflective character of poetry and that of narrative discourse, whose parameters of communication involve the descriptions and narrations presented as objectivisations and externalisations, mostly set within the co-ordinates of time and space. While poems usually reflect a dominant state of mind, fictions present the passage from one sentiment to another, their evolution. The expressions “seeing something brings back the memory of a feeling”, *chujing shengqing* 觸景生情, and “recalling somebody by seeing an image” *dijing siren* 睹景思人 are analogous in the idea of blending feelings and objects. The poet may spontaneously feel an emotion that can be expressed in a poem at the sight of an image; however these sentences can have different implications: they do not necessarily deal with language and communication (of emotions), but rather may concern the psychological process inspired by the perception of an image in the rumination’s effects. A particular case is “reflection upon ancient sites”, *huaiwu* 懷古, which combines the *ubi sunt* motif with landscape description – a former capital or the ruins of historical monuments that become a “subjective site”, a “site of memory” (Frankel 1973: 345–366; Owen 1986; Zeitlin 2007: 88–106).

An example concerning personal experiences may be found at the beginning of chapter 113 of the “The Dream of the Red Mansion”, where Fengjie feels remorse for her previous bad behaviour and is assailed by spectres. A poem is quoted in Feng Menglong’s anthology “Tales Old and New” that warns not to do anything that gives one a guilty conscience (為人莫作虧心事). The expression used, *kuixin* 虧心, literally ‘to damage one’s mind’, implies remorse: “You are exhorted to do nothing of which you may feel ashamed. From ancient times to the present, who could escape his responsibility?” (*Gujin xiaoshuo* 36:198). Often inauspicious premonitions follow on from a feeling of guilt and are associated with retribution. The seventh tale in “Adversaries in love” (*Huanxi yuanjia* 7:123–133), “The deceitfulness of Chen Zhimei”, tells the story of the adultery of Lady You with the merchant Chen Cai, who marries her after having secretly killed her husband; after eighteen years of passionate domestic life, Chen feels compelled to confess the crime to his wife. In the most dramatic episode in the story, Lady You, after making love with Chen on the bank of a pond, frightens two mandarin ducks in heat by beating on the water with a stick. This apparently irrelevant reaction leads Chen to recite a few verses on the misfortune supposedly caused by disturbing ducks in love. The woman is surprised to hear the merchant reciting the poem, and tries to persuade him to recite another one by hitting a frog in the pool. But the sight of the dead animal floating on the water reminds Chen of the corpse of You’s husband, which he had thrown into the river eighteen years before. At first, he is unwilling to recite the verses that come to his mind, but in order not to upset You, at her insistence, he writes them on a sheet of paper which will then become the item of proof she will produce in court against him.

Nostalgia is a component of a more complex feeling like love, in which the functions of imagination and memory are exerted when a certain object comes into view: “At that sight, Sanqiao’er was seized with sadness and thought of her distant husband” (*Gujin xiaoshuo* 1:31); or again: “at the sight of the bodice he began to weep” 顧之輒淚 (*Qingshi* 16:476). A classical example of “association” (聯想) of an object with a loved person is the case of the woman who cries in the middle of a marsh for having lost her cheap hairpin, which had however been the gift of the deceased husband. The whole meaning of the story re-

volves around the answer of the woman to Confucius' disciple: "I am not upset about losing the hairpin, but I do *not want to forget the story [behind it]!*" 非傷亡簪也. 蓋不忘故也. Here remembrance, nostalgia, mourning and ritual duty are all combined in a complex emotional externalisation (Harbsmeier 1999: 353). In *Lian Xiang* 蓮香 by Pu Songling, the object associated with the memory of the loved one becomes a metaphor, as it is a female shoe – a clearly fetishist item of apparel in the Chinese culture of the time: it is sufficient to stroke it with desire ("concentrating one's thought on" 傾想) to miraculously evoke the presence of the loved one. We could say that these passages are typical in Chinese literature, owing to the recurrent *topos* referring to particular events or objects capable of evoking a situation or feeling experienced in the past, or a person met a long time before.

6 References

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XV Emotion, media, and public discourse

Elke Wagner and Martin Stempfhuber

75 Media, entertainment, and emotion

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Abstract: The article addresses the question of the importance of emotions and affects for society and in sociological descriptions of the social from the perspective of media sociology. Over the past decades, sociologists have shifted from a skeptical assessment of the role of emotions in modernity to a reappraisal of the role of affects in contemporary society. We trace this shift by reconstructing the connection of emotion and language in the Grand Theories of Jürgen Habermas and Niklas Luhmann and by contrasting them with the recent interest of sociologists in the notion of affect. The focus is on the evolution of formats of mass media entertainment and new possibilities of mediated public communication to account for this shift.

1 Introduction

Recent years have seen the emergence of a reinforced interest in sociological theoretical projects and sociological research to come to terms with the relation of the discipline of sociology and the topic of emotions, feelings, and particularly “affects” in modern and contemporary society (Reckwitz 2020; Koppetsch 2019). So why emotions? And why affects? Why now? Some time ago, Simon Williams (2001: 7–12) was suggesting some guidelines that helped to connect post-1970s societal developments with the then new-found sociological interest in emotions: the notion of rationality and therefore affective neutrality as the fundamental ordering principle of modern society coming under attack in late modern society; the (re-)emergence of the human body as a topic of interest inside sociological discourse and in mainstream media discourses; finally, the “growth of consumer culture and the commoditized and commercialized forms of emotional experience and expression” (Williams 2001: 11). As media sociologists, we supplement these reasons with a fourth one that might also help to explain the ongoing turn from emotion to affect: the changing nature of the media landscape and the public sphere in which traditional mass media like newspapers and television are supplemented by new formats of social media like Facebook, Twitter, and other digital platforms. As preferential examples we therefore concentrate on sociological texts that tackle the role played by emotions and affects in mediated

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forms of public or semi-public communication – the seemingly private and intimate settings of love and desire affected by entertainment media like e.g. new television formats and the seemingly public settings of public discourse affected by changes in the everyday use of diverse forms of media.

Attempts at a reassessment of the *history* of the relationship of the sociological discipline to the topic of emotions and feelings have been somewhat contradictory. On the one hand, there is a lot of evidence that the “problem” of the emotional and affective side of modernity has haunted sociology since its institutional establishment and the roots of a sociology of emotions can be traced back to its founding “fathers” such as Émile Durkheim, Max Weber (Gerhards 1988), and more recently rediscovered figures such as Gabriel Tarde; at least from the 1970s onward, emotion has been tackled head-on by a number of influential sociologists (Hochschild 1983; Denzin 1984; Collins 1981; Barbalet 1998). On the other hand, there is as much evidence that sociology and emotions always seemed to be an “odd couple”, because the major tendencies in the discipline assigned the complex of feeling, emotions, and affects to a necessarily minor place in modernity, therefore missing its central role for contemporary society and its adequate theorization. What recent commentators agree upon, however, is the urgent need for a more thorough sociological concentration on emotional and affective dimensions of the *contemporary* social world – an agreement that produced, in recent years, a rich literature on the topic (Williams 2001). It is interesting to note that there is a newfound willingness to accept the diagnosis of a “society of affects”. One example would be the influential contribution of the French economist Frédéric Lordon titled *La Société des Affects* (Lordon 2013). Meanwhile, the German sociologist Andreas Reckwitz, in what is one of the most discussed and visible books in sociological theory in recent years, *The society of singularities* (Reckwitz 2020), has no problem of calling the society of late modernity a society of affects.

From Reckwitz’s point of view, contemporary society is a society of affects that can be contrasted with “classical modernity” since now “its components operate in an affective manner, and its subjects long to be affected and to affect others in order to be considered attractive and authentic themselves” (Reckwitz 2020: 9). In this respect, society is a society of affects. At the same time, however, Reckwitz points to the allure the *concept* of affect has for contemporary sociology on the level of a disciplinary and theoretical dynamic: in overemphasizing the cultural, the symbolic, the discursive, the linguistic dimensions of the social world, sociology has lost its ability to come to terms with the *material* dimension of it all. The *turn to affect*, in this reading, offers sociologists an analytical tool to recognize the “structural properties of the social that are material and cultural *at the same time*” (Reckwitz 2015: 29; our translation; emphasis in the original). We might note that there is an interesting tension between these accounts of the importance of affects: one is a realistic and diagnostic account of the growth of affective phenomena in the contemporary social world, the other an epistemological account of the possibilities of categories of affects to solve an impasse in sociological theory and research.

We might also note that there is a tension between the categories of emotion and affect in these accounts. There certainly is, in sociological discourse, no consensus on a clear-cut definition that separates the two terms. Clare Hemming (2005), however, points to a possible working definition: “Affect broadly refers to states of being, rather than to their mani-

festation or interpretation as emotions" (Hemming 2005: 551). In the next section, we concentrate on the (re-)appearance of emotions in by now classical sociological theories that came to full prominence after the linguistic turn: in Jürgen Habermas and Niklas Luhmann emotions conceptualized as *discursive phenomena* emerge as a topic in sociological theory that establish communication and "meaning" as the fundamental categories of sociology. We argue that the role of emotion, here, is informed by the specific concepts of language these theorists employ. In Section 3 we address more recent sociological (and Cultural) studies that turn to emotion and *affect* as more basic categories and gesture towards a more fundamental role played by affective dynamics in late modern societies. The last section reflects on some consequences of this shift in emphasis.

2 From resource to topic: Two “classical” sociological concepts of emotion

Commentators on the very possibility of a sociological sub-discipline that uses concepts of emotion or affect as their fundamental theoretical or conceptual tools have repeatedly pointed to the history of sociological thinking to explain that it is no mere accident that “classical” sociology has assigned emotions a minor role in modern societies (Gerhards 1988). A first reason certainly seems to be the establishment of the very discipline of sociology that had to delineate and defend *the social* as its proper object of study in a double border dispute: against the psychological, on the one hand, and the biological or physiological on the other (Opitz 2014: 270). Psychological emotions and bodily affects, therefore, seem to appear only at the borders of the social. Reckwitz (2015) speaks of a sociological blind spot and adds two further reasons; pointing mainly to the paradigm associated with Talcott Parsons, there is the insistence that *social order* is based on the internalization of a *normative order* and, therefore, basically cognitive structures or principles, once again banishing emotions or affects by associating them with a pre-social place that is centered in individuals or their bodies. What is more, the very definition of modernity that classical sociology has to offer is connected to a vector that points in the direction of formal rationality and, in Parson's terms, affect-neutrality. We might add a fourth reason that is essentially *epistemological*: insofar as classical sociology accepts its task of answering the question of how social order is possible, the notions of unruliness, messiness, and ambiguity often associated with emotions and affects don't seem to make them an attractive starting point for its analytical project.

Framed this way, it seems an obvious imperative for contemporary sociological projects to correct the disregard of emotions and affects by attacking and critiquing the implicit dualisms that seem to produce this disregard, whether it is the disciplinary boundary between sociology proper and other disciplines, the difference between social order and individual or bodily unruliness, between a “rational” modernity and an affective pre-modernity, or clear-cut distinctions of phenomena of discernable social regularities and dispersed instances of affective ambiguity (see Section 3 below). For the rest of this section, however, we point to the *advantages* that the alleged problem of the exclusion of emotions and

affects in major strands of sociological theorizing can have for addressing these topics. The short version of our argument is that emotions emerge as a *topic* for sociological inquiry rather than as a *resource* for explaining social phenomena. A sociological treatment of emotions that resists being a social-psychological account of emotions offers the chance of seeing emotions as a product of social interactions and interaction chains (Hochschild 1983; Ahmed 2004; Seyfert 2012) or communicative processes (our examples below). We have chosen two examples that position themselves decidedly after the *linguistic turn*: Habermas' (1984, 1987) theory of communicative action and Luhmann's (1995a) systems theory of society. Both posit the basic units of the social as communication. As such, these sociologies offer an account of emotions that sees them as a discursive, symbolic, and signifying phenomenon while opening up a space for the affective that is at once outside of communicative processes as it is an effect of it.

2.1 Habermas and the idea of discourse

The idea of discourse, which Habermas has in mind, is one that is strongly connected to the concept of rationalization that Max Weber established (Habermas 1981). While Weber argued for a science of journalism, he never realized that demand in his own writings. Instead, he followed his program of rationalization which put into center-stage reasonable persons like the politician against the rise of irrational publics in the beginning of the 20th century (Weber 2015). Habermas' aim was then to conceptualize a program of critique which can disclose its own standards. He reconstructed discursive practice as a tool to achieve rational standards for critique. For Habermas, public discourse is a phenomenon of authentic but disinterested, that is rational, if not emotion-free then at least well-tempered approaches. It is language conceived as communicative action that helps to free society from irrationality and non-argumentative speech – for Habermas, communicative action is a medium of rationality.

From this point of view, mass media are the wrong media, because there is no recoupling; mass media interrupts the interactive structure, the back-and-forth of communicative action and is only interested in consumption but not rationalization. For Habermas' approach to work, recoupling is necessary: the give-and-take of better arguments is a form of disciplining of the emotional actor. Spoken or written language is here a kind of *percolator*; only by discourse can there emerge a rationalized result. This program of course was also a turning point within Critical Theory in Germany. That is, Habermas conceptualized his program of (rational) discourse against the perspective of Adorno, who could only see dazzlement and alienation within the modern world. Habermas' program of rational discourse means a kind of rationalization of rationalization. It's a hyperrationalization program in the sense of reflection. Communicative action is a counter-concept of the cold rationality which Adorno (and Max Weber) saw emerge within the modern societies.

In this sketch of his view of emotions we don't want to issue charges against Habermas in the vein of Chantal Mouffe (1999) that his sociology of discursive action simply dismisses the topic of emotions as a whole. Quite on the contrary, Habermas' turn within Critical Theory tries to undermine the clear-cut distinction between mere instrumental reason and

lived feelings: “Feelings seem to have a similar function for the moral justification of action as sense perceptions have for the theoretical justification of facts” (Habermas 1990: 50). It seems to be clear, however, that emotions are interesting or relevant only pertaining to communicative action, discourse, and rational deliberation. Emotions, that is, can be analyzed as a resource or as a source of interference for processes of rational communication. At the same time, emotions are always informed by communication. Given this complex, dual role of emotions in the process of linguistic interaction, it is no wonder that Habermas’ focus is on the sphere of public discourse and not on the role of entertainment, which can only emerge as a lopsided field manipulating authentic attitudes, feelings, and emotions.

2.2 Luhmann on love, fear, and mass media

Niklas Luhmann is often positioned as Habermas’ main antagonist in late 20th-century sociology. Similarities emerge, however, if the systematic place of emotions comes into view. At first sight, emotions also do not play a significant role in Luhmann’s system theory (Baecker 2004: 9). In his magnum opus, *Social Systems* (Luhmann 1995a), he even seems to assign the theory of emotions a role that is beyond the field of responsibility of the sociologist. Emotions may play an important role in the reproduction of consciousness where they pop up in case the psychic processes are threatened by some sort of intellectual stagnation. Emotions seem to be “privatized” to a degree that places them outside the social altogether – a case for the psychologist rather than the sociologist.

It seems surprising, then, that Luhmann is often consulted for inspiration for a contemporary sociology of affects and emotions (Baecker 2004; Stäheli 2007; Opitz 2014). The reason for this lies in Luhmann’s emphasis that it might not be emotions as such, but the *communication of emotion* that should be a major field for sociological inquiry. Luhmann is perfectly clear that “private” emotions as such cannot be a direct resource or source of interference for social processes. Only as a “public” communicative event can emotions become visible and influential in social processes. Luhmann himself produced two major studies that tackle the communication of emotion head-on – one focuses on “love” (Luhmann 1986), the other one on “fear” (Luhmann 1989); both are situated at the interface between public discourse and entertainment.

Most influential for a sociology of emotion was – maybe paradoxically – Luhmann’s proposition to treat love *not* “as a feeling (or at least only secondarily so), but rather in terms of its constituting a symbolic code which shows how to communicate effectively in situations where this would otherwise appear improbable” (Luhmann 1986: 8) The focus clearly is on a sociological-historical study of the semantics of love (as a passion) and on the specific communicative practices that are made possible by the use of a specific language for loving. Note that the communication of love does not (merely) refer to a thematic communication *about* love. Luhmann stresses the idea that love as a psychic or bodily emotion does not as such explain any social, i.e. communicative practices. This would get the phenomenon exactly backwards: “Taking a chance on love and the correspondingly complicated, demanding reorientation of everyday life is only possible if one has cultural traditions, literary texts, convincingly evocative linguistic patterns and situational imag-

es – in short, if one can fall back on a timeworn structure of semantics” (Luhmann 1986: 39). What recent followers (Baecker 2004; Stäheli 2013) of this approach have stressed is the fact that this does not imply that emotions or affects are to be denigrated. On the contrary, emotions become all the more interesting as an *effect* of communicative processes: even if “love as a medium is not itself a feeling”, it can be studied as a “code of communication, according to the rules of which one can express, form and simulate feelings, deny them, impute them to others, and be prepared to face up to all the consequences which enacting such a communication may bring with it” (Luhmann 1986: 20). While even some sympathetic commentators have criticized that systems theory never delivered on the promise of combining his explorations of the communication of emotions with a theory of “psychic” emotions (Hahn 2010), this change in perspective allowed for a number of exciting studies of emotions, affects, and atmospheres by some of his followers and critics (Neckel 1999; Stäheli 2013; Opitz 2014).

Less prominent is Luhmann’s contribution to the sociology of fear. We mention this only to stress how recent contributions detect here an interesting way of connecting systems theory not only to a sociology of emotion but to a sociology of affect (Opitz 2014; Reckwitz 2015). Not surprisingly, Luhmann is not directly concerned with “fear”, but with the communication of fear (Luhmann 1989). A direct causal connection of communication, psychic feelings, and events in the environment continues to be ruled out. As Sven Opitz has noted, there is, however, a specific form of what Luhmann calls “resonance” (Luhmann 1989: 15) that accounts for a different “logic” of the communication of fear. Most notably, the communication of fear tends to be a border-phenomenon of communication as it is situated on the threshold of language, at its very border to incommunicability – it’s hard to rationally and meaningfully communicate fear and that seems to be the reason why it has its own tumultuous logic. The communication of fear seems to “resonate” in a specific way that has its own sensitivity to environmental noises, its own dynamics and connectivity.

From the perspective of media sociology it is interesting where Luhmann observes these versions of the communication of emotions. Both mentioned cases are situated in communicative practices that emerge in the context of mass media, i.e. technically mediated forms of communications that make the possibilities for direct talking back improbable. Both are situated at the interface between public discourse and “entertainment” – love is learned through novels and (later) movies and becomes an obsession of public discourse on adequate forms of intimacy; fear resonates in public discourse and affects and is affected by popular formats of entertainment. In his systematic account of *The Reality of the Mass Media*, Luhmann (1995b) himself worked with a clear-cut distinction of the fields of *news and in-depth reporting, advertising, and entertainment*. This distinction, of course, will come under heavy critique from the authors of our next section.

To recapitulate the complicated account of emotions we are left with after Habermas and Luhmann: Both authors position themselves decidedly against the option of transforming sociology into social psychology to come to terms with emotions. They argue against the position of what Urs Stäheli (2007) calls an “unreconstructed materialism” regarding emotions. Even when Habermas stresses the possible contradiction of emotions, affects, and feelings on the one hand and rational discourse on the other, he has a keen eye for the social construction of emotions. Luhmann radicalizes this “constructivist” perspective

insofar as his main interest is the communication of emotions and not or only secondarily emotions or affects as a psychic effect of communicative processes. From a sociological point of view, the advantages of such a focus are clear: they avoid the temptation to treat emotion as a pre-social category that is positioned on a psychic plane and can act as a resource of social order or a source of irritation. Thus, the danger of essentializing or psychologizing emotions can be sidestepped. Emotions emerge here as a discursive phenomenon and can be treated as a topic for a purely sociological analysis. If we're accepting Hemming's working definition, we could stress that both Habermas and Luhmann are not so much interested in affects as a state of being, but strictly speaking only in their discursively interpreted form as emotions – in their manifestations in communication and language. Emotions emerge as a sociological topic among others that can be treated with the standard sociological tools of discourse analysis or the systems-theoretical analysis of the autopoiesis of communicative events.

From our sketch of Habermas' position concerning emotions, it seems easy to conclude that this sociological adjustment of emotions clearly has a cognitivist bias. More recently, however, Luhmann also has come under attack for the same reason, even by sympathetic observers. The reason is not so much, as with Habermas, that there might be a political overestimation of the capabilities of reason to structure inter-subjective communication if only there is no interference of power or affects. One argument is the charge that the focus on the communicative dimension cannot come to grips with the *particular dynamics* (*Eigendynamik*) of social processes that are triggered by affects as opposed to other forms of social interplay. Even Luhmann understands communication only in terms of a meaningful connectivity that overemphasizes the cognitive: "such a view can only address affects in the form of nameable emotions that have to be attributed to Ego or Alter. Invisible for the theory remains the affective structuration of [...] communication – that runs counter to the cognitive notion of anticipation inherent to systems theory" (Stäheli 2007: 515; our translation). Even more telling is the second argument that addresses the theoretical shift that sociology's focus on communication might have to accept if it wants to come to terms with the specific dynamics of affective structuration. Even given the specific point of view of the discipline of sociology that establishes an object of study that cannot be reduced to either the "physiological" or the "psychic", these dynamics might point to a dimension that undermines a clear-cut distinction of the (communicative) social from other dimensions. To put it succinctly, in Opitz's words, emotional and affective dynamics point to an "overlay of registers: an overlay of rational-meaningful and sensual-bodily processes in a collective excitement. [...] How do we have to correlate the meaningful and the sensual?" (Opitz 2014: 270; our translation).

3 Media, entertainment, and public “discourse”

Habermas and Luhmann have given us two influential models of how to address the "challenge" of emotions and affects in a specific sociological way. Emotions can be addressed as discursive phenomena that avoid the substantializing and psychologizing ways of accounting for affects as a pre-social dimension. But we have also pointed at the discomfort

that accompanies such perspectives on emotions and affects: can they be enclosed in the frame of the social that only consists in communicative action? Reckwitz has already pointed to the surprising resistance of the topic of emotions and affects when it comes to their reduction to a purely social, communicative, or discursive plane. His ideas point to the reemergence of emotions or affects at certain “turning points” of sociological theory: they come into play in a *spatial* turn in order to account for the material role of e.g. “atmospheres” in structuring the logic of interaction; in a *bodily* turn in order to account for the material role of human bodies in undermining the cognitive telos of communication; in a turn to artifacts in order to account for the material role of things and objects in contributing to the structuring of the processes we call “the social”; and in the cultural turn in order to account for the material role of routines and traditions in shaping sociality, which all too often is only constructed as a rational matter. In this section, we want to hint at the possibilities of this last cultural turn to shake up the sociological study of emotions and affects. Cultural Studies offer an interesting contribution; while this project shares some of the premises of Habermas and Luhmann – most obviously a focus on the realm of the discursive that rehabilitates a “struggle over meaning” – it also suggests an affective dimension that is irreducible to the mundane logic of communication. We want to argue that this is connected to a specific focus: media, for Cultural Studies, includes entertainment and traces a development from mass media to new forms of electronic and digital media.

Cultural Studies turned the program of Habermas’ notion of media and discourse somewhat around. Suddenly, electronic media were no longer the enemy, but the motor of emancipation. By analyzing the media practices within popular culture (the great enemy of Habermas), authors like Stuart Hall (1980) and John Fiske (1989) found in the somewhat *irrational* readings of the encodings of media institutions not alienations but potentials for emancipation. The unpredictable decodings of public broadcasting – reading as joyous pleasure and play – no longer lead to a problematic irrationality but to political self-discovery and progressive forms of self-identification. It is interesting that a central concern of this tradition of Cultural Studies is to challenge any received notions of mass media that work with clear-cut distinctions between public discourse and mere entertainment. Neither Habermas’ attempts to strengthen the barriers between rational discourse and the threats of power relations and diverting sentiment, nor Luhmann’s heuristic tripartition of media in news, entertainment, and advertisement, are seen to do justice to the contemporary landscape of electronic media. Cultural Studies, instead, focus on a shifting and heterogeneous field of media *ideology*. The mere term suggests a theoretical and political skepticism concerning the purely rational quality of the public sphere – the search for a subversion of this ideology firmly focuses on the creative (mis-)readings by emotionally and affectively situated consumers of mass media.

Some commentators have criticized this politicization of media, entertainment, and emotion as ill-conceived and of little benefit for a sober sociological analysis of popular phenomena. Urs Stäheli (2000), for example, has detected the tendency of Cultural Studies to overemphasize the subversive potential of the pleasures and joys of misreading; in criticizing the perspective of Critical Theory – mass media ideology is always successful in manipulating and entrapping its public – Cultural Studies seem to make the inverse mistake of overrating the subversive public – mass media ideology is always bound to fail.

Stäheli, therefore, suggests getting rid of the notion of ideology and instead recommends to talk of the “global popular”. For the purpose of the sociological study of emotions and affects, however, it seems important to see how this alleged politicization of the problem also yields helpful results. John Fiske, for example, provides useful distinctions in dealing with the role of emotions and affects in the context of mass media. On the one hand, pleasure and play can always be co-opted or instrumentalized for business as usual. Studies like Arlie Hochschild’s (1983) on the “commercialization of human feeling” are seminal here. On the other hand, Fiske’s notion of *Jouissance* points to a domain where affects and emotions can be analyzed as a *surplus*, an excess of pleasure and joy that resists the disciplinary logic of mass media and allows for an account of affect that is neither pre-social nor merely an instrument in controlling contemporary media consumers.

Elaborating this research program of Cultural Studies, Eva Illouz (1999) has made an interesting contribution to the sociological study of public feelings in her analysis of talk shows and rationality; she can show that talk shows on television “accomplish something that is foreign to liberal politics: they put on the agenda for discussion the *wounds and pain of ordinary private actors*” (Illouz 1999: 128; emphasis in the original). In that way, they offer “powerful metaphors to discuss the content of everyday life and reconcile the contradictions that saturate liberal politics” (Illouz 1999: 129). In that sense, television formats like talk shows can unfold a certain kind of progressive logic and offer their protagonists as well as their viewers powerful tools – they work emotionally and are not reducible to the affectively well-tempered public discourse which a deliberative theory of publicity (Habermas) has in mind. Cultural Studies, thus, are able to show that, within the media paradigm of television, entertainment and emancipation can go together.

We have referred to Illouz’s (1999) study to accentuate the point that, in the sociological study of public emotions, the formats of talk shows of reality TV often mark the transition point to new media – media, that is, that in contrast to mass media allow for a higher degree of user participation. Consumers turn into prosumers; the question of reciprocity (per definition eliminated in mass media) comes to the forefront; once again, *interaction* and *interactivity* become visible for the sociological observer on a larger scale. The sociological turn to New Media that stress the dimension of interaction and interactivity, thus, can directly fall in line with the predilections of Cultural Studies mentioned above. Once again, the “consumer” of media writes back – be it in unlikely and marginalized guises. A case in point is Anthony McCosker’s (2014) influential study of the seemingly disruptive behavior of some users of YouTube to post incoherent and sometimes inflammatory comments, a practice now commonly known as “trolling”. Trolling, from this perspective, mustn’t be read as a purely irrational practice. Instead, McCosker argues, the trolling practices establish a kind of agonistic public (Mouffe 1999). Public “discourse”, that is, doesn’t simply collapse when confronted with trolling practices but emerges and flourishes in an agonistic way: “What is clear, however, is that vitriolic forms of provocation and vitriolic responses work as expressive tools to engage with the video, events and with others in an agonistic contest that extends the public that forms around these video events” (McCosker 2014: 251). There is no decline of the public sphere because of affectively high-pitched input and similarly emotional responses to these provocations. A better way to describe these phenomena is to allow for the opening of the notion of public discourse that thrives on not being constrained by rational criteria.

Zizi Papacharissi follows the same path of describing contemporary media logic and proposes a concept of *affective publics* (Papacharissi 2015) – publics, that is, that emerge through the ubiquitous use of the interactive internet. She shows that “affective publics support connective yet not necessarily collective action” (Papacharissi 2015: 128). They “typically produce disruptions/interruptions of dominant political narratives by presenting underrepresented viewpoints” (Papacharissi 2015: 130). In this sense, she concludes, internet publics work as publics, even though they don’t follow what one could call collective reason. This is a result that fits perfectly well to our own findings about publics on Facebook (Wagner 2019; Wagner and Stempfhuber 2013). We are speaking of *intimate publics* that emerge within the network of Web 2.0. Intimate publics can be characterized as *publics* because everyone has the possibility of joining them. But on the other hand they work like an *intimate space*; they are based on the exclusion of strangers, they function emotionally and are structured technically by algorithms. In that sense they differ strongly from the concept of bourgeois publics Habermas has in mind when he speaks of discourse. They in turn work via the possible inclusion of everyone and a clear tendency towards rationalization. In intimate publics, again, communication represents what Marshall McLuhan might have called “hot” communication (analogous to “hot media”; McLuhan 1964). Authentic speakers don’t discuss reasonably or self-reflexively but affectively and emotionally. Rational discourse vanishes – and discourse becomes a discourse of mental state and authenticity. The notion of “firestorm” (Pfeffer 2014), shit- (Stegbauer 2017) or candy-storm tries to describe that phenomenon.

It is interesting to notice that the new interest in pre-verbal affects is not necessarily detecting a universal trend; research on hate speech on the internet, for example, observes cultural differences between countries concerning the particular practices of hate speech. Keipi et al. (2017) state: “[D]ifferent studies conducted on cybercrime victimisation show differences between countries [...]” (Keipi et al. 2017: 60). They argue that “[e]ven in the online world, geographical locations and national borders do make a difference” (Keipi et al. 2017: 60; see also Livingstone et al. 2011; Näsi et al. 2015; Reyns, Henson, and Fisher 2011). While these results are not necessarily surprising, we would like to argue for a specific focus on the cultural specificities in accepting, employing, and converting different media formats. In short, there are not only cultural differences in hate crime practices regarding particular countries; differences can mainly be observed between different online formats (Wagner 2019) – it makes a difference, that is, how hate crime is framed by media formats and where it is located. Again, it is helpful to take into account how shifts and turns of primary media frames are making affectivity generally visible and have repercussions in affective practices in these different formats.

One example is the communication behavior that can be observed in the comment sections on the internet platforms; it reveals a phenomenon that Irmhild Saake and Armin Nassehi identify as generally applicable for contemporary social analysis, particularly when they are making concrete reference to cultures of *speech*: “Cultures consider themselves relevant and assume that others are not” (Saake and Nassehi 2004: 102). Internet communication e.g. on the semi-public platform of Facebook no longer emancipates the insightful speaker we know from the discursive, rational public sphere in the tradition of Habermas but the actual speakers themselves. It appears to be exactly this promotion of

authentic speakers that e.g. social media managers are confronted with when they encounter different community cultures in their comment sections. In their emerging discourse formations, what matters is no longer the better argument or acknowledgement of good reasons. What is becoming more conspicuous instead are cultures of speech or writing in which the essence of the message itself appears to be “to infer individuality and the authenticity of its performance” (Nassehi 2006: 173). This practice of communication – in which “speech itself becomes an argument” (Nassehi 2006: 172) – may fail when both sides decide no longer to accept the incommensurable speaker-position of the other. Then, affective responses to others perceived as totally different become painfully permanently visible; they become, most notably, an ethical problem for social media managers that have to visibly intervene in the public discourse and flag speech acts as hate speech (Wagner 2019).

While this example of the new visibility of affects was concerned with cultures of speech, our last case highlights the new role of images and visual communication. As in cultures of speech, the phenomenon under sociological scrutiny is not *per se* of recent origin. In a study of body images in consumer culture, Mike Featherstone takes notice of how affective stances towards the perception of the own body and effects of cosmetic surgery are not only mediated by online discussions of these effects but also by a new “relation to photography and moving images” (Featherstone 2010: 193). For Featherstone, the mere fact that the proliferation of images in consumer culture – for example the omnipresence of pictures of Hollywood stars in different kinds of media – has influenced the way consumers relate to their own and other bodies. In one of our own studies, we found that it is not only the body pictures within mass media, but also the medical body pictures retrievable in digital media that influence the decision for aesthetic surgery (Wagner 2014). What Featherstone is particularly interested in, however, is the *affective surplus* that should be taken into account in the context of new media landscapes. Again, this intensive affective dimension exceeds the frame of rational discussion or cognitive individual choices. Mediated through new channels of exchange, “experience transmitted between bodies (can have) the capacity to create affective resonances below the threshold of articulated meaning” (Featherstone 2010: 199). Once again, this affective register is not something entirely new. But Featherstone can compellingly argue that in New Media, there emerges a visibility and communicability of an intensive quality that escapes traditional image techniques and referential language: digital technologies “have the capacity to record, capture and slow down the body moving image. They enable us to view in slow-motion the ways in which affects are communicated by the face, gestures and body movements, to observe the affect thresholds which cannot be perceived in the normal choreography of face-to-face interactions but can be felt – e.g. the ‘gut feeling’” (Featherstone 2010: 199). Clearly, then, “the centrality of affect” has to do with the central role of new media in reconfiguring the relationship of images, language, and most importantly corporeal movements – a “new register of affect previously undetected” (Featherstone 2010: 211).

In this section, we have highlighted the shift to the foreground of emotions and affects in the sociological study of public discourse and entertainment. One intermediary result is the questioning of a meaningful distinction between public discourse and entertainment as such. This distinction seems to be of little use in the research of the ways in which “public” emotions work. As a diagnosis of contemporary media landscapes, notions of a

public discourse with an emphasis on “reason” that are contrasted with notions of entertainment with an emphasis of (public) feelings have come under attack as being particularly unhelpful or outdated. From the perspective of media sociology, this account doesn’t have to be necessarily turned into a history of decline of public reason nor as a history of the triumphal ascent of emotion and affect. What is more appropriate is the sober taking into account of the role of the primary medium in these shifts in emphasis. Affects, it seems, are now detectable in the very center of the functioning of new media. As Nigel Thrift puts it: “through the advent of a whole series of technologies, small spaces and times, upon which affect thrives and out of which it is often constituted, have become visible and are able to be enlarged so that they can be knowingly operated upon” (Thrift 2004: 66). Note that this new visibility can be assigned to at least two different observers. On the one hand, the spaces where affects and emotions emerge and thrive become visible and computable for the actors in the landscape of New Media themselves; they can be observed, managed, and worked upon by powerful or subversive producers, algorithms, or users. On the other hand, they also become more visible than ever before for the sociological researcher. It is this last point that we have to reflect upon in our last section.

4 Emotions and affect: from resource to topic and back again?

Certainly, the “turn to affect” (Leys 2011; Wetherell 2015) is not a homogeneous movement that unites the totality of sociological investigations of public discourse and entertainment; nor is it clear that the majority of sociological theoretical approaches are aware of this affective turn, let alone proponents of the need to come to terms with the “centrality of affect”. Quite on the contrary, we have begun by recounting how a turn *away from* emotion and affect was, for diverse reasons, a founding gesture of sociology. As a discipline, the object of study for sociology had to be differentiated from merely psychological perspectives and, at the same time, from the model of the natural sciences. As a diagnosis of modernity, it was helpful to stress the predilection for affectively neutral forms of communication of modern society. And – we have highlighted Habermas’ contribution – as a politically relevant form of social science, it was indispensable to award emotions and affects a proper (minor) role vis-à-vis the more pressing issue of theories of communicative action and public discourse in modern democracies.

This initial position, we have argued, was not only a detriment. Emotions emerged as an interesting *topic* for sociological research. By treating emotions as an effect of rather than a resource for processes of communication, sociological theoretical propositions like systems theory were able to establish a sociology of emotions that takes their object of study seriously as an *empirical* topic. In this respect, the much-maligned political abstinen^{ce} and amorality may have resulted in a clearer view of the role of emotions and affects in modern societies. Note that the attacks on the supposed hyper-rationality of Habermas’ concept of the public sphere are characterized by a political bias; while Chantal Mouffe’s critique of a view of politics and democracy argues for an agonistic politics of passion that

is able to tame and re-articulate these passions in a democratic direction, critics like Antonio Negri and Michael Hardt (2009) turn to a politics of affect that mobilizes feelings and emotional work towards a revolutionary project. Both would agree that the Habermasian view illegitimately privileges a liberal-modern dispositive of emotions that has to be substituted by a contemporary dispositive of affect (Angerer 2007). In this respect, the supposed hyper-sobriety of systems theory seems to have fared better.

Reckwitz' hint towards a certain contemporary sociological unease with the tradition of a sociology of emotions seems spot-on though. The concept of emotion as mainly a discursive phenomenon, that is, is more and more seen as reductive; the concentration on feelings as an effect of predominantly verbal communication rather than as a different register of social exchange and interaction altogether is increasingly considered out of date. The very cutback of the social to communicative processes seems to neglect the material and bodily dimensions of modern societies. In theoretical terms, it is maybe Bruno Latour (2005) who most famously articulated this discontent. This discontent is the theoretical site on which the return and re-emergence of affect is most visible. While Latour sometimes argues for a return to Gabriel Tarde, a return to a period before the pitfalls of sociology, it is important to notice that the recent sociological trends in the turn to affect are situated in a discipline that has learned from the theoretical insights we sketched in the second section.

First, even if affects cannot be reduced to a register of rational exchange or cognitive anticipation, they are *not* conceptualized as *pre-social*. Second, as social phenomena, affects cannot be reduced to mere subjective qualities. Insofar as they are visible to the sociological observer, as we have seen, affects emerge as relational. Our focus on the new centrality of affects in public discourse and entertainment has shown that feelings may indeed be seen as public; the very distinction of a public world of reasoning and a private sphere of emotions has come under attack. To different degrees, the point of invoking affects in the examples was to show that this relationality is not only intersubjective; affects seem to emerge not only in relation to other subjects, but also in relation to other objects, other ideas, or new media technologies. And lastly, in sociological research affects are still predominantly seen as processes rather than entities: the question is “What do affects do?” rather than “What are affects?” (Blackman and Venn 2010: 8–9).

It is controversial if these forms of connectivity and relationality of affects should still be discussed as a subitem of the category of “the social” (Opitz 2014: 278). It is also controversial if the tools many of the proponents of a turn to affects in the social sciences chose to employ are sociologically sound and methodologically legitimate (Hemmings 2005; Leys 2011; Wetherell 2015). The argument of our contribution, however, was that a perspective that concentrates on the changing media landscape can help to make sense of this turn. Our preliminary answer to the questions posed in the beginning – Why affect? Why now? – points to a new visibility of mediated affective phenomena that may not be entirely new but quite literally pop up on the screen of the sociological observer and stay there in need of further analysis. While, in the sociological studies we listed here, one finds a very skeptical appraisal of the tendency of affect theory to conceive of affects as “asocial” (Massumi 2002: 30), the analysis of the specific dynamic and logic of affects in new media formats can also offer a new and promising object for empirical sociological research that might

inspire interesting interventions into urgent political debates. To give just some obvious contemporary examples, the notion of affective publics is currently used to analyze the role of affects and new media formats to explain the success of Donald Trump (Boczkowski and Papacharissi 2018). In Europe, the “explosion” of right-wing populism in networked environments is situated in a framework that takes affective factors as serious as economical ones (Koppetsch 2019; Krämer 2017; Barth and Wagner 2019). And the on-going debate on the phenomenon of internet hate speech is traced with the help of notions of affective behavior in intimate publics (Wagner 2019; Dobson, Robards, and Carah 2018).

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76 Discourse linguistics and emotions in media

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- 2 Language and emotions in German linguistics – review of concepts
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Abstract: Emotions, media and discourses are mutually intertwined: As communicative phenomena, emotions are manifested or generated in discourses. Their material form depends on specificity and they play a critical role in all areas of the media. Currently emotions are perceived, recognized and analyzed from practically all perspectives of scientific discussions devoted to various aspects of (mass) media communication. In this chapter, the scientific interest focuses on the construction of emotions as signs or sign complexes and communicative practices in media discourses. Reference is made to three dominant research traditions: emotion semiotics, emotion semantics and emotion-oriented textology. Furthermore, the question of the emotionalization of discursive events is investigated against the background of the role of both the media and the actors in the establishment and development of discourses. In this context, we advocate a discourse-linguistic multi-level approach to the study of emotions in media discourses: In order to comprehend emotions as media-discursive phenomena, we take into consideration not only the level of the media and the actors, but also the intra- and trans-textual levels. We present an example to show how the processes of coding, manifestation and/or generation of emotions can be analyzed. We also discuss how emotionalized media discourses can influence the collective formation of awareness and action orientation.

1 Introduction

A media- and discourse-linguistic approach to emotions has so far been rather rare in German-speaking emotion research (see for instance Rothenhöfer 2018). This fact proves to be surprising because emotions are an integral part of mass media communication. Therefore,

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the statements presented in this chapter are intended to show that the research program of media and discourse theory and linguistically based discourse analysis can make an important contribution to the study of emotions generated and conveyed by mass media in public communication.

Investigating emotions in discourses by conceiving of them as discursive practices means taking up such aspects and formulating questions which, on the one hand, uncover the media-discursive status of emotions in all its facets and, on the other, make the strategies of their coding and manifestation visible in discourse.

In the following chapter, we will first briefly reflect on three research traditions established in German-language linguistics that are rich in insights for the study of emotions from the perspective of media and discourse linguistics: emotion semantics, emotion semiotics and emotion-oriented text linguistics. While these approaches function as reference concepts that can provide a framework of orientation for the study of emotions, they are not sufficient for the conceptualization of emotions in discourse. The theoretical framework of the concept of discourse-linguistic emotion research presented here serves as an essential part of the considerations discussed. The aspects of the medial and the discursive, which are fundamental for the determination of the nature of emotions as medially realized practices carried out by concrete discourse actors, are addressed. Against the background of the theoretical framework, it is argued that emotions should be understood as socio-cultural, historical and media-based constructs. Discourses are seen as places where emotions arise or are generated.

For the analysis of emotions in discourses, the discourse-linguistic multi-level model (cf. Spitzmüller and Warnke 2011) is used, which is modified here, however, by emphasizing the importance of the medial. In order to be able to grasp emotions as media-discursive phenomena, the level of the media, the actors and the intra- and trans-textual levels are thus taken into account. Subsequently, an example is used to illustrate how processes of coding, manifestation and/or generation of emotions can be analyzed in the respective dimension. Finally, we draw a brief conclusion and provide an outlook on possible perspectives for emotion research based on media and discourse linguistics.

2 Language and emotions in German linguistics – review of concepts

Research into media texts and discourses from a linguistic perspective has a tradition going back decades and several theoretical approaches and research methods have been developed to date that enable linguists to access media texts with all their facets and the cross-text level of discourse. On this basis, the subdisciplines ‘media linguistics’ and ‘discourse linguistics’ represent relevant components of the linguistic research spectrum of the 21st century. However, rapid developments in psychology, sociology, neurobiology and interdisciplinary cognitive science invite linguists to integrate their findings and insights into the research programs of these linguistic subdisciplines in order to do justice to the interest in language and communication in the modern world of high complexity and dynamics.

Emotion-related questions are also taken up by ‘conversation linguistics’. Huynh (2020) took a contrastive view of natural conversational data in German and Turkish as the basis for examining emotions in interactions in everyday communication in both cultures. Starting from the multimodal constitution of emotionality, Huynh analyzed linguistic and non-linguistic practices of emotion production. He focused on the gestures of the interactants accompanying the conversation. To achieve his research goals, Huynh employed a trans-disciplinary set of methodological approaches, which he called “ethnographic conversation analysis” in reference to Arnulf Deppermann (2000: 104).

In linguistic emotion research, research programs are also formulated to look at a specific emotion from different linguistic and interdisciplinary perspectives. A research program of this kind, in which empathy became the object of research, was offered by Jacob, Konerding, and Liebert (2020) and the researchers cooperating with them. All methodological approaches within the framework of the ‘linguistics of empathy’ (cf. Jacob, Konerding, and Liebert 2020: 1–10) stem from linguistic methodology or contain a linguistic component that has been expanded by theoretical-methodological apparatus from other disciplines.

In the following, three dominant research traditions (emotional semantics, emotional semiotics and emotionally oriented text linguistics) are sketched out. These are reference concepts which have established themselves in linguistically based emotion research in the German-speaking world and are undoubtedly insightful, but which do not (or do not sufficiently) take into account the complexity of the phenomenon of emotion as situated media practices.

With a cognitivistically oriented approach, Monika Schwarz-Friesel represents the research tradition of emotional semantics. She theoretically and empirically reveals that emotion, cognition and language have relevant interfaces. According to Schwarz-Friesel, emotions are “mental knowledge and evaluation systems” (Schwarz-Friesel 2008: 284) and “articulate themselves at the level of perceptible expression via different forms of realisation: physical states (blood pressure, sweating, trembling), non-verbal expression manifestations (facial expressions and gestures), paraverbal aspects (such as prosody) and verbal representations at word, sentence and text level” (Schwarz-Friesel 2008: 284, note 16). It is assumed that cognitive and especially linguistic representations often contain emotionally controlled evaluations. In order for emotions to be coded linguistically, cognitive activities must take place. From the cognitive science perspective of emotion research, it is assumed with regard to the emotion-cognition relation that “both components represent two different systems, which do not, however, work independently of each other, but have numerous, mutual interactions” (Schwarz-Friesel 2008: 291). This approach has resulted in linguistic analyses of the verbal coding of emotions and the emotional attitude in their external representations, precisely at the word, sentence and text levels (cf. Schwarz-Friesel 2007, 2013). Although the approach represented here does not regard emotions as “mental knowledge and evaluation systems”, as these cannot be simplified as such in terms of discourse linguistics, the aspect of emotionalization as a persuasive strategy in mass communication described by Schwarz-Friesel is certainly interesting for a discourse linguistic analysis of emotions. This approach is to be examined with regard to the potential for emotionalization in many persuasive strategies in media discourses: reference to authorities, reference to regular relationships, reference to authenticity, presentation of

the sympathy bearers, presentation of the atmosphere via analogies, emphasis in a positive or negative sense and contrasting (see Klein 1994; Schwarz-Friesel 2007: 223–224), and furthermore the distancing or personalizing perspective in reporting. More recent works by Schwarz-Friesel are dedicated to Jew-hatred on the World Wide Web (see e.g. Schwarz-Friesel 2019).

Among emotion researchers in the German-speaking world, Gesine Lenore Schiewer (2007, 2014) and Norbert Fries (2007, 2009) in particular have explored the possibilities of semiotic access to emotions. From the semiotic perspective, the definition of emotions must primarily include the component of visualization or manifestation of emotions via other semiotic channels of the ostensibly invisible (cf. Schiewer 2007: 236). The spectrum of semiotically relevant and describable levels includes a wide range of channels, media and codes, which generally interact in emotion semiotics. According to Schiewer (2014: 42, following Jewitt 2009), the semiotically oriented dimensions of communication direct the attention of emotion research to multimodality and intersemiotic relations (multichannel semiosis), which contribute to the subtlety and ambiguity, but also to the expressiveness and intensity of emotional processes. Schiewer (2014: 42) also points out that complex conceptual developments in emotion research – over and above such references to semiotic principles, which are primarily conceptual in nature – are also linked to approaches of semiotics. In Schiewer (2007), the reflections on emotion semiotics take as their starting point Bühler's concept of sign, which must be differentiated with regard to the different forms of emotion manifestation. The fundamental distinction within the manifold forms of emotion manifestation concerns the one between the expression and the thematization of emotions. Among the forms of expression of the emotional is the form of communication of emotions, which does not explicitly address the issue (cf. Schiewer 2007: 238, following Fiehler 1990: 99). These include physiological manifestations (bodily reactions such as trembling, etc.), non-verbal manifestations (facial expressions, gestures, gaze behavior, postures and movements, etc.), paraverbal-prosodic manifestations (voice qualities, speech rate, etc.) and manifestations in the verbal part of utterances (specific choice of words, stylistic features, exclamations or interjections, verbal-emotional utterances, use of certain speech acts, etc.) (cf. Schiewer 2007: 238).

For further detailed differentiation of the manifestations of emotions, Schiewer (2007: 238–248) relies on Karl Bühler's 'Organon model' and the categories of semiotic functions summarized therein – symptom function, symbol function and the signal or appeal function. On this basis, the manifold forms of emotional manifestations (expressions and thematizations of emotions) can be assigned to different categories – the symptom (utterances with an immediate emotionalization), the symbol (utterances with no immediate emotionalization) or the appeal (utterances with or without immediate emotionalization on the part of the issuer, which can be realized as emotional thematizations or emotional expressions and can evoke both an immediate and a non-immediate emotionalization of the utterance as a reaction on the part of the recipient).

The above-mentioned aspects of emotion semiotics can give interesting impulses to emotion research oriented towards discourse linguistics, which can make a revealing contribution to the research of emotions as media practices.

In her book *Textstilistik des Deutschen* (2006), Barbara Sandig deals with emotions in text style. She sees the process of emotionalizing as a complex, (text) stylistic pattern of

action that reinforces evaluation and includes experience (cf. also Fiehler 1990). On the other hand, emotionalizing may consist in several speech acts, e.g. contrasting, asserting, wishing, exclaming. Following Foolen (1997), Sandig presents a repertoire of linguistic features which are considered to be the descriptive levels for emotionalizing: phonology, morphology, lexis, interjections, particles, syntax, expressive speech act types. They can be combined in various ways to place the style of a text on a scale between two opposite poles: factual – emotional. The concept of including emotions in text stylistic analyses is based on the conceptualization of emotion by Reinhard Fiehler (1990). He takes an interaction-analytical perspective and assumes that emotions are primarily not individual but social phenomena and that a conception of emotions as primarily inner-individual phenomena would obscure the intersubjective meaning and function of emotions (cf. Fiehler 1990: 27–28).

Another reference concept related to text stylistics is the text-linguistically oriented approach to the study of emotions. If one considers text as a basic unit of communication in which content is encoded and generated by means of language and other semiotic signs, it can be argued within the framework of emotionally oriented text linguistics that the actual object of investigation in linguistics and any examination of emotions are not emotions as physiological processes or mental representations of inner states, but rather as conceptualizations of emotions as they become tangible in verbal (and semiotic) manifestations (cf. Ortner 2014: 46). “In communication, emotions are symbols, semiotically coded, arbitrary” (Ortner 2014: 46), and only become empirically graspable in texts when they are symbolized, i.e. when they are coded in the text. The text-linguistic perspective on emotion research opens up interesting questions about the coding of emotions in texts and, related to this, about emotionalization as a discursive strategy.

3 Medium and discourse in linguistic emotions research: Theoretical framework

For the present practical approach to the analysis of emotions, the media and discourse-linguistic perspective is predominant: It attempts to show the specific relationship between discourse, medium/mediality and emotion in the respective context and at a specific time. The interest in knowledge is directed towards certain conventions or orders of manifestation and generation of emotions in written language (and possibly iconic ones), which are created in a sociocultural, medial, historical, etc., context. Media and discourse linguistics, as subdisciplines of linguistics constituted inter- or transdisciplinary per se, offer suitable theoretical and methodological frameworks to analytically deal with such complex objects as emotions on intra-, inter- and transtextual levels. The central terms ‘discourse’ and ‘medium’ are explained below.

3.1 Discourse

In order to adequately take into account the research goal – the analysis of emotions in the print media environment – it seems to be useful to follow the interpretative approach

of sociological and linguistic discourse analysis based on Foucault's theory. In general, discourses are understood as practices or practice structures "that leave their traces in texts, but are not identical with text structures" (Diaz-Bone 2013: 280).

Accordingly, in a reconstructive procedure, properties of a text or a text chain are inferred from properties of a practice. In Foucault's sense, discourses are also arrangements of statements – material quantities of text – that have certain interests and/or power structures as their basis and also generate them: "Thus, in their discursive bondage, statements not only refer to so-called extra-linguistic realities, but they create them" (Warnke 2013: 101).

In this way they contribute to the collective production of meaning. Discourses are thus social phenomena that are constitutive for other social practices and phenomena. They can be regarded as generators and carriers of knowledge. In this function, discourses constitute the reality and thus exercise power, i.e. they have an influence on the participants of the discourse. The task of a discourse analysis lies in the exploration of discourses as practices that systematically form objects of which they speak (cf. Foucault 1981: 74). It should thereby make its contribution to "making visible the discursively determined reality" (Teubert 2013: 64), because the statement in discourse is the place where the reality and knowledge-constitutive power of language (in cooperation with other semiotic sign systems) becomes effective and recognizable.

Consequently, the text as a communicative unit moves to the center of discourse analysis. Its respective performance is understood as an event involving certain social subjects (discourse actors) in a specific social, cultural, historical and media context. The entire spectrum of semiotic resources that were used in the production of the text will be focused on. It should be emphasized, however, that the predominantly linguistic material is "the constant touchstone and thus the starting point of any analysis": "Discourse analysis is thus first and foremost language analysis" (Busse 2013b: 63).

The analysis of texts as discourse excerpts in a given period of time, taking into account the conditions, norms or practices to be observed by the respective discourse actors, allows conclusions to be drawn about the view of reality, the knowledge or the mentality of the actors (cf. Wengeler 2013: 151). The theoretical perspective outlined above allows us to grasp emotions as products of communicative practices and dynamics and to analyze emotional meanings as discursive constructs. With this dynamic conception of emotions, actor-specific emotionalization strategies on intra-, inter- and transtextual levels are taken into account.

The goal of a (media) linguistically oriented discourse analysis is thus to provide information on how certain facts are discursively formed and to what extent collective thought patterns and mentalities are expressed and become visible (recognizable) in a certain media form in communicative events.

If one assumes that discourse is a virtual archive of all that is said, i.e. the totality of all uttered utterances (understood as symbolic interactions) "in an analytically given time" (Spitzmüller and Warnke 2011: 24), then discourse analysts do not have access to the entire discourse, but only a recorded and archived excerpt of this discourse, a sub- or special discourse – a construct (usually) defined (i.e. arbitrary) according to content-related criteria.

The following explanations are based on the assumption that discourse is to be understood as "an autopoietic, text-generating entity, as a self-organizing, self-referential net-

work of intertextual references” (Teubert 2013: 100) or a “formation system of statements that refers to collective, action-guiding and socially stratifying knowledge” (Spitzmüller and Warnke 2011: 9). It exists independently of the researchers and can only be grasped, at least in part, by means of the texts or text-image conglomerates compiled according to comprehensible criteria.

These collections of texts as multimodal semiotic units in the sense of Kress (2010) are called corpora. The use of these methodological instruments is necessary in the context of empirically based research: they allow us to draw conclusions about the object under investigation – in this case, emotions – from a limited number of communicative utterances that cannot be easily grasped (cf. Angermuller 2014: 604).

From a discourse-analytical (macro)perspective (thus leaving aside the reception- and disposition-oriented views), emotions as an object of investigation are relevant in two respects: on the one hand as objects – results or manifestations of discursive actions; on the other hand as discursive practices themselves – practices of representation, manifestation and generation of emotional states.

3.2 Medium

In the present chapter, the assumption is made that emotional communication has an artifact character: Emotions as discourse constructs (as social and cultural phenomena) always have a contextual and media-specific design. In a next step, therefore, the component ‘mediality of emotion’ is addressed.

To claim in the McLuhanian sense that “the medium is the emotion” would probably be exaggerated. Nevertheless, it should be pointed out that every articulation necessarily presupposes a medium. In communication, therefore, there is also no extra-medial functioning of emotions. Emotions are evoked, produced, mediated, stored, modified and multiplied by media – especially by language in its spoken and written forms as well as iconic sign systems: Inner states (feelings) are “changed through representations in these media and newly constituted or articulated as reality and thus made conscious” (Süselbeck 2019: 284).

In order to meet the needs of a media- and discourse-linguistically founded explication of emotions, the reifying concept of media as mere carriers of communicative products, i.e. as technical aids or means of transport, which is still predominant in German-language media linguistics, is to be expanded and modified: Following Jan Georg Schneider (2017: 37), we want to understand media as means and “procedures of sign processing” that operate via material substrates.

Although they impose specific restrictions, they can at the same time open up new scope and provide new means of expression. According to this action-oriented understanding, media “always serve the processing (i.e., the constitution, production, distribution, reception, and storage) of signs. *Processing* here means not only mediation, but also constitution. The sign with its potential for meaning and its material properties cannot be separated from its media processing” (Schneider 2017: 37, emphasis in the original).

This changed perspective also has an impact on research practice: The question is not about objects that function as media, but about the media conditions specific to the respec-

tive procedure (medium) and the effects of the respective mediality on communication. The focus of interest is thus the mode of showing, which (co-)constitutes what is said: “Media make possible [...] specific perceptions and experiences and do not serve the transmission and representation of facts, i.e. they form modalizations of our experience, through which we always experience other people and the environment in a certain way” (Metten 2014: 328).

Every discursive practice is thus shaped by the media. Therefore, for example, the medium of writing gives the mediatized (emotions) its specific form in the context of print or digital communication and thereby realizes its function of creating meaning and form. The communicative practice to which the case study presented in the following refers, i.e. press coverage (texts or text-image conglomerates), has the following mediality (including structural conditions of communication):

- Medium – press releases: print (analog) press media formats
- Channel of drawing/mode of communication – written/visual via font (and image)
- Communications direction – monologue
- Spatial dimension – distance
- Time dimension (speed of message exchange) – asynchronous
- Communication sector (degree of publicity) – public

In summary, it can accordingly be stated that emotional states become recognizable, communicable and graspable through sensually perceptible, i.e. intentionally used elements realized in a medium. Only in this way do these phenomena become ‘visible’ and can be thematized, manifested, transmitted or generated in interactive processes. Media not only transmit meaning, they also participate in its generation: What is transmitted carries the traces of the respective medium, which (co)constituted it, in an inescapable way.

The presented approach is based on the assumption that emotional states and processes can only be objectified and made an analytical object through their material or media contours. In the present case, language in its medially written form of realization is seen as the dominant semiotic medium – as a medium of perception and action, as a medium with reality-constituting power. In this context, print media are seen as possibility conditions for discourses (cf. Spieß 2011: 253).

The language of a discursive formation is the basis for a media- and discourse-linguistically oriented emotion research and thus becomes the starting point for the explication of context-specific expressions of emotions and strategies of their generation in discourses. Linguistic signs are namely “conventionally established means for the rule-based creation of perceptual events with the purpose of inducing the activation of certain sections of knowledge relevant to understanding by the (targeted) perceivers (interpreters) through the creation of these perceptual events” (Busse 2013a: 153).

From the perspective of media theory, language is thus a medium that makes structures and elements of knowledge visible. At the same time, it can be described in terms of discourse analysis as a text-bound phenomenon that structures and organizes knowledge, that discursively constructs knowledge (including knowledge of emotions) and that can be understood as a socially negotiated good of socialization, the result of agreements based on historical, mutual commitments (cf. Spitzmüller and Warnke 2011: 41).

Within the framework of a specific social practice and in cooperation between written language and iconic elements (image, typography), meaning is generated. In this media-sensitive approach, ‘writing’ is regarded as a semiotically peculiar constitutional condition of linguistic practice, as a suitable instrument for the manifestation and generation of affective states.

Like all social practices, emotional practices are also carried out by certain discourse actors or constellations of actors (producers/authors and recipients/readers) in a context-dependent manner, i.e. also in a concrete (here, print media) environment, and according to certain rules within the framework of one-to-many or many-to-many communication. Discourse actors are thus subjects who act on an individual and/or collective level in the field of mass media communication and generate certain discourse segments (print media products) by applying applicable rules.

If one falls back on the already mentioned Bühler categories of the symbol, symptom and appeal function, one can speak of symbolically realized expressions of emotion in the case of analog (and digital) written communication. As a rule, they are based on the state of the so-called cold emotion, the ‘reflexive emotion’, which is evoked by the specifics of the medium of writing and realized primarily through the representational function of language: “On the part of the issuer, this is more a matter-of-fact and generally intentional expression of emotion without immediate emotionalization of its own” (Schiewer 2007a: 348). Emotionality realized in written forms is thus explicitly linked to cognitive evaluation aspects. The reflexive dimension of representation or expression is actually forced by the medial nature of writing.

Emotions in their material or media form are to be regarded as “instruments of meaning construction”, “which gain their semantic profile from the cognitive and communicative strategies in which they are respectively integrated” (Köller 2006: 333). In this sense, they are not absolute entities that can be precisely captured beyond medial and situational embedding. Against the background of the concept of practice, which is based on cultural, social and linguistic studies, emotions can be understood as certain practices characterized by their sociocultural, media-modal, situational, spatio-temporal and historical characteristics, which are carried out by certain participants (actors) socialized into a specific form of life (Wittgenstein).

By theorizing and reflecting on emotions in this way, they can be understood as communicative resources for media offerings, media and discursive activities (performances) and as the results of these activities. In contrast to the cognitive view of emotions, which is widespread in linguistics, this research perspective, which is based on media and discursive linguistics, is still hardly developed/established.

4 Emotions as discourse practices

Current emotion research is characterized by an enormous heterogeneity of perspectives and consequently an almost inflationary number of emotion definitions. However, there is no uniform, generally accepted definition of emotion and it is questionable whether one can or should exist at all.

The understanding of what “emotion” is, how emotional processes, states or dynamics can be adequately grasped and theoretically defined, is inseparably connected with questions about the respective approaches. What is meant are different intellectual attitudes from which affectivity comes into focus in a characteristic way. The respective research questions and objectives of the research work are also fundamentally determined by these attitudes (cf. Slaby 2018: 53). Because of its operationalization possibilities, each definition of a term must therefore always be located in a specific research tradition and be related to a concrete theoretical concept.

The present integrative approach is based on a decidedly language usage/use-oriented, media-sensitive and discourse-analytical perspective. This leads to a definition of emotions, which conceives of them not as properties but as interindividual dynamic constructs, as “components of routinized, culturally standardized practice complexes” (Reckwitz 2016: 108). This view makes it possible to analyze the emotions in their respective media form as situated, historically and socioculturally shaped, symbolic representatives of an immediately present reality. In this way, it makes its communicative relevance visible and could be seen as complementary to the concepts mentioned above.

Emotions understood in this way represent “an event of our social life regulated by human practice” (Gebauer et al. 2017: 9): They can be constructed, perceived, observed, interpreted or thematized by individual or collective actors who have common, discursively generated emotional knowledge. “We may experience feelings prelingually. But our knowledge about them is always only a verbal representation of what has already been promised” (Teubert 2013: 65). In this sense, emotions are thus “far from being pre-social or pre-cultural; rather, cultural meanings and social relationships are inseparably intertwined in them” (Illouz 2007: 10). As in the case of any social/discursive practice, the shared knowledge between the discourse actors thus forms the basis for successful communication in the case of emotions as well.

On this basis, the connection between the explicitly expressed and the implicitly meant can be reconstructed. Emotions as semiotic entities and social action practices at the same time can be attributed to those activities that can be understood as operating with signs. It requires certain skills, ‘techniques’ – components of semiotic competence – which make it possible to draw conclusions from sensually perceptible elements to what is not directly visible.

Keller (2003) speaks in this context of “interpreting” and points out that “the basis of interpretative conclusions [...] are the rules of use of the expressions used” (Keller 2003: 173). In the framed context of a discursive practice, the communicators can thus use different sign systems to “form recognizable patterns out of the incomprehensible flow” (Gebauer 2009: 182). Only in the media context are phenomena ‘in their raw state’ discursified and made the object of communication and interpretation. Social practice – interaction – is the place where emotions become tangible as a social reality (cf. Drescher 2003: 68). The manifestation and generation of emotional states on the one hand, and their understanding and interpretation on the other, necessarily follow certain regularities in communication. This ensures their recognizability (see below: affective rules). For members of a discourse community, the rules that determine the structure and organization of emotional communication are an internalized, implicit knowledge shared by producer and recipient. It is acti-

vated in concrete, emotionally relevant situations (usually without conscious intention). It is a knowledge of semantics of the respective emotion, coding procedures/methods and means, the situationally appropriate form of expression or the social expectation or undesirability of an emotional behavior, etc. (see Szczepaniak 2015: 189).

Emotional patterns are based on experiences appropriated from the world of life and mass media. Due to these patterns, most actors in mass media discourses are able to attribute emotional quality(ies) to certain (written and possibly iconic) communications and to infer intended evaluations or attitudes.

Discursive practices encompass much more than the simple usage of signs. It is about those communicative actions in discourse through which meaning is generated and distributed. Discursive practices are not used as communicative routines in discourse to reproduce content and cope with communicative situations, but as mechanisms which convey the meaning. Their usage is always motivated and determined by media conditions. The conception of emotions as discursive practice(s) broadens the perspective to interactions that are contoured by media, situated in time and space, that are rule-determined, performed by concrete subjects (discourse actors) and can develop reality-constituting effects. In this sense, discourses are places of origin where emotions arise or are generated.

To explore emotions as discursive practices and above all to grasp their multidimensional semantics, it seems plausible to fall back on categories from psychology or sociology. These are applied in the classification and description of phenomena of human inner life. In this context, certain descriptive dimensions, values, modalities, or variables that are fundamental for the explication of individual emotions and that are referred to here as parameters of emotional significance should be mentioned. Thanks to these criteria, emotions can be better grasped in terms of their terminology and reference and more precisely distinguished from one another. Following Roseman (2001) and Fries (2003), the subsequent components, which are essential for the explication of emotional meanings or emotional attitudes, are named:

- a. valence (direction): pleasant (+) – unpleasant (-), positive – negative, friendly – unfriendly, pleasure – unwillingness, approach – avoidance;
- b. potency (intensity or activation level): weak (-) – strong (+), powerful – tender, violent – moderate, large – small;
- c. target relevance (situation status): target congruent (+) – target discrete (-);
- d. appreciation (cognitive assessment): respected (+) – despised (-);
- e. expectation: expected (+) – unexpected (-);
- f. duration: permanent – not permanent, short – long;
- g. problem type: intrinsic (intr) – instrumental (inst), person-related action – object-related.

The above parameters are values, not all of which are required to be part of every emotional meaning. They can be dimensioned on corresponding scales – so they are gradual (except the binary/dichotomic parameter ‘valence’) and variable depending on different internal and external factors. The listed pairs of limits, which can also take on different semiotic shapes/forms, usually only determine the end points of the respective dimension (cf. Szczepaniak 2015: 190). These determinants are to be regarded as parts not only of expert knowl-

edge, but also of world knowledge, rules of emotion and everyday knowledge. They enable the perception, recognition and interpretation of an affective state in its concrete medial realization. Together with the semiotic environment they form the semantics of the respective emotion.

The act of constituting an emotional meaning is thus composed of numerous and diverse factors that cannot be fully demonstrated in the concrete analysis. It is important, however, that one remains aware of their relevance for the individual meaning and knowledge constitution (cf. Wengeler 2013: 151–152). Such an understanding makes it also possible to interpret the constructions of reality that appear continually in different discursive individual events as an expression of collective, social knowledge.

Emotions are understood as intersubjective, overarching entities. They encompass the entire spectrum of linguistic, para-linguistic and iconic means, patterns and procedures for the expression of specific content and are determined by social and cultural rules. Accordingly, emotions represent conglomerates, which are formed by the following complexes: (a) the semantic image of the respective emotion, (b) affective rules, and (c) media framework conditions. Each emotion is made up of these components.

4.1 Semantic images

Semantic images of emotions are used to understand significant characteristics, preshaped patterns and culturally coded models of these entities. With the help of a lexicon, their differences are described as distinct phenomena in their own right (cf. Weigel 2005: 244). In this case, the focus is on all elements relevant for the recognition, interpretation and differentiation of the respective manifested or generated emotional state.

This knowledge of the human internal, introspectively perceptible states and processes, of emotionally triggering factors and social or cultural determinants of the manifestation or generation of emotions is an integral part of the so-called world knowledge of each member of a cultural, linguistic or communication community. In the creation of emotion profiles, we use terms that function as everyday terms and at the same time as technical terms in the context of (pre)scientific thought and argumentation patterns.

4.2 Affective rules

The culturally, socially and medially determined affective rules (emotion rules) are conventions that influence social interactions; that is, communicative, gender and age-related behavior of communication partners and its forms as well as meanings and interpretation patterns.

The respective inner affective state (feeling) and its (possible) material manifestation as an emotion depend not only on the factors that trigger the respective experience, on the personality structure of the person carrying the feeling, their life experiences, etc., but also on (foreign) influences of culture and society (cf. Ulich and Kapfhammer 2002).

What we have in mind here is a set of social and (in part also individual) rules that structure, organize, or standardize the handling of feelings and their material manifesta-

tions to varying degrees. They become a reference system of feeling acquired in the socialization process. The communication partners must adhere to certain social rules and conventions when naming or constituting terms, even if they have a certain freedom of variation of word meanings or creativity. Individuality, creativity and conventionality or sociality are not mutually exclusive, but rather they often mutually condition each other: individuality can only exist “in the context of and in tension with sociality, but not detached from it” (Köller 2006: 402).

4.3 The mediality of emotions

The mediality of emotion refers to material, media-related (linguistic and extra-linguistic) conditions: forms, structures and means of manifesting and generating emotions

In the media- and discourse-linguistic analysis of print media mass communication a deliberative paradigm is predominantly followed. Accordingly, mass media reporting on political and economic issues is considered rational discourse (cf. Bucher and Barth 2019: 58).

However, the analytical focus must also take the emotional dimension into account, since it can modify the quality of discourse (e.g., constitute a certain climate of opinion) and influence the discourse actors (e.g., mobilize or demobilize them).

As already mentioned, emotions are situated and socially formed, “they are based on cognitive interpretations and normative assumptions and accordingly follow a rational logic that rationality/emotionality dualism does not do justice to” (Bucher and Barth 2019: 61). Emotions thus represent integral components of mass media communication – independent of the respective communication domain. Press releases, for example, not only transport information (semantic content), but can also create emotional resonance spaces that affect recipients, modify their attitudes and motivate them to engage in certain activities: “This affective dimension of textual addressing is often the result of a consciously practiced strategy by the respective authors” (Slaby 2018: 56). In other words, through an emotionalizing subjectivizing e.g. a print media message, by affective framing of a media event, an attempt is made to influence the emotional sphere of the reader.

The aim is to generate a certain attitude towards what is represented through the emotional involvement of the recipient.

5 Encoding and generating emotions in discourse

The media and discourse linguistic approach to research on emotions investigates the question of the emotionalization of discursive events and takes into account aspects in the investigation that reveal the connection between emotions, semiotic signs and media discourses. Based on the fact that emotions, media and discourses are mutually intertwined, the question now arises of how emotions are manifested or generated as communicative phenomena in discourses, i.e. as discursive practices. Emotions in their medial (material) form represent the outcome of different discursive processes, which result from the interaction of different factors.

From the perspective of media linguistics, the question arises as to which means and procedures are used to emotionalize knowledge conveyed/constructed through the media and which goals or functions are associated with the emotionalization of the knowledge/the emotionalized knowledge.

From a discourse-linguistic perspective, however, it is important to understand through which discursive processes in mass media emotions are manifested and generated. There are a number of points of contact with research results and theoretical positions from the linguistically oriented research approaches mentioned above, which provide the appropriate methodological framework of a transdisciplinary nature for capturing media-mediated and discursively constructed emotions.

The fact that discourses are strongly characterized by emotions and that emotions are constructed in or by discourses can be seen especially in the so-called ‘agonal centers’ (cf. Felder 2012: 136). Agonal centers are discursive constructs with enormous emotional potential and point at the existence of social, discursive antagonisms and resulting media discourses (cf. Rothenhöfer 2018: 515). It is precisely those media events that are characterized by a relatively high potential for conflict, as Felder (2015) calls ‘frictional spaces’, that form the basis of “semantic battles” occurring in the media (cf. Felder 2006: 13).

An example of such *an agonal center* is the economic project *Nord Stream*, which is being evaluated by the mass media. It involves the construction and transport of Russian gas through the Baltic Sea to Germany. There has been much controversy about this project in terms of political, legal, ecological and economic aspects. Several countries with different conflicting interests were involved. For this reason, the project has been the subject of intense debate both in Europe and in the USA. The controversies surrounding the Baltic Sea pipeline have led to the event being discussed, commented on and thus made accessible to the general public in the media of varying range, in technical-media distribution and political orientation as well as in various communicative genres.

A well-founded starting point for the analysis of discursive practices is the discourse-linguistic multi-level model (DIMEAN) designed by Spitzmüller and Warnke (2011). For the purposes of a large-scale study, *Emotionale Nachbarschaft. Affekte in deutsch-polnischen medialen Diskursen / Emocjonalne sąsiedztwo. Afekty w polsko-niemieckich dyskursach medialnych / Emotional Neighborhood. Affects in German-Polish media discourses*, the model was slightly modified: The role of the medium or mediality was emphasized. The idea of considering the level of mediality as a dimension of the generation and coding of emotions in discourse, results from the fact that although the media can be understood as technical-technological means, they are rather to be understood as procedures of sign processing (Schneider 2017: 37). The emotionalization of communication is always bound to the medium and is to be seen through the prism of the respective medium, because emotions are constituted, generated, mediated and stored by media. In the process of mediatization, emotions are discursively constituted by means of signs in concrete social (communicative) practices. They can only be perceived and described in discourse and are therefore always discourse-bound and media-specific as social and cultural constructs.

In the following, it is important to illustrate that from a discourse-linguistic point of view, the generation and coding of emotions can be analyzed with our model. Using a discursive excerpt from the media event *Nord Stream*, discursive emotionalization strate-

gies will be illustrated that are visible on the media, actor-specific, trans- and intratextual levels.

The case study is a text from the news magazine *Gość Niedzielny* from 9 November 2011. *Gość Niedzielny* is a national weekly newspaper of Catholic-conservative orientation, which appears in two media variants: print and online. Apart from the media-specific features, the text medium (print newspaper, mobile text medium) and the communication technology (print, digital-online), the two variants have the same formal and content design. In the present case, we are dealing with a print-media discursive excerpt in which writing and iconic sign systems use their potential to generate emotions.

The influence of media factors on the coding of emotions and the reception process is enormous. The already mentioned factors of the mediality of press texts, such as political orientation of the source, position of the medium on the media market, but also the communicative genre of the text (commentary, report, etc.), applied sign modalities (language, image) with their characteristics (color, font size, type and format, etc.), are not only known to provide meaning, but can also have an emotion-developing effect. The way in which content is medialized is an instrument for manifesting and generating emotions in discourse.

A further descriptive dimension, which is extremely important in the analysis of explicitly or implicitly evoked emotions, is *the level of media actors*. Since the actors are involved to varying degrees in the generation and coding of emotions and are in different interaction roles, different types of actors are distinguished. The group of first-order actors includes the respective editorial staff and journalists (in the case of *Gość Niedzielny*), who use the technical-discursive potentials to produce texts/communications and thereby medialize social events.

The group of second-order actors, on the other hand, consists of people and institutions to which reference is made, e.g. editorial offices, journalists from the cited press sources (*Wiedomosty*), quoted politicians or experts (*Michail Korczemkin*), who act as reference points. Individual or collective media actors (*Rosjanie* ['Russians']) with different media potential, who function as ideology brokers, opinion leaders or quasi experts, can also generate discursive knowledge and thus emotions. In such cases, the generation of emotions is based on cognitive interpretations or assumptions by the recipients. Whether these mechanisms of emotionalization (mobilizing or demobilizing) have an effect on recipients depends on which emotions (meaning their valence, intensity, duration, etc. – see the parameters of emotional significance above) the respective actors or their utterances evoke and how the addressees interpret the corresponding utterance. In addition, evaluative perceptions and emotions can be generated by other meaning foundations of the actors. These often subjective perceptions of the emotionally constitutive actors can be derived from personal, cultural, historical or other factors of a non-causal nature. However, since emotions are understood as dynamically discursively generated social constructs and as "components of routinized, culturally standardized practice complexes" (Reckwitz 2016: 108), the actors' endowments of meaning cannot be reflected in the initial statements, the follow-up actions and reactions of the respective addressees (cf. Langlotz and Locher 2012: 1595), but rather in the results of the actors' 'evaluative statements' and the processes constituted by media discourse that imply emotions (cf. Fiehler 2008: 759).

However, the generation of emotions can also result from the constellation of the actors in a discourse fragment. This is the case, for example, when the otherwise emotionally neutral or positive actors appear next to actors with negative connotations, which is often aggravated by expressions of emotional rejection. In our example, the photo of the Chancellor of Germany *Angela Merkel*, Russian President *Dmitry Anatolyevich Medvedev*, and former German chancellor *Gerhard Schröder* may well generate emotions in the context of the discourse on *Nord Stream*.

On the transtextual level of discourse-oriented analysis, which is important for the constitution of media discourses, various strategies of generating and evoking emotions can be observed. Discourses consist of a multitude of discourse fragments or statements in various media and texts, which show structural, thematic similarities and action references (cf. Spitzmüller and Warnke 2011: 188) and form a dense network of interrelated texts. The most common strategies of explicit or implicit reference between discourse fragments are based on direct quotations, references and more or less recognizable allusions. These processes can take place on the verbal as well as the pictorial level.

Especially in the case of intertextual references, it can be observed that explicit intertextuality is carried out through linguistic quotations. Often the quotations serve to underpin one's own standpoint and argumentation.

The analyzed discourse fragment represents a prime example of linguistic intertextuality processes. The majority of the continuous text consists of direct and indirect quotations and references to other sources explicitly expressed by linguistic means. The text's title itself explicitly refers to a statement: *Rosjanie przyznają: Możemy zakręcić Polsce kurek* ['The Russians admit: We can turn the tap off for Poland']. However, the statement is taken up again in the lead and in the main body as direct quotations. Frequent use of the negatively connotated, contextualized fixed phrase *Turning the tap off for Poland* leads to an emotionalization of the whole statement with the aim of evoking fear. Due to the frequent direct quotes from *Wiedomosti*, the quoted daily newspaper assumes the role of the second-order actors and seems to be a reliable and citable source of information from the perspective of the first-order actors (editorial staff and journalists of *Gość Niedzielny*). The reference to the sources is made in the text, in addition to quotation marks, by linguistic means introducing and characterizing the quotation and by explicitly naming the source. This includes the following phrases built into the text: *zauważa ... dziennik Wiedomosti, komentując ...* ['notes ... commenting on the daily newspaper'], *Rosyjska gazeta podkreśla ...* ['Russian newspaper emphasizes'], *Wiedomosti wskazują ...* ['Wiedomosti points out'], ... *pisze dziennik/pisze moskiewski dziennik* ['writes the daily newspaper/Moscow daily'], *Wiedomosti uważają ...* ['Wiedomosti claims'], ... *dodają Wiedomosti* ['adds Wiedomosti'], *Dziennik przyznaje ...* ['The daily newspaper admits...'], *Wiedomosti odnotowują jednocośnie* ['Wiedomosti also notes'], etc. In addition, some quotations have the function of explicating the knowledge conveyed. This is done by introducing the quotations accordingly: ... *wyjaśnia gazeta; ... tłumaczą Wiedomosti* ['explains the newspaper/Wiedomosti'].

A further intertextual strategy is provided by the explicitly expressed verbal allusion to the non-aggression pact between the Soviet Union and nationalist Germany (Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact) in 1939: ... *Nord Stream ma się jakoby stać podstawą dla groźnego aliansu, który będzie przypominać pakt Mołotowa-Ribbentropa z 1939 roku między Związkiem Radzi-*

eckim a nazistowskimi Niemcami – wyjaśnia gazeta [...] Nord Stream is to be the basis for a dangerous alliance between the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany similar to the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact of 1939 – the paper explains]. This historical event represents a part of the knowledge that is deeply rooted in the collective memory of the Poles. The explicit comparison of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact with the Nord Stream project evokes affective memories of the disastrous consequences of the pact, which in the new political, historical, and media environment – the debate on the Nord Stream – are deliberately used to evoke desired emotions (FEAR) and (negative) attitudes towards what is depicted.

In discursive practices, emotions can be coded or generated explicitly or implicitly not only with linguistic signs and sign complexes, but also with iconic signs. To understand emotions as media constructs and to grasp them on the visual level means also to regard images as discursive signs that constitute and generate emotions. The manifestation and generation of medially coded emotions by means of images takes place through the process of intericonicity. The image in the analyzed example shows three important political and social actors at the ceremonial opening of the Baltic Sea pipeline: the Chancellor of Germany *Angela Merkel*, the President of Russia *Dmitry Anatolyevich Medvedev* and the former Chancellor *Gerhard Schröder* (Figure 76.1). If one looks at the picture detached from the linguistic text, no pronounced emotions can be detected. It is only through the linguistic reference to the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact in the continuous text, already mentioned in the quotation, and through the iconic similarity to the illustration (Figure 76.2), on which the signatories of *the German-Soviet Nonaggression Pact in 1939* are shown, that emotions are generated. However, these are not emotions that can be taken from the actors in the illustration, but emotions that are evoked by the use of this particular illustration in the given discourse. In case of Figure 76.2, positive emotions such as joy and satisfaction can be clearly read from the depicted actors, but this positive mood in this figure evokes negative emotions such as fear or anger in the Nord Stream discourse in Poland. The verbal intertextual references to past events play a special role in their interpretation.

The example shows, however, that the construction of emotions (and ultimately the evocation of emotional states in the recipient) as well as the emotionalization of media discourses can only be realized when the transiconic references are recognized and interpreted. In addition, it can be said with regard to the example that the recognition of the inter-pictorial constellations is controlled and guaranteed by linguistic means.

Most strategies of generating emotions take place on the intratextual level. Since emotional meanings are generated with the help of linguistic (and iconic) signs in concrete discourse segments, the question arises as to which linguistic means are used to verbalize emotional content and communicate it in discourse. The focus of emotion analysis on the intratextual level is to investigate the use of lexical units that manifest or evoke emotions explicitly or implicitly. On the intratextual level, phrases, sentences, speech acts or communicative acts, speech action patterns, propositions, partial texts and images are considered as elementary building blocks of discourses and as creative components of the discourse fragments (cf. Reisigl and Ziem 2014: 71). In principle, strategies of emotionalization can be observed on each of these sublevels (cf. Ortner 2014: 189–197). For example, in the text-oriented analyses, one can search for design strategies that are meaning-generating and can evoke emotions. This can be the case if the design modalities or submodalities

Rosjanie przyznają: Możemy zakręcić Polsce kurek



Fig. 76.1: German Chancellor Angela Merkel, Russian President Dmitry Anatolyevich Medvedev and former German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder at the opening of Nord Stream.



Fig. 76.2: Friedrich Wilhelm Otto Gaus (Head of the legal department of the Foreign Office), Joachim von Ribbentrop (Reichsminister of Foreign Affairs), Josef Stalin and Vyacheslav Molotov (Soviet Foreign Minister) at the signing of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact in 1939.

are unusually conspicuously linked, or if conspicuous unreal images are used that co-constitute meanings and emotions.

Proposition-oriented analysis of the discourse fragments can also make emotionalization strategies visible. In the discourse on Nord Stream, expressions such as catchwords and stigma words are often used that influence public opinion and decision-making and imply emotions: *Rura Gazpromu obok nuklearnych odpadów* ['Gazprom's pipe next to nuclear waste'], *Nord Stream to ekobomba* ['Nord Stream eco-bomb'], *manipulować* ['manipulate'], *omijać* ['bypass'], *blokować* ['block'], *pogrzebać* ['bury'], etc.

The emotions implied in this way can be seen as special discursive practices of emotionalization. These examples prove the point of view held within the framework of the linguistics of emotions that every statement contains emotional and evaluative elements (cf. Jahr 2000: 73).

With regard to the emotionalization of statements through speech actions and their influence, Felder (2013: 24) refers to the fact that the actors in the production of texts perform three basic types of acts of medium abstraction. First, they linguistically define a factual situation, which, in order to establish a factual claim, is primarily accompanied by assertive/representative speech acts. The execution of speech acts by institutions is declarative. Second, the actors locate the established facts in relation to other facts. 'Contextualization' is understood less as the social and local context of a current communication event than as a comprehensive epistemic-cognitive background, including sociocultural and linguistically shaped knowledge frameworks that make the understanding of individual character strings possible in the first place (cf. Busse 2007: 81). Third, the actors evaluate the facts explicitly or implicitly. These assessments are used to co-constitute content from which consequences arise for the individuals, social groups, or the community involved in the discourse.

It is often emphasized that discourses and discursive practices (such as emotionalization) are constituted by linguistic (and iconic) signs and sign complexes. Language is thereby attributed the status of the primary medium in the construction of knowledge (cf. Keller

2001: 142). If one considers emotionalization strategies in our case study on the word-oriented level of analysis, some expressions stand out that do justice to the function of the discursive constitution of emotions. These expressions include primarily one-word and multi-word units such as keywords *Zależność od Rosji* ['dependence on Russia'], *Elektrownie atomowe* ['nuclear power plants'], *omijać* ['bypass'], *blokować* ['block']; stigma words *straszydło* ['spook'], *poszkodowani* ['disadvantaged']; flag words or high-value words *przyjaźń* ['friendship'], *gazowe bezpieczeństwo* ['gas security'], *niezależność energetyczna* ['energy independence']. A similar role is played by occasionalisms and modified fixed expressions that have an emotionalizing effect in a certain context: *zakręcić Polsce kurek* ['turning the tap off for Poland'], *zgodnie z zasadą tłocz lub płac* ['according to the rule – pump and pay']. In addition, it is necessary to point out emotive words that name the respective affective state: *pełno obaw* ['full of fear'], *Gazprom straszy* ['Gazprom threatens'], *irytujący gazociąg* ['irritating gas pipeline']. The characteristic of the emotive words is that they function as discourse-marking and discourse-determining units with emotional value, because their contextual and connotative meaning is dominant.

Nomina propria (antroponyms, toponyms) and *Nomina appellativa* form another group of discourse-constituting expressions. In the analysis of discursive processes they are understood as expressions of transtextual statement contexts (cf. Spitzmüller and Warnke 2011: 140). In contrast to emotion words, they do not function as discourse-marking units, but as naming units, which can, however, evoke emotions in discourse: *Rosjanie* ['Russians'], *Pakt Molotow-Rippentrop z 1939* ['The Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact of 1939'], *Związek Radziecki* ['Soviet Union'], *nazistowskie Niemcy* ['Nazi Germany'] *Gerhard Schröder, Putin*.

6 Conclusion and outlook

The theoretical framework of discourse-linguistic emotion research presented in the first section provides a well-founded orientation basis for considering emotions in discourse. The advantage of the theoretical concept lies in its connectivity to other concepts and in the emphasis on the role of the medial/mediality in the coding and generation of emotions. This leads to the fact that the material form of emotions is co-constituted by the respective media and is to be regarded as a visible and medially ascertainable result of different discursive processes.

The focus of analytical interest here is on strategies for generating and coding emotions that are discursively negotiated with the help of signs in concrete social (communicative) practices. The rather open and here somewhat modified and expandable analytical model of discursive practices by Spitzmüller and Warnke (2011) also allows one to grasp emotions as products of communicative practices and emotional meanings as discursive constructs. Although the analyzed case study was taken from print media mass communication, the analysis model can be extended to various media forms, communicative genres and formats of different communication technologies. For instance, discursive emotions in social media phenomena should be considered, such as user comments under posts additionally endorsed with extensive use of emojis. This also opens further research fields for multimo-

dal emotion research. To illustrate, it could be investigated how emotions are coded and generated in multimodally designed discourse excerpts.

With the proposed analysis model a spiral-like emotional structure can be reconstructed: The trigger of the respective emotion – a person, an event, an object or an action as a reference object – as well as the media-specific means and strategies of communication used are determined. In this context, a functional perspective can also be taken on the emotions generated in media discourses. It can thus be placed according to the functions of emotions or emotionalizations in a specific context of use and a concrete constellation of actors: For example, is it a matter of emotionally charged evaluations, the increase in relevance of the respective media content or the formation or mobilization of an emotional community or an ‘affective public’? The focus will thus be on the significance of discursive practices for the constitution of emotions and also on the (potential) impact of these discursively generated social constructs.

The considerations made here lead to the conclusion that the emotionalization of media content is a relevant feature of discursivization and is a permanent feature of media emotion cultures (cf. Hauser, Luginbühl, and Tienken 2019). The more or less emotionalized content can explicitly or implicitly shape the opinions, attitudes and decisions of the recipients. Although the discursively generated emotionalization of knowledge transfer can certainly support the personal handling of knowledge and emotions, the emotions as discursive practices influence the collective formation of consciousness and action orientation, strengthen the collective sense of community and collective memory and can often create affective nationally shaped or viewpoint-specific world views.

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77 Media and public emotions

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Abstract: In the following chapter, I will elaborate on the relations between media, the public sphere, and affectivity. The concept of the public sphere will serve as a guideline throughout the text. First, I situate the current debate in its recent historical context, ongoing since the publication of Jürgen Habermas' *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere* in 1962. I briefly outline the main lines of critique towards Habermas' approach and subsequently go into detail on the theoretical challenges arising for such critical accounts. I then introduce the cinema as the paradigmatic mass medium of the 20th century to provide an example for how these debates go to the core of the relation between politics and aesthetics. Having established the scope of the question at hand, I then turn to discuss a number of contemporary approaches regarding the relations between media, the public sphere, and affectivity. In my conclusion and outlook, I finally introduce the concept of gossip, understood as a media practice, to suggest a direction for further research on the topic.

1 Introduction

A general election, a sporting event, a political protest, a Twitter campaign, or a movie screening all count as public phenomena. They all can be said to not only involve media and emotions, but to thoroughly *depend* on their being mediated as well as on the affective engagement of participants and audiences: on the feelings of enthusiastic support, of frustration with defeat, of outrage, compassion, fear, suspense, or relief. Feelings and emotions do not just happen in the context of such events; they are thoroughly entangled with their

very existence. (For the purposes of this chapter, rigorous distinctions between feelings, affects, sentiments, and emotions are not of primary importance – for an account detailing these distinctions, see Slaby and von Scheve [2019]; I nonetheless do emphasize the relationality and complementarity of these terms as opposed to positing a strict dichotomy between affect and emotion, as can be found in Massumi [2015], for example.) How can we understand the nature of this relation? The subject of this chapter interrelates three terms that not only invoke long and complicated histories, but are also of critical importance to each other's conceptual concerns: media, the public sphere, and emotions. Any account of “the” media (in the more narrow sense, as opposed to the extensive conceptualizations of media philosophy) that neglects their public dimension or their role in producing and circulating affects must remain incomplete. Similarly, theories of emotion that locate them only in individuals and their biological setup run the risk of oversimplifying the complex manner in which those individuals are entangled with each other and the world around them – socially, culturally, and historically.

This entanglement spans a wide spectrum, from affective participation in social movements (cf. Papacharissi 2014) to the embodiment of the consuming logic of contemporary capitalism (cf. Cvetkovich 2012), from the pleasure of sharing gossip (cf. Siegel 2017) to the urgently felt need to “have a public presence beyond one’s bodily presence” (Couldry 2012: 50, original emphasis), to define one’s place in history and the memory of others (cf. Doss 2010). Some, though not all, of the recent discussions of the concept of the public sphere (Karatzogianni and Kuntsman 2012; Hillis, Paasonen, and Petit 2015; Lünenborg 2019; Grotkopp, Kappelhoff, and Wihstutz 2019) have tended to take this complex interrelationship into account, which is why they can serve as a starting point for the following discussion.

First, I am going to elaborate a little bit on the foundations of the current debate, to then focus on the theoretical challenges arising from the fact that a lot of different disciplines have been involved with the question of the public sphere. In this regard, I identify two major approaches, which I will examine in depth. In order to provide some historical perspective, I am going to introduce the cinema as the paradigm for mediated public affectivity in the 20th and 21st centuries. The function of cinematic images and the manners of appropriating them will also figure at the end of the article in an attempt to provide an outlook towards future possibilities.

2 Habermas’ concept of the public sphere and its subsequent critique

The concept of the public sphere has been at the center of political and sociological debates for a long time, but at least since Jürgen Habermas wrote *Strukturwandel der Öffentlichkeit* (“The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere”) in 1962. It has become commonplace to criticize the Habermasian model for its emphasis on societies rationally coping with disagreement (see Markell [1997] for a review of these critiques). According to Habermas and theories more or less closely following the liberal tradition, the public sphere in its genuine sense engages differences in worldview or misunderstandings by a disinterested

exchange of arguments aiming at reaching a consensus. The role of written language (mainly linked to the evolving landscape of newspapers in the 16th and 17th centuries) is critical in this regard, as it made possible the critique of the king's representation of the people. Furthermore, “[w]riting is the axis that, in the sense of Habermas, correlates the bourgeois public sphere and bourgeois intimacy” (Koschorke 1999: 183, my translation). A basis for this view is Habermas' supposition that language's rationality guarantees more or less universal access to understanding and, therefore, participation – a claim that is made more explicitly in his 1981 book *Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns* ('The Theory of Communicative Action').

The by now not-so-recent rise to prominence of affect and emotion theories has provided a systematic basis for challenging this view – either by arguing for the centrality of (sometimes specific) affects and emotions in public exchange (Mouffe 2000; Nussbaum 2013) or by arguing against a categorical division between rational argument and affectively charged agonism in the first place (Krause 2008). As Sharon Krause puts it, “sentiments constitute the horizons of concern within which practical judgments and deliberation transpire. [...] we cannot deliberate effectively about practical ends (in politics or anything else) without feeling” (Krause 2008: 3). Thus, even normative theories of justice and morality acknowledge the need for including an affective dimension in the processes of political action. Postfoundational theories of the political are even more receptive towards the emphasis on dynamics, change, and unpredictability central to many concepts of affect (see e.g. Braidotti 2013; Bens et al. 2019).

Combining affect theory with media theoretical approaches furthermore suggests – against Habermas' tendency to privilege reading over other modes of communication – stressing the idea of a plurality of and even conflict between different publics (Fraser 1990; Warner 2002; Papacharissi 2014), which require both media structures and media practices for their perpetuation (Negt and Kluge 1972; Hansen 1991; Donald and Donald 2000). On a conceptual level one could argue that the more recent approaches work together in restoring not only the multiplicity of meanings of the term “communication”, understood as comprising all forms of exchange, be they physical, non-physical, or something in-between, for example, affective (Mattelart [1996: xiii] lists some of the disciplines historically involved with the concept). They also refer to the concept's inherent and longstanding connection to the realm of bodily experience (see Mattelart 1996; Koschorke 1999). In this very basic sense, “communication” can be taken to encompass all three of our key terms: media, public, and emotions.

In a similar vein, the theoretical separation between public and private is being criticized from the standpoint of (feminist) affect theory as well as media theory (Clough 2000; Berlant 2008). As one among several, Brian Massumi argues that this distinction cannot be upheld in the light of the way communication is shaped in social media (the interplay of language and technological media, along with the emergence of new modalities of expression, is discussed in several contributions in Aitchison and Lewis [2003]). The mode of expression prevalent on Facebook and other platforms “is already informed and formatted by its quasi-publicness, so that it is marked from within by the presence of others” (Massumi 2015: 132–133). Vice versa, Nick Couldry writes, quoting Daniel Miller: “Facebook's 'public' dimension results from 'an aggregate of private spheres'" (Couldry 2012: 50).

E. Doyle McCarthy (2016: 36–37) quite emphatically suggests a new kind of “social imaginary” – marked by distinct experiences of time and space – in place of the dichotomy of private vs. public. The question arises, however, whether such observations place too much emphasis on the supposed novelty of these phenomena, and on technological changes as their determining factor. Lauren Berlant, for example, asserts that “the experience of identity might be personal and private, but its forms are always ‘collective’ and political” (Berlant 1991: 2–3) – and, one could add, have always been so. As Koschorke remarks with regard to the history of the public sphere in the 18th century, “Enlightenment succeeds insofar as it opens up the private interior towards the public sphere. Without losing its private character, the public sphere becomes the forum of society, which penetrates the entire state” (Koschorke 1999: 184, my translation). Leaving behind simple dichotomies of private vs. public is necessary if one wants to arrive at a more precise idea of the public than just the negative definition of “not-private” (cf. Fraser 1990: 57).

3 How to relate media and affectivity

As becomes apparent, media theoretical approaches are faced with a complex task, especially if they aim to come to terms with the concept of affect. Affect theory in recent years has aimed to question longstanding sociological assumptions like the primacy of rationality in decision making or, more radically, the integrity of the subject regarded as responsible for making decisions in the first place. Crucially, “coming to terms” with affect requires incorporating some concept of bodily experience often lacking in analyses of (written) language (see Fleig [2019] for a discussion on the possibilities of such a novel approach of “writing affect”): On the one hand, media theories can stress the plurality and diversity of modes of such experience. This not only serves to avoid the concept of “text” with its universalizing tendencies, but also helps to shed light on the question how processes of affecting and being affected actually unfold. This may be combined, on the other hand, with precisely defining the role of the human body in these processes. This involves describing different modes of experience as different ways of establishing relations between bodies and other bodies as well as between bodies and the world. These modes are not necessarily determined by the potential of the human body: affects can be actualized in a wide variety of “matters of expression” (Guattari 2009: 243): phonemes, sounds, music, colors, light, graphics, gestures, facial expression, atmospheres, etc. In a wide sense of the term, all these can be regarded as media – as exemplified by Walter Benjamin (2007), who reserved the term “apparatus” for what we today would call technological media.

Language in the narrow sense represents only one possibility in this broad spectrum. To reclaim a crucial role for language in this context would require a rethinking of the concept of language itself, for example as in the philosophy of Nelson Goodman (1968), who sees the question of “languages of art” as a stepping stone towards a theory of symbols: “‘Languages’ in my title should, strictly, be replaced by ‘symbol systems’” (Goodman 1968: xi–xii). As to the question of experience, Goodman insists that a categorical division between emotion and cognition is missing the point: “in aesthetic experience, *emotions function cognitively*” (Goodman 1968: 248, original emphasis). In this perspective, Good-

man's philosophy suggests that the question of how the public sphere, media, and emotions relate to each other should be treated as a question of media aesthetics.

The first important point that follows from these considerations is that from the interplay between media and apparatus, the dimension of history emerges as crucial (even if Goodman, e.g., does not particularly emphasize this aspect). The history of media, understood as a process of "extending" (McLuhan 2017) and thereby transforming man (and the human body), has to be taken into account if one wants to develop a productive understanding of public, mediated affectivity. As Marshall McLuhan writes, "[a]ny extension, whether of skin, hand, or foot, affects the whole psychic and social complex" (McLuhan 2017: 5). The second important point, which is connected to the first, is that the "extensions of man", aside from affecting the social, also very concretely manifest themselves in the ordinariness of daily life and in the lived-bodies of individuals. This is made clear in Vivian Sobchack's critique of the media theoretical metaphor of prosthetics, a critique that she bases on her own experience of living with a prosthetic leg (cf. Sobchack 2006). It is precisely affect theory, understood not least as a theory of experience, which makes it possible to address these complex interrelations, since affectivity itself can be regarded as the medium where the somatic, the aesthetic, and the social meet, overlap, and interpenetrate one another.

This point is emphasized when one takes into account a theory such as Goodman's, who determines several strands along which these interrelations can be analyzed (e.g., denotation, imitation, fiction, representation) – all related, but not at all confined to a concept of language in the narrow sense. Rather, according to Goodman, art is engaged in the creation of worlds. In this regard, the concept of medium in Benjamin's sense (i.e., closely linked to the concept of experience, see further below) might provide a useful starting point for thinking through the connections between the body, affective experience, and meaning on a symbolic and a socio-cultural level.

4 Image and metaphor: Making sense

Interestingly, the main medium for Benjamin is the image. But at the same time, he is far from advocating a kind of raw, naïve, exclusively sensual engagement with images. In contrast, he is chiefly concerned with their "readability" (Weigel 1996: 44) – bringing the question of language up again, but in a decidedly wider understanding of the term. It is at this point, where experience and sense-making intersect, that history comes into play. For Benjamin, this "point" is the realm of allegory (Benjamin 1928 [2003]). For the philosopher Max Black, it is the realm of metaphor (Black 1954 [1977]). Black's concept of metaphors being "generative" in nature is especially interesting with regard to this article, because it entails a quite explicit idea of how metaphors are not restricted to language, but can be regarded as media themselves, enabling new perceptions of the world around us:

"Did the slow motion appearance of a galloping horse exist before the invention of cinematography?" Here the "view" is necessarily mediated by a man-made instrument [...]. And yet what is seen in a slow motion film becomes a part of the world once it is seen. The last example comes the closest to what I originally had in mind by the "strong creativity thesis". If some metaphors are what might be called

“cognitive instruments”, indispensable for perceiving connections that, once perceived, are then truly present, the case for the thesis would be made out. Do metaphors ever function as such “cognitive instruments?” I believe so. (Black 1977: 454)

“Seeing” things in a certain way, or perceiving something “as” something else is the basic operation of metaphor, understood as a “linguistic image” (*Sprachbild* in German). This also means that with metaphor, there is bound to be historical variance and change (see Rorty 2009: 16). In this perspective, metaphors can be regarded as “the spawning ground of most kinds of understanding [...] and expressiveness” (Sontag 2002: 91). Or, as Nietzsche puts it: “The initial power [of metaphor formation] produces an equation of things that are unequal, and is thus an operation of the imagination. The existence of concepts, forms, etc. is based on this” (Nietzsche 1993: 94).

Understanding and expressiveness in this case do not refer to metaphor as a way of discovering the “truth” about the world, but rather as a tool to establish connections between individuals and the world around them: creating meaning out of (affective) resonance (see Nietzsche 1993: 82). Theories of metaphor therefore prove important for transforming and making useful linguistic models of sense-making for media theory (for an integrated model of metaphor theory in a media studies context, see Müller and Kappelhoff [2018]). This capacity to “make sense” and to link diverging realms of experience with one another will prove essential for any kind of public to emerge (on the significance of different “ways of making sense” in conjunction with the question of experience, see Stanley Cavell [1979]).

5 The two main approaches

Two main avenues for engaging the connection between media, affects/emotions, and the public can be identified in contemporary academic discourse. The first one is focusing on the interplay between media theory and a variant of affect theory that is influenced chiefly by Gilles Deleuze and his interpretation of Spinoza. The second one originates in feminist interest in the concept of affect initiated by Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick (1995, 2003), often via the work of Silvan Tomkins. Of course, there are overlaps between the two approaches – for example, an often-shared reference to Raymond Williams’ concept of “structures of feeling” (Williams 1977) as a tool for describing the complex array of political and cultural conditions mediating between the social and the personal in expressing and communicating affect. Both approaches refer, sometimes only in passing and sometimes essentially, to certain strands of political theory and political philosophy, such as the writings of Hannah Arendt (1992), Stanley Cavell (2002), or Jacques Rancière (2009). Both approaches differ in their choice of subject: while the first one often concentrates on phenomena of popular culture in a digital media landscape, such as Twitter or network TV, the second one mostly bases its theoretical explorations on the analysis of contemporary artworks. This difference in focus considerably influences the respective conclusions that are drawn from such studies.

In what follows, I will first introduce some historical background for the current theoretical debates by elaborating on the public dimension of cinema, understood as the para-

digmatic mass medium of the 20th century. Coming back to the present day, I will then examine both above approaches more closely before I identify some desiderata and perspectives for further research.

6 The publicness of cinema

If we limit the scope of our discussion to the 20th and 21st centuries, the cinema emerges as the most powerful paradigm of mediated public affectivity, taking over this role from literature and the theater. In her book *Babel and Babylon*, Miriam Hansen (1991) links the emergence of a new type of public sphere to the cinematic modulation of forms of spectatorship. She conceives of this public dimension as “distinct from both textual and social determinations of spectatorship because it entails the very moment in which reception can gain a momentum of its own, can give rise to formations not necessarily anticipated in the context of production” (Hansen 1991: 7).

Although Hansen does not mention affect, and although she explicitly relies on (a modified version of) Habermas’ concept of the public sphere, processes of affecting and being affected actually fit what she describes as the virtual aspect of the public sphere, its capacity to open up in unforeseen directions. By distinguishing the cinematic public sphere from both the filmic “text” and the social in the narrow sense, she makes it possible to conceive of it as the matrix for an affective encounter between the movie screen and a plurality of spectators. Furthermore, she emphasizes the need for distinguishing between different and conflicting types of public life, taking her cue from Oskar Negt and Alexander Kluge (1972), who differentiate these types according to the way they deal with specific aspects of experience: they either tend to exclude them, exploit them, or foster them. Cinema potentially takes part in all three of these tendencies.

The public sphere in this context designates a “horizon of experience” (Hansen 1991: 19), which is “produced and reproduced, appropriated and contested, in the cinema as one among a number of cultural institutions and practices” (Hansen 1991: 14). The focus on experience allows Hansen to temper Habermas’ privileging of written language as the principal form of communication. Following critical theorists like Adorno, Kracauer, and Benjamin, Hansen understands experience not in an empiricist sense as acts of perception and cognition that are “based on stable subject-object relations”, but rather as “that which mediates individual perception with social meaning, conscious with unconscious processes, loss of self with self-reflexivity [...]; experience as the matrix of conflicting temporalities, of memory and hope, including the historical loss of these dimensions” (Hansen 1991: 12–13).

The notion of the public sphere of the cinema as an alternative horizon of experience enables Hansen to write a history of spectatorship that coincides neither with the invention of cinema as a technological medium nor with the social history of the United States. Instead, categories like “visual pleasure” (Hansen 1991: 2) and “mode of narration” (Hansen 1991: 16) come to the foreground. Donald and Donald (2000) complement this list by adding that cinema “makes available structures of visibility, modes of conduct, and practices of judgement, which together constitute a culture of public participation” (Donald and Donald 2000: 114). These categories can not only be connected to processes of affective

exchange, but are also crucial to processes of cultural meaning making. In this regard, one could summarize one aspect of cinema's publicness as providing "a normative discipline for living in a mediated present" (Donald and Donald 2000: 119). More openly, one might speak of film as "a *material expression* – not just representation – of a particular historical experience, an objective correlative, as it were, of the ongoing process of distintegration [sic]" characterizing modernity (Hansen 2012: 10, original emphasis).

This understanding of cinema's publicness has not remained uncontested itself. A contemporary of Kracauer's, Sergei Eisenstein, can count as an exemplary figure for the effort not only to regard cinema as a correlative to modern culture, but to remold modern societies in cinema's image. To this end, the audience – the "*basic material*" of cinema – has to be influenced "*in the desired direction* through a series of calculated pressures on its psyche" (Eisenstein 1924: 39, original emphasis). Cinema in this perspective is not conceptualized in terms of its mimetic capacities, but in terms of its capacities to affectively mobilize spectators: to "deliver [...] a series of blows to the consciousness and emotions of the audience" (Eisenstein 1924: 39). The goal of this kind of poetics is the public not as anonymous and dispersed, but as revolutionary community.

With regard especially to the first half of the 20th century, much research (cf. Horten 2002; Taylor 1998) has focused on the way "mass media" like radio and the cinema have influenced the construction of political communities by trying to create "a different type of citizen" (Donald and Donald 2000: 119) – an idea decidedly distinct from those models of the public sphere that have been formulated before and after. In recent years, this understanding of mediatization, that is, the creation, modulation and transformation of social relations by (the) media (as formulated, for example, by Jonathan Beller 2006) has been recast: After the disastrous and much-discussed failure of artistic and political projects to create a "new man", recent research has focused on the question of participation (cf. Knudsen and Stage 2014; Scullion et al. 2013). Most of these approaches proceed from some version of the argument that the concept of community can no longer be based on some pre-given common essence but has to take into account the radical and irreducible singularity of the many (cf. Nancy 2000). Theories of the public sphere have to be understood precisely with regard to this framework. Partly as an effect of the resistance against strong models of a "new man" or a "new society", the rational dimension of linguistic exchange has been overemphasized, and the role of affectivity has been underappreciated. But especially in the light of 9/11 and the subsequent transformations in political discourse, a consensus emerges that conventional theories of deliberative democracy are in need of renewal. In what follows, I will present and discuss some recent approaches that in one way or another aim to address the interplay between the media, the public, and emotions.

7 The mediasphere and its problems

At the outset of his book *Premediation* (2010), Richard Grusin introduces the idea of a "global mediasphere" (Grusin 2010: 2) constituted and perpetuated through the production of feelings by the media, and populated with its own citizens. In this context, "premediation" is a kind of discursive or cultural "logic" designed to provide those citizens with a

kind of affective stability in times of great insecurity, brought about by the watershed event of 9/11. An obvious example for this logic is how since around the time of the attacks “the role of the news media ha[s] increasingly come to consist not only of reporting what ha[s] already happened, but also of premediating what could happen next” (Grusin 2010: 41) – creating an affective experience of temporality that is directly linked to the kind of political concerns that might, in a Habermasian model, be subject to public deliberation: namely, questions of national and individual security, of war and peace, etc. Grusin’s concepts of media and affect are closely connected, insofar as mediation “operates through [...] ‘translation’, not by neutrally reproducing meaning or information but by actively transforming conceptual and affective states” (Grusin 2010: 6).

It follows that Grusin (2010) is interested not so much in the fact that, for example, arguments in favor of the US-Iraq War of 2003 were fabricated, but rather in how “the formal and structural premediation of the war, as much as any specific misinformation about it, created a sense of the war’s inevitability” (Grusin 2010: 43–44). Indeed, “so many different possible scenarios were pre-mediated that war with Iraq [...] seemed in many senses to have already been a televisually mediated news event” (Grusin 2010: 43). Grusin uncouples premediation from a representational model of mediation, in which media might be judged according to how accurately they mirror what we agree to call reality. By doing so, he manages to convincingly describe how the temporalities that structure mediated experience serve to create a shared sense, to “make sense” of the potential futures inhering in the present: a common, public feeling for what is possible:

Premediation is in this sense distinct from prediction. Unlike prediction, premediation is not about getting the future right. In fact it is precisely the proliferation of competing and often contradictory future scenarios that enables premediation to prevent the experience of a traumatic future by generating and maintaining a low level of anxiety as a kind of affective prophylactic. (Grusin 2010: 46)

Grusin is also able to relate the affective dimension of mediated experience to the constitution of a publicly shared morality: “we see the photographs [of Abu Ghraib] as outside the pale of civilized behavior because we first experienced them affectively within our everyday media practices” (Grusin 2010: 82). Here, the “we” of moral outrage cannot be divorced from the “we” that refers to a common way of using media. It seems problematic, however, to posit mediality against representationality in terms of historical succession, as Grusin (referring to Massumi) does, postulating that earlier uses of media have been “oriented more towards truth or fidelity of representation” than today (Grusin 2010: 79). A stronger emphasis on media history would cast doubt on this claim: the arousal and catharsis of feelings through media has not only been conceptualized theoretically in the Western world at least since Aristotle, but also implemented in the concrete design of innumerable works of art. Pitting affect and representation against one another in this way leads to false alternatives. The task is rather to account for the role of affects in *producing* meaning and/or representation, which is, as the example of film theory demonstrates, a matter of great complexity (cf. Kappelhoff 2018).

Another criticism that could be formulated against Grusin’s model is that it describes the emergence and perpetuation of the mediasphere as a necessary product of the “human/technics relation” and its “co-evolutionary technogenesis” bringing forth certain structures

of feeling. It is in this sense that he speaks of a “media regime” – without clarifying the political dimension of this regime (Grusin 2010: 138). At the same time, Grusin’s argument conveys the impression that certain actors (like governments) do have the capacity to influence and modulate the outlines of this sphere, although this is not explicitly conceptualized. On the contrary, Grusin dismisses the idea of a culture industry as ahistorical. He tends to bypass the question of political participation, instead implying an idea of consumers as passive recipients of media products – thus neglecting one of the most important tenets of affect theory, namely, the concept of relationality (or resonance). He does not account for the *tactics* through which spectators or users appropriate media products to arrive at their own ways of making sense of the world (on the distinction and relation between strategies and tactics, cf. Michel de Certeau 1988). Consequently, he speaks of “the public” only in the singular, never in the plural. As such, in Grusin’s account, the affective potential inherent in “the” public seems to be of rather secondary importance.

8 Affective publics

By contrast, publics (in the plural) take center stage in Zizi Papacharissi’s (2014, 2016) study on the relations between sentiments, media, and politics. Papacharissi describes this relation as follows:

[Affective publics] assemble around media and platforms that invite affective attunement, support affective investment, and propagate affectively charged expression, like Twitter. In doing so, media do not make or break revolutions, but they do lend emerging publics their own distinct mediality. Mediality shapes the texture of these publics and affect becomes the drive that keeps them going. (Papacharissi 2016: 308)

At least two questions result from this description: what is meant by the “texture” of publics, and where are these publics “going”? As Papacharissi explains it, her empirical approach was not initially guided by affect theory, but rather by several basic assumptions about the modes and functions of storytelling. In describing these modes, Papacharissi (2016: 309) refers to Grusin’s concept of premediation as a model for how stories become charged with affective intensity. The concept of “texture”, on the other hand, remains on a metaphorical level. It is used interchangeably with “form” and refers to the dimension of “mediality” (Papacharissi 2014: 5) marking these narratives. The strong focus on narrative (operating almost as a theoretical *apriori*) distinguishes Papacharissi’s engagement with both affect and media theory from other approaches. At the same time, it provokes questions with regard to her conceptualization of publics (more on that later).

Papacharissi studies “public displays of affect as political statements” (Papacharissi 2014: 7). The examples she gives (Occupy Wall Street, the Arab Spring) make it clear that “public” in her understanding is not so much a “sphere” but is rather almost synonymous with “movement” or even “revolution” – that is, a directed political effort (and not primarily, but only secondarily a realm of circulating, competing and often conflicting ideas, ideologies, images, and sensibilities). Such phenomena (social movements) have been the subject of sociological studies for a while now (cf. Goodwin, Jasper, and Polletta 2001; Gould

2009; Jasper 2018). It is from this perspective that Papacharissi's emphasis on narrative and directionality can be understood – an emphasis that is not necessarily shared by other approaches to public spheres. Michael Warner, for example, considers a public as strictly non-directional, existing “only as the end for which books are published, shows broadcast, Web sites posted [...]. It exists *by virtue of being addressed*” (Warner 2002: 67, original emphasis). Papacharissi's focus limits her study of publics to a few special and spectacular cases. (Side note: this interest in revolution in conjunction with the public sphere would be quite justifiable not only with regard to the above comments on Soviet montage theory and especially Eisenstein, but even more so with recourse to Immanuel Kant's remarks on the French Revolution and Arendt's development of Kant's theses. But neither of these thinkers is a significant point of reference for Papacharissi.)

What role do media play in the emergence of these affective publics or movements? Linking media and affect theory is far from being self-explanatory. According to Papacharissi (2014: 22–23), the relation between affect and media has to be thought of in economic terms:

Therefore, media are capable of sustaining and transmitting affect, in ways that may lead to the cultivation of subsequent feelings, emotions, thoughts, attitudes, and behaviors. The intensity supporting these reactions can be transformed into value, and the tendency to evaluate labor or play by virtue of the intensity behind the feeling with which it is performed produces an affect economy. (Papacharissi 2014: 22–23)

This definition with its comparatively narrow concept of economy builds on Hardt and Negri's (2000) theorization of the exploitation of affective labor. According to Hardt and Negri, in neoliberal capitalism affects become commodities that are being marketed and circulated. The question that arises is how such an understanding can account for the political function of media, especially with regard to participation (cf. Lehmann, Roth, and Schankweiler [2019] for an alternative approach to affective economies). In Papacharissi's account, this is where technology comes in: she states that online environments can create hybrid, “third places” that “invite newer civic habits that deviate from the deliberative ideal but also democratize by inviting a turn to the affective” (Papacharissi 2014: 25).

Papacharissi (2014: 113) argues that this deviation in media practices, which is inherent in a lot of newer forms of communication (e.g., on Twitter, other concepts of literacy become relevant compared to offline communication), goes along not only with new forms of expression, but also with a distinct sense of disagreement with normative categories in a political perspective. Such a shared sense of disagreement with a dominant (media) culture can be a powerful catalyst for feelings of commonality. This idea complements Grusin's argument that the specific way people are affected (by the gruesome images of Abu Ghraib, for example) is deeply connected to their everyday media practices. In this context, aesthetic judgment seems closely related to moral or political judgment – a point that could be elaborated further with recourse to the thinking of Hannah Arendt.

At the same time, the image of unison that Papacharissi (2014) sometimes paints with regard to these publics driven by deviation – e.g., “activated and sustained by feelings of belonging and solidarity” (Papacharissi 2014: 9) – might strike one as overstated. A description like “networked publics that want to tell their story collaboratively and on their

own terms” (Papacharissi 2016: 308), aimed at the concentration of exchange around certain hashtags on Twitter, conveys the impression almost of a plural subject united around a specific, commonly shared project. On the one hand, it seems unclear that what emerges from communication on Twitter can indeed be described in narrative terms, let alone as “a” (coherent or incoherent) story in the singular. Papacharissi rightfully poses the question “how affective infrastructures of storytelling turn an event *into* a story” (Papacharissi 2014: 56, original emphasis), but does not explain why one should regard the infrastructure of Twitter as an instrument of storytelling in the first place. A stronger vision of the mediality of language itself would be helpful in this regard. It seems that systematically, the concept of narrative is needed to explain affective involvement – although this has the problematic effect of transforming affective involvement into something resembling empathy or identification – e.g., “[w]e imagine their feelings of excitement” (Papacharissi 2014: 4). The creative dimension of media sometimes threatens to become an afterthought to the “transmission” of “real”, originally felt feelings in the form of stories.

Intuitively, it would appear more useful to take into account or even emphasize the non-linear, possibly rhizomatic structure of these generically highly diverse communications, consisting of declarations, re-tweets, likes, supportive or contrarian comments, inserted pictures, videos and gifs, back-and-forths, memes, misunderstandings, unanswered questions, etc. (From the standpoint of media theory it is rather questionable, for example, to regard photographs as a “storytelling device” [Papacharissi 2014: 4].) This would perhaps make it possible, on the other hand, to better account for the upsurges and the ebbing away of intensity, the infiltration of adjacent discourses, the spreading and transformation of topics – that is, the affective dynamics – that characterize these clusters of communication. The concept of story with its implications of authorship and linearity (or at least composition) seems ill-suited to capture the tensions and multiple facets that ought to be addressed by theories of publics.

By defining affective publics through a “public display of affect”, Papacharissi runs the risk not so much of introducing a circular argument, but of too narrowly defining her object of study, thus forfeiting the opportunity to make a general point about the affective foundations of any kind of public, including those that purport to be founded on a rational, disinterested exchange of arguments (Papacharissi 2014: 6). By concentrating on public displays of feeling affected – which would be the more precise formulation – Papacharissi leaves intact precisely those conventional notions of agency, intentionality, and rationality that affect theory originally set out to disturb. Thus, her conceptualization of affective publics relies on a dichotomy between deliberation and declaration (Papacharissi 2014: 114), between emotion and opinion, or between “drama” and “fact” (Papacharissi 2014: 56) that has repeatedly been criticized for not only unnecessarily reducing the complexity of public discourse, but for reproducing the divide between rationality and irrationality that contributes to the discursive perpetuation of inequalities in terms of gender, race, and class (cf. Hall 2007). What is instead needed is not only a recognition of the affective dimension of public deliberation, but also a theoretical model for mediated processes of affective exchange that goes beyond both this idea of deliberation and the metaphor of texture.

9 Genres of public feelings

So far, we have been looking at media theoretical approaches with more or less strong leanings to affect studies in the more narrow sense. The other prominent strand of research with regard to the relation between media, publics, and emotional phenomena originates from a comparatively clearly defined area of research, namely feminist and queer studies with a decidedly critical attitude towards phenomena from popular culture. Some of the researchers within this field have even formed a kind of loose association called “Public Feelings”. From within this group and its various associates, a number of insightful and productive contributions has enriched the debate on the topic (cf. Love 2007; Stewart 2007; Cvetkovich 2012).

Lauren Berlant’s book *Cruel Optimism* (2011), for example, is concerned with describing how “aesthetically mediated affective responses exemplify a shared *historical sense*” (Berlant 2011: 3, original emphasis). This formulation promises to take up the three main threads running through this article (media, emotions, and the public sphere). Berlant’s conception of public differs from Papacharissi’s insofar as a shared sense of historical perspective does not amount to common goals for action, nor even to a common story, but is rather the precondition for negotiating political decisions or developing personal narratives – a precondition that itself has to be recreated again and again: “Public spheres are always affect worlds, worlds to which people are bound, when they are, by affective projections of a constantly negotiated interestedness” (Berlant 2011: 226). This production of a shared historicity, of a shared *now* is, according to Berlant, a function of various genres she finds in political speech, literature, and audiovisual images – genres in which morality, intimacy, and economy are inherently intermingled through the tissue of fantasy. While these genres further the emergence of “a precarious public sphere” (Berlant 2011: 3), this sphere itself produces new variations, modulations, and overlaps between different genres and circulates them in turn.

Berlant (2011: 11) describes genres as emerging from a process of “adjustment” or mediation between the affective, embodied rhythms of the everyday and fantasies of the “good life” – effectively, as “ways of making sense” (Cavell 1979: 32). One such genre she calls “situation tragedy”, her examples being two films by the Dardenne brothers, *La Promesse* (1996) and *Rosetta* (1999). In situation tragedy (as opposed to comedy), “the subject’s world is fragile beyond repair, one gesture away from losing all access to sustaining its fantasies: the situation threatens utter, abject unraveling” (Berlant 2011: 6). If one wants to raise one criticism against Berlant, it would be that her analysis of these films does not reach the level of her theoretical argument (which is at times phrased rather demandingly): she remains mostly at the level of plot and narrative, without reconstructing how the cinematic image produces those fictional characters that she describes in psychological terms. This is a quite common problem in affect studies, as the theoretical models tend so much towards abstraction that practical application proves difficult, and analysis reverts to the level of representation – especially easily in the case of a quasi-naturalistic aesthetic like that of the Dardennes.

A central question for the constitution of any kind of public sphere is how it is constituted sensorially. In one chapter, Berlant discusses the interplay and political tensions that

unfold between speech, silence, and their respective mediated stagings with regard to public spheres and spaces – taking up the question of language, but in a way clearly distinct from Habermas' focus on intelligibility. She understands the demonstrative use of silence as another kind of noise, emphasizing its “visceral immediacy” (Berlant 2011: 229). Political art reorganizes the sensorium of social communication, aiming to “remobilize and redirect the normative noise that binds the affective public of the political to normative politics as such” (Berlant 2011: 228). As a consequence, the perspective on language changes radically.

The distinction between politics (meaning the organization of state power) and the political (meaning the distribution of the sensible) that is implied here has been central to those postfoundational political theories that were mentioned in the beginning of this chapter. It is important also for models of the public sphere insofar as it helps explain the political dimension of conflicts over public visibility: disputing the limits of what can be seen or heard is, according to theorists like Jacques Rancière (2009), political activity par excellence. Berlant complements his account not only by stressing how redistributing the sensible involves bodies affectively; she also draws on a broad spectrum of examples reaching from “classical” avant-garde to projects that navigate and sometimes undermine the divide between high and low forms of art on which much of Rancière’s argument depends. In this way, her work can be read as a productive resumption of a longstanding debate on the public sphere – a debate that has time and again centered on the merits and problems of Habermas’ defining study.

10 Publics and/or counterpublics

One important challenge to Habermas’ conceptualization of the public sphere has been formulated by Nancy Fraser (1990): it is misguided, Fraser argues, to think of the public as a transcendent sphere where we can prescind from contingent, individual traits and properties like class and race to encounter each other as equal participants of democratic discourse. On the contrary, it is these aspects of one’s identity that are central to any negotiation of political consequences. Consequently, she argues in favor of “a multiplicity of publics” (Fraser 1990: 62), each one potentially challenging normative discourse on its own terms. But while Fraser characterizes her “subaltern counterpublics” as “parallel discursive arenas where members of subordinated social groups invent and circulate counterdiscourses” (Fraser 1990: 67), Michael Warner dismisses this conceptualization as a “classically Habermasian description of rational-critical publics, with the word ‘oppositional’ inserted” (Warner 2002: 118). In contradistinction, Warner emphasizes the poetic making of new worlds in counterpublics, based on specific genres, styles, and temporalities. This implicitly aesthetic definition aims not only at the content of discourse but at an existential dimension of being affected and transformed in one’s corporeal being (cf. Tedjasukmana 2014: 18): “Here the point is that the [conventional] perception of public discourse as conversation obscures the importance of the poetic functions of both language and corporeal expressivity in giving a particular shape to publics. The public is thought to exist empirically and to require persuasion rather than poesis” (Warner 2002: 115).

Even more explicitly than Berlant, Warner (2002: 114–115) conceives of publics as processes of “poetic world making” via “multigeneric circulation”, implicitly providing a link to the aforementioned work of Nelson Goodman. This capacity of poetic world-making carries with it a certain utopian potential that can itself give rise to feelings of hope and exuberance connected to a specific manner of living together. In this context, Warner finds a productive role for language, connecting it to aspects of styles and attitudes, as well as pointing out its economic function – meaning both its manner of circulation and its capacity for exploitation (as exemplified in the term “talk value”, see Warner [2002: 101–102]).

In an interesting reversal of Warner’s insistence on non-directionality, a certain subliminal aspect of revolutionary temporality seems at play at least in those kinds of (counter-) publics that are “defined by their tension with a larger public” (Warner 2002: 56). This description seems to echo Berlant’s idea of an “intimate public that organizes life without threading through dominant political institutions” (Berlant 2011: 20) – such publics being understood as constellations characterized by their implicit promise of mutual recognition. This promise is especially interesting because publics, according to Warner, necessarily include an imaginary aspect by which they always exceed their known social basis (Warner 2002: 74). This trait places them at the intermediary position between the perspective of the individual lived-body and the plurality of perspectives suspended in the realm of fantasies, images, and ideas through which societies make sense of themselves. It is this intermediary position which connects publics so deeply to the question of mediality and, by extension, to the domain of aesthetic experience. For it is media through which we construct our concepts of space and time that make it possible to develop a feeling for a commonly shared world in the first place.

11 Space and time

In discussing the political function of art, one can take at least two basically distinct positions: one approach locates the political value of art in its withdrawal from the dynamics of circulation that characterize popular culture and that could be said to make up public spheres. The paradigmatic example for this approach would be critical theory in the vein of Theodor Adorno, especially strongly formulated in his and Max Horkheimer’s chapter on the “culture industry” in *The Dialectic of Enlightenment* (Adorno and Horkheimer [1947] 2002). One can find a contemporary version of this idea in the writings of Jacques Rancière (2009), whose model of a politics of aesthetics relies in part on a distinction between high and low art: new distributions of the sensible are reserved, according to his argument, for truly challenging aesthetic experiences not to be found in daytime TV, social media, or conventional genre cinema, for example.

The opposite position insists that the manner of intervention into the affective dynamics of public communication is central to any discussion of the political dimension of art and aesthetic experience. One important task in this context is to question the concept of “the” public sphere itself. This can be done, as we have seen in Fraser (1990), by insisting on a plurality of publics. Another option, developed by Sarah Sharma (2014), is to dispute the paradigm of spatiality upon which the idea of a public sphere seems to be founded.

She starts by referring to a debate on “slowness” that has emerged in reaction to a perceived speedup in social and mediated relations of all kinds. And although she does not emphasize the topic of aesthetic experience, her argument echoes the controversy outlined above: “There is a dominating sensibility within this discourse on slowness that being a ‘good’ political citizen requires transcendence” (Sharma 2014: 134). Sharma traces this sensibility back to an encompassing cultural dominance of spatial over temporal paradigms: “our ways of knowing, systems of power, and even notions of resistance tend to be spatial” (Sharma 2014: 12). In contradistinction to this hegemony of spatial thinking, Sharma argues for a politics of temporality: “the temporal is political regardless of speed and is present no matter what the dominant technologies of the day are. For [Harold] Innis, the temporal is a power dynamic – not a new condition resulting from speedup but an enduring political and economic reality with important cultural effects” (Sharma 2014: 11).

Sharma understands the constitution of social collectivity in terms of a biopolitical economy of time. Speedup, from this perspective, is not so much an undisputed fact brought about by technological progress, but rather a narrative that legitimizes the demands for transformation made in the name of global capitalism. The impression of speedup, like all individual sense of temporality, is not constituted technologically, but depends on one's own relation to this biopolitical economy of time. Sharma describes the institutionalization of social cohesion somewhat akin to a cinematic image in the sense of Gilles Deleuze, that is, as an entanglement of multiple temporalities: sharing a common space does not entail acting according to the same regime of temporality (her examples include taxis, underground trains, yoga classes or public libraries). In this approach, *all* spaces are understood as transitional spaces – against the conventional notion according to which spaces of transit are regarded as deficient variants of public spheres: “But a temporal public is not based on the opposition between public space and private space. Rather, a temporal public recognizes that all social spaces produce publics” (Sharma 2014: 147).

Offering a convincing alternative to the spatial model of political resistance would require theories of time to describe more precisely the ways in which the entanglements are realized: “A temporal perspective does not try to create more free time; it strives to free time from this fixation. It reimagines time, not as being singularly yours or mine for the taking but as uncompromisingly tethered and collective” (Sharma 2014: 150).

It seems questionable, however, to conceive of the idea of temporal publics with recourse to Martin Heidegger of all people (Sharma 2014: 149), a thinker known for his problematic focus on individual as opposed to collective experience. However, Sharma brings up an important point: “there is no common experience of time, no universal free time in which the spatialized ideals of democracy and social change can be realized. In short, the radical revising of the public via spatial pluralism requires temporal pluralism” (Sharma 2014: 146). The simple, sometimes brute fact of living together in a shared space is not enough for a sense of commonality to emerge; rather, a common basis, an experience of space and time needs to be created that is accessible from multiple entry points. It is beyond the scope of Sharma's book to envision the means for such a creation; from the point of view of this chapter, it is not surprising to imagine art and aesthetic experience playing a key role in such a project.

12 Conclusion: Summary of the state of research

At the end of this review of the state of research, we can extract several results. One is that there is a considerable divide in affect studies between theoretical claims and the analysis that is actually carried out. While in the domain of theory, the arguments of Deleuze, Guattari, or Spinoza are quoted and discussed in great detail, it often proves difficult to convert their insights analytically when confronted with empirical material – whether this be cinematic images, social movements, or political discourse. This methodological problem concerns affect studies as a whole. It cannot, however, be solved simply by inventing adequate methods. Additionally, there has to be a debate about the place of methodology itself in the nexus between the social sciences and the humanities, both of which rightfully claim their part in the study of affective phenomena (see Kahl 2018). At the very least, it seems necessary to recognize that there are no methods independent from the material they are applied to. This is because with regard to affective phenomena, there is no position of sovereignty from where to observe events impartially. Rather, the principle of affective relationality involves each and every one – which is why the question of its public dimension is so important.

Another question concerns the choice of subject: while some studies analyze phenomena of popular culture (network TV, internet platforms like YouTube or Twitter) or openly political events like revolutionary uprisings, others focus on works of art, often of the decidedly avant-garde variety, that are mostly not widely known. This difference in subject matter is not simply a question of pessimistic vs. optimistic conclusions, but instead has a number of repercussions: for example, emphasizing the significance of artworks in the narrow sense tends to attribute more weight to capacities of reflection and resistance, while attention to popular culture may bear the risk of exaggerating the power of institutions and their strategies, leaving no room for the aesthetic and political productivity of consumers. With regard to this problem, the study of Zizi Papacharissi is to be commended for its nuanced appraisal of the potentials and difficulties inherent in the use of media like Twitter.

On the other hand, trying to determine the political potential of specific media or works of art can prove to be problematic, because it usually serves to affirm the discursive position established by the research itself: ascribing political (and/or aesthetic) “value” to a given film, for example, does not do much except legitimize both the film and its analysis. It seems much more insightful to study how a given film makes possible a plurality of diverging readings (each being used, potentially, in different kinds of public), and how these readings make use of the audiovisual images in different ways: “not posing questions about the value of avant-garde modernism as such, but addressing the question of *how* political art [...] shapes the desire for the political” (Berlant 2011: 238). Such a project would represent a step towards a more precise understanding of the interplay between media, publics, and emotion.

13 Outlook: Gossip as media practice

In this outlook, to provide a line of flight towards possible future research, I would like to come back to the paradigm of cinema I introduced in the beginning via Miriam Hansen's discussion of Kracauer and others. From that discussion, one question remained open: What does a life look like that belongs to no one, and what is its potential? Let's recall Kracauer's account of boredom:

In the evening one saunters through the streets, replete with an unfulfillment from which a fullness could sprout. Illuminated words glide by on the rooftops, and already one is banished from one's own emptiness into the alien *advertisement*. One's body takes root in the asphalt, and, together with the enlightening revelations of the illuminations, one's spirit – which is no longer one's own – roams ceaselessly out of the night and into the night. If only it were allowed to disappear! [...]

Should the spirit by chance return at some point, it soon takes its leave in order to allow itself to be cranked away in various guises in a *movie theater*. It squats as a fake Chinaman in a fake opium den, transforms itself into a trained dog that performs ludicrously clever tricks to please a film diva, gathers up into a storm amid towering mountain peaks, and turns into both a circus artist and a lion at the same time. How could it resist these metamorphoses? The posters swoop into the empty space that the spirit itself would not mind pervading; they drag it in front of the silver screen, which is as barren as an emptied-out palazzo. And once the images begin to emerge one after another, there is nothing left in the world besides their evanescence. One forgets oneself in the process of gawking, and the huge dark hole is animated with the illusion of a life that belongs to no one and exhausts everyone. (Kracauer 1995: 332)

If Kracauer's descriptions at times seem oddly contemporary (he could almost as well describe an online browser history), we might take this impression as a basis for an analysis of our contemporary "mediaspHERE": In his essay "The Secret Lives of Images", Marc Siegel starts with collecting a list of images not so unlike those enumerated by Kracauer. And, similar to Kracauer, Siegel is concerned with allowing "the porousness of the cinematic text to open onto a cinematic experience beyond that of the moment of projection" (Siegel 2017: 196). However, Siegel frames his list from the outset as a repertoire of cinematic moments circulating in and constituting an important dimension of gay and lesbian culture, thereby referring to a kind of public sphere that is constructed and contested in quite specific ways – namely, through the circulation of cinematic images regardless of their supposedly "proper" contexts: "their contextualization in found-footage films and clip-show presentations at queer film festivals; their reproduction in queer criticism and scholarship; their manipulations on blogs, YouTube, and Tumblr; or their invocation in gossip" (Siegel 2017: 196).

Gossip in fact plays a major role in conceptualizing a public sphere that comes into being and sustains itself through media practices. Again, we return to the subject of language – although in a quite specific perspective, as gossip is a manner of speaking that cannot be detached from its way of relating all kinds of human and nonhuman participants to one another. It can be, in fact, described as a media practice (see e.g. Couldry 2012). Thus, we come full circle, back to the beginning of this essay, which started with the critique on Habermas and his notion of language. Regarding gossip as a media practice turns our attention away from aspects like veracity or normativity and towards aspects like appropriation and performance – perhaps leading towards a more adequate understanding

of contemporary publics in future research. An important step towards this goal would be to connect the description of media practices with the emergence of power relations and a “common space of appearances” (Couldry 2012: 62), i.e. the formation of communities.

In this context, the subject of gossip is not completely arbitrary. Michael Warner argues, for example, that most kinds of gossip rely on intimate knowledge of the persons who participate in gossip as well as of the persons who are its subject (Warner 2002: 78–79). Siegel circumvents this problem by focusing on a kind of gossip that is mainly directed at film stars and their “image” (understood in a double/metaphorical sense). Echoing Krausser’s analysis of boredom as a mode of linking everyday behavior and practices of spectatorship, Siegel (2017) describes gossip (and rumor) as being not only a social practice which “anticipates and generates new scenarios of human interaction” (Siegel 2017: 198), but also a way of modulating cinematic experience:

Gossip, I argue, is not simply a means of oral communication but rather a speculative logic of thought apposite to cinema and central to the construction of identity and intimacy in queer counterpublics. I treat gossip as a performative means of transforming one’s relationship to the self and one’s intimates through the circulation of speculations about others. (Siegel 2017: 198)

This activity of speculation, one could argue, is not only a logic of thought but has to be seen as an inherently affective one – driven not only by curiosity and the self-propelling energy of the gossip speech act itself, which can be analyzed as a specific mode of mobilizing spatiotemporal relations and thereby affectively engaging spectators. Speculation is also bound up with the complex dynamic of resonance and dissonance, insecurities, hesitation, and desire for confidentiality that Rick Altman describes as being characteristic for generic communities (cf. Altman 1999: 158–159). Remarkably, Altman compares the act of “confessing” one’s taste in genres to the act of “coming out”, which, in the case of generic communities, “simultaneously involves *coming into contact* with a select group of genre fans” (Altman 1999: 159, original emphasis). Importantly for the purposes of this article, Siegel directly links these affective dimensions to aesthetic experience: Playing on the entanglement and double/metaphorical meaning between star image (which is emphatically public and at the same time still connected to the aesthetic experience of films) and cinematic image, he describes how a feeling of commonality is produced through acts of consumption and distribution: “a sense of ourselves as queer was linked to this counterpublic’s re-circulation of images from popular culture” (Siegel 2017: 201).

The important aspect to note is that “cinematic images” in this context are no longer necessarily projected in a cinema, but instead disseminated across a variety of different viewing contexts, which also interpenetrate one another. “Online cinema”, apart from picking up modalities and formats of the early “cinema of attractions” (along with reanimating the state of constant *distraction* characterizing the attitude of spectators well into the 1920s),

also reprises early television structures and programming, it is reminiscent of the structure of home movies, the project of Do-It-Yourself, as well as restaging the videotape and the structure of waves and vibrations inherent to it. Online cinema resumes all of the experimental and amateur film movements, and their plans for politicizing art [...]. (Holl 2012: 152)

Internet video platforms make the circulation and re-circulation of images both manifest and prefigure it by embedding each video in a field of others that in some way or another respond either to the content of the current video, the viewer's search history, recent events, or some combination of these (and probably a lot more) factors. In this way, media practices become visibly interwoven with media structures, and the audiovisual images themselves become porous to the affective flux of multiple temporalities intersecting with each other, answering to sudden impulses of curiosity as well as to longstanding fascinations or unpredictable changes in mood. In this flux, mediated and social realities are so closely intertwined as to become indistinguishable. This intertwinement in turn enables the emergence of new "affective publics", which make it possible for people "to feel their own place" (Papacharissi 2014: 4, original emphasis) in the world – that is, to extract a sense of commonality out of our mediated present.

14 References

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Konstanze Marx

78 Social media and emotion

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Abstract: That emotions can be expressed is not a matter of course, but often the result of difficult reflection processes. In addition, contexts are needed in which an expression of emotions is possible. Social media are an ideal place for the expression of emotions. They function like a big stage. Sayability is expressed here in a performative way, reflected and strikingly questioned. So there are two dimensions that are thematized in this paper. On the one hand, so-called intra-territorial data that reveal private things and carefully explore spaces of sayability. On the other hand, so-called extra-territorial data, which are strategically used to discredit other people and overstress sayability. Both forms make different use of emotional expressions in social media, with different goals and purposes. They are brought together with the consideration that both are ultimately not only understood as linguistic actions, but always as pointing actions. This pointing is probably already inscribed in the linguistic actions and could influence the way they are presented in the long term.

1 Introductory overview of the relationship between social media and emotion

In recent years, communication in social media has increasingly been associated with a new form of “sayability”. Sayability covers several aspects: the ability to express something, objects that can be made the subject of something said, contexts that allow something to be said as a specific environment. This integrates several different perspectives: the speaker perspective, the object perspective and the discourse perspective. It is therefore necessary to ask under what conditions speakers or writers feel able to say things. Furthermore, we must ask which objects even touch the question of sayability. Consider what is able to be talked about, what is not, taboos (both present and outdated), and the reason for the existence of taboos in the first place. We must also consider the respective context of a given taboo. Thus, taboo subjects are dependent on the size and composition of a communicative environment.

Against this background, sayability as a concept is initially free of values. It can integrate speech involving taboo subjects (in the course of this paper referred to as “intra-territorial data”) as well as violation of politeness (in the course of this paper referred to as “extra-territorial data”); there are even interfaces between both kinds of data, which emerge in contexts of arguing for instance.

Sayability not only manifests itself in previously private content now being discussed in a publicly accessible space rather than behind closed doors, but it also relates to the way things are actually thematized. There is a special emotional intensity that plays a role, the spectrum of which ranges from intimate confessions of love to the expression of extreme anger. This latter type (of expressing things aggressively and in public) in particular is generally acknowledged and has recently been problematized: for example, in April 2017 the German President Walter Steinmeier (Der Bundespräsident 2017) lamented the brutalization of language on the Internet, when expressing his consternation about hateful entries in social media, and in August 2018 Federal Justice Minister Katarina Barley (dpa 2018) warned against “brutal language use”. So this one side of the new phenomenon is clearly being noticed from an observational point of view (even in linguistic science; see Niehr 2018). It is noticed because borders are crossed or at least a border crossing is felt. On the basis of this observation, these communicative events are to be classified as phenomena of delimitation. Taboos are either broken, because intimate or private things are revealed, or ethical and moral values are disregarded in social dealings with each other and in this way boundaries are crossed. These communicative events are always accompanied by a visible expression of emotion and the question arises why digital space is so well suited for delimitation phenomena, especially with regard to the expression of emotions?

On the one hand, anonymity, which allows users to hide their civic identity in network communication, is repeatedly cited as an important factor (see among others Schwarz-Friesel 2013; Livingstone 2008; Utz 2010; Antaki et al. 2005). Chenault (1998) speaks of “depersonalisation” as a prerequisite for communication at a particularly personal level. Indeed, as Thaler (2012: 135) states, the degree of familiarity and solidarity, e.g. in anonymous chats, is particularly high. Proximity – while remaining isolated in digital space – can perhaps be permitted precisely because one’s own identity does not have to be revealed to exchange highly personal content.

On the other hand, anonymity on the Social Web no longer plays a major role (see, among others, Bedijs and Heyder 2012: 7; Marx 2017a: 30). On the contrary, users seem to use the Social Web as a stage for self-expression. For this purpose, acting as a real, identifiable person appears to be an important requirement. The question as to why people would publish highly personal content as well as politically compromising statements can be explained with the concept of digital narcissism by Rüdiger and Bayerl (2018). It states that, in an online environment, people disclose highly personal content to gain self-affirmation and recognition through positive feedback. It can be assumed that this narcissism leads to a gamified design of an online identity – a digital ego that can align itself with positive evaluations.

This is one of the ways in which so-called “echo chambers” are formed (see Sunstein 2001; Hill et al. 2010). Brodnig (2016: 222) also refers to it as “filter bubble”, or digital isolation. The establishment of echo chambers is based on principles that have been dis-

cussed in cognitive psychology since the 1960s as “perseverance of beliefs, hypothesis preservation and confirmation bias” (Klayman 1995: 385) in decision-making processes. Users therefore actively make use of the opportunity to create a digital feel-good space for themselves that clearly contrasts with the real world in which the diversity of beliefs must be sustained and which nevertheless integrates people who really exist. Lovestorms or so-called “shitstorms” can also be viewed in this context as they demonstrate the dynamics of spiralling emotions. Lovestorms are communicative events in which an initial event evokes a series of positive evaluations in the form of social media comments, whereas shitstorms contain of negative, defamatory (even just critical) comments (see Gredel 2016 or Marx 2020).

What follows from this idea is that another reason for revealing highly personal content may be the need to make emotions expressible in words in order to be able to communicate them and to reassure oneself of one’s own emotional world. This brings us back to conceptualizing social media as a kind of rehearsal stage (inspired by Goffman 1959).

Continuing with this analogy: On this “social” stage there are countless actors and plenty of interesting details on the set. It is therefore a special task and challenge to draw the attention of the audience to oneself. Exaggerations, spectacular announcements, and breaking taboos are particularly well suited for this purpose, as we also know from other contexts. According to Meier’s (2016: 41–42) statement that the Internet loves rants, one can extrapolate that rage (and emotion at large) adds to the feedback loop and baits out more engagement (or clicks) from users. This could serve as a possible explanation as to the use of attention-grabbing posts.

This article summarizes the main features of the connection between social media and emotions. It begins with a schematic overview of the kinds of semiotic resources that are used in social media to express emotions. In fact, language is only one mode. As I will show, there are a number of other semiotic modes that are used to express emotions in social media. Therefore, it makes sense to speak of a multimodal implementation of emotions (Section 2). Section 3 then takes a close-up look at specific emotions. These represent intra-territorial data on the one hand, and extra-territorial data on the other (see Marx 2019). This division is inspired by Goffman’s conceptualization of the “Territory of the Self” (Goffman 1974; see also Meyrowitz 1990). Intra-territorial data represent forms of communication of highly personal content. They can be considered from two perspectives with respect to sayability: data whose sayability is not actively reflected and data whose sayability is metapragmatically reflected and even reinterpreted functionally. With extra-territorial data the net affordance (see Bucher and Helmond [2019] for a very good overview of the term “affordances” in general and of the affordances of social media platforms in particular), sayability is negated and paradoxically at the same time is continuously strained and overstretched by reaching into the territory of others. This may include vilification, discrimination, slander, sedition, in short: hate speech and fake news. Sayability is considered as something that does not exist, something that one actively must strive for. Thus, these data types differ both in content and in their communicative function and effects. In the concluding Section 4, the question of why social media in particular are suitable platforms for expressing emotions is revisited.

2 Semiotic resources for the transport of emotions in social media

2.1 Emojis

Since the early days of linguistic research of the Internet it has been believed that smileys express feelings (Runkehl, Schlobinski, and Siever 1998: 96). Smileys existed even before communication was established in social media (Bieswanger 2013) and have been regarded as typical examples of Internet-based communication, and as the linguistic feature of digital communication par excellence (see Beißwenger 2016: 15). Püschel (2014: 58) describes them as abstract signs for human facial expressions. Consequently, smileys/emoticons and their further developed forms, the emojis, are said to be able to compensate for para- and non-verbal signs (see, among others, Runkehl, Schlobinski, and Siever [1998: 99]; for an overview, see Albert [2015] and Pappert [2017: 179–181]). However, Imo (2015: 137) pleads for emojis to be understood as verbal units rather than gestural, mimic or prosodic ones. These assumptions are based on the analysis of WhatsApp data and other messenger communications in which emojis are often used as substitutes for text messages. Schwarz-Friesel points out that emoticons could be “interjections of the Internet” (Schwarz-Friesel 2013: 161).

Emoji is a loan word from Japanese, which is composed of the words *e* for *picture* and *moji* for *characters* (see owid.de or oed.com, entry: *Emoji*), but the association of the partial equivalence with the word *emotion* seems to be mainly reflected in its use: “These symbols have become a frequently used expression of emotion and communicative intent” (Kaye, Malone, and Wall 2017: 66). With the increasing differentiation and growing list of graphic icons, the pragmatic functions have also been examined in more detail in recent research. Emotional feedback, humorous play and the modalization of sound play an important role here (Herring and Dainas 2017). Busch (2020) shows that emojis are among the social emblems of so-called female writing. The heart emoji in particular is considered as a marker of female digital writing. Male writers also make situational use of so-called female registered forms, such as the heart/kiss emojis, but mainly to create ironic distance in same-sex communication or to stage their romantic interest in cross-gender flirt sequences; see also Fladrich and Imo (2020).

The use of hearts, which will be discussed in more detail here as an example, seems very differentiated. Colours and shapes are adapted to match the topic of the message. For mourning or condolence, for example, black, purple or broken hearts are used (see [1]), while soccer enthusiasts use hearts in the club’s colour, etc. Emojis hardly ever have a fixed semantic meaning. Rather, the meaning arises in the respective context. This is worth mentioning because emojis are often assumed to have a fixed meaning. So there are long lists in the Internet which show the assumed meaning of emojis. In the end, however, these can only be orientations or approximations.

In example (1) we also see a comment in which the emoji was explicitly omitted, shown by the brackets enclosing an empty space. By omitting the emoji, especially deep compassion can be expressed, analogous to silence.

- (1) Kurze drei Wochen zu sechst. Aber es hat wohl nicht gepasst für uns. Fluch und Segen zugleich diese frühen Schwangerschaftstests.
 'Short three weeks in a group of six. But the time wasn't right for us. Early pregnancy tests are both a curse and a blessing.'
 (Twitter, 2018–08–17, 10:19 replies: 42, retweets 0, likes: 49)

reply: (((Heart)))

(Twitter, 2018–08–17, 10:47 replies: 0, retweets 0, likes: 1)

reply: Das tut mir leid. ((0))

'I'm sorry [to read that].'

(Twitter, 2018–08–17, 12:26 replies: 0, retweets 0, likes: 2)

reply: 💔

(Twitter, 2018–08–17, 12:41, replies: 0, retweets 0, likes: 2)

reply: Vor zwei Wochen bei uns genau das gleiche...es ist traurig... 💔💔

'Two weeks ago we had exactly the same... it's sad... '

(Twitter, 2018–08–17, 13:31 replies: 0, retweets 0, likes: 0)

2.2. Additional pictorial elements

Images are undoubtedly an important mode for the transmission of emotions in social media. These can be photos that show everyday moments and document a broad spectrum of human emotions in all their complexity. However, wedding photos, photos showing happy couples, photos of and with one's own children or pictures showing pets, the garden or one's vehicle play a special role. Photographs are usually taken and published in moments of great joy or pride.

So-called Facebook poetry (which can also be found on other social networking sites) is used to create an emotional atmosphere or facilitate reflection on feelings. These are words of wisdom, clever sayings, insights and mottos related to people's specific experiences. Mostly they are placed on top of pictures of flowers, paths, angels or beaches (see Figure 78.1).

Memes represent another transmission mode for emotions as they show patterns that are generally easy to recognize and that allow users to express solidarity with the pattern in one form or another (see Figure 78.2). They are usually humorous and help to establish an ironic distance.

Grief, fear of loss, longing, vulnerability or depression are also pictorially documented, but symbolic images are often used for this purpose (see also Willis and Ferrucci 2017). On Instagram we find depersonalised images that show the results of self-harming (such as cutting) for example.

In cases like this, we often find text-image combinations that try to make visible what would otherwise be very difficult to articulate (see Figure 78.3). This includes speaking



Fig. 78.1: Example of Facebook poetry (pictorial inscription: 'Sometimes you have to have the courage to change direction to follow your path').




Fig. 78.2: Meme: Dawson crying, see <https://knowyourmeme.com/memes/dawson-crying> (accessed 23 April 2022) for the meme's origin and spread.




Fig. 78.3: Instagram images referring to depression and self-harm.

nicknames, such as *suicidemon_*, *deprezzed_moon* or *thinspiration* (cf. for speaking nicknames, see Kaziaba [2016] or Lotze, Sprengel, and Zimmer [2015]). They are integrated into images that relentlessly show anorexia or self-harm. As a result the author disappears behind the picture and seems to speak with a voice that's not his/her own, thereby building up a distance to him- or herself, his/her own emotions and his/her own suffering.

2.3. Graphic modifications

The expression of emotions is reflected not only in the use of pictorial elements, but also in the design of the script. The most important features are majuscules (comment by C and F in example [2], taken from a Facebook comment history of a vegan recipe for Mousse au Chocolat from 16 August 2018) and so-called iterations, i.e. the repetition of letters and punctuation marks (comment by B, D and E in example [2]).

- (2) A to B: machen wir nächste Woche ?
 ‘We’ll do that next week?’
 B: Omg jaaaaa 
 ‘Omg yesssss’
 C: Ihr seid der HAMMA  
 ‘You guys are HAMMERS = so COOL’
 D: Ihr seid sooooo süß  <3
 ‘You are sooooo sweet’
 E: ausprobiereeeeen 
 ‘check it ooouuut’
 F: ICH WILL EUCH TREFFEN. haha ihr seid die geilsten 
 ‘I WANT TO MEET YOU. haha you are the coolest, man’

Capital letters are attributed to various expressive functions. These range from varying the volume (such as screaming in chat) to emphasis and highlighting. Dürscheid and Frick (2016: 94) speak of expressive capitalization and compare the function of capitalization in social media with advertising, where words often act as eye-catchers.

With iterations, a distinction must be made between repetition of letters or punctuation marks. Letter repetitions as in (2) are associated with the imitation of sound characteristics. Haase et al. (1997: 14) call it “emulated prosody”, i.e. that accent, rhythm and initiation are imitated in writing. Repetition of punctuation marks is usually used for expressive amplification. In (3) (the comments are taken from a Facebook comment history of an article from Wochensicht.at with the title “Eating meat is unnatural and uneconomical for humans” from 21 July 2018), B’s writing thus signals incomprehension, which can be associated with impatience and the lack of will to deal with the content of the previous comment, because the punctuation is misleading. In (4) we are confronted not only with the iteration of exclamation marks, which in itself conveys a strong expressiveness. Typically, repetitions of exclamation marks are additionally interspersed with the number one (“1”). This appears because you need to press Caps Lock to type question marks. The “1”s appear when the

user lets go of Caps Lock too soon. Thus, it seems as if exclamation marks were therefore written in capital letters for special reinforcement, like a sign of typing fast to express one's consternation. This way, of course, several "1"s can be created in a row, such as the eleven (in [4]). The fact that it is spelled out marks the maximum degree of indignation or even aggression.

- (3) A: Tut das was der hat eigentlich weh?
‘Does what he has actually hurt?’
B: ??,??
- (4) Denkt denn keiner an die Kinder!!!!1elf (@xyz)
‘Doesn’t anybody think of the children!!!!1eleven (@xyz)’
(Twitter, 2018–08–19, 11:09)

2.4 Hashtags

Hashtags are an important component in computer-mediated communication. According to Messina (2007; cf. the first mention by Chris Messina: “how do you feel about using # (pound) for groups. As in #barcamp [msg]?” (Twitter, 2007–08–23, 12:25, Comments: 150, Retweets: 1.416, Likes: 2,636), they were “a rather messy proposal” for “improving contextualization, content filtering and explanatory serendipity within Twitter by creating a system of ‘channel tags’ using the pound or hash (#) symbol, allowing people to follow and contribute to conversation on particular topics of interest” (Messina 2007). Of course, they are still used in this sense today, thus it is worth taking a closer look at the potential of the hashtag, which I call a “virtual macro sign” in terms of emotional sayability.

Hashtags have a number of pragmatic functions that cannot be explained in detail here (Marx 2017b). In the context of sayability, the practice of marking posts or messages with a hashtag is relevant because hashtags are no longer just a discursive and thus ordering instance (cf. however Yang et al. 2012). This is evident, for example, as hashtags are now also used analogously in situations where entering them into the computer does not open up any text world. They are further printed on clothing and products, or are used in conversation by being explicitly named (often accompanied by a lozenge gesture).

This shows a special function of the labelling practice that is detached from the purely technical function. Hashtags can also be used to indicate the ability to establish a discourse or the dignity of an agenda. So by labelling linguistic material with a hashtag within a stretch of discourse, one anticipates the decision about public sayability. And one notices them as it were in this moment and can thus literally index a virtual – i.e. not yet existing – discourse and, if necessary, construct virality and thus active follow-up communication and interactivity prospectively. This is simply because the function of hashtags, namely the technically supported bundling of discourse, has become anchored as a constitutive component of meaning and now functions independently of the actual application. This can be illustrated by the following example.

Hashtags are a combination of rhombic markers and the hashtag connective, which can be structurally quite disparate linguistic material. This is directly linked to the hash,

e.g. *Gänsehaut* ('goosebumps'). With this hashtag, for example, affective reactions were made suitable for the public. It is now used as an index in all possible positively emotionally charged situations, which in no way means that the named physical reaction to a specific event actually occurs. Rather, a whole repertoire of emotions is thus compressed into a short formula that is also used without any hesitations and is culturally anchored (cf. Schützeichel 2006; Grau and Keil 2005).

The Instagram-typical inflationary use of hashtags (see [5]) reveals also something that belongs in a phenomenology of sayability. It is the attempt to overcome scepticism or speechlessness in the context of highly personal content, i.e. to make things "sayable". It is not necessary to differentiate between the emotions that one may not be able to express, as key words are sufficient, such as *svv* for "selbstverletzendes Verhalten" ('self-harming behaviour'), *Überdosis* ('overdose'), *Klingen* ('blades'), *angst* ('fear'), *esstörung* ('eating disorder'), etc. These combine to form an associative network that makes a macro-proposition accessible. Example (5) depicts a story of a person's suffering with depression, eating disorders, self-destructive behaviour and thoughts of suicide. Each of these hashtags alone evokes a complex conception of emotions. The accumulation intensifies the effect once more, without having to describe a person's mental state in well-formulated sentences.

(5) #depressed edits #depression edits#sad edits #worthless #killme #sadaudios
 #depressed audios #svv #selfhate#triggered #anorexic #anxiety #skinny #fat#ritzen
 #sad #depressed #cut #cutting#depression #suicidal #suicide #sadeedit#letmedie
 #anorexia #13reasonswhy#hannabaker #triggerwarning #quotes#scars

(Note, that *13reasonswhy* und *hannabaker* refer to the Netflix series *Dead girls don't lie* and its fictional main character Hanna Baker. Before her suicide, she made recordings to explain why 13 people were responsible for her death.)

2.5 Inflectives

So-called inflectives are an outdated form for the representation of emotions. They were typical for chat communication of the past and are used today in order to establish a reference to the computer-mediated communication mode of that time. This creates a certain irony, while their use also suggests that the user is of a certain age having been a witness of the beginning of social media. Beißwenger (2016: 43–45) calls them action words rather than inflectives, with which inner states are also formulated, e.g. **freu** ('looking forward'), cf. also Haase et al.'s (1997: 11) term "state and emotional expressions". Action words are usually formed from uninflected word stems (verbs) and marked with asterisks. Groups of words can also be used in such a form, for example **rotwerd** ('blushing'). This form of abridged emotional representation has virtually survived in acronyms such as *lol* (laughing out loud) or *rofl* (rolling on the floor laughing) (cf. Beißwenger 2016: 45).

3 Close up: Particular emotions

After presenting the semiotic resources typical for computer-mediated communication in the first part and showing their potential for the representation of emotions, we will now

take a look at specific emotional representations that are commonly encountered in social media. A distinction is made between intra-territorial data such as love, grief or suffering, and extra-territorial data such as hatred.

3.1 Intra-territorial data

3.1.1 Expressions of love and friendship

Lovers use social media to confess their love for each other in a semi-public space which creates a face-threatening situation. In general, declarations of love are sequentially embedded in pair sequences (see Auer 1988; cf. Staffeldt 2011: 193). This means that the expression of a confession of love makes the response expectable. If a partner now deviates from this prototypical direct approach (be it face-to-face, on the phone or via text message) and carries part of the intimate communication to the outside, the already mentioned face-threatening situation arises. Multiple addressing is possible in a situation in which single addressing is the norm. This makes addressing equally diffuse. One can ask oneself who else is addressed besides the partner and whether the partner is actually the addressee. Who is actually meant by *der hübschesten Frau* ('the prettiest woman') or *mein Schatz* ('my darling') (as in [6])? The synchronicity of the situation is also removed: The decision to switch to a communication platform also alleviates the pressure to answer, which is normally caused by the automatic assignment of speaking rights (a declaration of love makes the confirmation of the addressee necessary). If the addressee does not answer publicly, the addresser has several ways of explaining this: He/she couldn't have read it, he/she might not want to go public with such intimate confessions, etc.

These are also statements that the person who published the article could have recourse to – should she ever be asked why there was no reaction. At the same time, the confession of love is given a special meaning, because it is not simply shared with the addressee, but also demonstrated in a public space.

Example (6) shows what typically happens when people share such intimate posts in social networks: It is appreciated. The Facebook friends congratulate the couple on their love, their long marriage, their anniversary or share their own stories. They thus conceptualize the opening of emotional space as an opening of a pair sequence to which they react accordingly. As a result, the reaction of the respective partner fades into the background. In example (6), this (merely) consisted of the partner choosing the love option of the Like button function, but not expressing herself verbally in a comment.

- (6) 6 Jahre mit der hübschesten Frau verheiratet.

'Six years married to the prettiest woman.'

Wieder 1 Jahr rum, ich liebe dich wie am ersten Tag mein Schatz, auf ganz ganz viele weitere Jahre mit dir. 

'Another year gone by. Darling, I love you as I did the first day, to many more years with you.'

(Facebook, 2018–08–17, Likes: 68, Comments: 7)

- A: Alles gute zum Hochzeitstag
‘All the best for your wedding day’
- B: Herzlichen Glückwunsch!
‘Congratulations!’
- C: Herzlichen Glückwunsch euch beiden!
‘Congratulations to both of you!’
- D: Herzlichen Glückwunsch zum Hochzeitstag. Auf viele weitere schöne Jahre 🎂
‘Happy anniversary. To many more happy years.’
- E: Ich wünsche Euch noch viele glückliche Jahre. Bin jetzt mit meiner Frau auch schon 10 Jahre zusammen.
‘I wish you many more happy years. I’ve also been with my wife for 10 years now.’
- F: Alles gute zum Hochzeitstag
‘All the best for your wedding day’
- G: Wahre Worte....
‘True words....’

In the context of declarations of love, an interesting trend can be observed in social networks: They are also increasingly found in the interactions between friends, via nicknames (Wyss 2015), private codes (Leisi 2016), explicit formulas, the explicit thematization of one’s own emotions, heart emojis and other emojis associated with love, e.g. kiss emojis, references to specific activities and characteristics of the partners and to the common relationship as well as images showing the happy pair (see Figure 78.4 and Kreiser 2018). Obviously, there are large intersections between both concepts that are reflected in the language used to express either love or friendship.



Fig. 78.4: Convergence between love and friendship communication on Facebook.

3.1.2 Expressions of grief and ailment

While love and friendship are less considered as topics not to talk about (they are just primarily addressed linguistically), we find an additional reflexive level in the social media for topics such as death, grief or illness. This observation will be addressed again in more detail at the end of this chapter.

As discussed above, a variety of semiotic resources are used to draw attention to diseases such as depression, anorexia, bulimia or self-harming behaviour. In addition, there are a variety of platforms for expressing grief, which now has a firm place in social media. Examples are YouTube channels such as “Sarggeschichten” ('coffin tales', <https://www.youtube.com/channel/UC7K79LVAqPVPH9SXbr5mbgw>) or the Twitter account @_Bestattung ('burial'), whose goal is to eliminate fears of contact with death and bereavement and answer questions on how to deal with death and dying. There are also public memorial pages on Facebook created by bereaved individuals, or private Facebook profiles of deceased persons that are still maintained by relatives. They may show the label “In Remembrance of”. As the analysis of Getty et al. (2011: 1000) shows, mourners use “memorialized profiles as a way to maintain a continuing bond with the deceased, as well as a way to accomplish specific front stage bereavement communication, such as sharing memories, expressing sorrow and providing social support” (Getty et al. 2011: 1000). This becomes clear when deceased persons are addressed directly, as in (7).

- (7) Ich wünsche dir lieber Papa und Astrid da oben wo ihr jetzt seit , alles liebe und gute zum Geburtstag
 ‘I wish you a happy birthday, dear Papa and Astrid, up there where you are now’
 (Facebook, 2018–04–13, Likes: 5 (sad: 2), comments: 0, Share: 1)

The deceased are also involved in everyday situations, e.g. in (8)

- (8) Danke fürs Daumen drücken diese Woche,hat geklappt 😊😊
 ‘Thanks for keeping your fingers crossed this week, it worked out’
 (Facebook, 2017–02–11; example taken from Lück 2018: 18)

While in the past the deceased used to be addressed in private space (e.g. in prayer or in the diary), this intimate sphere is now often made public. Other (personal) mourning rituals, which previously were only shared in the (close) family circle, are now also made accessible online and thus opened to others.

This step is often reflected upon by the users. Sayability is reflected here while practicing it and it is also formulated explicitly as condition. Thus the title of the blog “Totenhemd” (burial shroud) is extended by “Übers Sterben reden” ('talking about dying'). The author of the blog “In stiller (durchgestrichen) lauter Trauer” ('In silent (crossed out) loud mourning', <https://in-lauter-trauer.de>) writes: “Nun möchte ich einen Beitrag dazu leisten, dass über Trauer und Tod geredet wird. Wir müssen unsere Trauer nicht still und alleine ganz für uns tragen und ausmachen.” ('I would like to make a contribution to the discussion of grief and death. We don't have to carry our grief quietly and alone all to ourselves.').

On a help blog for stillborn children it says: “Wir wollen dieses Schweigen brechen...” (‘We want to break this silence...’, <https://www.sternenkind-hilfe.de/2016/08/09/sternenkind-elaine/>). A young stoma patient is quoted as follows: “Wer selber nicht krank ist, kann einfach nicht nachvollziehen, wie es einem wirklich geht. Für sowas ist das Internet genial. Ich kann mit allen Menschen auf der ganzen Welt schreiben und merke so, dass ich nicht alleine bin.” (‘If you are not ill yourself, you simply cannot understand how it really feels. The Internet is great for those purposes. I can write with people all over the world and realize that I am not alone’, <https://ze.tt/das-erste-mal-sex-mit-stoma-war-schon-komisch-so-leben-junge-menschen-mit-kuenstlichem-darmausgang/>).

The development of turning the inside out is also reflected in the fact that people affected by anorexia (or bulimia) are now also writing on publicly accessible platforms. They report things that have been discussed in so-called Anaforums (the short form *Ana* here stands for *anorexia*) for a long time. However, access to these forums is conditional on being affected by the disease itself. Now, the problem is also released for discussion (and evaluation) by those not affected.

This subchapter showed that intra-territorial data are presented (even performed) as one could see in the communication of love, friendship and mourning, and that the sayability of highly personal content is explicitly reflected upon. The point here is to free yourself from your language crisis, to change your state from being silent to speaking (or writing). The opening of the inner territory goes hand in hand with self-revelation, mental hygiene and relief. This opening is unidirectional into a diffuse reception room. This does not compromise anyone on the web. No one needs to feel addressed. However, networking is possible. The actors openly demonstrate their vulnerabilities and open them up for discussion, which plays an important role for being able to handle the problems. Sayability is thus conceptualized here as an important affordance of the web, as something that is made possible.

3.2 Extra-territorial data

3.2.1 Expressions of rage and hate

The situation is different with extra-territorial data. Sayability as an affordance of the web is negated and paradoxically continuously strained and overused at the same time by interfering with the territory of others. The topics of disparagement, discrimination, slander, hate-speech and fake news fall into this area.

Sayability is sketched here as something non-existent, something which one must actively strive for, cf. for example the AfD slogan #MutzurWahrheit (‘Courage to tell the truth’; AfD [Alternative for Germany] is a right-wing populist political party in Germany with extreme right-wing tendencies; see Wikipedia entry https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alternative_for_Germany), which implies that truth is usually suppressed. The AfD uses social media to continuously extend the limits of what can be said, in the sense of the brutalization understandably criticized above by Steinmeier or Barley. Thus the slogan “Courage to tell the truth” is exemplary for the striking negation of sayability, while at the same time

it is overused. Allegedly, it takes courage to tell the truth. This is a pre-supposition that is used as an emotional strategy to evoke resistance. A problem (which is actually non-existent) is actively (and discursively) created in order to be able to fight it. A frequently used motif is the muzzle ([9]) and the noticing of restricted freedom of expression ([9]).

- (9) ++Gnade für Schlepper, Maulkorb für Bürger?++ Bundesheuchelminister #Maas lehnt die Kriminalisierung von Seenotrettern mit Schlepper-Ambitionen ab. Beim #NetzDG dagegen kümmerte es ihn keinen Deut, Meinungen ohne Strafverfahren zu kriminalisieren! #AfD

'Mercy for tugboats, muzzle for citizens? Federal minister of sham #Maas rejects the criminalisation of sea rescue workers with tugboat ambitions. At #NetzDG, on the other hand, he didn't give a damn about criminalizing opinions without trial! #AfD' (Twitter, 2018-07-20, replies 54, RT: 322, Likes: 751)

Consequently, it is mostly a matter of criticising limits of sayability or the ostentatious rebellion against limits of sayability (cf. Niehr 2018). This is done by means of verbal border crossings and explicitly breaking the alleged ban on speaking.

But what is actually expressed in examples such as (10)?

- (10) A: ich kannte mal 1 hund namens hasnain
 'I once knew a dog named hasnain'
 B: Zufall?
 'coincidence?'
 A: keine ahnung er wurde auf jeden fall von 1 auto überfahren, war schlimm
 'No idea, he was definitely run over by a car, it was bad'

This Twitter dialogue was republished on 30 July 2018 by journalist Hasnain Kazim under the Hashtag #metwo. He commented "Solche Dialoge. Seit Jahren schon" ('Such dialogues. For years already'). The journalist is equated with an animal and is indirectly threatened with violence. No doubt about it, this is hate speech. But is this also an expression of emotions? Or are we dealing with coldness, that is, the absence of emotions? How is hate as emotion to be classified? From a psychological/neurobiological point of view, hate is a strategy to overcome fear (see Hüther in discussion with Kropik [2016]). According to Kernberg (2003: 63), hate is derived from anger. This anger can have various causes and can be a reaction to the feeling of fainting in anxiety situations. In hate expressions, this fear can only be seen in the defence. A clear distinction is made between you and us, and the other (you) is rejected. At the same time, hatred and deeply rooted prejudices are also explicitly denied, as for example in (11) (*Kein Hasstweet; 'no hatetweet'*) or typical initial phrases, such as *Ich bin kein Rassist/Sexist/Antisemit, aber ...* ('I'm not a racist/sexist/anti-Semite, but...'), while being simultaneously reproduced (*Menschen die gar nicht hergehören; 'People who don't belong here'*).

- (11) [...] GEWISSE MENSCHEN DIE GAR NICHT HERGEHÖREN, VERGEWALTIGEN,
 STEHLEN, TÖTEN SOGAR UND RENNEN ALS FREIE MENSCHEN RUM. DAS MACHT
 MICH AUSGESPROCHEN WÜTEND! Kein Hasstweet!

'CERTAIN PEOPLE WHO DON'T BELONG HERE AT ALL, RAPE, STEAL, EVEN KILL AND RUN AROUND AS FREE PEOPLE. THIS MAKES ME EXTREMELY ANGRY! No hate tweet!'

(Twitter, 2018-08-21, RT: 2, Likes: 3)

However, example (11) also shows that typical emotive means are used, such as capital letters to express special (emotional) involvement, anger as well as loudness, which in turn could be an indicator of a high emotional involvement. It is difficult to decide whether the emotions that are expressed are truly felt or if the emotional involvement is just simulated. It becomes clear, however, that emotions are used to convey a political attitude. Emotions are thereby pushed forward as legitimizing. At the same time, the responsibility for the political attitude is given up and a kind of helplessness towards one's own emotions is marked, in order to justify the ability to say things. Nevertheless, the exemplary nature of the supposedly expressed anger does not remain hidden. Therefore, even outbursts of anger such as those in (11) can be read as a symptom of deeply rooted and long-held prejudices.

In summary, it can be said that in the field of extra-territorial phenomena sayability is negated and at the same time instrumentalized and strained. The main thing here is to act externally, e.g. to penetrate the territories of others through personal attacks. The actors claim to be the only ones who are able to judge and classify the facts correctly. With hate speech it is especially difficult to draw conclusions about the underlying emotions, as the drastic expression of emotion may also be employed to adapt to the disparate and confusing communication environment from which the speaker wants to stand out. If an utterance aims to increase "popularity" in terms of high level of attention and clicks, it is the breaking of taboos, or at least their announcement, that achieve this best. The "negative bias", which has already been established within the framework of vigilance research in the 1990s, still seems to be relevant here (see Pratto and John 1991; Shoemaker 1996). What does that mean? Hate speech, fake news, verbal aggression (i.e. crossing borders) are not necessarily expressions of emotions in the social media. Rather, they are used strategically and have a much more lasting effect than positive communication events. Negative (communicative) events seem to have a greater impact on our perception, they draw our attention more intensively. One the one hand, this is useful for social media companies. Communication space also represents an advertising space. It is an area where companies (such as Facebook etc.) considerate economic issues because they want to make money. The company's "currency" is attention and also the negative bias. Unusual information or particularly negative information is a guarantor for attention. From a user's perspective, one might ask how the digital space is designed and how he or she can act adequately in the sense of getting as much attention as possible. How is one supposed to transfer actions in order to make them visible? Looking at the "currency" mentioned above, information has to be transferred in a rather extraordinary way or needs to be negative in some way.

One the other hand, a dangerous framesetting is achieved. This effect is particularly visible in connection with the SARS-CoV-2 crisis. With the means of defamation described above, a disease that threatens the entire population is politicised here. False information in the social media, but especially on YouTube and WhatsApp, mobilises people to gather

in large numbers for demonstrations and runs the objective risk of generating superspread-ing events. Negative information binds the attention, seems to be memorized better and controls the perception, so that own realities are formed, which even in the case of a dan-gerous illness, are no longer related to other realities or at least questioned.

4 What are the consequences?

In this article, we have seen a number of possibilities and different contents that are emo-tionally charged and thus determine communication on social media. Why do they work so well? Intra-territorial data (assumed here) can be disseminated because direct addressing is usually not carried out. This calls for the concept of negative courtesy (Brown and Levin-son 1987), because although the producers open their territory here, they don't burden anyone with it. Consequently, recipients in social media nominate themselves. Extra-terri-torial data are above all conspicuous, if not to say "loud". To reach this point, processes of removal of taboos had to be passed through. How would the removing of taboos take place? When we bring our actions onto the projection screen of the social web (and of course this action can also be purely linguistic action), then any action becomes shown or better: presented action. That means it is displayed publicly to a more or less unknown disparate audience. So whatever is done – as soon as it appears on the screen, it becomes a matter of presenting. This integrates and represents two different aspects, because pre-senting actions is subject to different rules than the acting itself. Activities and actions are oriented towards at least two issues: first, my concrete environment, the concrete space in which I find myself; secondly, concrete people who surround me. Presenting is based on a construct that is very unclear for us, the Social Web. In this highly dynamic interaction space, the users who are posting have no control over their posts. They are subject to ratings, in terms of likes, shares and comments. Information about the addressees or the reception conditions is hardly available. So, from the user's point of view a recipient design is quite hard to calibrate.

Therefore, the conditions for presenting something in social media have an effect on actions themselves in such a way that the conditions of presenting are already taken into account in the course of acting. It is to be assumed that action will turn into a process of transformation to showcase. Both materially (the physical devices are getting smaller and smaller, so we don't have to sit in front of them anymore, but can carry them with us, e.g. in our trouser pocket) and conceptually, the Social Web is infiltrating our lives. This could result in our actions being carried out simply for the sake of demonstration, or in other words, presenting is no longer separated from acting in the perception of the interacting persons. We assume sensitivity for the fact that travelling by train, setting a table or shop-ping are activities that differ in their execution and in their form as long as they are not presented. As soon as one carries out these actions with the intention of presenting them, these actions take on a different meaning. It is now conceivable that the mentioned sensi-tivity for the described difference just dwindles. This is a dynamic process that is currently taking place. Thus, not only presenting becomes public, but also action is influenced by the conditions of presenting. This means that in the end something else is presented.

So behaviour could change to make behaviour including activities representable. Such processes can also affect the expression of emotions. The view that the communication conditions and rules on the presentation stage differ from the rules of personal interaction may become blurred. The view that presented emotions on the presentation stage differ from the authentically felt emotions may become blurred. When actions and emotions are conceptualized this way, the producers turn themselves into Personae (Horton and Wohl 1956; cf. Zappavigna 2014). In a distant space so alienated from reality, of course, much more is possible – both intra- and extra-territorially. The context as an essential component regulating the sayability thus gets out of focus. This makes it all the more important to raise awareness of convergence and dwindling processes and to sharpen the perception of the communication participants that it is people who interact with each other in social media (see Vosoughi, Roy, and Aral 2018).

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Kristyn Gorton

79 Emotion and the internet

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Abstract: This chapter introduces the reader to broader theories of emotion and affect that underpin an engagement with online media. In so doing it argues that emotion connects individuals to their environments and to one another and flows across different media, places and contexts. More specifically, this chapter considers the concept of emotion through a close examination of the affective language in Kristen Roupenian’s viral rise to fame and contribution to the #MeToo movement. It will focus on Roupenian’s account of her instant notoriety alongside the public responses to her work. The case study is deployed as a mechanism through which we might think about both the structure of feeling around Roupenian’s rise to fame as a response to her short story “Cat Person” and the collective language and emotion used to display the sense of feeling it engenders. It also seeks to understand why this short story elicited such an affective online response with a view to examining ways in which emotion travels online and how it contributes to what Clare Hemmings (2012) has termed “affective solidarity”. This chapter situates itself within the study of emotion as an everyday or ordinary expression of feelings. It begins with a theoretical outline of the concepts of emotion and affect within theoretical work before moving on to address the case study on “Cat Person”.

1 Introduction

In her introduction to the collection *Digital Cultures and the Politics of Emotion: Feelings, Affect and Technological Change*, Adi Kuntsman asks: “What are the structures of feeling that operate in our everyday digital life, and what kind of virtual public spheres do they create?” (Kuntsman 2012: 4). She continues: “How do digital media shape our everyday experiences and political horizons of love, boredom, fear, anxiety, compassion, hate, hope?” (Kuntsman 2012: 4). This focus on the ordinary and the everyday can recede from view when much research on emotion and feeling in digital cultures may be produced through the lens of intense, sublime, or traumatic human experiences such as war (Clough 2012; Hoskins and O’Loughlin 2010); terrorism (Chen 2012; Weimann 2006), racism (Kuntsman 2009), death (Ferreday 2010), and conflict/global politics (Karatzogianni 2009). And

yet, as this chapter demonstrates, the structures of feeling around women and their personal experiences has been and continues to be an important mobilizing force over the internet.

This chapter introduces the reader to the broader theories of emotion and affect that underpin an engagement with online media and what Manovich defines as “the practice of everyday (media) life” (Manovich 2008: 33). It starts both from the position that this media life is always already a mixed-media life with no single media tool or practice in ascendancy, and from the position that all media discourses, forms, and practices function as emotion agents (some more powerful than others perhaps) or carriers of affect (see Garde-Hansen and Gorton 2011). The chapter will then consider these theoretical ideas through an exploration of Kristen Roupenian’s viral rise to fame.

There have been significant shifts towards an interrogation of the everyday and the ordinary in cultural studies (see Stewart 2007; Hartley 2009; Highmore 2018; Turner 2010), and these changes are now visible in internet studies and mobile media research (see Goggin and Hjorth 2014; Lásen and Casado 2012, for example). Cultural studies of affect, public feelings, and the politics of emotion on the one hand, and scholarship on digital culture, new media, and information-communication technologies on the other have also begun to converge (see Vincent and Fortunati’s [2009] *Electronic Emotion: The Mediation of Emotion via Information and Communication Technologies*). Indeed, as this essay will go on to consider, a move towards the everyday has led to an understanding of what Doveling, Harju, and Sommer (2018) refer to as “digital affect cultures”. Their theorisation “[approaches] emotion as a cultural practice, in terms of affect, as something people *do* instead of *have*” (Doveling, Harju, and Sommer 2018: 1, original emphasis). They therefore focus on how the action instead of the acquisition of emotion is integral to thinking about the ways in which emotion and affect travels on the internet.

2 Defining emotion and affect

Before moving on to explore the ways in which emotion and affect move online, I consider some of the key themes and scholarly work on emotion and affect. This section builds upon and overviews work I have undertaken elsewhere on the affective turn (Gorton 2007), on emotion and television (Gorton 2009), and in my work, with Joanne Garde-Hansen, in *Emotion Online: Theorizing Affect on the Internet* (Gorton and Garde-Hansen 2011). In what follows I aim to construct a theoretical framework that will help to explain how an affective story such as “Cat Person” can galvanise such a strong emotional response both on- and offline. It will become clear that the concepts of emotion and affect are often interchangeable such that it is difficult to fix either concept to one meaning.

Significant work on emotion and affect has roots going back to theorists such as Aristotle, Spinoza, Freud, and William James. These names are often used to anchor chronological overviews of emotion as a concept. Of course, like all broad-brush attempts to survey such a vast and complicated area, schematic overviews often omit many other important scholars, such as Adam Smith, David Hume, Silvan S. Tomkins, and Raymond Williams. Books have been written already that successfully navigate the theoretical development of

the term. Robert C. Solomon's ([1984] 2003) *What Is an Emotion? Classic and Contemporary Readings*, for instance, provides an excellent historical overview alongside Martha C. Nussbaum's (2001) *Upheavals of Thought: The Intelligence of Emotions*. The *Secret History of Emotion: From Aristotle's Rhetoric to Modern Brain Science* (2006) by Daniel M. Gross is a radical reading of similar writers. Jennifer Harding and E. Deidre Pribram's (2009) *Emotions: A Cultural Studies Reader* offers a survey of recent work within the fields of cultural and critical studies, while Jerome Kagan's (2007) *What Is Emotion? History, Measures and Meanings* charts a sophisticated course through the history of emotion in fields as diverse as anthropology, psychology, and neurobiology. By contrast with these overviews, this chapter will draw out some of the key definitions and ideas, particularly as they will later concern the issue of emotion and affect in online media culture.

A renewed focus on emotions, particularly within critical and cultural theory, has informed the production of numerous books and collections that examine particular feelings and states of being. For instance, David L. Eng and David Kazanjian's (2003) *Loss* considers the remains of the body, space, and ideas; while Sianne Ngai's (2005) *Ugly Feelings* examines negative emotions such as envy, anxiety, and paranoia to reflect on the 'ugly' side of the way we feel. Ngai exposes the political and cultural underpinnings of such emotions and their gendered and racial overtones. William Davies's (2015) *The Happiness Industry: How the Government and Big Business Sold Us Well Being* considers the ways in which the concept of happiness has been colonised by capitalism through a "growing number of corporations [that] employ 'chief happiness officers'" (Davies 2015: 4).

There has also been a resurgence of interest in the emotions in neuroscience and philosophy. For example, Dylan Evans and Pierre Cruse's (2004) *Emotion, Evolution and Rationality* highlights pivotal work in neuroscience from scholars such as Antonio Damasio, Andrew D. Lawrence, and Andrew J. Calder, as well as philosophical work from Finn Spicer and Peter Goldie. Lisa Feldman Barret's (2017) *How Emotions Are Made: The Secret Life of the Brain* draws on the latest scientific evidence to radically reconceptualise what she refers to as the "classical view" of emotions in order to advance what she calls the "theory of constructed emotions". Ralph Adolphs and David J. Anderson open their study on emotions in *The Neuroscience of Emotion: A New Synthesis* (2018) by questioning common misconceptions about emotions. In order to discuss these, such as thinking that there are a few "primary emotions", the authors use the example of the popular children's animated movie *Inside Out* (2016) to highlight and debunk outdated assumptions about emotion. Their use of the movie enables the authors to map out and challenge some of the historical views around the concept of emotion while simultaneously shedding light on new research.

In basic terms, emotion is seen as something that people express about the feelings they have, whether the feelings refer to a state of being or to a physical condition. Emotions can be individual or can be expressed by the masses, and people often refer to the emotional climate/atmosphere of events such as funerals, weddings, or riots. These public gatherings capture an emotional mood and can have positive or adverse effects on individuals. Emotion is defined in various ways but is generally seen as a social expression of feelings. It is less frequently associated with the body, although it might describe a particular response to feelings such as a blush or clammy hands.

For this chapter, emotion is understood as something that can be distributed and exchanged through psychic and physical contact, but also by social and technological means.

Sara Ahmed (2004) argues, in *The Cultural Politics of Emotion*, for instance, that emotions are simultaneously psychic and social, individual and collective: “The emotions are not ‘in’ either individual or social, but produce the very surfaces and boundaries that allow the individual and the social to be delineated as if they are objects” (Ahmed 2004: 10).

In her work on “ordinary affects”, Kathleen Stewart (2007) puts forward another way of thinking about affects, and argues that “[a]ffects are not so much forms of signification, or units of knowledge, as they are expressions of ideas or problems performed as a kind of involuntary and powerful learning and participation” (Stewart 2007: 40). Here affect is conceived by Stewart more abstractly and complexly as “varied, surging capacities”, “that give everyday life the quality of a continual motion of relations, scenes, contingencies and emergences” (Stewart 2007: 2). Affect is, then, more about becoming than being, a form of expressive learning and participation, just as finding something online to cry about may say less about us and more about what we could be. For the purpose of this chapter, Stewart’s formulation offers a practical application of how media audiences and online users cannot help but be affected content, because online processes happen in a detached or disembodied sphere. That is, they occur “in impulses, sensations, expectations, day-dreams, encounters and habits of relating, in strategies and their failures, in forms or persuasion, contagion, and compulsion, in modes of attention, attachment and agency, and in publics that catch people up in something that feels like something” (Stewart 2007: 2). Interpretations such as Stewart’s have had a great influence on the social sciences through their attempt to understand the materiality of space, time, and place in a lived way, because she describes a process by which ordinary affects “pick up density and texture as they move through bodies, dreams, dramas and social worldings of all kinds” (Stewart 2007: 3). These definitions illustrate the various ways in which affect is used within cultural and critical theory in a way that demonstrates the slipperiness of the term and its usage within academic study. In their introduction to *The Affect Theory Reader*, Melissa Gregg and Gregory J. Seigworth (2010) also make reference to affect’s messy in-between-ness, arguing that “[t]here is no single unwavering line that might unfurl toward or around affect and its singularities, let alone its theories” (Gregg and Seigworth 2010: 5). Indeed, titles such as such as Brian Massumi’s (2015) *The Politics of Affect*, Eugenie Brinkema’s (2014) *The Forms of the Affects*, and Ruth Leys’s (2017) *The Ascent of Affect* reflect the diverse approaches to affect.

Culturally, emotion and affect have been long associated with femininity in the Western world. Historically women have been cautioned for getting ‘too emotional’; emotion and affect have been understood to work against rational thought. As Alison Jaggar writes: “Not only has reason been contrasted with emotion, but it has also been associated with the mental, the cultural, the universal, the public and the male, whereas emotion has been associated with the irrational, the physical, the natural, the particular, the private, and, of course, the female” (Jaggar 1989: 145). In feminist theory, a focus upon the body and on the emotions and women has led to a vast corpus of work on emotion and affect (see Gorton 2007). In the 1980s, feminist theorists such as Lila Abu-Lughod (1986), Arlie Russell Hochschild ([1983] 2003), and Alison Jaggar (1989) took interest in women’s emotional lives and labours. In fact, Elspeth Probyn suggests that Alison Jaggar’s (1989) chapter, “Love and knowledge: Emotion in feminist epistemology”, was one of the first to consider what emotion might mean for feminism (Probyn 2005: 8).

Theoretical encounters with affect online have been addressed, for instance, in *Digital Cultures and the Politics of Emotion: Feelings, Affect and Technological Change*, edited by Athina Karatzogianni and Adi Kuntsman (2012) and, more recently, in *Networked Affect* edited by Ken Hillis, Susanna Paasonen, and Michael Petit (2015). Affect is the through line that draws together quite disconnected activities and experiences that occur in very different places and spaces. Kuntsman uses the term “affective fabrics” to describe “the lived and deeply felt everyday sociality of connections, ruptures, emotions, words, politics and sensory energies” (Kuntsman 2012: 3) within digital cultures. Drawing on work from popular music studies, she uses the concept of “reverberation” as a way of explaining the movement of emotion and feelings as well as “the multiplicity of effects such movement might entail” (Kuntsman 2012: 2). Reverberation allows her to think about the ways in which emotion moves but also how they open up particular spaces for creating change. This active side to emotion online is also reflected in Hillis et al.’s conceptualisation of affect. As they argue: “the fluctuating and altering dynamics of affect give shape to online connections and disconnections, to the proximities and distances of love, desire and wanting between and among different bodies” (Hillis et al. 2015: 1).

As Hillis et al. (2015) suggest, when discussing emotion and affect, it is important to mention desire, intimacy, feelings, and touch, which have also attracted a great deal of attention in critical and cultural theory following the ‘affective turn’, for while these terms overlap with emotion and affect, they all carry different meanings. Touch, for example, is a very sensual, tactile, and often loving expression of intimacy and emotion. But how does touch function online? Surakka and Vanhala remind us that the “mouse-driven user interface” is still the “most visible milestone for an ordinary user” in human-computer interaction (Surakka and Vanhala 2011: 213). As they argue: “The most important consequences are that the user receives feedback about his or her actions when operating a desktop computer or another kind of information technology, such as handheld devices, televisions, and mobile telephones” (Surakka and Vanhala 2011: 213–214).

In *Intimacy*, Lauren Berlant (2000) argues that “the inwardness of the intimate is met by a corresponding publicness [...]. At present, in the U.S., therapy saturates the scene of intimacy, from psychoanalysis and twelve-step groups to girl talk, talk shows, and other witnessing genres” (Berlant 2000: 1). The essays in this collection address the “contradictory desires” that “mark the intimacy of daily life” (Berlant 2000: 5). Berlant’s work is useful insofar as it explains ways in which the intimate meets the public, and she articulates the relationship between emotion and the public sphere. Intimacy also involves an aspiration for a narrative about something shared, a story about both oneself and others that will turn out a particular way. Usually, this story is set within zones of familiarity and comfort: friendship, the couple, and the family form, animated by expressive and emancipating kinds of love. Berlant’s observation is particularly germane to online examples of this kind of intimacy. People’s blogs or individual web pages will often tell a story, an intimate one about their family, their travels, their parenting experiences. This example speaks to what Doveling, Harju, and Sommer (2018: 4) see as the core characteristics of digital affect cultures, those of discourse, alignment and belonging. The discursive space online, such as a blog, constructs subject positions that invite “emotional identification” which prompts a “feeling of cultural and social belonging” (Doveling, Harju, and Sommer

2018: 4). The stories we tell about ourselves and how we discursively frame them with emotion lend to a sense of recognition, as this chapter will go on to illustrate in the example of “Cat Person”.

The question of how we negotiate the boundaries between the public and the private in terms of emotion and affect has dominated a good deal of emergent work on emotions, with a burgeoning attention to media and communications. In their chapter on emotions in culture, for instance, Jennifer Harding and E. Deidre Pribram (2002), consider “how emotions as a category of experience might be implicated in negotiations of the (hierarchically arranged) public/private divide in contemporary popular discourse” (Harding and Pribram 2002: 408). Indeed, one of the directions in which the interest in the divide between the personal and political takes us is towards a contemplation of public displays of sentimentalism. In her book *Impersonal Passion: Language as Affect*, Denise Riley (2005) refers to the handwritten cards, flowers, and teddy bears that grace scenes of public mourning. The cards contain the question ‘Why?’ and, as Riley argues, “[s]uch cards have become part of today’s panoply of public mourning” (Riley 2005: 59). These public expressions of mourning lead Riley to consider how “this WHY, a prostrated inert thing, is also a provocation. To whom is it put? The writers of such cards will realize perfectly well that the only answer to their implied ‘Why was this innocent life destroyed?’ is swift and brutal-sounding: that here there is no why to be answered other than by a terse ‘Because’” (Riley 2005: 59). Her analysis of these public displays also leads Riley to consider why these metaphysical interrogatives have replaced questions of moral responsibility. For example, “I must be involved in this somewhere” vies with “I am not responsible for this” (Riley 2005: 69). ‘Why?’ and ‘Why me?’ allow its speaker to replace moral responsibility with accusation, destiny, and bad fortune, but also involve the audience in answering the question. One might also think of the way in which people refer to an event as ‘tragic’, instead of attending to the political or social structures that allow these ‘tragic’ events to happen in the first place. Lauren Berlant (1997), in *The Queen of America Goes to Washington City*, intelligently addresses what she sees as an increase of the private in the public sphere, what she terms “the intimate public sphere”. Her work has been influential to feminist theorists writing about emotion and affect, but it is also crucial to those working on mediated public spheres such as online media.

The ways in which the intimate has entered into the public domain have meant that feelings have been given more importance than ever in the Western world. Dana L. Cloud has argued that “the therapeutic, as a situated, strategic discourse (or rhetoric), dislocates social and political conflicts onto individuals or families, privatizes both the experience of oppression and possible modes of resistance to it, and translates political questions into psychological issues to be resolved through personal, psychological change” (Cloud 1998: xviii–xix). As Cloud suggests, responsibility is increasingly given to individuals to ‘manage’ their feelings, emotions, and affective lives, especially in the public sphere. The internet becomes a space to do so, but it is also a very public domain for blowing the whistle on oneself, which problematises notions of intimacy and constructions of the self as private.

The next section will consider how this notion of the personal, in the form of a personal story, joins up with the public and galvanises people to respond.

3 “Cat Person” and #MeToo

In her work on the concept of emotion, Deirdre Pribram writes: “Emotions circulate: that is what they *do*, making possible relations among individuals, and between individuals and social structures” (Pribram 2011: 2, original emphasis). The case study, Kristen Roupenian’s short story “Cat Person”, allows us to map out and explore just how emotions circulate between individuals. “Cat Person” was first posted by *The New Yorker*, which will be understood here as a social media platform. It is also important to consider how storytelling has been changed by new media. In her work in *Affective Publics: Sentiment, Technology and Publics*, Zizi Papacharissi (2015) considers how newer media affects the act of storytelling, particularly on social media such as twitter. As she explains:

newer media follow, amplify, and remediate that tradition of storytelling. They permit meaning-making of situation unknown to us by evoking affective reactions. Tuning in affectively does not mean that reactions are strictly emotional; they may also be rational. But it does mean that we are prompted to interpret situations by *feeling* like those directly experiencing them, even though, in most cases, we are not able to *think* like them. (Papacharissi 2015: 4, original emphasis)

As Papacharissi argues, newer media, such as Twitter, which I will go on to discuss, amplifies and remediates the act of storytelling by prompting people to feel something about what has been said, even if they may think differently to the person writing the story, or sharing the experience. Affect, in this instance, works to bring people together through shared emotions, but not necessarily shared knowledge or thought. As Clare Hemmings argues in her work on ‘affective solidarity’: “we might say that politics can be characterised as that which moves us, rather than that which confirms us in what we already know” (Hemmings 2012: 151). Part of what this case study works to explore are the ways in which the ‘feeling’ that Papacharissi identifies moves people into collective spaces of feeling, and to what extent this also includes or motivates changes in thought or action.

“Cat Person” became a viral sensation shortly after it was posted by *The New Yorker* at the end of 2017. Covering the sensation, Constance Grady writes: “This past weekend, the biggest story on social media was not about a powerful man who had sexually assaulted someone, or something the president said on Twitter. Charmingly, as if we were all at a Paris salon in the 1920s, everyone had an opinion about a short story” (Grady 2017). As Grady goes on to explain, most of the narratives that quickly circulated around the story focused their attention on the central character, Margot, as “a figure of enormous privilege and a figure who is disempowered” (Grady 2017).

As a white, college-educated, heterosexual and relatively thin woman, she is seen as both in a position of power but also in a position of vulnerability and the ‘uproar’ centres itself affectively around which one she is.

Following the online posting of “Cat Person”, Twitter exploded and it was the first time that a short story caused such a response. The story was blamed for ruining the reputation of beards (@emilynussbaum, 13 December 2017) and making straight men feel uncomfortable (@MichaelGLFlood, 12 December 2017). In an interview with NPR’s Indira Lakshmanan, Roupenian explains the timing of “Cat Person” and why she thinks it became a viral sensation:

I wrote “Cat Person” in April of 2017 [...] that was prior to the real explosion of the #MeToo conversations but it was after the Access Hollywood tape, after the 2016 election [...] I was kind of simmering in the same atmosphere that we all were, or most women were at that time [...] the news was brutal, the language that people were using with each other was harsh. It felt to me as though all of our interpersonal relationships were kind of on edge and that talking about gender and power just had this bite that it didn’t have before. So, in that moment I sat down and wrote a story that felt very personal to me [...] I wrote that story and put it out there [...] and it caught this larger wave that was powered by the same anxieties, the same frustrations, the same anger [...] without having made an active effort to coincide. (Roupenian in Lakshmanan 2019)

Roupenian makes direct references to Trump’s presidential campaign and the leaking of the Access Hollywood tape which is a recorded conversation between Trump and Billy Bush in 2005 where Trump was recorded as saying “I don’t even wait. And when you’re a star, they let you do it. You can do anything. ... Grab them by the pussy. You can do anything” (Roupenian in Lakshmanan 2019).

In discussing the reception of Roupenian’s story I want to pay particular attention to the way in which she sees the affective movement of the story across the internet. Firstly, she refers to the way in which “the language” that people were using with each other and its harshness prompted her to write. So not only was she angry with the way in which people were talking to and addressing each other, but this anger drove her to find her own language to write something very personal. Secondly, she refers to the way in which her story “caught” a “larger wave” and this underlines the notion that emotion is not only contagious but also that it moves online in “waves”. And finally, the fact that she describes the movement of emotion in terms of waves powered by anxieties, frustration and anger, is interesting in terms of feminist theory with its emphasis on ‘waves’ (first wave, second wave, third wave).

The emotions she draws attention to, anger, frustration and anxiety, are also worth exploring further. In her work on *Ugly Feelings*, for instance, Sianne Ngai (2005) pays particular attention to anxiety as an emotion that is “expectant” (Ngai 2005: 209), that is, as something anticipatory and heavily linked to time. Drawing on work by Ernst Bloch and Louis Althusser, she describes anxiety as “aligned with the concept of futurity, and the temporal dynamics of deferral and anticipation in particular”, but as also having “a spatial dimension” (Ngai 2005: 210). As she explains, anxiety is “a quality or feeling the subject refuses to recognize in himself and attempts to locate in another person or thing” (Ngai 2005: 210). Returning to the example of “Cat Person”, Margot, as a character, becomes a site for people to project their anxieties of America and women’s place in America on. She becomes a receptacle for fears and doubts that people have about a country where a man, who holds as much power as Trump does, is able to say what he does and get away with it: to be able “to do anything”, to borrow his words. As Roupenian suggests, the language people were using and the stories they were telling become linked to the one she writes in a way that allows people access to some of the concerns they have, but perhaps more than this, it allows people to connect to the *feelings* they have. The story orientates the discussion and the emotions that are flowing in that moment in a particular way – harnessing the anxiety and giving it direction (in this case, allowing it to flow into discussions regarding #MeToo). And, even more importantly, the story makes these fears and anxieties visible and legible.

In her work on popular feminism, Sarah Banet-Weiser (2018) writes that:

It is difficult to explain to young women, who see and experience a volume of messages and initiatives telling them to be confident, to lean in, to just *be* empowered, why a known misogynist and racist has just been elected president. Popular feminism exists most spectacularly in an economy of visibility, where it often remains just that: visibility. Popular misogyny, on the other hand, seems to fold into state and national structures with terrible efficiency – like the election of Donald Trump as president. (Banet-Weiser 2018: ix–x, original emphasis)

Banet-Weiser's distinction about the difference between the economies for popular feminism and popular misogyny are significant in terms of their visibility and efficiency. As she argues, popular feminism often remains visible, but it is not folded into state and national structures with the efficiency that misogyny is. So, although we can see and feel injustice, we do not end up with policy that fights against it. In contrast, injustice is further embedded into state and national structures.

One of the reasons "Cat Person" captured the attention of many on social media is that it makes something dark visible, and in so doing, creates a kind of movement around it. This notion of making the dark visible is at the heart of recent work by Carol Gilligan and David A. J. Richards (2018) on feminism and patriarchy. It is therefore important to map out the way in which the personal, Roupenian's story about Margot and her 'bad date', plays out into the public sphere and connects in various ways to the #MeToo movement. But first, some further detail about Margot and the possible reasons her narrative generates so much anxiety. "Cat Person" begins with the following: "Margot met Robert on a Wednesday night toward the end of her fall semester" (Roupenian 2018: 1). On the surface, this is very much a girl meets boy story. Margot is working behind the concession stand at the "artsy movie theatre" downtown and when Robert chooses a box of Red Vines, she responds that he's made "an unusual choice" (Roupenian 2018: 1). As readers, we discover that she learned to flirt with customers when she worked as a barista as a way of earning tips, but now did it out of boredom. What then follows is an explanation of Robert's appeal. He is cute in Margot's estimation, but more for an "imaginary crush [...] during a dull class" rather than as someone she would have gone up to at a party: "he was on the heavy side, his beard was a little too long, and his shoulders slumped forward slightly, as though he were protecting something" (Roupenian 2018: 2). Robert does not engage with her attempts at flirtation at first but returns to the concession stand the next week and asks for her number. Over the next few weeks they communicate via text and Margot is impressed with Robert's witty commentary. Eventually they go on a date that is not very successful. And eventually they return to Robert's house where they have sex. The description of the awkward sex is at the heart of much commentary because it depicts a woman begrudgingly having sex because it is the path of least resistance. Margot knows that she has initiated the sex and therefore feels compelled to carry through with it even though she is somewhat repulsed by herself and Robert. While they are having a drink Margot imagines what it would be like to have sex with Robert, and although she knows it will be "clumsy and excessive" she feels a "twinge of desire pluck at her belly" knowing how "hungry and eager" Robert will be to impress her (Roupenian 2018: 24):

As they kissed, she found herself carried away by a fantasy of such pure ego that she could hardly admit even to herself that she was having it. Look at this beautiful girl, she imagined him thinking.

She's so perfect, her body is perfect, everything about her is perfect, she's only twenty years old, her skin is flawless. I want her so badly, I want her more than I've ever wanted anyone else, I want her so bad I might die. (Roupenian 2018: 35)

Following the night together, Margot feels herself wanting to disappear and sleep. She slowly returns to her friends and confesses the experience. Her friend writes a blunt reply to Robert telling him: "Hi im not interested in you stop texting me" (Roupenian 2018: 54) and then she ignores him when she sees him in the bar, acknowledging to herself that she "was acting like a mean girl, but, at the same time, she truly did feel sick and scared" (Roupenian 2018: 57). The short story ends with a series of messages Robert writes in response that ends with the word "whore", the final word of the story. The complexity of the story lies in the way Margot is simultaneously empowered and vulnerable. She is in a position of entitlement through her education, class, physical attributes, age – all things she is aware of and yet this does not make her feel entitled enough to interrupt Robert's desire. And ultimately, she is labelled a whore by Robert. Kelly Walsh and Terry Murphy argue that "[i]n stylistic terms, the remarkable social and cultural impact of 'Cat Person', particularly the interpretive disagreements, can be explained by its irresolute ending and the strategies readers have used to resolve it" (Walsh and Murphy 2019: 102).

Indeed, the complex and ambiguous nature of the story sparked an online response on Twitter that serves as an interesting site to consider the ways in which emotion and affect travel online. As Zizi Papacharissi argues, "Twitter affords a platform for potentially rich and variable public or private performances of the self through condensed statements that frequently manifest a converged response to sociocultural, economic and political issues" (Papacharissi 2015: 94). Twitter allows people to express themselves and their impressions of the world in short, pithy ways that reflect both themselves but also the shorthand that is often used to stand in for more complex and abstract issues. Papacharissi's work is interested in both the playfulness that Twitter allows and the "storytelling" of the self it encourages (Papacharissi 2015: 100). The Twitter feeds on #CatPerson mostly circulate on the following themes: "consent, fat shaming, objectification, Bad sex, [and] what constitutes (capital-L) Literature" (Donoughue 2017). The journalistic coverage also highlights that memes, jokes and animal videos are usually the subject of viral twitter sensations, not short stories (Donoughue 2017).

The following highlights two tweets from the vast array of tweets on "Cat Person" in order to consider the storytelling of the self and the ways in which it responds to the socio-cultural and political issues that surround it:

#CatPerson author interview: "it speaks to the way that many women, especially young women, move through the world: not making people angry, taking responsibility for other people's emotions, working extremely hard to keep everyone around them happy" (Mary Anne Franks, @ma_franks, 11 December 2017)

Here, "Franks" indicates the active labour that is involved in emotion work: "not making people angry", and "working extremely hard to keep everyone around them happy", are references to the active labour involved in the everyday as Franks sees it. This kind of emotional labour is reflective of the research A. R. Hochschild (2003) conducted in the 1980s around stewardesses on airlines.

It's 2:30 am and I can't sleep because I'm still thinking about #CatPerson and how tons of women identify with it & and have had experiences just like this or worse – but the men who read it, even if they do, will never ever think that maybe they are like this too. (Martha Sorren, @marthasorren, 11 December 2017)

The previous tweet corresponds with the research Mendes, Ringrose, and Keller (2018) undertook in studying hashtag feminisms such as #BeenRapedNeverReported in that it, like the ones they researched, "were not flippant responses, but carefully produced testimonials that were scaffolded after sleepless nights" (Mendes, Ringrose, and Keller 2018: 237).

In a *Guardian* article, Sian Cain (2017) notes the way in which the initial story inspires spin-offs and moves across the media: from online story, to Twitter, to print, and other social media platforms. She writes: "The 4,000 word story has provoked, at the time of counting: a BBC short story written from the perspective of Robert; a Twitter account that only tweeted responses from bewildered men, to the scornful laughter of quite a few more women and responses from approximately 10,000 millennials, who recounted their own slightly sad dating experiences" (Cain 2017). As Cain notes, the story is not confined to the digital even if that is where it finds its initial mobility. Not only does the story travel across digital platforms but so do the emotions that surround it.

Although "Cat Person" is not clearly one of harassment, it is a narrative about a woman who ends up feeling diminished from a sexual experience. As such, it became connected to the #MeToo movement that was gaining momentum at the time. As Lulu Garcia-Navarro suggests in an interview with Roupenian: "[Cat Person] shaped the conversation at a moment when women were grappling with #MeToo" (Garcia-Navarro 2019). Grace Beard's argues that "it's unusual for a work of fiction to go viral, but in the context of the #MeToo movement and ongoing discussions around sexual assault and consent, it's not a surprise that this one did" in her article *Is #MeToo the Reason Everyone is Talking about Cat Person?* (Beard 2017). Although "Cat Person" and #MeToo share hashtags, the link between the two, as suggested above, arose out of the proximity between the story's publication online and the cultural moment of the #MeToo movement. In other words, the connection between the story ("Cat Person") and the feminist digital activism of #MeToo is rooted more in the feelings and emotions the story provokes from women than the narrative itself. As the first tweet suggests, "it speaks to the way many women' manage other peoples" feelings and, as the second tweet explains, it reminds women of "experiences like this or worse". The fact that the connection is formed through the emotional resonance rather than the actual story is significant and suggests that it is the emotions that flow from one example ("Cat Person") to the next (#MeToo). The bridge, in other words, is the recognition by others in the feelings these stories generate, rather than in the way the story is told (the language). As Sara Ahmed argues, "even when we feel we have the same feeling, we don't necessarily have the same relationship to the feeling" (Ahmed 2004: 10).

In their work on 'hashtag feminism' and feminist digital activism, Mendes, Ringrose, and Keller (2018) find that campaigns such as #MeToo can generate powerful responses and yet, they also find that the emotional labour that goes into them can be exhaustive for some participants. As they explain:

These campaigns are providing important spaces for a wider range of women and girls (in relation to age, ability, race and other factors) to participate in public debates on sexual harassment, sexism and

rape culture. These platforms are also making women's and girls' voices and participation visible in ways that can generate the type of ripple effect we have witnessed in the aftermath of #MeToo, where many powerful (mainly white) men are being held accountable for historic instances of abuse and harassment. At the same time, our findings clearly demonstrate that it is never easy to engage in such activism. (Mendes, Ringrose, and Keller 2018: 244)

As they suggest, the campaigns cause a 'ripple effect' which is similar to the wave metaphor used earlier and connects with the notion that the emotion and affect help to move the stories and campaigns along, rather than the stories. The shared or collective sense of hurt, shame and anger work to move the stories and carry them along, and at times, it means they crash down on particular sites of injustice. However, in her research on #Ask-Thicke, Horeck notes caution in the "radical potential of digital media" noting that "it is vital not to forget that social networks also promulgate sexually violent discourse and expand the opportunities to shame and humiliate women" (Horeck 2014: 1106). Joanne Garde-Hansen and I have argued a similar point (Gorton and Garde-Hansen 2013) with regards to the trolling of Madonna and the online hate and shame directed to an older woman's body: while there is radical potential in feminist digital activism, it shares a space with online forms of violence against women. As Banet-Weiser argues: "While networked culture has provided a context for a transfigured feminist politics, it has also provided a context for misogyny to twist and distort the popular in ways that seem new to the contemporary era" (Banet-Weiser 2018: 3). Although online space allows emotion to circulate in ways that makes feelings about feminism visible, there is still work to do to make resistance against misogyny part of state and national structures.

4 Conclusion

In this chapter I have drawn on a case study to explore some of the complexities of emotion and affect online. As various scholars have argued, online emotion can work to form, focus and create digital movements, galvanise actions around particular stories and to help make what are very personal stories ones that affect and resonate with public feeling. The attention to the everyday and the ordinary in cultural studies has led to research that considers the ways in which emotion moves across digital platforms, creating 'digital affect cultures'. This research allows us to think about how a personal story about vulnerability can affect so many, particularly in a context where the emotional register around these feelings is already gaining momentum, such as the example of "Cat Person" and #MeToo demonstrates.

I have also considered the ways in which online emotional labour is often gendered and is something that can unfairly burden people, particularly women. Likewise, although online emotion can work towards productive means, the all too prominent existence of trolling evidences that unless emotion and affect are integrated with knowledge and rationality, they can too often lead in destructive and damaging directions. Social media platforms, such as Twitter, often use emotion to help capture the attention of others and to provide a way for others to *feel connected*. This connection is underpinned by a shared feeling. However, these shared feelings may not also represent shared thinking: they are

also feelings that can be fleeting or temporary. Although campaigns such as #MeToo work well to make feeling visible, they do not necessarily mean that change is embedded into state and national structures. Emotion online therefore can be understood in terms of how affect travels and the directions in which it moves, but more needs to be understood in terms of how this emotion underpins and leads to changes in thought and policy.

Finally, this chapter focuses particular attention, through the example of “Cat Person”, on language and emotion online. Ropenian’s disgust at both Trump’s misogynistic language and the harshness of the language around her led her to write “Cat Person”. The intimate nature of the story and the affective language used to construct it led to a Twitter response that went viral and coincided with the beginnings of the #MeToo movement. Walsh and Murphy argue that Ropenian’s stylistic devices, particularly the “irresolute ending”, contribute to the connection with the #MeToo movement (Walsh and Murphy 2019: 102). The language and stylistics used to describe an intimate and personal sexual experience led to a sense of recognition shared publicly online.

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Katrin Doeveling and Denise Sommer

80 Mediatized emotions, digitalized communication and globalization

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Abstract: In view of current events, such as the worldwide pandemic, political and humanitarian crises, social and ecological activism, to name but a few examples, it becomes clear that mediated communication is not only about rational information but also about emotions. Furthermore, rapidly developing digital communication devices have led to an increasing demand for the analysis of emotions and their impact on human behavior. To better comprehend the influence of emotions in both media use and reception, one has to take into account emotions as vital aspects within communication, that is, the psychological, social, and cultural dimensions. Therefore, the study of emotions in and through media, especially social networking sites, is attracting attention not only in communication studies but also in neighboring disciplines such as psychology, sociology, political science, and cultural studies. This chapter tackles the challenge of revealing and systematically bringing together these insights with the aim of better comprehending the diverse spectrum of mediatized emotions and their influence within digitalized global communication processes. Language as a major human symbol system is conceptualized as the basis of understanding and expressing social belonging. Emotional bonds and support, we argue, serve elementary human needs in a globalized world that are maintained more and more through digital communication networks.

1 Introduction: emotional communication in a globally mediatized society

A young woman obtained an internship at NASA but lost it a short time later because she had sent a tweet in crude language around the world expressing her excitement about the

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job. A NASA official had read her tweet and publicly expressed his doubts about her suitability for the organization (Howell 2018). Her story spread publicly via international media channels, accompanied by mockery and schadenfreude.

Another example, covered by the international press, is Simone Giertz, who was highly successful with her YouTube channel “Simone’s robots” where she displayed silly scientific inventions. When she was diagnosed with a brain tumor, she communicated her situation via her YouTube channel. People around the world empathized with her and expressed their compassion and emotional support online (Gallucci 2018).

In a digitally mediatized global world, meaning that leads to emotions is virtually communicated and negotiated worldwide (Döveling 2017; Döveling and Konijn 2021: 3–11). Likewise, as tragic events such as terrorist attacks disclose, the continuous online mediatization of emotions leads to the creation of new symbols, idioms or memes like “Je suis Charlie” and “Je suis Paris”, “Pray for Berlin” or “Pray for London”, to name but a few. Similarly, women around the world united in the #MeToo campaign.

Currently, in these unprecedented times, the worldwide coronavirus pandemic is affecting all our lives. We first heard and read of the Covid-19 outbreak in China in late 2019 in the news. Within months, this pandemic spread throughout the world, leading to shutting down of borders and having massive impacts on us in our daily lives. In this unforeseen global threat, we follow digital as well as mass media, where we hear about warnings, and imperative measures as recommended by the World Health Organization (WHO).

At the same time, we observe a virtual joining of people around the world. Renowned stars like Lady Gaga, Paul McCartney, Elton John and Billie Eilish sing in their living rooms, alone, but connected digitally with us all. They raise money and show emotional support for those working to fight the coronavirus pandemic. Others express their empathy on their Twitter channels by letting the distressed know that they are not alone and encouraging everyone to practice social distancing and stay at home. In this pandemic, a great outpouring of kindness, compassion and empathy for one another is communicated worldwide through digital media. Mediatized emotions and globalization become evident and palpable on a daily basis.

As all these examples reveal, *digital media* enable new forms of language and universal slogans, which connect people in a common repertoire for shared feelings. Medially transmitted globalized communication, especially online, is not only about rational information. It is equally about emotions. On the one hand, within seconds, *emotions* are displayed and globally channeled in the digital realm; on the other hand, they are motivating factors in digital media usage, influencing wide areas such as political choices, and leading to extensive influences within both the media and the globalized social world.

The communication of emotions in and through digital media is analyzed in numerous disciplines such as psychology, sociology, media and communication studies and cultural studies. In the following section, we provide an *interdisciplinary synthesis* of the essential ideas pertaining to the interplay of emotion and language in digitally globalized media environments. To do so, the chapter first discloses the facets of emotions from a psychological point of view. In a next step, language is conceptualized as a primary human symbol system, directly linked to evolutionarily based emotional social bonding functions. In this context, the sociological perspective of symbolic interaction provides the basis for the un-

derstanding of emotions in digitalized environments. This highly influential theory stresses that emotions are not regarded as physiological invariants, but as resulting from the meaning a person derives from a social situation. We then disclose that *language*, however, is also crucial for mutual understanding from a normative perspective. Thus, classical concepts from media and communication studies are referred to, stressing the integrative power of communicating emotion in connecting interpersonal and mediated acts. In a synopsis, the different viewpoints are united in a model of socio-emotional meta-appraisal (SEMA [Döveling and Sommer 2012]). Within this theoretical framework, language and emotions are linked in *digitally mediatized communication* and empirical evidence for this link is provided. We conclude with implications of communicating emotions in global perspectives and lay out analytical challenges that arise in the analysis thereof.

2 Communicating emotions from a psychological and evolutionary point of view

The term “emotion” has undergone many endeavors at definition. In the last decades, emotion research has generated highly valuable insights in this domain. Most researchers agree that emotions are “a positive or negative type of experience of the subjects”, and lead to a “response following an evaluation of stimuli and situations” (Gerhards 1988: 16; Döveling 2005: 337). Taking a psychological viewpoint, Scherer defines emotion “as a sequence of interrelated, synchronized changes in the states of all organismic subsystems (information processing, support, execution, action, monitoring) in response to the evaluation of an external or internal stimulus event as relevant to central concerns of the organism” (Scherer 1992: 150).

The idea that different appraisals lead to emotions was then further developed (Scherer 2001) and lead to the understanding that so-called “stimulus evaluation checks (SECs)” are essential in the formation of emotion. These include:

1. *Novelty check* (Have external or internal stimuli changed?)
2. *Intrinsic pleasantness check* (Is it pleasant or unpleasant for oneself?)
3. *Goal/Need significance check* (Does it support or prevent one's own goals?)
4. *Coping potential check* (To what extent does the person believe to have the event under control?)
5. *Norm/Self compatibility check* (How does the event relate to one's internal and external standards?)

Manstead and Fischer (2001) emphasized that it is not enough to focus on the individual, but to analyze the individual assessment in a social surrounding and include the appraisal of others in the individual appraisal. They further developed this ground-breaking conceptualization and pointed out:

What is crucial is that individuals anticipate others' definitions of the situation and how they are likely to respond to the situation and to our behaviors. This anticipation is needed in order to coordinate social activity: if we act without any consideration of the implications for how we are evaluated by

others, we risk losing their esteem and ultimately our social bonds with them. (Manstead and Fischer 2001: 224)

It is here where *communication* is vital. Through communicative acts, we do not only know where we stand in terms of our own appraisal, but we equally recognize how we can position ourselves in relation to others.

Furthermore, language serves another function. From an evolutionary perspective, the communication of *negative emotions* helps to prepare the individual to adaptively deal with adverse circumstances, while the communication of *positive emotions* stimulates the expansion of human mental capability (Schwab and Schwender 2011). Likewise, Dunbar highlights that language has evolved mainly for facilitating social bonding in large and complex social groups (Dunbar 2004; Oesch 2016: 5). Dunbar (2004) equally stresses that communicating affiliation bears on the sharing of emotions and attitudes regarding the world through gossip, narration and linguistic interaction. Schwab and Schwender (2011) apply Dunbar's theory to communication from an evolutionary stance to new media technologies. They stress that gossip (Dunbar 2004), a phenomenon that is rooted in human evolution, simply arrives in a different package: ancient subjects and themes nowadays are communicated via electronic channels such as the computer, games console, film, television, radio or even print.

3 Communicating emotions from a linguistic perspective: language as primary human symbol system

Within the communication of appraisals, as disclosed above, language can be understood as the most powerful and essential communicative symbol system of human behavior (Burkart 2002). As Nadal, Pilar, and Santiago Perera (2013) highlight in their linguistic analysis that includes vital psychological aspects, language – as a clear sign of belonging – plays a crucial role in the formation of emotional bonding within a community and culture thereof. The authors emphasize that language is one of the most evident indications of community, more than the total number of the individuals of which it is comprised (Nadal, Pilar, and Santiago Perera 2013: 214). They conceptualize language as a “long-lasting entity projected into both the past and the future and which, moreover, accumulates [...] the whole of the culture” (Nadal, Pilar, and Santiago Perera 2013: 214) by referring to the passion for language as “living and feeling” (Nadal, Pilar, and Santiago Perera 2013: 216) in contemporary societies. Language and specifically the communication of emotions has enabled humankind to convey shared intentionality, which is at the core of culture and human development: “[I]ntentionality and collaborative communication go hand in hand.” (Nadal, Pilar, and Santiago Perera 2103: 215).

Edward Sapir and Benjamin Whorf postulate the so-called *linguistic relativity* and incongruence, referring to the culturally different linguistic codes of reality (Burkart 2002). In such a way, belonging and distance between groups are implicitly expressed via symbolic references. Psycho-linguistic phenomena like the *Linguistic Intergroup Bias* (Maass 1999) demonstrate that within one linguistic community people tend to use different terms when

describing strangers compared to members of their own group. Negative emotions towards outgroups are – often unconsciously – expressed in a more abstract and generalizing way (by using adjectives or state verbs), implying negative group characteristics. Referring to negative characteristics or manners among the in-group, in contrast, group members use concrete language (action verbs) implying an exception to the rule untypical for oneself (Maass 1999). Hence, language conveys and reinforces stereotypes and prejudice, serving a function of distinction or even exclusion. At the same time, language supports our sense of belonging by reducing complexity. In this vein, Oesch (2016: 2) finds language directly linked to social bonding functions. Social bonding is a fundamental evolutionary necessity.

Humans tend to associate with those who are like themselves, and thus those with whom they share experience and evaluation, the so-called appraisals, as were explained above (Luminet et al. 2000; Nadal, Pilar, and Santiago Perera 2013). Culture is also shaped by a set of rules expressing emotions, so-called display rules (for an overview, see Ekman and Davidson 1994) that are passed on from one generation to the next. Alba-Juez and Larina (2018) equally conceptualize in their discourse-pragmatic analysis the linguistics of emotion and the “emotional turn in linguistics” (Alba-Juez and Larina 2018: 11) from an interdisciplinary stance, which includes not only communicative, but amongst others, also cognitive, cultural and discursive aspects, as language facilitates emotional dialogue.

4 Communicating emotions from a sociological perspective

4.1 Language as symbolic interaction

A classical theoretical paradigm pertaining to social communicative processes applies an integrative understanding of different modes of communication as the basis of and human need for social interaction. *Symbolic Interactionism*, founded in the early 20th century at the Chicago School of Sociology, is based on three major premises (Blumer 1969):

1. People act towards things according to the subjective meaning they ascribe to them.
2. These meanings result from social interactions.
3. They are negotiated in interpersonal encounters and constantly changed in further interactions.

Thus, Symbolic Interactionism (Blumer 1969; Mead 1934) can be understood as a theory of peoples’ encounters with their social environment, stressing the individual as well as social (inter-)subjectivity of meaning to everything around us. “In the process of communication there appears a social world of selves standing on the same level of immediate reality as that of the physical world that surrounds us” (Mead 1964: 305).

Our social contacts and contexts affect our worldviews and the symbols we use and share. People need a common ground and shared understanding to survive in a changing and highly complex globalized media environment where meaning is socially relative, depending on situation, time and culture.

It is the interactionist perspective on *emotions* that is thus highly influential in understanding online communication in digital media. It was in the 1970s and early 1980s, when the internet as we know it was not omnipresent, that Arlie Hochschild (1979), Susan Shott (1979) and Louis Zurcher (1982) initiated the analysis of the sociology of emotions from an interactionist perspective. This perspective focuses on

- the *context*,
- the *meaning* a situation has for a person and
- the *corresponding emotions* that result from this meaning.

Connecting these aspects is groundbreaking and still applicable and powerful for the understanding of emotions in digitalized environments. Hochschild, Shott, and Zurcher, amongst others (e.g., Thoits 1990), highlight that emotions are not regarded as physiological invariants, but as resulting from the *meaning* a person derives from a situation. It is only through the shared reference and interpretation within a social interaction that emotions and emotion management arise (Hochschild 1979: 555; 1983; Shott 1979: 1318; Zurcher 1982: 1–2).

4.2 Understanding the communication of emotion from a normative perspective

In his influential theory of communicative action, Habermas (1988) presents a normative *concept of understanding*, characterized by mutuality. Habermas specifically stresses the feature of agreement as an essential goal of communication. He identifies four aspects necessary for successful communication:

1. *Understanding*: Communicative action should be intelligible in terms of language and content. This is ensured by respecting grammatical rules and linguistic conventions.
2. *Correctness*: Correctness means less the correctness of the content, but rather that of dealing with each other against the background of shared values and norms.
3. *Truth*: Communicative action should have a relation to reality, that is, both communication partners should accept what is being said as existent and real. This aspect also relates to the symbolic interactionist idea of shared meanings.
4. *Truthfulness*: Finally, communicative action should be credible; the communication partners should reveal their intentions and not deceive each other.

These aspects guide a deliberative discourse, which serves as the basis of modern democracy. From Habermas' point of view, humans follow these aspects in their everyday communication habitually, assuming that their communication partners do the same. In case of misunderstanding, communication may be repaired by asking for understanding, correctness, truth and truthfulness (e.g., "What do you mean?", "Are you allowed to say that?", "Are you sure?", "Are you serious?"). Although Habermas' concept of communicative action seems rational and intentional, it includes the strong implicit emotional character of everyday communication. In view of these four aspects in our daily communicative routines, we tacitly connect to others via implicit behavioral norms – and again – build a sense of emotional belonging.

Yet, in public communication, the situation becomes more complex. Whenever people doubt one of the aspects, mutual understanding is not achieved. In various situations, for example, people may be unsure in their understanding, as Habermas points out. Social systems use their specific codes. Expert language in politics or economics or science for example is hard to be decoded appropriately by laypersons. A reproach like “gobbledygook” is one example for doubts on the level of understanding. Doubts in truthfulness are also quite common and involve questioning the legitimacy and trustworthiness of communication partners (Burkart 2012).

In public (online) communication, and in times of Donald Trump and Twitter, these highly emotional phenomena include challenging the truthfulness of the press and journalism and accusations of bias or even corruption. It is where *affective discourse* starts with the aim of discussing and eliminating doubts and repairing communication (Burkart 2012).

Russmann (2015) applied Habermas' concept to a content analysis of Facebook comments during election campaigning in Austria. In a four-week period, nearly 9,500 Facebook postings from sites of the relevant parties and leading candidates were analyzed. The quality of understanding was measured by assessing (i) argumentation and reasoning, (ii) proposals for solutions of the problems addressed, (iii) mutual respect as well as (iv) the expression of doubts on all the four aspects of successful communication as defined by Habermas (1988). The study discloses that onliners rather rarely explicitly doubt any aspects of understanding and, if they do so, they typically doubt the truthfulness of their communication partners by challenging their legitimacy (Russmann 2015: 191–192). However, the findings also demonstrate that the more deliberative elements (like the expression of doubts) can be found in discourse, the more actively and fruitfully users eventually discuss political issues (Russmann 2015: 188). Thus, this basic concept of understanding can be *applied to digital media environments* and it seems relevant for civic involvement in political discussion.

5 Communicating emotions from a media and communication studies point of view

5.1 Communicating or not communicating emotions: the spiral of silence

A prominent theory elucidating the dynamics of political discourse is the spiral of silence. By illuminating the role of silence and communication in media effects (Noelle-Neumann 1974), the theory holds that people talk when they *feel safe* in a situation, while they remain silent when assessing that they feel uncomfortable to speak up. Having different appraisals than others might even feel morally wrong. This ultimately leads to a spiraling effect where only one fraction speaks out and thus becomes the voice that is heard, while the other fraction continues to be silent. Consequently, the relations between majority and minority change and a loud minority may rise and become the visible majority. Thus, the theory specifically stresses the features of *interpretation* and *behavior* in communication.

Noelle-Neumann explicates this mechanism with a human *fear of isolation*. This decision may not occur consciously based on an appraisal of *fear*, but fear as an implicit drive plays a vital role as people observe their environment carefully and have a strong sense of perceiving majority-minority relations around them. These perceptions rely heavily on mediatized communication nowadays. Once we perceive an opinion or position expressed by a majority, we tend to support it in public, or at least not speak up against it in order to avoid social exclusion. Likewise, also in this theory, *belonging* is a fundamental aspect of human nature, leading to emotions of fear and thus silence if we feel that we might be rejected from a seemingly dominant position.

There has been an array of studies supporting Noelle-Neumann's theory, although it has also been intensively criticized (Scheufele and Moy 2000). In times of *digitalized mediaization*, the basic concept of fear of isolation has been questioned as online communication offers a broad range of possibilities to speak out anonymously. In addition, discussion culture online has become quite rough; cyberbullying, fat shaming (Döveling and Krämer 2016; Bowman, Cohen, and Döveling 2021: 321) and hate speech reveal inherent issues in contemporary communication cultures. However, as a recent study conducted by the Pew Research Internet Project points out, there is undeniable proof for the applicability of the spiral of silence in online communication (Hampton et al. 2014). When asked for their willingness to speak out in online discussions on Facebook and Twitter, users revealed their readiness to express their positions anonymously. However, the study found clear evidence that in online conversations with friends and acquaintances, like posting on a Facebook timeline of peers, people still tend to fall quiet when they feel they might be in the minority. Thus, again, *the need to belong* and the fear to stand alone need to be regarded as highly influential forces, driving communication in mediatized online contexts.

As Marzinkowski and Engelmann (2018) show in a content analysis of online user comments, the willingness to express one's opinion online increases with the number of different voices cited in online newspaper articles. At the same time, such dynamics may enhance negative reactions such as cyberbullying or hate speech, as these are based on group processes like exclusion, silencing and discrimination (Dooley, Pyżalski, and Cross 2009; Kowalski et al. 2014; Sponholz 2017).

These findings also correspond to the results reported by Gehrau et al. (2014). When talking about emotionally disturbing media content, the social context matters. Participants in an experimental study had watched a staged and highly emotionally exaggerated TV casting show with their peers and talked about it while watching. They felt more skeptical and distanced in their evaluation of the show compared to those who had watched alone (Gehrau et al. 2014).

5.2 Communicating in multi-step flows of communication

As early as 1944, Lazarsfeld, Berelson, and Gaudet stressed the link between mediatized and interpersonal communication. The authors postulated that communication flows from the mass media (predominantly the radio at that time) to certain people serving as a kind of *relais* for the transmission of relevant issues to other people. These so-called "opinion

leaders” (Lazarsfeld, Berelson, and Gaudet 1944: 50) or “influentials” (Weimann 1994) do not only transfer information from the media – they form our evaluations and judgments. As particularly trustworthy and strongly reliable persons, they persuade their followers or even serve as positive role models or figures of identification for decisions (like for example voting behavior that has been investigated quite often in this context).

The classical idea of public communication as a *two-step flow* was superseded by several conceptions of *multi-step flows* (Eisenstein 1994; Robinson 1976; Troldahl and Van Dam 1966), acknowledging that communication does not only flow from mass media to interpersonal sources but also from interpersonal encounters to the media. Moreover, both processes often occur simultaneously or convergently. Likewise, ethnographic studies have illustrated how families integrate mediated messages in their everyday lives. The media becomes part of dinner conversations or serves as trigger for gossip and small talk during television consumption (Keppler 1994; Klemm 2000). Conversation bits while watching television reveal their own specific linguistic character as they are concise and even incomplete. They serve the function of deeper *cognitive and emotional* – and even unconscious – processing of mediated messages and thus again demonstrate the *social contextualization of communication and language* (Baldauf and Klemm 1997).

In today’s digital media environment, the so-called influencers play a key role comparable to that of opinion leaders (Geise 2017; Huffaker 2010). Through YouTube channels or Instagram profiles, they reach an enormous level of popularity and acknowledgement and are digitally omnipresent. Followers usually ascribe expertise to influencers in specific areas such as sports, beauty, arts or the like. Serving as role models and identification figures, specifically for young people, their outreach is quite immense, making them commercially successful with product recommendations or placements (Döveling and Krämer 2016). Especially young people integrate influencers in daily routines by following them in their daily lives. From a contemporary perspective, we therefore note that the ground-breaking aspect of the multi-step flow lies in the potential to lay out an *integrative view* on interpersonal and mediatized communication. As interpersonal and mediatized emotional communication cannot be regarded separately from each other in modern digital communication environments, the need for a more complex view becomes obvious in order to grasp its manifold chances, risks and facets in a globalized world.

6 Bridging the disciplinary boundaries in a globally mediatized society: socio-emotional meta-appraisal in digital communication

It is indisputable that emotions play a key role in communication, in everyday interactions as well as in digital media usage. Nevertheless, the *psychological* and *media communication approach*, as explained above, has focused on emotions mainly from an internally oriented individual perspective. Yet, as the examples demonstrate, media exposure and media effects need to be conceptualized, analyzed, and embedded in a larger social communicative context.

Mediatized messages are processed and discussed with peers to verify one's individual perspective and secure one's distinctive views in a surrounding that is highly influenced by the media (Gehrau et al. 2014; Sommer 2010; Southwell and Yzer 2009). Furthermore, digital media such as Facebook, Twitter and the many applications such as Instagram or Snapchat, permeate life at the personal, social and global level (Döveling and Knorr 2018; Hjarvard 2008). Considering that mediatized everyday communication leads to mutually constructed information exchange systems (Vorderer 2015), it is vital to understand not only their rational side but also their *emotional spectrum* and to grasp how and why mediatized communication engenders different kinds of emotional interactions and how these interactions influence mediatized behavior.

Mediatization "as a continuing process of the restructuring of living conditions through the change of communication media" (Hoffmann, Krotz, and Reißmann 2017: 3) can be understood as a meta-process of social change, comparable to and strongly intertwined with similar processes like globalization or secularization (Krotz 2007, 2014). Mediatization research has evolved into a fruitful and highly beneficial science perspective since the 1990s (Hepp 2012; Krotz 2014). This perspective includes conceptualizing the influence of media on communicative structures as well as the diverse living areas and the rapid and permanent change of communication.

As Döveling and Knorr (2018) and Bowman, Cohen, and Döveling (2021) disclose, in a mediatized digital society, interactivity is inherent in constant communication processes. As all levels of culture and society are gradually shaped by mediatization (Couldry and Hepp 2013; Hepp, Hjarvard, and Lundby 2010), the ways and contexts in which digital media are integrated into emotionally constructed communicative structures are indisputably becoming more differentiated and globalized (Döveling, Harju, and Sommer 2018). Such digital entrenching does not only influence cultural production but also affects how we experience our social lives and how we construct and share emotions in communicative actions (Döveling 2015a, 2015b, 2017; Bowman, Cohen, and Döveling 2021).

Online, often, the unspeakable is transformed into something reportable, offering co-constitutive emotion practices in *digital affect cultures* through discourse, belonging and alignment (Döveling, Harju, and Sommer 2018). It is not only the big social networking platforms such as Facebook that can generate digital affect cultures. Recently, specifically designed online bereavement networks have evolved that enable highly emotional communication among anonymous mourners of all ages. A recent analysis of a multitude of such sites reveals that communicating online and engaging in discourse in a joint emotional appraisal can lead to emotion regulation patterns in tormenting life experiences of children, adolescents, and adults (Döveling 2015a). In addition, as Döveling (2017) shows, online communication of empathy is not dependent on the age of the bereaved or the type of loss of a loved one. Comparing one's emotions and situational assessment in communication with others was found to be vital and is linked to relief (Döveling 2017).

Emotional exchange patterns within symbolic interaction as well as *role structures* as applied by interactional role theory (Mead 1934) were also disclosed in a content analysis of social networking sites (Döveling and Wasgien 2015). The findings illuminate the applicability of the concept in today's online communication in social website platforms.

In this line of argument, the integrative model of socio-emotional meta-appraisal (SEMA [Döveling and Sommer 2012: 148]) is to be applied. This model conceptualizes com-

municative interaction as an ongoing emotional negotiation and social appraisal process, which conclusively leads to redefining the situation and finding meaning (Döveling 2005; Döveling and Wasgien 2014). *Social appraisal* involves taking the role of the other in social interaction, as suggested in symbolic interactionism theory above, and placing oneself in another person's position to think and reflect about oneself. In this process, communication is vital as it enables to validate and justify one's own position.

In this vein, Döveling and Wasgien (2014, 2015) reveal that shared online suffering in terms of grief discloses social meta-appraisal in ritualistic interaction chains in texts as well as in symbols like lighting virtual candles. Additionally, interactive roles in socio-emotional meta-appraisal were identified: Users who helped other users were characterized as care-givers, while users who searched for and potentially received emotional support were defined as care-seekers. The following excerpt reveals the reciprocity within this interaction.

- (1) R., care-giving: I just want to hug you and let you know that I send supporting thoughts. Please endure what maybe cannot be understood. You are not alone, wherever you are! Letting out your thoughts and emotions may be the only thing that I can suggest to you.
- S., care-seeking: Thank you! I don't know what to do. We were already separated since January. Do you think I should visit his parents? Or maybe call? I am just helpless right now.

Moreover, a further analysis shows *the use of visual communication* in coping practices, which are comparable to those in real life.

- (2) My grandma just told me that my grandpa will only live for a couple more weeks. 😢
I am just so scared!! (I. in YW)
(Döveling 2015a: 415).

Different functions of emojis and visuals were identified from Döveling (2015: 414–415):

1. Affirmative interpretational functions, which emphasize the message,
2. Toning functions, which give a special emotional tone to the message,
3. Complementary functions disclosing additional emotional appraisal through supplementary meaning.

These empirical results illustrate: More than ever, online messages are integrated into our daily lives, and daily lives are integrated into online communication. Emotional messages are processed and discussed with others on Facebook, Twitter and specifically designed social networking platforms to reassure one's subjective perception and endorse individual emotional assessments. Interacting with each other and supporting the other empathically – even though in a distant country – has direct positive effects on worldwide social solidarity online (Döveling, Harju, and Sommer 2018).

These findings disclose that in the digital world, socially appraised and shared emotions should not be disregarded within the scientific community. The studies equally dem-

onstrate the relevance and positive outcomes of interpersonal communication in social networks in distressing situations such as grief and bereavement.

7 Communicating emotions: a global perspective

Taking on a *global perspective* on communication of emotions in and through media, Buck (1988), Buck and Powers (2011: 182) and Stifano, Buck, and Powers (2021: 195) illuminate the interrelations of *globalized emotions*, media, and McLuhan's concept of the "global village" (McLuhan 1962, 1964). The authors suggest that the genesis of the "global village" is based upon the ability of the media to foster emotional communication on a global scale. Thus, the emotional power of electronic media is embedded in their aptitude to stimulate communication that links human beings emotionally with one another, "for good or ill" (Buck and Powers 2011: 191).

Such affective connection may lead to compassionate and altruistic feelings as disclosed above, yet it can equally bring about the opposite, such as resentment, public degradation or hatred, and is in such a way also capable of dehumanizing and destroying (Buck and Powers 2011). Stressing the positive aspects in particular, Chaudhuri and Buck (1995: 122) note:

Today we have in place a system of electronic emotional communication that is capable of sharing feelings and thus influencing the emotional education of vast numbers of people. Whether the news is from Somalia or Bosnia, it is the transmission of emotion that makes us feel like members of a single community. It is through the realm of feelings, empathy and altruism, and not only in the realm of ideas, that we are beginning to come together as one world. (Chaudhuri and Buck 1995: 122)

On the other hand, dehumanization and lowered inhibitions (Buck and Powers 2011) set the stage for schadenfreude, the enjoyment of the suffering of others (Döveling 2017; Gehrau et al. 2014). Phenomena like hate speech and cyberbullying are cruel consequences of expressing negative emotions publicly and globally through the media (Dooley, Pyżalski, and Cross 2009; Kowalski et al. 2014; Sponholz 2017).

In the summer of 2017, the German Parliament agreed upon a law against hate speech on the web, the so-called *Network Enforcement Act*. It is compelling international companies such as Facebook, Twitter or YouTube to cooperate with national authorities in order to regulate global phenomena of dangerous mediatized emotions. The companies are responsible for deleting and punishing inappropriate wordings and posts within a certain amount of time (Federal Ministry of Justice and Consumer Protection 2017). Additionally, prevention work has been established for years sensitizing specifically young people to the risks of cyberbullying and their potentially disastrous consequences. Scientifically analyzing "emotion and mediatization by drawing attention to the ways in which social media affect forms and norms of emotional communication and affective flows online" (Döveling and Giaxoglou 2018: 2) thus becomes imperative in our vastly evolving digital surroundings as digital culture permeates all levels of life on the individual, social and global scales (Döveling, Harju, and Sommer 2018).

8 Conclusion and perspectives

In today's "global village" (McLuhan 1964), online communication fosters globally mediated emotional interaction and exchange. Facebook has increased massively in usage worldwide, being the biggest global platform (Kemp 2022). Social networking sites have gained relevance in all areas of life, not only for the good. Rapid exchange of emotions has a vital relevance within social online communication (Bowman, Cohen, and Döveling 2021; Döveling and Wasgien 2014).

As the analysis above displays, positive developments as well as great dangers can be observed challenging the investigation of mediated emotional communication processes. The above-mentioned examples such as terrorist attacks and especially the current Covid-19 crisis illustrate that mediated emotions online connect people all over the world in consolation and create global bonds. Users support each other in socio-emotional meta-appraisal (Döveling and Sommer 2012: 148), stimulating one globalized digital affect culture (Döveling, Harju, and Sommer 2018). Yet they also reveal the risks that we need to be aware of. As humans feel the need to belong to social groups, they may fear social isolation and exclusion and therefore resist speaking up online. Such dynamics can lead to a climate of hate and aggression, as has also been found online within various contexts of intergroup relations (Sponholz 2017).

An interdisciplinary lens, integrating communication research with insights from psychology and sociology, provides the diverse theories and methods for keeping up with such intriguing and rapidly developing online phenomena. Deliberative mutual understanding in online communication, spirals of silence due to fear of isolation, and various multi-step flow processes of mediated emotional communication build the basis of socio-emotional meta-appraisal processes and digital affect cultures around the globe. Engaging in an integrative interdisciplinary view is essential to grasp the complex mechanisms of public communication on- and offline. Moreover, technical developments as well as ethical considerations appear to be an enormous challenge for the academic examination of mediated emotions. Sharing emotions publicly, sometimes even globally, also means revealing one's intimate world to everyone. Even in the anonymous web, researchers have to question their right to observe communication by private individuals without an explicit permission (Döveling et al. 2016a). Taking aside ethical considerations, many methodical and methodological questions remain: How do we deal with the emerging number of algorithms and bots influencing social interaction and interactivity in the digital world? How can we really grasp the complex interconnectedness of communicative action in a globalized and digitally networked world and at the same time consider specific cultural aspects? Such issues continue to strongly challenge academic research in the field and remain extremely fascinating at the same time.

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81 Emotions, language, and advertising

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Abstract: The main goals of this paper are three-fold: (i) to present a state-of-the-art research review of global advertising with special reference to emotional versus rational persuasive strategies, (ii) to identify key issues and approaches in global advertising to reach global consumers; (iii) to underscore the central role of language in creating a wide range of emotional and affective aspects/meaning in global advertising, namely product appeals, consumer attitudes and product attachment. To achieve these goals, we will draw upon recent studies of monolingual and bi-/multilingual advertising across various product types. Language choice, lexical and structural selection and prosodic features will be identified as the linguistic building blocks of emotions within the framework of modern generative linguistics. Drawing insights from marketing, cross-cultural advertising and socio-/psycholinguistics, we will explore a variety of approaches/models and central issues in global advertising and its effectiveness across the various product types (consumer, electronic) and media modality (e.g., social/digital media). The dynamics of language mixing and its various manifestations will be explored for its significance in creating a wide variety of emotional effects. Finally, conclusions and indications for future research will be presented.

1 Introduction

It is widely acknowledged that advertisers employ primarily two types of persuasion strategies – rational versus emotional – to persuade consumers to buy their products. In partnership with brain researchers since the 1970s (Schwarzkopf and Gries 2010: 58–74), advertising guru Ernest Dichter's motivational research revolutionized the landscape of advertising in the US and abroad by arguing that it is not important to think of products as inanimate objects of consumption, but as living beings with personalities and emotions. So, rather than offering dull facts about product attributes, to sell products, emotional product positioning ought to take precedence over a rational appeal. See Packard (1979) on the psychological power of advertising.

2 Objectives

The overarching purpose of this chapter is to examine the dynamics and the complexity of emotional and affective effects/meaning rendered by language use in cross-cultural advertising, which in turn shapes consumers' attitude and attachment to products. The main goals are three-fold: (i) to present a state-of-the-art research review of global advertising with special reference to emotional branding and consumer targeting; (ii) to provide an overview of key issues and approaches in international advertising; (iii) to underscore the central role of language in creating a wide range of emotional and affective aspects/meaning in global advertising, namely product appeals, product attachment and consumer attitudes towards products, by drawing upon recent studies of monolingual advertising and bi-/multilingual advertising.

The chapter comprises three parts. The first part gives a brief overview of the challenges of defining and treating emotions across various disciplines. It also deals with the current issues and approaches in language and advertising research. Discussion in this part also underscores two types of paradigm shifts witnessed in current advertising – a shift from rational to emotional ad positioning, and a departure from monolingual to multilingual nature of advertising. In part two, after laying the theoretical and methodological underpinning, we present an in-depth analysis of emotional ads with multiple language mixing to show the dynamics of language choices in creating emotional appeals. In the third part, various manifestations of language mixing and other factors such as culture and emotional themes are explored with an eye to resolve the global versus local paradox of identities and appeals. Finally, conclusions and future trends are presented.

3 Emotions

3.1 The term: emotion

Before we proceed further, it should be emphasized that the distinction between emotions and mood often becomes blurred in marketing and consumer behavior research. Although the ephemeral emotions do have a permanent presence in the mind, since moods are longer lasting (*for a few hours up to days*), they have *longer lasting* temporal and lower intensity dimensions (Bagozzi, Gopinath, and Nyer 1999: 184; see Ekkekakis [2013] for a converse view). For the purposes of organization and exposition of this chapter, we will use the term *emotion* as an umbrella term to include emotions, moods, attitudes, and identities.

3.1.1 Emotions: review of literature

Emotions have long been the center of scientific inquiry and conceptualization in drama and the fine arts. One of the oldest treatment of emotions can be traced back to Bharata in Ancient India. Bharata formulated his theory of human emotions, *rasas* (lit. 'juices' or

‘emotional experiences’) in his work, *Nātyaśāstra* ‘science of drama’, which was written between 200 BC and 200 AD. Bharata’s treatment of emotions presented a generative framework of emotions. Bharata posited eight primary or innate emotions (*sthāi bhāva* ‘permanent states/emotions’): 1. *śrigār* ‘love/erotic’, 2. *hāsyā* ‘humor’, 3. *karuṇā* ‘tragic’, 4. *raudra* ‘furious’ or ‘cruel’, 5 *vīra*. ‘Heroic’, 6. *bhayānaka* ‘Fearsome’ or ‘timorous’, 7. *vi-bhatsa* ‘gruesome’ or ‘loathsome’, 8. *adbhuta* ‘Wonderous’. To this list the ninth emotion, *śānta* ‘peace’, was added later by Sanskrit theorists of emotions. Linguistic (verbal and gestural) and pragmatic conditions transform these core conditions into different emotional effects and appeals (such as joy, fear, trust). The *rasas* theory was further augmented by the theory of *Dhvani* (lit. ‘sound/resonance’; ‘the power of aesthetic suggestion’) by Ānandavardhana (820–890 AD), which was grounded in audience design (Ingalls 1990). The primary goal of the *Rasa* and *Dhvani* theories is to explain how a creative text creates a parallel world in front of the audience to experience a sense of one’s own world. More than a thousand years later, these theories influenced, either directly or indirectly, modern advertisers and cognitive scientists (Oateley 2004).

Recent research on the lexical level meaning of emotional words (*sad*, *happy*) and emotion-laden words (*cancer*, *COVID*), shows that such words are treated as a separate class of words in the mental lexicon – separate from concrete and abstract words (see Pavlenko 2008: 147). Moving beyond lexical meaning, through their use of componential analysis, Osgood (1958; Osgood, May, and Miron 1975; Pavlenko 2008) paved the way for analyzing language and its linkage to emotions along several semantic/universal dimensions. While drawing from a variety of text and literary genres and datasets (e.g., narrative and autobiographies, suicide notes and manifestos), Pennebaker, Mehl, and Niederhoffer (2003), Boals and Klein (2005), Danner, Snowdon, and Friesen (2001), Knoll (2010) and Bhatia (2018) among others explored the interface of language, emotions and thoughts.

Additionally, marketing and consumer research draws heavily from psychology to characterize emotions and their meaning (for a detailed account and a review of five major theories, see Huang [2001]). Strikingly similar to Bharata’s account of emotions, modern cognitive scientists such as Ekman (1973; Ekman in Ekman and Davidson [1994: 46]) and others (Izard 1977; Plutchik 1982) have identified seven or eight primary “basic” emotions and present a three-part typology – positive, neutral, and negative emotions – based on the mental states they invoke in the human mind.

Finally, it is worth noting that the issues concerning the definition and conceptualization of emotions, their lexical and grammatical encoding across languages, together with production, processing, and perception are so complex, that no single field can come to grips with them because of the dynamic nature of language emotionality based on social, psychological, cultural and pragmatic factors.

3.2 Key issues

Having briefly surveyed the theories and the challenges of conceptualization and linguistic encoding of emotions, let us turn our attention to advertising. Although a number of issues regarding content creation, media modality and consumer reach confront global advertis-

ers from the perspectives of the topic at hand (Bhatia 2007, 2020), the following three represent the main concerns of international advertising: Standardization versus adaptation, Language choice and language attitude, and mixed language versus single language advertising.

3.2.1 Standardization versus adaptation

In 1983, Theodore Levitt claimed in a *Harvard Business Review* article that with the dawn of globalization, the era of multinational companies customizing their products and advertising in numerous ways to meet the individual tastes and choices of different markets was over. Levitt's view opened the floodgates to the standardization versus adaptation debate in international advertising, a debate which persists to this day (see Bhatia and Ritchie [2013]; Prahalad and Hammond [2002] for details). In other words, Levitt advocated an overly simplistic, flawed *one size fits all* approach to advertising for international advertisers seeking to reach out to diverse consumers and markets worldwide. As it stands, one of the key challenges for advertisers is how to resolve the paradox of globalization and localization (national and regional appeals, affiliations, etc.) in the actual making of an ad. Should advertisers tailor the content of their message uniformly across cultures or customize them for culture-specific appeals? These questions not only hold a key to the standardization versus adaptation issue, but are also critical for their linkage to emotional branding and the effectiveness of an ad.

3.2.2 Language choice and language attitude

Related to the standardization versus adaptation debate is the question of the most suitable linguistic vehicle for globalization and customization. With the global spread of English, the question of language choice is practically resolved: Indeed, English is the most preferred choice of global advertisers and marketers. English has effectively displaced its competitor languages, such as French and Russian, and continues to do so with more vigor and dynamism, thus becoming the single most important language of globalization. Indeed, a cursory examination of global advertising reveals that ad writers view English as the most suitable linguistic tool for advertising on one hand and for promoting global bilingualism based in English on the other.

Although the language choice is settled, the question of which variety of English is appropriate is still far from being settled. With the shifting economic pendulum toward Asia and its contact with Asian and African languages, English is undergoing dynamic and evolutionary changes, which has important ramifications for international advertising media and marketing. The indigenization of English has played an important role in rendering emotional appeals and moods. Hsu (2012: 223) shows how grammatical errors in Taiwanese English are used as a strategy to appeal to local customers.

3.2.3 Mixed language versus single language advertising

Although language mixing is the integral characteristic of the bilingual brain/mind and its verbal behavior, society often views it negatively as a sign of language deficiency or *bad* language. What is interesting is that bilinguals themselves view language mixing in a similarly negative way. So, the key concern of advertisers is whether to mix languages or not, as consumers' negative reaction to an ad has not only the potential of ad failure, but also most importantly the possibility of economic loss and brand failure.

3.3 Crafting an ad: approaches

From the viewpoint of advertising goals, the following strategic approaches go into the making of an ad. These approaches, in turn, also mark a paradigm shift in branding products and their advertising.

3.3.1 Rational versus emotional

The fundamental goals of advertising are to inform and persuade. An ad needs to transmit information about the product, its attributes, and price to the audience. Naturally, then, advertising was originally conceived as informational in essence. That is why historically, technological and pharmaceutical brands have been deeply wedded to informational advertising. However, in the new millennium, advertising and marketing grounded in motivational and neurological research is entering into a new era, in which the main mantra is emotional branding and marketing. In partnership with brain researchers since the 1970s (Schwarzkopf and Gries 2010), advertising guru Ernest Dichter's motivational research revolutionized the landscape of advertising in the US and abroad, by arguing that it is not important to think of products as inanimate objects of consumption, but as human beings with personalities and emotions. So, rather than offering factual claims in a real-world situation, like pricing, packaging, and product attributes, emotional product positioning ought to take precedence over a rational appeal. Such an approach evidenced by coronavirus disease (COVID-19) ads (from 2019 to 2020) bridges the gap between emotional and rational ads by technological companies such as Google and Intel. "COVID-19", of course, refers to a respiratory disease that spread from person to person, and caused a global pandemic starting from 2019. These ads dealt with the subject matter of the COVID-19 virus and its impact on humanity. These companies have traditionally taken pride in showcasing their product and message appeal in rationality. More recent ads also rely on the charisma of emotional appeal to maximize product and message appeal. The scope, intensity, and power of emotional positioning of products are skyrocketing, particularly in the age of digital advertising. See Bhatia (2019) for a detailed linguistic analysis of Google India's Reunion Ad, and concomitant consumer emotional experience. The works of Friestad and Thorson (1986), Batra and Ray (1986) and Puntoni, de Langhe, and van Osselaer (2009) are also noteworthy for their investigation of the memory recall and consumer emotional experience rendered by language, including gestural and facial expressions.

3.3.2 Monolingualism versus bi-/multilingualism

In order to reach out to diverse consumers at the global level based on linguistic grounds, two fundamental approaches rooted in monolingualism versus multilingualism can be discerned in advertising and marketing. Recent trends in advertising recognize the multilingual reality of global communication. Consequently, there is a shift from single-language ads to multilingual and/or mixed-language ads. The ad appeal power of multilingual ads over monolingual ads will be explored in Section 4 (“The language factor”).

From the perspective of linguistics, the language of advertising has been studied broadly from two perspectives – monolingualism and bilingualism.

Monolingual advertising explores structural, semantic, pragmatic, socio-/psycholinguistic, and information processing components of language use in advertising and branding in single-language ads (see Bhatia [2007: 101–112]; Bhatia [2019] for a detailed review of monolingual analytical approaches to the language of advertising). Single-language COVID-19 ads (from 2019 to 2020) generate positive appeal primarily by content generation. COVID-19 commercials avoid a gloom and doom approach though. They carry extra-gritty content such as staying healthy, staying safe, staying together and appreciation for fire-fighters, and caregivers. Nike ads’ plucky commercials echo a value-laden message of staying healthy in these difficult times. Acknowledging tough realities, Ford made an ad explaining how its mass production of ventilators during that COVID-19 pandemic is comparable to its mass production of tanks and other war vehicles during World War II, while Hyundai offered to give its customers the opportunity to return the cars if they are experiencing financial difficulty.

Recently, there has been a shift from monolingual ads (single-language ads) to bilingual/multilingual ads (multiple language ads, multiple language mixing, multiple appeals). Central to bilingual/multilingual advertising is a question of language choice (L1 vs. L2) to reach out to bilingual consumers with multiple identities and emotions (moods and sentiments). Studies of such ads investigate differential language effects on emotionality, identity perception, memory, and recall. The main premise of these studies is that the linguistic experience of consumers is an important determinant of a person’s ability to interpret and appraise emotional expression (Altarriba and Morier 2006; Dewaele 2004, 2010; Harris 2000; Irvine 1990; Martinovic and Altarriba 2014; Pavlenko 2005; Puntoni et al. 2008).

4 The language factor

4.1 Theoretical and methodological underpinning

Before we present the role of language in emotional advertising, brief remarks about the theoretical and methodological underpinning of current advertising research are in order. Research on the universal grammar of emotions and language (Russell 1991; Wierzbicka 1999, 2010; and others) reveals that although emotions are universal in nature, languages encode emotions differentially, which means that lexical equivalents and grammatical en-

coding are not shared uniformly across languages (Altarriba 2003; Altarriba and Morier 2006; Pavlenko 2008). In spite of everyday expressions such as *I can't express in words how I feel*, language is central to analyzing and understanding emotions both as the object of interdisciplinary research and as the research tool (for extracting cultural meaning and thought patterns), as shown by the theoretical works of Enfield and Wierzbicka (2002) and social identity research by Tajfel (1978), Tajfel and Turner (2004). These theoretical frameworks serve as the foundation of the qualitative language analysis presented later in this chapter.

On methodological grounds, both qualitative and quantitative techniques are employed by advertising researchers. Data collection methods include random sampling, judgmental sampling, nonprobability sampling, and stratified random sampling drawn from both print and digital advertising. In addition to interview and survey methods for studying marketers' perceptions of product positioning and effectiveness of ads (e.g., Hsu 2012; Martin 2001; among others), experimental techniques are also employed. Experimental techniques have been the salient feature of psycholinguistically motivated advertising research, investigating issues such as language effects on ad consumers' experience, brand attachment, content memory, biscriptal processing and frame switching (Dwivedi et al. 2019; Luna 2011; Samiee and Jeong 1994; among others). The main concern of psycholinguistic research is to address issues pertaining to message appeal (sentiment analysis), language processing, memory and product name recall (Ahn and La Ferle 2008; Daye 2013). In recent years, these types of research have begun to align themselves with the multilingual nature of advertising, thus expanding the scope of experimental and linguistic works.

The tripartite classification of emotions – positive, negative and neutral emotions – constitutes the basis of a typological approach. Following this approach, Bhatia (2019) presents an in-depth content and linguistic analysis of the three types of emotional ads showing how linguistic, lexical, and structural choices mediate emotions and the intensity of emotional experience and appeals. It is worth pointing out that the three types of emotions are not mutually exclusive; themes and event structural conditions make an ad modulate between negative and positive emotions. For methodological details (data size and product type, etc.), see Bhatia (2019: 3–5).

4.2 Language analysis

4.2.1 Positive-emotional ads

This section presents the differential role of language in powerfully effective multilingual ads.

Ad: Google India's Reunion Ad (Impacting Ads, YouTube) represents a multilingual ad with multiple language mixing. It employs Hindi-Punjabi mixing with Urdu and English as key linguistic tools to render emotive effects. Both positive and negative emotions (and peripherally, the neutral emotion *surprise*) lay the foundation of the Reunion ad.

The storyline brings back the nightmarish memories of India's bloody partition in 1947, when Pakistan was carved out of India along religious lines – Muslim Pakistan and Hindu

India. The partition separated two best friends overnight – Beldev, a Hindu, and Yusef, a Muslim. Using the Google search engine, Beldev's granddaughter manages to connect to a sweet shop in Pakistan, which was the favorite of the two friends. On the Pakistani side, Yusef's grandson makes necessary arrangements, primarily through the Google search engine, for his grandfather to go to Delhi on Beldev's birthday. Finally, there is a teary surprise grand reunion. Prior to the reunion, Baldev tells his granddaughter about the trauma he experienced when he lost his friend as a result of the Indian partition. Short stretches of text are mixed with a photograph and facial expressions, which underscore negative emotions (profound sadness and despair) due to the loss of a childhood friend with no hope of connecting with him.

The reunion ad not only displays intense emotion, which cuts across religion, age, gender, national barriers, but also exemplifies corporate responsibility as Google helps to build a harmonious relationship between India and Pakistan. Language is the key vehicle marking emotional intensity. The ad is *not* in English, but in Hindi-Punjabi mixed variety, which is the first language of the bilingual friends and is best-suited for emotional coding and encoding of positive, negative emotions. What is noteworthy is only two to four words are drawn from English – *happy birthday*, *partition*, etc. English is not rich enough for the two friends to express their intense emotional experience, as it is their third language acquired after puberty. From the viewpoint of bilingual language acquisition, the two friends can be characterized as childhood simultaneous bilinguals.

The key features of content analysis in the Reunion ad, namely linguistic markers and mechanism of encoding positive emotions, are summed up below:

1. Content: childhood memories and events (e.g., celebrating birthday, flying kites).
2. Interactional strategies: Hindi-Urdu greeting exchange and intimate address forms to convey warmth in phatic communication.
3. Use of emotional and emotion-laden nouns (e.g., friendship Hindi/Urdu/Punjabi term: *yārā!*, meaning ‘close friend since childhood’); descriptors of intimate friendship.
4. Use of emotional experiencer verbs and subjects.
5. The abstract noun *yāden* ‘memories’ is interfaced with a short theme song of the memories of childhood.
6. Vowel elongation for the intensity of joy of reunion and pain of separation.
7. Intensifiers: *very*. Reduplication – *very very*. Reduplication conveys very high emotional intensity.
8. Metaphors: *sweets* further augmenting happy memories.
9. Deixis: sharing physical and psychological space; monsoon rain to mark reunion.
10. Culture-specific deixis of positive emotional experience of monsoon rain in South Asia.
11. Visual (pictures) and gestural language (tears; suprasegmental) and emojis.

Negative emotions are encoded by supra-segmental language, i.e., barely audible sounds, falling intonation, narration punctuated by long silence.

4.2.1.1 Translation equivalent and semantic asymmetry

Interestingly the preference and the choice for the English word *partition* over Hindi/Punjabi *baṭwārā* connotes negative emotions – anger and sadness – toward the out-group, i.e., the British.

4.2.1.2 Consumer reaction

The consumer response was positive and powerful, which is best summed up by Mahnoor Khan, from Karachi, Pakistan, in the following words: *Crying so hard right now. Lots and lots of love for India, from Karachi. Bless you* ❤️❤️❤️. The ad touched a chord with Indians as well as Pakistanis. They shared their family stories of partition and the agony of separation overnight.

The pattern of emotional appeal rendered by the linguistic encoding of emotions in the Google Reunion ad is also mirrored by print ads, particularly in the internal structure of an ad (e.g., slogans and attention-getters), see Bhatia (2019) for details.

4.2.2 Negative-emotional ads

Products such as pharmaceutical and taboo products show close affinity to negative emotions. Advertising and marketing gurus often warn against the use of negative emotions and even negative structures in their ads (Percy 1982), as positive emotions are associated with optimism and an upbeat attitude, whereas negative emotions are associated with pessimism and fear. So, negative emotions should be avoided at every cost. Besides, psycholinguistic research reveals that it takes more time to process negative structures than corresponding positive structures (Bhatia 1995). Therefore, advertisers often employ taboo-suppressant linguistic strategies to reduce potential negative fallout. For the definition and classification of taboo products, see Wilson and West (1981).

Consider the language choices employed in the advertising of sanitary pads in India to target female consumers. The language, lexical, and grammatical choices are listed in Table 81.1.

Table 81.1: Taboo suppression choices in Indian advertising (adapted from Bhatia [2019: table 3]).

Strategy to avoid taboo words	Examples
Language choice	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> – Lexical preference for foreign language, primarily from English and secondarily from Persian, over native-language lexicon
Discourse style	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> – Indirect (non-volitional verbs, experiential subjects, locative/oblique subjects) – Preference for female style over male style – Euphemistic language
Message appeal	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> – To avoid negative consequences of sex and still experience pleasure and satisfaction
Role model and familial network	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> – Mothers and grandmothers
Thematic structure	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> – Security over sexual pleasures
Authoritative text	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> – Credibility by citing authoritative Sanskrit texts such as <i>Kāmsuutra</i>.
Role model	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> – Educators; women (grandmothers)

What is noteworthy is that the language choice in taboo products is diametrically opposed to the language choice employed in the Google Reunion ad. Furthermore, the language use in taboo products is subject to severe linguistic constraints – lexical, structural and discourse – as shown by the cross-cultural findings of Allan and Burridge (2006), Freitas (2008), among others.

In sharp contrast to taboo (commercial) advertising, social developmental ads (public service commercials) do not use taboo suppression devices in language or pictures to render shock. Negative emotions (disgust, agony, sufferings) are not only depicted but also enhanced or even exaggerated graphically and linguistically. Consider cigarette ads in the US. These ads persuade smokers to give up smoking by using strong shock-appeal with graphic images of diseased lungs and smokers with agonal gasps.

4.2.3 Child speech and motherese

Children can harness emotions. Naturally, then, they are a prime tool of emotional attention-getters. Children and their speech together with motherese are an integral part of emotional advertising. That explains why stories with highly emotional content go viral. For instance, 8-year-old Ryan Kaji, listed as 2019's top YouTube earner with \$26 million in revenue, now has grown his video presence into a children's channel called Ryan's World with 23 million subscribers. Ryan opens boxes, plays with toys and reviews toys on his stunningly successful channel, which counts over 2.3 billion viewers as of August 2018. Naturally, his reviews convey untamed emotions, which he can unleash in his reviews by means of his gestural and verbal language. The use of child language is one of the salient features of his reviews. His expressions employ vowel prolongation (e.g., ooooh, noooo!), rhythm and tempo to mark the intensity of emotions full of joy and surprise.

The examples and discussion above serve to illustrate the strong link between emotions and bilingual language mixing, motherese and child speech. When crafting modern (emotional) advertising, successful advertisers are now beginning to leverage these and other linguistic elements to heighten the emotional appeal of their ads.

5 The English language factor

5.1 English language-based language mixing

As pointed out earlier in Section 3.2.2 in the context of the globalization versus localization issue, for all intents and purposes, English is perceived as the global language, having come into contact with every major and minor language in the world. Consequently, English serves as a single most important language of global plurilingualism, which manifests itself in the following four types of mixing in global advertising:

- Mixing of world varieties of Englishes
- Mixing of world English accents
- Mixing of English with other languages
- Mixing of English with non-Roman scripts

In global advertising, the use of the four types of mixing is widespread in the structural components of an ad – attention-getters, ad body, slogans, product names and labels – to render a wide range of ad-internal effects, ranging from indexing multiple identities and resolving the global versus local paradox to new ways of communicating taboo ideas and generating new emotive meanings. For more details and examples of the structural components of ads, see Bhatia and Ritchie (2013).

5.1.1 Glocalization

Rather than following the either-or dichotomy along the line of *think global, act global; think local, act local*, language mixing provides advertisers a creative linguistic tool to generate both global and local appeals in their message. In addition to resolving the global versus local conflict, the glocalization strategy offers an integrative alternative on how to unify the effects of two languages, e.g., English and local languages. The case in point are the English-*Hindi* slogans of the multinational companies with their English names.

- (1) Mechanism of glocalization: English-*Hindi* mixed slogans
 - a. Domino's
 hungry *kyā*
 'are you hungry'
 - b. Coca-Cola
ThaDā matlab Coca-Cola
 'cold meaning Coca Cola'
 - c. McDonald's
 What is your *bahānā*? I'm loving it.
 'What is your excuse?' I'm loving it.

These examples shed light on one of several mechanisms of glocalization within the structural components of ads.

It is instructive to point out that on formal and functional grounds, language mixing is not a random phenomenon; it requires a complex integration of two or more grammars by tapping the multilingual competencies of the multilingual mind/brain (Bhatia and Ritchie 2009, 2011). For instance, English and Hindi belong to two distinct word order typologies. While English is an SVO (Subject-Verb-Object) word-order type language, Hindi is a SOV language. Consequently, English prepositional phrases are realized as postpositional phrases in Hindi. English-Hindi mixing must resolve this structural conflict in advertising language, and it is certainly resolved in creative ways (see syntactic constraints on code-mixing in Bhatia and Ritchie [2009]). Beyond grammar, on functional grounds language mixing is motivated by optimization considerations as evidenced by the power of a mixed-language message and its reach to consumers with multiple identities. Advertising research shows that single-language ads – in English or in the local language – fall short of encoding different identities and fail to reach the audience of a mixed ad.

5.2 Identity and emotions

Individual and ingroup identity also serves as a strong link to emotions (Tajfel 1978; Tajfel and Turner 2004). Kinship relationship terms, proper names, clothing, music, and cultural motifs among others, invoke deeper emotional bonds with a product (Watzlawik et al. 2016; among others). Coca-Cola's global campaign incorporates most of these devices to convey a rich array of identities in their ads. Proper names (e.g., Kevin, Jane) on Coke bottles successfully capitalized on the power of the name – an individualized identity. Coca-Cola's ads from the 1950s indexed White Anglo-Saxon Protestant identity through names and images. Product names from South Asia mixed with English and regional languages reflect multiple identities.

The following Hindi slogan used by Coke reminds consumers that one's name resonates an every-human relation.

- (2) *Har rishtā bolā, mere nām kī Coca-Cola*
 every relation spoke my name of Coca-Cola
 'every relation speaks with my personalized Coca-Cola'

To heighten rural, religious, and ethnic group identity appeals, Coca-Cola makes use of Bollywood actors and actresses, music, songs, and cultural motifs, etc., to build local appeal of its global brand. In Figure 81.1, a famous Bollywood actor is depicted in Punjabi farmer and South Indian Muslim (Hyderabad) clothing. Interestingly, the Coca-Cola brand name is in English because of its global brand identity.

Choice of multiple languages and scripts went into the making of Coke's campaign to encode the multiple identities of India. The same strategy is adopted by the Fidelity investment firm in Japan (see figure 2 in Bhatia [2019] for the actual ad). The main carrier of identity in the Fidelity ad is not the content per se but the different scripting. The third line of the ad is written in the Devanagari/Hindi script, the content of the message – golden earrings in the ear of a lion – is incomprehensible to Hindi as well as Japanese readers. While the message of the golden earrings may not be immediately accessible to all readers for its relevance in the ad, they can read the script and understand the message of the ad.

Punjabi Farmer and Hyderabadi Thanda TVCs



Fig. 81.1: Glocalization: cultural and linguistic adaptation (source: https://randomspecific.com/wp-content/uploads/2009/03/glocal_colा. pdf (last accessed 24 April 2022).

5.3 Socio-psychological appeals

Research on cross-cultural advertising reveals that mixing with English is motivated by a complex array of socio-psychological factors besides indexing identities and attitudes (see Ritchie and Bhatia [2013] for details). Most importantly, besides being the global language, English is perceived as a “cool” language, containing deep association with youth on one hand and with progress and new ideas on the other. That explains why young people around the world are embracing English (Lin, Wang, and Hsieh 2016).

In multilingual advertising in countries such as India, Singapore and Nigeria, different languages carve out distinct appeals (e.g., audience, product, pragmatic and symbolic). In Indian advertising, each language lends a differential emotionality load, as shown in Table 81.2. The pattern identified is relative in nature and it is by no means absolute.

For instance, Sanskrit is ideal for invoking deep-cultural connection to a product, Hindi is ideal for sentimental product association. While Sanskrit is more effective for *Ayurvedic* products, English is admired for trustworthy modern medical products. These appeals have critical implications for brand recognition (brand attitude), brand loyalty, consumer decision-making actions and advertisers’ goal attainment (to sell their products).

The content analysis of cross-linguistic and cross-cultural research on language mixing with English reveals that English serves as a key source of triggering socio-psychological features due to the global and “cool” positioning of English. When English is mixed with a local language, it evokes socio-psychological features such as those listed in Table 81.3.

Tab. 81.2: Emotions and value appeal (adapted from Bhatia [2013: table 23.3]).

Language	Indexing (gender)	Pragmatic/ utilitarian value	Sentimental/ symbolism	Product type
English	Male/Female	Information, luxury effectiveness	Modern, Western	Technological, modern medicine Fashion, scientific, taboo
Hindi	Female	Utility, pragmatic, convenience	Sentimental	Insurance Home products
Sanskrit	Male/Female	Effectiveness	Deep-rooted cultural reliability	Pharmaceutical (<i>Ayurvedic</i>)
Punjabi	Male, ethnic	Utility, pragmatic Convenience	Rural	Agricultural products

Tab. 81.3: English mixing in advertising: socio-psychological features (adapted from Bhatia [2013: table 23.2]).

- 1 Vision, foresightedness, advancement, betterment
- 2 Limited westernization, Christianity, values such as independence, freedom modernization, etc.
- 3 Authenticity, certification, standard of measure
- 4 Reliability, scientific appeal, problem-solving
- 5 Efficiency, organization, quality, safety, protection, functionality, pragmatism
- 6 Elegance, style, rarity

The socio-psychological effects of English mixing (Table 81.3) are attested by a number of content and appeal analysis studies of various product types, interviews with copy writers, and consumer surveys, in Asia (Taiwan: Hsu [2012, 2019]; Singapore: Hiramoto [2019]), in Europe (France: Martin [2019]; Italy: Vettorel and Franceschi [2019]), in South America (Brazil: Friedrich [2019]), and in Africa (Congo: Kasanga [2019]).

5.4 Breaking taboos

Because of its positive association with youth and progressive thinking, the direct discourse style of English is gradually replacing the traditionally indirect discourse style used in taboo advertising in India. For instance, expressions such as *pānv bhārī honā* (lit. ‘feet to become heavy’), *māsik dharma* (lit. ‘monthly religious act’) are no longer used to express pregnancy and menstruation respectively, particularly by urban females. Similarly, the same shift is seen in the advertising of sanitary pad advertising behavior (see Bhatia and Bhargava [2014] for details). Due to recent American influence on Indian culture, American NGOs and advertisers are devising “social developmental advertising” which encourages direct and frank exchange about the topics which are unmentionable in a traditionally socially acceptable way of talking. Ads devoted to AIDS awareness stress an open/clear discourse style and directness of meaning that challenges those who are unable to speak about taboo subjects. For an in-depth study of print and television advertising for similar taboo products/concepts in Europe, see Freitas (2008).

5.5 Cross-cultural translations and intelligibility

Additionally, language mixing with English generates a range of literary effects – rhyming, reduplication, puns, humor, etc. – in slogans and attention-getters which further facilitate easy product recall. The impact of translation and intelligibility in the success or failures of ads together with transcreation of messages in cross-cultural ads is discussed in Martin (2019) and Bhatia (2020). Martin (2019) sheds light on how global brands succeed in their campaigns by translating and transcreating advertising messages for local audiences, using pluralistic as well as distinct strategies in French-English mixing, glossing techniques for different markets, media and products.

In short, mixing with English yields a cluster of emotions and appeals which renders a favorable product appraisal, leading to positive product attitude. This explains why despite the universal negative social perception of language mixing as a bad language, mixed language ads do not lead to ad failure because of their creative power.

6 Conclusion

Since Ernest Dichter’s call for the reconceptualization of products as living beings, marketing and advertising research has shifted the landscape of advertising in two substantive

ways: (i) persuasive strategy: from the original rational and informational strategy to a more emotional experience to persuade consumers to buy their products; and (ii) context: a shift from monolingual advertising to multilingual advertising, which recognizes multilingualism and multiculturalism as a new global reality. Our linguistic analysis of positively salient and negatively salient emotional ads shows that language offers a rich array of building blocks of emotional intensity in advertising language. These building blocks include themes (love, friendship, relationship), cultural symbols and motifs, emotional and emotion-laden words, quantifiers and intensifiers, experiential verbs and experiencer subjects, interactional and deixis strategies, metaphors, interface of verbal and gestural language and motherese, among others. Rather than relying either on global or local appeal, a mixed approach of glocalization is preferred. The glocalization strategy is driven primarily by language mixing – mixing of English with other languages – to render a wide variety of social-psychological emotional effects and forge multiple regional, ethnic and religious identity appeals (Martin 2006). For products which deal with negative emotions, language serves as a catalyst for transforming negative emotions into positive emotional states and experiences. Taboo words and taboo contents are suppressed in order not to undercut positive product appeal. Finally, the language dimension of emotionality is becoming more and more complex in the age of globalization due to the relatively differential emotional load borne by different languages in multilingual societies. In short, mixing of multiple languages, scripts, accents, etc., offers a broad range of emotional experience to create favorable consumer attachment to a product. The deeper understanding of socio-psycholinguistic of language mixing is an area of more future research.

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D Interdisciplinary and Application-Related Perspectives

Rainer Schützeichel

82 A survey of sociological theories and approaches to communication and emotion

- 1 Introduction
- 2 Cultural-sociological research cluster
- 3 Socio-structural research cluster
- 4 Phenomenological and enactivist research clusters
- 5 Communication of emotions
- 6 Concluding remarks
- 7 References

Abstract: The chapter discusses central sociological theories that deal with the connection between emotion and communication. Sociological theories consider communication as embedded in social and societal, in cultural and political relations. Accordingly, they anchor the genesis of emotions either in the cultural or discursive contexts in which communication takes place, in the social-structural positions of the communication partners or in the bodily-affective relations of the communication partners to each other. Conversely, sociological approaches see the function of emotions for communicative processes in the fact that they inform about the expectations, norms and social positions of communication partners. These approaches will be presented using prominent theoretical positions such as Affect-Control theory, Goffman's identity theory, Kemper's socio-structural theory and more recent enactivist conceptions. At the same time, an outlook on desiderata of sociological emotion and communication research is given.

1 Introduction

If one approaches the topic of “communication and emotion” from a sociological perspective, one is faced not only with the notorious problem of having to deal with the unwieldy concept of emotion (cf. Scarantino and de Sousa 2018; Zinck and Newen 2008), but also with the equally diffuse concept of communication. To a certain extent, if one takes a broader concept of communication as “social relationship”, most sociological theories are communication theories. Sociology, according to a definition with which not all, but many sociologists would agree, is the science of social action and thus action in social, communicative relationships. From this it also follows that many approaches deal with feelings, affects or emotions, sometimes rather casually, but sometimes also as a thematic focus.

Sociological research on emotions aims to analyze the social conditions of their development as well as the communicative functions of emotions (see Bericat 2016; Senge and Schützeichel 2021; Schützeichel 2006). This interest is, however, pursued in the context of diverse research approaches. In sociology, both communication and emotion are studied extensively, but the research is thematically fragmented. Studies are typically carried out within very specific frameworks and approaches with little theoretical overlap. Therefore, the problem arises of how to provide a simultaneously systematic and yet sufficiently differentiated overview of this research (cf. Fiehler 1990; Guerrero, Andersen, and Trost 1998; Planalp 1999). Since a purely additive approach is not possible, the following section uses the example of exemplary representatives to distinguish between the conceptual and theoretical drafts of research clusters, i.e., theory families which, despite all their divergence in detail, have common paradigmatic starting positions and thus structurally similar research programs.

- Cultural-sociological research approaches trace the genesis of emotions back to linguistic and communicative rules.
- Socio-structural approaches consider the positions and communicative constellations of actors in social relationships as decisive factors in the genesis of emotions.
- Phenomenological and enactivist approaches relate emotions to the conditions of bodily-based interaffectivity in communicative relationships.

In addition to these, there are (like the family of rational choice theories, network theory, sociology of practice or systems theory) a number of other emotionally sociologically relevant approaches, which, however, are not discussed due to different issues. The reconstruction of the research clusters focuses primarily on the following questions: How are emotions generated in communicative relationships? What functions are attributed to emotions in such relationships? How are emotions communicated? For the purpose of this discussion no functional distinction will be made between emotions, feelings, affects, and moods, and the terms are used interchangeably to refer to a state of psycho-somatic excitation that goes beyond cold cognition alone (cf. Gebauer et al. 2017; Schützeichel 2008; Thamm 2006; Turner 2014).

2 Cultural-sociological research cluster

In this section, sociological approaches are presented that deal with cultural, discursive and linguistic preconditions and conditions of the emergence as well as the communication of emotions. Among them, the Affect-Control theory occupies a prominent position.

Cultural-sociological approaches (Illouz, Gilon, and Shachak 2014; Williams 1978) are based on two theoretical principles that are important for the thematic context of “communication and emotion”: generalized constitutive rules, which constitute the meaning of something, and normative rules, which guide specific communicative action. The common assumption prevails that emotions are due to the interpretation and evaluation of events, facts or persons, guided by discourse, cultural rules or linguistic meanings (cf. Scherer 1999). They therefore correspond to psychological or cognitive appraisal theories, but em-

phasize more strongly than these the social, collective or even communicative character of the evaluation standards that are responsible for the evocation, genesis and reproduction of emotions. Sociological theories therefore stress the existence and significance of emotion cultures, emotion rules, feeling rules and display rules, which provide authoritative guidance on how emotions are shown or felt in which situations (cf. Hochschild 1979; Robinson 2014).

It often remains open what function is assigned to linguistic categories (cf. Pritzker, Fenigsen, and Wilce 2020), though both a strong and a weak thesis have been proposed on the matter. The strong thesis that emotions are individuated with the help of linguistic categories is supported by only a few approaches (e.g., sociological systems theory as presented by Luhmann [1984]). The theory of individuation is a strong thesis, because emotions are attributed the status of “social kinds” or “cultural kinds”, whereas the status of “natural kinds” is denied. In the sociology of culture, the weaker thesis is assumed to be that linguistic expressions and concepts are affectively connotated, i.e., they are not carriers of meaning in semantic or syntactic terms, but in affective-pragmatic terms too.

In most publications on the subject, Affect-Control Theory is an important reference position in this research cluster. Initiated mainly by David Heise and Lynn Smith-Lovin (Heise 2006, 2010, 2019; Smith-Lovin and Heise 1988) as an analytical continuation within the framework of Symbolic Interactionism, Affect-Control Theory has so far been able to achieve a lot of empirical support from multiple studies. Language is regarded as the primary symbolic system through which cognitions are represented, processed and communicated. The research approach is based on the premise that language has affective connotations called “fundamental sentiments”, which actors automatically fall back on when determining and evaluating situations and choosing options for action. The term “affective control” does not refer to the control of affects, but to the shaping of evaluations and actions by emotions.

The core of this theory is not that actors choose their actions on the basis of (common or contrary) situational definitions, but that situational definitions are based on linguistic categories that have affective connotations and are capable of evoking specific feelings in the actors. To illustrate this with simple examples: When we notice that a father hits his child, this arouses certain emotions in us, for example anger, resentment or shame, depending on how the script “father-slaps-child” is connected with linguistically and culturally induced basic effects. When we see our child being presented with a medal at a sports festival, this linguistically defined setting “child sports medal” can trigger certain emotions such as pride, satisfaction or envy in us – depending on how we define these facts and in which constellations we stand by them.

The Affect-Control Theory thus assumes that the meanings of something are always associated with corresponding feelings. Meanings are affective. Language is not only a categorizing and communicative, but also an affective organon. It has an affective characteristic that shapes the definitions of situations. If certain elements of a situation appear in a strong contradiction to or even matching the expected affective characteristics, this leads to corresponding emotional reactions by the participants. The guiding assumption is that actors in social situations and in their interactions are oriented towards establishing consistency and coherence between the linguistically and categorically given basic mean-

ings (fundamental meanings and sentiments) and the meaning of the situational events (transient meanings and sentiments) and thus also the affective qualities supporting them (Lively and Heise 2004). Emotions indicate to the actors whether such coherence is present or not. In communications, they process the evaluation and attitude regarding the relationship between the definition of the situation and real action events.

This affective characteristic is determined using the methodology of semantic differentials according to Osgood, Suci, and Tannenbaum (1957). The affective meaning of words and terms is obtained in a three-dimensional “affective space”. The first dimension of “evaluation” (E) is carried by the contrasts of good or bad, pleasant or unpleasant and is associated with the behavioral opportunities of “approach versus avoidance”. The second dimension of “potency” (P) is carried out in the contrasts of strong versus weak and is connected with the attribution of power and control opportunities. The third dimension of “activation” (A) takes place in the contrasts of active versus passive and is connected with the attribution of a willingness to act and to react. These three dimensions can be regarded as vectors of a socio-emotional space in which the distinctive linguistic categories can be entered with the help of their so-called EPA profiles. Affect-Control Theory assumes that the basic structure of semantic differentials is transcultural and thus structural in nature, but that the values, i.e., the so-called EPA profiles for individual linguistic categories, naturally vary culturally. Moreover, linguistic categories are usually calibrated, specified and contextualized by habituation and experience. From the abstract category “father”, in which the expectations regarding roles condense, “my father” or “the father of Anton”, i.e., a more personalized variant, can then be formed. This entails corresponding changes in the EPA profiles and thus in the “fundamental sentiments” or “core affects” induced by the linguistic categories. In the affective connotations of language, the individual, but even more so the collective experiences of interaction have, as it were, coagulated and are stabilized in them.

“Fundamental sentiments” result from the expectations of the communication partners. If they are shared, affective coherence is formed among these individuals, by which they can orient themselves in their behavior as well as in their expectations, but also notice deviations. Thus, if events or actions occur that contradict the “fundamental sentiments”, this can lead to the situation definitions being reviewed and corresponding adjustment categorizations being made, but it can also lead to the basic feelings being retained as an orientation variable and deviating actions being corrected, which can generally be associated with the elicitation of discrete emotions such as anger or rage or, in the case of positive deviations, with joy or happiness depending on the situation assessment. Thus, unlike most other sociological approaches, Affect-Control Theory assumes two affective variables: “fundamental sentiments” as linguistically or discursively induced qualities, which are sometimes only represented diffusely and pre-reflexively, and discrete emotions as reactions to the coherence or incoherence of expectation and event.

According to this approach, emotions have an important communicative function. Emotions document what impression an event, an action or a behavior has made on actors and how they evaluate this event. Do they evaluate it in terms of the fundamental sentiments assumed to be shared or do they deviate from them? They signal a certain readiness to act and – in this way – to control the situation definitions and the actions of the other

actors. In the communicative space, however, emotions not only have a documentary display and signal value, but they are also experienced like phenomena that have EPA profiles, i.e., they can be located in a three-dimensional, affective space and thus generate certain expectations of connection, which in turn can trigger affective reactions. Communications thus not only show sequences of actions, but also sequences of “fundamental sentiments” and emotions. However, these are not functionally significant for the reproduction of communications, but rather serve as a control variable. According to the Affect-Control Theory, communications always deal with the problem of whether or not emotions are confirmed as documentary and evaluative statements and thus as proof of a person’s “identity”. Actors are concerned with the confirmation of their emotions and try to achieve confirmation in their own actions, but even more so in the behavior of the other actors. In their affective reactions to their own and their communication partners’ emotions, the actors thus negotiate their social identities.

Against this background, the central thesis of Affect-Control Theory is that individuals in communicative situations choose their behavior in such a way that they can experience emotional episodes or states that correspond to the affectively significant values of their situatively used linguistic categories. Actors attempt to confirm the fundamental sentiments connoted in the situation definitions towards their communication partners, but also towards themselves (cf. Heise 1977: 164). Their own as well as the emotions of the co-actors are thus limiting the scope of options for action and situation interpretations that are available to them in communications. The actors are assumed to have a homeostatic need, as it were, to confirm their basic feelings; accordingly, the aim is to establish affective coherence between the linguistic and behavioral levels. Emotions indicate whether such coherence is achieved. Which emotions are reached depends on the strength and interpretation of the discrepancy. If there are negative discrepancies, different possibilities are offered to the actors: Either they stay in the situation or they avoid the situation. If they remain in the situation, they can try to correct their own actions or the situation definition of the co-actors.

The central analytical difference to other approaches to communication theory is not that emotions are traced back to discursively induced situation definitions, but rather that these situation definitions themselves are already linked to affective qualities. Hence, communicative spaces are to be understood in all their elements as affective spaces. This also presupposes a modification of the concept of emotion: in contrast to older approaches, emotions are no longer understood as primary biological strata of human consciousness, but as linguistically and thus also culturally permeable phenomena; according to Affect-Control Theory, a strict distinction between cognitions and affects cannot be made (Heise 2019).

Formulated in the conceptual frame of the underlying model, the affective meanings stored in the situation definitions and assumed to be common are thus assigned the function of a cybernetic control variable, which, when shared in a communicative situation, enables a relatively automatic course of interaction, but can lead to conflicting courses of interaction in the case of contradictory situation definitions. Affect control is thus based, as it were, on a cybernetic control mechanism that is constituted by reinforcing loops between linguistic categorization and behavior. For this reason, along with similar Identity-Control

Theory, in which the central cybernetic regulator is not discursively induced affects, but rather personal or social ideas of identity, Affect-Control Theory belongs to the sociological group of cybernetic control theories (McClelland and Fararo 2014).

Other approaches in the research clusters, which we present in the following section, emphasize much more strongly than Affect-Control Theory the fact that discourses and languages are not outside of power relations. Consequently, discourses and languages serve to produce the reproduction of constellations of power, domination and inequality. This applies all the more to the emotions evoked by them. The central thesis is that emotions, communicated in their bodily expressions and affective actions, arise in communicative situations in the difference between expectations and events and thus have the function of pointing out divergences or convergences of normative attitudes and behavior and thus give the opportunity for their correction.

3 Socio-structural research cluster

In the research cluster we are now turning to, communicative acts are seen as traits in a struggle for status and power in social relations. Status and power dimensions, rather than linguistic or cultural rules, are the central conditions for the generation of emotions. The theories of Erving Goffman and Theodore D. Kemper present two exemplary approaches.

3.1 Face-work and identity

Although the famous sociological interaction analyses of Erving Goffman (1959, 1967, 1983) are to be found in the same traditions as the Affect-Control Theory, they offer us a different model for the genesis of emotions. With them Goffman opens up a line of research that can be described as socio-structural emotion research. For in Goffman's work, the interactional configurations in which the actors are related to one another appear as the central conditional factors for the genesis and function of emotions. One could also formulate the difference to the first theory group in this way: Whereas in Affect-Control Theory the linguistically induced meanings with affective implications are at stake, in Goffman's theory it is the "image" or the social identity of actors that forms the normative regulatory variable. Goffman's model can be identified as interaction cybernetics, too, because the emotions emerge in relation to a control variable, but the decisive variable, the regulatory value, is occupied by status and identity formations.

Goffman himself did not leave behind a decided theory of emotions. He deals intensively only with a larger group of emotions which he calls "embarrassment", i.e., those emotions that occur when certain norms and rules are violated, the blame for which one attributes to oneself (Goffman 1956). These include such emotions as embarrassment, uncertainty, abashment and shame, which are difficult to distinguish in phenomenal experience. Instead of "embarrassment" Goffman also speaks of "discomfiture" or "uneasiness". However, Goffman does not consider emotions in their phenomenal qualities or mental representations, but as interactions. In his analyses they are conceived as acts like

other actions. He was interested in what function such acts have in the grammar of social life.

By "interaction" Goffman does not understand communication in the common sense. According to Goffman, interactions are "encounters" that take place face-to-face and in which the aim is to assert certain positions and situation definitions by confirming, if possible, a positive image of oneself through one's actions or letting oneself be confirmed by the actions of others. Hence, as in the first theory group, interactions according to Goffman have two levels, a level of regulation symbolized by a "self", by "identities" or by "faces", and an operative level of behavior and action. In Goffman's work, too, the game of interactions is about the normative level being confirmed in behavior and action. But he gives analytical priority to a particular research question: Particularly under the conditions of face-to-face communication, which are associated with considerable mutual control possibilities, deviations, mistakes or general incoherence between the normative and operational levels are often and easily observed – why, therefore, is "embarrassment" an almost universal event? "There is no interaction in which participants do not take an appreciable chance of being slightly embarrassed or a slight chance of being deeply humiliated" (Goffman 1959: 243). Interactions make the communication partners vulnerable. This brings up the problem: How and with which communicative techniques can incoherence between actions and claims be prevented and how is it possible to repair and normalize such incoherence, i.e., to do "face work" (cf. Goffman 1955)?

In such a research question, the focus on the emotions of "embarrassment" is therefore obvious. "Embarrassment has to do with unfulfilled expectations [...] Given their social identities and the setting, the participants will sense what sort of conduct ought to be maintained as the appropriate thing, however much they may despair of its actually occurring" (Goffman 1956: 268; emphasis deleted). The positive values that are striven for in interactions are, according to Goffman, "poise" or "ease" and show themselves in behavior such as confident demeanor, composure, sovereignty or tact. Interaction partners are required to present their desired identities through impression management, face work or generally through dramaturgical actions. With this interaction model, Goffman primarily analyzes two subject areas: the assertion and conquest of status positions in social relationships and the differentiation of private and public interaction spaces or, as Goffman calls them, backstage and front stage

Goffman did not develop an explicitly elaborated theory of emotions, but one can deduce the following concept from his analyses: As acts of interaction, emotions have a documentary character: they refer the interactants to how situations and events are experienced and evaluated and which action tendencies might be associated with them. If one also considers the structural preconditions that Goffman cites for the emergence of such acts of interaction, it can be concluded that emotions result from the perception of a (positively or negatively evaluated) difference between normative expectations regarding status in social relationships and behavior. Goffman, too, structurally assumes similar interactive mechanisms regarding the genesis and function of emotions in communications as the theory of affect control, although the variables are different – status dimensions with Goffman, linguistically induced basic emotions in Affect-Control Theory.

3.2 Status and power

In the research approach of Theodore Kemper (1978, 1991), too, status differences together with power constellations (see also Collins 2004; Schützeichel 2018) play the explanatory basis for the analysis of emotions. His work, which is in the tradition of exchange theory, considers status and power relations as the decisive determinants for the selection of actions, emotions and information in communicative relationships. The aim of this approach is to identify universal social configurations and mechanisms that can be used to explain the behavior of actors. Individuals are identified as self-interested actors whose general goal is to strive for status and power and the positive feelings associated with them, or to avoid their loss and negative feelings. According to the exchange theory, feelings represent “autonomic-motoric-cognitive states” (Kemper 1987: 263), they elude the control of their bearers, they represent physiologically based mechanisms resulting from the environmental stimuli caused by (real or imagined) social power and status constellations. Hormonal and physiological processes are introduced as intervening variables between social configurations and emotional sensations.

The initial thesis is that communicative processes unfold in the context of power and status dimensions, that actors try to maintain or enforce balances in these dimensions, and that emotions are physiologically based experiences with regard to balances or imbalances in communication. Why power and status? According to Kemper, these are the two central mechanisms of coordinating actions. All actions can be located in a communicative power-status space. Power and status are not actor properties, but rather relational properties, i.e., those that arise in specific communicative relationships. Actions are based on power if they are able to assert interests even in the face of opposition from others. If, on the other hand, one assumes a certain status, an actor is granted certain voluntary benefits. In a certain sense, power is thus based on “involuntary compliance”, status on “voluntary compliance” (cf. Kemper 2006).

Power and status are distributed across broad communication networks. For methodological reasons, Kemper primarily analyzes dyadic constellations, but even in such constellations there are complex power-status relations and states. To show only a few relations: Due to certain events the power of A over B can increase, decrease or continue. Similarly, the status can be similar. If the power of A over B increases and if this state is judged excessive by A, he will feel guilt towards B, whereas B will fear A. If A's power over B decreases and is therefore judged to be insufficient, the feelings of both are likely to be reversed. If, due to certain actions, the status of A increases in relation to B and this is judged adequate by B, he will feel satisfaction or perhaps happiness, but will feel embarrassment or shame if this increase in status does not seem justified to him or is only feigned. On the other hand, if A feels a lack of respect or recognition, he will feel sadness or anger, depending on his evaluation.

These sketches show: Kemper's exchange theory models communications as processes whose coordination of action moves in the dimensions of power and status. Specific power-status constellations trigger corresponding physiological reactions with corresponding emotional experiences. Emotions result from the combination of two axes: a socio-structural axis, namely the change in the position of persons in the power-status structure of com-

munications on the one hand, and the evaluation of these changes, however automated or reflected, on the other. Here, too, despite all the differences in detail, there is again a commonality with the approaches presented so far: Emotions are based on the comparison of normative and operational dimensions. Emotions are thus the embodiment of social relations in the phenomenal experience of individuals.

Lawler (2001; cf. Lawler, Thye, and Yoon 2014) goes one step further. Emotions relate not only to the actors in communicative relationships, but to these relationships themselves. It is argued that actors tend to cultivate those relationships that are associated with positive feelings for them. The relationship itself thus becomes the object of the emotions. When actors attribute positive feelings to a communicative relationship, the connection to this relationship is strengthened and forces of cohesion are awakened. Negative feelings, on the other hand, have a burdening effect and tend to erode or dissolve communication. This can be seen in the form of serial collectivity analyzed by Sartre (1960), as it occurs, for example, with feelings of envy – envy is a widespread feeling, but cannot be communicated and therefore leads to serial isolation.

In contrast to the cultural or discourse sociological approaches presented first, socio-structural theories assume that interactions and communications are always shaped by the social position of individuals and, accordingly, that the social person also has a significant influence on the emergence of emotions. Socio-structural theories differ, however, in their conceptualizations of social positions, which can be understood more as the production and concern for an appropriate social identity (Goffman) or as the production of symmetrical power relations.

4 Phenomenological and enactivist research clusters

Phenomenological theories have enormously enriched sociological research on the relationship between communication and emotions by conceiving of emotions as intentional phenomena and thus marking a counter-position to naturalistic positions frequently held in sociology. This has enabled and continues to enable sociology to consider emotions in a much more comprehensive way, to draw attention to their analytical relevance for a wide range of social phenomena, and to re-found its research and theory-building activities, which have hitherto been blocked by such rigid dichotomies as rationality versus emotionality, emotion versus cognition, emotion versus action. In contrast to the vast majority of studies in sociology, which views emotions as a characteristic of individuals, phenomenological studies have also drawn attention to the collectivity and commonality of emotions. Max Scheler's (2005, 2006) phenomenological description is paradigmatic: Parents mourn the death of their child as parents, i.e., as a common unit in the sense of a collective intentionality, rather than individually each for himself. According to this, communicative relationships can be carried by common or collective feelings and are not always the scene of individual, episodic feelings.

Phenomenological analyses of bodily intentionality have a significant influence on sociology. Especially the analyses of Maurice Merleau-Ponty ("It is through my body that I understand other people, just as it is through my body that I perceive 'things'" [Merleau-

Ponty 1945: 216]) or Hermann Schmitz (1989) are of great relevance. Accordingly, emotions are not to be regarded as propositions or appraisals that are enriched with certain sensations, but rather they are to be understood from the outset as bodily wholes that enable a genuine access to the world, i.e., they represent a specific form of intentionality. More recently, such phenomenological approaches have entered into a strong liaison with those research programs that call for a stronger consideration of physical, bodily and affective dimensions of perception and cognition in the disciplines of cognitive research. They often see themselves as “naturalized phenomenology” (Zahavi 2009). The following section outlines the aspects of this more recent variant of phenomenology that are important for sociological theory formation on communication and emotion.

This variant is often abbreviated to the 4E's (Newen, De Bruin, and Gallagher 2018), which stands for cognitions being “embodied, embedded, extended, enactive”, i.e., as embodied, as contextually embedded, as extended beyond one's own spheres of consciousness and as anchored in actions and their objects (De Jaegher and Di Paolo 2007). And finally, one must add an “A”, which stands for “affective”: cognitions have intrinsically affective qualities (Colombetti 2018). Enactivist theories of affect emphasize that although the things and facts in our world are natural and can also be described physically, they are constitutive elements in our life-world actions and therefore have a meaning that manifests itself in our affective relationships with and to them. This research program, often referred to briefly as “enactivism” (Gallagher 2017, 2020; Schützeichel 2020), is in turn in the tradition of early pragmatism, especially John Dewey's philosophy. The more recent theories of affect (cf. Slaby and von Scheve 2019) are also partly in these traditions and show certain parallels with enactivist theories. However, they will not be considered in detail here because their conception is not elaborated in the direction of communication theory.

Phenomenology, pragmatism and enactivism open up a new analytical approach to communication. They emphasize the bodily, pre-reflexive or pre-linguistic level of communicative relationships and the affective dimensions that constitute them. Against this background, communication is not (only) an exchange of information about something in the world, but takes place as a process of bodily intentionality or inter-bodily relations. But the relevance of the affective also changes. Theoretical attention is shifted beyond salient emotional episodes to phenomena of interaffectivity and inter-bodily existence.

Thus, the analysis of the genesis and function of emotions in communicative processes would not start with the linguistic meanings or discursive rules, nor would it start with an analysis of “isolated” individuals and their inner states, but with the interpersonal and interaffective relations that occur communicatively and in which gestural, mimic or linguistic acts of communication are formed and acquire their meaning.

The concepts of “embodied affectivity” and “embodied interaffectivity” (Fuchs 2020) point to communicatively significant facts. Above all, emotions are not internal states or acts, but bodily phenomena in which persons are in dynamic relationships with each other and with things. They indicate in a recognizable language how a person is connected with other people or things in a situation. On this basic level of relationships, affordances in particular play a decisive role, i.e., the behavioral offers and possibilities for action that are made in situations of things, artifacts and persons. Such affordances, which emanate from the elements in our action situations, correspond to resonances as “answers” which

can sustain our own experience and action in a social situation and which can be expressed in kinesthetic experiences.

Affordances and resonances, however, are not physical facts, but rather those that are evaluated, which carry a primitive normativity within them and are therefore the basis for the formation of affects, emotions, atmosphere and moods. On such a primordial level, we are dealing with basal emotions, the pleasant or the unpleasant, the pleasant or the painful, the attractive or the repulsive, whose phenomenal qualities then continue in higher or cognitive emotions. So these primordial affective qualities have a simple duality or dichotomy and encode the states in a simple way: They can be divided into centripetal and centrifugal qualities, those that are attractive, pleasant and beneficial, and those that lead to a departure from or escape from things, respectively. Fuchs (2020) accordingly defines emotions “as circular interactions or feedback cycles between the embodied subject and the current situation” (Fuchs 2020: 325).

This leads to the concept of “embodied interaffectivity”, a basic form of affectivity that arises from the mutual bodily resonance in communicative spaces. With Froese and Fuchs (2012) these dynamics can be modelled in the following way: A is annoyed. The proprio- and interoceptive contents of his anger are experienced in the form of an inner bodily resonance. At the same time, however, they form an expressive phenomenon for B, which he in turn experiences impressively in the form of bodily resonance. B does not only visually perceive the anger of A in his bodily expression, but he also experiences this anger in his own bodily impressions. These in turn now form a field of expression for A, to which he reacts with his forms of bodily resonance. Expressions and impressions of feelings and affects communicate mutually and circularly in the medium of their bodily intentionality. Expressions and impressions are connected with each other in such a way that they have to be considered as “extended phenomena” in the sense described above. This bodily communication is not dependent on mental representations, but does not exclude them either. Fuchs (2020: 326–327) attributes to this circularly processing “embodied interaffectivity” an autonomy that can hardly be controlled by the participants themselves – an everyday experience for each of us. But this is precisely why “embodied interaffectivity” is also experienced as something that cannot be split into individual movements, but which only rarely occurs in synchronous agreement. Mismatching, physical resistance and unpleasant impulses are also an integral part of this interaffectivity.

In such spaces, emotions become interactive phenomena and as such become carriers of meaning, in which actions and intentions, attitudes and evaluations are displayed (cf. Griffero 2020). Emotions become communicative elements. Here, too, we are thus made aware of the intrinsic connection of values for the genesis and function of emotions in basic communicative contexts. Affective, phenomenal experience reacts to how, in the social field of bodily affordances and resonances, differences between what is given and what value the given or happening should have become perceptible. Emotions indicate what is valuable. This is evident not only in general situations, but also in the sequences of communicative acts in whose retentional and potential action such values always play a role.

In terms of communication theory, however, the question arises: Do these approaches only cover a narrow segment of communicative relationships, namely those that represent

an “interaction” in the sense of physical co-presence? Communications, whether written, medial or digital, are still realized – and in a way that cannot be ignored – as physical resonance, but no longer in the medium of physical co-presence or even verbal communication. The answer to this is that communication, however mediated and technical, is dependent on derivatives based on design characteristics and symbolic worlds of immediate “embodied affectivity” and “embodied interaffectivity” – such communicative derivatives as emoticons are only one particularly impressive example. But one will still have to presuppose different social forms of communication with their own structural possibilities and media substrates. These are briefly discussed in the following section.

5 Communication of emotions

The first sections dealt with the cultural and socio-structural contexts of communication, which are crucial for the generation and the functions of emotions in social relationships. Now we will abstract from these contexts and focus on how emotions are communicated.

Not only in sociological research is the analysis of expressive behavior often limited to the analysis of the emotions. This is an important component, but only one possible aspect of communicating emotions. If this question is to be dealt with systematically, some basic considerations about the concept of communication must first be made and various levels of abstraction must be combined. In the following, we start from the universal concept of communication of sociological systems theory (cf. Luhmann 1984), because this concept allows in a special way to order the different “affective” dimensions of communication. Communications are relational facts. They consist of selections of information, utterance, understanding and a subsequent act of communication. Something – information – is communicated in one act and “understood” or received in a complementary act. This is followed by a new communication act, which again has the same combination of functionally defined selections. What is meant by selection is that all aspects of communication, i.e., the content of the information, the form of the utterance, the mode of understanding and the subsequent act, could also be chosen differently (Luhmann 1984). All these functional aspects, individually as well as in combination, naturally have affective dimensions and relevance (Scholl 2013). Are emotions communicated or is there an emotional communication? It can be “communication emotion” or “communicating emotionally” (cf. Planalp 1999: 43), i.e., information about emotions or the form of the communication. Often, however, the reception side is not taken into account in research, even though complex questions are also involved here: Are emotions understood or is emotional understanding achieved? Or is the fourth selection affected, how to achieve a corresponding follow-up communication through affective messages, the information about emotions or such communications as “I love you”. A comprehensive sociological theory of emotion communication will have to integrate all these selections and their combinations. In communicative practice itself, however, it is decided whether and in which act of selection “emotion” is communicated. In other words: A sociological theory of the communication of emotions must assume the presence of emotions in all steps of communication, but a distinction

must be made as to whether and in what form this is used in communicative practice. This is subject to conventions and rules in the specific social constellations.

One function should be explained briefly, because the connection between emotion and communication theory is particularly clear in this case. How do we understand the emotions or the corresponding communication acts of other people? This is where different theories stand opposite each other. Theory-theories (Carruthers and Smith 1996) claim that we have cognitive theories about the behavior and emotions of other people. Simulation theories (Goldman 2008) assume that we simulate the situations and thus the emotions of other people within us. The direct perception theories (Gallagher 2017) propose that we can perceive the emotions of other people directly in their expression, and interaction theories, which are closely related to the models of “embodied interaffectivity”, assume physical resonances. These approaches therefore provide very different answers. From a sociological perspective, however, the question arises as to whether they do not implicitly presuppose different paradigmatic forms of communication, ranging from physical co-presence to spatially and temporally segregated communication sequences, and therefore also presuppose individual forms of access and understanding of communicative acts. This also touches on a question that is being discussed very intensively and widely in sociology: To what extent can emotions be shared collectively and how are groups formed through collective emotions (cf. Kaufmann and Quéré 2020; von Scheve and Salmella 2014)?

The basic model outlined above therefore becomes more complex when, in addition to these processual parameters, media of communication are added – from communication with the help of bodily expression and bodily resonances to the emotional cues in verbal communication, which are often declared as “non-verbal” (cf. Buck and Van Lear 2002), to expressive forms in written, pictorial-iconical or tonal form. All these modes have their own specific forms of communicating emotions.

A sociological theory of the communication of emotion, however, requires a further stage of concretization, namely social entities or forms: In families (cf. Erickson and Cotttingham 2014; Röttger-Rössler and Slaby 2018), peer groups, religious communities (Corrigan 2016), social movements, professional groups, companies, administrations (cf. Finegan 2006) and other social fields there are different memberships, objectives, socio-structural orders, each with different rules of emotion, valuation conventions and requirements for the coping of emotions (Lively and Weed 2014). The constitutive connection of emotions for communication in social movements is pointed out in a number of studies (cf. Jasper 2011, 2018). With regard to work and company organizations, sociological research mainly discusses two quite compatible concepts: The concept of emotion work (Hochschild 1983) describes the adaptation of emotions to rules and their commodification in the service sector. The concept of bounded emotionality (Mumby and Putnam 1992), on the other hand, refers to “work feelings” and states that in organizations a form of communication is often predominant which aims at “compassion”, concern, individual responsibility and social support. The studies on the role of emotions in the communication settings of professions are unmistakable. As an example, studies on the significant role of emotions in the legal professions and the legal system (Conway and Stannard 2016; Flower 2020; Pierce 1996; Schützeichel 2016) can be cited, in which it becomes clear once again that all communicative acts in the legal system or in court are also carried by emotions,

but that specific communication codes and rules determine whether and in what form emotions can be communicated, thematized and evaluated.

Let us note: The question of how emotions are communicated is thus examined by sociology in all its breadth, which encompasses both the various medial forms as well as the various social forms of relationships. It is always assumed that the communication of emotions is oriented towards the function of emotions, namely the information about the normative and cognitive expectations as well as the social position of communication participants.

6 Concluding remarks

At the beginning it was found that in a pluralistic science like sociology heterogeneous concepts and theorems about communication and emotions can be found. Emotions are conceived as “natural, social or cultural kind” and are traced back to physiological, cognitive, linguistic or cultural processes and structures. Communication is conceived as an aggregation of atomic actions, as a relationship of relational acts or as a system governed by its own laws, as an order that can only be explained “bottom up” or “top down”. Nevertheless, a general structural matrix can be identified with regard to the problem of genesis: Emotions are formed in a relationship between factual events and the normative requirements for such events. If we are dealing with emotions that arise in social contexts, we are accordingly dealing with a relationship between communicative acts and the normative expectations that demand them with regard to the execution of such acts.

From a constitutional theory point of view, at least a minimal difference between (real or possible) factual events and normative expectations, desires, values or objectives with regard to these factual events must therefore be presupposed, so that affective or emotional experiences or states arise in the event of negative or positive deviations or even approximations between these levels (Schützeichel 2012). Structurally, in sociology, emotions are regarded as difference phenomena that indicate how something is for an organism, an individual, a person or a group. Which emotions are generated depends on the “contents” with which this form is filled in concrete situations. Many sociological approaches assume not only a relationship of the co-constitution of communication and emotion, but also a relationship of their co-evolution in the sense that decisive characteristics of emotions, for example the splitting into an inner, mental phenomenon and its bodily expression, which we take for granted, can be traced back to the development of communicative media and social configurations (cf. e.g., the well-known considerations on affect control by Norbert Elias [2010]). And conversely, the differentiation of communicative orders, for example the formation of intimate relationships in the medium of romantic love, can be traced back to the stabilization of certain emotions.

However, sociological approaches differ considerably in the detailed design of this conditional relationship. Does this structural matrix translate directly into a physiological event, to which the phenomenal, affective experience can then be regarded as an epiphomenon only? Are we dealing with cognitive processes of comparison and evaluation or primarily with differences that are articulated physically? What are the “values” at stake,

and what is the basis of their normativity? And finally: Doesn't the evolution of forms of communication also depend on the evaluation of emotions made possible by them?

With a certain amount of caution, it is also possible to identify another common feature that concerns emotions in communication: sociological theories no longer regard emotions as mental phenomena that can be traced back to social constellations, but otherwise remain within the actors. Such an image, which was common to traditions of action and systems theory, is increasingly being replaced by the idea that emotions and affects are themselves a form of communication and that communications as such are always "feeling communications", i.e., social relationships that have an inherent affective dimension because they are ultimately "value-based" relationships. But this statement of a universal affection must be supplemented by a second one if it is not to remain sterile in theory and if it has to be transformed into sociological research: How in communicative relationships affects, emotions and feelings are thematized and included into what can and cannot be openly communicated depends on the values that are pursued in these relationships.

7 References

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XVI Society and emotion

Patricia M. Rodriguez Mosquera

83 Words, poems and cultural meanings

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Abstract: Emotional experiences, and the language we use to express these experiences, are not culture-free. Emotional experiences always occur in a cultural context that gives meaning to these experiences. Cultures value some emotions over others, and this selective valuation of emotions affects how emotion language is used in everyday social interactions. This chapter's main argument is that emotion language is grounded in culture. Emotion language carries cultural meaning as it reflects shared cultural values and shared ethnotheories (beliefs, assumptions, attitudes) about emotions. This main argument is illustrated by research examples from cultural psychology and anthropology. These research examples use different methodological approaches, and also cover a variety of cultures, languages, and emotions. Taken together, the research reviewed shows that the meaning, and everyday use of emotion language, cannot be fully understood outside of its cultural context. In addition, the research reviewed shows that the study of emotion language provides rich and important information about how members of different cultures think about, experience, and regulate emotions.

1 Introduction

Morriña, fargin, fremdschämen, kreng-jai, myötähäpeä, omoiyari, pole, agápē, ishq (عشق), *malu, otožno* ... these are words that express emotional feelings in Galician, Yiddish, German, Thai, Finnish, Japanese, Swahili, Greek, Arabic, Indonesian, and Slovenian, respectively. Emotion words have an important expressive function because they are powerful means to make our inner emotional world known to others. However, we communicate more than just our feelings through emotion words. For example, when we use the English words "I am *angry*", we are not only communicating that someone has insulted or offended us – the prototypical elicitor of anger – but, more importantly, that we *care* about the opinion of the person who insulted us. If we did not care, we would not feel anger about their insult. This means that emotion words also communicate what we *value*, and here is where culture plays a major role in the meaning of emotion words. We use emotion words

so often in our everyday conversations that we take this cultural dimension of their meaning for granted.

Cultures are characterized by their shared meanings, including shared values like humility, respect, cooperation, or conformity (e.g., Berry, Poortinga, and Pandey 1997; Manstead and Fischer 2002; Kağıtçıbaşı 2007; Shweder and Levine 1984). Cultural values influence emotion words through *ethnotheories*, which are the beliefs, assumptions, and attitudes that individuals hold about emotions. For example, assumptions about what emotions are, or beliefs about which emotions are “good” or “bad” to feel and express. These beliefs, assumptions, and attitudes about emotions are not universal; they are culture-bound and heavily influenced by the shared values of a culture (e.g., Markus and Kitayama 1991; Mesquita and Leu 2007; Russell, Fernandez-Dols, and Wellekamp 1995; Solomon 2007; White 2000). Emotion words are *not separate from*, but *part of* ethnotheories and, as a consequence, their meaning reflects culture-bound beliefs, assumptions, and attitudes about emotions. In other words, emotion words carry cultural meaning.

This chapter focuses on the cultural meaning of emotion words. To illustrate this cultural meaning, the chapter presents research examples from cultural psychology and anthropology. These research examples use different methodological approaches, and also cover a variety of cultures, languages, and emotions. These examples show that the meaning and everyday use of emotion words cannot be fully understood outside of their cultural context. In addition, the examples also show that the study of emotion words provides rich information about how members of different cultures think about, experience, and regulate emotions.

2 Emotion words in narratives of emotional experience

The emotional narrative methodology asks individuals to write about their significant emotional experiences (e.g., Averill 1982). Studies that use this methodology can use emotion words as a prompt for participants to remember experiences of a particular emotion. My collaborators and I used this method to examine the cultural meanings of pride and shame in Dutch and Spanish culture (Rodriguez Mosquera, Manstead, and Fischer 2000).

The English emotion words *pride* and *shame* can be literally translated into Dutch as *trots* ‘pride’ and *schaamte* ‘shame’, and into Spanish as *orgullo* ‘pride’ and *vergüenza* ‘shame’. However, literal translations of emotion words from one language to another do not imply that the emotion words in the different languages have equivalent meanings (Wierzbicka 2009). For example, are *trots* and *orgullo*, and *schaamte* and *vergüenza*, associated with the same situations and behaviors for Dutch and Spanish speakers? Are *trots* and *orgullo* viewed as equally positive by Dutch and Spanish speakers? And, what about *schaamte* and *vergüenza*? Are they viewed by Dutch and Spanish speakers as equally negative?

We examined these questions by asking 169 Spanish (87 women and 82 men) and 157 Dutch (85 women and 72 men) participants to tell us about a recent experience of pride and a recent experience of shame. Because we wanted to examine whether the cultural meaning of pride and shame changed with age, both Spanish and Dutch samples included

participants from four different age groups: 7- and 12-year-old children, 16-year-old adolescents, and 23-year-old adults. Further, emotions are multi-componential processes that have different components or facets: the situations that elicit the emotion (antecedent of an emotion); the ways in which we evaluate the situation (cognitive appraisals); the experience of the emotion (physiological correlates; feelings; motivations); the verbal (social sharing) and non-verbal (e.g., facial expression) communication of emotion; and the perceived social consequences of emotion (for an overview of emotions as multi-componential processes, see e.g., Arnold 1960; Frijda 1986; Parkinson, Fischer, and Manstead 2005; Scherer 2009). In the study, we assessed several of these facets of the emotion process, with participants completing all measures in their native languages. Thus, the emotion words for pride and shame in Spanish and Dutch were used to assess all facets of the emotions (for details on all measures, see Rodriguez Mosquera et al. 2000).

2.1 Research findings

We found important cultural differences in the social sharing of pride and shame: Dutch adolescents and adults reported that they talked less about their *schaamte* ('shame' in Dutch) and more about their *trots* ('pride' in Dutch) compared to their Spanish counterparts, who reported that they talked more about their *vergüenza* ('shame' in Spanish) and less about their *orgullo* ('pride' in Spanish). These cultural differences were not an artefact of the type of shame- or pride-elicitting situations reported by the Spanish and Dutch. In fact, both cultural groups reported similar types of situations for each emotion word: moral wrongdoings (e.g., lying) for shame and personal achievements for pride (for details, see Rodriguez Mosquera et al. 2000). Moreover, an intriguing set of findings emerged for the youngest participants in the study: an overwhelming majority (80 %) of the 7-year-old Spanish children reported *not knowing* what the word *orgullo* ('pride' in Spanish) means, whereas only 6.7 % Dutch children reported not knowing what the word *trots* ('pride' in Dutch) means. The reverse pattern emerged for shame: 31.1 % of the 7-year-old Dutch children reported not knowing what the word *schaamte* ('shame' in Dutch) means, whereas only 6.8 % of the Spanish children reported not knowing what the word *vergüenza* ('shame' in Spanish) means. Thus, the youngest *Spanish children* knew more about the word for *shame* than the word for *pride* in their language, whereas the youngest *Dutch children* knew more about the word for *pride* than the word for *shame* in their language. What can explain these differences in (i) the *social sharing* of pride and shame among the Dutch and Spanish adolescent and adult participants, and (ii) in *knowledge* of the emotion words among the youngest Spanish and Dutch participants (7-year-old children)? Different cultural values and ethnotheories of emotion explain this pattern of results.

2.2 Explanations and conclusions

Dutch culture is more individualistic than Spanish culture is, whereas Spanish culture is more collectivistic and honor-oriented than Dutch culture is (Rodriguez Mosquera et al. 2000;

see also Rodriguez Mosquera 2018a). Cultural individualism promotes the values of *individual uniqueness, autonomy, assertiveness, and success*, whereas cultural collectivism promotes the values of *interpersonal harmony, cooperation, conformity, and humility* (Kağıtçıbaşı 2007; Markus and Kitayama 1991; Parkinson et al. 2005; Triandis and Gelfand 1998). In addition, honor represents a form of collectivism that emphasizes the protection of one's own and important others' social image (Rodriguez Mosquera 2016, 2018a). These cultural value differences should be associated with different beliefs and attitudes toward pride and shame in Spanish and Dutch culture.

In particular, talking about one's pride highlights an individual's achievements and qualities; it is an emotion that presents the self as a unique and competent individual (e.g., Williams and DeSteno 2009). Pride therefore aligns with individualistic values because of its emphasis on individuality and uniqueness and, as a consequence, talking about one's pride should be less regulated in individualistic than in collectivistic, honor-oriented cultures. In the latter cultures, talking about one's pride could be seen as too self-focused and as a potential sign of arrogance. As a consequence of these cultural differences in beliefs about pride and shame, the emotion word *trots* carried a more positive cultural meaning for the Dutch than the emotion word *orgullo* had for the Spanish, leading to a greater social sharing of experiences of *trots* among the Dutch than experiences of *orgullo* among the Spanish (Rodriguez Mosquera et al. 2000).

In contrast to pride, talking about one's shame typically implies an expression of one's moral mistakes and vulnerabilities because the typical elicitor of shame is a moral wrong-doing (Leach and Cigdam 2008). In collectivistic, honor-oriented cultures, the communication of one's mistakes and vulnerabilities through shame is likely to be interpreted as an indication that a person cares about how others think of them (social image) and as a sign of humility (Rodriguez Mosquera et al. 2000; see also Rodriguez Mosquera 2018a). In fact, the emotion terms *tener vergüenza* in Spanish summarize an honor view on shame (Rodriguez Mosquera, Manstead, and Fischer 2002). Those who *tienen vergüenza* ('have shame') care about how others think of them and their families. This concern for social image, in turn, motivates individuals to behave in accordance with cultural norms for the maintenance of honor (or honor codes; for a detailed definition of honor, honor codes, and research on honor in psychology, see Rodriguez Mosquera 2013, 2016, 2018a, 2022). Moreover, *tener vergüenza* is also viewed as a core characteristic of the moral person in Spanish culture. Thus, the emotion term *vergüenza* carries a positive cultural meaning in Spanish culture. The emotion term *schaamte*, however, should have a less positive cultural meaning in Dutch culture because of this culture's emphasis on the values of independence and assertiveness. In this more individualistic cultural context, talking about one's shame could be seen as a potential sign of weakness and lack of assertiveness, rather than as a sign of honorability and moral strength. It is therefore not surprising that, in our study, the Spanish participants talked more with others about their experiences of *vergüenza* than the Dutch did about their experiences of *schaamte* (Rodriguez Mosquera et al. 2000).

Finally, given the more positive cultural meaning of pride in Dutch than in Spanish culture, it is likely that *Spanish* children knew *less* about the meaning of the word *orgullo* ('pride' in Spanish) compared to how much Dutch children knew about the meaning of the word *trots* ('pride' in Dutch) because the Spanish caretakers talked less frequently to the

Spanish children about *orgullo* compared to how frequently Dutch caretakers talked to the Dutch children about *trots*. In a similar vein, it is also likely that the *Dutch* children knew less about the meaning of the word *schaamte* ('shame' in Dutch) compared to how much the Spanish children knew about the meaning of the word *vergüenza* ('shame' in Spanish) because their Dutch caretakers talked to them less frequently about *schaamte* compared to how often the Spanish caretakers talked to the Spanish children about *vergüenza*. This means that the frequency with which caretakers use specific emotion words when they talk to children is strongly related to the cultural meaning of the emotion words in their culture. Emotion words that have a positive cultural meaning are used more frequently by caretakers in their everyday conversations with children (see also Halberstad and Lozada 2011).

3 Emotion words in social interactions

The Ifaluk are a small cultural community in the Micronesian Atoll. This community views the emotions described by the words *fago* and *song* at the center of social life. Why are *fago* and *song* so important in Ifaluk's social relations? How are the emotion words *fago* and *song* used in everyday social interactions? How do these emotions relate to Ifaluk cultural values and ethnotheories? Catherine Lutz's ethnography examined Ifaluk's ethnotheories about *fago* and *song* (Lutz 1998). Lutz's groundbreaking research revealed the multiple ways in which emotion words are used in everyday social interactions to negotiate relationships and community resources.

3.1 *Fago* in social interactions

Lutz's ethnography showed that the emotion word *fago* was central to everyday social interactions among the Ifaluk. This centrality of *fago* stems from its close association with a core cultural value among the Ifaluk: the maintenance of strong relationship ties with kin. Among the Ifaluk, this relational closeness with kin is expected to be expressed in three different ways. First, by sharing resources with kin, including financial resources. Second, by offering emotional support to kin when they need it. Third, by living physically close to kin, which can also mean living in the same household. This cultural importance of relational closeness is also reflected in Ifaluk's conceptions of personhood. In Ifaluk culture, the ideal person is one that lives up to kin's social expectations in terms of financial and emotional support, as well as physical proximity. As a consequence, social roles vis-à-vis kin are central to self-definition and self-image among the Ifaluk (Lutz 1998). Furthermore, this psychological importance of social roles is not universal; for example, cultures that view individuals' autonomy as more important than their relations with kin tend to have a different conception of personhood. In particular, in these cultures, the ideal person is one that pursues their goals and desires as an expression of their uniqueness (Heine and Butchel 2009).

Among the Ifaluk, how does the cultural importance of relational closeness with kin affect emotion language? More specifically, what are the implications of this cultural value

for the use of the word *fago*? As Lutz (1998) showed, this emotion word is typically used in situations that threaten relational closeness with kin, most frequently the death of a loved one or physical separation from kin due to, for example, traveling. Importantly however, despite this association of the emotion word *fago* with death and separation, the Ifaluk view the emotion as fostering strong social bonds. This is because the Ifaluk view *fago* as an emotion that motivates helping others in need. Moreover, *fago* is so central to Ifaluk culture that the Ifaluk view those who frequently experience and express *fago* as moral and trustworthy. In fact, “having *fago*” is a core characteristic of the ideal Ifaluk person, or *maluwelo*. Those who are referred to with the word *maluwelo* are seen as calm and kind, wise and mature. Not surprisingly, these individuals often enjoy high social status and leadership positions in the community. Given these social benefits of *fago*, it is not surprising that children are encouraged to experience the emotion from a young age by, for example, participating in mourning rituals of kin (Lutz 1998). Thus, the emotion word *fago* has a positive cultural meaning among the Ifaluk due to its association with morality and prosocial behavior among kin.

3.2 *Song* in social interactions

The emotion word *song* is the counterpart of the word *fago* (Lutz 1998). In particular, this emotion word marks *immoral* behavior among the Ifaluk. More specifically, the emotion word is used when an individual refuses to share resources with others, especially with kin. Thus, whereas the emotion word *fago* is used to refer to emotional and physical separation from kin (as in the case of traveling or death), the emotion word *song* is used to refer to situations of financial separation from kin by not sharing resources with them. The two emotion words are therefore used to signal those situations that violate the three types of relational closeness with kin that are valued among the Ifaluk: emotional and physical closeness (*fago*) and communal sharing (*song*). Moreover, *song* is used in everyday conversations to refer to violations of communal sharing *only*. This restricted use of the emotion word shows *song*’s centrality in Ifaluk culture. The Ifaluk view an individual’s refusal to engage in communal sharing (especially with kin) as a serious offense to the community and as a disruption of community life. It is for this reason that the Ifaluk have a specific emotion word to mark this type of offense. Indeed, the Ifaluk have other negatively valenced emotion words to refer to less serious offenses and situations; for example, feeling irritated when sick (*tipmochmoch*) or minor frustrating events accumulated over time (*lingeriger*). The word *song* is reserved for the most serious of offenses to the community (Lutz 1998).

Given the seriousness of the offense indicated by the emotion word *song*, social exclusion is typically the punishment that the Ifaluk community places on those who refuse to share their resources (Lutz 1998). In this community, social exclusion is an effective form of punishment precisely because of the Ifaluk’s emphasis on relational closeness. Furthermore, this form of punishment is heavily featured in the “typhoon stories” (Lutz 1998: 161) that are frequently told in Ifaluk’s social gatherings. Typhoons are a frequent environmental threat to the island, and the typhoon stories warn the community about the threat of

typhoons and, importantly, about the refusal to share resources when a typhoon occurs. In Lutz's words:

The stories draw an image of one coconut being split open by the chief and divided into minuscule but equal portions for the survivors. They also tell of the punishment meted out by the chiefs, again as a measure of their *song*, for those caught eating alone (and hence not sharing what food they have found) – a circle is drawn in the earth out in the direct sunlight, and the culprit is made to sit there for an extended period, a sanction that is notably harsh in comparison with those for other infractions of law and morality. (Lutz 1998: 161)

This excerpt is important because it illustrates the centrality of *song* among the Ifaluk and how the severity of punishment is determined by the degree of an individual's *song* (i.e., degree of refusal to engage in communal sharing). *Song* is so severe that the offender is expected to compensate for their offense by either apologizing or engaging in communal sharing (e.g., giving gifts). In addition, the typhoon stories are important because they teach children about the importance of communal sharing and about the cultural meaning of the emotion word *song*. By being present in the social gatherings where typhoon stories are told, children learn that the word *song* is a negative evaluation placed on those who violate an important value in their community, a violation that can be severely punished through social rejection and exclusion (Lutz 1998).

3.3 Conclusions

Lutz's (1998) ethnography of Ifaluk's *fago* and *song* reveals that these emotion words function to protect the community's well-being. *Fago* and *song* are emotion words laden with cultural meaning because they identify those who are moral members of the community (those who have *fago* are *maluwelo*) by upholding the values of relational and physical closeness with kin, and those who engage in immoral behavior (*song*) by not engaging in communal sharing. The emotion terms therefore also act to protect the cohesiveness of the community and its boundaries: those who are included and those who should be (temporarily) excluded. This culture-bound meaning of the emotion words *fago* and *song* illustrate how the meaning of emotion words cannot be understood outside of their cultural context. Their meaning is embedded in Ifaluk's cultural worldview. In other words, to understand what the Ifaluk mean when they use the words *fago* and *song* in their everyday social interactions, we need to understand the shared values that are important to this community.

Lutz's ethnography also reveals another key aspect of the relationship between culture and emotion language. Because emotion words like *fago* and *song* carry cultural meanings, it is difficult to translate them to another language in a way that completely reproduces their meaning in the culture and language community from which they originate. As Lutz (1998) explained, it is not possible to capture the meaning of either emotion word with a single English emotion term. Lutz (1998) translated *fago* as a combination of the English emotion words love, sadness, and compassion. However, Lutz (1998) also showed that the three English words cannot fully capture the cultural meaning that *fago* has among the Ifaluk by comparing the ethnotheory associated with this emotion word to the ethnotheo-

ries associated with the words love, sadness, and compassion among White, middle-class, European-Americans living in New York. Lutz referred to these participants' ethnotheories as Western ethnotheories of emotion (Lutz 1998).

Lutz's analysis of the emotion word *fago* showed that the word is associated with morality and moral behavior. Moreover, *fago* also has positive connotations of power and high social status because helping behavior is highly valued among the Ifaluk. In contrast, Lutz (1998) explained, the English emotion words *sadness* and *compassion* do not have the same positive cultural meanings. For the European-Americans that Lutz interviewed, the words *sadness* and *compassion* were associated with negative traits, in particular, with emotionality, softness, and weakness (Lutz 1998). In Western ethnotheories of emotion, these adjectives are often stereotypically associated with *femaleness* (Fischer 1993; Shields 2002). Thus, the European-American participants in Lutz's ethnography had a *gendered* ethnotheory about the emotion words *sadness* and *compassion* that gave negative and stereotypical connotations to these emotion words. This ethnotheory stands in stark contrast with *fago*'s cultural meaning (Lutz 1998). In fact, when Lutz did her ethnography among the Ifaluk, this cultural community had a matriarchal social structure where women enjoyed high social status and power. This means that the Ifaluk associated the emotion word *fago* with social power, nurturance, and *femaleness*. These differences between *fago*, *sadness* and *compassion* reveal that the cultural meaning of emotion words also reflects a culture's prevalent gender ideology.

4 Emotion words and poems

Emotion words are not the only way to communicate emotional experiences and the important values of one's cultural community. The pioneering work of anthropologist Lila Abu-Lughod in a Bedouin cultural community showed that everyday, spontaneous poems are powerful ways of communicating one's emotions and values (Abu-Lughod 1999).

4.1 Emotional expression through *ghinnāwas*

Abu-Lughod carried out ethnographic work among the Awlad 'Ali Bedouins of the Egyptian Western Desert (Abu-Lughod 1999). The Awlad Ali regularly recite or sing *ghinnāwas*, which are short lyric poems. *Ghinnāwas* are part of the Awlad 'Ali oral tradition and are spoken in important social gatherings, for example, at weddings. In these social gatherings, *ghinnāwas* typically are a component of celebratory rituals and aim to convey the social significance of an event. In addition to this use in social gatherings, *ghinnāwas* are also recited in social settings that are private and intimate, rather than public and celebratory, like gatherings of women in a household. In these settings however, *ghinnāwas* are not used to communicate positive emotions associated with celebrations. In these private and intimate settings, *ghinnāwas* are exclusively used to express feelings of sadness, vulnerability, or hurt. For example, the heartache of unrequited love, the hurt felt by a close friend's disrespectful behavior, or the sadness about the loss of a loved one are these *ghin-*

nāwas' typical themes. Anger, or related emotions like indignation or outrage, are never expressed through *ghinnāwas* (Abu-Lughod 1999).

In these intimate settings, why are *ghinnāwas* the *language of emotional vulnerability*, and not the language of anger, among the Awlad 'Ali? Lila Abu-Lughod's ethnography answered this question by comparing the social settings of two types of emotion language in everyday social interactions among the Awlad 'Ali: *ghinnāwas* and *mundane, non-poetic* emotion language. Abu-Lughod referred to the two types of emotion language as "discourses on sentiment" (Abu-Lughod 1999: 17). Abu-Lughod's research showed that these discourses on sentiment are used in distinct social settings to protect a core cultural value among Awlad 'Ali: honor.

4.2 Honor and *ghinnāwas*

For the Awlad 'Ali, to be honorable means to be generous, courageous, autonomous, and modest (Abu Lughod 1999). Both women and men are expected to uphold these values to maintain their honor. Moreover, honor among the Awlad 'Ali is not only based on individual women's and men's behavior. To be honorable, one's behavior needs to be recognized by others. In other words, to maintain honor, one needs *to be known by others* as an autonomous, courageous, generous, and modest person. All of these behaviors require self-control and confidence, which implies that maintaining a social image as a person who has self-mastery is central to honor. And, as Lutz (1999) showed, it is precisely the importance of this social image that explains why *ghinnāwas* about sadness, compassion or love are not expressed in public settings. Because *ghinnāwas* represent the language of emotional vulnerability in intimate, private settings, their expression in public settings would compromise a social image of the self as confident, self-possessed, and honorable. For example, the following two *ghinnāwas* communicate feelings of loss of a loved one, and the emotional pain of unrequited love, which present the self as vulnerable and strongly dependent on others (Abu-Lughod 1999: 304, 306).

- (1) Oh eyes be strong
you cherish people and then they are gone
it's your fate oh eye
you cherish people and then they are gone
- (2) The wounds, oh beloved, of your love
heal some days then open again
and today oh my torment they tore open.

It is for the sake of honor that the Awlad 'Ali only recite *ghinnāwas*, and the feelings of love, sadness, or hurt they communicate in private, intimate, and same-gender settings. These social settings are appropriate for *ghinnāwas* because the protection of honor is less of a concern with intimate others. Moreover, expressing *ghinnāwas* only in private settings characterized by closeness and familiarity allows the Awlad 'Ali to preserve modesty, which is also an important value for the maintenance of honor (Abu-Lughod 1999).

In contrast to the vulnerability that sadness, hurt, or unrequited love express, anger is an emotion of empowerment (see e.g., Averill 1982; Lazarus 1991, 2000; Rodriguez Mosquera 2018b). Feeling angry about another person's wrongdoing implies feeling entitled to respect and good treatment (Shields 2002). Because other-blame is a core appraisal of anger (Averill 1982; Lazarus 1991; Parkinson et al. 2005; Shields 2002), anger is typically expressed through confrontational behavior. This type of behavior highlights the autonomy of the angry person vis-à-vis the target of one's anger. And, here is the value of anger for honor. The expression of anger *in public settings* contributes to one's social image as an autonomous and strong person who has self-control and is courageous. Public settings therefore provide a wide audience to affirm honor through the expression of anger (Abu-Lughod 1999).

Importantly however, as Abu Lughod (1999) explained, it is not the case that the Awlad 'Ali *generally* encourage the expression of anger as a means to maintain honor. In fact, the expression of anger through *ghinnāwas* is *discouraged* in this community. This is because anger expressions are seen as disruptive for the interpersonal closeness and intimacy characteristic of *ghinnāwas'* private settings. This is important because it means that the Awlad 'Ali do not view the mundane, public language of anger as more important for the maintenance of honor than the language of vulnerability represented by *ghinnāwas*. In fact, the maintenance of honor requires the Awlad 'Ali to engage in each type of emotion language in its appropriate social setting. Thus, the Awlad 'Ali show their commitment to honor by following their culture's norms that dictate *where* and *toward whom* one should engage in *ghinnāwas'* language of emotional vulnerability or in the discourse of anger (Abu-Lughod 1999).

5 General conclusions and implications

I feel anger. I feel sadness. I feel happiness. The English emotion words anger, sadness, and happiness – or any other English emotion word – do not signal universal emotional experiences across cultures and languages. Their meanings are culture-bound. Their use in everyday social interactions is culture-bound. The research reviewed in this chapter has shown that emotion language carries cultural meanings because it reflects core cultural values and beliefs (i.e., ethnotheories) about emotions.

Furthermore, the reviewed research also shows that emotion language has the important function of *signaling* those situations that are particularly important to cultural values. This was clearly shown in Lutz's (1998) ethnography. Relational closeness with kin was a core cultural value among the Ifaluk and the emotion word *fago* was used among the Ifaluk in situations that involved physical or emotional separation from kin.

In addition, the research reviewed also shows that individuals' use of emotion language in everyday social interactions is *purposeful* as it aims to convey desired cultural identities. Abu-Lughod's (1999) ethnography clearly shows the intentionality of emotion language. Among the Awlad 'Ali, the maintenance of honor required understanding of an ethnotheory of emotions that gives different meanings to sadness-related and anger-related emotions. At the core of this ethnotheory is a distinction between poetic and non-poetic

emotion language, and clear norms about the social settings in which each type of language should be used. The Awlad 'Ali viewed private and public settings as affording different types of emotional expression, what requires the use of different types of emotion language in each setting. The language of emotional vulnerability through *ghinnāwas* was appropriate for intimate settings where the only audience are close others. The language of anger was only appropriate for public settings, which facilitates a larger audience for the affirmation of an identity as strong and autonomous. Using the appropriate emotion language in the appropriate social setting aims to maintain honor. In this way, emotion language is used to convey a desired cultural identity as an honorable person.

In sum, culture constitutes emotion language. Cultural values and ethnotheories provide the framework in which emotion words and other linguistic forms of emotional expression *acquire their meaning*. Cultural values and ethnotheories also provide *norms* about the appropriate use of emotion language. Furthermore, by using emotion language in culturally appropriate ways, individuals *reproduce* and *sustain* their cultures. In this way, cultural values and ethnotheories are not static but dynamic as they are always being re-created in everyday social interactions through language.

Because emotion language is culture-bound, social scientists cannot take the meaning of emotion words for granted in their studies on emotion. This is because emotion words in different languages do not necessarily reflect cross-culturally equivalent emotional experiences and semantic meanings (Wierzbicka 2009). Thus, studies on emotion language as well as studies that use emotion words to assess emotional experiences need to *contextualize* how participants use emotion words. This can be done by including measures that reveal what the participants *mean* when they use those emotion words, for example, measures of cultural values and beliefs about emotions, or measures of cognitive appraisals and motivations. This methodological approach also has the advantage of being inclusive of participants' cultural identities and perspectives. These perspectives are, in fact, *necessary* to understand the language of emotion.

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Rita Gross

84 The social construction of emotion and its linguistic and communicative dimensions

- 1 Introduction
- 2 Comparison of social construction theory of emotion in German literature and in its American counterparts
- 3 Criticisms of the social construction of emotion model
- 4 Emotional intelligence and its relevance in the social construction of emotions
- 5 Conclusion
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Abstract: Previous research suggests that emotions are omnipresent in humans. It is thought that at any point in time, people experience at least one emotion (Trampe, Quoidbach, and Taquet 2015). However, our emotions can have an impact beyond the individual who is experiencing them. They are often expressed in the form of words or behaviors, thus becoming vessels of communication. The expressed emotions, in turn, affect other individual's emotions respectively. Both the emotional intelligence of the individual and sociocultural norms can influence this social construction of emotion. Social/emotional intelligence is the ability to understand one's own and other's emotions while connecting thoughts to them (Mayer and Geher 1996). Sociocultural influences also tend to play a significant role in the social construction of emotion. There appear to be significant differences in the expression of emotion between individualistic cultures (Kotchemidova 2010) and collectivistic cultures (Mesquita and Albert 2007). The purpose of this chapter is to provide a conceptual review of the existing literature on the social construction of emotion. One focus of this review will be on the comparison of social constructivism theory of emotion in German literature to its American counterparts. Suggestions for future research directions will be discussed.

1 Introduction

A life without emotions is unimaginable for most people. A study by Trampe, Quoidbach, and Taquet (2015) found that most of the time, individuals experience at least one emotion, if not more than one emotion, simultaneously. They also found that participants experienced one or more positive emotions (e.g., joy, love, anxiety) significantly more often than negative emotions. On the other hand, participants also reported feeling a mixture of at least one positive and one negative emotion (e.g., anxiety and love) most of the time. The results of this study imply that emotions represent enigmas that have yet to be fully understood. Moreover, the impact that emotions have on their environment is an area in need of

more attention. Emotions reach beyond the individual who is experiencing them as they are often expressed in the form of words or behaviors, and thus become building blocks of communication. The expressed emotions, in turn, affect other individual's emotions as well. However, there appears to be no consensus on the general definition of emotions (Cabanac 2002; Kleinginna and Kleinginna 1981).

This situation might be due to the emotion paradox (Barrett 2006). As emotion is a latent construct, it is something that everyone experiences in some way, yet there does not seem to be one set of criteria that categorizes any single emotion. Russell (1980) proposed that what can be measured scientifically is actually affect, while what is considered emotion by lay people is an interpretation of affect. While there is a considerable difference between affect and emotion, according to Russell (1980), they appear to have two attributes in common – valence and arousal. Valence describes the positive or negative connotation of a sensation, while arousal refers to the intensity of a sensation. This also explains why the terms affect and emotion are often used interchangeably. Barrett echoes Russell's definition of emotion, so much so that Barrett's psychological construction of emotion is built on the tenets of Russell's understanding of affect. According to Barrett, the word "affect" describes the sensation of emotion, while the word "emotion" itself is rather a mental representation that is universal but can also vary from person to person (Barrett 2017a: chapter 4, endnote 36). For the purpose of this chapter, Russell's (1980) definition of affect appears to be the most relevant to the current discussion.

Additionally, there also appear to be competing theories regarding the origins of emotions, whether they could be innate (Chomsky 2006), evolutionary (Nesse and Ellsworth 2009; Plutchik 2003), or acquired (Skinner 1957). One of these theories is the theory of constructed emotion. This theory does not classify emotions as exclusively innate, evolutionary, or acquired. Rather, as its name implies, this theory asserts that emotions are categories of representations. These representations involve a unique combination of core affects with a number of other elements. Core affects are defined as a neurological sensation that indicates varying unlabeled levels of valence and arousal. During the labeling process, these core affects are combined with preconceived ideas about core affects that are ever-changing along with past and current experiences. Therefore, emotion, as an extension, is a combination of core affects and subjective experience. This theory is based on two assumptions. First, emotions are neither purely innate nor purely acquired, and second, this assumption is currently contested as emotions do not appear to be universal. It is also not unreasonable to assume that there is a component of emotion that is innate, which is a so-called core affect (Russell 2003). It appears that the five primary emotions – joy, anger, sadness, disgust, and fear (sometimes "surprise" is included in this group as well) – are often also referred to as "feelings". All of these feelings share the fact that they can be categorized in the form of valence and affect, as previously mentioned in the definition of emotion. While the existence of such feelings might be universal, their expression is not universal due to factors that the psychological construction of emotion theory accounts for. The psychological construction of emotion theory also expands on the theory of constructed emotion in such a way that it asserts that emotions are constructed in a new manner each time an emotion arises in a situation. In such a creation, the emotion is elicited from the core affect, situational circumstances as well as social and cultural ones (Barrett 2012).

In addition, the psychological construction of emotion theory integrates a social constructionist view.

Yet the overall focus in the social construction of emotion theory emphasizes the socio-cultural influences during the construction process (Barrett and Russell 2014). It appears though that there are individual variations of this theory among researchers. For example, Boiger and Mesquita (2012) suggest a sociodynamic perspective of the construction of emotion rather than a social construction of emotion. They assert that there might be a compromise between the psychological construction of emotion theory and the social construction of emotion theory, in the sense that the two ideas might be complementary, rather than mutually exclusive. In their theory, they suggest that emotions are influenced socially in three modalities: in moment-to-moment interactions (hence, why their theory takes a socio-dynamic perspective), in ongoing relationships, and in their larger sociocultural context. The current chapter will focus on the social construction of emotion theory. Based on previous research and anecdotal evidence, it is plausible that emotions should not be evaluated from an isolated perspective, as emotion most often involves other people. Rather, emotions should be evaluated from the context of a group perspective or more specifically, depending on group membership, in a sociological sense (Fisher and Chon 1989). It is also not unreasonable to assert that the relationship between emotion and society remains unclear – are emotions affected by society or is society affected by emotions? Regardless, this review's purpose is not to find an answer to this question but rather to emphasize a number of issues in the current research. The rationale for this chapter is to broadly introduce the concept of the social construction theory of emotion via comparison of key literature in the German and the English scientific literature, covering selected highlights across the past 110 years (1909–2019). Criticisms of this model will be mentioned. Lastly, the gap between the theory of the social construction of emotion and its practical applications in the fields of psychology and sociology will be described.

One of the reasons why a comparison between Anglo-American literature and German literature is inevitable lies in the history of the *Geisteswissenschaften* in Germany. The term loosely translates to ‘arts’ or ‘humanities’, neither term quite capturing its larger meaning. The term and what it encompasses was coined by William Dilthey in the early 19th century through a strict distinction between the “pure” natural sciences of biology, chemistry and physics, and *Geisteswissenschaften*, including the human studies of everything else (Makkkreel and Rodi 2010). However, this distinction has been subject to debate. Regardless, it is because of this development that a significant number of scholars from different disciplines have had their start in Germany – philosophers (Hegel, Nietzsche, Karl Marx, Leibnitz, Kant), theologists (Martin Luther, Friedrich Bonhoeffer), psychologists (e.g., Wilhelm Wundt), and sociologists (Karl Marx, Weber, Georg Simmel). On the other hand, likely due to historical reasons, it appears that Anglo-American literature has gained popularity since the 19th century. While time has not stood still in Germany, it is important to consider particularly the development of the social construction of emotion. One of the intricacies of evaluating research in multiple languages is the differences in meanings across translations. Further confounding the matter is an ambiguous discrimination between social constructionism of emotion and social constructivism of emotion. While some researchers use these two classifications accordingly, others use the two interchangeably, thus creating noise in the literature.

In social constructionism, as defined previously, any concept is given meaning through interaction with others via social interactions. Thus, the focus is on outside influences rather than the implicit processes of the individual. Social constructivism, on the other hand, is the idea that concepts are given meaning by internal processes that take the aforementioned outside influences into account (Young and Collin 2004). Hence, both distinctions converge at the same idea but from different perspectives. They are similar in centering around the social influences in the construction of emotions; however, they differ in the focus of internal social influences versus external social influences. It has only been more recently that both fields of psychology and sociology, simultaneously, have shown an increased interest in the ontology of emotion. As previously mentioned, one of the purposes of this chapter is to bridge the gap between primary English literature and non-primary English literature – the case of German literature.

2 Comparison of social construction theory of emotion in German literature and in its American counterparts

There appears to be a consensus in both the German and the American literature that psychological theories, and particularly psychological construction of emotion theories (to date), typically do not integrate social influences sufficiently into their theories (Gerhards 1988; Parkinson and Manstead 2015). Moreover, German theories of social construction of emotion are largely based on existing American sociological theories (Gerhards 1988). Emile Durkheim, who is regarded by some researchers as one of the major influencers of the social construction of emotion theory, takes an inverse approach to a constructionist view. In his work *Suicide – A study in sociology*, Durkheim (2005) asserts that not only does society affect emotion (and the resulting behavior), but also that emotion in turn affects the behaviors which shape society in the same way (Fisher and Chon 1989). More specifically, if emotions indirectly shape society, then how exactly do emotions affect the construction of social reality? The link between the social construction of emotion and the social construction of reality is found in Berger and Luckmann's (1966) manifest *The social construction of reality*. While they do not consider emotion directly, their theory and language can be extended to that same approach that interprets emotions and the communication of emotions. Moreover, emotions are an essential part of shaping an individual's perception of reality, expressed by Berger and Luckmann as part of subjectivity. The way this is first mentioned is through what the researchers call "face-to-face" interactions (these define the prototypical case of social interaction), as well as through signs and objectification. Both of these concepts are part of the idea of society as an objective reality. Furthermore, in their book, the authors suggest that reality is socially constructed by individuals through habituation of interactions. These interactions translate over time into roles, which carry institutionalization as a consequence. In a scientific way, through replication and repetition, all of the aforementioned becomes embedded in the foundation of society. The works mentioned above are mostly of a sociological nature. Therefore, these researchers made some inferences about the communicative dimensions of the social construction of emo-

tions. Thus far, the literature reviewed here implies a number of communicative dimensions of the social construction of emotions in the forms of physical expressions (facial expressions and body posture), signs (including hand signals), and objectifications.

Another significant researcher in the German-language social constructionist literature is Hubert Knoblauch. While he does not directly consider emotions, he does add an interesting perspective to the accumulation of theories in this genre. Knoblauch and Wilke (2016) further develops Berger and Luckmann's (1966) theory of the social construction of reality. He postulates that social behavior in any way is a form of communication. This theory is called "the constructivism of communication" theory. More specifically, the idea of communication is realized through an observation of social behavior. This can be compared to the idea of a falling tree in the forest. One could argue that if nobody was there to hear a tree fall, it may not have made a noise (luckily, we know that this is not actually true). However, a similar logic applies here. A social behavior can only become a vehicle of communication if it is observed, regardless of whether it is observed actively by being experienced, or passively by an outsider. Furthermore, Knobloch proposes that not only can social behaviors become forms of communication, but theories about behavior can themselves become forms of communication; the social constructionism and constructivism of emotion can be considered a form of communication under this view. This is relevant when attempting to find empirical support for any social constructivist theory. Particularly in this type of theory of emotion literature, empirical support has been almost nonexistent. Whereas Knobloch suggests that the constructivism of communication reaches far beyond language and linguistic components as it also considers signs, technology and embodiment, his theory nevertheless remains relevant in the social construction of emotion realm. Despite the fact that Knobloch does not directly mention emotions, he implies them within his use of social behaviors that become vehicles of communications. Therefore, he documents both linguistic and communicative dimensions in this view of emotion.

However, it is not unreasonable to assert that in the German literature, Berger and Luckmann have become protagonists of the social construction of emotion, despite the fact that they did not directly investigate the role of emotion in the social construction of reality. Gerhards (1988) critiques Berger and Luckmann's (1966) theory by stating that only indirectly considering emotion in this view of reality is not sufficient. Instead, he postulates that no step of the social construction of reality is free from emotion and thus the theory should rather be titled the "emotional construction of social reality". On the other hand, it appears that Georg Simmel (1906) reached a compromise. Gerhards (1986) illuminated Georg Simmel's importance in the emotion sociology field, as in his time, the field delegated the study of emotion to the discipline of psychology, rather than the discipline of sociology. According to Gerhards, sociology as a field did not indicate interest in the field of emotion until about the 1970s. Simmel's sociology of emotions was based on the overall goal, like many before him, to understand the development of society, rather than to explain behavior. In his (Simmel's) view of emotions, he distinguished between primary and secondary emotions. This is quite an unfortunate naming, as his definition of primary and secondary emotions does not reflect the psychological definition of primary and secondary emotions.

In psychological terms, primary emotions can be described as implicit, subconscious, automatic reactions that – if Russell and colleagues are correct – can in their basic forms

be found universally, even in primates (for example, anger). Secondary emotions, on the other hand, are emotional reactions that involve cognitive processes and that can be about feelings that are not directly experienced in those primary emotions (Lewis, Haviland-Jones, and Barrett 2008). An example of a secondary emotion related to anger would be feeling shame or guilt. In contrast, Simmel considers primary emotions to be those that cause behavior, and secondary emotions to be emotions that we experience during an interaction. This is relevant to the current investigation via means of a definition of emotion. Simmel postulates emotions are constructed by the sociocultural environment of an individual and how the environment and its interactions are interpreted. However, he does not specify whether the individual or society is the interpreter, thus it is unclear whether he is a social constructionist or social constructivist. Simmel also describes emotions, particularly primary emotions, as constructions of social realities (Gerhards 1986). Referring back to the linguistic and communicative dimensions of the social construction of emotions, this section describes another instance of a communicative dimension as both Simmel and Gerhards use the term “interpreter”, a term referring to communication.

Another significant protagonist in the German-language social constructionist literature is Norbert Elias. He published his manuscript *Über den Prozess der Zivilisation* in 1939 in German; however, it remained ignored until its translation into English 30 (!) years later. Like other previously mentioned theorists, Elias, too, does not directly consider the social construction of emotion; instead, he adds an interesting perspective about the construction of social reality and the etiology of knowledge. Elias presents a historical perspective about how societies have been created, and he considers emotionality to be a part of that. One consideration in his manuscript is about cultural influences of emotionality (whether they are direct or indirect), but also, how these cultural influences have affected the development of societies under different kinds of pressure. Elias’ work shows how the social construction of emotions directly affects the social construction of society, and by extension of reality. A first step to bridge the gap between German and American social construction of emotion literature has been taken by Gerhards (1988). In his book, he ponders the function and relevance of a social construction of emotion while considering German and American historical influences. He suggests that social aspects are not considered enough in the cognitive construction of reality, which in itself does not consider emotions. He suggests instead that the fact that we, as humans, have emotion is exactly what makes us human. He also postulates that emotions are significantly different than cognition or instincts, in the sense that the three concepts are on a continuum. Instincts are “gut reactions”, while emotions are a simultaneous form of perceptions, and cognitions are a sequential form of perception. Further, both emotions and cognitions rely on language and thus are subject to individual communication. Both also are processes that are part of the social construction of reality and thus subject to individual differences and hence receive different levels of language (verbal communication, nonverbal communication, etc.) to be expressed. In conclusion, Gerhards interprets all three – instincts, emotions and cognitions – as forms of expression of social reality. In his view, Gerhards unites the previous knowledge about the social construction of emotion and the social construction of reality with the views of Norbert Elias and Jean-Paul Sartre. Furthermore, this perspective unites both the linguistic and the communicative dimensions of the social construction of emotions.

In comparison to the German literature, on the American side, James Averill (1982) and Rom Harré (1986) play essential roles in the social construction of emotion. While they use different methodology, they both understand that language and emotion are inseparable in their social construction of emotion theory approaches. Averill, for example, has built his view off of Berger and Luckmann's manifesto (1966). Averill defines emotion as a group of socially constituted characteristics that varies systematically with social circumstances, including individual perception of each situation. These interpretations can be divided into passions and actions, that is, things that happen to us passively and situations that involve us actively, respectively. In his theory, social norms build a blueprint for the construction of emotion, which is being built upon by the way the syndromes of characteristics are interpreted on a situational basis. By including other characteristics such as biological and empirical influences, and even potential third variables that remain unconsidered (for example, individual differences), he presents a well-rounded theoretical approach to the origins of emotions. In his opinion, prior to his approach, there were two concrete ways to think about emotions: either from a biological standpoint or from a social constructionist perspective. Averill postulates an integrated theoretical approach that forms an integrative social constructivist theory of emotion, which creates a bridge between social psychology and sociology. Harré's (1986) theory of the social construction of emotions shares some commonalities with Averill's (1982). However, a key difference is the definition of an emotion itself. Averill defines emotion as a group of socially constituted characteristics that vary systematically with social circumstances, including individual perception of each situation. Harré, on the other hand, takes an almost "Sapir-Whorfian" approach. He recognizes how closely language is involved in the perception of objects and abstract concepts, and how culture and language are closely related, and thus, how emotional vocabularies reflect the culture in which they are used and hence can give an idea of how culture can influence emotionality. Thus, at the center of Harré's theory is not a group of characteristics or "symptoms", but rather, the linguistic repertoire we use to describe internal emotional states. According to Harré, there are two main factors that are responsible for an individual's personal, emotional experience: local moral order (e.g., local social norms) and the local use of language. By using the word local, Harré acknowledges individual differences in language, culture and language-culture and integrates them in his theory. It also appears that, in this approach, the physiological and biological aspects of emotion are rather secondary; in Harré's opinion, they might be creating skewed or even misleading inferences about emotional states because the language that is used to describe the emotion and its sociocultural context is elementary in the construction of an emotion. Therefore, in this perspective the linguistic dimensions of the social construction of emotions are featured.

A more recent account of the Anglo-American literature and a perspective on the linguistic dimensions of the social construction of emotions are provided by Lisa Feldman Barrett (2011). She defines the social construction of emotion approach as a conglomerate of elements, one of which are emotions, which she defines as culturally normed performances. Barrett purports that emotions themselves are defined by social and sociocultural factors as well as context. She suggests that the social constructionist view of emotion may not be concrete; instead, there may be multiple variations of it that might be rather abstract and ordered along a continuum. This may be due to categorical differences between the

disciplines of psychology and sociology. In the discipline of psychology, according to Barrett, social construction models view social triggers (whether they are environmental or circumstantial) as triggers of basic emotion, much like the center of appraisal theory. This is particularly the case in Averill's (1982) approach. Sociological theorists, on the other hand, interpret emotions as cornucopias of sociocultural and social circumstances that are interpreted on a subjective basis by the individual. An assumption of sociological theorists is that mental processes and behavioral processes are activated and happen simultaneously in the construction of emotions, as a consequence of social triggers, as they believe the primary function of emotion is social. Moreover, having knowledge of social norms lets the individual understand and interact with his/her environment depending on the social context. An example of this would be to show sadness at a funeral, rather than joy.

In summary, there are many parallels and commonalities in the approaches found in both the Anglo-American literature and the German literature. For example, both the American and German approaches are largely based on existing social construction theories of reality and society. Contrarily, they also share one major point of criticism: Across all disciplines and research methods, few studies have considered the construct of "social construction of emotion" in a manner that would satisfy ecological validity. There are a number of explanations that are offered for the absence of empirical support for these theories. One explanation comes from Harré (1986). They remain doubtful about the reductionist view that empiricism provides when considering theoretical models, particularly when it comes to emotions. They postulate that physiological aspects that include subjective reports that can be collected via empirical methods might never completely capture the intricacies of the social construction of emotion. The physiological reports prioritize the physiological differences brought on by basic emotions rather than the social and situational circumstances that have constructed them. As a result, empirical methods present a skewed representation of the "true" social construction of emotion. Further support for this argument is brought forth by Barrett (2017b). During the 30 years that passed between Harré's publication and Barrett's publication, scientists attempted to study the construction of emotion via means of pattern classification (Kragel and LaBar 2013; Stephens, Christie, and Friedman 2010). Pattern classification (Vyzas and Picard 1998) is a method where artificial intelligence products are programmed to recognize biological patterns of emotions and distinguish between them. However, while it has been used routinely in emotion research, pattern classification is not infallible due to individual and situational differences. Furthermore, the statistical patterns that are at the center of pattern classification have little ecological validity, as is the case with statistical patterns in general. However, there is empirical support for the idea that a construction of emotion is happening on a biological basis. Pattern classification may not be able to represent the construction down to a detailed level, but it is undeniable that a process is happening. Therefore, pattern classification can serve as empirical support to the mental processes occurring during the social construction of emotions. This is particularly relevant to the current discussion as it is part of a small number of direct applications of the theory discussed throughout this chapter.

Saarimäki et al. (2016) conducted a multivariate pattern analysis to find support for a distinct neurological pattern of the basic emotions by inducing affective states via movies and imaginary methods. While they intended to find support for the hypothesis of finding

distinct patterns of firing for each emotion (which is how their results were presented), they actually succumbed to the above-mentioned fallacy of the method of pattern classification. Clark-Polner, Johnson, and Barrett (2017) instead suggest that Saarimäki et al. (2016) found support for a constructionist view of emotion: the conceptual act theory of emotion (Barrett 2012). The conceptual act theory of emotion is a sub-theory in the construction of emotion theoretical network. While this does not necessarily address the social constructionist or social constructivist views of emotion, as mentioned previously, it does provide support for an overall constructionist approach. The conceptual act hypothesizes that an instance of a basic emotion activates a collection of representations of that specific basic emotion. Through neural interactions (e.g., the memory network assessing prior experiences of the emotion), the emotion then gets constructed. It is not unreasonable to assume that social influences could be represented in the memory network; however, they are not given priority treatment, as assumed within the social constructionist view of emotion. Nevertheless, it is essential to consider the influence of sociocultural influences in the social construction of emotions, despite it being given a varying amount of relevance throughout past research.

3 Criticisms of the social construction of emotion model

English has been and continues to be the international language of research (Sekhar 2018; Swales 1985). This notion, as the previous section of the chapter attempted to point out, leads to discrepancies particularly in the realms of emotion research. Wierzbicka (1999) indicated how the description of an emotion could change over translation into different languages or vice versa when translated into English. While Lomas (2016) does not directly measure emotion, but rather communicative expression of well-being, he suggests that it is possible to turn the disadvantage of the social construction of emotion into an advantage to all. Thus, he postulates that it is possible to train English speakers, and by extension the field, to be able to recognize and understand the untranslatable terms. Some examples of this would be the English equivalents for *Schadenfreude* (the feeling of an individual who is feeling happiness at somebody else's misfortune who has done the individual wrong) or *Weltschmerz* (feeling gloomy and depressed for no specific reason other than feeling the weight of the world on one's shoulders). Or, on the other hand, descriptions of emotions might not represent the feeling at all in one language when translated to another (Altarriba 2003; Pavlenko 2009). Furthermore, Aranguren (2017) defines social constructionism of emotion as a theory that has at its heart that society and culture construct and create emotions. Furthermore, he postulates that if emotions are socially constructed that means that emotions are cultural. Thus, there is no difference between social and cultural influences on emotions. As a result of that, he suggests a reconstruction of the social constructionist view of emotion. This reconstruction also includes evidence for the social construction of non-human emotions.

When it comes to sociocultural appropriations, there is also a debate in the field on whether or not emotions can be universal. Ekman (1970), on the one hand, argues that emotions can be universal in the sense that facial expressions of emotions have been found

to be universal across cultures. The rest of this section of the chapter, however, presents support for the idea that there are individual differences in the social construction of emotion in both constructionism and constructivism. In social constructionism, any concept is given meaning through interaction with others via social interactions. Thus, the focus is on outside influences rather than the implicit processes of the individual. Social constructivism, on the other hand, is the idea that concepts are given meaning by internal processes that take the aforementioned outside influences into account (Young and Collin 2004). If this is the case, then it is essential to consider the language-culture-cognition hypothesis. Sapir (1985) and Whorf ([1956] 2012) both postulated that cognition is influenced by language and it is not unreasonable to assume that language and culture are also closely associated. Furthermore, since emotion can be considered part of cognition, the emotional Sapir-Whorf hypothesis (Perlovsky 2009) should be taken into account when evaluating the social construction theory of emotion. This hypothesis suggests that differences in emotion language influence cultures more than universal, preconceived mental representations of the same. On the other hand, one of the criticisms of the social construction of emotion theory from both the sociological side and the psychological perspective is that it is not generalizable across cross-cultural as well as bilingual and multilingual contexts. This might be due to the fact that emotions might be expressed differently in multilingual and cross-cultural contexts.

Additionally, there appears to be a twofold effect between emotion and culture on language as well as language and culture on emotion. As there are chapters dedicated throughout this book to this relationship, the following paragraph(s) will only name a few examples. One of the most common examples for this relationship comes from Jean L. Briggs' (1970) book *Never in anger*, where she recounts her personal experience of living with an Utku community. Particularly relevant for the discussion about the social construction of emotion and sociocultural influences is when she portrays her view of the village leader and her experience living in the community. When she would show anger and frustration, she experienced being an outcast. She describes the village leader as never showing anger as a tool of his social standing. She also states that unhappiness is in the Eskimo view often equated with happiness. This is just one example of how culture in some instances can play a larger role than initially accounted for in the social construction of emotion theory. It could be argued that emotion expression might be a consequence of emotion construction. Social emotion construction does place heavy emphasis on the social environments that are involved in social constructivism and social constructionism. Emotion expression could be seen as a reflection of the social construction of emotion as it is regulated by the social and cultural environment of an individual.

On the other hand, there are significant differences in emotion expression within and between cultures and languages. For example, Park et al. (2013) conducted a study evaluating whether culture mediates emotion expression with the example of anger expression. Previous research has found that lower socioeconomic background has been linked to higher exhibitions of aggressive and violent behaviors (Crutchfield 1989) in individuals coming from Western cultures. However, this finding does not translate to individuals from Eastern cultures. Park et al. (2013) conducted a number of surveys evaluating American and Japanese individuals. They were able to replicate previous findings in American partic-

ipants; however, they found that in Japanese participants' higher social statuses were associated with higher emotional expression of anger. Thus, they implied that culture must play a moderating role. Another set of examples comes from bilingualism research. Gutfreund (1990) assessed Spanish-English and English-Spanish bilinguals on whether or not they would show more affect in their native language compared to in their second language. Participants were given self-report measures of depression, anxiety, and social desirability in either their native or their second language. They were then asked to recall a sad event in either their native or their second language. Afterwards, the self-report measures were repeated. Gutfreund found that English-Spanish bilinguals expressed more emotionality in their second language and Spanish-English bilinguals expressed more emotionality in their native language. Levels of anxiety and depression also differed depending on which language the measures were assessed in.

Marian and Kaushanskaya (2004) reported that bilinguals expressed more intense emotion in a mother tongue than in the second language while recounting autobiographical memories that happened in L1. They also suggest that the self-narratives (so by extension how emotions are constructed in the social constructivist view) of bilinguals align with the culture of the native language or the second language. Further, language-cultures also play a role in this. Individualistic cultures, as the term includes, tend to center around the well-being of the individual. Collectivistic cultures, on the other hand, tend to focus on the well-being of the entirety of a group, rather than just centering around one individual. Therefore, if the language is associated with an individualistic culture (like many Western cultures), then their self-narrative would be reflecting an individualistic perspective. If their language is associated with a more collectivistic culture (like many Eastern cultures), then their self-narrative would be reflecting a more collectivistic view.

An additional criticism of the social construction of emotion model has been an overall undertone that has been mentioned by several researchers throughout this section, which is the use of a certain convenient demographic of participants (Heinrich, Heine, and Norenzayan 2010). Oftentimes, research that has been published involves participants from Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich, and Democratic populations, referred to by the researchers as WEIRD brains. There has been a debate in the field whether or not WEIRD brains present an actual scientific bias, however, particularly when evaluating a latent construct that induces such individual differences as the social construction of emotion does. Lomas (2016) suggests a two-step process that can be applied to solve this problem of a social construction of emotion not being universal across languages and cultures. In the first step he suggests the development of a universal emotion lexicon including "untranslatable emotion words". In the second step, this lexicon should be validated cross-culturally. If there could be a universal emotion-language that considers individual language and cultural differences, there could be a more comprehensive social construction of emotion theory that has more external validity. In summary, much of the research that has been reviewed above commonly points to a monolingual bias in the research of the social construction of emotion. Moreover, there is also a common threat of the applicability of theoretical construct to empirical studies. One possible application of knowledge about emotional constructs can be linked to emotional intelligence.

4 Emotional intelligence and its relevance in the social construction of emotions

When considering emotion research, it is of the essence to also consider the importance of the construct of emotional intelligence. Surprisingly, there is not a lot of research that has been done on the relationship between emotional intelligence and the social construction of emotion. Emotional intelligence is thought of as part of a concept called social intelligence (Salovey and Mayer 1990). Social intelligence is different from other cognitive forms of intelligence in the sense that it is difficult to measure as it is defined as the ability to understand other individuals (Thorndike and Stein 1937). Thus, emotional intelligence can be designated as an extension of social intelligence including the ability to be mindful and have an understanding of one's own feelings, and to let that understanding guide behavior (Salovey and Mayer 1990). Goleman (2006) advanced Salovey and Mayer's postulations. He coined the term *Emotional Intelligence* in his earlier work (Goleman 1995) and posited that emotional intelligence, in comparison to other types of intelligence, is comprised of five subcomponents: empathy, emotional control, self-awareness, self-motivation, and the ability to handle relationships. Furthermore, emotional intelligence appears to be distributed along a continuum among individuals as it relies on a number of factors. In the past, socio-economic factors like level of education, level of completed education or prior degree, or family income level have been named as factors that could possibly influence emotional intelligence (Rauf et al. 2013). Other research has named parent-child interaction and gender as contributing factors to emotional intelligence (Trivedi 2014). Social constructionism as well as social constructivism relies on a person's understanding of their own emotions and the emotions of others and their ability to integrate social influences and feedback into their emotions. Mayer and Geher (1996) found that individual differences in levels of emotional intelligence may be due to varying levels of general intelligence, emotional problem-solving skills as well as general empathy and defensiveness attitudes. Moreover, it appears that the term of emotional intelligence may not be addressing significant social cues and competencies. Therefore, it is elementary to address the relationship between emotional intelligence and the social constructionism and constructivism of emotion.

Of particular relevance is what happens if the relationship between emotional intelligence and the constructionism/constructivism of emotion becomes problematic when there are deficits in emotional intelligence or even alexithymia (Goleman 1995). Alexithymia has been defined as a disorder that among other deficits includes emotional deficits in the sense that individuals have trouble feeling emotions, naming emotions, as well as understanding emotions in other individuals (Samur et al. 2013). Moreover, Hobson et al. (2019) suggest that there are other assumptions that tend to overlap with emotional intelligence, which can also overlap with the presence of alexithymia symptomatology. One of those is emotional granularity, or the ability to describe one's emotions in detail (Barrett 2004), and the other one is emotional awareness, or the ability to detect an emotion if it is there (Gu et al. 2013). While Hobson et al. (2019) did draw conclusions from the relationship between alexithymia and emotion theories in general, they assert that there is a continuum between the side that argues that emotions are innate, and emotional construction theories, like the social and psychological construction of emotion account. While it is largely assumed that

alexithymia is mostly a cognitive impairment, the researchers hypothesize that a language impairment is the source of the deficit based on the fact that what all the emotion theories have in common is that language is needed for the existence of emotions. Further, their findings imply that language is essential for the construction of emotion. Consequently, a bidirectional relationship between emotion construction ability and emotion language deficits during development under an alexithymia pathology is suggested. If one has deficits in emotion language, then their emotion construction ability might be affected and vice versa. Based on these findings, it is important to consider emotional intelligence, emotional granularity, emotional awareness and what happens with these dysfunctions (as in alexithymia) when evaluating the external validity of social construction of emotion approaches.

5 Conclusion

In conclusion, this chapter evaluated psychological and social construction theories of emotion, and outlined the differences between the social constructionist and the social constructivist approach. A comprehensive picture was provided between American emotion research and non-American (specifically, German) research. Overall, a universal conclusion that could be drawn would be that it appears that for both disciplines, psychological and sociological constructionists and constructivists, social construction appears to be more than just the sum of its parts. It appears that no single interpretation of the social construction of emotion theory that has been presented here captures the reality of emotions. There always appears to be an added component, regardless of what theoretical approach is taken. For example, the emotion “joy” is composed of various components. However, those components can change and reconfigure each time an individual experiences “joy”. Thus, “joy” can be characterized in the context of different situations, but it will not be perceived in the exact same way every time. It would be interesting to find a mathematical/computational multiple regression model that would do exactly that. As with many theoretical approaches, finding empirical evidence through scientific inquiry has been challenging, as when measuring latent concepts like emotion, interpretations of hypothesis represent a best guess as the true amounts of the single components of the construction of emotions will never be known. It would be challenging to create one single overarching theoretical approach to unite social constructionist, social constructivist, and psychological constructionist approaches to emotion. A future direction for social constructivist and constructionist theories could be to be more integrative with psychological construction theory, in order to facilitate further empirical research about the concrete components of social emotional construction and the depth of their involvement in the emotional construction process. This knowledge could potentially find practical implications in the treatment of mood disorders like depression and anxiety. If the exact blueprint of an emotion could be found, then it could be combined with known research about how to adapt the blueprint to improve depression and anxiety treatments.

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Christian von Scheve

85 The social and cultural constitution of emotion in language, discourse and the body

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Abstract: Many existing theories of emotion suggest that the relationship between emotions and the social world is mediated by language. Following this assumption, this chapter first clarifies some terminology related to emotion and how emotions are associated with symbolic orders. Second, the chapter discusses different approaches at how language is involved in shaping and constructing human emotion. Language here is primarily referred to as a key element and facilitator of culture, both in terms of its capacity to establish symbolic realities and in view of communicating and establishing these realities within language communities. The chapter will discuss this potential with regard to emotion-related norms and values, both of which are expressed and communicated through language and exhibit a specific grammar on their own. It will also look at social practices and the pragmatics of language and discuss how practical and tacit knowledge coalesce to form emotional practices. This also includes a discussion of how public discourse as a realm of the institutionalized and politicized use of language affects emotions. In a third step, the chapter discusses different ways in which the cultural shaping of emotion is related to specific social groups and collectives as constituents of the social world and how identity and the politics of identity contribute to the emergence of collective emotions and emotion repertoires.

1 Introduction

What are emotions? How do they shape social life and individual well-being? And how are they in turn shaped by social and cultural affairs? These are central questions of almost any discipline concerned with understanding emotions as *explanans* and *explanandum*, as Georg Simmel pointed out when he suggested to look at emotions from the perspectives of ‘primary’ and ‘secondary’ emotions, the former asking which social relationships bring about which emotions, the latter capitalizing on the question of how emotions in turn affect social relationships (Gerhards 1986). Contemporary accounts have predominantly focused

on the former question and looked at the various ways in which emotions are socially and culturally constructed or – more recently – even constituted. Existing research has shown how certain types of feelings are contingent on the social world, how they become associated with cultural emotion concepts, and how feelings and emotions affect social action and the fabrics of society. This includes the conjecture that emotions do not arise arbitrarily across individuals, but rather in more or less patterned and structured ways, for instance in relation to power hierarchies, politics, or inequalities. It also means that emotions are linked to social norms, values, and practices, with regards to the situations in which emotions are experienced as well as in view of the cultural meanings attached to them. Most theories suggest that this relationship between feelings and the social world is mediated by language in the broadest sense. Following this assumption, this chapter first clarifies some terminology related to emotion and subsequently discusses different approaches at how language is involved in shaping and calibrating human emotion. Language here is primarily referred to as a key element and facilitator of culture, both in terms of its capacity to establish symbolic realities and in view of communicating these realities within language communities. The chapter will discuss this potential with regard to (a) emotion-related norms and values, both of which are expressed through language and exhibit a specific grammar on their own; (b) social practices and the pragmatics of language; and (c) public discourse as a realm of the institutionalized and politicized use of language. In a third step, the chapter discusses different ways in which the cultural shaping of emotion is related to specific social groups and collectives as constituents of the social world and how identity and the politics of identity contribute to the emergence of collective emotions and emotion repertoires.

2 Emotions and symbolic orders

A central assumption of debates on the role of human emotions for the Social takes the view that emotions are social and cultural constructs. This means, first, that emotions do not occur entirely arbitrarily or even randomly across individuals, but more or less systematically and in a somehow structured or organized manner. Emotions hinge on social forms and the patterns of social organization and thus may depend on, amongst other things, existing power relations, social inequalities, or the structure of social networks. Second, this means that emotions are not only tied to these formal or social structural aspects of society, but likewise to the contents and meanings – *the symbolic orders* – that are inextricably linked to these forms. This includes socially shared norms, values, and beliefs but also institutions, practices, customs, and traditions. Importantly, symbolic orders can be specifically tailored to emotions and the situations in which they arise, i.e., at the ways in which emotions are momentarily experienced, communicated, and reflected upon and at their more general cultural significance, for instance regarding their cultural appreciation or taboo status, their commodification and political exploitation, or their importance as an object of science.

Although many works stress that emotions are socially and culturally constructed, they often still conceive of emotions – and in particular the subjective emotional experience

which is characteristic of an emotion – as physiological and personal phenomena (see Bericat 2016). Some of the classics in the sociology of emotion, for example, assume that human subjects experience and perceive emotions, as well as communicate and express them. In her seminal study, Arlie Hochschild (1979) defines emotions “as bodily cooperation with an image, a thought, a memory – a cooperation of which the individual is aware” (Hochschild 1979: 551). Along similar lines, Peggy Thoits (1989: 318) argues that emotions consist of cognitive appraisals, changes in physiological or bodily sensations and expressive gestures, different constellations of which become culturally classified as emotions and conceptualized using words like shame, guilt, or embarrassment. Still more radically, Theodore Kemper (1987) understands emotions as “autonomic-motoric-cognitive states” (Kemper 1987: 263).

Somewhat to the contrary, interactive and relational perspectives emphasize the social situatedness and contingent character of emotion. For Norman Denzin (1984: 66), emotions are best analyzed sociologically from a phenomenological standpoint. As *self-feelings*, they are lived, imagined, situated, and temporally embodied experiences that permeate the stream of consciousness as well as the entire body. Jack Katz (1999) likewise speaks of emotions as “self-reflexive actions and experiences”, emphasizing that the “self-reflection in emotion is corporeal rather than a matter of discursive reasoning” (Katz 1999: 7). Through emotions, he suggests, individuals “reach back sensually to grasp the tacit, embodied foundations” (Katz 1999: 7) of their selves. Finally, Ian Burkitt (2014) advocates a thoroughly relational view of emotions, in which he supposes, on the one hand, the presence of different components of emotions – e.g., psychological, physical, linguistic, biographical – and, on the other, emphasizes that emotions are primarily to be understood as indices of social relations.

Part of this conceptual plurality is certainly due to a lack of clarity regarding the distinction between close relatives like affect, feeling, and emotion. In the following, I would like to propose an understanding of how these notions are linked and what this means for the broader connections of culture, language and emotion (von Scheve 2017; von Scheve and Slaby 2019). A key feature of emotions, as discussed in many theoretical paradigms and disciplines (e.g., *Conceptual Act Theory*; Barrett 2014), is that they are *intentionally directed* affective stances towards some object or entity which are categorized according to culturally prevailing prototypical constellations of objects, situations, and affective stances to which we typically refer using specific emotion words, such as anger, guilt, shame, embarrassment, or joy (see also Russell [1991] for an elaboration of the notion of emotions as prototypes). Although there certainly is no direct matching between emotional experiences and specific lexical terms (Sabini and Silver 2005), it is equally clear that every language, and its words for emotions in particular, “imposes its own system of classification upon human emotional experience” (Wierzbicka 1992: 546), thereby altering and even constituting this very experience (Bamberg 1997).

Language and the emotion words that categorize situated affective experiences therefore not only represent but at the same time constitute specific kinds of evaluative world-relations, for instance a relation to an imminent danger in the case of fear, to an insult or offense in the case of anger, or to a severe loss in the case of grief. An “affective stance” is a specific mode of being and bodily orientation towards the world that has meaningful

evaluative qualities and usually involves a specific action potential or readiness. As part of an emotion, this stance normally involves a certain *subjective feeling* or *feeling towards* (Goldie 2000: 58) as a specific phenomenal experience, although feelings frequently occur unrelated to emotions, as in, for instance, sensations like pain. Any understanding of emotion must accommodate this prototypical directedness towards evaluatively salient classes of objects. Emotion then is an affective and cognitive process unfolding along culturally categorized evaluative relations that links an individual to a specific matter of concern. Fear thus comprises affective processes and cognitive appraisals for which individuals face an imminent danger; anger comprises those thoughts and affects that relate someone to an offense or insult; and grief would comprise dynamics relating an individual to a situation of significant loss. Importantly, the lexical terms we use to denote these relations are an essential *part* of an emotion proper.

This view of emotions necessarily implies that emotions are inextricably tied to culturally established and thus historically contingent linguistic categories. They likewise involve elements of conceptual knowledge and understanding over and above physiological processes, affect and feelings. Emotions also presuppose and contribute to shaping an intelligible domain of value, that is, socially instituted and culturally codified domains of significance, combined with normatively proper ways to deal with them (e.g., what we find disgusting or praiseworthy, how to respond to specific dangers, or how to adequately deal with conflict, loss, mischief, and so on). Moreover, emotions (and emotion categories) are closely related to reflective self-relations since they provide sources for self-understanding, anchoring individual narratives of value and importance and provide default ways of making sense of actions, decisions and commitments. In virtue of the intrinsic connection between emotions, lexical terms and linguistic categories, and associated types of value, emotions relate individual traits and experience to a cultural repertoire and thus provide intelligibility and accountability to individuals within a sphere of acculturation and belonging. This, amongst other things, explains the close association of emotions with canons of norms, values, customs, and traditions. Based on this understanding, the following section will outline how culture – in different understandings of the term – is and becomes associated with emotion.

3 Culture and emotion

Culture comes to bear in this understanding of emotion in different ways, not least depending on which understanding of culture one employs. Conceiving of culture as encompassing socially shared patterns of meaning-making and corresponding practices is widespread not only in sociology (Reckwitz 2003) but also in neighboring disciplines such as political science and social and cultural anthropology. Likewise, this view of culture is an important component of most sociological approaches to understanding the generation, experience, and communication of emotion. In this section, I will first focus on values and norms as integral to shared patterns of meaning-making and, second, capitalize on embodied approaches to (shared) meaning, as found in practice theories.

3.1 Values and norms

To the extent that we accept that thoughts, ideas, memories, imaginations, and beliefs are essential features of an emotion – i.e., of a prototypical evaluative world-relation reflecting particular concerns – we can assume that emotions are always and necessarily social and linguistic and discursive phenomena. This is because ever since the inception of the sociology of knowledge by Karl Mannheim (1929) it has become commonplace that the mind is inextricably tied to the social world and that most of our attitudes, desires, and beliefs are of a social and collective, rather than an individual nature. Language is essential for this coupling not only because it allows one to articulate, denote, and represent these cognitive components of emotion, but also because it enables their communication and sharing across individuals within a designated language community, thus creating a shared social reality (Berger and Luckmann 1966; Laitin 1977).

How the social world impinges on people's mental lives and their thoughts and beliefs is well documented, for example, in sociological research on values and attitudes. Findings from this line of research show that attitudes regarding, for instance, the environment, immigration, or social justice are highly correlated with individuals' socio-demographic characteristics, such as educational attainment in the case of right-wing or xenophobic attitudes (Zick and Küpper 2015). Likewise, values research indicates that the relevance of different values like self-direction, tradition, or conformity (Schwartz 1992) differs significantly across countries (Gerhards 2009) and is, moreover, subject to considerable historical variability (Inglehardt 1977).

What does this mean for emotions? Let us take the self-direction of children, valuing their independent thought and action, their choosing, creating, exploring, as an example of how values and attitudes and their (historical) variability are linked to emotional experience. In contemporary Western societies, autonomy, self-determination, and, above all, the physical and psychological well-being of children are considered sacrosanct. Their disregard, as in cases of child labor and child abuse, thus consistently produces strong emotional responses such as anger and indignation. In other historical and cultural contexts, however, these emotions are quickly relativized because of different underlying values and concerns, when, for example, child labor was the rule rather than the shocking exception.

As important components of culture, values are relevant for emotions in another respect. As “conceptions of the desirable” (Kluckhohn 1951) they not only reflect preferred maxims of action, but may also refer to the desirability and thus the cultural significance of specific emotions. One of the defining criteria for values and moral norms is their universality and sharedness within society and across situations (Turiel 1983). If one values freedom, honesty, and fairness, one usually does so regardless of a specific context or social situation. Values, therefore, can refer to emotions that are particularly esteemed or eschewed in a culture. Tsai (2007) suggested the term “ideal affect” to refer to the affective states that people value, prefer, and ideally want to feel. For example, we disregard envy and rage in most contemporary Western societies, regardless of the situations in which they arise. In contrast, feeling rules as instances of social norms are bound to specific situations. We are supposed to feel sad at funerals and happy on New Year's Eve. Values can hence incorporate what a “good feeling” actually is and means.

Emotions in this sense are also often objects (indeed also the objects of other emotions, for instance the fear of shame) that are treated in a particular way, as in artistic representations or public debates, for example regarding religious feelings or fear of social decline. Typically, attending to emotions is facilitated by language. Text and talk have a considerable say in whether we cherish or despise certain emotions (for example in literature), they pre- or proscribe specific emotions vis-à-vis specific acts, events, or objects (as in socialization and processes of *Gefühlsbildung*; Röttger-Rössler 2019), and they render emotions political, as matters of debate and negotiation (Lutz 1990). This is also why social and cultural anthropologists frequently speak about hyper- or hypo-cognitive emotions (Levy 1984), i.e., those emotions which either have a wide array of lexical terms and linguistic concepts or those which rather only play a minor role in a culture. As Peter Stearns (1994) traces for the concept of *coolness* in the US, historical studies demonstrate that the cultural presence and significance of emotions are subject to constant change. Needless to say, the place of certain emotions in culture and the value we attach to these emotions is hardly ever taken for granted, but is subject to political interests, issues of power relations, and public negotiations.

Aside from values, the concept of culture in the sociology of emotion also usually contains norms and rules that are widely regarded as socially shared reference points in the construction of meaning and significance. Unlike values that represent general and situation-independent ideas of what is good and desirable, norms and rules have a strong deontological character that are more strongly oriented toward questions of *ought* and corresponding social expectations. Moreover, social norms are often also situation-specific in that they prescribe what to do and expect from others in a specific situation. In addition, in cases of deviant behavior, formal or informal sanctions usually enforce and maintain social norms. Deviant behavior in this regard includes social actions, like littering, as well as showing inappropriate emotions, for instance joy at a funeral.

Arlie Hochschild (1979) has popularized this normative perspective on emotions with her concept of *feeling rules* and corroborated it empirically in her study on the emotion work of flight attendants (Hochschild 1983). A feeling rule “delineates a zone within which one has permission to be free of worry, guilt, or shame with regard to the situated feeling” (Hochschild 1979: 565). These rules specify which emotions are regarded as appropriate and expected in particular situations. Based on this understanding, feelings rules are a subset of prescriptive social norms that indicate what “ought or ought not to be the case” under specific circumstances (Opp 2002: 132). More specifically, these norms demarcate the intensity, direction, duration, and objects of emotions appropriate in a situation (Hochschild 1979; Thoits 2004). Feeling rules can be understood as elements of an overarching ideology, a broader system of the symbolic social order. In the same way as normative orders guide all sorts of behaviors through norms and values, for example fairness, reciprocity, or generalized trust, they guide emotions and their expression. Whereas ideal affect (Tsai 2007) and the culture-specific values ascribed to different emotions are usually not situation-specific but cover a wide range of circumstances, feelings rules are closely tied to specific social situations in which they govern emotional experience and expression. These feeling rules have also been investigated from a cross-culturally comparative perspective, for example investigating the social expectations regarding the sensing and ex-

pression of shame in Indonesia, as Röttger-Rössler (2004) describes using Indonesian case studies, or mass-media mediated compassion, as Scholz (2012) elucidates.

Norms and values are no free-floating and arbitrary “mental objects”, but reflect stances and worldviews that are learned and internalized (some would even say “incorporated”, see the following section) during socialization within specific social and cultural contexts (see Section 4 on collectivity and identity). This is true for norms and values governing various sorts of behaviors as well as for those directed at emotions. Although norms and values as hallmarks of culture are not monolithic and subject to constant change, those adopted in early socialization certainly are amongst the more fundamental and enduring ones for which there is a broad consensus within a society. This is reflected, amongst other things, in those institutions doing the heavy-lifting of socialization, in particular the family and the educational system. Most socialization processes rely on the operation of sign systems, both verbal and non-verbal. Aside from gestures and facial expressions, language is critically involved in communicating normative emotional expectations, both in written and oral forms (Shields 2002), in establishing emotional consensus (Ambrosat et al. 2014), and in reassuring (one’s own) compliance with norms, for instance through the verbal sharing of emotions (Rimé 2009). Moreover, due to their conventional character, linguistic categories of emotion have normative properties as well (Gelman and Roberts 2017).

But the adoption of norms – and to some extent also of values – does not end in adolescence. Most norms are notoriously contested within society and their validity and adequacy are subject to debate and negotiation. Discourse is the main arena in which these negotiations take place and discourse is primarily – though not exclusively – language-driven. This can be highly specialized discourses, for instance regarding the adequate expression of emotion in management, organizational behavior, and consumer relationships (Fineman 2008; Ashkanasy, Zerbe, and Hartel 2002), but also public discourse concerned with issues that cut across entire societies.

In public discourse, conflicting views and positions regarding these cleavages are debated amongst different social and political groups with the aim to establish hegemonic patterns of seeing and understanding the world. This includes not only dominant ways of talking, writing, thinking and reasoning, but also ways of feeling. Individuals as well as political parties and interest groups have a genuine interest in channelling how “the public” or certain groups within society feel towards contested political issues. This is because, as outlined above, emotions are closely linked to actions, in this case actions that political actors deem desirable. These actors therefore aim at establishing what the “right” and “adequate” and also the socially expected ways of feeling are – they aim at instituting feeling rules. Ahmed (2004) has outlined the general principles concerning the linkages between discourse, language and emotion. In line with the above proposed understanding of emotion, she argues that emotions are relationally constituted (instead of solely being socially constructed) through language and discourse and cannot be conceptualized as merely individual phenomenal feelings. Discourse in this sense is conceived of not only in terms of (structural) semantics, but in a more comprehensive way, encompassing a range of non-linguistic phenomena such as attitudes, thoughts, and beliefs, all of which contribute to the formation of a feeling subject. In line with Foucault (1977), the language of discourse

is intimately tied to power and power relationships that determine and regulate who can speak, what can be spoken about, and who can be addressed. In Ahmed's (2004) view, discourse is the main arena in which the politics of these power relations are enacted. Language thus becomes the key intermediary between politics and emotions.

Discourse provides the very patterns of linguistic classification and categorization that render affect into emotion. Through this rendering, discourse not only provides deontic rules in the form of declarative knowledge – in particular, knowledge about emotions and their appropriateness – but also is a critical agent of subjectivation, i.e., of an audience's (collective) self-conception and self-understanding. Discourse in this view 'makes' the feeling and emoting subject and creates an emotion culture or emotional climate (de Rivera 1992). Concrete 'discursive renderings' and political strategies aimed at establishing these emotional frameworks have recently been analyzed by various authors. Mishra (2017) shows how hatred, *ressentiment*, and anger are crafted politically on a global scale. Furedi (2005) and Wodak (2015) illustrate how discursive strategies of eliciting fear in an audience are used to achieve political ends and to mobilize individuals into political action. George (2016) has investigated discursive renderings and political strategies related to religious injury. In his book (2016), George examines, at an international level, *hate spin dynamics* as political techniques that involve strategic use of offense-giving and offense-taking (George 2016: 5). He concludes that both the under- and over regulation of hate speech have detrimental societal consequences. The under-regulation of discourse involving hate speech and other forms of linguistic harm opens up countless possibilities for the injury of groups and individuals. On the other hand, an overregulation of such a discourse encourages the "manufacture of offendedness as a political weapon" (George 2016: 6).

Aside from these intentional political strategies aimed at attributing and eventually also evoking emotions in certain groups, Ural and Berg (2019) have investigated the more subtle, yet potent affective patterns of discourses on emotions, belonging, and religious minorities. Using media coverage following the *Charlie Hebdo* attacks in 2015 and the public debate that followed the publication of Michel Houellebecq's *Submission* shortly after, they trace the ways in which discourse establishes (and is part of) the affective relations between different social groups, in particular "the Muslims" and a contrarian "secular We". Although this discourse operates with references to emotions using a broad range of emotion words, its more meticulous workings are linked to the creation of antagonistic subject positions ("religious emotional" vs. "secular rational" subjects) and their consequences for subjectivation and, ultimately, for social life. Ural and Berg (2019) argue that after the *Charlie Hebdo* attacks, speakers in the discourse are keen to establish not only a specific we-ness in opposition to those committing the attack or empathizing with the attackers, but that this "we" becomes associated with a range of emotions, such as concern, fear, and vulnerability. Interestingly, this secular "we" and its emotions are intimately linked to the values of an open and liberal society and result, at least in part, from these values being questioned or coming under attack. Language here not only is the main arena for talk about emotions – for example, which emotions are adequate or inadequate to experience in view of the attacks – but language also constructs a shared symbolic, and ultimately social, reality in which social groups and categories become affectively related to one another.

In a similar vein, the debates surrounding the publication of Houellebecq's *Submission* include constructions of a 'We' that is portrayed as being prone to a variety of emotions, in particular fear, disgust, and fascination. Various commentators have accused Houellebecq for inciting fear of Islam within liberal democratic societies, and some have extended this reasoning to acknowledge that this is what 'our' societies stand for, i.e., the toleration of literary fictions of various kinds, even if they are playing with people's collective fears (Walther-Jochum, Berg, and Ural 2018). At the same time, fear of Islam is a constant point of reference throughout the literary criticism of *Submission*. Many commentators state that fear of Islam is in fact widespread in Western societies and not just simply a literary fiction. Walther-Jochum, Berg, and Ural (2018) argue that this proposition – the attribution of an emotion to a social collective – contributes to the construction of some 'secular We' that is construed in stark opposition to Muslim subjects.

3.2 Practices and the body

Existing approaches to emotion account for culture not only in terms of norms and values, but also in the unanimously presumed bodily nature of emotion. These bodily and physiological facets of emotion are not to be confused with a presumed "natural" or "biological" core of emotions. On the contrary, in recent years the sociology of the body has exhaustively described the complex interactions between body, culture, and society (Cregan 2006; Shilling 2016). For example, Luc Boltanski's term *somatic culture* (Boltanski 1976: 154; Meuser 2004: 207) highlights the bodily dimensions of culture as well as the cultural dimensions of the human body. Robert Gugutzer (2004: 68) points to the different forms and possibilities of socio-culturally *imprinting* bodies, with a view, for instance, to physical health, fitness, behavior, taste, or style. Pierre Bourdieu (1984) has described these forms as *physical capital* that is to be developed and accumulated in modern society. One could draw on Foucault and the concept of discourse to make a similar argument about a socio-cultural formation of the body. Here, as Foucault (1978) illustrates in his study on power and sexuality (Gugutzer 2004: 74–75), the focus would, however, be less on the notion of an accumulation of capital rather than on the discursive knowledge of the body. Thus, if emotions are associated in various ways with bodily feelings, as most theories assume, then they are also always cultural in the sense that bodies are constantly subjected to processes of cultural framing and configuration.

Looking at understandings of culture that are less concerned with the mental and the cognitive, but more geared towards social action, such as in practice theory, emotions can almost be understood as practices or at least as components of practices, as forcefully and convincingly argued by Scheer (2012). Following Reckwitz (2003: 289), practice theories conceive of collective forms of knowledge not as purely mental or cognitive *contents* of some sort as "knowledge about" or "codes within" discourse or communications. Instead, they emphasize forms of practical and tacit knowledge and understanding that are inscribed in actors' bodies, bringing about corresponding – and often non-reflexive – habitual behaviors. According to Schatzki (1996: 89), practices can also be understood as *conglomerates* of speech and action. Given such insights into practices, it seems reasonable to

also consider emotions as components of these conglomerates. In most instances, routines of speech and action are accompanied by routines of feeling and sensing, as in the practice of visiting a stadium or attending a concert or participating in a protest march. Moreover, it is not just routines of feeling and sensing, but, as it were, *emotional practices* (Scheer 2012), which include all the components of emotions like feelings, expressions, or bodily symptoms.

If one accepts the conjecture that emotions are intimately tied to bodies, that bodies and bodily behaviors are not merely “natural” biological entities, but substantially contingent on culture and society, then it follows that emotions are likewise constituted culturally. Bodily practices – tacit ways of doing and saying in specific contexts – such as those involved in dancing, childrearing, courtship, schooling, fitness, apparel, or the workplace, are essential vehicles for how emotions are attuned to a dominant culture. Practices, much like social norms and values, do not exist in a social vacuum, but are by definition socially shared amongst a number of social actors. To fully comprehend the social and cultural nature of emotions, we therefore also have to come to an understanding of the principles of social sharing and the consequences of this sharing for emotions. How is the sharing of norms and values facilitated by language? Who shares common values? For whom is a social norm a valid code of conduct and for whom is it not? Who engages in the same bodily practices and whose practices differ significantly? The following section attends to these questions and also elucidates the potential consequences of sharing for emotions.

4 Collectivity and identity

Although various approaches to emotion frequently capitalize on the role of culture in emotion, they only rarely attend to the social-relational scope of this role and thus to the collective aspects of emotion that are integral to their understanding as culturally constituted. Although a substantial number of inquiries has looked into the sociality and collectivity of emotion from a social structural and social functional perspective (Collins 2004; von Scheve 2009), these studies often tend to neglect the cultural scope to which different forms of collectivity revert. On the one hand, social structural accounts focus on the analysis of patterns and regularities in emotional experience across individuals who, for example, share a common social background, live in the same neighborhood, city, or county, or are members of the same social group or community. On the other hand, functional accounts capitalize on the consequences of emotions for group cohesion, social solidarity, conflict within and between groups, and the reproduction of social and political boundaries. This section aims at further elaborating some of these principles of social differentiation and at elucidating how they relate to and emerge from culture and what their repercussions are for the generation of emotion.

4.1 Social positioning and linguistic categorization

A range of sociological and social psychological studies have documented systematic differences in the emotional experiences of people who differ in terms of their social status

(Rackow, Schupp, and von Scheve 2012), of whether they are employed or unemployed (von Scheve, Esche, and Schupp 2017), or whether they have an immigrant background or belong to the native population (De Leersnyder, Mesquita, and Kim 2011). Also, individuals from Eastern and Western cultures have been shown to differ in terms of their emotional experiences and in the ways they express and communicate emotions (Mesquita and Leu 2007; Tamir et al. 2016). Moreover, an array of studies has pointed out differences in emotional experience that related to the social and linguistic categories associated with these differences, such as gender (Simon and Nath 2004) or age (Mather and Pondzio 2016). All of these studies more or less explicitly assume that social positioning, cultural background, and social classifications become affectively meaningful because they are tied to linguistic terms and categories and are symbolically ordered and valued, all of which bring about differences in how individuals see and appraise the world, in the values and norms they adhere to, and in the social practices into which they are socialized. Within cognitive sociology and the sociology of knowledge, these social formations have also been referred to as *thought communities* that exhibit comparable cognitive structures, language uses, and stocks of knowledge (Bernstein 1974; Brekhus 2015; Zerubavel 1999). Culture in emotion is thus tied to certain characteristics, resources or social positions that actors share or do not share. This kind of cultural and linguistic “proximity” is supposed to bring about similarities in people’s emotional responding in a rather aggregate sense, where the actual “sharing” of emotion (Salmela 2012) is not particularly distinct. Research on this sort of cultural differences rarely makes assumptions about the phenomenological consequences of cultural proximity that is rooted in, for instance, social category membership or a common social background. Moreover, criteria like category membership or social positioning are usually taken as indirect evidence of emotionally relevant cultural differences and thus of emotional experience. In favor of this assumption, social, spatial, and historical contexts certainly give rise to similarities and differences in how people engage with the world and derive meaning and significance from this engagement. As Göller (2015) points out, culture is always dependent on these inter-subjective and collective forms of meaning making and expression.

This perspective gives rise to questions about the (symbolic) limits and boundaries within which collective patterns of meaning making – as a hallmark of culture – and emotions coalesce. These boundaries are easier or more difficult to pin down depending on the social categories and positions we are interested in. We might be tempted, for example, to take gender as a social category that can be identified with reasonable effort to investigate gender differences in emotion, based on gender-specific roles and stereotypes. However, as Shields (2013) argues from an intersectional perspective on the relationship between gender and emotion, such a categorization is fraught with pitfalls because not only social categories but also social positions and cultural backgrounds frequently overlap. Another critical example are nation-state and geographical enclosures of culture, especially in times of globalization and transnationalization.

4.2 Self and identity

Social categories and positions such as class, age, gender, or ethnicity usually do go hand in hand with culturally and discursively charged processes of *self*-categorization, which

are characterized by reflexivity and are essential for social identity (Tajfel 1978). This also gives rise to a significant change in perspectives on the links between culture and emotion, which not only refers to an aggregate form of feeling, but (also) has important phenomenological consequences. For example, one can be personally irritated – like many others – by inappropriate treatment at work, or one can be irritated *as a woman* and *in relation to* all women who are discriminated against in the workplace. One can also – like many other German citizens – look forward to an impending tax cut, or I can be happy *as*, say, a Portuguese, *along with* my other compatriots, about winning the 2016 football World Cup. These categorizations are not only cognitive operations taking place in isolated individuals, but they are conferred through linguistic choices in social interactions, signaling identity and belonging; in institutions, signaling power relations and coalitions; and in public discourse, constructing otherness and exclusion as well as solidarity and commonality.

Both varieties of emotion require comparable cognitive appraisal processes which, in each of the above-mentioned cases, are flanked by salient self-categorizations and social identities. These, in some ways, also presuppose that shared and intersubjective patterns of meaning making are reflexively accessible to individuals as existing or to be established social facts. The culture of emotion here lies not only in common goals, values, and patterns of meaning making, but also in the social collective that is the intentional object of the emotion. Discourse and social practices accentuate social difference and distinctiveness in terms of norms, values, and beliefs, but also with regard to specific types of feeling, which are at the same time constitutive for a social collective.

Examples of this include, for instance, analyses of the emotion of guilt as an identity-constituting emotion of Germans, as Bernhard Giesen (2004) proposed. Even resentment and emotions like anger and rage arising in certain social situations in light of social change can be discursively channeled, normalized, and correspondingly exploited for the development of a collective identity, as Salmela and von Scheve (2017) have shown for right-wing populist parties. Each of these examples is distinguished by a variety of interactions between the cultural foundations of emotions and the construction of collective identities (Owens, Robinson, and Smith-Lovin 2010). Collective identities usually denote those varieties of identity which have a strong *we*-component as regards feelings of belonging and solidarity. Such affiliations are based not just on linguistically represented collective memories, traditions, or rituals (Assmann 1988), but also largely on the shared feelings that are linked to these practices.

4.3 Groups and communities

A more fully developed understanding of the collective cultural dimension of emotion stems from the analysis of group-related emotions and their social consequences. Here, I will mainly focus on approaches dealing with existing (or emergent) collectives like groups and communities which can therefore presuppose existing social structures and symbolic orders in the analysis of emotion. These studies, by and large, consider groups as self-reflexive and identity-relevant collectives whose members can experience emotions *in relation to* and *along with* these collectives. A basic requirement for this type of emotion is a

person's (situationally contingent) self-categorization as a member of a (real or imaginary) social category or group, as illustrated above. At the same time, however, the basic principles of social interaction amongst group members become critical to understanding how certain cultural practices impinge on emotion and how emotion in turn affects the cultural underpinnings of social collectives.

Since Emile Durkheim (1912), sociologists have paid close attention to the ritual nature of social interaction. Durkheim had studied rituals of Australian aborigines, whose performances regularly exhibited euphoric and emotional states of arousal or what Durkheim called *collective effervescence*. Later, Collins (2004) introduced the concept of *emotional entrainment* to describe this phenomenon – a kind of collectively experienced emotion, which sets in due to a shared focus of attention and the synchronization of bodily activities. Durkheim already recognized the essential role that culture played with regard to shared values and beliefs, as well as the performative and hierarchical structure of rituals (von Scheve 2012). They charge ritual acts with intersubjective meaning and, by proscribing ritual behavior, facilitate the shared focus of attention and the synchronization of bodily activities. This, then, results in collective effervescence and processes of emotional contagion (Hatfield, Carpenter, and Rapson 2014). Here, the possibility of social interaction in bodily co-presence is a necessary precondition (at least for Durkheim), for this is the only way to ensure the embodied nature of effervescence. The practical dimension of culture as embodied action – as in repertoires, choreographies, performances, etc. – is thus a key component of this perspective on culture and emotion. More recent studies, however, also assume that mediated interaction is sufficient to generate this type of collective emotionality (Konijn and ten Holt 2011).

Looking at the consequences of collectively enacted emotions, studies in the Durkheimian tradition argue that the experience of emotions in ritual contexts contributes to the creation or strengthening of collective identity. They hypothesize that the emotions experienced in ritual contexts 'affectively charge' existing values and beliefs that are constitutive of a group or community, thereby promoting the emotional basis of collective identity (von Scheve et al. 2014, 2017; Páez et al. 2015). Comparable arguments on the close links between culture, emotion, and identity have been developed by scholars of group-based and intergroup emotions (Smith and Mackie 2015). Emotions that are experienced with reference to one's social identity and in relation to or on behalf of a group may, first, be directed at other groups and thus convey the perception of cultural differences and boundaries that exist between groups. At the same time, studies suggest that group-based emotions play a major role in propelling social conflict, since they contribute to the revitalization of collective identity and the emergence of belonging and solidarity as well as demarcation and exclusion. This is because of the specific phenomenological qualities of group-based or *we*-feelings (Krueger 2015; Salmela 2016), which do not necessarily require a substantive group structure, but nonetheless become more likely because of it and can evolve into a constitutive feature of groups.

Although these studies typically refer to groups that already exist, one can argue that coordinated actions and behaviors focused on the emergence of (collective) emotions in masses and gatherings are essential to the formation of groups and collective identities in the first place. This is consistent with the classical sociological understanding of collective

behavior of the Chicago School (Blumer 1951), which has primarily dealt with spontaneous, public and extraordinary formations of the social. On the one hand, these writings emphasize the otherness, normlessness, and deviance of collective behavior, as for instance in protests, marches, demonstrations or mobs; on the other, they are concerned with emerging norms and practices in these contexts (see Smelser 1962).

Research on social movements, in particular, shows just how important emotions are for such social *tipping points* between established and new symbolic orders. A number of reviews summarizes the different modes of action by means of which emotions can promote the formation of groups and communities and collective identities. Jeff Goodwin and James Jasper (2006) describe emotions as the *raw materials* of the gravitational pull and recruitment potential of social movements and as essential inducements for joining movements. In the context of social movements, the emotions at issue are mainly those that arise with respect to established norms and morals, either because these norms and values are considered illegitimate or inadequate, as in the case of gender and sexuality norms in the 1960s, or because valued norms and practices are considered to have been violated or threatened, as in the case of the *Occupy* protests (Mizen 2015). Social movements often use such “raw” affects or emotions to transform them into political convictions and actions, which then contribute to cultural and political change (Goodwin and Jasper 2006: 620). Moreover, and entirely consistent with Durkheim’s ideas, emotions play an important role in the internal dynamics of social movements, particularly with regard to issues of solidarity, belonging, cohesion, and identity (Polletta and Jasper 2001).

5 Summary

In recent decades, emotion research in different disciplines has highlighted the various entanglements between culture and emotion, both theoretically and empirically. Distinguishing emotions from related concepts of feeling and affect, this chapter has argued that language and culture are indeed constitutive for emotions, understood as intentionally directed affective stances towards some object or entity which are categorized using linguistic labels and prototypical constellations of objects, situations, and affective stances.

The chapter has argued, first, that language is not only relevant for the linguistic categorization and lexical labeling of specific affective states, but also occupies an essential role in the generation of emotions, in particular when emotions are rooted in values, beliefs, and social norms. Based on this rationale, an essential approach to understanding the social and cultural dimension of emotion is comparative, looking at differences in the experience and expression of emotions between individuals and groups who are assumed to hold distinct values and norms, engage in different language-based socialization practices, and constitute different language communities. The chapter has further shown that language in emotion is also important in an embodied sense, in particular with respect to the performativity, manifestation, and enacting of emotions. Referring to practice theories and the sociology of the body, it has also been shown that bodies are neither simply “natural” nor “biological” entities, but subject to various processes of cultural incorporation,

significantly facilitated through language and discourse, that also shape and contour human emotion.

Second, this chapter has elaborated on the social relational dimension of culture and how it contributes to the constitution of emotions. Culture is supposed to go hand in hand with different social positions and linguistic categorizations as *bearers* of culture, such as class, age or gender. In this sense, emotions can collectively be attributed to these positions and categories in a purely aggregate sense, pointing out differences in people's emotional responding across these categories. Furthermore, such categories and positions are related to processes of self-categorization and social identity as well as to prevailing power relations, all of which affect the phenomenological aspects of emotion, for example through patterns of linguistic choice, discursive practices or social differences in language use. Feeling *on behalf of* or *in relation to* a social group reflects the culturally established meanings and characteristics of as well as the relations between groups and individuals. Finally, research in the tradition of Emile Durkheim points at the mutual linkages between culture and emotion. In particular, when group members gather in physical proximity and/or engage in (mediated) ritual practices, they experience collective emotional entrainment which in turn is supposed to reinforce the group's values and beliefs.

Extending these more established and recent developments in research on emotion, many current endeavors increasingly center on the body and the corporeality of emotions, not least with the aim of developing adequate methods to describe or measure this essential aspect of emotions. Also, there is an increasing interest in including measures of emotion into large-scale surveys to address cross-culturally comparative questions and issues related to differences in social class. Finally, the sociology of emotion has also shown a keen interest in affect studies, as it is prominent in the field of cultural studies, to explore how affect as a more basic and relational category compared to emotion is contoured by language and culture.

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86 Hurtful words and hate speech

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Abstract: This chapter addresses speakers' uses of emotionally hurtful words and their victims' emotional responses to hurtful words in American English. Hurtful words are defined here as negatively valenced or *bad* words used to express one's feelings and convey those feelings to others. Topics include anger and frustration, hate speech, obscene telephone calls, workplace sexual harassment, verbal abuse, internet and online offenses, and research involving children as speaker-victims. Research cited here is drawn primarily from psychological and social science empirical studies on the topic of how people produce and comprehend offensive speech. The chapter includes an examination of ethical and methodological problems associated with hurtful word research and concludes with suggestions for conducting meaningful research on hurtful words.

1 Introduction

Competent speakers of English would agree that a single offensive word, for example *ass*, can be used to create humor, or to cajole, ridicule, harass or abuse those who hear it. How a word such as *ass* is understood depends entirely on its context (Jay 1992, 2000, 2003). This chapter examines those contexts in which words may hurt their victims, while also recognizing that offensive words have many other uses that are not hurtful. The terms "hurt" and "harm" are used as synonyms here. Research has demonstrated that most uses of taboo, offensive or vulgar expressions in public are not hurtful and do not lead to negative consequences such as physical aggression (see Jay and Jay 2013, 2015). Hurtful words as used here are defined as emotionally arousing, negatively valenced (*bad*) words used to express emotions and convey feelings to others. The category of offensive words have been referred to as swearwords, taboo words, curse words, vulgarity, profanity, obscenity, name

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calling, slurs, and scatology (Jay 1992, 2000, 2009b). The category of hurtful words comprises this broad category of offensive speech that mainly draws on angry outbursts, names, insults, slurs, put downs, and comments of a sexual nature directed toward listeners with the purpose of affecting them. Consider that words can be offensive (e.g., *puke* or *piss*) without being hurtful. Hurtful words are unique and they contrast with non-hurtful words because hurtful words are more emotionally arousing and more negatively valenced than non-hurtful words. Hearing hurtful words feels more like experiencing a physiological or bodily reaction than hearing non-hurtful words. Hurtful words have been characterized as *insults* to the person, as if the words physically hurt the body in a manner that non-hurtful words do not, although non-hurtful words can be offensive and insulting too. Research shows that due to their emotionally arousing properties, hurtful words are remembered better than non-hurtful words, which adds to their lasting impact (Jay, Caldwell-Harris, and King 2008).

Of central interest here is how victims react to hurtful words and why speakers say hurtful words in the first place. Keep in mind that the use of hurtful words is a two-way street: one avenue involves the emotional conditions which cause speakers to choose to say hurtful words; the other avenue involves emotional reactions of listeners who hear those words. This is important because some speakers use words that are not meant to be hurtful and some listeners may feel offended when they were not meant to be. Some speakers are not aware of how offensive a particular word might be to others, and some listeners have lower thresholds for being offended than others (Jay and Jay 2013; Jay 1992).

2 Venting anger and frustration emotions

Anger is the most common link to offensive word use (Jay 1992). Emotional hurtful word use has been most closely associated with the expression of anger and frustration but not in the way readers might think (Jay 2000). The expression of anger or frustration is more complicated than a knee-jerk type reaction. Think of anger as a goal-directed or strategic behavior rather than as a reflex. To support the goal-directed explanation, Averill (1983) surveyed people about their experiences with anger and the functions that anger fulfilled for them. Averill found that when people become angry they do not immediately become aggressive; instead they first try to engage in some non-aggressive or calming behavior. When people do become aggressive, most of the time they engage in some form of verbal expression but they do not automatically turn to physical aggression. In Averill's view it is clear that before they physically lash out, speakers express anger or frustration with comments that sometimes include hurtful words. Ultimately, swearing in anger is a complex, multi-stage emotional process, not a simple ballistic act. Swearing usually unfolds first with a provocation that creates the level of anger or frustration; this is followed by an attempt at inhibition, as Averill found. Next, there is disinhibition that results in swearing, followed by the final stage of retribution or getting even (see Jay 1992, 2000). Hurtful words are not necessarily ballistic responses but are the product of a quick assessment of the context that gives rise to them.

As just suggested, when people become angry and frustrated, they vent their feelings toward other people. Angry and frustrated speakers vent their emotions toward themselves and others in the form of name calling, insults, and slurs that are used to debase the victims of venom. Native English speakers learn these forms of offensive insulting early on. Name calling, insulting and abusive language with hurtful words occur early in children's verbal repertoire, as has been detailed previously (Jay and Jay 2013, 2015; Jay 1992, 2000). Children's insulting language reflects a simple view of others (*ass, chicken, stupid*) when compared to adults' insults, which reflect a deeper social and psychological awareness of others (*sexist pig, damned Nazi*). Offensive sexist slang terms (*cunt, dick, fag, dyke*) are used to describe out-group members with the intent of insulting them; these kinds of insulting slang terms for outsiders or non-conformists develop in all variety of social communities.

Research (Jay 1992, 2000, 2009b) indicates that roughly two-thirds of the uses of offensive words in public are the result of anger/frustration. These data regarding anger as a primary motive for swearing have been confirmed in a variety of settings: public recordings of children in summer camps or at schools, adults in public places, in educational settings, in nursing homes, and in mental health facilities. These data make it clear that the primary motive for speakers' use of offensive words is because they are angry or frustrated.

3 Emotional reactions to hurtful words

Knowing that most uses of offensive words are due to anger, a logical follow up question asks how people evaluate and react to offensive words. A long line of research has demonstrated that adults can make accurate judgments regarding the relative offensiveness of a list of hurtful words (Bergen 2016; Jay 1992). Native speakers through experience have learned that some words are more offensive than others; this perception allows us to compare one word to another on the basis of relative offensiveness or to generate numerical word ratings on the basis of offensiveness. Non-native speakers relative to native speakers have been found to have muted reactivity to offensive words in non-native languages (see Allan 2018; Dewaele 2010; Fägersten and Stapleton 2017).

People feel different levels of harm when they are victims of offensive words. In a 1972 study (see Jay 1992) participants were asked to rate words based on how offensive they were to "a significant part of the population" on a 1 (not obscene at all) to 9 (most obscene word imaginable) scale. The framing of the task is critical; here it was meant to tap general attitudes toward hurtful words, not college students' personal attitudes. The top 10 ratings from highest to lowest were: *motherfucker, cocksucker, fuck, pussy, cunt, prick, cock, bastard, son of a bitch, and asshole*. Jay (1992) also reported offensiveness ratings from a 1978 study where participants were asked to rate a set of hurtful and non-hurtful words on a 1 (not offensive at all) to 9 (most offensive imaginable) scale. The top 10 offensive words from highest to lowest were: *motherfucker, cunt, cocksucker, cockteaser, fuck, blowjob, douchebag, cock, pussy, and prick*. The statistical correlation between the 1972 and 1978 ratings was quite strong ($r = .92$) indicating considerable consistency in the perception of hurtful words in terms of their offensiveness. It is assumed that the more offensive a word is, the more hurtful it can be.

A more recent set of ratings of word offensiveness was reported by Janschewitz (2008). Janschewitz measured a word's inappropriateness in two ways: one from the point of view of the rater in terms of offensiveness, and a second in terms of how the rater perceived the tabooeness of the word to society at large. The separation of these two evaluations of offensiveness is crucial because the semantic or emotional properties of a word differ from the personal reaction of the participant (Jay 1992). Separating judgments based on *personal* offensiveness versus those based on *social* tabooeness is essential. Some people acted as if they were not offended by anything and these types of reactions belie their judgments of words' offensiveness to the general public (hurtfulness).

Janschewitz asked participants to provide 1 to 9 judgments of offensiveness and found that hurtful words were rated as more offensive than non-hurtful words in the study, as expected. Participants also provided tabooeness ratings ($M = 4.83$) that were higher overall than the personal offensiveness ratings ($M = 2.77$). These data indicated that word offensiveness has dimensions based on both personal reactions as well as on society at large and that hurtful words are judged as more offensive to the general public than they are judged to be offensive to the college student participants in the study. The top 10 hurtful words in terms of personal offensiveness from highest to lowest were: *nigger, cunt, fag, cocksucker, chink, motherfucker, buttfuck, bitch, retard, and whore*. The top 10 words in terms of public tabooeness from highest to lowest were: *nigger, buttfuck, motherfucker, cocksucker, fuck, cunt, fag, chink, blowjob, and pussy*.

Offensiveness ratings spanning decades reveal the consistent effects of sexist and racist semantics on hurtful words' negative interpretations. The emotional aspects of individual offensive words, as indicated by participants' ability to rank order words, are part of the word's meaning, as each word has an emotional "tag" representing its hurtfulness (Jay 2009b). These emotional tags are used by speakers in the speech production process in order to make decisions regarding whether to offend or not offend listeners. Word rating data indicate that all hurtful words are not equally offensive or hurtful. The judgment of word differences in hurtfulness has been incorporated into mass media broadcast standards, legal decisions, conduct codes for schools, and for language standards at work (Jay 2009a).

4 Hate speech

A contemporary social and legal problem involves speakers who use hate speech to negatively affect their victims (Butler 1997; Jay 2009a). Hate speech is bias-motivated speech directed to a person identified as a member of a historically victimized group based on his/her gender, sexual orientation, race, ethnicity, religion, national origin, or disability. Generally, bias-motivated *speech* falls under First Amendment protection since expressing a prejudice is not illegal. Similar to the problem of sexual harassment, hate speech is protected until it rises to the level of a threat.

Butler (1997) suggested that an instance of hate speech is not a single act that can be decontextualized. Hate speech is a citation, a performative, involving the repetition of what has transpired historically with a particular hurtful word or phrase. The repetition calls up

the past uses of a racist or sexist comment but also evokes non-hurtful alternatives or “counter speech”. A central idea for Butler is the notion that hate speech is constructed by the state, that is, institutions of power (e.g., courts of law) that can define hate speech. The state has the power to define what is and is not hate speech and can punish those who cross the line.

A common feature of hate speech and harassment situations is that victims feel threatened by their victimizers’ speech (Jay 2009a). The US Supreme Court case *Virginia v. Black* (2003) established that speech with the intent to intimidate (e.g., cross burning) may not be protected under the First Amendment and may constitute a bias-motivated *crime*. Bias-motivated or hate crimes are prohibited by criminal law and warrant more severe penalties compared to crimes that are not bias motivated. The US Supreme Court in the case of *Wisconsin v. Mitchell* (1993) upheld a statute providing for enhanced punishment when the defendant committed a crime – here it was assault – and intentionally selected the victim because of his group status. The racial slur can be used as evidence of that choice. The defendant is not charged based on saying the slur alone, but because the defendant uttered the slur when committing assault. The defendant may be charged with committing a bias-motivated attack and his or her speech may lead to additional penalties or additional charges, depending on the jurisdiction. The use of a slur would not always mean that the victim was chosen on the basis of race.

A key factor relevant to determining whether bias-motivated speech is constitutionally protected language, or subject to criminal penalties, is whether the utterance is a general comment about minorities or a targeted, personal threat directed toward the victim. Casual bias-based speech, for example, “I hate queers”, which is not directed at a specific individual, would be protected. Harm arises if a speaker directly targets a member of a protected group; for example, “I’m going to bust your head, you fucking queer”, as the intention expressed is a threat, signaling imminent harm. The general-versus-specific dichotomy is traced to the “fighting words” doctrine which, as established in the US Supreme Court case *Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire* (1942), where it was judged that fighting words provoked the victim to imminent violence and were addressed to an individual, not a group of people (see Butler 1997; Friedlieb 2005).

The kind of hate speech that draws on ethnic, gender, and racial slurs (*kike*, *faggot*, *nigger*) serves the purpose of insulting people based on their perceived group membership. The growing literature on slurs (see Croom 2014) has suggested that slurs represent the most offensive forms of derogatory linguistic expressions used to insult people. Slurs are often considered to be a form of hate speech or *microaggressions* or *microassaults* (Lilienfeld 2017). The use of slurs in social contexts does not occur randomly but instead slurs are used systematically, depending on the features of the victims they abuse. Slurs are particularly offensive because they focus on aspects of targets that are not changeable, such as their sex, race or ethnicity. Other forms of insults may not rely on ethnic, racial or gender references, but these uses are responses to temporary conditions or behaviors such as calling someone an “asshole” for crowding in line or calling someone an “idiot” for behaving recklessly. The use of any offensive word is not universally hurtful. How insulting words are interpreted depends on the speaker-listener relationship in a context. In the final analysis there are no words or phrases that are universally insulting or hurtful, as even

words perceived as offensive such as *nigger* or *cunt* can be used affectionately under the right circumstances (Jay 2009a).

What are the emotional consequences of hurtful speech? How do we know words hurt their victims? Harms experienced by victims of hateful speech, as outlined by Matsuda et al. (1993) and later by Sullaway (2004), include psychological and physiological symptoms similar to the symptoms of posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD): panic, fear, anxiety, sleep disturbance, nightmares, intrusive thoughts of intimidation and denigration. The experience of harm may be exacerbated if a victim's friends or subordinates witness the incident (Matsuda et al. 1993; Neu 2008; Sullaway 2004). Secondary harm to the victim's community (e.g., racial or ethnic group) may also occur. Publicized incidents of hate speech or bias-motivated crimes can have a rippling effect on those people who identify with the victim, and become secondary victims.

Historically, claims of emotional and psychological distress in reaction to hateful speech have been regarded as credible injuries based on the specific circumstances of each individual case (see Neu 2008). Research indicated that the victims of hate crimes are more severely traumatized, and their trauma lasts longer than victims of comparably violent non-hate-motivated crimes (Sullaway 2004). Researchers should be sensitive to the problems associated with conducting empirical research using hateful speech. On ethical grounds, psychological research does not permit researchers to construct empirical research to test the harm thesis for hate by exposing one group to hate speech and comparing its reaction to a control group that has not been victimized. However, on the basis of archival demographic data, there is some evidence that suicide rates for ethnic immigrant groups in the United States can be predicted by the degree of negativity of hate speech that was directed toward them (Mullen and Smyth 2004).

5 Obscene telephone calls

Another context for hurtful speech resides in the phenomenon of obscene telephone calls. Obscene telephone calls, which are illegal, represent another form of verbal harassment directed mainly toward women, as research shows. As an example, Massachusetts General Law Ch. 269 § 14A defines an obscene telephone call as a misdemeanor. To meet this criterion, the caller must make at least three calls to the victim or their family, and the person's language has to be either indecent or obscene, or the person's sole purpose was to harass or molest the victim. Whoever telephones and uses indecent or obscene language can be punished by a fine of not more than \$ 500 or by imprisonment for not more than three months, or both, according to the Massachusetts law.

The obscene telephone call is primarily a form of male-to-female harassment, and its impact depends on situational variables at the time of the call. Women report that obscene telephone calls are most troubling when experienced alone and in the middle of the night. When other people are nearby or during the daytime, the impact of obscene telephone calls is lessened. Research on women as victims of obscene telephone calls demonstrates that the experience is common and memorable, resulting in short-term consequences that include self-reported feelings of shock, fear, shame, and panic. Women commonly reported

persistent feelings of anger, disgust, and lingering fears. In the future it would be more informative if women's feelings could be corroborated with objective measures of harm, such as psychological or physiological symptoms documented by a physician or psychiatrist. It would also be helpful to know exactly what offensive words were used during obscene telephone calls, as threats are very different in content than is sexually themed speech.

Research on obscene telephone calls is not as extensive as one might think. More research exists on the nature of obscene telephone *callers* than research on the emotional effects of obscene telephone calls on their victims. Unless recorded in the act, the caller victimizes the listener, who later can report the incident to the phone company or police. Most women do not report obscene telephone calls because complaints produce minimal cooperation from the police and phone company. Nonetheless, the victims are left with the memories of the calls, which produce fear, anger, and annoyance, which might constitute hurt (see Smith and Morra 1994).

There exists a body of empirical research regarding the impact of obscene telephone calls on women (e.g., Rounds 1996; Sheffield 1989; Smith and Morra 1994). Sheffield (1989) used a self-report procedure to record descriptive data from 58 women's experiences with obscene telephone calls. Sheffield's respondents reported feeling anger, fear, disgust, and degradation in reaction to the calls. Smith and Morra (1994) interviewed 1,990 Canadian women and found that two-thirds of the victims reported receiving at least one sexual or threatening phone call. The calls were mainly from men whom they did not know. Three out of four women indicated that they experienced some degree of fear, ranging from uneasiness to terror.

In contrast to what is known about how women react to obscene telephone calls, little is known about how obscene telephone calls affect children, although studies point to debilitating effects depending on the degree to which the child participates in the conversation. Larsen, Leth, and Maher (2000) studied a sample of Danish children who had received obscene telephone calls from a single adult offender. All children experienced verbal abuse from the same caller, and none had a previous record of abuse from other sources. The caller threatened to bring the children to the police station, do a body search, or kill their mothers if they did not comply with his requests to undress and perform sexual acts such as touching and penetrating their own genitals while he was masturbating. Most of the children suffered psychological consequences from his calls. The children who obeyed the man's commands (58 % of the girls and 31 % of the boys) experienced more serious consequences than children who did not comply. Obedient children scored significantly higher than non-obedient children on the Posttraumatic Stress Reaction Index. The most common symptoms, similar to PTSD, were bad memories, intrusive thoughts, fear of being alone, and fear of being contacted again.

Larsen et al. (2000) provided evidence of the negative psychological consequences from obscene telephone calls to children. Almost all of the children evidenced psychological stress symptoms; however, children's memories of obscene telephone calls may be in doubt. One difficulty with studying children's perceptions of and reactions to hurtful speech is that children's memories of abuse are not accurate (see Bidrose and Goodman 2000; Leander, Christianson, and Granhag 2008; Leander, Granhag, and Christianson

2005). For example, Leander et al. (2005) examined reports of 8- to 16-year-olds' memories of obscene telephone calls. The investigators were able to match children's accounts of these incidents with police recordings of statements made by the caller regarding his phone calls. All children remembered the phone calls, but they omitted almost all of the sexual and sensitive material (what the caller said); and they omitted about 70 % of the neutral material about the obscene telephone call. Leander et al. (2005) suggested that the children may have remembered the sexual materials but that they chose not to disclose it within the interview situation because of shame or embarrassment. One is left with the conclusion that more research needs to be conducted to determine the factors that contribute to children's memories for hurtful sexual and threatening language. One noteworthy advantage of the research on obscene telephone calls for children, relative to adult research reported here, is that children's interviews could be compared with the caller's confessions of his obscene telephone calls, corroborating the accuracy of both interviews.

6 Workplace sexual harassment

Another hurtful speech situation involves sexual harassment (Keyton and Menzie 2007). Sexual harassment laws have been evolving since the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission defined harassment in the 1980s. Gender-related insults and racial epithets that result in denying citizens their civil rights are legally actionable under both federal and state statutes. Title VII of the US Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits employment discrimination based on race, color, religion, gender, or national origin. Title IX of the Education Amendments Act of 1972 also makes it illegal to discriminate based on gender in educational settings. Judgments about speech being hurtful to women, children, or minorities depend on the nature of an abusive environment, as well as the hurtful words used. Verbal sexual harassment has been defined as unwanted humor of a sexual nature, references to someone's sexual behavior, body, or clothing; or it can be based on pervasive offensive sexual comments. The mere utterance of a swearword, however, does not meet the conditions of sexual harassment, nor is speech that is not severe or pervasive enough to create an objectively hostile or abusive work environment according to a reasonable or average person standard.

Whether an environment is hostile or abusive has to be determined by considering all the contextual circumstances. One has to judge whether the words are physically threatening or humiliating and not just offensive words. It also is important to determine whether the speech interferes with the person's work performance. A worker's psychological well-being also can be used to demonstrate that the work environment was abusive; however, no single factor is necessary to determine whether sexual harassment has occurred.

The landmark case in the development of US sexual harassment law was *Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc.* (1993). Teresa Harris worked at an equipment rental company, Forklift Systems, where Mr. Charles Hardy was Forklift's president. Court testimony showed that throughout Harris's occupation at Forklift, Mr. Hardy frequently insulted and made her the victim of unwanted sexual comments because she was a woman. Hardy told Harris several times, in the presence of other workers, "You're a woman, what do you know" and "We

need a man as the rental manager". Hardy called her "a dumb ass woman" in front of other workers and suggested that the two of them could "go to the Holiday Inn to negotiate [Harris's] raise". Hardy asked Harris and other female workers to get coins from his front trouser pocket. He also made sexual innuendos about Harris's and other women's clothing.

When Harris complained to Mr. Hardy about his conduct, he said he was surprised that she was offended, claimed he was only joking with her, and apologized. Hardy promised he would stop but later began again. Once when Harris was working with a Forklift customer, Hardy asked her, again in front of other employees, "What did you do, promise the guy [...] some [sex] Saturday night?" after which Harris collected her pay and left Forklift. Harris then sued Forklift, claiming that Hardy's conduct had created an abusive work environment for her because she was a woman. The US Supreme Court ruled that it was not necessary to prove that the work environment caused serious psychological harm to demonstrate harassment.

Comments that are merely offensive do not constitute harassment. For example, in *Lyle v. Warner Brothers Television Productions* (2006), a case from California, Ms. Amaani Lyle was working as a writers' assistant for the sexually permissive American television series *Friends*. Lyle claimed that she was subjected to sexually coarse language, sexual jokes, vulgar language, and conduct as the show writers talked about their own sexual behaviors and used offensive language in the course of creating content for the *Friends* shows. The California Supreme Court held, however, that the plaintiff failed to establish a sexually objectionable work environment that was sufficiently severe or pervasive to support the sexual harassment claim. US Federal courts have held that sexually offensive phrases, for example, *fuck me* or *kiss my ass*, are commonplace in some workplace contexts and these kinds of comments do not constitute unlawful harassment by employees.

7 Verbal abuse

From the onset it must be made clear that the body of verbal abuse research suffers from a difficulty in defining exactly what constitutes verbal abuse (O'Leary 1999; Vissing et al. 1991). In order to operationally define *abuse*, Straus (1979) developed the Conflict Tactics Scale to measure family verbal aggression. Participants have to estimate the number of times per year that they have done the following: insulted/swore at someone, sulked/re-fused to talk to someone, stomped out of a room/house/yard, did or said something in spite, threatened to hit or throw, and threw or smashed something. Unfortunately the conflict tactics scale does not separate acts of insulting someone from acts of using offensive words in conversations that are not hurtful, and it provides no estimate for how frequently people use offensive words conversationally, that is, when the use of offensive language was not an abusive problem. Uttering swearwords conversationally, not abusively, is never measured or isolated from its hurtful counterpart in verbal abuse research, implying that all forms of swearing are abusive. Furthermore, throwing an object is a symbolic form of aggression, but it is not *verbal* aggression.

It is a common practice in abuse research to administer the conflict tactics scale to parents and then correlate conflict tactics scale scores with other dependent variables, such

as parents' estimates of their children's problems. For example, Vissing et al. (1991) administered the conflict tactics scale to parents and obtained data regarding their children's physical aggression and psychosocial problems (delinquency, interpersonal problems). They found that two-thirds of the parents reported one or more instances of verbal aggression per year, and the average was 13 instances per year. Vissing and colleagues reported that children who experienced frequent acts of verbal aggression exhibited higher rates of problems, but their findings are open to question. Results are correlations between the parents' estimates of verbal aggression and the parents' estimates of children's problems. Relationships are not reported between the parents' aggression and external criteria, such as problems at school or victim-based interviews, as are reported in obscene telephone call research. These external problem criteria would provide a validity check on the parents' estimates. The authors noted that although they found a significant relationship between the parents' use of verbal aggression and psychological problems with children, they could not tell which component was the cause and which was the effect (Vissing et al. 1991: 235). It remains problematic that verbal abuse research relying on conflict tactics scale and solely on parents' subjective estimates is questionable, and such research does not provide solid evidence that words alone actually hurt children.

A frequently cited article in the verbal abuse literature is one by Ney (1987) who stated that verbal abuse (e.g., cursing, threatening, humiliating) is more likely than are physical forms of abuse to change a child's view of the world and alter his or her self-perception. Ney speculated that verbal abuse has a greater impact during the childhood years than during adulthood because a child cannot defend himself or herself from a verbal attack. Ney asked parents to complete a questionnaire about abuse on themselves and their children. Ney's goal was to find correlations between parents' self-reports of verbally abusing their children and children's self-reports of their feelings about hopelessness ("Do you feel hopeless?") and war ("Do you expect there will be a nuclear war?"). An analysis of the feelings responses constituted what Ney referred to as verbal abuse changing the child's view of the world. A greater proportion of the children who were reported to be verbally abused answered "yes" to the feelings questions. From this Ney concluded, "[t]his study generally supports the clinical impression that verbal abuse is as harmful as or more harmful to children than other types of abuse" (Ney 1987: 376). Importantly, Ney's results are based on correlations, and causation cannot be determined solely from self-reports and correlations. One could conclude that the self-reported abuse and questionnaire answers were correlated but not that words alone caused the higher proportion of "yes" responses.

Ney's claim that verbal abuse is more hurtful than physical abuse has been repeated in subsequent research. Ney, Fung, and Wickett (1994) examined the covariance of multiple forms of neglect and abuse. They found that physical abuse, physical neglect, verbal abuse, emotional neglect, and sexual abuse occurred in isolation less than 5 % of the time, indicating how difficult it is to separate verbal abuse from other abuses. The combination of physical neglect, physical abuse, and verbal abuse has the greatest effect on children's sense of well-being, supporting the point that it is difficult to disentangle verbal abuse from other forms of abuse.

To address the difficulty with isolating verbal abuse from other forms of abuse, Teicher et al. (2006) attempted to assess the impact of verbal aggression (e.g., scolding, yelling,

swearing, blaming, insulting, threatening, demeaning, ridiculing, criticizing, and belittling) in the absence of physical abuse, sexual abuse, or exposure to domestic violence. They found a compounding effect of abuse, so that subjects who were exposed to two or more categories of abuse (emotional, physical, or sexual) experienced symptoms that were greater than a single abuse component. The authors noted “the possibility that individuals who have a high degree of current psychological symptoms may report their childhood in a more negative light than do individuals who are free from such symptoms” (Teicher et al. 2006: 998). A selection bias toward those people who are inclined to feel negatively about childhood compromises the results, but the problems with verbal abuse research do not end there.

Teicher et al. (2006) sampled primarily upper middle-class college students who were recruited by responding to an advertisement for individuals who experienced an unhappy childhood. This recruitment eliminates children who grew up with verbal aggression but still experienced a happy childhood. As a result, one has no idea how often children hear their parents swearing conversationally, where swearing is not connected with any form of abuse. It also may be the case that verbal abuse is perceived as more punitive by participating upper middle-class children than by lower status children, who experience more frequent physical punishments (see Mosby et al. 1999).

Methodological problems have not abated in studies that are more recent. In a paper titled “Wounding words”, Moore and Pepler (2006) examined maternal verbal abuse and child adjustment in violent and nonviolent groups. The mothers’ scores on the conflict tactics scale were used to estimate the degree of parental verbal aggression. Conflict tactics scale scores were then compared with the mothers’ perceptions of their children’s behavior on the Child Behavior Checklist (Achenbach and Edelbrock 1983). Moore and Pepler found that both insults and threats were associated with poorer adjustment in children from both violent and nonviolent groups, with stronger associations for the violent group. The authors concluded, “[w]hile the inference of a causal link is tempting, these data are essentially correlational in nature” (Moore and Pepler 2006: 92). This is an important admission. Not only are these data correlational, but they also rely on the mothers’ perceptions of verbal abuse and of their children’s problems, perceptions subject to the accuracy of mothers’ memories as well as their biases against accurately reporting undesirable abusive behaviors.

8 Internet and online offenses

It should come as no surprise that emotional word use is ubiquitous on the internet in online communication and it is replacing obscene telephone calls as a significant problem with hurtful interpersonal speech. Jay (2018) reported the widespread use of offensive speech in flames, email, blogs, Facebook, MySpace, YouTube, chat rooms, and 4chan sites. Jay (2018) documented the following: offensive email messages in college email systems; swearwords used in 3% of chat room conversations and in 0.2% of MySpace communications; 5.8% of men’s Twitter tweets contained at least one swearword and so did 4.8% of women’s tweets; swearwords appear in some author’s blogs and through trolling (deliber-

ately deceptive and antagonistic ploys for the instigator's amusement); and sexist, racist, and anti-Semitic comments on 4chan.

What differentiates emoting in online communication from emoting in face-to-face discourse is (i) the powerful effect of online users' anonymity or hidden identity, and (ii) the lack of a shared physical context or social presence (both people in the same place) where dimensions of social status operate (authority, social economic class, physical size, and eye contact). Internet sites also have different rules for civility depending on the nature of online discourse taking place. Some internet sites are polarized and antagonistic and this demeanor will attract different kinds of users; people participate or refuse to participate depending on the emotional language used in a particular site. For some people, norms against using swearwords are viewed as a form of class-based discrimination and politeness rules against swearing are perceived as a form of upper-class elitism under the guise of civility (pluralism and mutual respect) that in the end has the effect of excluding lower-class users that view swearing as a legitimate form of social protest (see White 2002).

Women are frequently the targets of online abuse. Bou-Franch and Blitvich (2014), for example, examined comments about violence against women in response to public service advertisements posted on YouTube. The Bou-Franch and Blitvich analysis revealed three abusive strategies that relied on: minimizing the nature of abuse (41 %), denying the existence of abuse (9 %), and mostly blaming the women for abuse in the first place (50 %). Abused women were portrayed as a group of aggressive, dumb, masochistic women to be judged in terms of their physical attributes; and if abused women refused to accept the submissive role, they deserved to be battered.

Jane (2014) argued that scholarship on offensive internet speech has lagged behind the pervasiveness of the phenomenon, but that scholarship has not been explicit about the offensive words used. Expurgating references to swearword use misrepresents the severity of attacks on women (and men) by eliminating offensive threats, rape fantasies, and cyber mob attacks on victims. Jane's interpretation of the cyber-attacks on women is that the attacks are representative of broader cultural attitudes belittling women which do not only appear in computer-mediated communication. Men are also the targets of abuse because offensive postings attack men for: lack of masculinity, such as having a micro penis, or accusations of incestuous behaviors. Jane attributed attacks on both women and men as due in part to the anonymity afforded by social media, which is not like face-to-face communication.

A final example of offensive language online attacks came from attorney and writer David French in a *National Review* article (21 October 2016) entitled, "The price I've paid for opposing Donald Trump". After calling out Ann Coulter, a Trump ally, French received a flood of tweets from alt-right (white supremacist) advocates. Pictures of French's daughter, who is African-American, were posted with images of gas chambers. French's daughter in online attacks was referred to as a "niglet" and a "dindu". French's wife, Nancy, was described as having sex with "black bucks" and claims were made that she had slept with black men while David French was deployed to Iraq. David French noted that if anyone attacked Donald Trump, the attacker's life might change for the worse. He reported several accounts of other bloggers and tweeters who received "a staggering amount of hate" in the form of anti-Semitic tweets.

9 Children as speaker-victims

Children, even preschoolers, are not naïve with regard to the nature of offensive words. The knowledge of a hurtful lexicon of a three- to four-year-old is impressive; children at these ages have learned name-calling and psychosocial insults, abusive language, common profanities, scatological language, and gender-related insults (Jay and Jay 2013). The growth in their hurtful lexicon levels off a bit later at about the time children enter elementary school in the US. The leveling off is a function of parenting pressures combined with school speech codes that punish students' offensive language. There are few published studies that document the emergence of the hurtful lexicon throughout childhood. A study of children's use of hurtful words in the 1980s (see Jay 1992) revealed one- to two-year-olds using hurtful words. At this age, children will repeat offensive words without understanding what they mean to adults. Name calling or insulting is another reason for swearing, as was demonstrated in research by Winslow (1969). Winslow reported that the children he recorded insulting each other often used hurtful terms as insults, names, and ethnic slurs which focused on physical appearances and peculiarities (*Bubble Butt, Fatso*), others' names (*Jerry-Fairy*), mental traits (*Dopey, Jerky*), and social relationships (*Chickenshit, Faggot, Bully, Blabbermouth*). Winslow believed that these kinds of derogatory insults reflected the perceptions, anxieties, norms, and put-downs that were pertinent to the children who said them to their peers.

Research from field studies (Jay 1992) demonstrated how children used offensive words to express different emotions at a summer camp. On most occasions (64 %) children used hurtful words to express anger or frustration. Offensive words were used only 14 % of the time denotatively (*I have to take a piss*) and 12 % of the time to express humor or in joking. Hurtful words were used in 5 % of the episodes recorded to express surprise and 5 % of the time to express sarcasm. The primary use of hurtful words in public for children is to express anger or frustration.

Children's use of and comprehension of hurtful words is coordinate with their development of communication about emotions. As children develop, their awareness and production of emotional language, evaluative judgments, and linguistic politeness increases with age (Arunachalam et al. 2001; Peterson and Biggs 2001; Ridgeway et al. 1985). Children use less offensive hurtful words at younger ages and more offensive language when they get older. The trend occurs in part because parents are less likely to use extremely offensive words around young children and because young children lack a social awareness needed to make nuanced distinctions with hurtful words related to politics, race, or social class. Jay (1992) noted that infantile insults recorded from children between ages three and eight years were not used by older children. Instead, adolescents and adults produce insults evidencing greater awareness of social, political, and economic issues, for example, using words such as *dickeaser, chauvinist, wolf, slut, libber, skinhead, or dyke* (see Eble 1996; Holland and Skinner 1987; Jay 2003).

In order to address the question of whether children have the same perception of offensive words as do adults, Jay and Jay (2013) asked parents or caregivers and their children to make subjective ratings of the "badness" of offensive words. Ratings from younger children were then compared with those of older children and adults to document developmen-

tal changes in the perception of the offensiveness of specific words. The study's results describe the awareness of offensive words in childhood and into adulthood. These findings represent the kinds of data that can begin to address the nature of hurtful word awareness.

Jay and Jay (2013) created a list of 38 words, half "good" words and half "bad" words. Bad words came from a list of offensive words spoken in public by seven- to nine-year-olds (from Jay 1992). Good words were selected from a list of commonly spoken words by seven- to nine-year-olds (Hall et al. 1984). Each child (six- to twelve-year-olds) and his or her caregiver was read the list of words and asked to say out loud whether a word was a good word that could be used in their home or a bad word that was not used in their home. Parents or caregivers and children were interviewed separately. Some children said they did not know the meaning of some of the bad words. The words that some children said they did not know provide additional insight into children's awareness of taboo words. Of the 42 children tested, six reported not knowing one or more of four words from the list: *fag* (four "don't know"), *queer* (four "don't know"), *piss* (three "don't know"), and *bitch* (one "don't know").

It is informative to examine the cases where adults and children disagreed about what constituted a good or bad word. Several words were evaluated as bad by a significantly greater percentage of children than adults: *crap*, *damn*, *dork*, *fart*, *hell*, *stupid*, *suck* and *wimp*. Judgments of *Jesus Christ* and *pig* also trended in this direction. This list of bad words was perceived differently, as less bad, by adults than by their children. In other words, the children found mild taboo words to be more offensive than the adults did.

It is also informative to look at disagreements between younger and older children. Younger children (six- to eight-year-olds) and older children (nine- to twelve-year-olds) differed slightly in their evaluations. A greater percentage of the older children evaluated *down* as a good word than did younger children, and a greater percentage of older children evaluated *balls* as a bad word than did younger children. A greater percentage of younger children evaluated *dork* as a bad word than did older children. It seems very likely that more young children are insulted by the word *dork* than older children.

Collectively, the Jay and Jay (2013) data show that adults and children, even from the same home, have differing awareness of what is offensive speech. Adults were more liberal with their evaluation of mild taboos than children were. But the definition of a mild taboo is something that researchers have interpreted according to adult standards. Importantly, young children do not show the same pattern of word evaluations as adults. There were fewer disagreements between adults and older children, demonstrating that offensive language values become more adultlike with age. Likewise, the older children were more conservative than younger children toward the sexually loaded bad word, *balls*. Younger children are probably not aware of how offensive words are because they have not yet acquired adultlike emotional communication practices, as demonstrated in research on the use of emotion terms, evaluative judgments, and linguistic politeness (Arunachalam et al. 2001; Peterson and Biggs 2001; Ridgeway et al. 1985).

One inevitably has to address the question of how children use and are affected by hurtful speech, including the studies of children's experiences as victims of verbal abuse. Geiger and Fischer (2006) avoided some problems mentioned previously (in Section 7) regarding parents' biased perceptions of how they interact with their children. Geiger and

Fischer avoided parental subjective biases by directly interviewing sixth-grade victims of verbal aggression. Offensive speech was not universally experienced as hurtful, as children's reactions depended on several factors: whether they interpreted the speech as "for fun" or not, which contextual cues were present (facial expression, tone of voice), and the reactions of peers at the time of the verbal aggression. Children reported that they felt that cursing, teasing, and tormenting caused anger, hurt, and humiliation. When the message targeted students' permanent physical characteristics or ethnic-social identity, they felt that an escalation to physical retaliation toward the speaker was justifiable. Geiger and Fischer reported children's feelings, attitudes, and perceptions regarding harm, but the authors did not report convincing evidence of harm from corroborating sources, for example, documented psychosocial problems at school or home. Children's self-reports of being hurt are particularly subject to demand characteristics. When an older, more powerful person, such as a researcher, asks children how they responded when people verbally insulted them, there is pressure for the children to respond in a socially desirable manner.

Looking forward, the question of what hurtful words mean to children demands additional research. What is known from the Jay and Jay (2013) study is that by the age of six years most children have learned something about the social norms surrounding offensive words. There were only a few cases where children reported not knowing the meanings of the offensive words in the study. Future studies can meaningfully contribute to the understanding of the emergence of offensiveness awareness by sampling younger one- to five-year-old children, in addition to documenting their social home environment; including contributing factors such as their family's level of religiosity and media use habits associated with swearing. It would also be informative to survey children and adults who are not native speakers (see Allan 2018; Dewaele 2010; Fägersten and Stapleton 2017) to determine how hurt in a native language is related to hurt in a second language. It has been found that speakers find non-native taboo words as less emotion laden relative to native taboo words (Dewaele 2010).

10 Problems with hurtful word research

10.1 Problems doing research with children

There are several methodological problems associated with conducting empirical research on hurtful words. First the focus is on problems conducting empirical research with children. How do researchers recruit children to participate in hurtful word research? Obviously children as a participant pool are not as readily accessible as adults, especially adults enrolled in college courses where research participation is a course requirement. How can researchers recruit children? Even with informed consent procedures, how can researchers expose children to hurtful speech that they realize might affect them after their participation? It is assumed that younger children are more vulnerable to insults than adolescents and adults, who through experience have developed coping skills to deal with insulting language. But it is probably the youngest children who will provide the most information regarding initial uses of and reactions to offensive speech. In the end, the informed consent

process will restrict the pool participants to those children whose parents are willing to let them be exposed to offensive language. One alternative to empirical, laboratory-based research is to use observational methods. At this point researchers are handicapped by a paucity of observational research involving children and the emotional language they use, but that might not prevent scholars from designing field research observing how children try to hurt each other with words or how children react to being insulted. Researchers need to develop comprehensive interview techniques that nail down the specific words used and details about the reactions and consequences for victims who have been insulted or teased.

Researchers also need to look at resilient children who have grown up listening to offensive speech but were not hurt; this is an essential comparison group. Researchers do not want to produce only research with vulnerable children who have been hurt without being able to compare them to a group that were not hurt. Both groups will have a thorough knowledge of offensive words, but with different outcomes. Examining both groups will allow researchers to predict when words hurt some children but not others.

Research so far with children has been informative and it indicates that it should never be assumed that “normal” children are naïve about hurtful words or that they have the same sensibilities about speech that adults do. In the end a combination of methods and observations will converge on how children use and deal with hurtful speech.

10.2 General methodological problems

A major methodological problem with the literature on hurt involves its reliance on questionnaires and subjective self-reports of hurt. In message-scaling studies, college students are asked to rate on numerical scales the offensiveness or hurtfulness of written messages (e.g., Kinney 1994, 2003). Message-scaling studies cannot be interpreted as evidence of hurt. Scaling studies rely on attitudes or perceptions of potentially hurtful speech but they do not show actual hurt from the words. Questionnaire and survey research is not unimportant, but it needs to be supported by more objective evidence of hurt.

There also remains a fundamental problem establishing what constitutes hurt or distress as a result of verbal abuse, because different researchers use different criteria. Heyman et al. (2001) noted that there is no consensus for establishing reliable criteria for distress from verbal or physical abuse. They pointed out problems with using the conflict tactics scale as a diagnostic screening tool by comparing valid diagnostic interviews with adjustment and abuse questionnaires. They found that the conflict tactics scale over-diagnoses distress and aggression (especially for women) compared to interviews. They concluded that commonly used adjustment and satisfaction measures are likely to perform worse than real-world screening or interview sessions.

Another problem is the misrepresentation of the relationship between speech and hurt. For a critical evaluation of the hurtful words, empirical evidence is required but not anecdotes or speculation. As a bad example of anecdotal evidence, in a chapter on the topic of aggression, Buss asserted that “[a]ggression need not be physical, and the ‘bite’ of verbal aggression may be as sharp (psychologically) as the serpent’s sting, as may be documented by any married couple” (Buss 1971: 7–8). This is an example of the kind of off-the-cuff,

irresponsible assertion that, although being provocative, does not actually support the position that words hurt people. Buss provided no empirical evidence in that paper to prove that words hurt people.

Based in part on Buss's opinion that offensive speech is more hurtful than physical abuse, Kinney (1994) asked college students to provide examples of messages that hurt them in the past. A typology of verbal aggression (group membership attacks, personal failings, relational failings) was constructed, relating types of verbal aggression with subjects' feelings (e.g., angry, annoyed, depressed). Kinney concluded, similar to Buss (1971) and Ney (1987), that "[a]ttacks marshaled against the self-concept can be as potentially damaging as physical attacks on the body" (Kinney 1994: 213). Note again that Buss did not provide evidence of hurt, and Ney's research mentioned above is merely correlational. There is also a problem in this line of research defining exactly which offensive messages cause hurt and which do not. Kinney (1994) noted that some messages (e.g., maledictions, teasing, ridiculing, swearing) represent different forms of verbal attacks that vary in force; threats and ridicules are more forceful than teases. It is important to note that Kinney reported that there are wide individual differences regarding what constitutes a hurtful message. As in Geiger and Fischer (2006), what speech is considered hurtful depends critically on situational variables such as bystanders' reactions or the perceived intent of the message. With the wide individual and situational differences, it may be nearly impossible to determine what messages are hurtful on a universal basis. The strongest evidence of hurtful speech rests on subjective self-reports of hurt. It is almost impossible to disentangle verbal abuse from other forms of hurt where it matters – that is, with children.

Clearly, there is an obvious failure to differentiate systematically hurtful speech situations from harmless situations, which one would think is essential. Sociolinguistic research makes it clear that no universal statements can be made about what speech will be regarded as offensive (Butler 1997; Jay and Janschewitz 2008; Locher and Watts 2005). The meaning and impact of speech is entirely determined by the contextual factors, such as the relationship between the speaker and listener and the topic of discussion. Couples can agree that words such as *nigger*, *cunt*, *bitch*, or *fuck* are not offensive at a given time and place, regardless of what other people may think. Asserting that offensive words universally cause hurt cannot be justified. As with the need to contrast base rates for conversational swearing with rates of hurtful speech, researchers need to contrast situations in which offensive words produce hurt with those in which these words produce psychological and social benefits, such as substituting for physical violence. Indeed, some scientists (Jackson [1866] 1958) viewed swearing as providing an evolutionary advantage over physical forms of aggression, because swearing allows the speaker to vent his or her feelings without physically hurting a listener.

Speakers grow up in a culture in which they have to learn which speech is appropriate and which is offensive in a given situation; this is the folk psychology of offensive words. Folk psychology and commonsense beliefs about offensive words do not amount to a scientific understanding of the reasons why people use hurtful words or the impact of hurtful words on other people (see Lilienfeld 2017). When folk psychology, common sense, and flawed studies create a biased, misleading perception of emotional language, then this knowledge is inadequate for judges to use for making decisions regarding hurtful speech.

Scholars should discredit folk psychology and replace it with a more objective, research-oriented view of hurtful speech (Jay 2009a; Kovera, Russano, and McAuliff 2002).

11 Conclusion: conducting meaningful hurtful word research

Scholars need to abandon commonsense, folk psychology views of harm because these are inaccurate. Instead, researchers need to educate themselves regarding research on hurt. In turn, researchers ultimately should help alleviate social problems, such as verbal abuse, and help develop definitive methodology to demonstrate problems where evidence of hurt is definitive. The question of hurt suffers from two significant problems. First, there is no clear definition of what constitutes hurt (O’Leary 1999). Second, because of methodological inadequacies and ethical problems with exposing people to offensive speech, there is little good research evidence of hurt. The lack of evidence of hurt and serious questions of the scientific status of microaggressions research also plague that literature (see Lilienfeld 2017). The definition problems arise because there is no clear relationship between hurt from physical violence and hurt conveyed by offensive speech. Scholarship has not provided a clear definition of hurt, and this vagueness allows just about anything, from shifting world views to psychiatric symptoms, to qualify as hurt. Criteria are also needed for establishing what types of evidence constitute hurt. To assert that speech alone hurts people oversimplifies the role of complex contextual variables underlying anger, harassment, hate speech, and verbal abuse.

The final determination of hurt generally is not straightforward but rests almost entirely on complex contextual variables such as the location of the conversation, the relationship between the speaker and the listener, and the language used (Butler 1997; Jay and Janschewitz 2008). Although researchers acknowledge that words can hurt, a systematic assessment of conversational situations in which swearing is hurtless has not been attempted. This is a particularly germane criticism of the kinds of anecdotal evidence previously presented in courts throughout the entire history of American obscenity trials (see Heins 2007). For example, testimonials from criminals and juvenile delinquents who consumed sexually explicit materials in the form of novels, video games, comic books, or pornography were presented as evidence in court. But unless there is a control group of people who used sexually explicit materials but *did not* become criminals or delinquents, this is bad science. Offensive speech might constitute hurt, but not all offensive speech is hurtful, and one needs to compare and contrast both forms to be thorough.

Language scholars will profit from more clarity regarding any indirect hurt that may arise from adults’ conversational swearing. The most hurtful speech is that which is targeted specifically toward a vulnerable listener, as evidenced by research on obscene telephone calls, workplace harassment, and hate speech (see Sullaway 2004). Overhearing others’ offensive or sexual comments is, in most cases, harmless speech. Although there may be no direct hurt from a child hearing a parent swear, exposure to conversational swearing could communicate to the child that offensive speech is acceptable in all contexts. The

child may then be more likely to repeat offensive language outside his or her home (e.g., at school) where he or she would be punished for doing so. The issue here is not that hurt comes from exposure to arbitrarily determined offensive words, but that hurt may be the product of not clearly defining speech standards for children. Offensive speech is likely to result in punishment at school, where the context and standards are different from those encountered in a child's home.

Discrimination toward and verbal abuse of adults or children to the point of physical or psychological hurt is despicable, and any steps one can take to ameliorate these social ills are appreciated. Reviewing the literature on hurt shows that interviewing the victims of offensive speech is more credible than using surveys or questionnaires. Physiological or psychosocial evidence of hurt is more credible than subjective estimates of potential hurt. Researchers would do better to find negative effects of hurt through observing changes in the victim's behavior, psychological well-being, or problems with peers, or by interviewing those who directly observed changes in the victim's behavior (teachers, counselors). Interviewing victims is more informative than assessing parents' perception of distress in child victims. Victims' reports should be validated against secondary sources (e.g., recorded misbehaviors at school or work). In the end, it seems clear that sweeping statements about the impact of any message cannot be made without a careful delineation of contextual factors that affect hurt (e.g., racial inequality and vulnerability, speaker-listener body language, tone of voice, perceived intent).

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87 Emotions and globalization

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- 5 The case of migration
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Abstract: The purpose of this chapter is to discuss how emotions are significant in the context of an increasingly globalized world, especially in relation to the phenomenon of migration. Research in many academic disciplines during the last two decades highlights the importance of emotions to international relations, human mobility and the new emotional networks or borders that emerge from globalization and transnationalization processes. As this research shows, the role of language is significant, yet it is inseparable from the importance of spaces, bodies, and practices. Theorizing emotions as discursive-social-embodied processes enables an analysis of the different modalities – including language – through which emotions are constituted and circulated in globalizing and transnational contexts, and highlights their subversive and transformative possibilities. It is suggested that future research needs to delve deeper into exploring the complexities and interplay of these modalities and the impact they have on the affective economies of societies at the macro- and micro-levels. It is important to acknowledge how different people and groups bring different emotional histories and embodied experiences with them, and that these histories and embodiments are embedded in a wider context of sociopolitical forces, needs and interests that involve complex, multiple actors across national borders.

1 Introduction

Since the 1980s, anthropologists and sociologists working in the area of emotions have developed sociocultural theories that challenge traditional biological and psychological approaches to emotions, thereby acknowledging the social, cultural and political dimensions of emotional processes (e.g., Ahmed 2004; Lutz and Abu-Lughod 1990; Svašek 2008). In particular, during the last two decades, an increasing amount of work has been published on the role of emotions in international relations and politics (Clément and Sangar 2018; Russell Beattie, Eroukhmanoff, and Head 2019), and especially how emotions are entangled with the phenomena of migration, globalization and transnationalization (Boccagni and

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Baldassar 2015; Svašek and Skrbis 2007; Wise and Velayutham 2017). Although these are not new phenomena, their entanglement with emotions has not been theoretically and empirically explored until recently. Particularly in light of new theorizations of emotions and affects as social, political, and embodied processes (Barbalet 1998; Hutchison and Bleiker 2014; Thrift 2008), explorations of globalizing and transnational forces have gained a new interest. Thus, recent research into the emotional and affective dimensions of these forces has brought to the surface a wide variety of issues such as: the emotional discourses and practices in social media and long-distance communication; the embodied experiences of labour migration and human mobility in terms of gender, ethnicity and power; the emotional discourses and practices of belonging in migrant communities; the affective politics of critical events in politics such as terrorist attacks and their impact on migration; and, generally, the affective experiences of living in an increasingly globalized world (Boccagni and Baldassar 2015; Conradson and McKay 2007; Hall and Ross 2015; Hearn 2008; Svašek 2008, 2010; Svašek and Skrbis 2007; Wise and Velayutham 2017).

This chapter discusses emotions in relation to the globalization and transnationalization processes and particularly in relation to the phenomenon of migration, as emotions are part and parcel of the affective experiences of migrants. In general, globalization and transnationalization facilitate, produce and contextualize emotions (Hearn 2008). These phenomena are discussed in terms of how the mobility of people, ideas/practices and objects/images involves complex emotional processes that have important consequences for contemporary life (Svašek and Skrbis 2007). Emotions are understood as discursive, social and material processes that are simultaneously performed/embodied by actors acting within globalizing and transnational contexts, even though emotions often appear to lie within individuals (Ahmed 2004; Barbalet 1998; Davidson, Bondi, and Smith 2005). Hence, the emotional and affective processes that accompany mobility involve complex issues that need to be understood both as deeply emotive and deeply political (Boccagni and Baldassar 2015). The purpose of this chapter, then, is to theorize how emotions in the context of an increasingly globalized world are significant in social, political and material terms. The chapter will conclude with a discussion of some future directions for researching globalized and transnational emotional processes.

2 Globalization and transnationalization

Although globalization has always been part of the world since the beginnings of human exploration, its historical intensity has increased greatly during the last two centuries (Featherstone, Lash, and Robertson 1995). The modern era has brought global intensification in the movements of people, goods, services, and information – especially with the advancement of technology – e.g., transport, production, communication, and media. Thus, globalization is generally understood as the process in which people, products, technology, information, and jobs spread across national, social, and cultural borders (Appadurai 1996). Although discussions of globalization in the literature often emphasize its transnational economic dimensions, there is much variation in analysis of its political, social and cultural

changes, including the recognition of how important language and emotion are (Hearn 2008).

In addition to the notion of globalization, the concept of ‘transnationalization’ is another term that is used to highlight the new spaces of mobility and the cultural, economic and political exchanges within which non-institutional actors, networks and groups build links across different types of borders and create new communities. The concept of transnationalization emphasizes more explicitly how people today develop networks, activities, patterns of living, and ideologies that span beyond traditional boundaries of ‘home’ and the ‘nation’, operating across the whole globe (Basch, Glick-Schiller, and Szanton-Blanc 1994). Thus, one can talk about various forms of transnationalizations of emotions in and around these networks, activities, ideologies and ways of living and belonging (Hearn 2008). In fact, the notion of ‘transnational affect and emotion’ has been recently used to argue that an array of affects and emotions structure inter-subjective relationships and modes of reciprocity within transnational social fields (Wise and Velayutham 2017).

Along similar lines, Appadurai’s (1990) notion of the ‘disjunctive scapes’ is helpful in thinking through some of the elements in the emotional dynamics of these new transversal spaces of mobility and networking. For example, ethnoscapes refer to the “landscapes of persons who constitute the shifting world” (Appadurai 1990: 7); these “landscapes” include the social, economic and political practices and ideologies that are exchanged in transnational processes. Thus, there are ethnoscapes, ideoescapes, mediascapes and financescapes; the suffix *-scape* denotes that these terms are situated within historical, cultural, and political spaces. The notion of ‘emoscape’ (Kenway and Fahey 2011a, 2011b) adds another potential ‘scape’ to Appadurai’s (1990) original list. As Kenway and Fahey (2011b) explain,

By this [emoscape] we mean the movement of emotion across various spatial scales. In proposing this notion, we clearly reject the view that emotion only moves *within* individuals’ psychology or psyche. Instead, we draw on the views above that understand emotions as processes, involving intersections of the social, cultural, spatial and psychic realms. We see emotions as mobile, mobilized and mobilizing. Emotions move individuals, but they also operate in a realm beyond the personal and interpersonal. Emotions are on the move on a global scale via different technologies. They are mobilized by various discourses. It is these discourses that create a cultural context for certain ideas. And, finally, emotions are mobilizing as they motivate people to act. These actions then work to move other people and thus we come full circle. (Kenway and Fahey 2011b: 169, original emphasis)

The notion of ‘emoscape’, in Kenway and Fahey’s (2011b) view, highlights the spatial flow of feelings between people and places, emphasizing not only the movement of emotion within an individual or between individuals, but also in relation to particular historical, political, social and cultural landscapes.

Finally, ‘translocality’ is another term suggested by Appadurai (1996) to describe the ways in which uprooted communities become regrounded and extended as a result of globalizing and transnational experiences. The ‘trans’ in trans-national and trans-local, then, denotes two important notions that need to be considered in understanding globalizing and transnational experiences: first, there is “*moving across* something or *between* two or more somethings – in this case, across national boundaries or between nations” (Hearn 2008: 187, original emphasis); and, second, there is some sort of “*metamorphosing*, problematizing, blurring, transgressing, breaking down, even dissolving something(s)” (Hearn 2008: 187,

original emphasis). These two notions highlight the social, political, spatial and material context within which emotional and affective experiences take place, accompanying mobility. All in all, examining emotions in relation to transnationalization requires that our current conceptualization of various terms and categories to theorize emotions as part of globalization and transnational practices needs to be reformulated and redefined. We begin discussing this re-conceptualization by examining more closely the interplay between language and emotions.

3 Language and emotions

The relation between language and emotions has been widely studied in psychology, anthropology and (applied) linguistics (e.g., Besnier 1990). Scholars from different disciplines have examined several dimensions of this relationship: for example, how language can create different affective stances (Ochs 2002; Ochs and Capps 1996; Ochs and Schieffelin 1989); how affect can be communicated in interaction or it can be manifested within the micro-organization of someone's talk (Besnier 1990; Ochs and Schieffelin 1989); and how speakers in different cultures talk about or define emotions (Wierzbicka 2004). Different languages have also been studied in relation to their different emotional impact on bilingual or multilingual individuals, and in relation to individuals' choice for expressing emotions (usually with one language being the language of 'proximity' and the other one the language of 'distance') (Dewaele 2004; Dewaele and Pavlenko 2002; Pavlenko 2002). However, similarly to other studies of emotion, discussions on the interplay of language and emotions for a long time tended to treat emotions as individual properties, or confined within a certain cultural experience, and often still do not fully consider emotions' sociopolitical and discursive dimension (see Charalambous 2013).

In multilingualism research, special attention has been paid to people's emotional attachment to different languages, and in these discussions, the social and political dimensions of emotions are more explicit. As Pavlenko argues, "the relation between multilingualism and emotions is not exclusively an individual phenomenon – it also plays out on the societal level" (Pavlenko 2012: 462). Sociolinguistic research has long highlighted the power of language to create a sense of sameness and difference, and has shown that many communities regard language as a salient and essential part of their culture and ethnic identity (Blommaert and Verschueren 1998; Charalambous 2013; Heller 1999; May 2001), something that often triggers strong emotional attachments.

At the same time, learning a second or a foreign language is often seen as a way of gaining access to another culture (see, for example, Charalambous and Rampton 2020; Phipps and Gonzalez 2004), which means, consequently, that it offers learners the possibilities of negotiating different emotional stances towards this culture and language. In Kramsch's (2006) words, learners of a foreign language are seen as occupying "an embodied, socially and culturally inflected third place in language, filled with memories of other languages and fantasies of other identities" (Kramsch 2006: 97). The negotiation though of different languages and identities is never independent from language ideologies and sociopolitical discourses that define 'us' versus the 'others', and in the case of many mi-

grants, it also is affected by discourses and processes that have to do with (in)security, fear and conflict (Khan 2017; Kinginger 2004; Rampton and Charalambous 2020).

Processes of forced migration and dislocation, in particular, require therefore a shift on how we view and analyse language, communication and language learning in relation to emotions as they foreground issues of power relations, linguistic inequalities, (in)securitization and trauma. As Brigitta Busch (2017: 342) explains,

Under the conditions of globalization, speakers participate in varying spaces of communication which may be arranged sequentially, in parallel, juxtapositionally, or in overlapping form. At different periods in their lives, at different moments of their day, or even simultaneously (with the help of digital means of communication, for example), speakers participate in several spaces that are socially and linguistically constituted in different ways. Each of these spaces has its own language regime – its own set of rules, orders of discourse, and language ideologies – in which linguistic resources are assessed differently. (Busch 2017: 342–343)

These different communicative settings create different language and emotion hierarchies that often have important impact on people's lives – e.g., people may experience discrimination as some linguistic forms are evaluated as more prestigious than others; inclusion/exclusion based on language, etc. Studies have also shown how language can play a role in getting an asylum status, as it can be used to judge the authenticity and credibility of asylum seekers' narratives (see, for example, Blommaert 2009; Maryns 2006). In order to research these settings, Busch (2016, 2017) argues that sociolinguists need to pay attention to the “lived experience of language” which is a deeply emotional experience that gets inscribed into body memory, but at the same time it is shaped by powerful ideologies and inequalities.

Such an approach requires a theorization of emotion that escapes dichotomies and encompasses the discursive, social, political dimensions of the concept that take shape and materialize differently in different chronotopes. The following section unpacks this theorization of emotions, which is needed to understand emotions in relation to globalized and transnational processes.

4 Emotions as discourses, practices and embodied experiences

Sociocultural theories of emotion highlight that emotions are public, not exclusively private, experiences that are interactively embedded in power relations. This theoretical perspective historicizes the ways in which emotions are constituted, their organization into discourses and technologies of power, and their importance as a site of social, embodied, and spatial control through surveillance and self-policing (Ahmed 2004; Barbalet 1998; Thrift 2008). As power relations are inherent in social, political and cultural experiences (e.g., gender, kinship, class or ethnicity), domination, resistance and sociality are at the core of emotional and affective processes (Svašek 2008).

In particular, Ahmed's (2004) ‘sociality of emotions’ model is valuable in understanding how emotional encounters with others create boundaries or move beyond such bounda-

ries. Along the lines of the spatial notion of ‘emotional geographies’ (Davidson, Bondi, and Smith 2005), but stretched out in social and political relations (over national borders), Ahmed argues that emotions play a crucial role in the ways that individuals come together, move *towards* or *away* in relation to others and constitute collective bodies. In other words, affective encounters are not individualized but work to bind together a whole community. This argument challenges the assumption that emotions are ‘individual’ or ‘private’ phenomena and supports the position that emotions are located in movement, circulating between objects.

Hence, emotions do not come from inside us as *reaction*, but are produced in and circulated between others and ourselves as *discourses* and *practices*. This circulation happens precisely because individuals do not live in a social and political vacuum but move, and thus emotions become attached to individuals united in their feelings for something. For example, it is shown that emotions shape and are shaped by discourses of race and ethnicity; therefore, there are certain emotions that ‘stick’ to certain bodies through the work of emotions (Zembylas 2008, 2015). In other words, certain bodies (e.g., of migrants) as well as emotional practices and discourses (e.g., hatred and resentment) ‘stick’ together and perpetuate certain perceptions about race/ethnicity; such bodies and practices occur within racialized and ethnicized spaces and networks of power.

The notion of ‘affect’, and its relation to ‘emotion’, is an important element of these discussions (Thrift 2008). For post-Deleuzian scholars, for example (e.g., Massumi 1996), emotion signals cultural constructs and conscious processes, where affect marks precognitive sensory experience, relations to surroundings, and generally the body’s capacity to act, to engage, to resist, and to connect. Hence emotion represents a form of assimilation, a closure and containment of affect within symbolic means, whereas affect is considered along the lines of a bodily intensity resistant to domestication, always evading a final structuration. If affect emerges, then, through embodied encounter, transnational mobility is inevitably entangled with the generation and circulation of particular affects and emotions (Conradson and McKay 2007; Wise and Velayutham 2017). An important aspect of theorizing affect, then, is the recognition of variations in local interpretations of affective states and their expression through different linguistic and other semiotic resources. This is why linguist Anna Wierzbicka (2004) emphasizes the importance of language in emotional experiences and their interpretation; different vocabularies of emotion can make a difference to people’s emotional experiences (Wierzbicka 2004: 579); at the same time they can also influence the ways people communicate these experiences, the relations they form with others, and the ways they are perceived by both individuals and institutions.

Another way of making sense of emotions research in recent years revolves around a macro/micro distinction (Hutchison and Bleiker 2014) and the different kinds of emotional practices, their political effects and their political contestation within both micro- and macro-politics (Russell Beattie, Eroukhmanoff, and Head 2019). As Hutchison and Bleiker (2014) clarify, macro-approaches theorize in general how emotions matter in world politics, while micro-approaches focus on how specific emotions emerge in particular political circumstances; however, the distinction between macro- and micro-approaches is not essentialized in any way, as there are important similarities such as the notion that emotions are more than just individual and private phenomena. Both approaches offer rich insights into

the entanglement of emotions with international relations and politics, albeit from different perspectives that link how individual dimensions of emotions become collective and political through everyday actions. As Russell Beattie, Eroukhmanoff, and Head (2019) also suggest, recent attention to the everyday practices through which emotions are negotiated allow a deeper exploration of the relationship between individual and collective emotions as well as a focus on the role of embodiment within emotions research and its relationship with the dynamics and structures of power.

All in all, there are two key advantages in theorizing emotions as discourses, practices and embodied experiences to analyse transnational emotional processes. The first derives from recognizing that the social, political and embodied dimensions of emotion are manifest at many levels of social interaction, from the dynamics of everyday life and everyday interactions to the dynamics of local, national and globalized processes. Emotions are treated as social, political and embodied forces that are located in the liminal space between the individual and the social. This perspective challenges binary divisions between individual versus social, private versus public, and emphasizes that emotion operates as a constitutively reciprocal component in the interaction/transaction between larger social forces and the internal psychic and embodied terrain of the individual (Leavitt 1996). As Leavitt explains, these perspectives seem truer to common, ‘everyday’ life experience of emotion than a vision of emotion as either individual or simply social (see also Schick 2019).

The second advantage in theorizing emotions as discourses, practices and embodied experiences derives from the fundamental nature of the globalizing and transnational experiences themselves. For example, migration is invariably a process that creates relations of proximity and distance with strong emotional connotations (Skrbis 2008). It is not difficult to see, then, how transnational migration may be implicated in the generation of particular emotional practices and discourses (e.g., marginalization and social injustice). Consequently, if we want to pursue a more systematic and critical investigation of the emotional dimensions of human mobility in globalizing and transnational processes, it is necessary to develop concepts and theories that focus centrally on emotions and affects (Hutchison and Bleiker 2014; Svašek and Skrbis 2007; Wise and Velayutham 2017). Migrant life experiences and the migration process offer a rich, complex and under-examined account of the emotional aspects of globalization and transnationalization, especially in light of the contemporary European migration and refugee crisis; therefore, a case is made for paying attention to emotion and migration.

5 The case of migration

This part of the chapter takes on the case of migration to show an example of how globalization and transnationalization of emotions operate in this phenomenon. As several reviews of literature and special issues have shown in recent years, there are a number of issues emerging in the nexus between emotion and migration, such as the emotional challenges faced by migrant workers; the affective attachments of migrants to their homeland; the ambivalent feelings of ethnic minority groups born in another country; the negative emotional responses of the ‘host’ population to the presence of migrants; the distressing

experience of forced migration and refugeehood (Boccagni and Baldassar 2015; Conradson and McKay 2007; Skrbis 2008; Svašek 2008, 2010; Svašek and Skrbis 2007; Wise and Velayutham 2017); and the emotional experience related to having to adjust to a different language/linguistic repertoire (Busch 2016) or to perform a repertoire that is judged negatively (Charalambous, Charalambous, and Zembylas 2016). Emotions are inextricable parts of the migration experiences of ‘translocal subjectivities’, that is, “the multiply-located senses of self amongst those who inhabit transnational social fields” (Conradson and McKay 2007: 168).

Not surprisingly, not all movements in transnational social fields are the same; for example, there are differences between movements of the elite and movements of the disenfranchised. Research has systematically shown that many disenfranchised individuals and minority groups feel that they are ‘othered’ by hegemonic groups (Boccagni and Baldassar 2015). This encounter between various groups is undoubtedly emotional and is represented as proximity or distance between bodies that are read as similar and those that are considered to be different (Ahmed 2004; Fortier 2007). It is an encounter where the national ‘we’ (the host) is differentiated from the arriving ‘other’ (the stranger), but it is important to acknowledge how strangeness (including strangeness in language) is unevenly distributed. This uneven distribution, asserts Ahmed (2004), reminds us that who gets constructed as the host or stranger is an effect of relations of power. Similarly, Busch (2017: 352) reminds us the different ways in which linguistic inequalities, embedded in power relations, can be manifested and felt by dislocated people: discomfort and confusion may be experienced when “*self-perception and perception by others* are not experienced as congruent, when people experience *inclusion or exclusion* because of a language or a particular way of speaking, or when their own capacity of interacting by words is associated with the experience of *power or powerlessness*” (Busch 2017: 352, original emphasis). Hence, the political element is an inextricable part of the emotions in the globalized and transnational terrain.

In one of the first papers published that theorized migration, emotions and belonging, sociologist Zlatko Skrbis (2008) pointed out that most theories of transnationalism and migration had failed to incorporate a focus on emotions and especially the power relations involved. As Skrbis wrote, “[m]igrant stories are linked with the experiences of adjustment, settlement, nostalgia, a shattered sense of belonging, renewal, loss, discrimination, abrupt endings, new beginnings and new opportunities – all potent sources of emotions” (Skrbis 2008: 236). Therefore, a more systematic investigation of the emotional dimensions of transnational migration and its entanglement with politics is extremely important “in contemporary settings of globalised economic crisis, state violence, exploited migrant communities, and hegemonic gender politics of post-colonial states” (Good 2004: 529). The explicit investigation of emotions in precisely these settings, argues Good, shows that “only through explicating the logic of key emotional constructs do major social dramas become intelligible, and [...] can particular domains of affect be understood” (Good 2004: 529).

In a more recent overview of migration and emotion studies, Boccagni and Baldassar (2015) suggest that the nexus between emotion and migration makes for an important research field for two reasons: first, the migration process offers a window from which to view emotions in the light of everyday life experiences; second, an analysis of emotions

provides an important critique of the predominant ‘economic rationalist’ approaches to migration of the past. Arguably, as this paper maintains, transnational migration offers a valuable lens through which to examine the interplay of emotional and political complexities of human mobility and the ways in which they are entangled with issues of language (interaction, communication, language choice, language learning, etc.) and the living experience of language.

Also, Wise and Velayutham (2017) reiterate that affective and emotional dimensions of transnational practice require further empirical and theoretical attention and suggest the notion of ‘transnational affect and emotion’ to describe emerging work in this area. In operationalizing transnational affect, Wise and Velayutham (2017: 127) sketch out different kinds of affective intensity (strategic intensity, moral intensity, embodied intensity, intensity of ties or exclusions) and their intersections with transnational social fields. As they write, “[a]ffective intensities *implicate* transnational objects” (Wise and Velayutham 2017: 127, original emphasis), both shaping the migration experience and reproducing transnational connections.

As noted earlier, migration frequently results in a sense of marginalization among migrants and their children due to discrimination or the lack of communication with members from the receiving country (Svašek and Skrbis 2007). Migrants and their families have to deal with emotions of loss, trauma, suffering, physical hardship and the “violence of voicelessness” (Busch 2016). At the same time, members of the receiving country may experience fear, anger, anxiety, resentment, and hatred for migrants who come and threaten the social, cultural and linguistic character of the nation (Fortier 2007). Migration, then, influences the emotional and political dynamics as well as notions of self and belonging for both migrants and members from the receiving country. Attending to feelings linked to transnational migration is essential, if we, as researchers, are to understand the new manifestations of racism, marginalization, far-right movements, and nationalism and the resulting implications for migrants’ lives in multicultural societies (e.g., see Kølvraa 2015).

In particular, emotional practices and discourses must be examined as constitutive components of perceptions about ‘race’ and ‘ethnicity’ in light of the multiple forms of globalization and transnational migration (Fortier 2007). Race and ethnicity have a materiality that is partly to do with the aspects of racial and ethnic discourses that are constructed as being material (e.g., bodily markers are used to stereotype people) and partly about the emotional discourses and practices through which bodies are drawn together or apart on racialized and ethnicized terms (Riggs and Augoustinos 2005; Zembylas 2018). As far as racism is concerned, the differences between ethnic or religious groups are highlighted and used to structure superiority/inferiority relations and thus prevent migrants’ integration into the society, on the ground that migrants are a threat to the society’s unity (Balibar and Wallerstein 1991). Similarly, nationalism is another powerful example of how national identity is emotionally constituted and organized (e.g., through the use of symbols, language, imagery and music) to create certain inclusions and exclusions (Closs Stephens 2016). When categorizations and boundaries between the national self and the arriving other are accompanied by practices of exclusion and discrimination, then nationalism becomes manifest in powerful collective feelings such as national pride and national consciousness (Zembylas 2015).

In an era of globalization, increasingly fractured and diasporic communities are seeking to (re)gain a sense of home and belonging (Nash 2002); this process redefines the emotional dynamics of proximity and distance (Davidson and Milligan 2004). In the encounter with the other, as a movement of proximity or distance between the national self and the arriving other, new social, political, material, linguistic and spatial boundaries are formed. Uncovering the links between power relations and certain emotion discourses about migrants and their families, then, reveals the affective economies created by social policies and practices in different societies.

6 Conclusion and future directions

In this chapter, we have considered emotions as part of globalization and transnationalization processes, particularly in relation to the phenomenon of migration. In this, we have suggested that the role of language is an important part of the emotional experience, yet it is inseparable from the importance of spaces, bodies, and practices. Emotions are experienced in localized ways, but they are also embedded in complex, transnational ways, especially in the case of migration. The globalization and transnationalization of emotions, then, constitute attempts, however flawed, to talk about contemporary and substantial historical, social and political changes (Hearn 2008). It is important, as Hearn suggests, to further explore how micro-political contextual factors (e.g., segregation, interethnic relations) are entangled with macro-political conditions (citizenship, welfare, opportunities) (see also, Hutchison and Bleiker 2014).

For example, future research needs to delve deeper into exploring the modalities through which certain emotions about migrants and other minority groups (e.g., fear, anxiety) are constituted and maintained in particular societies and what impact they have on the affective economies of these societies at the macro- and micro-level. These modalities are unavoidably part of ongoing efforts within a globalized world to articulate a viable relationship between the self and the other (Zembylas 2012). This struggle involves the systematic investigation of the ways in which explicit mobilization of certain emotions (e.g., patriotism, national pride) produces exclusive definitions of subjectivity and belonging. As Boccagni and Baldassar (2015: 78–79) suggest, more systematic and comparative studies are needed to examine how migrants display and negotiate their emotions, as affected by their belonging in terms of religion, ethnicity, nationality, normative frameworks of morality and so forth. Another idea could also be to see how different emotions are stylized/organized hierarchically in different societies and how these hierarchies interact with discourses and experiences of migration. In general, Wise and Velayutham (2017) suggest that affective and emotional dimensions of transnational practice constitute a productive new theoretical and methodological approach that can advance understandings of what motivates, compels, and structures transnational actors' participation in transnational social fields.

Furthermore, in relation to the issue of methods, more research is necessary using multi-methods (mixed methods including an ethnographic component, and life histories/biographic narratives) and multimodal analysis that could inform the study of emotion and

globalization (see also Karrebæk and Charalambous [2018] on an account of how linguistic ethnography can contribute to the study of people and languages in motion). Methodological choices of how to study emotion and globalization – e.g., whether to use a questionnaire to focus on key variables or qualitative case studies – are inevitably entangled with ontological and epistemological assumptions of how emotions are understood (see Clément and Sangar 2018; Schutz and Zembylas 2016). As Savage suggests, “an important part of the process of deciding what is the most appropriate approach for researching emotion is ensuring coherency between theory, methodology, and the focus of the study” (Savage 2004: 32). The methodological choice of how to study emotion and various aspects of globalization is not only a question of methods, of course, but rather it is also about the ethical issues involved in the research process (Prosser 2015). Ethical questions such as the following are unavoidable:

If this research opens up new perspectives and identities for participants to embrace, to what environments will they return and what supports will be in place to sustain them in these new identities? Is it ethically just for this research to prompt social change, but potentially increase social injustice? In addition, where does the researcher-participant responsibility extend and end? (Prosser 2015: 180)

It is important for researchers of emotion in different disciplines to consider such questions and refine their methods and methodologies to ensure that the ethical implications are addressed (Schutz and Zembylas 2016).

To conclude, a focus on emotions as discursive-social-material processes in globalizing and transnational contexts highlights the subversive and transformative possibilities that are created. These possibilities refer to *un-doing* existing discourses and practices that exclude and marginalize certain people and groups as well as understanding the resilience of such discourses (see for example Charalambous et al. 2020). This effort includes the development of a mode of critique in research and theorization that comprehends the role of affective economies and their political implications in societies. Moreover, it needs to be acknowledged that different people and groups bring different emotional histories and embodied experiences with them, and that these histories and embodiments are embedded in a wider context of sociopolitical forces, needs and interests that involve complex, multiple actors across national borders. Unless these emotional histories and embodied experiences are constantly interrogated, to question taken-for granted ideas about race, ethnicity, language class and gender, there will be little hope of transforming the material, relational, emotional and spatial contexts of globalization and transnationalization.

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XVII Language and emotion in economics and business communication

Ann Kronrod

88 Language and emotion in business communication

- 1 Introduction
- 2 Phonetics
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Abstract: Communication in the Business and Economics world is strategic in nature: statements are pre-planned and performed with the purpose of achieving a certain goal. Therefore, the emotional effect of language within this communication is often anticipated. However, not all communication is strategically planned. Communication coming from consumers, such as product reviews or word of mouth about consumption experiences, is predominantly spontaneous. Addressing these two types of communication, the current chapter will expose readers to the theories and findings that explain how certain language aspects of strategic communication influence emotional states, behaviors and decisions. The chapter will also relate to the opposite direction of influence, focusing on the way emotions shape the language people use to describe their consumption experiences. The structure of the chapter will follow five aspects of linguistic inquiry: phonetics (sounds), semantics (meaning), syntax (text), pragmatics (use), and cross-cultural linguistics. Within each of these aspects of language, the prevailing literature and conclusions are discussed, and future research directions conclude this chapter.

1 Introduction

Business communication is traditionally considered a strategically pre-planned type of communication in which language is used with the purpose of achieving a certain goal (Kronrod 2016; 2022a). Importantly, language philosophers posit that language is always used to achieve goals (e.g., Austin 1962; Grice 1975; Kasher 1976; Searle 1969). One such goal is creating an emotional impact on the listener. For instance, one of the uses of swear words is to derogate, offend, and humiliate the listener (e.g., Robbins et al. 2011; Stapleton 2010). Language can be used to express or influence emotions, but it can also be used to influence decisions, evoke positive and negative attitudes, or merely transfer information

about the state of affairs in the world. This chapter will focus on the emotional impact that language creates within business communication and its outcomes.

1.1 It's just business – or is it?

We sometimes think that business should be conducted emotionlessly. We should detach emotions from work-related issues. We think that logical-rational thinking is a prerequisite for economic behavior, and a good negotiator is one who does not involve emotion. However, as we shall see in this chapter, research on the role of emotion in business has repeatedly shown that emotions are an integral part of any human activity, and the business world is not an exception. In this chapter, I draw upon research that demonstrates how business is not detached from emotion to explain how language is used to convey emotions in the business world and how language can *influence* emotions.

1.2 What is “language”?

It has long been understood that language and emotion are linked (Havas, Glenberg, and Rinck 2007; Majid 2012; Niedenthal 2007; though see Sauter [2018] for a counter view) and that language is one of the predominant means by which people convey emotions (e.g., Fussell 2002). But what do we mean when we say “language”? To describe this unique human behavior, I employ a traditional approach to language inquiry, dividing it into five levels: phonetics (sounds), semantics (meaning), syntax (text structure), pragmatics (use), and cross-cultural linguistics. Within each of these aspects of language, I discuss the prevailing literature and conclusions about the relation of language to emotion, as well as future research directions.

1.3 A note on language and emotion

Research into language and emotion can be roughly divided into language about emotions (how people describe emotions or use language to convey their emotions to others) and emotion language (how emotions influence the way language is used and how language can influence emotions). This chapter focuses on the second topic and describes findings about emotional changes following language use as well as the way emotional states influence the language people use in business communication.

2 Phonetics

Phonetics is the smallest unit of language – these are the sounds that comprise words. For example, the phoneme (the sound) that corresponds to the letter *p* in English is produced by exhaling air while closing the lips and then releasing it at once. The sound that corre-

sponds to the letter *b* in English is produced in the same way, with the addition of activating the vocal chords. How do small phonetic differences influence emotional states? In this chapter, I show how the sounds of a word or a name can influence emotional responses and consequential decisions.

Imagine that you are deciding between two new brands of shampoo. One is called Polbee and the other is called Silbee. How does the brand name influence the associations that come to mind about the characteristics of the shampoo? Klink (2001) found that, since the sounds “p” and “o” are less associated with softness, compared with “s” and “i”, people felt that the Silbee shampoo was going to make their hair softer and, therefore, preferred that brand over the Polbee brand. This capacity of sounds to evoke certain meanings is called Phonetic Symbolism or Sound Symbolism (e.g., Bolinger 1975; Klink 2001; Lowrey and Shrum 2007). Sound Symbolism is one of the main theories that are used to describe the way the phonetics of a word can influence perceptions. Research finds that meanings are evoked through the physical aspects of the sounds, such as their frequency, as well as the muscle movement caused by the creation of sounds (Pogacar et al. 2018), and that this process is automatic and subconscious (Yorkston and Menon 2004). Some even suggest that the meanings associated with sound production are hardwired in our brain (Revill et al. 2014). For example, silent sounds (e.g., /p/, /k/, /t/) are produced by the separation of the vocal chords, resulting in a higher frequency of the sound (Klink 2000). Therefore, silent consonants are associated with smallness (Newman 1933), lightness, brightness of objects, as well as angular shapes and higher speed (Ohala 2005). Conversely, voiced consonants (e.g., /b/, /d/, /g/) create greater vibration of the vocal chords, resulting in lower sound frequency (Clark and Yallop 1990; Klink 2000). Therefore, such sounds are associated with heaviness, strength, bluntness, darkness, largeness, and roundness (Heath, Chatterjee, and France 1990; Klink 2001, 2003). Pathak, Calvert, and Lim (2017) find that certain sounds make brand names sound more luxurious because of perceptions of exclusivity associated with these sounds, while other sounds make a brand seem more basic, because of perceptions of simplicity associated with these sounds. Specifically, the authors find that luxury brand names (e.g., Toblerone, Louis Vuitton, and Porsche) contained more back vowels (‘u’), nasals (‘n’), affricates (‘sh’), and more syllables, whereas basic brand names (e.g., Twix, Gap, and Ford) contained more front vowels (“i”), less nasals, affricates, and syllables. Moreover, these sounds can convey luxuriousness or basicness when embedded in unfamiliar brand names. Furthermore, research by Joshi and Kronrod (2020) shows that silent sounds are associated with human characteristics, such as good-heartedness, gentleness, or patience, and through these associations businesses are able to metaphorically convey relevant product attributes, such as environmental friendliness. In this way, a cleaning substance that is named Posifad (as opposed to Bozivat) would elicit a feeling of “doing good” and would, therefore, be associated with environmental friendliness. Supporting this prediction, people preferred a butter cookie (less healthy) when it was named Ramune (voiced sounds) and a muesli cookie (healthier) when it was named Asahi (Fenko, Lotterman, and Galetzka 2016).

These findings suggest that emotions can be influenced by the mere sounds of brand names or company names. Evidence for the influence of phonetics on emotion also comes from research on stock market behavior. Some phonetic structures make certain company

names easier for pronunciation. For example, the stock abbreviation KAR is easier to pronounce than RDO. This ease of pronunciation elicits perceptions of fluency which, in turn, increases positive affect (Alter and Oppenheimer 2006; Reber, Winkielman, and Schwarz 1998). Based on this prediction, Alter and Oppenheimer (2006) conducted both lab studies and analyses of stock market fluctuations and found that, at least in the short run, stocks that had easy-to-pronounce names (that is, fluently named stocks) consistently performed better than stocks with disfluent names. Thus, phonetic structure can influence business decisions through emotion-based processes such as fluency. Positive affect can also originate from the pleasure in the familiar: Kronrod and Lowrey (2016) find that brand names that are phonetically similar to familiar brands (for example, Areo is similar to Oreo) can evoke positive emotions and liking, compared with brand names that are not similar to familiar ones. Relatedly, Pogacar et al. (2015, 2018) show that people develop positive emotions towards sounds that are more common among top brand names (for example, *S, M, L, and E*). Notably, there is no particular effect of merely more frequently used sounds on brand name liking. Rather, sounds that are specifically more frequently used in *top brand names* elicit more positive reactions.

An important aspect of phonemes, which explains their influence on emotion, is the location of pronunciation. For instance, the phoneme “b” is located at the front of the mouth, whereas the phoneme “g” is located at the back of the mouth. Research finds that the location of the pronunciation of a phoneme can influence emotional responses to brands. For instance, brand names with vowels that are pronounced at the front of the mouth (e.g., “i”) evoke a perception of a feminine brand personality and receive more positive emotional responses from females, whereas brand names with back vowels (e.g., “u”) create a perception of a masculine brand personality and are more likely to receive positive responses from males (Wu, Klink, and Guo 2013). Overall, when the use of certain sounds is suitable for the product category of the brand name, positive emotions are enhanced (Schloss 1981), possibly because of other positive reactions that take place, such as enhanced memory (Lowrey, Shrum, and Dubitsky 2003; Bergh et al. 1984; Peterson and Ross 1972).

Not only does the location of single phoneme pronunciation have an impact on brand name perceptions, but also the direction of movement in the mouth while pronouncing one phoneme after the other. Recent work finds that when the movement inside the mouth caused by a brand name is by a front-to-back order (for instance BeeGoo), this inward movement creates positive emotions associated with the embodiment of food intake or acceptance. Therefore, brand names that have an inward phonetic arrangement are consistently preferred over brand names that are ordered back-to-front (such as Koomee) because those brand names simulate and, therefore, associate with food rejection (e.g., Kronrod, Lowrey, and Ackerman 2014; Topolinski et al. 2014).

To summarize, research on the phonetic structure of brand names and other words used in business shows that every sound matters: the place of pronunciation, the direction of pronunciation, the ease of pronunciation, and its similarity to familiar words – all of these influence basic subconscious states, such as perceived fluency, familiarity, and pleasure, and result in positive emotional effects that, in turn, influence decisions that are made in the business world.

When clustered together, phonemes can constitute words. While phonemes alone may not have an established dictionary meaning, words predominantly do. The next section describes the influence that word meanings – semantics – can have on emotions in business, as well as the way emotions are expressed through words.

3 Semantics

The second smallest component of language are words. By combining phonemes in sequences and assigning them meaning, people create words. For example, the word “dog” is created by combining the phonemes d + o + g and assigning this combination the meaning: “a domesticated carnivorous mammal in the canine family that typically has a long snout, an acute sense of smell, and a barking, howling, or whining voice. It is widely kept as a pet or for work or field sports” (www.dictionary.com). Semantics is the science of word meaning. Importantly, in most languages, several words can denote the same meaning (e.g., happy and glad) and some words are homonyms – they have more than one meaning (e.g., “bank” means at least ‘a financial institution’ and ‘a river boundary’). Words can also have a literal meaning (e.g., blank = empty of content, as in “this piece of paper is blank”) and an indirect meaning (blank = empty or featureless, showing incomprehension or no reaction, as in, “In the middle of the sentence she suddenly went blank.”).

Particular word choice can have immense influence on emotion through implied meaning. Relatively incremental differences can have vast impact. For example, when making a business-related decision, people sometimes face struggles, such as the need to stand their ground, be firm enough, and exhibit power. Semantics can help achieve these goals. For instance, choosing to say “I don’t eat after 8pm” as opposed to “I can’t eat after 8pm” shows power and prevents others from questioning one’s preference or decision (Patrick and Hagtvedt 2012). Using “I don’t” versus “I can’t” also influences the user herself, empowering her to make certain product choices and to be more persistent. The reason for this lies in the implied meaning behind the two expressions: “I don’t” means that the speaker is in control of herself, while “I can’t” denotes external control to which the speaker abides. Thus, word choice can imply power.

Semantic meaning influences emotion through basic psychological mechanisms, such as familiarity and pleasure with the familiar, as well as pleasure with the novel, implications of positive or negative affect, and cognitions associated with processing non-literal, figurative language. The following paragraphs expand on research investigating these basic psychological processes.

3.1 Familiarity effect

How do the different meanings of words play a role in detecting, expressing, and influencing emotions in the business world? Words are used as the vehicle to convey emotional states, as well as the means to influence emotions. One important mechanism that is often used to evoke positive affect is familiarity (Fang, Singh, and Ahluwalia 2007). Familiarity

builds up through recurrent use of a word in the same meaning. Indeed, word (or name) familiarity can increase positive emotions towards business representatives (Gueguen 2003) or brand names (Cunha, Forehand, and Angle 2014). Furthermore, the mere knowledge of a familiar brand name can evoke more positive affect and greater liking, compared with an unfamiliar brand, as well as the unbranded sample of the same product (Isen, Labroo, and Durlach 2004). An effect which is also based on familiarity is the effect of linguistic style matching. Linguistic style matching occurs when a source (such as a product review author, a firm representative, or an advertisement) uses language that is similar in style to the linguistic style of the audience. Linguistic style matching (e.g., formal/informal language) has been shown to increase positive emotions and, importantly, trust, and results in greater purchase intentions (Moore and McFerran 2017; Ludwig et al. 2013). Research augmenting these findings suggests that novelty cues (like mentioning “new” on a product’s advertisement) may evoke the emotion of interest and curiosity (Sung et al. 2016) and result in more positive emotional reactions to business offers through the mechanism of pleasure with the novel (e.g., Berlyne 1954). Thus, pleasure with the familiar and pleasure with the novel, a basic psychological effect, integrate with word choice and its semantic implications to influence emotions in business communication.

3.2 Emotional valence

Yet another basic aspect of communication reflected through language is valence: positive and negative meaning. Positive and negative words themselves can influence emotional states and result in consumption outcomes. For instance, Ludwig et al. (2013) found that while greater increases in positive affective language in online product reviews do not influence purchase volume to a great extent, increases in negative affective content do. This asymmetry between the effect of positive and negative emotional words can be explained by our general tendency to attend more to negative content (Baumeister et al. 2007; Cohen, Pham, and Andrade 2008). In business communication, positive language, such as flattery, can influence perceptions of other people and objects. Moreover, when a product or a person is praised, people observing this flattery are likely to develop dual attitudes, encompassing positive emotions and attitudes about the target of flattery, but also negative affective reactions due to self-comparison and envy (Chan and Sengupta 2013). In this way, positive and negative language does not necessarily have a linear positive and negative influence on emotions and consequential decisions in business.

3.3 Figurative language

The majority of business communication employs the literal meanings of words. That is, the intended meaning of words in business meetings, consumer reviews or ads is their direct dictionary meaning. However, a prevalent portion of language used in business communication is figurative. There are multiple articles about figurative language in advertising, which predominantly suggest that the pleasure of saying, reading, or hearing a meta-

phor positively influences emotions and results in greater agreement with the business proposition (McQuarrie and Mick 1992, 1999, 2003). Recent research also finds that merely naming food items figuratively (e.g., ‘Tree of Life’ for steamed broccoli) significantly increases consumption of healthful food options, because of the pleasure people experience when encountering the figurative food names (Kronrod et al. 2021). Furthermore, research by Kronrod and Danziger (2013) on the use and effect of figurative language in consumer reviews of hedonic and utilitarian consumption suggests that language, such as metaphor, rhyme, irony, humor, or word play, can make both positive and negative emotions more extreme when the product or service is hedonic (consumed for fun), but there is no significant link between figurative language and emotional extremity in contexts of utilitarian (functional) products or services. Similarly, when consumers are in an emotional state, they tend to use more figurative language in product reviews, compared to less emotionally intense consumers, but this link is evident only in emotional contexts, such as hedonic consumption, and not in functional contexts such as utilitarian consumption. Thus, although figurative language in business communication predominantly induces positive emotions, some contexts do not contribute to this link as much as others.

3.4 Meaning from words and non-words

In a review of product designs that semantically convey positive emotions, Demirbilek and Sener (2003) provide multiple examples of “product language” – product features that convey meaning and influence emotions. For example, products and cars that resemble the enlarged baby’s skull (for instance the VW buggy), compared to slimmer designs (for instance Chevrolet), evoke the sense of cuteness. The color of a product can elicit depression or fear (e.g., black), as well as positive emotions like those evoked by soft yellow. Product forms that resemble humans increase interest towards the product, and in certain cases, attraction and desire. This work introduces an important aspect of the language of products – that business language can often be conveyed nonverbally. However, with the exception of this work, this chapter does not delve into nonverbal communication, which deserves a dedicated account.

To conclude, words in business (e.g., negotiations, advertising, social media) can both convey and influence emotions (Lefkowitz 2003), predominantly because of their ability to evoke meanings and associations. Although words, and especially brand names, can be presented alone, they usually convey meaning separately and are often analyzed in solitude. Most business communication consists of full phrases, which connect several words employing syntactical and grammatical rules. The next section is devoted to an analysis of the way the syntax or grammar in business language can influence emotion.

4 Grammar and syntax (text structure)

A prominent and interesting characteristic of language is that although it consists of a finite number of words and grammatical rules, there is an indefinite number of ways in which people use these grammatical rules to combine words into sentences. This nature

of language creates diverse and rich content. Research has identified several intriguing grammatical and syntactic aspects that influence emotions in business communication.

4.1 Personal pronouns

One prevalent grammatical feature of language, and an aspect that has received attention in research, is personal pronouns. While in most cases people choose grammatically appropriate and intuitively expected personal pronouns, the choice of certain pronouns can bear certain meanings that may influence the speaker or the listener. For example, certain languages have a singular and a polite plural form of this pronoun (e.g., Russian *ты/вы* or French *tu/vous*). Research shows that while the use of the singular “you” in those languages can signal disrespect, it also signals directness and warmth, as opposed to the use of the plural “you”. Other research shows that the choice of the pronoun “we” as opposed to using “I” and “you” in conversation with firm representatives, negotiations, and business meetings, creates a feeling of unity, cooperation, and “being on the same side of the fence” (Sela, Wheeler, and Sarial-Abi 2012). This trust-evoking choice of personal pronoun in business communication can be a deal maker or breaker.

Pronouns can also influence emotions in service communication: Packard, Moore, and McFerran (2014) show that company representatives who use self-referencing singular pronouns, such as “me” and “I” (as opposed to “we”), can increase customer’s positive responses because customers perceive the service provider as more empathetic. Similarly, the use of formal second person address, such as the plural form of “you” in French or Russian or the use of *usted* versus *tú* in Spanish, makes people feel that the company is more competent, whereas the use of informal second person address makes the company feel warmer (Bayyurt and Bayraktaroglu 2001). These emotions should be relevant to the business context: while restaurants may benefit from exerting warmth, law firms would benefit from more formal address because of the importance of competence in this context.

4.2 Parts of speech: Adverbs

Sun et al. (2015) show that using adverbs can have a significant influence on emotion expression in e-business. For example, a sentence containing “extremely” or “a little” can signal the intensity of the emotion underlying it. These findings contribute to the ability of e-businesses to improve customer relationship management by implementing adverbs, as adverbs seem to support emotional strength and contribute to the overall emotional meaning of e-business communication, where other ways of expressing emotion, such as gestures, tone of voice, and face movements, are not available.

4.3 Sentence types: Statements and questions

A central division in syntactic structure of language is to types of sentences, specifically questions versus statements. Hagtvedt (2015) finds that consumers who are excited (emo-

tionally aroused) evaluate products more positively if the products are promoted using statement rather than question phrasing (e.g., “the pen for you”) because they feel as if the argument in the advertisement is clear. Conversely, under low arousal, people react better to advertisements that are phrased as questions and, subsequently, develop more favorable product evaluations because questions evoke interest and curiosity, which are important motivators in these emotional states. Investigating the influence of questions on financial planning, Kronrod (2022b) finds that, compared with statements, questions evoke much greater involvement. Interestingly, this changes perceptions of time, making future events seem closer. Therefore using questions in communication about future financial planning (like planning for retirement) can make people more proactive about these important, but often underestimated issues.

4.4 Other grammatical effects on emotion

Other grammatical aspects of the sentence influence its emotional impact. Some works focus on the ways in which consumers express positive and negative product evaluations and how managers interpret product reviews (Antioco and Coussement 2018). Although direct expressions of positive or negative emotions in reviews do not significantly influence the way managers interpret those reviews, using more third-person pronouns like “they” and cognitive language markers like discrepancy words (“by contrast”, “unlike”) sharpens managers’ interpretation of the reviews as being negative. Furthermore, longer reviews make it more challenging for managers to correctly identify negative reviews, possibly because of fatigue. Finally, when consumers use causal language (“because” and “therefore”) and express behavior intentions and future plans through the use of future tense verbs, managers interpret the reviews as being more positive than they actually are. This is possibly because both causality and future tense are linked to optimism and problem solving.

In summary, research indicates that grammatical structure, such as clauses including explanations or question sentences as well as parts of speech that are used in expected and less expected ways (e.g., adverbs, personal pronouns) can have particular emotional effects and can reveal the emotional states of the communicators. While the use of grammatical rules to convey emotion or influence emotion may appear to be goal-oriented, pragmatics – the research of using language to achieve goals – is a sub-field of linguistic inquiry that is of particular interest to business communication and will be the focus of the next section.

5 Pragmatics

Pragmatics is a sub-field in linguistics that focuses on the way people use language to achieve goals. There are various ways in which the same word or expression can be used, and the outcome of this usage can be quite different. For instance, Grinstein and Kronrod (2016) find that in communication encouraging prosocial behavior, an assertive tone can intensify the emotional influence of using a scolding approach (e.g., “You have not done enough.”) or praising approach (e.g., “You have been doing great, keep it up!”). Specifically,

ly, assertive language in the context of praising intensifies the feeling of optimism and self-efficacy. Conversely, when the message scolds people for not doing enough, assertive language increases feelings of guilt and might be an “overkill”, which decreases the likelihood of engaging in more prosocial behavior. Similarly, in a recent work, Lee, Hosanagar, and Nair (2018) find that including language describing brand personality, such as humor, emotion, or the brand’s pro-social positioning, increases consumer engagement with marketing messages. Conversely, directly informative language, such as mentions of prices, availability, and product features, reduces consumer engagement with the message and reduces purchasing. It seems then that choosing *what* to say and *how* to say it can influence resulting reactions and consequential actions.

5.1 Assertiveness

A prominent characteristic of business communication is a relatively high level of politeness and indirectness. However, research investigating politeness in business communication has also found that sometimes a more assertive, less gentle approach can influence emotions in a significant way. For instance, Kronrod, Grinstein, and Wathieu (2012a) found that marketing communication about hedonic products – products that are consumed for fun – which uses assertive language such as, “You must try this ice-cream.” or, “Enjoy!” may be more convincing than more polite and gentle language, like, “Consider trying this ice-cream.”, because consumption of such products elicits positive mood and positive mood, in turn, changes language such that more intense language is used and expected. Kronrod, Grinstein and Shuval (2021) also find that assertive language suits positive communication that praises and encourages people to do something, because it reinforces the positive emotional ambiance of such communication. By contrast, negative communication about undesirable behaviors that evokes feelings of guilt should be non-assertive, to reduce the negative affective responses it evokes.

In another work investigating politeness and assertiveness in business communication, Kronrod, Grinstein, and Wathieu (2012b) find that people who are emotionally involved with an issue and deem the issue important (for instance, water conservation) tend to expect, and are consequently more likely to adhere to, assertive marketing communication promoting these issues because assertive language emphasizes the urgency and importance of the matter, while more gentle language might signal dismissal of the important issue. Finally, as assertive language is a natural intensifier of the topic at hand (Grinstein and Kronrod 2016), other emotionally intense contexts may benefit from the use of assertive communication (e.g., emergency, hurricane preparedness, etc.).

5.2 Narrative and style

Text structure is an important feature of online communication about brands. Aspects of the text, such as formality or employing narrative style, can have a vast influence on the reader’s emotions and reveal the writer’s emotional state as well. For instance, research has commonly found that online content that is telling a story positively influences atti-

tudes because the reader is transported into the story, gets more involved with the main character, and is consequently more emotionally engaged (Adaval and Wyer 1998; Murphy et al. 2013; van Laer et al. 2014). Conversely, Dessart (2018) found that storytelling video ads that generate greater narrative transportation may in fact reduce character identification, resulting in an overall *decrease* in positive attitudes towards the brand. Using formal language in online communication increases perceptions of the speaker's competence but, at the same time, people tend to like and trust speakers who use informal language because they appear warmer and closer (Na 2018).

5.3 Using language to signal meaning

One of the predominant uses of language in business is signaling. For instance, emotional language can signal dominance: using language that expresses anger increases perceptions of the speaker's dominance. Conversely, language expressing happiness can signal submissiveness (Belkin, Kurtzberg, and Naquin 2013). In another work which focused on language abstraction (Schellekens, Verlegh, and Smidts 2010), it was found that people tend to use more abstract language when they describe consumption experiences that are in line with their attitudes towards products (whether positive or negative) and more concrete language when the experience is in contradiction with their perceptions of the product. Interestingly, this use of more abstract or more concrete language influences listeners of Word of Mouth as well. When people hear or read positive product reviews, the use of more abstract language in those reviews signals that the person sharing the review has a more positive attitude towards the product and has higher intentions to purchase it.

5.4 Influence of emotion on the speaker's language

Emotional states influence the pragmatic use of language. For example, when people share posts about their experiences, they are likely to adjust their language to other posters on the platform because language matching is an outcome of feeling "in the same boat", which often occurs in online forums. Moore and McFerran (2017) find that when people feel personally similar to a previous poster, they mimic this poster's positive emotional and social language. However, when people feel similar in *status* to a previous poster, they do not mimic emotional or social language, but rather their cognitive and descriptive words. Furthermore, this differential mimicry can influence people's frequency and volume of posting. As the mere intention to persuade other people can change the language people use, for instance increase its emotionality (Rocklage, Rucker, and Nordgren 2018a), a highly important link between goals and the pragmatic use of language should be considered.

5.5 Influence of language on the speaker's emotion

Language can influence not only Word of Mouth receivers, but also those who share it. For instance, when people try to explain what happened during their consumption experience,

this action of explaining influences their own reactions to the product and changes their evaluations of the products. Specifically, when people explain their hedonic consumption experiences, the explanations decrease the emotionality of their reactions and, as a result, their evaluations of the product become less extreme, such that positive evaluations become less positive and negative evaluations become less negative. However, explaining utilitarian consumption experiences has a converse effect, increasing the extremity of product evaluations, whether negative or positive (Moore 2012). Furthermore, *what* people explain is also of importance to the extremity of product evaluations. People share Word of Mouth explaining their actions (what they did) more than their reactions (how they feel about it) for utilitarian products, but they explain their reactions more than their actions for hedonic products (Moore 2015). Suiting the type of explanation to product type can influence the persuasive power of Word of Mouth.

5.6 Norms and influence

Any pragmatic use of language depends on linguistic norms, or what is expected to be said and how (e.g., Kronrod, Grinstein, and Wathieu 2012a; Xie and Kronrod 2012; Miller and Kahn 2005). Specifically, Miller and Kahn (2005) explain that when a message deviates from conversation norms, consumers understand that there is more to the message than the obvious meaning and this increases product evaluations due to a perception that the communicator has made a contribution to the conversation beyond the usual. Xie and Kronrod (2012) find that when a communicator uses more precise words to describe environmentally friendly features of a product, consumers feel that the firm is more competent because the norm for more professional sources is to use more precise language because they have greater expertise (they know what they are talking about). Similarly, norms drive reactions to marketing messages in various contexts. For instance, Kronrod, Grinstein, and Wathieu (2012a) show that as people in a positive mood have higher expectations for blunter and less polite language, messages about hedonic products (products that are consumed for fun and, therefore, are associated with positive mood) are more persuasive when they employ more assertive and direct language, such as “Just do it!”.

To summarize, pragmatics research reveals how the use (and sometimes abuse) of language influences both the target audience and the speaker herself. While pragmatics is considered a universal trait of language use, mounting research has devoted attention to differences between cultures and languages. Globalization processes of business expansion make this sub-field of linguistic inquiry an important source of information. The final section focuses on this question.

6 Cross-cultural linguistics

Following the advancement of international trade and online communication, both researchers and professionals have devoted much thought to the investigation of cultural differences that can be evidenced within a market and between different markets. Within this research, linguistic differences are a relevant topic because language and cultural dif-

ferences sometimes pose an issue in current marketing and communication management environments. For instance, emotional states can be described differently in different cultures. Consequently, research has noticed overarching cross-cultural differences in several topics, as discussed below.

6.1 Emotion and control

Emotion and self-control are often at the center of cross-cultural differences. For example, while Hebrew puts the experiencer in the object place within a sentence and tends to use somatic descriptions of the experiencer losing control or being controlled by emotions, such as “anger shook me”, English uses descriptions that put the experiencer as the subject of the sentence and entail experiencer control, as in “I shook with anger” (Kidron and Kuzar 2002). Also, while American individuals express emotion verbally more often and in greater elaboration, Chinese respondents tend to express emotion nonverbally and exercise reticence (Caldwell-Harris, Kronrod, and Young 2013).

Alcántara-Pilar et al. (2017) asked British and Spanish participants to browse a website in their first language, or in their second language (Spanish for British and English for Spanish). The authors find that processing information in one’s first language can contribute to feelings of certainty to a greater extent than browsing in a second language.

6.2 Emotional intensity

Puntoni, de Langhe, and van Osselaer (2008) found that texts (such as advertising slogans) in a person’s first language are perceived as more emotional than texts in a second/foreign language. Similarly, Langhe et al. (2011) show that bilinguals tend to provide more extreme ratings on scales appearing in their second language versus in their first language because words in an individual’s native language are intrinsically more emotional, due to the higher frequency with which words are used and heard in first- versus second-language contexts. Interestingly, Domzal, Hunt, and Kernan (1995) found a somewhat contrasting phenomenon where foreign words that are used in advertisements increased advertising effectiveness because of the less frequent use of these words in one’s day-to-day conversations, which are mainly done in one’s first language. Thus, the less frequently experienced words are those more likely to increase persuasiveness because of enhanced memory for the unusual.

As speaking a foreign language might increase anxiety because of the less comfortable situation (Aichhorn and Puck 2017), perceptions of foreign business communication are likely to be influenced by this uncomfortable feeling. For example, communication avoidance, negative emotional response, or confusion are likely to occur in such cases.

6.3 Code switching and meaning

Brasel and Gips (2014) show that same-language subtitles (that match the spoken language in the ad) can enhance advertising effectiveness for television commercials, compared to

translation subtitles, because brand recall and memory of other verbal information is enhanced with the attention people devote to the same-language subtitles. In these cases, processing is significantly enhanced by the matching between what is said and what is written.

One of the questions discussed with relation to code switching is whether it matters what language the switching goes from and to. Relatedly, Ahn, Ferle, and Lee (2017) find that code switching (both spoken and written) from Korean to English evokes more positive reactions than code switching from English to Korean. One possible reason for this difference is that code switching from a first language to a foreign language is easier than the other way around, as the first-language introduction provides an important context and background that helps understand the foreign language continuation.

6.4 Language and thought

Hornikx and van Meurs (2017) explored brand positioning as belonging to a foreign culture by using foreign language. They found that using foreign language in an ad implies country-of-origin (COO) of the brand. These implications, in turn, evoke associations, expectations, and affective responses depending on the consumer's own culture. Using a foreign language helps brands signal country of origin without explicitly mentioning the country, thereby allowing the mind to seamlessly arrive at the conclusion while processing brand information.

Following research comparing product evaluation as dependent on language structure in different cultures, Schmitt and Zhang (1998) and Huang and Chan (2005) find that because objects in certain languages, such as Chinese, have names that represent their form or other attributes, perceptions of these products also differ between Chinese and English speakers. Specifically, product categorization on websites and in people's perception when comparing products, depends on these linguistic structures and results in differences in the positivity of responses to different products. A very interesting work on the structure of tenses in different languages by Chen (2013) demonstrates that languages in which the future and present are grammatically associated (e.g., the English phrase "we are buying a car next month" is relating to the future, but grammatically it is in the present continuous tense) encourage future-oriented behavior, such as greater saving (resulting in greater wealth at retirement) or more cautious health behavior (e.g., smoking less, practicing safer sex, or avoiding obesity).

Importantly, associations with the language in use, especially for bilinguals, can influence perceptions of what is being said such that, if the language a slogan switches to has positive associations (for instance, it is the language of a powerful culture in the context or it is the language of the majority), people evaluate the brand or product more highly. The opposite is found for switching to languages with negative associations (Luna and Peracchio 2005a, 2005b).

7 Conclusion

Within the business world, the link between language and emotion bears practical implications. Therefore, theories of language within business communication describe linguistic phenomena from both a theoretical and a practical perspective. For example, Assertiveness Theory (Kronrod, Grinstein, and Wathieu 2012a, 2012b; Grinstein and Kronrod 2016) suggests that an assertive tone intensifies what is being said, resulting in increased extremity of consumer reactions to marketing communication messages. Another theory by Carnevale, Luna, and Lerman (2017), the theory of Brand Linguistics, suggests a novel integrative approach which, among other topics, offers an analysis of the effects of brand name graphics, sounds, and meaning on emotional reactions to brands. Finally, work on the link between language and trust has developed theoretical definitions of linguistic aspects of insincerity. For instance, Kronrod, Lee, and Gordeliy (2017; 2022) suggest that the different types of memory involved in telling about authentic or fictitious experiences influence the language that is used by the teller and, consequently, insincere tales are characterized by less concrete language and by lesser use of low-frequency words. These examples, as well as the findings reviewed in this chapter, describe the current state of research on language and emotion in the business world.

Recent developments in text analytics and computational linguistics approaches contribute new methods to define, operationalize, and investigate the language of emotion. For instance, Colladon (2018) developed a code that computes the relative importance of a brand through a combined measure of the brand's prevalence in online discourse, the diversity of opinions about it, and the connectivity of terms mentioned in its regard (for instance, through word co-occurrences). Rocklage, Rucker, and Nordgren (2018b) developed a language-based computational measure of the degree of emotionality of a text. Using this software (available at www.evaluativelexicon.com), one can measure to what extent a text is emotional and what is the emotional valence of the text. Employing text mining, Ludwig et al. (2013) discovered that while larger increases in positive emotional language in customer product reviews have a smaller effect on subsequent increases in purchases, this effect does not occur for changes in negative emotional language in product reviews. In addition, these authors find that if the language of the product review matches with the linguistic style within the community where the review is posted, this linguistic style matching enhances the influence of the review on purchases. Preoțiuc-Pietro et al. (2015) reveal novel findings through text analysis, showing that people who express more fear and anger are more likely to be of higher income, whereas lower income people tend to express emotions and opinions. These findings may be related to the link between income and intelligence or education, but future research is needed to shed light on the causal explanation of such results. Finally, Tirunillai and Tellis (2012) found relationships between language and stock price. Specifically, they found that the volume of user-generated online content significantly influences trading volume and that, while negative emotional content has a significant and long-lasting negative effect on abnormal returns, positive emotional content does not influence stock abnormal returns.

While overall emotional intensity increases product preference consistency (Holbrook and Batra 1987; Lee, Amir, and Ariely 2009), language can influence the relationships be-

tween emotion and business decisions to a great extent as language, itself, influences emotions, perceptions, and decision making. The exploration of the links between language and emotion within the business world, employing traditional methods and more recent text analytics methods, can reveal novel results that will inform business practice on ways to effectively communicate, converse, influence, and achieve set goals.

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89 Management, organizational communication, and emotion

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Abstract: Emotions are woven into the fabric of organizations and are shaped and understood through communication processes. Through language choices in formal policy training, meetings, and informal interactions, managers influence organizational emotions in a variety of ways. For instance, managers can mandate preferred emotional displays, leverage emotions to enhance relationships with employees, and even create negative emotions to exert power and bully employees. Thus, emotions serve important functions in organizations by connecting organizational members, heightening awareness, inspiring change, guiding or influencing decisions, and creating outcomes to benefit organizations. Yet, emotions are also tied to problematic issues in organizations such as stress, burnout, incivility, harassment, and workplace bullying. This chapter explores emotions in terms of management and organizational communication by discussing how emotions are leveraged and negotiated in terms of leadership (e.g., leader member exchange, transformational leadership), training (e.g., emotional intelligence), organizational culture and manipulation of emotions (e.g., preferred emotional displays, organization socialization of specific emotions, emotion labor, and emotional contagion), and problematic outcomes (e.g., stress, burnout, incivility, harassment and bullying). Importantly, this in-depth examination of the intersections of emotions, management, and organizational communication provides practical applications and avenues to extend current understanding.

1 Introduction

“Today was fantastic!”

“I had the worst day ever.”

“I am so frustrated with my co-worker.”

“I feel recognized and appreciated by my boss.”

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Organizations are filled with emotions which are experienced, shaped, shared and interpreted through communication (Riforgiate and Komarova 2017). On the one hand, emotion serves to connect members, heighten awareness, inspire change, guide or influence decisions, and create preferred outcomes. On the other hand, emotions are tied to problematic issues in organizations such as stress, burnout, incivility, harassment, and workplace bullying. Because full-time employees often privilege work identities over private identities (Tracy and Trethewey 2005) and spend half of their waking hours or more at work, it is worthwhile to explore emotions in the workplace. Importantly, managers and organizational leaders are influential sources of emotion rules and regulations that have a bearing on how employees experience the workplace (Ashkanasy and Dorris 2017; Riforgiate and Sepúlveda 2021). Therefore, this chapter examines how emotions, language, and management are intertwined and the associated implications for employees, organizational structures, and relationships.

In doing so, the chapter takes a structuration theoretical approach for understanding emotion and organizing (Giddens 1984). Such an approach assumes that the communication of organizational emotion unfolds at micro, meso, and macro levels (Tracy and Malvini Redden 2019). Given this handbook's focus on language, we primarily emphasize the ways that emotions unfold through micro interactions, talk, and nonverbals. That said, along the way, we also touch upon the ways in which emotion-related communication is structured through meso level organizational policies and procedures, as well as the ways in which macro societal discourses (which are created, resisted, and reified through language) serve to motivate or discipline various aspects of emotion communication in organizations.

2 Emotions and language

According to Barsade, “emotions are intense, relatively short-term affective reactions to a specific environmental stimulus” (Barsade 2002: 646). Emotions involve a reaction to a particular event or interaction and are more specific than moods (Weiss and Cropanzano 1996). In other words, one may express joy in learning about a promotion, anger when required to work overtime, great compassion when working with a client, or embarrassment when reprimanded in front of co-workers. Scholars categorize and study emotions in a variety of ways, ranging from describing emotions as a combination of two primary dimensions – direction (positive or negative) and intensity – to emotions as discrete categories such as jealousy or pride (Waldron 2012).

Regardless of how emotions are characterized, they fulfill important functions. People are “inherently emotional beings”, using emotions to feel connected and a sense of belonging (Frost et al. 2000: 26). Emotions are heavily relied on when weighing alternatives to make decisions (George 2000), make sense of experiences (Lutgen-Sandvik, Chromey, and Paskewitz 2015), and guide moral assessments (Waldron 2012). Planalp (1998) explains that emotions help us determine what is important because, “in an age of information overload, it is easy to get lost in what makes sense and lose track of what matters” (Planalp 1998: 67). Furthermore, for some jobs communicating emotions is the work. For example, Sutton (1991) describes that bill collectors are trained and required to make angry statements to persuade

payees to fulfill financial promises, and Hall (1993) discusses how waitresses exude happiness through positive language and nonverbal cues to increase their tips.

It is also vital to recognize that emotions and language are inextricably linked. While emotions are experienced through physiological processes (e.g., increased heart rate, pupil dilation), individuals use language to interpret and make sense of these feelings in a given context (Heelas 1996), making emotions both biological and social (Anderson and Guerrero 1998). Our emotions are organized and shaped through formal policy language, as well as informal interactions. As Waldron explains, “[i]t is through communication that emotion is recognized in others, expressed, regulated, interpreted and elicited” (Waldron 2012: xii). Importantly, emotion is a prominent part of work and creating a work culture (Miller 2002).

3 Managing emotions

3.1 Relationship-oriented leadership

As technology developments and workforce demands have shifted over time, theories about the best ways to lead the workforce have increasingly focused on leader-follower relationships to motivate and retain employees. For example, the leader member exchange theory (LMX) highlights the importance of developing in-group meaningful relationships with employees to increase worker satisfaction and commitment (Graen and Uhl-Bien 1995). Managers who regularly and sincerely use positive language and nonverbal cues to develop relationships with employees increase helping behaviors, teamwork, and creativity (Lutgen-Sandvik, Riforgiate, and Westerman 2015).

However, when workers do not feel this connection with managers and feel like there are contradictions between managers' language and behaviors, there can be a divide between the way managers and employees see the same organization, resulting in cynicism and low motivation. For example, Hall (2011) interviewed managers who described how successful their leadership was, with one manager sharing that one could “look at just about everybody and see an orientation where we attempt to inspire, to motivate” (Hall 2011: 71). Yet, while the managers' language said one thing, employees' observations led to different understandings. Employees shared that leaders' behaviors indicated that managers did not care about the employees and only focused on “bottom line results, results, results” (Hall 2011: 72). The employees discussed that because of inconsistencies between the verbal and nonverbal messages, they had poor working relationships with the managers and felt disconnected, cynical of management, and dissatisfied. Hall's (2011) study calls attention to the importance of alignment between verbal communication and nonverbal cues in communicating sincerity and trust among followers. Critically, poor supervisor-employee relationships and the associated negative emotions are detrimental to employee morale and work practices.

Transformational leadership theory also highlights the importance of leader-follower relationships and communication by focusing on meeting followers' self-esteem and self-actualization needs to positively alter (transform) followers (Riforgiate 2016). Bass (1985) posits that transformational leaders embody and communicate four characteristics to their

followers: idealized influence (communicates charismatically), individualized consideration (awareness and attentiveness to each follower's unique needs), intellectual stimulation (challenges followers to think critically and creatively), and inspirational motivation (sharing a focused vision that resonates with followers). These human-oriented leaders use precise language that enhances positive employee perceptions of the leader (deVries, Bakker-Pieper, and Oostenveld 2010), and followers of transformational leadership also feel included and excited about transformational leadership (Riforgiate 2016). Importantly, the frequency of positive emotional experiences has greater influence than the intensity (Weiss and Cropanzano 1996), indicating the need for consistent communication over time.

Further, supportive language increases the amount of information employees share with the leader and other employees, while enhancing follower satisfaction and team commitment (deVries, Bakker-Pieper, and Oostenveld 2010). To be successful in transformational leadership, leaders must understand their own and followers' emotions to create change. However, expectations of leaders' use of supportive language are different for male and female leaders. While females are expected to communicate and behave in supportive ways, Loughlin, Arnold, and Bell Crawford (2012) found that male leaders who used the exact same supportive language were seen more positively than the female leaders. As a result, male leaders were rated higher and recommended for raises and special projects more frequently than the female leaders for language that reflected individualized consideration (Loughlin, Arnold, and Bell Crawford 2012). Ultimately, while supportive language is important for all leaders, some leaders are more advantaged when using messages that attend to followers needs.

3.2 Emotional intelligence

One way to build stronger leader-follower relationships is through developing emotional intelligence. Emotional intelligence, or the ability of managers to self-regulate their own and workers' emotions, was introduced by Salovey and Mayer and popularized by Goleman in the 1990s (Fineman 2000). Intelligent emotional regulation of employees occurs when managers use language to dissipate negative emotions and heighten positive emotions in productive ways. In addition, emotional intelligence also includes the ability to manage one's own emotions by accentuating, expressing, or suppressing emotions as needed to perform well. People with greater emotional intelligence tend to be better at processing information, motivating others, demonstrating greater decision-making flexibility, and managing organizational culture (George 2000). Goleman (1995) contends that emotional intelligence is measurable and teachable, commodifying emotions through managerial training. He highlights that rational and emotional thought are both important, with rationality contributing reflection and thought and emotion providing important impulses to act. Goleman (1998) suggests that by shaping automatic responses into productive habits, people can enhance "what we think, feel, and do to get the job done" (Goleman 1998: 243).

However, the concept of emotional intelligence is not without criticism. As Dougherty and Krone (2002) pointed out, the ability to manipulate emotions does not necessarily mean the manager is ethical. Further, it is quite possible that emotionally intelligent man-

agers could use language to manipulate emotions for their own benefit rather than to improve the organization. Finally, emotional intelligence may simply be a way to commodify emotion, where “it’s less a celebration of feeling than a resource to enhance managers’ ‘intelligent’, rational control” (Fineman 2000: 105), as managing emotions can involve faking emotions for the benefit of the manager or organization. Ultimately, leadership theories and management training programs are increasingly acknowledging the importance of emotions in the workplace and the role of language and nonverbal behaviors in shaping those emotions. This is not without its challenges, given the ease with which emotions can be manipulated, in their expression and in their elicitation.

4 Emotions at work

Despite emotion being part and parcel of workplace interactions, professional ideals often deem the expression of workplace emotions as inappropriate, with a preference for rational (unemotional) decision making and goal-directed behavior (Mumby and Putnam 1992). Emotions can be perceived as detrimental to productivity when the energy spent on emotions interferes with work tasks. From this point of view, “good organizations are places where feelings are managed, designed out, or removed” (Fineman 1996: 545). Generally, verbalizing and expressing negative or intense emotion is seen as inappropriate except for special circumstances (Ashforth and Humphrey 1995).

Showing negative or other unapproved workplace emotion is especially problematic for marginalized employees. Indeed, workers’ positions, biological sex, and race influence the acceptability of particular emotional expressions. Davis, LaRosa, and Foshee reported that female workers “perceived the display of anger as more costly to supervisor-subordinate relations and more costly to them personally than did male subjects” (Davis, LaRosa, and Foshee 1992: 518). In other studies, African American professionals shared that they needed to display neutral and positive emotions while suppressing expressions of anger as minority workers in the United States (Wingfield 2010). In Western cultures, emotions are expected to be managed, and if not managed, they are seen as a sign of weakness, with women explaining they need to control their emotions twice as frequently as men (Lutz 1996). The load of emotion work, therefore, is not consistent across employees. What’s more, and in connection with what we reviewed earlier in terms of leadership, the same emotional expressions are interpreted differently depending on the gendered and raced bodies from which they emanate (Parker 2002).

Which emotions are seen as most dangerous? Rather than omitting all emotions from the workplace, it is more accurate to say that managers generally discourage extreme and/or negative emotion expressions, while moderate and positive emotions are viewed as more appropriate and acceptable. Yet, what it means to be “professional” in a given context in terms of expressing emotions can vary greatly depending on the work. For example, using harsh language and nonverbal cues to communicate extreme anger may be completely inappropriate for a hospice care worker who is expected to exercise compassion (Way and Tracy 2012), but rewarded for a bill collector who is trained to see clients not as people, but as a “bill you’ve got to collect” (Sutton 1991: 260). Managers and other organizational

members are key stakeholders in shaping the understanding of preferred emotional expressions through hiring processes, policies and everyday interactions (Rafaeli and Sutton 1987; Sutton 1991).

4.1 Organizational socialization of emotions

Through interactions, people come to understand which emotions are most appropriate in an organization to perform specific types of work; the process of learning these emotional language rules and behaviors occurs through organizational socialization (Scott and Myers 2005). Workers learn to manipulate their language to display unfelt emotions, stifle or suppress emotional expression, accentuate and heighten felt emotions, and even outwardly express different emotions than are felt (Ekman and Friesen 1975; Scarduzio and Malvini Redden 2015). Emotions can be diffused through humor, reframed through comparisons, adapted or desensitized through repeated exposures, or ritualized to become a routine expression (Ashforth and Kreiner 2002).

One example of emotional manipulation occurs when medical students are socialized to speak in calm and neutral language because “neutrality reinforces professionals’ power and keeps clients from challenging them” (Smith and Kleinman 1989: 56). Senior medical students initiate new students using humor by telling stories and pulling pranks with cadavers to normalize working with bodies; this signals to new members to toughen emotions and discourages expressing emotions that indicate weakness (Hafferty 1998). In contrast, hospice care workers learn to communicate and experience compassion by recognizing, relating, and (re)acting with patients, which suggests awareness, attention, and observation to understand and connect with clients (Way and Tracy 2012).

Some organizations socialize workers to suppress or compartmentalize emotions. Basic training is designed to teach drill sergeants to constrain emotions felt and displayed, denying feeling to enhance motivation and control attitudes (Katz 1990). Part of the job of high steel ironworkers is to not be afraid, so managers and workers use language to tease, shame, and rebuke those who do not want to work because of poor weather conditions to discourage the expression of fear (Haas 1977). Through hiring processes, municipal fire department employees are screened to weed out those who do not manage their emotions (Scott and Myers 2005). Further, through repeated exposure to emotional events, hazing to toughen character, and formal training emphasizing professionalism, fire fighters are taught to buffer and compartmentalize emotions to focus on urgent tasks at hand (Scott and Myers 2005). However, compartmentalization of emotions may come at a cost. While this emotional socialization helps fire fighters perform dangerous work, Scott and Myers (2005) caution that by repeatedly managing and suppressing emotions, individuals might ignore important danger cues or signals.

Each of these examples demonstrates how managers and members select, train, and interact with new members to socialize them into the organizational emotions that should be vocalized, displayed, and shared to uphold cultural expectations and rules pertaining to emotion. In these cases, managing emotions helps employees fit in at work, complete tasks, and meet expectations. As will be explained further, depending on the socialization

and purpose of emotion management and performance, sometimes displaying particular emotions is not just part of being an organizational member, but is the work.

4.2 Emotional labor

In 1983, Arlie Hochschild published research on airline stewardesses and bill collectors, coining the term “emotional labor” to describe how managers commodify employee’s performance of specified emotions for organizational benefit. Emotional labor involves “the management of feeling to create a publicly observable facial and bodily display” for commerce (Hochschild 1983: 7). This display is created through language choice, vocal tone, rate, and pitch, as well as through other nonverbal actions such as posture and facial expression. What’s more, employees manage the strain of emotion via multiple types of verbal communication such as joking, teasing, storytelling, and gossiping. While lucrative for companies, linguistically and nonverbally performing organizationally sanctioned emotions can be problematic since emotions are central to how individuals understand, think about, and make decisions about the world (Scott and Myers 2005).

People have a natural tendency to participate in organizational socialization practices and accept organizational rules, even if it is not in their best interest. For example, airline stewardesses are trained to emotionally respond to airline emergencies by keeping their voice calm and in control, suppressing any wavering fear and betraying natural physiological responses (Hochschild 1983). Their language and nonverbal communication choices also reflect these goals to assure passengers and maintain calm. One stewardess shared that in the event of a crash, “[e]ven though I’m a very honest person, I have learned not to allow my face to mirror my alarm or fright. [...] *I think I would probably [...] be able to keep them [the passengers] from being too worried about it*” (Hochschild 1983: 107; italics in original). Here, the stewardess denies her natural response to communicate a preferred organizational response for the passengers and the bottom line of the airline.

Employees manipulate how customers see an organization by engaging in emotional labor at two levels: surface acting and deep acting, both of which involve manipulating communication performance and messages to make outward emotions appear authentic (Waldron 2012). *Surface acting* involves identity management when employees fake their outward emotional displays and align their language to appear as if they are feeling an emotion that they are not authentically experiencing (Hochschild 1983). For instance, employees might smile and use positive language during a customer interaction even if the customer is rude, inappropriate, and berating them. *Deep acting* involves feeling the displayed emotion. Deep acting might be naturally felt or involve re-framing a situation to see it in a more flattering light. Using the above example, a stewardess might re-frame inappropriate passenger behavior to see the passenger’s behavior as that of a frightened child, shifting the stewardess’s emotion felt and language used to address the passenger with compassion and care rather than with anger (Hochschild 1983).

Emotional labor has been examined across myriad contexts after Hochschild’s (1983) seminal work on airline stewardesses and bill collectors. Emotional labor research ranges across work settings from financial planners (Miller and Koesten 2008) to journalists (Hop-

per and Huxford 2015) to municipal court judges (Scarduzio 2011) to paralegals (Lively 2000), among others. These studies illustrate how managers that require employees to manipulate emotional performance, either faking expression or changing internal feelings, can lead to both problematic and beneficial outcomes (Malvini Redden 2013; Rivera 2015; Rivera and Tracy 2014). For example, Hall (1993) studied waitresses who accepted and enacted a subordinate role to management and customers. By enacting “deference, particularly by smiling to show they take pleasure in serving” (Hall 1993: 456), they benefited by increasing their tip income. Simultaneously, this emotional performance also created problems by exposing female waitresses to explicit harassment, with some customers making sexual references such as “here comes dessert” (Hall 1993: 464) or objectifying their server.

Additionally, in terms of surface acting, the tension and strain experienced when there is a discrepancy between the performed and felt emotion creates emotional dissonance (Ashforth and Humphrey 1993). The strain of emotional dissonance contributes to employees feeling like they have a fake work-self as they manufacture and communicate unfelt emotions (Conrad and Witte 1994; Tracy 2000). Dissonance is heightened the more employees feel they are required to fake emotions that they do not agree with, leading to burnout (Rafaeli and Sutton 1987; Riforgiate, Howes, and Simmons 2021). Emotional dissonance can “lead to personal and work-related maladjustment, such as poor self-esteem, depression, cynicism, and alienation from work” (Ashforth and Humphrey 1993: 96–97). It is worth noting that women may be particularly vulnerable when faking emotions using language and nonverbal cues because they are more likely to experience emotional exhaustion compared to men (Gaines and Jermier 1983).

Strain also results when employees are expected to perform conflicting emotions. For example, Tracy (2004) notes how correctional officers were required to take care of inmates (performing emotions indicating weakness) and also expected to maintain authority and suspicion (performing emotions indicating detachment and toughness). When employees simultaneously performed the paradox of being weak and tough, they experienced greater stress and burnout (Tracy 2004). Tracy (2004) notes that emotional labor is particularly taxing when power and organizational processes limit employees’ ability to see themselves in preferred ways. Yet workers who were able to re-frame their work when talking with others as just part of the job to fund outside interests felt less emotional dissonance (Tracy 2004).

However, not all negative emotional language and nonverbal cues are bad. Employees may perform negative emotions to increase unity and camaraderie among co-workers, distance themselves from customers, and question organizational practices (Scarduzio and Malvini Redden 2015). Further, emotional labor requiring the communication of positive emotions can also be beneficial. “The mere act of saying positive things or acting cheerful even if one does not feel cheerful leads to healthier individuals” (Conrad and Witte 1994: 420). People who maintain a positive outlook on life are sick less and have better immune functioning (Conrad and Witte 1994). Additionally, joking and laughing can increase job satisfaction and group cohesiveness, remove unwanted attention or avoid uncomfortable topics, and allow employees to define and affirm themselves (Pogrebin and Poole 2003; Tracy, Myers, and Scott 2006). Positive language positively impacts wellbeing.

4.3 Emotional contagion and buzzing

When emotions are experienced and expressed, they transfer between managers and employees spontaneously through interactions or as part of organizational routines (Waldron 2012). Because people have a natural tendency to mimic or mirror emotions in others, emotions can spread rapidly as organizational members catch each other's emotions (Ashforth and Humphrey 1995). When emotions are transferred through language and nonverbal cues, these expressions create an emotional buzz or contagion with a variety of outcomes. For example, buzzing may positively benefit members by increasing cohesion or negatively influence members by spreading fear or anxiety (Waldron 2012). Interestingly, even in text-based virtual teams, workers assess messages as conveying emotion which can spread rapidly (Cheshin, Rafaeli, and Bos 2011). Specifically, messages vary on how flexible or resolute team members are, giving co-workers cues for interpreting emotions where message flexibility is perceived to convey happiness and message resoluteness is interpreted as conveying anger (Cheshin, Rafaeli, and Bos 2011).

Positive emotional contagion can be beneficial for organizations by enhancing interactions and team cohesion, increasing performance, and decreasing conflict (Barsade 2002). Positive emotions occur through and are a result of ongoing interactions in the workplace, making them dynamic and social (Lutgen-Sandvik, Rifforgiate, and Fletcher 2011). Managers can encourage the experience of positive emotions through communication. Lutgen-Sandvik, Rifforgiate, and Westerman (2015) identify ten communication practices used by managers that promote positive worker experiences and emotions including: speaking to and treating employees as equals, expressing understanding, sharing praise and satisfaction, communicating in an upbeat/lighthearted manner, using power/position to help solve problems, articulating trust, listening and being open, recognizing and building potential, defending employees, and bailing employees out when needed.

Conversely, negative emotions are generally found to be counterproductive. Frustrated, employees often vent to coworkers or ruminate on issues in conversations; these linguistic expressions are ultimately not constructive and can heighten negative emotions and stress (Boren 2014). Negative emotional contagion is also related to emotional exhaustion in the workplace (Snyder 2012). Interestingly, not all negative emotions are destructive. While positive moods can improve productivity, negative moods make individuals “less susceptible to bias and less likely to be swayed by persuasion” (Ashkanasy and Dorris 2017: 74), allowing for better decision making.

Managers' approaches to resolve conflicts can heighten negative emotions and contagion. Paul and Rifforgiate (2015) reported that school administrators who take a traditional justice-based approach to conflict, where discussing negative emotions is discouraged and language emphasizes professionalism, increase the experience and contagion of negative emotions. Conversely, administrators who foster a restorative justice-based approach to conflict, where employees are encouraged to talk about emotions through open dialogue to restore relationships, shorten negative emotions experienced while increasing positive organizational relationships and an open supportive environment.

5 Problematic emotional experiences

The language managers use constructs and constrains negative emotions in organizations in several different ways. Although much of the emotional labor research presumes that emotion has an essential and “more real” nature before it is constructed by organizational norms, “this assumption underestimates the role of communication in constructing emotion and the very notion of real feeling” (Tracy and Trethewey 2005: 176). Faking inauthentic emotion can cause emotive dissonance and discomfort especially when one is forced to communicate emotions that they do not feel (Rafaeli and Sutton 1987) or portray emotions that mark the organizational actor as especially low status, such as when a male correctional officer must use polite or service-oriented language with a low-status female inmate (Tracy 2005). Furthermore, suppressing emotion is also taxing, such as when 911 call-takers must stifle their anger and communicate neutrality to an angry citizen calling the police (Tracy and Tracy 1998). In addition to emotional labor, several specific phenomena are linked to communication and negative emotion in organizations including workplace stress, burnout, incivility, and bullying; these phenomena will be discussed in detail in what follows.

5.1 Workplace stress

Workplace stress is generally considered to be the difference between worker satisfaction (represented by individual need fulfillment) and the realities of an employee’s day-to-day work (Kahn et al. 1964). Language is related to stress in several important ways. First, when employees are given an opportunity to voice their viewpoints to managers and participate in decision-making, doing so alleviates stress (Miller, Stiff, and Ellis 1988). Further, when employees feel constricted from talking with their support network about those things that bother or overwhelm them in organizations, this results in higher stress – something called Communicatively Restricted Organization Stress (CROS) (Boren and Veksler 2015). Yet, too much rumination or “bitching” can also be a bad thing. When colleagues simply co-ruminate using negative language to discuss events in their work, focusing on problems rather than possible solutions, this also results in stress (Boren 2014).

Further, stress is also caused through constant connection and message overwhelm through various communication technologies including social media, push messages, and email (Day, Scott, and Kelloway 2010). Mediated communication lacks the richness available in face-to-face embodied language, so even when messages are clear, they are more likely to be misunderstood; what’s more, high reliance on social media is related to increased anxiety and depression (Tracy 2019).

5.2 Burnout

When the stress from chronic work overload is not managed, it results in the phenomenon of organizational burnout. Burnout is typically considered to be the general “wearing

down” from the pressures of work, and is characterized by emotional exhaustion, depersonalization, cynicism, and decreased personal accomplishment or sense of efficacy (Tracy 2017). Language and communication are related to burnout in several ways. First, the emotional exhaustion and depersonalization aspects of burnout often result from constant interaction with clients who are themselves suffering. Burnout was initially conceptualized in studies of human service workers, such as those who work with the sick, the poor, or the needy. These employees must not only manage their own distress, but they also must absorb or transform the suffering and negativity experienced by their clients, resulting in compassion fatigue (Lilius et al. 2008). When employees must listen to, absorb, manage, or linguistically (re)frame the negative emotions communicated by others, something called toxin management (Frost 1999), this results in negative emotion among other problematic outcomes.

Of course, all ways of interacting with those who are suffering are not created equal. The empathic communication model of burnout suggests that empathy is a two-pronged concept, consisting of emotional contagion and empathic concern, the first of which is linked to burnout and the second to more satisfying results (Miller et al. 1995). Emotional contagion occurs when the caregiver experiences emotional responses parallel to the client’s (negative) emotion, whereas empathic concern is considered to rest between the polar extremes of complete emotional involvement and complete depersonalization. In a study of psychiatric hospital employees, researchers found that caregivers’ ability to communicate empathically is integral to their sense of worth (Miller, Stiff, and Ellis 1988). However, this connection must be moderated with some distance from the client to avoid becoming emotionally exhausted and burned out (Miller, Stiff, and Ellis 1988).

Another way to deal with burnout is to surround oneself with high-quality relationships and trusted others. When employees can regularly communicate with supportive colleagues, and especially if they enjoy a strong supervisor-subordinate relationship, they are less likely to be burned out (Maslach and Leiter 1997). However, burnout thrives in environments that allow for incivility, rudeness, ostracism or manipulation – something we turn to next.

5.3 Incivility, harassment, and bullying

Bad interactional behavior at work results in a variety of negative emotions such as worry, anxiety, anger, sadness, fear, and hopelessness. When targets of bullying were asked to describe and draw what bullying feels like (Tracy, Lutgen-Sandvik, and Alberts 2006), they conjure images of torture, imprisonment, domestic violence, nightmares. Further, workplace abuse is fundamentally a communicative issue. According to the model developed by Lutgen-Sandvik and Tracy (2012), the main questions related to workplace bullying include (i) how does abuse manifest, (ii) how do employees respond, (iii) why bullying is so harmful, (iv) why is resolution so difficult, and (v) how might bullying be resolved.

The language of bullying happens at micro, meso, and macro levels. Micro-interactions such as giggles, eye rolls, name-calling and threats perpetuate bad behavior. Meso-level workplace policies oftentimes fail to articulate how to deal with “equal opportunity” work-

place bullies. Organizational cultures, built through years of language patterns and interactional activities, can promote abuse or make it unlikely. This is particularly problematic when the workplace culture justifies harassment as a means to increase productivity (Keashly and Jagatic 2003). Finally, macro level discourses, such as the “just world hypothesis”, suggest that the world is typically fair and stable, and that victims of bad behavior probably deserve it (see more at https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Just-world_phenomenon). In short, incivility, rudeness, harassment and bullying are *talked* into being, as discussed in more detail in the following paragraphs.

Incivility and rudeness are related to language given that they come in the form of insults, profanities, dismissing others, and engaging in nonverbal actions such as sneering in contempt (Anderson and Pearson 1999). Incivility can also come in the form of a lack of language and communication: such as giving someone the silent treatment, ignoring their opinions, or refusing to acknowledge or look at them. Even more specific, discourse analysis suggests that rudeness or face attack (Goffman 1967) is communicatively portrayed through linguistic acts such as controlled enunciation, yelling, and interruption, and specific speech acts such as strings of assertion and counter-assertions, reprimands, meta-communicative directives (such as “do you understand me?”), and strings of questions without accompanying explanation (Tracy 2002; Tracy and Tracy 1998).

These acts of incivility and rudeness are clearly linked to emotion. As Goffman (1967) noted about face threat and face attack, “[i]t is plain that emotions play a part in these cycles of responses, as when anger [is expressed] because of what has been done to one’s own [face]. I want to stress that these emotions function as moves, and fit so precisely into the logic of the ritual game that it would be difficult to understand them without it” (Goffman 1967: 23). Clearly, incivility and rudeness are linked to negative emotions in the workplace. While rudeness and incivility tend to be more fleeting communicative phenomena, this type of interactional bad behavior can, over time, transform into harassment and/or workplace bullying.

Harassment occurs when one person works to increase their status over another person and includes scapegoating (targeting and blaming one person to take the blame for others) and sexual harassment. The harasser uses communication that “persistently provokes, pressures, frightens, intimidates, or otherwise discomforts another” (Brodsy 1976: 2). Over time, the repeated negative communication can intimidate while increasing fear and stress in the target, ultimately creating feelings of “embarrassment, humiliation, depression, alienation or anger” and “smallness and helplessness” (Brodsy 1976: 39).

Workplace bullying, also known as workplace mobbing, “is about repeated actions and practices that are directed against one or more workers, that are unwanted by the victim, that may be carried out deliberately or unconsciously, but clearly cause humiliation, offence and distress, and that may interfere with job performance and/or cause an unpleasant working environment” (Einarsen et al. 2003: 6). These actions may include yelling and swearing at employees, engaging in hushed whispers about them when they pass by, or gossiping about them with co-employees. When bullying language and associated nonverbal behaviors are perceived as intentional, they are viewed as more threatening (Keashly and Jagatic 2003). Although bullying occasionally includes physical abuse and work overload, it most commonly occurs over a span of time as the victim is exposed to negative

communication from others. This can come in the form of persistent criticism, offensive remarks, embarrassing interactions, teasing, and insults. It can also come in the form of second-hand communication, when the target of bullying overhears gossip or rumors.

Bullying can also be perpetuated through a lack of communication, which is the case when employees are isolated, prevented from having access to opportunities, or not provided with key information required to do their job (Rayner 1997). However, workplace bullying is different from incivility or rudeness in that it is considered to be intentional abuse, occurs over time with some frequency, and causes significant physical or psychological harm against targets who increasingly feel as though they are unable to defend themselves (Lutgen-Sandvik, Tracy, and Alberts 2007).

Lack of communication is not only related to the bully's behavior but is also related to bullying because silence from others is what allows bullying to continue and escalate. Bystanders, witnesses, and supervisors can use language to name and stop the progression of bullying. However, because bullying is difficult to prove, many organizations ignore it, or even worse, deal with it by firing the bullying target or promoting the bully (Lutgen-Sandvik and Tracy 2012). When organizations do have policies, policy language can be ambiguous and human resource professions tend to interpret policies in a variety of unpredictable ways (Cowan 2011). Bullying targets indicate that upper management failed to speak up despite knowledge of the bullying, noting that organizational relationships prevented intervention (Lutgen-Sandvik and McDermott 2011). Commonly, targets are muted by those in power; their concerns and troubling emotions are dismissed as managers frame targets as troublemakers (Lutgen-Sandvik 2003).

Furthermore, witnesses of workplace bullying often feel afraid that stepping in to interject will trigger the bully to turn their abuse onto them, yet they feel guilty when they fail to speak up (Tracy, Lutgen-Sandvik, and Alberts 2006). Often when witnesses do try to step in and help, they end up giving bad advice, such as telling the target to just quit, fight back, or to simply blow it off (Tye-Williams and Krone 2017).

Language and other supportive communication behaviors are also related to the ways that they serve to ameliorate workplace bullying and employees' feelings of fear and hopelessness. Targets feel better when they are able to talk with one another and collectively fantasize about revenge (Tye-Williams and Krone 2015). Although this talk may not do anything to change the situation, it allows targets to reframe the situation and maintain a preferred identity (Lutgen-Sandvik 2008). Furthermore, bystanders can effectively pivot or *re-source* problematic behavior (Foss and Foss 2011).

Resourcing is when a conversant communicates a response based upon a neutral or positive element from an otherwise aggressively framed statement. For example, if supervisor Bob says, "Sue is such a bitch. What does she know about working with community members?", employee Karen can *re-source* or pivot by saying, "Speaking of community members, we really need to include that new client, and I have an idea". (Lutgen-Sandvik and Tracy 2012: 31)

In this example, we see how an employee can use language to pivot from negative to positive. In sum, communication is instrumental for cultivating, expressing, perpetuating and/or dealing with organizational bad behavior such as incivility, harassment, and workplace bullying. In the process of doing so, it may improve or exacerbate negative emotions in organizations.

6 Extending current understanding

Taken as a whole, this chapter illustrates the importance of emotions in organizations and how management and language can suppress, provoke, and shape emotions experienced and expressed by workers. Considering the role emotions play in workplace experiences, from increasing a sense of belonging and connection, to providing cues for decision making, to buoying and fostering creativity, to a range of problematic outcomes, it is necessary to continue to explore ways to enhance workplaces and ameliorate destructive practices.

Goleman's (1995, 1998) research on emotional intelligence and studies on leadership and communication (deVries, Bakker-Pieper, and Oostenveld 2010; Lutgen-Sandvik, Riforgiate, and Westerman 2015) emphasized the instrumental role of manager's influence on workers' perceptions and emotional experiences in the workplace. It would be fruitful to pursue this line of research further. Which organizational features, structures, policies and sedimented cultures facilitate or discourage managers' linguistic choices when leading and what are the resulting emotional experiences? When managers are trained in emotional intelligence, how does this also change the language used in follower interactions? Further, when leader language shifts, how do employees interpret these shifts as sincere or fake and how can real and lasting manager and worker change occur? Leadership is often studied based on the communication of the leader, yet what role do followers' emotions and leader-follower interactions play in shaping a leader's communication?

Hall's (2011) study shared that employees admired and felt positively about their CEO but felt negatively about middle managers who they saw as dysfunctional. How do emotions function and translate throughout power hierarchies, language use, and other communication behaviors at multiple levels in organizations? What types of messages and social distance in organizations create disparate emotions across levels of management?

Language used to communicate policies, training, and interactions is instrumental in shaping new employees' understanding of acceptable and appropriate workplace emotions (Scott and Myers 2005). However, of these sources, informal interactions with managers and co-workers are more powerful than stated policies and shape emotional perceptions of appropriate behavior (Kirby and Krone 2002; Riforgiate and Kramer 2021). What are best practices for management to align organizational language and interactions to help employees understand expectations while reducing experiences of stress? Extending Tracy's (2004) work on correctional officers to other contexts, when work involves either surface- or deep-acting in performing conflicting emotions, how can training strategies help employees use language to discuss and re-frame this work in productive ways? What are ways that emotional labor can mutually benefit employees and an organization's bottom line?

Emotions often spread rapidly across organizational members (Waldron 2012). How can management emphasize messages that spread helpful productive emotions and reduce unhelpful emotional contagion, particularly in times of organizational turmoil or rapid change? What role does communication technology and language used on various social media platforms play in spreading intended and unintended emotions in organizations?

Problematic emotional experiences including stress, burnout, incivility, rudeness, harassment, and bullying are common and destructive in organizations (Rayner 1997). There are ways managers and co-workers can employ communication to reduce or deflect these

behaviors (Lutgen-Sandvik and Tracy 2012); however, more research on and implementation of effective and proactive communication needs to be done. For example, what are the best practices to align the language of organizational policy and informal communication to help members and human resource professionals identify and intervene during early stages of bullying? What are management practices (e.g., using harassing language to increase productivity) that create destructive organizational climates and encourage problematic communication? What are the most effective ways to adjust these sedimented destructive language and behavioral patterns positively through mentoring and training of managers? What linguistic strategies (e.g., hiring/screening questions) are most effective in preventing destructive communication practices from entering the workplace? What are the most effective and appropriate communication practices to discourage incivility, rudeness and other hostile behaviors to help organizational members deflect destructive practices? Even prior to entering the workplace, what educational language and behavioral strategies in schools can enhance communication and conflict management skills to increase language competence in young adults' ability to recognize and respond to potential destructive workplace exchanges?

Work provides income and security, is tied to identity, and is where we spend much of our time. Organizational management, language, and emotions play a central role in workplace experiences, allowing workers to feel safe, respected, valued, trusted, and inspired (Lutgen-Sandvik, Rifforgiate, and Fletcher 2011) or like they are in a "nightmare" working for a "demon" (Tracy, Lutgen-Sandvik, and Alberts 2006: 148). Importantly, language also provides a powerful mechanism to improve how emotions are shaped and experienced, and to positively impact workplace interactions and therefore organizations more broadly.

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Maximilian Panthen and Claas Christian Germelmann

90 Marketing and the commercialization of emotions

- 1 Introduction
- 2 The classic view: Emotions in advertising and beyond
- 3 Emotions and value co-creation
- 4 The experience dimension of emotions
- 5 Conclusion
- 6 References

Abstract: Emotions play a decent role in marketing practices. Firms try to emotionally charge their brands through advertising and aim to elicit positive behavioural intentions towards their products or services. Emotions in advertising are used to inform and ultimately persuade potential customers. This paper further broadens this perspective and suggests areas in which emotions are relevant for the commercialization of firm offerings. The use of emotions differs from unidirectional marketing communication strategies and fundamentally changes the role of the customer in the commercialization process. Adapting a value co-creation perspective shows that customers and customer interactions can only be managed to a certain extent because some experiences resulting from such co-creation processes emerge from planned and unplanned emotional contagion processes. This view has major consequences for how firms need to integrate customer emotions in the process of value (co-)creation.

1 Introduction

As this handbook indicates, research on emotions is interdisciplinary by nature. It has a long and extensive history, strongly influenced by biology as a scientific discipline since the early 19th century. However, emotions also play an important role in everyday life and determine how we communicate verbally and non-verbally with other human beings. In the field of marketing, emotions impact consumer responses in a multitude of ways (see Bagozzi, Gopinath, and Nyer [1999], Erevelles [1998] for extensive reviews). Emotions impact consumer evaluation and decision-making processes (Williams 2014). With regard to commercialization, emotions can be viewed from two angles. On the one hand, emotions are socially constructed (or “co-created”) by marketing managers, consumers, the environment, and society in general. On the other hand, human emotions are deeply rooted, individual neuro-physiological human reaction schemes. They coordinate internal processes

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and human behaviour. The interplay between both perspectives is relevant to understanding how marketing managers can commercialize their products or services through and with emotions.

Think, for example, about how people experience a river rafting tour. Each individual feels his or her own mix of emotions during the trip. The emotional set can range from excitement and fun to thrill and fear. Someone's emotional reaction can be elicited by external stimuli during the trip, e.g. dangerous rapids. Bodily reactions such as sweat, increased blood pressure or increased heartbeat accompany the thrill of the situation. As with many other consumer experiences, people are not alone on a rafting tour, and there are others literally with them in the same boat. In fact, much of the fun stems from the co-experience with others (Arnould and Price 1993). The company offering the river rafting tour can only influence these emotions to a certain extent. The river tour guide who accompanies the group of people cannot tell the tour members which emotions they should feel while crossing the rapids. However, marketing managers of the rafting tours want to make use of the emotions that are experienced and associated with "riding a wild river". The question of *commercialization of emotions* covers all aspects that leverage the emotional facets before, during and after the river rafting tour. These aspects can involve advertisements for the tours in local shops, a website with helmet-camera videos on YouTube or the instructions given by the tour guide during the rafting trip. All these marketing activities can be well initiated and controlled by the tour provider. They may also involve occasions on which the tour provider has only limited control, e.g. online forums where like-minded people share their emotional experiences about rafting tours. This example shows that any intended commercialization of emotions is a complex task for the tour provider, because the emotions are only partly manageable by the company. Instead, the commercialization of emotions involves the planning and execution of one's own marketing activities as well as managing how different actors contribute to the co-creation process.

In this chapter, we review the place of emotions in marketing science. We further highlight that emotions are integral parts of experiences which are the subject of managerial efforts by marketing executives. Adding to this point, we argue that focusing on emotions in social contexts is a route worth pursuing for researchers as well as for managers. Note that we adopt a broad view on the topic of commercialization of emotions. Taking the abovementioned example, the shopping experience is not limited to a single physical space, but may span from initial search activities on the internet to the actual use of the product. This has substantial implications for marketing managers, as the shopping experience becomes a complex and dynamic encounter. Although a customer's actual experience at the store might have been really positive, he or she can later become angry about a potential product failure. Mapping and guiding customers' diverse emotional encounters is key to the commercialization of emotions and is an important part of what marketing managers call *customer experience management* (Homburg, Jozić, and Kuehnl 2017). The advent of computer-based sentiment analysis has made emotions that are voiced online accessible for management strategies on a large scale.

2 The classic view: Emotions in advertising and beyond

Advertising is possibly the field that has yielded the most academic articles about the role of emotions in the marketing domain (Aaker, Stayman, and Hagerty 1986; Agres, Edell, and Dubitsky 1990; Batra and Holbrook 1990; Batra and Ray 1986; Batra and Stayman 1990; Edell and Burke 1987; Friesz and Thorson 1986; Holbrook and O'Shaughnessy 1984). So-called “feeling ads” (Bagozzi, Gopinath, and Nyer 1999) emphasize the emotions a consumer feels when using a product or service. Emotional language in ads is also used to influence consumers’ buying decisions: For instance, ads for hedonic products that use affect-laden language have been shown to elicit favourable emotional and greater behavioural intentions, and also to mitigate guilt from consuming and purchasing these hedonic products (Kemp, Bui, and Chapa 2012).

One of the most obvious aspects of emotions in advertising and branding is how brands use emotion words in their claims and logos. A variety of emotion words or even symbols are used to emotionally charge the brand, for example, Nutella (“Spread the happy”), Coca Cola (“Open happiness”), Kia (“The power to surprise”), or UPS (“We love logistics”). The question remains as to why these marketing activities seem to change consumer perceptions of the brand. One of the basic mechanisms is based on Pavlov’s concept of classical conditioning (Pavlov 1927), namely emotional conditioning (Kroeber-Riel 1979; Gorn 1982; Stuart, Shimp, and Engle 1987). An unconditioned stimulus (e.g. music, picture) elicits positive emotional reactions, and is then presented along with a conditioned stimulus (e.g. a brand). Before the conditioning process, the brand does not evoke any associations, but after the conditioning, the brand does evoke positive emotions just as the unconditioned stimulus. Note that the conditioning process in the field of advertising has to follow some basic rules (Kroeber-Riel and Groeppel-Klein 2013):

- strong and suitable emotional stimuli (pictures, music or words);
- simultaneous presentation of the emotional stimuli and the brand (conditioned stimulus);
- repeated exposure;
- uniqueness of the associations.

Through the conditioning process, initially neutral names such as “Apple” can be emotionally charged as a brand. There is agreement on the effectiveness of conditioning in the field of marketing (Vlachos et al. 2011), although the mechanism has also been criticized because of the weak empirical evidence (Pornpitakpan 2012). Indeed, in one classic emotional conditioning experiment, it took various rounds to show significant effects (Kroeber-Riel 1979).

2.1 Language in marketing communication

Oftentimes people equate marketing with advertising. Although these terms are sometimes used interchangeably, there are fundamental differences between both business practices. Advertising is a component of marketing, more specifically marketing communication, and defined as “the exercise of promoting a company and its products or services through paid

channels" (AMA 2021). From a linguistic perspective, emotions in advertising are used to inform and ultimately persuade potential customers (El-Dali 2019). The use of emotional expressions, mainly adjectives and adverbs, for brand names, claims or campaign texts help the customer building associations with product or service features. Advertisers often combine pictures and emotional expressions in a direct and obvious way. The "Open happiness" campaign from Coca Cola shows people who are happy and enjoy their lives. The aim of the ad is to establish the association that Coca Cola is an integral part of customers' happy lives. However, language is also used in more subtle and indirect ways to elicit feelings and build brand associations. The Swedish brand IKEA, for example, has always used the informal form of the personal pronoun "you" in German ads in order to create positive feelings associated with closeness, friendship, and family.

Brand names with elements known to the customers provide direct information and allow easy associations in a product-related context. The brand name "LifeLong Luggage", for example, is easy to understand and to recall product features for customers, which makes it easier to bring a new product to the market (Keller, Heckler, and Houston 1998). However, these associations might inhibit future product associations that are related to product extensions (Keller, Heckler, and Houston 1998). The product feature "lifelong" does not necessarily include attributes such as light-weight or colorful.

No-meaning brand names such as Apple come with no initial product feature associations. These brand associations have to be established through marketing communication practices. In the case of Apple, the famous 1997 advertising campaign "Think different" underlined Apple's unique positioning in the market. The text of the campaign includes stereotypes such as "rebels, troublemakers, crazy ones and misfits" along with sentences like "and they have no respect for the status quo". The latter sentence underlines Apple's innovativeness, creativity and future orientation. The campaign was also remarkable from a linguistic standpoint as it provoked a discussion about the correct spelling ('think different' vs. 'think differently'). Research conducted in the context of the Apple campaign even showed that brand exposure has behavioural effects with no conscious awareness. Participants of an experiment showed higher performance in creativity tasks compared to the control group (Fitzsimons, Chartrand, and Fitzsimons 2008).

Brand names sometimes have semantic meaning (e.g. Xerox) that is not directly obvious to the customer (Erz 2014). Other brands do not have (e.g. tesa) semantic meaning. New brands (and companies) sometimes intentionally use semantic meaning in order to create business purpose. Xylem is an industrial engineering company which provides solutions for water transportation, e.g. pumping systems, filter, analysis units, valves, etc. In a botanic context, xylem is a vascular tissue which is responsible for water transportation and mineral distribution in land plants. The analogy with botany has two benefits for the brand. First, it allows the company to set focus, clearly set the target market and give the organization a direction (water transport). Second, terms from nature make it easier to establish associations related to sustainability, responsibility for the planet, environmental protection, etc., in order to build a green image.

It should be noted that any of the effects mentioned above can be influenced by language effects. In five experiments with bilingual consumers, Puntoni, De Langhe, and Van Osselaer (2009) could demonstrate that textual information like marketing slogans in con-

sumers' native language are perceived as more emotional than those in their second language, contingent on the frequency in which the words eliciting affective responses have been experienced in native- versus second-language contexts.

Traditional advertising has been a dominant marketing communication channel during the 20th century. Nowadays, modern technology has enabled two-way communication, for instance, on social media channels. Advertising is primarily designed as a unidirectional communication channel, which gives marketers the opportunity to design marketing messages and send them out to the customer through mass media, broadcasting, but also on the internet or in retail settings. Social media completely changed this logic as customers can now interact with brands and companies (see also Section 3, Emotions and value co-creation). Sentiment analysis gives companies the opportunity to analyze how customers think and write about their brand, for example, in brand communities (Homburg, Ehm, and Artz 2015). In extreme cases, companies lose control of their communication content, which is often regarded as a "social media firestorm" and results in negative emotional expressions about the brand or company (Hansen, Kupfer, and Thorsten Hennig-Thurau 2018).

2.2 Affect and decision-making

Emotions effect our decision-making, for example, under which affective conditions we prefer a healthy food option to an unhealthy one at a restaurant. Consumer psychology differentiates between two basic types of emotion: integral and incidental emotions (see Achar et al. [2016] for a review). Integral emotions comprise emotional stimuli or contexts designed by the marketer that affect a subsequent consumer buying decision. Emotional appeals include advertising and product-related features such as packaging design or positioning. Incidental emotions describe emotions elicited by stimuli unrelated to a particular decision such as the prior mood of the consumer or contextual variables. Note that the commercialization of emotions is not only limited to products in a narrow sense, e.g. automobiles. Emotions are also used by service industries to market their offerings, e.g. the financial industry. Adding to this point, the entire sports and entertainment industry is concerned with customers' emotional experiences. Here, the difference between integral and incidental emotions becomes obvious. At a rock concert or a sports event, the event organizer can create certain emotional elements of the experience, e.g. the music stars, the half-time show, or how the moderator warms up the audience. The social construction of the experience is conducted by managers, but not entirely.

There are also emotional stimuli that affect visitor experiences which are not designed by the event organizer. Consider, for example, the weather, individual mood or social dynamics. In our case, social dynamics describe how individuals of a group influence each other and how the relationship between group members and the group itself proliferates. Social dynamics are an important factor in service settings where individual experience resonates with group feeling. Collective interactions among visitors, for example at a football match, remain largely unmanageable (Carù and Cova 2015), because the event organizers can only partly set the rules for fan engagement – if such rules are accepted at all. Nonetheless, collective emotions are an important feature of these mass services (Stieler

and Germelmann 2016). In the management literature, the concept of value co-creation has been established to describe how a multitude of actors work together (directly or indirectly) to socially construct the experience. In the next section, we elaborate further on the concept of value co-creation.

3 Emotions and value co-creation

With regard to the commercialization of emotions, customer resource integration through emotions is essential for managers in certain settings. A good example is the abovementioned setting of spectator sports. The customers who buy the tickets and concurrently sing, clap or shout during the match create a highly emotional stadium environment. Thus, fans engage in what service researchers call *value co-creation* (Woratschek, Horbel, and Popp 2014; Vargo and Lusch 2016) where the value of the event is not created by a single actor (i.e. the football club or stadium organizer), but by different actors collaborating to create value. Value in the service context differs from classic economic thinking in a way that the “producer” cannot create value on his own, e.g. in the production process of a manufacturing firm (Vargo and Lusch 2004). Instead, the customer is an indispensable part of the value creation process which is most evident for service settings. This distinction is especially relevant for the role of emotions in marketing because a firm cannot “produce” emotions and deliver it to the customers. As noted in Section 2.1, social media gives the customer a voice and much of the value creation process (e.g., the brand building process) lies outside the company boundaries. Research shows that customers can design and re-interpret brands and service offerings in a way that was not intended by the provider (Stieler, Weismann, and Germelmann 2014; Popp, Germelmann, and Jung 2016). Consequently, value co-creation cannot be seen as a linear process, in which “one plus one equals two”, but rather as non-linear (Stieler and Germelmann 2018).

This is good news for managers, because they can expect multiplication effects in such contexts, through processes like emotional contagion. Emotional contagion describes a psychological phenomenon and is defined “as the tendency to automatically mimic and synchronize facial expressions, vocalizations, postures, and movements with those of another person, and consequently, to converge emotionally” (Hatfield, Cacioppo, and Rapson 1994: 5). The practice is thus an important part of the value creation process in service settings and how individual value is perceived (see Section 4.2). These emotional processes are difficult to predict and steer, and thus remain partly unmanageable. Accordingly, the task of managers of services in which emotions play a major role would be to identify emotional patterns of customers and to shape them according to the social norms of the particular environment. Of course, many different services might involve emotions. Even relatively comparable services, such as mass hedonic services (rock concerts, sports events, etc.) have completely different boundary conditions of experience value. This also means that the staging and management of these experiences is difficult, because ‘one size (often) does not fit all’. In their study on a silent protest at a football stadium, Stieler, Weismann, and Germelmann (2014) found that the silent protest, which was initiated by a single fan group, elicited very different emotional reactions. Some spectators were angry about the

fact that there was no thrilling atmosphere, others were pleased because they had the chance to concentrate fully on the match without any distracting noise. The authors term this phenomenon *value co-destruction*, which describes how various actors influence each other negatively. The appearance of value co-creation or value co-destruction is obvious in the case of mass services, but also takes place within a single service encounter between firm and customer.

4 The experience dimension of emotions

4.1 Emotions as integral components of experiences

One of the most relevant issues in marketing science is understanding the customer experience. The Marketing Science Institute has proposed that “Understanding Customers and the Customer Experience” is one of the key challenges confronting marketing researchers and practitioners (Marketing Science Institute 2014). Holbrook and Hirschman’s (1982) seminal article on experiential aspects of consumption paved the way for emotions as a relevant construct in customer experiences. Experience is defined “as a subjective episode in the construction/transformation of the individual, with, however, an emphasis on the emotions and senses lived during the immersion, at the expense of the cognitive dimension” (Carù and Cova 2003: 273). The word “experience” is nearly as difficult to define as emotion, but is clearly multi-dimensional and comprises emotions beside other aspects (Tynan and McKechnie 2009; Tynan, McKechnie, and Hartley 2014). However, there is still room to investigate emotions as key components of any experience (Jaakkola, Helkkula, and Aarikka-Stenroos 2015). Experiences not only have functional aspects (e.g. communication), emotions are also key components of experiences (Dube and Helkkula 2015). Recent publications in the marketing domain highlight the importance of managing experiences appropriately (Lemon and Verhoef 2016; Homburg, Jozic, and Kuehnl 2017). Some even draw attention to an increasing need for managers to evoke and co-create consumer emotions: “Companies must manage the emotional component of experiences with the same rigor they bring to the management of product and service functionality” (Berry, Carbone, and Haeckel 2002: 86).

Nonetheless, it remains unclear what *experience management* really means. Nowadays, marketers try to model customer “journeys”, because customers may go through multiple steps before they actually buy a product or service. During the customer journey, the customer may interact with a firm’s offerings and messages in various ways and potentially switch between online and offline. Regarding emotions, it is important for marketers to figure out where emotional appeals should be presented throughout the customer journey. In the case of the automotive industry, the purchase process involves at least five stages: visit the website, read media/brochure, first forecourt visit, test drive, collect car (Pennington 2016). Throughout this purchasing journey, the car dealer has to keep in mind the emotional state of the customer and figure out which emotional messages should be sent at the respective point of the way. As Pennington (2016) shows in his example, the positive emotions of joy and excitement elicited when someone collects his or her new car can be

hampered by long-winded instructions by the car dealer personnel. It is important for businesses to create and leverage these positive experiences with the brand to create and reinforce positive brand memory. As the customer journey concept suggests, a specific touchpoint with the firm is followed by a future interaction with the firm (Lemon and Verhoef 2016). However, the car dealer can neither predict nor control consumer emotions, but only construct the social environment for the consumer.

Experiences are highly contextual, so that it is essential to understand how an experience is created, when it is created, what is created and where (Dube and Helkkula 2015). The temporal and spatial boundaries of a setting also include social structures which exert an extensive influence on perceptions of value (Akaka, Vargo, and Schau 2015). Beyond that, experience co-creation with respect to imagery as opposed to lived, dyadic and systematic experience, describe the context of experience co-creation (Jaakkola, Helkkula, and Aarikka-Stenroos 2015). The idea of context-dependent value co-creation is also fundamental to this present text. It is crucial for the commercialization of emotions to be aware of the different contextual components that shape individual experiences. There is a need to monitor contextual boundaries and to adjust service propositions in a dynamic manner, to co-create value with other actors.

4.2 The social dimension of emotions

In their overview article on the role of emotions in marketing, Bagozzi, Gopinath, and Nyer (1999) posit that “marketing relationships seem to be contexts where more social conceptualizations of emotions would be worth pursuing” (Bagozzi, Gopinath, and Nyer 1999: 202). To the best of our knowledge, there have been only a few attempts to integrate the social dimension of emotions into the marketing domain, at least to a certain extent (see Ströbel et al. [2017] for a review). Whereas the importance of the social dimension of consumer behaviour is widely accepted (Dahl 2013), research on the social dimension of emotions leaves considerable room for future research. The social dimension of emotions is worth investigating because “emotions always have elements of the socially meaningful and discursive as they are embodied in specific situations” (Burkitt 2014: 15–16). One way to target emotional social phenomena is to consider whether emotions shape groups or vice versa (van Kleef and Fischer 2016). Both directions have led to extensive research in the field of social emotions. Emotion as Social Information (EASI) theory, for example, posits that emotions play a decisive role in social life, because they inform others about socially relevant information (van Kleef 2009). Socio-emotional cues have a function for the individual (Keltner and Haidt 1999), because emotions inform about socially relevant changes in the environment.

Social cues can be viewed as stimulating emotional reactions. In turn, Intergroup Emotion Theory (Mackie, Devos, and Smith 2000) posits that the individual can feel emotions on behalf of a group, when group membership is salient. Emotions at the group-level differ from individual emotions and can lead to different action tendencies (Smith, Seger, and Mackie 2007). This second perspective on social emotions, namely how groups shape emotions, is interested in how group-level factors influence individual emotions. Group-based

emotions are defined as “*emotional reactions that the group concerns*” (Yzerbyt, Kuppens, and Mathieu, 2016: 33, emphasis ours). In contrast to classic appraisal theory, these approaches explain appraisals on the basis of group concerns. That is why this perspective is heavily influenced by social identity theory (Tajfel and Turner 1986), and group identification plays a decisive role in such approaches (van Kleef and Fischer 2016). One can distinguish between the different levels of social identity theory, depending on the salient group membership (Brewer and Gardner 1996). In extreme cases of collectivity, the boundaries between personal self and collective self blur. Identity fusion theory argues that individuals engage in self-sacrifice for their group, because identification with that group is so strong that they cannot distinguish between their own and group-level concerns (Gómez et al. 2011; Swann et al. 2009; Swann et al. 2012). Psychological closeness with fellow group members and perceived similarity with group members play a key role in forming group-based emotions. Marketers aim to leverage these positive experiences that event spectators or fans share. In a study on public screening events, Stieler and Germelmann (2016) investigated how event visitors verbally expressed the emotions they felt during the event. This context is characterized by extreme social emotions that co-present crowd members feel. The authors found that emotion terms are specific to the football viewing context and that they express feelings of connectedness with other spectators. The emotional atmosphere is co-created by the interactions among visitors and less by the activities of the event organizer. Event visitors verbally express the emotional shift associated with the shift from self to shared identity.

Interviewer: “*What does this mean to you: ‘Being part of the group?’ What does ‘group’ mean to you?*”

Respondent: “*Well, you really feel like part of the group. Personally, I feel part of the collective if extreme emotions arise. That is a nice and positive feeling. I cannot describe it better.*” (Stieler and Germelmann 2016: 401)

Furthermore, the authors show that feelings of connectedness mediate the relationship between collaborative actions and individual enjoyment of event visitors (Stieler and Germelmann 2016).

In groups, emotions may spread throughout the entire collective through the process of emotional contagion (Hatfield, Cacioppo, and Rapson 1994). In the commercial domain, emotional contagion has been highlighted as a key process for determining repurchase intentions (Tombs and McColl-Kennedy 2003). Empirical studies in business, and especially in service literature, reveal that employee displays of positive emotions positively influence customer affect (Argo, Dahl, and Manchanda 2005; Du, Fan, and Feng 2011; Hennig-Thurau et al. 2006; Howard and Gengler 2001; Pugh 2001). In the same manner, emotional displays of customers could also influence other customers in both positive and negative ways. The process of emotional contagion in groups might be influenced further by trait-like variables such as emotional intelligence (Kidwell, Hardesty, and Childers 2008; Mayer, Caruso, and Salovey 1999), and susceptibility to emotions (Hatfield et al. 1994) or the ability to affect the emotions of others (Sy, Côté, and Saavedra 2005). These variables determine how we perceive, process and manage emotional information that we receive from other individuals. As a marketing manager, it is necessary to understand the emotional dynamics and how they contribute to the overall customer experience.

5 Conclusion

This chapter contributes to our understanding of the role of emotion in commercial contexts by outlining different mechanisms behind the impact of emotions in business settings. In particular, we emphasize that emotions are integral components of what marketing managers nowadays call experiences. This makes emotions the subject of management efforts, as managers in different industries aim to elicit, control, steer or hamper customers' emotions at a certain touchpoint in the customer journey. Regarding consumer experiences, there are certainly varying degrees of how managers try to, and often succeed in, socially constructing emotions. We argue that the social perspective, which is an essential facet of why we buy and consume certain products or services, is as important as the individual perspective on emotions. More broadly, we point out that emotions can be experienced individually (and thus for instance shape reactions to advertising), but that they are also socially relevant: social factors with individual experience, and the experience of some emotions that are highly relevant in commercial contexts, even substantially depend on co-present others.

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XVIII Politics, law, and emotions

Seanon S. Wong

91 Diplomatic negotiations

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Abstract: In this chapter, I discuss how the discipline of International Relations (IR) has come to understand the role that language and emotions play in diplomatic negotiations. I provide an overview of IR’s major theories. On the one hand, language and emotions have been much neglected among proponents of neorealism, neoliberalism and rationalism – commonly considered the more “American” approach to IR. The exchange of words and bodily (including emotional) cues in diplomatic negotiations is often dismissed as irrelevant – as the saying goes, “talk is cheap” – or assumed to be epiphenomenal to some larger forces at work (e.g. the balance of power and interest among interlocutors). However, scholars of constructivism (including normative constructivism, and the theory of communicative action) have in the past two decades sought to overturn such “nihilistic” understanding of diplomacy. They argue that, as in all social interactions, meanings are created because of the intersubjective social structures that leaders and diplomats share. Finally, and more recently, a number of scholars have leveraged insights from cognate disciplines – notably social psychology, cognitive science and neuroscience – to better substantiate the emotional dynamics that transpire in diplomatic negotiations. In the conclusion, I highlight a couple of directions for research in the future.

1 Introduction

Diplomacy, as the British diplomat and author Harold Nicolson once wrote, is “the art of negotiating agreements between Sovereign States” (Nicolson [1939] 1988: 7). *The Oxford English Dictionary* similarly defines it as “the management of international relations by negotiation” (*OED* 1989: 696). In fact, diplomats spend a “very substantial portion” of their time on “bargaining and persuasion designed to convince foreigners and fellow nationals alike to take some action, cooperate in some venture, or see a problem in a certain way” (Reychler 1979: 5). This is according to Luc Reychler after extensive interviews with the diplomatic corps in Washington, DC (Reychler 1979). It would not be an exaggeration to say that diplomats are first and foremost international negotiators.

What, then, is a negotiation? According to Dean G. Pruitt and Peter J. Carnevale in their seminal book on the topic, a negotiation is “discussion between two or more parties aimed at resolving incompatible goals. The parties involved may be individuals, groups, organizations, or political units such as countries or the UN Security Council. When there are incompatible goals, a state of social conflict exists. Hence, negotiation is a way of dealing with social conflict” (Pruitt and Carnevale 1993: xv). In the academic discipline of International Relations (IR), John Odell has provided a similar definition: a negotiation is “a sequence of actions in which two or more parties address demands and proposals to each other for the ostensible purposes of reaching an agreement and changing the behavior of at least one actor” (Odell 2000: 4).

Negotiations are ever-present in international politics. As Richard Jackson notes, “negotiation by diplomacy is as common as conflict itself” (Jackson 2000: 324). According to his tally, there were at least 295 violent international disputes between 1945 and 1995. Among them, 171 (or 58 %) experienced negotiations. The total number of negotiation attempts pertaining to these disputes was 1,154, and 47 % of them successfully led to a dispute’s resolution (Jackson 2000: 329–311). An earlier study by K. J. Holsti (1966) similarly revealed that of the 77 international conflicts that occurred between 1919 and 1965, there were 47 attempts to resolve them through negotiations (for more recent statistics on diplomatic negotiations in cases of war, see Min 2020).

A negotiation, in diplomacy or other social relations, requires the revelation of one’s intentions, so that the parties involved can make the necessary demands and concessions to arrive at a cooperative outcome. But how do states – or more specifically, the leaders, diplomats and other government officials negotiating on their behalf – communicate their intentions? Such is a requirement that applies to the management of relationships among adversaries. The recent trade disputes and ensuing negotiations between China and the US are but one example. It is also true among allies and friends. President Donald Trump’s alleged resolve to renegotiate better terms for the US in NATO is a case in point. Failure to communicate credibly at the negotiation table could lead to disaster. For instance, to believe that an adversary’s claim of resolve in a military-security crisis is a bluff when in fact it is not could lead to escalations of tension that neither party wants. Conversely, to believe that a partner’s claim of sincerity to cooperate (for example, in agreements over trade, climate change, arms control, and military alliance) is heartfelt when in fact it is not would render one vulnerable to – among other problems – exploitation (as when a trade partner enacts nontariff barriers), entrapment (being “dragged” by an ally into a conflict with a third party that is detrimental to one’s interests) and abandonment (when an ally fails to fulfill its duty to defend against a common threat).

To communicate in a negotiation, language serves as the obvious medium. Communication also involves the use of emotional appeals (such as expressions of anger and liking) and appeals to the emotions of others (such as a counterpart’s capacity to empathize) to influence their preference, strategy, goals and behavior. Interestingly, though, IR has tended to neglect both the role of language and emotions in diplomatic negotiations. Like it or not, the discipline is dominated by a number of theories. Theories are essential; they enable us to impose structure, consistency and legibility in the way we conceptualize international politics and therefore make sense of what is otherwise a complex and overwhelming reality.

The downside with theories, however, is that their representation of the world, and hence how we come to see it, is only as accurate as the ontological and epistemological assumptions they make. To paraphrase Abraham Maslow, when one has a hammer in hand, everything resembles a nail (Maslow 1966: 15). In much of IR's intellectual history, particularly on the subject of diplomatic negotiations, neither language nor emotions have been accorded much weight as mechanisms of communication (in recent years, scholars have debated whether the discipline's historical development along distinct theoretical "camps" is more conducive or a hindrance to the advancement of knowledge; see, for instance, Friedrichs and Kratochwil 2009; Sil and Katzenstein 2010; Dunne, Hansen, and Wight 2013; Grieco 2018; Whyte 2019).

In this chapter, I provide an overview of the relevant theories. They have all provided answers to the *problematique* of intentions, some more directly while others are more by implication. Frequently, they disagree on what constitutes information about intentions and the nature of communication (i.e. the question of ontology) and how actors learn, construct and update their beliefs about each other (the question of actor epistemology). On the one hand, we have neorealism (or, structural realism), neoliberalism (particularly neoliberal institutionalism, a subset of neoliberalism that focuses on the role of international institutions), and rationalism. Collectively, they are often considered the more "American" theories of IR because of the currency they enjoy among scholars in the American academia (for sure, such geographical divide is more a crude characterization than faithful depiction of reality; for a more elaborate discussion, see Weaver 1998). The exchange of words and bodily (including emotional) cues in diplomatic negotiations is often dismissed among their proponents as irrelevant – as the saying goes, "talk is cheap" – or assumed to be epiphenomenal to some larger structural factors (material, institutional or informational) that define a relationship. On the other hand, scholars of constructivism – including normative constructivism and the theory of communicative action – have sought to overturn such "nihilistic" understanding of diplomacy. Representing the more "European" (and Canadian) approach to IR, they argue that communication can be meaningful in diplomatic negotiations because of the intersubjective knowledge that interlocutors share. Language, but not so much emotions, plays an indispensable role in the communicative process. Finally, and more recently, a number of scholars have leveraged insights from cognate disciplines – notably social psychology, cognitive science and neuroscience – to better substantiate the interpersonal dynamics that transpire in diplomatic negotiations. Challenging the discipline's longstanding biases towards structure and rationality, they contend that emotions are integral to the communication of intentions. They theorize how such phenomena as the development of a "personal touch" and "first impressions" between interlocutors occur. They underscore how "affective information" on one's face, body and tone of voice – both within and beyond one's voluntary and conscious control – provides the basis for judgment about sincerity. Attention has also been given to differentiating the communicative functions of specific emotions, such as anger, liking, exasperation and fear. These works have blossomed in the last several years into a major research program, challenging IR's conventional understanding of diplomatic negotiations.

2 Neorealism, neoliberalism and rationalism: The “cheap talk” paradigm

For proponents of neorealism, anarchy is the defining feature of the international order. Without a higher authority, according to John Mearsheimer, a leading figure in neorealism, “[s]tatesmen and diplomats are rarely punished for lying” (Mearsheimer 2011: 9). As such, they do not (descriptively) and should not (prescriptively) take what others say or how they behave in private seriously, including in diplomatic negotiations. Any claim of intentions, regardless of the choice of words and emotional expressions used in support of it – for instance, when one threatens to pull out of a negotiation, expresses commitment to a deal, or alleges that no further concession is possible – may be deceptive in purpose. But even if one is speaking his mind, others cannot tell for sure. As such, communication is “irrelevant” in neorealist thinking (Majeski and Fricks 1995: 625). Neither do diplomats rely on a counterpart’s track record for honesty to gauge the credibility of a claim, since “they can never be sure that they will not be duped by a state with good reputation” (Mearsheimer 2011: 89).

How, then, do they come up with ideas about each other’s intentions? They rely on such material factors as their relative power as proxies (Mearsheimer 2001; Press 2005). It is “much easier [...] to count and assess another country’s military capabilities, which are tangible assets that can be seen by the naked eye” (Mearsheimer 2011: 29), Mearsheimer argues. Intentions, on the other hand, are “ultimately in the minds of policymakers, making them impossible to observe and measure” (Mearsheimer 2011: 29). As Brian Rathbun notes, “[p]ower is what resolves conflicts, not signaling resolve [...] [P]ower speaks for itself in realism” (Rathbun 2007: 540). As such, a diplomat who claims that he would honor an agreement should not be trusted if he is powerful enough to defect and it is in his interest to do so. Similarly, he could threaten to retaliate if certain demands are not met. But he would not be taken seriously if he lacks the power to back his claim, or if it is not in his interest to follow through with the threat. The conduct of diplomacy, including what diplomats actually speak and how they behave towards each other, does not add much to what one is already able to infer from the prevailing balance of power and interests. Diplomacy is therefore epiphenomenal, if not redundant. As the historian A. J. P. Taylor puts it, “wars make the decisions; diplomacy merely records them” (Taylor 1954: 246; for an applied example that privileges the changing balance of power and interest as overarching drivers of negotiation outcomes, see Ross [1995] on US-China relations).

Diplomatic negotiations may occur in an *ad hoc* setting (for instance, during the Camp David negotiations between Egypt and Israel in 1978 and the Dayton Accords negotiations among belligerents of the Serbian War in 1995). More often, however, diplomats do not have a free hand to do whatever they wish depending on the prevailing balance of power and interests, as a strict reading of neorealism would suggest. Instead, negotiations frequently take place under the auspices of a multilateral regime or organization (for instance, rounds of trade negotiations in the World Trade Organization). Diplomats are therefore more or less motivated or constrained by the incentives and disincentives that such international institutions impose upon them. According to proponents of neoliberalism, these institutions are conducive to international cooperation because, among other benefits, they

facilitate the flow of information, reduce uncertainties, and lower transaction costs among parties (Keohane 1984; Keohane and Martin 1995).

At the heart of it, however, neoliberal institutionalism is no less dismissive of diplomacy as a channel to communicate. Diplomats may be willing to give each other the benefit of the doubt in assessing what a counterpart says and how he behaves, but it is not the language and emotions expressed *per se* in the course of an interaction that confer him credibility. If a claim is deemed credible (or not), it is only because a counterpart's future actions are constrained (or not) institutionally. For instance, a counterpart who claims that he is sincere about upholding his end of an agreement would be considered more credible if repeated interactions are expected (such as in the UN Security Council, where representatives are tasked with the responsibility to negotiate with each other over a broad range of issues over a sustained period of time) than if an interaction is one-off (such as the negotiations between Neville Chamberlain and Adolf Hitler during the Sudeten Crisis of 1938); if interactions are multilateral and therefore reputation for credibility in the eyes of other current or potential negotiation counterparts is at stake (such as in negotiations over climate change and multilateral trade agreements); or if punishment is forthcoming if an agreement is breached or cheating occurs (such as in the World Trade Organization). Hence, like its neorealist counterpart, neoliberal institutionalism does not see what diplomats say and how they behave as inherently meaningful; much would depend on the incentives (or in game-theoretical terms, the payoff structure) that diplomats find themselves in given the prevailing institutional arrangements.

Finally, the theory that has most explicitly theorized the communication of intentions in international politics, and has thus been the most influential in shaping IR's understanding of diplomacy, is rationalism. Like structural realism and neoliberal institutionalism, scholars in this tradition have tended to discount the communicative value of diplomacy. Writing on the particular context of international military-security crises, James Fearon argues that there are three major reasons why a negotiated settlement often fails: issue indivisibilities, commitment problems, and the most relevant for our purpose, "*private information* about relative capabilities or resolve and *incentives to misrepresent*" (Fearon 1995: 381–382; emphasis original). Ideally, diplomats should be candid about such information, because doing so would enable them to identify possible ways to settle a dispute rather than prolong it. But any rational actor would want a better cut of the deal, and is thus predisposed to ask for more than what is minimally acceptable. The incentive to misrepresent – or more precisely, the perception that others are inclined to misrepresent – means that diplomats would find it difficult to discern the credible from the incredible. Behind closed doors, a leader may say that he is sincere about cooperation, resolute about his position, serious about a threat or committed to an agreement, but so may someone who is insincere, irresolute, bluffing or uncommitted. Private communication is therefore so much "cheap talk" (Fearon 1994: 579). By itself, the act of talking confers no credibility to what one claims to be his intentions. Logically, then, diplomats "cannot always use *quiet diplomatic conversations* to discover mutually preferable settlement" (Fearon 1995: 400; emphasis added).

Rationalism, and also neoliberal institutionalism, are therefore in line with neorealism in their assumption that intentions are in the end only privately known. They differ, how-

ever, in their assumptions concerning actor epistemology. As one IR scholar notes, while both assume “objective evaluation of information in an anarchic setting of asymmetric and incomplete information about the intentions of other states, they make different predictions about how states cope with that challenge” (Rathbun 2007: 538). Since caution is paramount in the neorealist worldview, claims of intentions are discredited. On the other hand, rationalists and neoliberal institutionalists assume that diplomats remain receptive to what others say, and they update their beliefs about each other following Bayesian logic (Rathbun 2007: 542–543).

Specifically, a claim carries weight if the speaker is expected to suffer should he turn out to be disingenuous, i.e. the claim is accompanied by actions, expressed in a manner that puts the speaker in a position that is potentially “costly”. Echoing Schelling (1960), Fearon (1994) posits that – among other types of “costly signals” (mobilization of troops in a military-security crisis, severance of diplomatic ties, etc.) – credibility is established when a leader is willing to state his intentions *publicly* (for an overview of the rationalist approach to diplomacy, see Trager 2016: 206–217). Since his domestic constituency and international allies (i.e. his “audience”) are expected to punish him if he backtracks on his statements – because they care about their country’s or an ally’s “loss of credibility, face or honor” – he is considered more credible than if communication had occurred *privately*. To put simply, if he is willing to express himself through “forceful public speeches” (Fearon 1994: 581), chances are that he means what he says. Fearon’s thesis has spawned a prodigious literature over the past two decades exploring the dynamics of so-called “audience costs” in international politics or whose arguments are premised on the “audience costs” logic. (This literature is vast. For a review and critique, see contributions in *Security Studies* vol. 21, no. 3, 2012.)

Nonetheless, it appears that with the dominance of this literature, mainstream (American) IR has come to accept the premise that public statements are “costly”, and with it, unproblematically assumes that its converse – that is, private communication is “cheap” – is empirically accurate. (That talk is “cheap” and a claim of intentions must be costly to be credible have been widely accepted beyond the more “traditional” realm of security studies in IR. For instance, in the literature on terrorism, Kydd and Walter contend that peaceful resolution of a conflict through negotiations is difficult. “[V]erbal statements are often not credible,” they assert, “because actors frequently have incentives to lie and bluff [...] Because talk is cheap, states and terrorists who wish to influence the behavior of an adversary must resort to costly signals” [Kydd and Walter 2006: 57–58].) As scholars focus on public communications that occurred during any historical event, they rarely investigate if the diplomats involved actually learned anything from the behind-the-scenes exchanges – including both formal and informal negotiations – that almost invariably took place in parallel, or even point out their occurrence. Interstate bargaining is as a result reduced to a “game” of competitive costly signaling in which the role of agents and negotiations among them are more or less dispensed with. (It is therefore no coincidence that the literature often anthropomorphizes the state and uses it as their unit of analysis with apparent ease, even though in reality, it is the individuals within [leaders, diplomats, bureaucrats, policy-makers, etc.] who interact, communicate and negotiate with each other.) As John Odell observed, diplomatic negotiations are “recurrent, widespread, and important [...] [They are] far more pervasive than war, fortunately, yet far less studied” (Odell 2000: 4).

For instance, rationalists have argued that at the height of the Fashoda Crisis (1898), it was British Prime Minister Lord Salisbury's "public speeches" (Fearon 1994: 582) and his deliberate attempt to stoke outrage in the public (Schultz 2001: 186–187) that enabled Britain to signal resolve and convinced France to back down. Rarely mentioned are the numerous meetings he had with the French ambassador in London, and between the French foreign minister and the British ambassador in Paris, as the two governments strived to negotiate their way out of imminent conflict (Brown 1970). Likewise, during the Cuban Missile Crisis (1962), it was President Kennedy's "televised speech" demanding the Soviets to back down (Fearon 1994: 582) and the capacity of American democracy to generate "audience costs" vis-à-vis the oligarchic Soviet Union (Brown and Marcum 2011) that explained how the crisis unfolded. Overlooked, then, is the "principal private channel to Moscow" established between the US President's "closest confidant [...] his brother Robert Kennedy", and the Soviet ambassador in Washington, Anatoly Dobrynin. During the crisis, the two had "almost daily conversations" (Dobrynin 1995: 75–77), the last of which – according to Dobrynin (Lebow and Stein 1994: 126) – was "critical" to the crisis' resolution.

Most people would suppose that diplomatic negotiations are crucial to how countries manage their relations, and more specifically, resolve crises and disputes (Sharp 2011: 709). But with the "cheap talk" paradigm's dominance in IR, scholars and students alike have come to embrace a "nihilistic" understanding of diplomacy. It is not a subject worthy of much intellectual attention. As Geoffrey Wiseman puts it, the literature has shown "little interest in what diplomacy is, in what diplomats do, and, indeed, in what diplomats should do" (Wiseman 2011: 710). The result, as Jan Melissen notes, is that "mainstream IR [had] developed in a way that left little room for those who believed that diplomacy matters" (Melissen 2011: 723). (That is not to say that there has not been much written on diplomacy. The literature, however, remains largely descriptive [with the exception of what is known as the English School in IR; for an earlier review and critique, see Neumann 2003]. Most contributors have been practitioners and diplomatic historians, and as one scholar puts it, "[n]either category of authors has been particularly interested in theory-building" [Jönsson 2012: 16].) "[Q]uite what diplomacy is remains a mystery", notes Paul Sharp, "neither the diplomats nor those who study them provide much insight into how and why diplomacy works" (Sharp 2009: 1–2).

But how can we reconcile the lack of academic interest in diplomacy with its commonplace in international politics? Why would diplomats even bother to negotiate if they do not expect to learn something about an adversary or ally that they have not already been able to infer given prevailing structural conditions – power, interest, institutional or informational? There is something amiss about this paradigm. As Majeski and Fricks note – rather "diplomatically" – "[b]ecause cheap talk abounds in international relations and because nation-states do unexpectedly cooperate in competitive settings, discounting the effects of cheap talk may be unwise" (Majeski and Fricks 1995: 625).

The fundamental problem with the "cheap talk" paradigm of neorealism, and particularly neoliberalism and rationalism, is that diplomatic interactions – verbally or behaviorally – are never "cheap" to begin with. Such a belief, as I have suggested, is in fact more a result of the ontological and epistemological assumptions that these theories make concerning communication than an accurate depiction of reality. The primary objective of

these theories is to understand the actions available to diplomats given their structural conditions and how they interact with each other strategically. As structural theories, they cannot shed light on the dynamics that occur when diplomats negotiate in person. After all, as John Odell notes, game-theoretical models – the method most commonly used among proponents of the paradigm – are “not designed to illuminate explicit negotiator behavior at the micro level, and typical models do not come with nuanced empirical observations at that level” (Odell 2013: 387).

As anyone would agree, and indeed, as our everyday experience attest, social interactions are never “cheap”. Those that occur in the realm of diplomacy are no exception. Diplomats would indeed find IR’s dismissal of what they do odd (for a further discussion on how practitioners see the academic study of diplomacy, see Adler-Nissen 2015). In the words of François de Callières, a special envoy of Louis XIV and a noted writer on diplomacy, “it is impossible to form a just notion of the true character of things except by first-hand acquaintance” (Callières [1716] 1963: 47–48). It is “always more advantageous for the practised diplomatist to negotiate face to face, because by that means he can discover the true intentions of those with whom he is dealing” (Callières 1963: 120). Practitioners of diplomacy in the modern days would agree. “I was to find throughout my years as [US] Secretary [of State] that travel was an efficient use of time”, Madeleine Albright wrote in her memoir, “because face-to-face meetings were action-forcing” (Albright 2003: 277). Similarly, Condoleezza Rice wrote: “it’s much easier as secretary of state to drive the agenda when you’re abroad [...] [W]ith all the technological possibilities of phone and video, diplomacy is best practiced in person” (Rice 2012: 291). “[P]hysical presence trumps electronic presence”, Colin Powell also proclaimed (Powell 2014: 56). Finally, in one of the ten “Parting Thoughts for America’s Diplomats” he offered upon his retirement, William Burns, a 33-year veteran at the US Department of State, admonished his colleagues to “[m]aster the fundamentals”. “In today’s world of digital and virtual relationships, there is still no alternative to old-fashioned human interactions – not in business, romance, or diplomacy” (Burns 2014). Quoting an advice that another respected diplomat put forth over a half-century earlier, Burns continued: “The really critical link in the international communications chain is the last three feet, which is best bridged by personal contact – one person talking to another” (Burns 2014). In short, diplomats often go to great lengths – literally – to meet with each other, often behind closed doors, exchange conversations outsiders may never be privy to, and expect to learn something about each other’s intentions. (The amount of time, effort and resources that diplomats invest in travelling to meet with one another is breathtaking. Take the US Secretary of State as an example. Warren Christopher logged almost 800,000 miles during his four-year tenure under President Bill Clinton [Christopher 2001: 192]. Colin Powell travelled to 37 countries and accumulated almost 150,000 miles during his first year as the US top diplomat [Powell 2014: 55]. His successor under President George W. Bush, Condoleezza Rice, visited 46 countries and recorded more than 170,000 miles in just nine months [Rice 2012: 395]. Finally, Hillary Clinton logged nearly one million miles with 87 full days in the air over her four-year tenure as Secretary [Garber 2013].)

3 Constructivism: The intersubjective meaning of language

For sure, the “elephant in the room” of diplomatic negotiations has not gone unnoticed. Constructivist scholars – including proponents of normative constructivism, and the theory of communicative action – would find the “cheap talk” paradigm problematic. For them, just because intentions are ultimately in one’s head and it is “costless” to misrepresent them does not mean that diplomats make nothing out of “talking” to each other. Intentions are informed by the *intersubjective* meaning of social relations, rather than what actors are able to infer from the *objective* distribution of power, interest or information (Rathbun 2007: 549–552). In particular, shared social structures, such as norms and identities, provide guidance to actors on what to expect in an interaction, and their invocation through the medium of language would transform what neorealists and rationalists assume to be “cheap talk” into acts of legitimization and persuasion (Finnamore and Sikkink 2001: 402–403; Krebs and Jackson 2007).

For instance, Stacie Goddard (2008) contends that by appealing to prevailing rules and norms about sovereignty, Prussia was able to allay fear in other European powers after its expansion into the duchies of Schleswig-Holstein in 1864. By the same token, Hitler’s invocation of such norms as collective security, equality, and self-determination for the Austrians and Germans in Czechoslovakia in the 1930s was in part what convinced British policymakers to respond to German aggression with appeasement (Goddard 2015; for a neorealist discussion on how Hitler and other German leaders assessed British and French intentions in the same time period, see Press 2005: ch. 2). Christopher Gelpi similarly posits that when the Americans discovered that the Soviets were building a naval base in Cienfuegos, Cuba, in 1971, the understanding developed between President John F. Kennedy and Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev with regard to Cuba’s status nine years earlier constituted a “normative referent” that bolstered Henry Kissinger’s claim of resolve when he relayed in person Kennedy’s ultimatum to Anatoly Dobrynin, the Soviet ambassador to the US (Gelpi 2003: 112–116).

But the theory that has most directly challenged the dominance of the “cheap talk” paradigm is the theory of communicative action (Johnson 1993; Müller 2004). Drawing upon the works of Jürgen Habermas, its proponents contend that when diplomats communicate, their behaviors might be calculative and strategic; i.e. they follow the “logic of consequentialism”, as rationalists and their neorealist and neoliberal kin assume. Much of what goes on in diplomatic interactions, however, also involve the exchange of “validity claims” – in other words, arguments – based on an intersubjectively constituted rationality. Their interactions follow the “logic of arguing”. Communication is therefore less about bargaining for the maximization of individual interests than persuading others to submit to the better argument. By placing front and center the power of argumentation, individual behavior – or, in Habermasian language, the interlocutors’ “speech acts” – is construed as fundamental to how actors come to understand each other (e.g. Crawford 2009; Lose 2001; Mitzen 2005; Müller 2001; Risse 2000).

Constructivism’s emphasis on the intersubjective meaning of language and its associated social acts of persuasion, argumentation and reasoning as the basis for communication

is a welcoming development. At the least, it makes the academic study of diplomacy more in sync with how practitioners understand the significance and purpose of what they do. Constructivism, however, can still be faulted for its penchant for structural explanations. Like the “cheap talk” paradigm, it fails to illuminate the interpersonal mechanisms that occur in diplomatic negotiations. There is still very limited room for agency, for the behavior of diplomats to influence the outcome of a negotiation.

If intersubjective social structures – norms, identities, rules, mutually constituted rationality, etc. – and their implications for how diplomats update their beliefs about each other are self-evident, what information does the act of “talking”, or more broadly, “interacting”, add to what one does not already know? For instance, the invocation of a norm is perhaps less important than the manner in which it is invoked. Kissinger, for instance, did not simply “remind” Dobrynin of the 1962 understanding on Cuba matter-of-factly or nonchalantly. Rather, he declared that the Americans viewed Soviet buildup with “utmost gravity” and “were determined that there would be no Soviet submarine in Cuba” (Kissinger 1979: 647). Between social structures that constrain and guide actor beliefs and what they actually think of each other’s intentions, there must be interpersonal mechanisms over the course of a communicative action – such as the exchange of emotions – that enable them to convey their commitment (or lack thereof) to the former. As Jonathan Mercer notes, “[e]motion sustains norms” (Mercer 2006: 298).

The crux of the problem is that constructivism often treats social structures as “scripts” that influence agents, and as a result, pays less attention to how these structures are in turn sustained and reinvented through interactions between agents. They tend to “overrate the stability of intersubjective structures” (Widmaier and Park 2012: 124). As Finnemore and Sikkink put it over two decades ago, when “[i]deational phenomena” are treated as mere “information”, the “result is politics without passion or principles, which is hardly the politics of the world in which we live” (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998: 916). To better understand the “[m]icrofoundations for norm-based behavior”, scholars are advised to turn to “studies in psychology, particularly work on the roles of affect, empathy, conformity, and esteem” (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998: 916). Absent an account for such interpersonal dynamics, constructivism is no better positioned to explain why the invocation of an intersubjective social structure can amount to anything more than just “cheap talk”.

Habermas’ theory of communicative action has been subject to a similar critique in its “home” discipline of sociology. It has been faulted for overlooking the affective basis of communication – an issue that scholars of IR, in assessing its application in the realm of international politics, have occasionally remarked upon but not sufficiently addressed. As James Johnson puts it, “suggesting *that* the validity basis of language works to coordinate social interaction is not the same as establishing *how* it does so” (Johnson 1993: 82, emphasis original). Specifically, Habermas has failed “to consider that communication is (or at least can be) more than exchange of symbols and ideas; that it is a process of mutual affecting in which interlocutors make emotional as well as cognitive appeals” (Crossley 1998: 46–47). Within IR, Finnemore and Sikkink note – in reference to research in psychology – that to bring about persuasion, “both cognition and affect work synergistically to produce changes in attitudes, beliefs, and preferences” (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998: 915). Neta Crawford asserts that “argument and persuasion [are not] simply rational in the

broader sense of giving logical reasons for the validity of claims that one makes and where one's counterpart [...] either accepts those reasons, or challenges them on the basis of better reasons [...] [W]e will miss important features of the process if we leave emotion and normative beliefs [...] out of our account" (Crawford 2009: 107). Jonathan Mercer similarly contends that constructivists have previously emphasized that persuasion "depends on argument, debate, evidence, logic, and deliberation. It also depends on emotion" (Mercer 2010: 20). Simply put, the act of arguing is emotional and persuasion requires emotions.

Again, practitioners of diplomacy would agree. If they were to read the constructivist literature, they would probably consider it a leap forward from the "nihilistic" understanding of diplomacy implied under the "cheap talk" paradigm. Still, they would find constructivism excessively "structural"; its omission of the interpersonal dynamics in diplomacy renders it incomplete, if not ontologically flawed. As Watkins and Rosegrant wrote in their book on diplomatic negotiations, "information gathered at the table should be subjected to commonsense tests for plausibility, consistency, and congruence with body language, facial expressions, voice tone, and other signals" (Watkins and Rosegrant 2001: 115; see also Thompson 2009: 320). "[N]onverbal messages or 'body language'", argue Jönsson and Hall, "constitute important aspects of diplomatic communication" (Jönsson and Hall 2005: 84). As Alisher Faizullaev, a longtime practitioner-turned-scholar, suggests, "emotions play a significant role in diplomacy [...] [They] have a pervasive effect on negotiation behavior and outcomes, especially when negotiators are both motivated and able to act on the information available in the opponents' emotions" (Faizullaev 2006: 513). As the top Soviet envoy to the US throughout much of the Cold War, Anatoly Dobrynin wrote: "We saw many conflicts emerge and saw them resolved, but not without strained negotiations, claims and counterclaims, and emotional debates" (Dobrynin 1995: 5). Similarly, James Baker, the US Secretary of State under President George H. W. Bush, asserts in his memoir that among other advantages, diplomatic meetings facilitate the exchange of tone and body language (Baker 1995: 460). Madeleine Albright claims that "[i]nterpreters play a vital but overlooked part in diplomacy" and the best ones are those who can "translate not only words but also points of emphasis and tone, and are careful to ensure that idiomatic expressions are not misunderstood" (Albright 2003: 254). Finally, turning the "cheap talk" paradigm on its head, Hillary Clinton avers in her memoir as the US Secretary of State that it is the private – rather than public – setting of diplomacy that makes communication possible, because diplomats are freer to interact with each other emotionally than if they were to behave under public scrutiny. She wrote, in reference to the Action Group on Syria convened in June 2012:

The public portion of international meetings like this is typically scripted [...] and it can be rather boring. The action generally starts when the cameras leave. That's what happened here [...] We left the ceremonial hall and crowded into a long rectangular room [...] Emotions ran high; at one point Ministers were shouting at one another and even pounding the table. (Clinton 2014: 386)

In short, diplomats have themselves made the case that emotional exchanges are integral to what they do. No explanations for how diplomacy "works" – and by extension, how countries manage their relations – can be complete without understanding the psychological, particularly emotional, dynamics that transpire when they negotiate directly.

4 The (emerging) psychological challenge

That “emotional debates” are part and parcel to diplomatic negotiations may sound obvious. We all have experience with negotiations in our everyday life, and can attest to their emotional nature. But if emotions are important to communication, why have not scholars better theorized their role and functions? One explanation would be the literature’s “structural” bias that discourages attention to what happens at the “micro” level of interactions – which I have already elaborated in detail. However, the oversight has also been the upshot of three closely related trends in IR, and indeed the social sciences more generally. These trends have discouraged the study of emotions.

First, emotions have conventionally been portrayed in IR as “epiphenomenal at best and a source of irrationality at worst” (Mercer 2006: 288). They are a force for bad, either because they interfere with “rational” beliefs and decisions, or because they constitute the psychological impulses for aggression and conflict. As Ned Lebow puts it, IR “has stressed [...] [the] negative influence [of emotions] [...] on behavior. The time is long overdue [...] to acknowledge and study the positive contribution of emotions, harnessed to reason, order and cooperation” (Lebow 2008: 515). More specifically, recent advances in psychology have called into question the long-held view that when people negotiate, emotions should be purged and suppressed because they are anathema to sound judgments and proper relationships (Van Kleef and Sinaceur 2013). Emotions are in fact critical to social engagement and cooperation, including the resolution of conflicts through negotiation (e.g. Frank 1988; Ekman 1993). As Van Kleef, De Dreu, and Manstead remark, “[i]f two parties have a difference of opinion but neither has an emotional reaction, there will be no negotiation” (Van Kleef, De Dreu, and Manstead 2004: 57). IR scholars have been slow – although not entirely unreceptive, as I explain soon – to revise their largely negative assumption concerning the role of emotions.

Furthermore, it is not only that emotions have been cast negatively in contradistinction to “rationality”; the latter has been considered the driver of progress in Western intellectual thought since at least the enlightenment. More generally, scholars have exhibited limited interest in emotions. “[P]olitical scientists rarely talk about affect” (Jervis 2001: 294), Robert Jervis wrote at the turn of the twenty-first century. Finnemore and Sikkink commented two decades ago that “affect and empathy have been swept under the carpet [...] The result is politics without passion or principles which is hardly the politics of the world in which we live” (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998: 916). IR scholars have shown greater interest in emotions more recently, particularly since Neta Crawford’s (2000) seminal article near two decades ago. Most studies that have appeared since, however, are concerned with conceptualizing emotions as a group, intergroup or systemic phenomenon. As Hall and Ross wrote, they are primarily interested in the causal power of emotions “at the level of the state and other corporate actors” (Hall and Ross 2015: 10). Among research that investigates the role of emotions at the individual level of analysis, the lion’s share of attention has been given to their influence on the *subjective* beliefs and behavior of the person (i.e. leaders and diplomats) experiencing them (e.g. Hymans 2006; Mercer 2013; Holmes 2015; Dolan 2016), rather than their effect on interpersonal communication, including in diplomacy.

Finally, the broader academic literature – in psychology, economics and political science – has until recently tended to focus on the cognitive dimension of negotiations (Barry,

Fulmer, and Van Kleef 2004: 71; Van Kleef and Sinaceur 2013). As one scholar points out, a negotiation had for a long time been construed “as a ‘problem’ to be ‘solved’, rather than as a context for human interaction with all of its social and emotional baggage” (Barry 2008: 97). The research on negotiations in international politics (e.g. Odell 2000; Rathbun 2014; McKibben 2015), which has derived many of its insights from findings in psychology (and therefore perhaps because of that), suffers from a similar bias. As John Odell and Dustin Tingley suggest in their review of this literature, an “important theoretical line of development [in future research] is to investigate [...] how and why emotions have an impact [...] Most negotiation and bargaining research has sidestepped this question” (Odell and Tingley 2013: 171).

It is in reaction to such longstanding biases towards structure and rationality that a recent generation of scholars has redirected their attention to the interpersonal psychology of diplomatic negotiations. These scholars have done so by leveraging insights most frequently from social psychology and cognitive science, and also neuroscience. Hall and Yarhi-Milo, for instance, have shed light on the “personal touch” that often characterizes relationships between diplomats. “Affective information”, including “facial expressions, body language, tone of voice, and even unconscious movements or reactions” (Hall and Yarhi-Milo 2012: 562), often constitutes the basis for judgments of sincerity. Empirically, they demonstrate their argument with case studies from Chamberlain’s interactions with Hitler, which as discussed, has also been the subject of constructivist and realist analyses, and also from US President Ronald Reagan’s assessment of Soviet intentions in the late-1980s. Marcus Holmes (2016) looks at the impact of first impressions in personal diplomacy on subsequent assessment of intentions among world leaders. Yarhi-Milo (2014) puts forth the “selective attention thesis”. This thesis includes what the author calls the “vividness hypothesis”, which in short, “predicts that decision-makers will rely on personal impressions [including affective information] acquired from private interactions with the adversary’s leadership” (Yarhi-Milo 2014: 4) to gauge the latter’s long-term intentions. Wong (2016) argues that emotions are credible indicators of intentions in diplomacy because they are both what Robert Jervis (1970) calls “indices” and “signals”, and presents four case studies in his analysis, ranging from negotiations during the Fashoda Crisis between Britain and France (1898) to US-Syria negotiations over the Middle East (1991). In a subsequent article (Wong 2020), he provides a more differentiated understanding of emotions’ communicative functions by specifying how different emotions – anger, liking, exasperation, fear, etc. – serve to overcome the different relational dilemmas that diplomats face, and as such, enable a negotiation to proceed from mutual mistrust at the beginning to a cooperative agreement in the end. In Holmes and Yarhi-Milo (2016), the authors examine how a specific emotion – empathy – and its associated expressive behaviors (or lack thereof) could result in cooperative versus conflictive outcomes, with the successful and failed negotiations on the Middle East peace process at Camp David in 1978 and 2000, respectively, as their case studies. Similarly, Wong (2019) focuses on the role of anger and explains why its expression would compel a counterpart to back down under certain conditions, but causes him to become intransigent under others. Finally, Holmes (2013) seeks answer to the *problematique* of intentions by looking at the activities “one level down”. In essence, he argues that the mirror neurons in the brain allow the “physical simulation of the intentions of others”,

thus making face-to-face diplomacy a unique channel to communicate what is otherwise not captured in rationalist models of bargaining. These works have in the last several years cohered into a research agenda challenging IR's conventional understanding of diplomatic negotiations.

5 Summary and suggestions for research

In this chapter, I have provided an overview of the major theories of IR and explain how they construe diplomatic negotiations. I argue that their portrayal of diplomacy – its purpose, functions and nature – often do not match up, if they are not grossly at odds, with the reality of international politics. Theories that fall under the rubric of the “cheap talk” paradigm (neorealism, neoliberalism and rationalism) are generally dismissive of diplomatic interactions as an inherently meaningful way to communicate. To be credible, some exogenous factors that imply the veracity of a claim (e.g. the prevailing balance of power and interests) or diminish an actor’s incentive to misrepresent (institutional constraints on future payoffs, concomitant performance of a potentially costly behavior, etc.) must be present. Their treatment of diplomacy, however, would be difficult to square with the practice’s commonplace and practitioners’ apparent reliance on it as a way to manage international relations.

On the other hand, proponents of constructivism, including its normative variant and the theory of communicative action, contend that the meaning behind any attempt to communicate is informed by the intersubjective social structures that interlocutors share. They, however, still fall short. Neglected in their analyses, as is the case with the “cheap talk” paradigm, is how the psychological dynamics of diplomatic negotiations, including those of emotions, serve to overcome the asymmetry of information. By their account, there is limited room – if any – for the behavior of individual diplomats to influence the larger trajectory of events and change in international politics. Such bias, again, is reflective of the discipline’s overall development in the past several decades. As Valerie Hudson notes, IR has provided “much more insight into structure than agency” (Hudson 2005: 4).

The recent “turn” towards a more psychological and “micro” approach to the study of diplomacy is picking up steam. Its call to redirect scholarly attention to diplomatic interactions at the interpersonal level has also opened up new opportunities for future research on a wide range of topics. I discuss two broad directions in this regard.

First, future research may investigate how language and emotions interact with other factors that have been hypothesized (and in some cases, empirically shown) to be important to communication in diplomatic negotiations (the balance of power between interlocutors, their shared versus conflicting identities, the normative constraints under which they operate, the public and private aspects of communication that often operate in parallel, etc.). I have presented the extant approaches to diplomatic negotiations in IR in a way that highlights their differences. Indeed, scholars often proceed in their research with the assumption that only one approach or theory (usually, theirs) offers the best explanation, with the rest being discredited. They engage in what one scholar calls the “gladiator” style of research (Checkel 2013: 221). But as in the parable of the blind men and the elephant,

they may simply be illuminating different parts of a larger, complex phenomenon (and claiming to have produced the whole truth). Only research that seeks to integrate their insights, instead of pitching them against each other, can yield a holistic understanding of diplomatic negotiations.

Second, to risk stating the obvious, IR does not “own” emotions and language; these factors are fundamental to communicative processes in any social setting whether or not those who study diplomatic negotiations (i.e. the different approaches discussed above) “choose” to appreciate their importance and explain the role they play. Emotions and language have been subjects of academic inquiry, both in the larger field of IR and other cognate disciplines in the social sciences. In the former case, some have argued that IR has experienced a “linguistic” turn (e.g. Neumann 2002; Albert, Kessler, and Stetter 2008), and more recently, an “emotions” turn (e.g. Bleiker and Hutchison 2008; Hutchison and Bleiker 2014; Clément and Sangar 2017; Koschut et al. 2017). Most of the studies in these two intellectual movements focus on the larger contexts of international politics (for instance, how fear and anger influence US foreign policy after 9/11) rather than interactions in diplomatic negotiations per se. But the latter do not operate in a vacuum. What a certain use of language or expression of an emotion means in a negotiation obviously depends on what it signifies in the larger social context. For instance, we cannot understand what an utterance as simple as a “No” or a show of anger by a Japanese diplomat means without understanding what “No” and anger means against the backdrop of Japanese culture (Adam, Shirako, and Maddux 2010). Similarly, language and emotions are of course fundamental to research in sociolinguistics, social psychology, neuroscience, etc. – disciplines that those who study international politics may not be as familiar with. One promising direction of research would therefore be for works on language and emotions in diplomatic negotiations to better connect with the broader IR literature and such other cognate disciplines and to seek inspiration from it, instead of developing in isolation. Cross-disciplinary research is often the best way to advance knowledge.

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92 Emotion, language, and legal processes

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Abstract: Most modern legal processes rely on the assumption that people are able to process emotional information objectively and control for its influence on judgment and reasoning. However, research in the field of psychology indicates this may not always be the case. This is especially troubling considering the kinds of decisions made in legal settings, which often have lasting, costly effects. One factor that contributes to this issue is the impact of emotional language in judgment, particularly as it applies to court. Specifically, jurors are often required to make decisions based on information with intense, negative emotional context (e.g., victim and execution impact statements). Furthermore, judges are required to render judgment (from legal briefs and oral arguments) and express their decisions via opinion writing, often with the aid of emotional appeal. This chapter will examine the social cognitive research on judgment as it relates to legal settings. Furthermore, applied studies examining the impact of emotional language in court in the form of impact statements, legal briefs, oral arguments and justice opinions will be discussed. Finally, directions for further research in this area are considered in the form of target populations and other stages in the legal process that may be susceptible to emotional influence.

1 Social cognitive theories on judgment

Perhaps the most critical element of modern western law is the need for judgment – whether it be by a jury of one's peers or at the hands of a professional judge. This concept is by no means new; Aristotle's claim that "the individual man is as truly a judge or decider as an entire audience" (as cited in Frost 1994: 87) remains prescient. Even aside from court proceedings, moral judgment and decision-making is integral to our lives. This section seeks to outline how social cognitive theories of judgment are influenced by emotion, and furthermore the ways that these processes relate to legal settings such as juror decision making and legal actors' arguments. Most legal theorists agree that emotions are seen as a barrier to sound, logical reasoning (Blumenthal 2005: 2), and the research within the field of psychology concurs, at least in the sense that emotion is tied to judgment (Salerno and Bottoms 2009). However, the literature varies on whether these effects occur dependent

upon a number of factors (e.g., methodology used, type of judgment task). One such obstacle lies in the definitions that psychology and legal researchers make use of. Blumenthal (2009) correctly points out that much of the discrepancy occurs due to a conflation of emotion and mood. The term *emotion* in this chapter refers to relatively permanent emotional changes in which the source is identifiable. *Mood* alternatively can be characterized as more transient feelings, often without a conscious source (Forgas 1995: 41). Though moods do have influences on judgment and have been applied to legal studies (for a review, see Blumenthal 2009), the focus of this chapter will be primarily on emotion and its effects, with research on mood considered secondarily.

The ways in which emotion can and does impact judgment are numerous, though Feigenson and Park (2006) propose three methods that are generally supported in the literature. First, emotions are capable of influencing the way in which one processes initial information. Broadly speaking, bottom-up processing takes detail into account and is data-driven, whereas top-down processes make use of schemas, heuristics, and previous experience to inform judgment. Furthermore, emotion can influence which of these processes is utilized (Bless et al. 1996). Second, emotion can bias how we incorporate additional information via congruency effects. Lastly, emotions can provide informational cues to assist in decisions regarding blame, responsibility, etc. Each of these are readily applicable to the demands of a judge or jury members in evaluating evidence, the substance of an argument, and ultimately delivering judgment.

In terms of information processing, the appraisal tendency distinguishes between emotions beyond valence alone. Within this framework emotions of a similar valence such as anger and fear (both negative) have been shown to elicit different effects on judgment due to the degree of certainty one feels (Lerner and Tiedens 2006: 117). In another study, Tiedens and Linton (2001: 978) found that the more certain a person felt (e.g., when angry), the more apt they were to rely on heuristic processing and to engage less in systematic processing. In essence, participants were satisfied with the conclusion they had come to, even if not all of the information was thoroughly evaluated. Emotions within a negative valence (e.g., fear, anger, disgust, sadness) have real implications for the sort of legal judgments frequently made by jurors, as typically what occurs in court is not of a positive nature. Oral arguments, testimony, impact statements, etc., presented in court have the capacity to induce such emotions, and frequently are included to do just that. If an impact statement presented by a victim of crime moves jurors to anger, they may be surer of their judgment than if it provokes an emotion associated with doubt, such as anxiety. Supporting this view, Choi (2013) manipulated incidental emotion in mock jurors in order to test its effects on information processing. Those who experienced sadness engaged more in systematic, fact-finding processing, whereas those induced to feel anger relied on heuristic processing and were less sensitive to the strength of evidence. Furthermore, some crimes may inherently induce anger, causing jurors to experience a disproportionate amount of certainty even before evidence is presented (Bandes 2008; Georges, Wiener, and Keller 2013).

Emotion also has the potential to shape future processing; emotion-congruency effects occur when the emotion experienced guides how subsequent information is assimilated in order to fit with that emotion and determines judgment (Feigenson 2016: 27). This particular bias in judgment is concerning, as an angry juror may attend more to evidence that

negatively implicates a defendant or even unconsciously discount any positive information to avoid internal conflict. If that anger persists into deliberation, they may recall evidence that further angered them or deem it more important relative to other aspects of the case such as mitigating evidence. This is supported by Georges, Wiener, and Keller (2013: 164), who found that mock jurors who reacted angrily to the details of a highly emotional case (attempted rape and first-degree murder) subsequently placed less value on mitigating evidence when making sentencing decisions. Jurors may be more inclined to reach decisions which are congruent with their emotional state.

Finally, the ultimate task in any judgment (legal or otherwise) is typically the assignment of blame. Is the party responsible for a given outcome and to what extent? The affect-as-information model (Clore, Schwarz, and Conway 1994) stipulates that emotions can mistakenly cause us to misattribute what we feel to targets, even if it is irrelevant to the judgment task at hand. If a juror is exposed to highly emotional information (e.g., victim impact statements, gruesome evidence, recordings from 911 calls), the resulting emotion may cause them to assign more punitive sentences to a defendant not because of the evidence itself, but the intensity of emotion experienced as a direct result. Schwarz and Clore (1983) demonstrated that while incidental emotions have effects on judgment, they were largely eradicated when participants became aware of them. This may be of some comfort, as jurors are traditionally instructed to rely solely on evidence presented in court and cautioned to think carefully about information before making final judgments (Feigenson 2016: 519). However, even when jurors are instructed to suspend their judgment, many studies that examine the influence of highly emotional testimony such as impact statements indicate that emotion does play a part.

Emotional effects on judgment and decision-making have an impact on many aspects of law. However, it should be noted that subsequent sections of this chapter pertain to common law systems, in which legal proceedings are shaped by judicial decisions, the principle of stare decisis, and precedence established by previous cases. This system differs from civil law, which relies on codified statutes that require both the interpretation and application of law to a given case (Pejovic 2001: 9–10). Legal processes differ for common and civil law, and the scope of this chapter relates primarily to common law.

2 Impact statements

Though other forms of evidence have become accepted in court proceedings (e.g., photos, videos), legal scholars maintain that “law has traditionally been about words: trial testimony and oral argument, statutes and judicial opinions, negotiations and jury deliberations” (Feigenson and Spiesel 2009: xi). This holds true even now, as an increasingly common form of verbal and written evidence presented in court are impact statements. These statements are typically presented as a detailed account of the consequences that a given verdict or action has, either for the defendant or the victim. Though more commonly delivered by the victims of crime (Victim Impact Statements, VISs), many states also permit their use by defendants in criminal cases which carry the possibility for the death penalty (Execution Impact Statements, EISs).

Impact statements, particularly in capital murder trials, are reserved until the guilt phase has concluded. The guilt phase determines whether a defendant is found guilty by a jury based on evidence presented. Once guilt has been established, a new jury is selected in order to dictate sentencing. It is in this second sentencing phase that impact statements are typically heard by the jury. In the timeline of judgment sketched earlier in this chapter, any emotions experienced as a result of hearing impact statements have the potential to influence sentencing primarily through the affect-as-information model (Clore, Schwarz, and Conway 1994), though overlap exists. Impact statements that arouse strong emotions in jurors may have more bearing on their sentencing decisions than courts realize.

Much of the experimental research in this area has focused on the effects of VISs in criminal court proceedings, particularly since *Payne v. Tennessee* (1991) ruled their use constitutional in capital murder trials. However, victims now have the right to deliver impact statements in all federal sentencing and nearly all state sentencing (Cassell 2008: 611). As a result of their increased use, legal scholars and social scientists alike have questioned their utility even in spite of the Payne ruling. Victim impact statements tend to be highly emotional given their nature, as victims and their families use the opportunity to express the damage, financial or emotional, as a direct result of a defendant's actions. In fact, in a field review of VISs presented at trial, it was reported that the language typically used is of extreme emotional valence (Myers et al. 2018: 26–29). Likewise, EISs present the consequences a defendants' family may endure if sentenced to death, signaling that a verdict has emotional repercussions that will affect more than the defendant alone. Given that much legal theory contends emotion should not play a role in court proceedings (Abrams and Keren 2010), impact statements and their effects should be considered.

2.1 Impact statements and emotional effects

Wevodau et al. (2014a) utilized a case vignette in order to examine two aspects that are common to VISs: presence of victim emotion and victim harm. Though murder cases are often used in impact studies, the researchers' vignette described a criminal case in which a male defendant stood trial for sexual assault. In three conditions the researchers manipulated the type of impact in each statement such that one emphasized the emotional consequences (victim emotion), one emphasized the practical and financial consequences (victim harm), and one made sentencing decisions without reading a VIS. Given that victims are encouraged to relay both the emotional and financial fallout to juries in their statements, it is important to determine whether the emotion or the perceived harm drives sentencing decisions. Wevodau et al. (2014a: 55–57) reported that overall, both of the VIS conditions significantly increased sentence length when compared to control, though there was no difference between victim harm and victim emotion. A similar pattern was found for victim blame in that both VIS conditions assigned less blame to the victim than the control; no differences were observed between victim harm and victim emotion. Overall, condition (VIS emotion, VIS harm, and control) accounted for more variance in overall sentencing than any other predictor, which supports the claim that presence of VISs alone at trial has an influence in outcomes.

In another study by the same group of researchers, Wevodau et al. (2014b) presented participants with a written vignette detailing a sexual assault case involving a male defendant. In this case, the researchers manipulated the presence of a VIS in order to test its effects on sentencing outcomes and emotional affect experienced by the jurors. In general, exposure to the VIS contributed to more punitive sentencing overall (replicating Wevodau et al. 2014a) as well as significantly more negative affect. Specifically, following the VIS, participants reported feeling more “nervous” and “upset” – emotions which both have negative valence. In follow-up analyses, Wevodau et al. (2014b: 2896) reported that each of these feelings independently lead to more punitive sentencing, indicating that emotions need to be examined within valence. Furthermore, this finding explicitly highlights that it may not be the content of impact statements that ultimately drives sentencing decisions, but the emotions that they elicit within jurors.

Rather than sexual assault, Paternoster and Deise (2011) presented participants with a description of the guilt phase of a murder trial in which the defendant was convicted. Their task was to review the recorded testimony from the penalty phase and deliver an appropriate sentence. One condition contained a VIS while the control did not. Supporting findings from Wevodau et al. (2014a, 2014b), Paternoster and Deise (2011: 147–149) also reported that exposure to VISs contributed to lengthier sentencing overall. Furthermore, those who evaluated the VIS subsequently reported higher levels of “upset” and “hostility”, though it is important to note that “sadness” did not change as a result. This finding may be critical, given that research on judgment has established that sadness may be less influential than anger due to the degree of certainty felt (Tiedens and Linton 2001). If VISs primarily induce anger in jurors rather than sadness, it is likely that this in turn has effects on sentencing decisions. Indeed, the researchers found that those who reported feeling more “angry” and “vengeful” about the murder after exposure to the VIS were significantly more likely to vote in favor of the death sentence. More broadly, those who were exposed to the VIS regardless of the emotions they felt were nearly four times as likely to recommend death than those who did not.

One facet of the previous study not considered directly is the level of emotion present in the VIS itself. Nuñez et al. (2017: 870) examined the emotionality of VISs that had been previously presented in court based on their linguistic content as measured by the Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count measure (LIWC [Pennebaker, Francis, and Booth 2001]). From this, Nuñez et al. (2017: 871) selected a VIS that had high levels of both anger and sadness in its language, and thus was highly emotional. In two VIS conditions, the transcript was reenacted in a way that emphasized either the anger or sadness present (though the exact language remained identical). Replicating results of previous studies, Nuñez et al. (2017: 874) found that exposure to any VIS (sadness or anger) resulted in a higher probability for more punitive sentencing (i.e., the death penalty) in comparison to the condition without a VIS. In order to parse out which negative emotion may be driving these effects, the researchers then compared the angry VIS, sad VIS, and no VIS (control) conditions. Importantly, the angry VIS was significantly different in terms of sentencing from both the sad VIS and no VIS, and those exposed to the angry VIS were more likely to vote for the death penalty. However, there was no difference reported between the sad VIS and no VIS, which aligns well with Paternoster and Deise (2011) and the notion that sadness may not have a

substantive impact on sentencing. This further supports the appraisal tendency model's (Tiedens and Linton 2001) claim that sadness may not wield the same degree of influence as anger due to diminished levels of certainty associated with the emotion. These findings also support both Wevodau et al. (2014b) and Paternoster and Deise (2011) in that VISs can be highly emotional and in turn have effects on sentencing decisions. However, not all emotions have equal effects, as anger and sadness (though both negative) impact sentencing differently.

2.2 Impact statements without emotional effect

While many studies within the last decade have provided evidence that impact statements have emotional effects on judgment, there are a few that depart from this trend. In order to investigate how VISs and EISs each affect sentencing, Bopp and Miller (2014) presented participants with a VIS, EIS, or no impact statement depending on their condition via an online trial description. Though VISs are most common and thus more extensively studied, EISs are also permitted in criminal trials and contain highly emotional appeals. Ultimately Bopp and Miller (2014: 423) found that presenting mock jurors with a VIS or EIS did not significantly impact sentencing decisions, contrary to other studies (Nuñez et al. 2017; Paternoster and Deise 2011; Wevodau et al. 2014a, 2014b). Furthermore, exposure to the VIS did not result in more negative affect overall (though the researchers indicate this effect was marginally significant). Surprisingly, those who saw the EIS did report significantly more positive affect. These findings are at odds with the research conducted on VISs discussed earlier and may be due to methodological differences.

In a follow-up study, West et al. (2019: 189–194) examined the effects of both EIS and VIS, as well as aggravators (aggravating evidence) and mitigators (mitigating evidence) on perception of the defendant and victim, as well as sentencing decisions. In this 2 (high aggravator, high mitigator) x 2 (VIS, no VIS) x 2 (EIS, no EIS) design, participants read an online trial summary in which the strength of the evidence and presence of impact statement was manipulated. The researchers found that overall VISs had no effect on positive perceptions of the victim, and EIS did not positively relate to perceptions of the defendant. This is counter to Paternoster and Deise (2011), who reported more positive emotions for the victim and their families after exposure to a VIS. Rather than the impact statements themselves, the perceptions of the defendant and the strength of the evidence were primarily responsible for sentencing decisions, which seems to suggest that impact statements have very little influence on mock jurors' judgment.

These data further conflict with past research on impact statements and their influences in court settings, though just as in Bopp and Miller (2014), both the impact statements, evidence, and trial description were presented entirely in text. It is possible that impact statements only evaluated in a written format (without oral delivery common in court) have decreased emotional impact for mock jurors. It also may indicate that it is not the language itself which causes differences in sentencing, but the emotions that jurors experience when statements are delivered by a victim or defendant. However, this explanation does not account for Wevodau et al. (2014a, 2014b), both of which made use of written

vignettes. Another consideration may be the context and participants themselves; while Wevodau et al. (2014a, 2014b) recruited participants from jury member panels just prior to jury selection in court for each study, both Boppre and Miller (2014) and West et al. (2019) utilized student samples.

2.3 Other considerations surrounding impact statements

Though some impact statement and other evidentiary studies evaluate effects through the use of vignettes, typically statements are presented in court verbally by victims or their families. As a result, some studies make use of video reenactments in which statements are delivered orally. One such study conducted by Corwin et al. (2012: 43–46) manipulated the level of remorse displayed by the defendant in a murder case via video and transcript, closely mimicking how statements would be processed by potential jurors. Researchers found that when verbal and nonverbal remorse cues do not align, more weight is given to the nonverbal cue as the defendant's true level of remorse. Importantly, levels of nonverbal remorse did not impact sentencing (high or low), but verbal remorse did. Non-remorseful verbal cues were linked to more lenient sentencing – this finding is somewhat counterintuitive, as one would think remorseful language would shorten sentencing. However, it may be that jurors interpret verbal remorse as an outright admission of guilt and are thus deserving of a longer sentence. The researchers did report an interaction in that sentencing was more lenient for incongruent verbal and nonverbal cues of remorse. This may be due to the jurors perceiving completely congruent remorse cues as impression management or faking. These findings are important, as it helps to identify the relative importance of written and oral statements in contrast to other information (such as nonverbal cues) that jurors may be exposed to. From Corwin et al. (2012) it seems that the content of verbal statements is not always considered most important in the eyes of juries.

Another finding from Corwin et al. (2012) that is perhaps less harmful, but no less relevant, is that the presence of a VIS increased positive emotions for the victim and their families. From this it seems clear that VISs may introduce considerations that do not relate to the defendant or prosecutor. This is somewhat controversial, as criminal trials are not between a defendant and a victim, but rather a defendant and the state. If statements made by victims introduce emotions (both positive and negative) that do not relate to either the defendant or the prosecution and are therefore extralegal, one begins to question whether they ought to be included during sentencing decisions at all (e.g., Greene 1999; Myers and Greene 2004). Restorative justice models do advocate for the continued use of impact statements in order to give victims a platform to express the harm they have endured. This may also have the benefit of influencing defendants themselves. Though research has not directly investigated how VISs impact defendants, Zosky (2018: 745–751) reported in a qualitative study that hearing the consequences a victim experienced moved a majority of those convicted to feelings of sadness, and increased empathy for the victim. If these sorts of effects occur when a defendant is unrelated to the victim, they may be even more impactful when a defendant is faced with a victim they have directly harmed.

If VISs do inspire feelings of anger in jurors, and subsequently increase sentencing, then it stands to reason that impact statements eliciting anger (as opposed to sadness)

should be barred from court proceedings. However, it may be that some awareness of the difference between these two emotions and their effects already exists within the legal system, if informally. Schuster and Propen (2010) interviewed a series of judges in an open-ended qualitative study to assess their responses to VISs in the court room. Overall, the researchers found that judges are comfortable with impact statements that arouse compassion for the victims. This seems reasonable given that the research indicates feelings of sadness and compassion do not unduly influence sentencing (e.g., Nuñez et al. 2017). However, judges did report feeling uncomfortable with those statements that expressed anger. While it is encouraging that legal actors' intuitions about impact statements align with the experimental research, the complexity of impact statements makes it difficult to parse out discrete emotions' effects. Nuñez et al. (2017) noted that the impact statements rated highly on "sad" content also rated high in "anger", indicating that jurors may predominantly feel both emotions in reaction to VISs.

It should be noted that the study of impact statements, and indeed many other legal processes, is complicated by the sheer number of factors at play in any given case. Researchers must balance the need for experimental control with external and ecological validity concerns. As applied research approaches accuracy, so too it must account for a greater number of considerations. The studies outlined here all represent individual judgments given by mock jurors, in some cases consisting of university students. In reality, jurors are a diverse set that also must undergo a critical process which many mock jury studies do not address; that of oral deliberation. Furthermore, each case may be different to the next in terms of evidence, severity of crime, presence of mitigating or aggravating evidence, etc. In addition, impact statements themselves have been shown to vary widely in emotionality (Myers et al. 2018), further complicating the sort of conclusions that can be drawn across studies.

Impact statements have been the focus of much psycho-legal research, and it is important in applied studies to consider contributing factors such as language and emotion, even if they are considered outside the realm of jurisprudence – perhaps especially so. While the exact influence of emotional language contained in impact statements should be further investigated, the experimental research in this area indicates that in cases where the use of VIS closely mimics court settings (verbally delivered, even if only in video), the presence of VISs do impact sentencing decisions, at least when they significantly contribute to emotional changes. It may be that studies utilizing only written text to convey case details and impact statements limit the emotional context typically observed in court settings when a defendant or victim reads their statement orally. Further research is needed to determine which factors contribute substantially, and in which situations, but overall researchers have supported the notion that anger induced from VISs consistently leads to lengthier and more punitive sentences, though this may not be true for all negative emotion.

3 Legal briefs, oral arguments and judicial opinion

Impact statements and their effects are relevant for non-legal actors (e.g., members of the jury, victims, defendants) in that they introduce emotion into the legal process. However,

legal actors also incorporate emotion and language in a number of ways, such as in brief and opinion writing as well as oral arguments. Importantly, the use of emotion varies depending primarily on intended audience; lawyers must be mindful of their use of emotional appeal as they prepare arguments for judges and juries alike. Judges also make use of emotional language depending on whether their writing is directed at fellow legal actors (judges, attorneys) or the outside community. The use of emotional language subsequently changes as intended audience shifts. This section will review such communication by two legal actors: oral arguments and briefs written by lawyers and judicial opinions written by judges. How emotion language is utilized and perceived depending on audience in each will be discussed.

3.1 Emotion in legal briefs and oral arguments

Legal briefs are typically written by lawyers and outline the merits and details of their case for review by a judge. According to Black et al. (2016: 379) briefs serve three major functions: to supply justices with accurate information needed to make a decision, to identify specific legal controversy or context to make the case more transparent, and to present their case uninterrupted. In sum, they “offer lawyers a prized opportunity to communicate directly with courts” (Black et al. 2016: 379), which ultimately has bearing on justices’ decisions and legal precedent. Thus, written briefs occupy an important space in legal processes, and the ways in which they are written are deserving of attention. One component of the language of briefs is that of emotionality – just as emotional language has effects on non-legal actors (e.g., jurors) so too does it impact professionals within the legal system.

Johnson claims that “the best briefs do indeed make a compelling case on both an emotional and intellectual level” (Johnson 2016: 397). Most cases are presented to judges via the use of *logos*; a set of arguments intended to persuade based on their logical reasoning. However, Johnson claims that lawyers also benefit from including *pathos* (an emotional persuasion tool) in the briefs that justices review prior to hearing oral arguments. Based on research in attention, it is true that emotional information is often given precedence and is processed automatically (e.g., Nielsen and Sarason 1981; Pratto and John 1991). However, the inclusion of *pathos* may not be solely for the judge’s benefit. Modern lawyers must appeal to two audiences: the amateur jury and the professional judge. While research indicates that juries are influenced by emotional appeal (Frost 1994: 90–91), it is less clear how judges respond to such arguments.

In their study, Black et al. (2016) ultimately wished to determine the effect that emotional language in written briefs had on judges’ opinions. Though most legal scholars would agree that a successful brief emphasizes the factual merits of a case (i.e., *logos*), this does not always play out in practice. Many lawyers heed advice given by Johnson (2016) and others and include emotional hooks at the beginning of their briefs in an attempt to persuade from more than one angle. In order to investigate their effects, Black et al. (2016: 384–397) used the Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count measure (LIWC [Tausczik and Pennebaker 2010]) to assess emotional language in briefs that appeared before the US Supreme

Court. They hypothesized that emotional language ultimately conveys a lack of credibility to justices and thus would result in fewer votes.

The researchers found that as predicted, the use of emotional language damages an attorney's chance at securing justices' votes. In fact, this result emerged for petitioners and respondents alike. In the context of lawsuits appearing before the Supreme Court, petitioners refer to those that petition and bring the case to Court, whereas respondents are those being tried. As emotional language content in a petitioners' brief increased, the probability of securing a vote from justices decreased. The results for respondents were similar in that a greater use of emotional language was associated with a higher probability of justices to vote for the petitioner (i.e., the opposition). The strong negative relationship observed for petitioners is perhaps most telling. Courts historically have a predisposition to vote in favor of petitioners – logically, they are the ones that bring the case to court and are thus confident in a favorable response. Respondents do not have this edge. Even despite the tendency for courts to vote in favor of petitioners, emotional language can abolish this advantage. These effects were observed even after controlling for other variables such as attorney quality and case quality. It is less likely, then, that the relative experience of the lawyer or the merits of the case can account for these findings. Though an attorney representing a weaker case may employ emotional language in lieu of strong legal support, this compensation does not appear to help.

However, given that these data are correlational, the causal relationship between emotional language in briefs and justices' decisions remains unclear. While Black et al. (2016) propose that emotional language in general may signal a lack of credibility to justices, further research is needed in order to support this specific claim. Furthermore, it is important to note that Black et al. (2016) limited their analysis to appellate briefs presented before the Supreme Court. In these cases, a jury is not summoned, and evidence is not presented. Justices comprise the entirety of the audience, and thus emotional language may be discounted more readily (as in Black et al. 2016).

Further supporting the notion that emotional language, and negative language in particular, is ineffective comes from Feldman (2016), who points out that attacks, intensifiers, and negative tone overall only serve to dissuade judges on the merits of a case. Instead of highly emotional language, lawyers should seek to write in an "adversarial" tone at most, which balances the use of negative statements and argumentation (Feldman 2016: 50). Feldman (2016) wished to examine which factors in legal brief writing ultimately secure justices' votes and furthermore whether brief quality predicts shared language. Feldman (2016: 46) hypothesized that higher quality briefs lead to justices' sharing language (or overlapping) when they subsequently write their own opinions – a kind of borrowing that signals agreement. Overall, Feldman (2016: 62–66) supported the notion that brief quality significantly predicts shared language – higher quality briefs are more likely to share language with judicial opinions. Though used as a control, Feldman (2016) predicted that the overall sentiment, which contributes to brief quality, would be positive in nature and contribute to shared language. This prediction was supported in that briefs with a more positive sentiment overall (determined via SentiWordNet [Baccianella, Esuli, and Sebastiani 2010]) were more likely to have their language shared in judicial opinions.

Another aspect of legal language that lawyers are well versed in is the oral argument. This provides lawyers with an opportunity to present their case before the Supreme Court

after briefs have been reviewed. However, as their name implies, oral arguments are less about presentation and more about conflict. During this proceeding, attorneys deliver their case to justices and must also defend it as questions are asked. In order to study the effects that situational mood may have over the course of oral arguments, Li and Pryor (2020: 163–176) reviewed transcripts from Supreme Court cases and took note of the number of times that laughter occurred. The researchers found that judges were more likely to vote in favor of the side with most attorney-induced laughter, even after controlling for relevant factors (e.g., ideology, salience). These findings suggest that even though justices are well trained in controlling for extraneous influences on their judgment, some emotion-congruency effects may still persist.

This is further supported by Black et al. (2011: 574–579), who also analyzed the number of negative words (those that are affectively unpleasant) used by Supreme Court justices during oral arguments. Their results indicated that use of negative language did significantly predict both probability of gaining justices' votes at the individual level as well as at the case level (winning or losing). The side that received more negative language during oral argument (whether petitioner or respondent) was significantly less likely to secure votes. This leads to the conclusion that not only do justices react emotionally during these proceedings, but also their language in oral arguments reflects it.

Dietrich, Enos, and Sen (2019) extended these findings via a different method. Instead of analyzing transcripts for written language and its emotional content, the researchers made use of audio recordings to test the theory that it is not what a justice says, but how they say it. With this in mind, Dietrich, Enos, and Sen (2019: 2–3) evaluated justices' vocal pitch during the oral argument phase in cases spanning 30 years. Results indicate that vocal pitch is able to uniquely predict how a justice will vote, whether in favor of the petitioner or against. Remarkably, when pitted against the {Marshall}+ algorithm, known for its predictive power in Supreme Court decisions (Katz, Bommarito, and Blackman 2014), vocal pitch successfully predicted a significantly greater percentage. This suggests that the tenor of voice, which conveys emotional arousal of the speaker, has greater predictive power than an algorithm with 95 predictors at its disposal. This further highlights the significance of emotion in legal settings.

From these findings it seems clear that emotion and language are capable of providing extraordinary insight into legal decision-making and judgment. Though research in this particular field is still developing, a greater number of tools have been adapted to help answer new questions in the form of dictionary analysis programs such as the Dictionary of Affect in Language (DAL [Whissell 1989]) as used in Black et al. (2011), and the Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count measure (LIWC [Tausczik and Pennebaker 2010]). These new methods combined with greater access to oral arguments and written briefs make this an exciting area for legal and social science researchers.

3.2 Emotion in judicial opinion writing

Language has an especially important role in the judiciary, as most professional communication between legal actors such as lawyers, judges, clerks, etc., occurs through written

briefs and opinions. This inter-legal communication serves as the primary method of communicating not only a judge's decision in a legal matter, but also the underlying rationale, which serves to persuade others that ultimately their judgment is the correct one. Judges, for their part, most often write for fellow legal actors such as judges, attorneys, clerks, etc. However, as salience of court decisions increase, judges become more beholden to justify outcomes to non-legal members in the general public and lower courts. This is especially critical for those cases that are decided by the Supreme Court. As a result, the opinions that justices subsequently write at the conclusion of a case hearing do often contain emotional and moral justification for decisions, as they are aimed at those outside the system.

Judicial opinions are typically written by the majority (those with the most votes in any given case), but those who dissent often write opinions expressing their disagreement as well. According to Ryan (2016: 299–300), depending on whether the opinion is majority or dissent can determine the content. In their analysis of Justice Scalia's judicial opinions, Ryan (2016: 299) argues that his dissenting opinions often showcased colorful, provocative language. The reason for this is due to a difference in audience; while justices in the majority write to persuade their fellow legal actors, those who write dissenting opinions appeal to the general public. This method of persuasion is dubbed "bottom-up" by Ryan (2016: 298), as it seeks to assert the dissenting opinion via the media and public acceptance. This claim rests on the notion that the judiciary at all levels (though especially those that are higher order, such as the Supreme Court) are ultimately subject to the public. If public acceptance of judicial opinions is low, the court is seen as misrepresentative of the public's will.

Though it seems clear from Ryan (2016) that judges do alter their use of emotional language depending on whether they are dissenting, it may be that this does not actually have an effect on media coverage and public attention. In order to address this, Bryan and Ringsmuth (2016: 167–168) measured the negativity of judicial opinions via the Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count measure (LIWC [Tausczik and Pennebaker 2010]) to evaluate whether more negative and emotionally charged language in dissenting opinions does in fact attain media and public attention. Their results indicate that negative language in dissenting opinions does increase media coverage of cases, effectively gaining the public as an audience and supporting Ryan's (2016) claim. In this way they are able to influence the media's perception, and subsequently the public at large. Interestingly, the researchers note that negative language in the context of law differs from everyday use – their methodology excluded taboo words and words that have lesser negative connotations within the specific context of law (e.g., "argue" is relatively common and neutral in legal writing, but it has a more negative connotation outside of court proceedings). However, future research should determine empirically how these words and others may differ in terms of valence in a legal context and if they are indeed perceived as less negative or emotional.

Bryan and Ringsmuth (2016: 172–174) do support the notion that negative dissents correspond to greater media attention. While dissenting opinions are primarily aimed at the public, assenting opinions seek to justify decisions to both legal and non-legal actors. By analyzing assenting opinions, Wedekind and Zilis (2018) found that justices do alter emotional language use (particularly negative language) in light of public response. In reviewing over 5,000 majority opinions from the years 1955–2000, Wedekind and Zilis (2018: 387–

389) found that as public opinion diverges from that of the Supreme Court, the language of those written opinions becomes predictably less harsh, particularly when the salience of that case is especially high. This indicates that justices do monitor the negativity of their rhetoric in anticipation of public rejection. This also highlights an intriguing outcome, which is that not only do justices write with emotional language in general (even when assenting), but also that they are sensitive enough to public opinion that they attenuate negative language when they are aware that their decision is unpopular. It is important to note that Wedeking and Zilis (2018) only included majority opinions in their analysis, without considering dissenting opinions. Based on the findings of Ryan (2016), we might predict that if dissenting opinions had also been considered, their use of harsh and emotional language would likewise increase as public opinion diverged further from the assenting opinion.

In order to determine if justices do in fact use emotional language differently depending on whether they are assenting or dissenting, Krewson (2019) analyzed both types of written opinions. Krewson (2019: 327–330) reported that at low levels of salience (less public interest) there were no differences in the degree of emotional language used between assenting and dissenting opinions. However, as the outcome of cases became more salient to the general public, more sensational and emotional language was used within dissenting opinions in particular. One rationale offered for this finding was that dissenting members of a vote are more likely to use this language in an attempt to appeal to the public at large, rather than legal actors. In comparison with the majority, “dissenting justices should be more likely to seek to communicate with extra-legal audiences” (Krewson 2019: 321) in an attempt to shape opinion. This aligns with the view that audience is what ultimately determines the acceptance of emotion within law. It also further supports Ryan’s (2016: 298) claim that justices who dissent are particularly apt to include emotional language in order to enact policy change by using a “bottom-up” approach. Another interesting finding reported by Krewson (2019) is that sensational and emotional language has steadily increased since the 1950s – for both assenting and dissenting opinions. There are any number of possible causes for this outcome, but a probable one may be that with the advent of the internet and 24-hour news cycles, the Supreme Court is cognizant that the general public is paying more attention, or at the very least able to. As a result, they may include emotional justifications within their opinions regardless of whether they are assenting or dissenting, in anticipation of their need to appeal to a more general audience. In total, the studies discussed here indicate that when writing is intended for legal actors (e.g., judges), emotional language is eschewed in favor of logical appeal. However, as the information becomes more relevant to non-legal actors such as the public, emotional appeal is utilized in an effort to persuade.

4 Future directions

It is important to note that the greater part of experimental research in the realm of law has focused on non-legal actors (as discussed in this chapter on juror decision-making, but also eyewitness testimony, etc.) and what these findings mean for legal processes. How-

ever, relatively less consideration has been given to legal actors. Of that research, many have primarily made use of observational or correlational methods, or in post-hoc analysis of available data. Further experimental research on the effect of emotional language on legal actors (e.g., judges, lawyers), their decisions, or their use of it would help to determine causal factors.

As experts in legal proceedings, there are several lines of research involving individuals such as judges, lawyers, and other legal actors that would benefit from experimental work in lab settings, to determine the role that emotion plays. Though previous work suggests that judges are aware of and disinclined toward certain emotional content in court (e.g., Schuster and Propen 2010), less is known about whether it impacts judicial opinion in situations such as bench trials, in ruling admissibility of evidence, or of certain arguments or questions posed by lawyers. Research on emotion regulation in other fields that involve potentially high stakes decision-making, such as financial trading, indicate that effective emotion regulation is associated with greater experience (Fenton-O'Creevy et al. 2012: 13–14). Similarly, it is possible that judges and other legal actors are less susceptible to emotional effects on judgment and decision-making, due to their familiarity and expertise in legal settings. This is an advantage that non-legal actors (e.g., jurors) may not benefit from. However, further experimental research that directly addresses these possibilities is needed.

In the context of non-legal actors, another avenue of research to consider is the act of group deliberation by mock jurors. The studies within this chapter that examined the emotional effects of victim impact statements did so at the individual level. Mock jurors were tasked with providing a verdict in isolation, often very soon after the presentation of trial details, and without participating in deliberation with other mock jurors. This methodology is useful in experimental settings in order to disentangle the effects that emotion may have on a person's judgment. However, recent research indicates that the use of emotional language as a persuasive tool is prevalent in jury deliberations, and the group dynamic may also introduce other factors that interact with emotion in decision-making processes, such as the gender (Lynch and Haney 2015) and race of jurors (Salerno and Peter-Hagene 2015). While jury deliberation has been considered a safeguard in legal systems as a way to promote reasoning and sound judgment, it may also be that jurors introduce emotion into this process in order to reach a consensus, which is often required in order to deliver a verdict. Thus, it is not clear whether deliberation would negate any effects that victim impact statements may have on juror decision-making. Future research might seek to clarify the effects that victim impact statements have on individual as compared to group decision-making.

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93 Emotional eyewitnesses and forensic questioning

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Abstract: Eyewitnesses serve a central role in the legal system. Their reports can provide information to legal decision makers that are necessary to achieve justice, but when they make errors they also can (and do) contribute to miscarriages of justice. Several decades of research have examined the various factors that influence eyewitnesses as they experience and report crimes. One factor found to have a substantial influence on eyewitnesses is emotion. Eyewitnesses' emotion at the time of the crime can impair their recall accuracy. Eyewitnesses' emotion at the time of reporting can influence jurors' and legal professionals' perceptions of their credibility. Eyewitnesses can also experience emotions by the very act of being questioned about and reporting on a crime, thereby producing adverse impacts on their accuracy and willingness to disclose information. In this chapter, we review the literature on the influence of emotion on eyewitness accuracy, perceived credibility, and process of disclosure. We discuss the similarities and differences of the effect of emotion for adult and child eyewitnesses. We conclude with recommendations based on the literature – including encouraging emotional expression, training legal professionals, and correcting misconceptions – that can be applied to the legal system to promote more just outcomes.

1 Introduction

The United States uses an accusatorial system of criminal prosecution in which the government accuses a person of a particular crime and then must prove to a factfinder (i.e., jury, judge) that its accusation is true beyond a reasonable doubt. In this system, eyewitnesses play a major role in the unfolding of criminal cases. Eyewitness reports can influence the leads investigators follow, the accusations the government makes, and the verdicts jurors and judges ultimately reach. In fact, Goldstein, Chance, and Schneller (1989) estimated that 3% of criminal cases in the United States are brought on account of eyewitness

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evidence, which they reported as a probable underestimation. In the grander scheme of things, 3% may seem like a small number, but at the time it equated to approximately 77,000 arrests.

Beyond arrests, eyewitness reports also lead to convictions. Research has repeatedly demonstrated the inordinately persuasive value of eyewitness evidence on jurors' decisions (Lampinen, Neuschatz, and Cling 2012; Lindsay et al. 2007; Wells, Memon, and Penrod 2006). Unfortunately, however, inaccurate eyewitness reports are well known to be the leading cause of wrongful convictions. The Innocence Project and the National Registry of Exonerations, organizations that work toward preventing and overturning wrongful convictions through advocacy and information gathering, estimate that inaccurate eyewitness reports contributed in 70–75 % of exoneration cases (Innocence Project n. d.; The National Registry of Exonerations 2017). Because of this, several decades of research have been dedicated to examining the factors that influence eyewitnesses in an attempt to lessen their errors and to lessen legal decision makers' reliance on them when they do make errors.

While a crime is occurring, many factors can contribute to eyewitness inaccuracy, including the eyewitness's awareness that a crime is occurring; the circumstances of the crime (e.g., if it contains a violent element or includes a threat to the eyewitness's personal safety); the role of the eyewitness (e.g., if the eyewitness is merely a bystander or also a victim); and the characteristics of the perpetrator, eyewitness, and situation. While reporting the crime, many factors can also influence legal decision makers' (e.g., investigators, jurors, judges) over- or under-reliance on eyewitness reports. Additionally, eyewitnesses must first be able and willing to disclose what they have observed. At each of these stages, emotion plays a pervasive role. Emotion can influence eyewitnesses from the very time that the crime is occurring all the way through the legal process and after. In this chapter, we discuss the impact of emotion on eyewitnesses' accuracy, perceived credibility, and process of disclosure. We provide examples from current literature and, where applicable, discuss the connection between emotion and language. We also provide some recommendations on how to improve the current state of the legal system when dealing with emotional eyewitnesses.

2 Eyewitness accuracy

While a crime is occurring, or during the "encoding" phase of memory, eyewitnesses may experience a range of emotions, such as stress, anger, or fear. Much of the literature on eyewitness emotions and accuracy focuses on stress, because extensive research has established that eyewitnesses may experience a stress response while a crime is occurring (Clifford and Hollin 1981; Yuille and Tollestrup 1992). This stress response is associated with a number of physiological and psychological characteristics, including an elevated heart rate and increased feelings of worry (Bornstein and Robicheaux 2009). In general, eyewitness experts believe that this stress response negatively affects eyewitness accuracy. In two separate surveys, Kassin and colleagues found that a majority of eyewitness experts (71 % in 1989, 60 % in 2001) agreed that "very high levels of stress impair the accuracy of eyewitness testimony" (Kassin, Ellsworth, and Smith 1989: 1091; Kassin et al. 2001: 408).

Studies examining the impact of stress on eyewitness accuracy typically employ a two-phase method: encoding and retrieval. During encoding, participants watch a video of a staged event that is manipulated to include a violent interaction (to produce stress) or a comparable nonviolent interaction. During retrieval, participants provide details about the interaction and/or attempt to identify the perpetrator. Several studies using this method have demonstrated that violent interactions (and thus, stressful interactions) result in less accurate recall and/or less accurate identifications than nonviolent interactions (e.g., Bornstein, Liebel, and Scarberry 1998; Clifford and Hollin 1981; Loftus and Burns 1982).

Stress may negatively affect encoding by causing a “narrowing of attention” in which eyewitnesses can only attend to a limited range of information (Clifford and Hollin 1981; Deffenbacher et al. 2004; Easterbrook 1959). This narrowing of attention can improve encoding for central details (which is gist information that is central to the event, such as the actions of the perpetrator); however, it can diminish encoding for peripheral details (which is specific information that is tangentially related to the crime, such as the features of a perpetrator’s appearance or the time of the crime) (Christianson 1992; Deffenbacher et al. 2004; Heuer and Reisberg 2007). Stress also impairs subsequent identification of perpetrators (Deffenbacher et al. 2004). Although some field studies have found no relationship between reported stress level and eyewitness accuracy (e.g., Christianson and Hübinette 1993; Yuille and Cutshall 1986), a majority of both laboratory and field studies support a negative relationship between stress and eyewitness accuracy (Deffenbacher et al. 2004; Morgan et al. 2007; Valentine and Mesout 2009).

However, eyewitnesses’ emotional experiences are not limited just to stress. In a study examining a wider range of emotions, Houston et al. (2013) measured participants’ experience with 13 different emotions while they watched a staged violent or nonviolent event: irritation, annoyance, outrage, anger, happiness, sadness, sympathy, disgust, upset, fright, anxiety, relief, and “I feel nothing”. Participants who watched the violent event reported high levels of sympathy, disgust, annoyance, irritation, anger, and sadness. Notably, participants reported near-floor levels of anxiety and fright – the two emotions that most closely resemble stress. This finding could have been a function of low event impact (because the participants merely watched a video of a violent event), but it demonstrates that it is too broad to say that emotion, as a whole, decreases eyewitness accuracy. It may, in fact, depend on which specific emotion the eyewitness experiences.

Overall, it is clear that the relationship between emotion and eyewitness accuracy is complex. Clifford and Hollin (1981) asserted that, “we can prudently conclude [...] that the criminal justice system must exercise great caution when evaluating the evidence presented by a witness to a violent crime” (Clifford and Hollin 1981: 370). Do those who rely on eyewitness evidence exercise great caution? Some studies indicate that many potential jurors are unaware of the potentially damaging effect of stress on eyewitness accuracy and actually believe that it has a positive effect (e.g., Bornstein, O’Bryant, and Zickafoose 2008). There is, unfortunately, little that the legal system can do to influence the emotions that eyewitnesses actually experience during encoding. This knowledge can, however, be used in determining how much one should rely on eyewitness evidence – that is, in assessing eyewitness credibility.

3 Eyewitness credibility

Eyewitness credibility is a separate, but related, topic to eyewitness accuracy. Whereas accuracy refers to actual correctness, credibility refers to whether an observer perceives an eyewitness to be reliable and correct. Credibility does not presuppose accuracy and accuracy does not guarantee credibility. In an ideal legal system, credibility would always align with accuracy, such that legal decision makers would only rely on accurate eyewitness evidence. In reality, research has consistently demonstrated that both laypeople and legal professionals cannot reliably distinguish between accurate and inaccurate eyewitnesses (for reviews, see Bornstein and Greene 2017; Memon, Vrij, and Bull 1998).

It is important to understand laypeople's perceptions of eyewitness credibility because the United States relies upon a trial by jury system wherein regular citizens compose a decision-making body that determines whether a defendant is guilty or not guilty of the crimes of which they have been accused. Moreover, credibility has a direct positive relationship with guilt judgments: when eyewitnesses appear more credible, defendants appear more guilty; when eyewitnesses appear less credible, defendants appear less guilty (Bollingmo et al. 2008; Bollingmo et al. 2009; Cooper, Quas, and Cleveland 2014; Kaufmann et al. 2003). In fact, Goodman-Delahunty, Cossins, and O'Brien (2010) found that for each one-unit increase in eyewitness credibility on a seven-point scale, the odds that jurors found the defendant guilty were nine times higher.

It is also important to understand legal professionals' perceptions of eyewitness credibility because they are the ones who lead the investigation of a case, bring forward the prosecution of a defendant, and, in the case of judges, make decisions about case outcomes.

Eyewitnesses' emotion while reporting a crime, or during the "retrieval" phase of memory, profoundly affect whether observers perceive them as credible. Research has demonstrated that both verbal (e.g., Lens et al. 2014) and nonverbal (e.g., Kaufmann et al. 2003) expression of emotion influences eyewitness credibility, which is where a connection between emotion and language manifests. Eyewitnesses may verbally express their emotion, as in the case of *Johnson v. State* (2000), where a witness testified, "It was dark. I was blindfolded. *I was so scared*. He had a ski mask on most of the time. I didn't take a look at him very good. *I was just so scared*. I don't think I would have a chance to identify him. *I thought I was going to die*" (emphasis ours). Eyewitnesses may also nonverbally express their emotion, as in the case of *Moffett v. State* (1984), where the District Attorney noted, "I would ask the Court to allow and to let the record also show that the witness is now crying on the witness stand". As discussed in the following sections, emotion can influence both jurors' and legal professionals' perceptions of adult and child eyewitnesses' credibility, especially when the eyewitness is a victim.

3.1 Adult eyewitness credibility

Eyewitnesses can express a wide range of emotions when discussing crimes. For victims, distress (e.g., crying, visibly shaking, or hesitating) and numbness (e.g., presenting flat

effect or little to no emotion) are both considered common emotional responses (Burgess and Holmstrøm 1974; Goodman et al. 1992; Frieze, Hymer, and Greenberg 1987; Sayfan et al. 2008; Wood et al. 1996). Furthermore, Frieze et al. (1987) noted that “victim[s] may experience swings in feelings from fear to anger. Feelings may also alternate between sadness and elation and between self-pity and guilt. Rape victims sometimes show shifts in feelings that range from feeling confident about their ability to cope to feeling quite incompetent” (Frieze et al. 1987: 301).

Despite the wide variability in emotional expressions, people generally perceive eyewitnesses who express negative emotions more favorably than eyewitnesses who express neutral or positive emotions. This phenomenon, termed the “emotional victim” or “emotional witness” effect (Ask and Landström 2010), has been widely substantiated in experimental research (Bollingmo et al. 2009; Calhoun et al. 1981; Schuller et al. 2010; Wessel et al. 2012; Winkel and Koppelaar 1991). Much of this literature focuses singularly on female victims of rape, but a handful of studies have extended it to include other types of adult eyewitnesses such as male victims of physical assault (Landström, Ask, and Sommar 2015) and male suspects (Wessel et al. 2012).

The emotional witness effect is also traditionally studied using a two-phase method. In the first phase, researchers present participants with eyewitness statements (alone or within the context of a trial) that vary in the emotion the eyewitness expresses. In the second phase, participants provide a series of ratings about the eyewitness (e.g., credibility) and about the case (e.g., verdict). In an example of this method, Kaufmann et al. (2003) presented student mock jurors with eyewitness statements in which the eyewitness – a female victim of an alleged rape – expressed negative emotions by occasionally sobbing and hesitating, neutral emotions by appearing calm, or positive emotions by smiling. Participants’ ratings demonstrated they found the eyewitness to be significantly more credible when she expressed negative emotions rather than neutral or positive emotions. Notably, however, participants reported that their credibility ratings were equally influenced by the content and presentation of the eyewitness’s statement. Because content was kept constant across conditions, participants’ reports suggested they were unaware of the pervasive effect of presentation in making their ratings.

The emotional witness effect is presumably mediated by people’s expectations that there are “typical” emotional responses to crimes (Ask and Landström 2010; Hackett, Day, and Mohr 2008; Klippenstine and Schuller 2012; Lens et al. 2014). In a survey of laypeople, Wrede and Ask (2015) found that most people expected victims to have some type of emotional response to crimes: 92% of their sample expected males to express anger and 86% expected hatred (collapsed across five different types of crime); 90% expected females to express fear and 89% expected anxiety. Expectations varied by gender, by crime, and by type of emotion, but these high percentages demonstrated that most people have some expectations about the typical emotional behavior of eyewitnesses. Beyond expectations for emotion type, people may also expect emotional consistency. Klippenstine and Schuller (2012) found that people perceived an eyewitness more favorably when the emotions she expressed at trial were consistent with those she expressed when originally reporting the crime compared to when she deviated from her prior emotional behavior.

Many of the results regarding emotion and eyewitness credibility can likely be explained in terms of *expectancy violations theory* (Burgoon and Hale 1988). According to the

theory, expectations of verbal and nonverbal behavior influence observers' perceptions of others. When one's behavior violates such expectations, observers must assess the violation and react accordingly. Violations may be perceived as an indication of deceptive behavior (Hackett, Day, and Mohr 2008). In application to the emotional witness effect, expectancy violations theory would posit that if people expect eyewitnesses to express distress, any deviation from distress is a violation that could be interpreted as deceptive behavior. As such, eyewitnesses who express neutral or positive emotions commit an expectancy violation, and people perceive them as less credible because of that violation.

In a direct test of the emotional witness effect and expectancy violations theory, Hackett, Day, and Mohr (2008) presented student mock jurors with an eyewitness statement that varied in emotion and also asked them to rate a series of emotional behaviors (e.g., crying the whole time, getting teary, avoiding eye contact) as to whether a typical eyewitness (specifically, a female victim of rape) would behave in that manner. When they compared results between participants who either had or did not have strong emotional expectations, they found the emotional witness effect present among only those who had strong expectations in line with the effect. Therefore, the emotional witness effect occurred only when the eyewitness's emotional behavior violated participants' expectations. Further studies have demonstrated support for this finding (Ask and Landström 2010; Lens et al. 2014).

Negative emotions, however, do not always produce higher perceptions of eyewitness credibility. For example, perceptions of credibility may adhere to a proportionality rule, in which people expect eyewitnesses to express emotions in a degree proportional to the seriousness of the crime they are reporting. In demonstrating the proportionality rule, Rose, Nadler, and Clark (2006) presented student mock jurors with vignettes that varied the seriousness of the crime (severe: armed robbery, mild: pickpocketing) and the eyewitness's emotion (severe: devastating/influenced everyday activities, mild: troubling/mostly forgot it happened). In two studies, they found that participants perceived eyewitnesses whose emotion did not align with the seriousness of the crime (i.e., severe crime/mild emotion, mild crime/severe emotion) as less credible than eyewitnesses whose emotion did align (i.e., severe crime/severe emotion, mild crime/mild emotion). These findings suggest that there are expectations not only for the type and consistency of emotion eyewitnesses express, but also for the emotion's magnitude.

Furthermore, emotions may have varying impacts on different types of eyewitnesses. There is scant literature examining the emotional witness effect with witnesses other than female victims of rape. We know of only two studies that have examined the emotional witness effect with adult male witnesses and these studies have yielded mixed results. The first study, conducted by Wessel et al. (2012), presented mock jurors with statements by an adult male suspected of rape and found patterns in line with the emotional witness effect. However, a study by Landström, Ask, and Sommar (2015) presented student mock jurors with statements by an adult male victim of physical assault and did not find the emotional witness effect to be present. The authors of the latter study contended that the lack of support for the emotional witness effect with the male victim of physical assault may have been a function of different emotional expectations for males than for females. Consistent with emotional gender stereotypes, a male eyewitness who expresses neutral emotion may not violate an observer's expectations in the same way that a female eyewitness would.

This does not, however, explain the discrepancy between the two studies. It may have also been a function of the type of crime or different types of eyewitnesses (i.e., suspect vs. victim), which may lend themselves to differential emotional expectations.

Overall, this research indicates that emotion can influence the way people perceive eyewitness credibility. However, each study mentioned above examined the emotional witness effect on individuals rather than groups of people. This distinction is important because jurors make decisions as a group of deliberating jurors rather than independently. Dahl et al. (2008) extended this line of research to examine the influence of emotion on eyewitness credibility at a group rather than individual level. They provided participants with eyewitness statements that varied in emotion and then had them deliberate in five- to seven-person juries. They used data from the aforementioned Kaufmann et al. (2003) study as a comparison group of jurors who made decisions only at the individual level. In their comparisons, they found a stark contrast in the effect of emotion on eyewitness credibility between the juror-level and the jury-level. At the juror-level, as discussed above from Kaufmann et al. (2003), emotion had a profound effect on perceptions of eyewitness credibility. At the jury-level, however, emotion had no influence on perceptions of eyewitness credibility or on ultimate determinations of guilt. After the study, participants who participated in the deliberating juries reported that disagreements on eyewitness credibility were common and that those who originally did not believe the eyewitness eventually changed their perceptions after it was discussed at the group-level. These findings indicate that an emotional witness might affect individual jurors, but that the effect may be mitigated during deliberation.

3.1.1 Legal professionals' perceptions

Emotion can also influence legal professionals' perceptions of eyewitness credibility. Research has been conducted examining the influence of eyewitness emotion with police officers, prosecutors, and judges. Although all three types of professionals have special training and experience working in the legal system, they each serve unique roles and may have varied experiences with and exposure to emotional eyewitnesses that make it important to examine them individually.

With respect to police and prosecutors, Ask (2015) conducted a survey in Sweden to understand their perceptions of emotional eyewitnesses. He found that both police and prosecutors believed that eyewitnesses' (specifically, victims') emotions indicate the truthfulness of their report. They also believed that if an eyewitness's emotion violated their personal expectations, there was reason to question the eyewitness's truthfulness. Additionally, some prosecutors were well aware of the pervasiveness of the emotional witness effect: almost half (46.3%) agreed or strongly agreed that an eyewitness who displays negative emotions is more likely to be believed in court, whereas only a small proportion (8.4 %) disagreed.

Furthermore, Bollingmo et al. (2008) demonstrated that police officers' perceptions of eyewitnesses adhere to the emotional witness effect. Police officers believed an eyewitness was more credible when she expressed negative emotion than when she expressed neutral

or positive emotion. However, as was the case with student mock jurors in the Kaufmann et al. (2003) study, police officers reported that their credibility ratings were influenced by the content of the eyewitness's statement rather than the presentation, again suggesting they were unaware of the influence of emotion on their perceptions. This is problematic, given that other research has shown that the questions police officers ask an eyewitness depend on the eyewitness's emotion and the police officers' emotional expectations (Kleider-Offutt, Cavrak, and Knuycky 2015).

With respect to judges, Wessel et al. (2006) found that judges were not influenced by an eyewitness's emotion in the same way that laypeople and police officers are. Judges rated an eyewitness as equally credible when she expressed negative emotion, neutral emotion, or positive emotion. Wessel et al. (2006) believed judges' professional experience may have suppressed the emotional witness effect; however, Bollingmo et al. (2008) argued that it cannot just be experience alone that guides this finding, as the emotional witness effect was found among police officers who have as much (if not more) contact with emotional eyewitnesses. Instead, they suggested the discrepancy might be a function of judges using strategies different from police officers and laypeople in making decisions.

3.2 Child eyewitness credibility

Children commonly serve as witnesses in legal cases. Their involvement can vary from being a victim or bystander eyewitness to providing background information in divorce/custody proceedings. Although the types of cases involving children vary, the overwhelming majority of their participation occurs as victims in child sexual abuse cases (Cross and Whitcomb 2017; Goodman et al. 1999). Children serve as especially important witnesses in these cases, as these types of crimes are generally secretive in nature and therefore often lack physical evidence or additional witnesses to corroborate their account (Cross and Whitcomb 2017; Myers et al. 1989).

Children's developmental, social, and cognitive abilities profoundly influence their efficacy as witnesses. Children as young as four may be called upon to testify in court (Goodman et al. 1999). Although the United States Supreme Court has held that there is no definitive age at which a child is competent or incompetent to testify, it has said that "[competency] depends on the capacity and intelligence of the child, his appreciation of the difference between truth and falsehood, as well as his duty to tell the former" (*Wheeler v. United States* 1895: 525). The application of Wheeler may differ from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, but at the very least, many courts require that children demonstrate they understand the difference between telling the truth and telling a lie before they can be deemed competent to testify (Lyon and Saywitz 1999). Developmentally, children often acquire an appreciation of the truth and a lie around four years old, which is the youngest age that most prosecutors have worked with in their cases (Goodman et al. 1999).

The connection between emotion and language is especially applicable to child witnesses. Children may not yet be able to express their emotional responses to crimes in ways that adult witnesses can. For example, Harter and Whitesell (1989) explained that children may experience ambivalence but lack the ability to express ambivalence because they do

not understand the emotion or have the necessary vocabulary to express it. According to normative patterns of development, the age when children develop the standards of competency (the ability to understand truth and lies discussed above) is around that same time that they become aware of their emotional states and are able to talk about them fluently (Denham et al. 2003). However, the children who serve as witnesses may not follow normative patterns of development, especially when they have experienced trauma or maltreatment (e.g., abuse or neglect). In a study of children who had experienced physical abuse or neglect, Pollak et al. (2000) found that maltreated children differed in their ability to recognize and distinguish among emotional expressions compared to their non-maltreated peers. Thus, child witnesses may or may not have the ability to express their emotional responses to the crimes they are reporting.

Child witnesses may not yet have the ability to express their emotional responses to crime, but replications of the emotional witness effect with child witnesses suggest that observers may hold them to a similar standard as adults (Cooper, Quas, and Cleveland 2014; Landström et al. 2015; Melinder et al. 2016; Regan and Baker 1998; Wessel, Magnussen, and Melinder 2013). For example, Regan and Baker (1998) found that people expect child witnesses to express emotion, such as expecting the child to cry (81%), to express fear (67%), confusion (43%), or anger (30%). Furthermore, Golding et al. (2003) found that people's perceptions of children's credibility also adhere to the proportionality rule, in which people expect child witnesses to express emotions in a degree proportional to the seriousness of the crime they are reporting. Golding et al. (2003) presented student mock jurors with written descriptions and drawings of a 6- or 15-year-old child witness that showed her expressing moderate negative emotion (e.g., teary), neutral emotion (e.g., calm), or strong negative emotion (e.g., hysterically crying). They found that participants perceived the child witness as more credible when she expressed moderate negative emotion than when she expressed neutral or strong negative emotion, regardless of her age. This finding suggests, as was found with adults, that there is a degree of emotion that people find credible, and any expression of emotion that is perceived as "too little" or "too much" is used as an indication of unreliability.

It is of significant concern that emotional children – at least up to a certain level of emotion as clarified by Golding et al. (2003) – are perceived as more credible than their neutral counterparts. It is understandable that having to testify in court and confront the accused can be a stressful experience for child witnesses; however, there are many reasons why a child may appear to be unemotional when truthfully reporting a crime, including professionals putting the child at ease; the child being unfamiliar with the setting, thereby inhibiting emotional behavior; adults mistaking dissociative behaviors as a lack of emotion; there being a significant amount of time passing before the child testifies; the child participating in programs designed to help cope with stress; or the system providing alternative procedures to assist the child (Bottoms et al. 2007; Wood et al. 1996).

In the United States, courts have recognized the importance of protecting child witnesses from trauma induced by their participation in the legal system. In fact, the United States Supreme Court has held that the "interest in safeguarding the physical and psychological wellbeing of a minor is compelling" (*Maryland v. Craig* 1990). Accordingly, many jurisdictions have implemented procedures, such as allowing a child to testify through

some alternative procedure, that are designed to lessen the emotional experience children have while testifying against the accused. Alternative testimony procedures may include allowing the child to have a supportive adult nearby, using closed-circuit television (CCTV) where the child can testify from a room other than the courtroom, using videotaped testimony, or allowing exceptions to the rule against hearsay testimony (McAuliff and Kovera 2012; McAuliff et al. 2013). Some of these innovations have been shown to decrease children's stress while testifying (e.g., CCTV in Goodman et al. [1998]). However, research has also found that, consistent with the emotional witness effect, these innovations might come at a cost to children's perceived credibility if they make the child less emotional while testifying. For example, Goodman et al. (1998) found that participants who viewed a child witness testifying via CCTV perceived the child as less believable than a child witness who testified using traditional methods. Furthermore, they perceived the child witness using CCTV as more likely to be making up a story and less likely to be basing their testimony on fact versus fantasy than the child using traditional methods. While this may have occurred because children were less emotional, findings from McAuliff and Kovera (2012) suggested that this may not be the only explanation. They found that laypeople held different expectations for children who testified using alternative procedures, such that they expected children who used alternative testimony procedures to be less nervous, less fearful, and more confident than children who testified traditionally. Therefore, the decrease in children's perceived credibility when testifying with alternative procedures may not be entirely explained by the emotional witness effect. Alternative testimony procedures serve an important purpose to encourage reluctant children to testify (and their parents to allow them to testify), but the benefits must be weighed against their potential effects on children's displayed emotion, jurors' expectations, and children's credibility.

3.2.1 Legal professionals' perceptions

A handful of studies have examined legal professionals' perceptions of child witness credibility. Legal professionals' beliefs about child witnesses can influence the outcome of a case in important ways, such as the likelihood that an allegation will be investigated and substantiated (Everson and Boat 1989). Everson et al. (1996) found that, in general, judges, law enforcement officers, mental health professionals, and child protective services professionals believe that false reports from children are fairly uncommon. When separated by profession, however, judges and law enforcement officers demonstrated more skepticism towards children's allegations than mental health professionals and child protective services (CPS) professionals.

In another study, Brigham and Spier (1992, as cited in Melinder et al. 2004) found that 96% of defense attorneys correctly believed that child witnesses recall less information than adult witnesses, whereas only 50–57% of prosecutors, CPS professionals, and law enforcement believed that to be the case. Defense attorneys also believed that approximately 20% of their cases involving child witnesses were either inaccurate or fabricated – a remarkably higher rate than the existing (albeit limited) research on this metric suggests (e.g., Jones and McGraw 1987; Trocmé and Bala 2005; US Department of Health and Human

Services 2017). As defense attorneys represent those on the receiving end of an allegation, it is understandable for them to be more skeptical than other legal professionals. Although defense attorneys will not likely influence whether an allegation is investigated or substantiated, their skepticism would likely be evident in their arguments in cases involving child witnesses, which may have an impact on jurors' decisions.

The aforementioned studies demonstrate that legal professionals of varying backgrounds exhibit some general skepticism towards child witnesses. But how are their perceptions of child witnesses influenced by emotion? Melinder et al. (2004) surveyed 418 legal professionals with positions ranging from judges and prosecutors to psychologists and psychiatrists. They found that professionals believed children's emotions were equally important to their verbal statements and to medical evidence in determining children's credibility. Furthermore, all types of legal professionals believed that strong emotional expressions were a more reliable indicator of credibility than neutral emotional expressions. This finding was consistent with the emotional witness effect, and additional analyses showed support for the notion that the effect was mediated by expectations. Professionals who were less skeptical of children's truthfulness tended to believe children regardless of whether they expressed negative or neutral emotion. Conversely, professionals who were more skeptical of children's truthfulness believed children less regardless of their emotion. Thus, the emotional witness effect appears to influence legal professionals' perceptions of child witness credibility in the same way it does for laypeople (Melinder et al. 2004).

4 Eyewitness disclosure

Before eyewitness statements can be assessed for accuracy or credibility, eyewitnesses must first be able and willing to discuss the events they have witnessed. There can be many emotional barriers to disclosure: eyewitnesses may be afraid of retaliation by the perpetrator, feel shame about their role in events, and fear not being believed by others. Furthermore, the actual process of disclosure can seem like a daunting emotional experience – especially for certain types of eyewitnesses (e.g., victims) and for certain types of crimes (e.g., sexual assault). While disclosing, eyewitnesses must remember potentially traumatic events, divulge sensitive information to strangers, and provide details they may not want to discuss. If the case goes to trial, eyewitnesses may have to testify in a courtroom and confront the accused. At each step of this process, eyewitnesses may also have to convince others that their allegation is truthful.

In the United States, eyewitnesses will first be questioned by some type of investigator. With adult eyewitnesses, these investigators tend to be police officers. With child eyewitnesses, these investigators tend to be trained interviewers. Although the investigators cannot control the emotions that eyewitnesses experience during and immediately following crimes, they can have some control over the emotions that eyewitnesses experience during their interviews. Researchers, practitioners, and victim advocates have collaborated to develop interviewing protocols with techniques that mitigate the negative effects of emotion on eyewitnesses that should also increase their ability and willingness to disclose accurate information.

4.1 Interviewing adult eyewitnesses

Comfortable eyewitnesses may be better eyewitnesses because they will be more willing to disclose information, more cooperative with interviewers, and more willing to exhaust their memory of crime-related information (Collins, Lincoln, and Frank 2002; Vallano and Schreiber Compo 2011). Congruent with this idea, leading interviewing protocols for adult eyewitnesses – such as the Cognitive Interview (Fisher and Geiselman 1992) and *Eyewitness Evidence: A Guide for Law Enforcement* (US Department of Justice 1999) – begin with a rapport-building phase. During the rapport-building phase, interviewers use nondirective conversational techniques to make eyewitnesses more comfortable and to put them at ease. Interviewers will ask questions that do not intend to prompt crime-related information (e.g., “tell me about your family”) (Fisher and Geiselman 1992). The rapport-building phase is another example of the interplay between emotion and language, as interviewers use neutral conversation to facilitate communication by lessening any negative emotional aspects of the experience (Wells, Memon, and Penrod 2006). This phase also promotes comfort by transferring control of the interview from the interviewer to the eyewitness (Memon et al. 1997a). By transferring control, eyewitnesses are able to set the interview pace and guide their own recall. Interviewers establish the transfer of control by asking open-ended questions, limiting interruptions, and timing their questions appropriately to the eyewitness’s narrative (Memon et al. 1997a). Studies have supported the use of rapport-building by showing that its use increases total accuracy of eyewitness reports (Collins, Lincoln, and Frank 2002; Vallano and Schreiber Compo 2011).

Some scholars have speculated that the positive effect on recall may be mediated by a reduction in stress (Vallano and Schreiber Compo 2011). Reducing eyewitnesses’ stress is certainly in the best interest of their emotional wellbeing (and perhaps also their willingness to disclose), but it is important to note that doing so could produce adverse effects on their accuracy. According to the theory of *state-dependent memory*, memory retrieval is most efficient when a person is in the same state at retrieval as at the time of encoding (Tulving and Thomson 1973). In application to interviewing eyewitnesses, this theory would posit that if an eyewitness was stressed or fearful at the time of the crime (encoding), then the eyewitness’s memory recall would be most efficient if they were stressed or fearful at the time of the interview (retrieval). Therefore, reducing eyewitnesses’ stress during interviews may be at odds with their ability to produce fully accurate reports.

It may be valuable to the investigative process to place eyewitnesses – either verbally or physically – in the same context they were in at encoding (National Research Council 2014). In fact, the Cognitive Interviewing protocol recommends that “the interviewer [...] should try to reinstate in the witness’s mind the [...] emotional features that were experienced at the time of the crime” (Fisher, Geiselman, and Amador 1989: 723), which could be accomplished by prompting the witness with emotion-focused questions (e.g., how were you feeling at the time?). While, ethically, interviewers should not cause eyewitnesses the levels of stress or fear comparable to those they would have experienced during a crime, they should remain aware that reducing stress too much could decrease eyewitnesses’ ability for optimal recall; they should try to promote a balance between these competing needs.

Extensive research has demonstrated the effectiveness of the Cognitive Interview protocol in terms of retrieval accuracy (for reviews, see Fisher and Schreiber 2007; Köhnken

et al. 1999; Memon, Meissner, and Fraser 2010). How well does it do with emotional eyewitnesses? Ginet and Verkamp (2007) tested whether the effectiveness of the Cognitive Interview would be affected by the level of emotion experienced by eyewitnesses at the time of encoding. They showed participants a video in which a young woman was hit by a car. To manipulate emotional arousal, they instructed half of the participants that they would receive electric shocks while watching the video (but did not actually administer electric shocks); this instruction was meant to impose personal threat on participants while they experienced the encoding event. One week later, they brought participants back for an interview about the event they witnessed. They also manipulated the interviewing protocol that would be used during the interview: the Cognitive Interview or a Structured Interview (a protocol that was designed to be a comparison to the Cognitive Interview; see Memon et al. 1997b). Regardless of the emotional arousal condition, participants in the Cognitive Interview produced more correct information than participants in the Structured Interview. When separated by information type, all participants in the Cognitive Interview produced more correct central details *and* peripheral details than participants in the Structured Interview. However, there was also a slight, but significant, increase in incorrect details produced by participants in the Cognitive Interview. Contrary to expectations, interview type did not interact with emotional arousal on any of the information participants recalled. These findings suggest that, regardless of the emotional level of the eyewitness, the mnemonic aspects of the Cognitive Interview facilitate recall of correct information.

4.2 Interviewing child eyewitnesses

Children are likely to be even more negatively affected by the emotional aspects of the interviewing process than adults. They may be intimidated by the interviewer, which could hinder their willingness to disclose information. They also may be so intimidated that they tell the interviewer what they think the interviewer wants to hear, which could diminish their accuracy. Adults are not immune to this intimidation, but they are developmentally less suggestible than children and thus less likely to be affected (Bruck and Ceci 1999). Researchers, professionals, and child advocates have developed forensic interviewing protocols specifically for children to mitigate these issues that include techniques targeting the developmental, social, and cognitive needs of their age group. These protocols focus on decreasing the negative emotional impact of an interview for children and also promote additional benefits.

It is important that children be interviewed in a supportive environment, as this will affect both the accuracy of their reports (Goodman et al. 1991) and the number of substantiated disclosures (Hershkowitz, Lamb, and Katz 2014). The movement toward creating a supportive environment for child forensic interviews has been largely facilitated by the advent of the Child Advocacy Center (CAC) model. CACs are specialized centers that are designed to provide a neutral, safe, and child-friendly location for working with child victims (American Professional Society on the Abuse of Children 2012; Newlin et al. 2015). CACs are often set up to make children feel more comfortable by including child-sized furniture, paper and markers to draw, or toys for children to play with in the waiting room.

The need for this type of location arose from the realization that traditional interviewing locations may not be optimal for interviewing child witnesses (Cross et al. 2007). Police stations, a traditionally common interviewing location, are not usually set up to be a welcoming and comforting environment and children may be intimidated by uniformed strangers (Lowenstein, Blank, and Sauer 2010); additionally, bringing children to police stations for interviews may insinuate to them that they have done something wrong (Cross et al. 2007). The child's home, another common interviewing location, might also not be comfortable if the perpetrator is connected to the home in some way (e.g., if the perpetrator is a family member). The child's school lacks privacy, could invite unwanted questions from peers, and could interfere with their education. Therefore, CACs are designed to provide a neutral and child-friendly environment where children can feel comfortable discussing their experiences. CACs promote additional advantages such as employing a trained professional in child interviewing, providing a variety of services (e.g., medical exams, mental health treatment), and increasing interagency coordination (which should decrease the number of times children have to "tell their story").

The use of CACs is becoming more common, but there is wide variety in the interviewing protocols that interviewers within those CACs follow, at least in the United States (National Children's Alliance 2016; the protocol is more standardized in other places, such as the United Kingdom). Several evidence-based protocols exist, many of which share considerable overlap and are based on the same body of research (Faller 2015; Newlin et al. 2015). In 2015, the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (OJJDP) consolidated the knowledge of several training organizations to publish the best practices for child forensic interviewing (Newlin et al. 2015). Within these best practices are several techniques that contribute to forming the supportive environment necessary to promote the desired outcomes of a child forensic interview.

Similar to adult interviews, it is considered best practice to begin a child forensic interview with a rapport-building phase (Newlin et al. 2015). Rapport-building with child witnesses serves a largely similar function as it does with adult witnesses. It can help ease the child into the interview, promote comfort with the interviewer, and facilitate communication. Past research has established support for the rapport-building phase, finding that it can increase the accuracy and completeness of children's reports (Price, Ahern, and Lamb 2016). The importance of the rapport-building phase with children is well-agreed upon by professionals (Price, Ahern, and Lamb 2016), and it is included in nearly all child forensic interviewing protocols (see Faller [2015] for a review).

The best practices also suggest that interviewers maintain awareness of the child's emotional state throughout the substantive phase of the interview, as they may need to make changes accordingly (Newlin et al. 2015). For example, OJJDP guidelines suggested that "if a child is anxious or embarrassed, has been threatened or cautioned not to talk [...] the interviewer may need a more focused approach" (Newlin et al. 2015: 9). The interviewer can detect these experiences through the child's verbal cues or nonverbal behavior. The more focused approach can include altering the pace to allow for hesitation or reassuring the child to decrease the child's reluctance. There may be a point in the interview, however, where the child reaches an emotional state so extreme that the interviewer should consider ending the interview early and continuing at a later date. Although multiple interviews are

not generally recommended, they may be warranted under these special circumstances. If children are overly emotional, they may be unable to produce accurate and complete reports (or any reports), and they may be retraumatized by the interview itself. It is important to gather information, but it is also important to ensure that the child is not being further traumatized by the interview.

Finally, interviews with children should end with a closure phase. The closure phase helps draw to an end what was likely an emotionally challenging conversation; the interviewer can ask final questions, allow the child to ask questions, and conclude on a positive note to bring the child back to a neutral state (American Professional Society on the Abuse of Children 2012; Newlin et al. 2015). Thus, every stage of child forensic interviewing protocols considers the emotional needs of the child and promotes the child's emotional well-being, even at the possible expense of an accurate memory report.

5 Recommendations

An abundance of research has demonstrated the effect of emotion on eyewitness identifications and reports. While this knowledge has contributed to our theoretical understanding of the relationship between emotion, memory, perceptions, and disclosure, it can also provide practical implications to improve the functioning of the legal system. Below, we discuss how this knowledge can be applied to promote the better use of emotion with eyewitnesses in ways that foster a stronger, evidence-based pursuit of justice in the legal system.

5.1 Encourage eyewitnesses' use of emotional language

Legal professionals may need to prompt eyewitnesses to display emotions and to use emotional language when reporting crimes to mitigate the negative impact of the emotional witness effect on eyewitnesses who display neutral affect. Lyon et al. (2012, Study 2) provided a promising example of how legal professionals can effectively elicit emotional responses from eyewitnesses. They trained child forensic interviewers to use the "feelings task" during the rapport-building phase, in which the interviewer asked children to describe times when they were the most happy, sad, mad, and scared. Further, they encouraged interviewers to use emotionally targeted follow-up questions such as, "how did you feel when...?" They found that children responded to "how did you feel when...?" questions with an emotional response 100 % of the time. Overall, children responded to emotionally targeted questions with emotional content most or all of the time, compared to only 6 % of the time when the question did not target emotion. These findings were specific to child forensic interviewers but could be expanded to other legal professionals such as police officers or attorneys. In another study, Lyon et al. (2012, Study 1) found that only 6 % of the questions attorneys asked children were emotionally targeted; however, these questions successfully elicited an emotional response more often than questions that did not target emotion. Therefore, to get eyewitnesses to provide emotional responses and consequently increase their perceived credibility, it may be necessary for professionals to ask emotionally

targeting questions. Using emotionally targeted questions may also allow for more accurate recall through state-dependent memory effects. By asking an eyewitness “how they felt when...”, the interviewer (or police officer, attorney, etc.) can help reinstate the emotional context that the eyewitness was experiencing at the time of the crime, which can facilitate more accurate recall. This recommendation should be balanced with the need to maintain eyewitnesses’ emotional wellbeing, the negative effects of being overly emotional through the proportionality rule, the need to avoid “coaching” (vs. preparing) witnesses, and the consideration that encouraging emotional displays might consequently inflate jurors’ perceptions of inaccurate eyewitnesses’ credibility.

5.2 Train professionals

Providing specialized training and increasing knowledge of eyewitness emotion could decrease the impact of the emotional witness effect on legal professionals. In Ask’s (2015) survey of legal professionals, police officers and prosecutors who reported participating in specialized training on eyewitness behavior were less influenced by an eyewitness’s displayed emotion than those who had not participated in specialized training. Unfortunately, they did not elaborate on what their special training might have been; however, this does offer the promising insight that education can provide an avenue to lessen legal professionals’ reliance on misconceptions of stereotypical eyewitness emotional behavior. Therefore, it would be beneficial to increase the availability of specialized training on eyewitnesses’ emotion to legal professionals. Furthermore, wider dispersal of relevant literature on eyewitnesses’ emotional behavior would help to decrease overuse of emotion as an indicator of credibility. Researchers should take steps to ensure legal professionals will be able to access and understand the information they produce. This could be accomplished by publishing in practice-oriented trade journals or presenting research findings at conferences that reach a wide audience of legal professionals.

5.3 Correct expectation misconceptions

Education may also be the answer to reduce the emotional witness effect in jurors. Rather than providing training to all potential jurors, as we recommended for legal professionals, this education can come in the form of jury instructions or expert testimony. For example, Bollingmo et al. (2009) demonstrated the efficiency of jury instructions at nullifying the emotional witness effect. They provided mock jurors with an eyewitness statement that varied in emotion. Before participants provided their credibility perceptions, the experimenters read jury instructions that were either stereotype-consistent (e.g., “a crying and distressed victim is more credible than one who is smiling or appearing neutral”) or stereotype-inconsistent (e.g., “the emotional expression of the woman does not necessarily tell us anything about whether she is lying or telling the truth”). Participants who received the stereotype-inconsistent jury instruction placed less weight on the eyewitness’s emotion and perceived the eyewitness who expressed neutral and positive emotion as more credible

than those who received the stereotype-consistent jury instruction. These findings suggest that correcting jurors' misconceptions about stereotypical emotional behavior of eyewitnesses may reduce their reliance on unreliable emotional indicators.

6 Conclusion

Emotion has a profound effect on eyewitnesses' experience with the legal system. In some ways, emotion can be advantageous. It can assist the encoding of gist details, increase perceived credibility with jurors and legal professionals, and facilitate accurate retrieval in limited circumstances. In other ways, however, emotion can be disadvantageous. It can inhibit the encoding of peripheral details (which can be quite important forensically), impair perpetrator identification, decrease perceived credibility if the eyewitness expresses too much or not enough emotion, and impede willingness to disclose. In order to remain balanced and just, the legal system must remain aware of the complex interplay between emotion and eyewitnesses' experiences. Researchers and policymakers can use this knowledge to improve outcomes for all parties involved in cases relying on eyewitness evidence.

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94 Law and emotion with specific regard to police and forensic aspects

- 1 Introduction
- 2 Police interviews: Characteristics
- 3 Dealing with emotions: Building rapport
- 4 Dealing with emotions: How language and culture operate
- 5 Conclusion and further research
- 6 References

Abstract: The purpose of this chapter is to give an overview of how emotions are dealt with in legal settings, with specific emphasis on police interviews. In a context where emotions are constrained by the nature of the interactions, expressing feelings and establishing rapport becomes challenging and language becomes essential in these interactions. The specific circumstances of police settings make the participants experience power asymmetry, which may lead to difficulties in expressing and showing emotion, or conversely, in displaying and expressing too much emotion. It is through verbal and non-verbal communication that emotions are expressed and from which different perceptions may be inferred. The following pages will provide an overview of how communication is at the core of legal settings, how language can enhance or hinder the outcomes of police interviews with suspects, victims or witnesses, and how the language of empathy and rapport becomes essential in the success of legal interactions.

1 Introduction

The following pages will give an overview of how emotions are dealt with in legal settings, with specific emphasis on rapport in police interviews. Legal systems aim at providing justice, at indicating what people should be required to do or prohibited from doing. In these contexts, emotions are constrained by the nature of the interactions, particularly in police settings, which are unfamiliar contexts and make the participants experience power asymmetry, leading to difficulties in expressing and showing emotion, or conversely, in displaying and expressing too much emotion, which can alter the outcomes of the interactions. Emotions are expressed verbally and non-verbally, therefore, verbal and non-verbal communication can help or hinder meaningful information as well as elicit inaccurate judgement from others, and it is here where rapport plays an important role in pursuing cooperation and eliciting meaningful outcomes.

This chapter provides an overview of the challenges faced by the participants in police interactions with suspects, victims and/or witnesses, how managing the expression of feelings and establishing rapport becomes essential in the success of legal interactions and the role language plays in these legal settings. This research could be particularly relevant for Masters, PhD students and researchers in the fields of emotions, linguistics, legal interpreting, discourse analysis and empathy studies, as well as the ontology, methodology and epistemology of police interview training, or instances where a party perceives there has been a miscarriage of justice.

2 Police interviews: Characteristics

Within legal settings, the field of police science is at the core of dealing with emotions. Police settings can include a range of different situations, such as crisis negotiations and operations with informants, but most police interactions focus on interviewing suspects, victims or witnesses. In these interactions, participants go through an array of emotional states that need to be dealt with to overcome a successful interview. The dynamics of how the interview is conducted plays a significant role in both the police interviewer and the interviewee's psychological state of mind (Risan, Binder, and Milne 2018: 374) and here is where dealing with emotions is key.

Police interview settings are highly institutionalized all over the world, and this is significant to the emotions that may influence the interview setting and the participants in the interaction. The main aim of police interviews is to collect evidence for suspects, victims or witnesses which will later be used in court. These encounters are dictated by police regulations and they are regulated by certain procedures. First of all, they have a set structure which divides the interview into three different parts: the opening, the information gathering and the closing (Heydon 2005: 47). Both the opening and the closing follow a rather fixed structure; during the opening, the police officer will identify the participant in the interview by asking personal information (usually name, surname, address, age, date of birth and identity number), will record the interviewee's status (suspect, victim or witness) and will inform the person about their rights. The closing part represents the end of the interview; in countries where the interview is audio-recorded or video-recorded by law, the police interviewer will indicate that the interview has finished, whereas in countries where interviews are not recorded, the interviewee will be asked to read and approve the written statement that has been produced as a result of the interview, containing the interviewee's verbal declaration. The information gathering part is where most of the information is provided and employs an interview structure, with sequences of questions and answers which follow a turn-taking pre-allocation system, where questions are produced by the police interviewer and answers are provided by the interviewed suspect, victim or witness (Perakyla and Silverman 1991). This question-answer structure followed in police interviews "constrains the distribution of turn types to speakers" (Heydon 2005: 21). This means that there is a clear condition of power asymmetry between the participants in the interview, since it is the police investigator who holds the power of turns and initiation of topic shifts. Moreover, features like time restraints or nature of the offense (Pounds 2019: 95–96) can lead to different reactions in the performance of the police investigator and the

emotional state of the interviewee (suspect, victim or witness), who often perceive the situation as “unwelcome, stressful or threatening” (Abbe and Brandon 2014: 209).

Differences in the participants are also relevant to the emotional component of the interview. The interviewee could be a child or a vulnerable victim that is unable to manage communication, for example, due to intellectual or physical disabilities. By defining vulnerable groups, we follow Gudjonsson’s definition of vulnerability as “psychological characteristics or mental state which render an [individual] prone, in certain circumstances, to providing information which is inaccurate, unreliable or misleading” (Gudjonsson 2006: 68). Vulnerability may result in compliance with regards to the police authority, who will need to change the communication dynamics and the language style. For example, approaches to interviews with children are meant to be developmentally sensitive (La Rooy et al. 2016: 59). The powerful authority ascribed to the police officer can have an impact on children and other vulnerable groups, who may feel constrained in what or how to respond appropriately to interview questions.

Similarly, the investigative methodology underneath a police investigation is also crucial in the management of emotions. Based on legal, ethical and political systems throughout the globe, police interviews can undertake an accusatorial method or an information-gathering method. Accusatorial methods are commonly used in countries such as the United States, Canada and many Asian countries (Costanzo and Redlich 2010; Ma 2007; Smith, Stinson, and Patry 2009). The main aim of the interview, or interrogation, as specified under this approach, is to obtain confessions, for which police investigators employ psychological manipulation to establish control of the suspect. Police officers are usually trained under the Reid Technique (Snook et al. 2010), which divides the interview into two stages. The first stage is a non-accusatorial stage, where the interviewer determines whether the interviewee should be formally interrogated in a second phase (Meissner et al. 2014); the second stage or phase is where the police investigator uses control-based techniques addressed at highlighting the interviewer authority over the interviewee and to facilitate the act of confession (Evans et al. 2010; Kassin 2008; Leo 1992; Snook et al. 2010). As it can be inferred, this interrogation approach involves active persuasion from the interrogators; historically, it has also involved manipulative techniques and even deception to pressure a suspect (Leo 2008).

On the other hand, information-gathering methods are commonly used in the United Kingdom and most other European countries as well as in New Zealand and Australia (Milne and Bull 1999; Oxburgh et al. 2016; Shepherd 2007), following the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR), which banned deception and advocates a fair trial. This method of interview, as opposed to interrogation, aims to elicit information and collect lawful evidence by using relationship-building interview techniques, direct and positive confrontation, as well as yielding cognitive cues to deception (Meissner et al. 2014). Police officers are usually trained following the Cognitive Interview Model (Fisher and Geiselman 1992) or the Conversation Management approach (Shepherd 2007), which are implemented to avoid coercion and facilitate the interviewee feeling at ease (Walsh and Bull 2011). An example based on this type of approach is the PEACE model, a method of investigative interviewing which is an acronym of the stages followed in a police interview: Planning and preparation, Engage and explain, Account, Closure and Evaluation. PEACE was originally introduced in

England and Wales in the 1990s, and was later adopted by other countries like New Zealand and Australia (Milne and Bull 1999). It trains the interviewers to manage interviews with minimal interference and as part of a set of activities aimed at improving interview outcomes and eliciting accurate and detailed information (Walsh and Bull 2010). The PEACE model and other information-gathering methods use techniques like the Cognitive Interview in order to conduct the investigative interview. This technique addresses psychological stressors that interviewees may encounter, for instance, after a disturbing incident (Fisher and Geiselman 2010). It uses communication aspects like verbal and non-verbal modes of expression, it trains interviewers to actively listen, and it encourages interviewees' participation using rapport-building techniques (Fisher and Geiselman 1992), which allow the participants to facilitate the interaction, as we will see in the following section.

With regards to the investigative approach undertaken by these methods, Meissner and colleagues (2014) conducted a systematic review and meta-analysis of the available empirical literature. This was done to assess the influence of accusatorial and information-gathering methods in eliciting true and false confessions; although caution is warranted due to the small number of available samples, the authors found that information-gathering methods preserved, and in some cases increased, the likelihood of true confessions, whereas the accusatorial methods increased both true and false confessions (Meissner et al. 2014). In addition, Vallano et al. (2015), in their research on police training, discovered that positive emotions and trust were perceived by police officers through rapport building in information-gathering methods. These studies emphasize the importance of rapport building in information-gathering methods and recommend how to deal with emotions in these settings nowadays.

3 Dealing with emotions: Building rapport

As a new model pattern to non-coercive interviews, rapport is central to information-gathering methods in police interviewing. This concept is defined following Spencer-Oatey's theory of rapport management, as "the management or mismanagement of relations between people" (Spencer-Oatey 2005: 96). In the context of law and specifically police interviews, the situation brings the working element to the definition, and rapport appears as "a working relationship between operator and source based on a mutually shared understanding of each other's goals and needs, which can lead to useful, actionable intelligence or information" (Kelly et al. 2013: 169). Operator refers here to the person conducting the interview, whereas source refers to the person being interviewed, mostly suspects, victims or witnesses. The idea of the working relationship must be highlighted since it is important to note that the relationship may or may not be positive, especially in the case of interviewing suspects (Kleinman 2006). However, it is based on a mutual understanding of what both the interviewer's and the interviewee's goals and needs are, which will ultimately lead to actionable information (Kleinman 2006: 165). In other words, rapport is used for the police investigator to maximize the interviewee's (suspect, victim or witness) cognitive resources, such as memory recall or emotional stability and to establish a quality relationship between two parties.

Accusatorial methods also support the use of rapport; however, their approach is different. Whereas information-gathering methods advocate building and maintaining rapport through the whole interview (Milne and Bull 1999), accusatorial methodology in police training recommends rapport-building techniques to elicit incriminating information with suspects of crime (Vallano et al. 2015). As an example, in interrogation guidelines based on the Reid Technique, such as the US Army Human Intelligence Field Manual (United States Department of the Army 2006), rapport is used to obtain cooperation from the source during the first phase of the interview (or approach phase). Rapport here may be used with the sole purpose of a suspect's cooperation and it may not be genuine, also considered pseudo-rapport (DePaulo and Bell 1990: 306). With cooperative witnesses, however, an information-gathering approach is commonly used both in the US and in Europe (Meissner et al. 2014).

Another aspect that needs to be considered is that police interviews take significant cognitive demands on both interviewers and interviewees. As Rock (2010) describes, police interviewers will be dealing with a range of activities, including

listening, devising questions, delivering questions, reacting to answers, writing notes on point for clarification, writing a statement, holding in mind prior utterances, imagining a crime context, reading texts produced by them and others before and during the interview. They will also engage in a range of identity-related activities such as showing empathy and encouraging disclosure, and in procedural activities, such as ensuring that the interview complies with legal requirements in terms of its duration. Interviewees too will potentially listen and respond to questions, deliver narratives, write or draw (for example mapping a crime location) and undertake a range of strategies for activating short- and long-term memories sometimes with the interviewer's help. In addition, the interviewee may have to work with a range of emotions during the interview such as fear, anger and guilt. (Rock 2010: 133)

This means that communication is complex, and each encounter brings a dynamic interaction with unique characteristics.

In recent years there has been an orientation towards aims of preserving high ethical principles in police operations. Following this approach, building and maintaining rapport through communication has proved to increase trust and produce more cooperation (Collins, Lincoln, and Frank 2002), hence increasing the quantity and quality of the information gathering (Alison et al. 2013, 2014; Dando, Wilcock, and Milne 2008; Oxburgh et al. 2016; Risan, Binder, and Milne 2018; Vallano et al. 2015; Walsh and Bull 2010). Rapport has then been introduced in police guidelines as the basis of successful investigative interviews (Abbe and Brandon 2013; Kelly et al. 2013; Vallano et al. 2015; Vallano and Schreiber Compo 2011; Walsh and Bull 2011). Most police interviewing guidelines recommend the use of rapport-building and maintenance through the investigative process as a key element to conduct effective interviews with suspect, victims or witnesses (College of Policing 2012; Cuerpo Nacional de Policía n. d.; Ministry of Justice 2011; The Army Field Manual 2006).

Numerous studies have empirically probed the benefits of rapport; Oxburgh et al. (2016) found that suspects of murder and sexual offenders would elicit more information when police investigators used appropriate empathic questions; Holmberg and Christiansson (2002) found that this type of suspect was more likely to confess when treated with empathic stances. Alison et al. (2014) discovered that rapport-based interrogation techniques would make police interactions with suspects of terrorism more successful. They

specify that this is pertinent to witnesses and especially victims dealing with intimate and personal experiences, and going through the emotional distress of describing crime-related circumstances, instances where it is essential to be psychologically comfortable with the police interviewer (Dando et al. 2016: 83).

In his article on the psychology of rapport, Michel St-Yves (2006) establishes five basic rules for communication skills in successful police interviews:

1. Keeping an open mind and remaining objective.
2. Building up rapport.
3. Paying attention.
4. Keeping a professional attitude.
5. Knowing how to conclude.

From all of them, he points out that establishing and maintaining rapport is essential to conducting an effective interview. Rapport is only conceivable as a result of an interaction between individuals (Tickle-Degnen and Rosenthal 1990) – in our case of study, the police investigator and the suspect, victim or witness – which generates different emotions in each party. Most techniques used in police interviews nowadays rely on psychological tactics which provoke different emotions in the interviewee in order to gather information (Kelly et al. 2013). In the case of rapport, and following Tickle-Degnen and Rosenthal's (1990) theory of rapport, the interaction should be based on three components: mutual attentiveness, positivity, and coordination. In the context of police interviews, *mutual attentiveness* refers to the involvement which both the interviewer and the interviewee experience in the interaction; *positivity* refers to mutual approval of the participants, which can be accomplished through mutual respect, rather than liking or caring (Abbe and Brandon 2013); and *coordination* refers to a balanced interaction between the parties, usually in terms of harmony or complementarity in the interaction. These components are defined by the participants and the goals for the interaction, where both verbal and non-verbal behaviour shape communication dynamics.

Research from psychology, forensic linguistics, discourse analysis and communication have analysed these dynamics, providing different techniques aimed at building rapport and safeguarding the emotional state of police interviewees during the investigative interview process (Abbe and Brandon 2014; Alison et al. 2013; Dhami, Goodman-Delahunty, and Desai 2017; Goodman-Delahunty and Howes 2019; Kieckhaefer, Vallano, and Schreiber Compo 2013; Pounds 2019). Most of these techniques have been developed based on empirical research, by analysing authentic data from police interviews with suspects, victims or witnesses, or collecting data through questionnaires distributed to police investigators. The results and subsequent analysis have highlighted different communicative and linguistic aspects to be considered in police encounters, exemplified in the next section.

4 Dealing with emotions: How language and culture operate

In situations like police interviews, power asymmetry is a noticeable aspect of the interaction. Firstly, the police officer's attire – wearing a police uniform and carrying a gun – and

their traditional role as an authority, can establish a psychological barrier with the person that is being interviewed, which may lead to anxiety and difficulty in information disclosure. Secondly, police interviews follow the fixed structure of an interview, where turns of questions and answers come after each other, characterized by a turn pre-allocation system, as previously explained. Police interviewers will ask questions that the interviewee will need to answer. This enables the police officer to have control over the interview, but it also tilts the power dynamics in their favour during the interaction; for example, by using some language strategies in the interview, like designating the conversation turns or controlling the topics in the conversation (La Rooy et al. 2016: 64). This may put pressure on the interviewee's capacity to answer a question. The formal communication that characterizes the police officers may also be a constraint on the interviewee's responses and reflect this power asymmetry (Heydon 2005).

Interactions with non-cooperative witnesses, who display emotional detachment from the interview and/or the interviewer, make this power asymmetry even more prominent. These interviewees can display emotional states related to anger, impassiveness or fear, resulting in a silent interview, which is known as "no comment" interview, where the person being interviewed does not say anything or replies with "no comment" utterances to most questions, hence disclosing minimal information. In these situations, successful interviewers try to influence disclosure by using strategies from the Conversation Management approach, which aims at treating the interviewee as an equal, no matter whether they are compliant or resistant.

Abbe and Brandon (2014) classify these strategies, aimed at building rapport, and identify them as immediacy behaviours, active listening, mimicry, contrast, self-disclosure, common ground, and contact and persistency. They specify the ones that may be counter-productive and where extra caution needs to be taken by the police officers when applying them, such as mimicking non-verbal behaviours or linguistic patterns. For example, if the interviewee is aware of the interviewer trying to mirror their behaviour, or the interviewer applies a degree of mimicry too late during the interview, it may lead to a decrease in trust, having a negative effect on the disclosure of information.

Police interview training in Norway operationalizes these specificities by facilitating communication through the interviewer, who

should give a good first impression, engage in casual conversation to initiate communication, and inform the interviewee about the relevant rules and regulations as well as the interview background, purpose, format, and process. The interviewer should ask the interviewee if they have any questions or needs, show empathy and understanding for the interviewees' state, prepare the interviewee that they might have to ask unpleasant questions and work towards establishing a climate of safety and trust. (Bjerknes and Johansen 2009, cited in Risan, Binder, and Milne 2018: 374)

Other tactics may be highly effective in these interactions; interacting with the same interviewer, active listening or immediacy behaviours should be positive to build rapport with a suspect, witness or victim, hence resulting in a successful information gathering. Immediacy behaviours are related to non-verbal behaviours that the police investigator can use in order to engage with the source. This can refer to having an open body position, as well as leaning forward or orienting one's body towards the interviewee (Imada and Hakel 1977). Police investigators are encouraged to make eye contact or reduce physical distance (for

example, removing a table placed between interviewer and interviewee so that there is no physical obstacle). They can also be supportive by active listening, which is related to paying attention to the statement of the person, with a conscious focus on understanding their feelings (Cambria et al. 2002). This can be signalled through verbal and non-verbal behaviour. The police officer may nod their head or use minimal prompts, such as *ok*, *right*, *uh-huh*, *yes*, paraphrasing, repeating back or summarizing. On the contrary, they should be careful with frowning, since this can be considered with suspicion or as questioning the veracity of the interviewee's account (Mann et al. 2013). Self-disclosure of personal information from the police officer is also used to maintain rapport; a getting-to-know phase, sharing social identities, values or even superficial similarities, such as a birthday date, can help to personalize the interaction, reduce power asymmetry, and make the interviewee feel more engaged, reducing emotional distress as well (Fisher and Geiselman 1992; Shepherd 2007).

Police interviewing models, such as the Cognitive Interview and the Conversation Management approaches, promote the use of empathic communication in order to establish and build rapport in investigative interviews (Milne and Bull 1999; Oxburgh and Ost 2011). The police investigator will be able to build rapport by paying attention to the verbal communication and the non-verbal indicators of the interviewee (St-Yves 2006), from which emotions will be able to be identified and interpreted. Good interviewers will be able to analyse their interlocutor's emotional state and undertake appropriate behaviour. For example, they will be able to adapt the interview's linguistic style to a more informal or inclusive interaction if needed, which can put the interviewee more at ease (Heydon 2005). From the perspective of the Conversation Management approach, a set of verbal and non-verbal techniques is recommended to make the interviewee feel at ease and to obtain maximum value from the interview. This set, comprised by the mnemonic GEMAC (Shepherd 2007: 21–24), trains the police interviewers to follow several steps which facilitate disclosure. The acronym stands for Greeting, Explanation, Mutual Activity and Closure, as explained below:

- Greeting (G): This first stage aims to start the first meeting with the interviewee in a way that signals respect, leading to feelings of equality.
- Explanation (E): The main aim of the interviewer is to share understanding of the stages followed in the interview process with the interviewee. By knowing the role of the police officers and any other person present (i.e., legal adviser, carer, interpreter or appropriate adult in the case of minors) in the interview, and understanding the main topics that will be discussed, the investigative expectations or some common emotions in interviewees like dread, apprehension and anxiety can be reduced, allowing a working relationship to take place.
- Mutual Activity (MA): This stage aims to look for clues in the emotional state and attitude of the interviewee, such as changes in non-verbal and verbal behaviour that can potentially indicate emotional arousal, such as gaze aversion, blushing, tone of voice, swallowing, or sweating, among others. Under circumstances of continuous disruptive behaviour on the part of the interviewee (i.e., loss of control, interrupting, overalking), interviewers should not react in anger and it is advised to stop the interview. In circumstances of resistance (i.e., continuous denial, evasion to answer, seeking to snub), in-

Interviewers should try to acknowledge any emotional change with sentences like *I can see that you are getting keyed up... and are unhappy taking about... I'd like to know the reason for your unhappiness about what we are covering...* in order to ease the situation and let the person express their emotion while listening or creating silence, allowing them to become composed again. The police interviewers are trained to avoid being influenced by the interviewee's emotions. Guidelines also advise them to follow certain behaviours in the case of the interviewee's expression of strong emotions; for example, they should not smile when a person is getting angry (this will provoke more anger in the person) or they should use complementary behaviours in interactions, such as lowering their voice if the interviewee raises their voice, or consciously become more and more relaxed in instances where the interviewee gets incrementally upset (Shepherd 2007: 245).

- Closing (C): The last stage is addressed to reinforce the working relationship by recognizing the value of the interview and expressing appreciation for the interviewee's contribution. Police interviewers summarize the outcomes of the interaction, invite questions and depart on a positive note.

Each of these stages are aimed at decreasing social distancing and creating emotional proximity. By facilitating dialogue, interactions try to overcome the issues regarding unwillingness to talk or deception due to emotional circumstances.

More generic linguistic examples are described in Shepherd's (2007) highly referenced book on investigative interviews, where he gives extensive instances aimed at building rapport. One of the contributions is his guidelines to police officers to adjust the register to the interviewee, by using simple words and phrasing. For instance, the acronym TED (Shepherd 2007: 184) refers to the words Tell, Explain and Describe, which police investigators are advised to use to allow the interviewee to disclose information freely. Among the three, the word *tell* is a highly useful instruction to allow the interviewee to respond with freedom. It is actually also understood by children or even educationally deprived or developmentally disadvantaged individuals; this may be preferred over *describe*, for instance, which may not be an everyday word for some people (especially deprived or developmentally disadvantaged). In the case of children, interviewers should avoid putting pressure on children if they cannot answer a question, since this may lead them to make or accept changes in their statement's accounts. A common rule is to reassure the child that they can just say *I don't know* or *I don't remember*, as a correct answer if that is actually the answer to a question; or *correct me if I make a mistake* to the interviewer so that they don't try to guess (Lamb et al. 2011). Questions like *Can you describe to/for me?* rather than *Do you know?* or *Can you remember?* also elicit more substantive responses (Heydon 2005: 162). In addition, the particle *Why?* used as a question when seeking an explanation of behaviour may be problematic since it may cause feelings of blame (Achieving Best Evidence in Criminal Proceedings [Ministry of Justice 2011]). When working with children and vulnerable victims, the use of *How come?* instead of *Why?* is perceived as less accusatory. Strategies to minimize fear in children recommend allowing preparation for the actual police interview, using a practical interview about a neutral topic, practicing how to ask for clarification in the case they do not understand, or having a rapport-building first stage

where the interviewer will ask open-ended questions related to the child's everyday life. This will allow the interviewer to assess informally the child's use of language and it will help the child to feel more relaxed (Saywitz and Camparo 1998).

When interviewing other vulnerable victims and witnesses, interviewers are confronted with emotional challenges such as attention, social pressure or motivation (Aldridge and Luchjenbroers 2008; Bartels 2011; Walsh and Bull 2011). For example, traumatized witnesses or victims, especially sex offence claimants, may be under high amounts of stress that can impede recall and increase suggestibility (Cutler, Findlay, and Moore et al. 2014; Snook, Eastwood, and Barron 2014). Strategies to minimize stress and errors in the interview include verbal mimicry (Richardson et al. 2019), such as the interviewer adapting to the interviewee's terminology or the use of simplified language, since people tend to align their grammar and word choices when engaged in a dialogue (Garrod and Pickering 2004). In the case of suspects, research shows that they align with interviewers when they are able to cooperate. For instance, Richardson et al. (2014) conducted an analysis regarding verbal behaviour in interrogations where they discovered that suspects increased matching of the police interviewer's language style when they confessed a crime.

Other exceptional settings within the law system are hostage and crisis negotiations. These scenarios are characterized by deep psychological distress, where negotiators need to use both verbal and non-verbal communication to achieve a successful interaction. In situations where the individual negotiating is rational and willing to reach a common solution, police negotiators use intervention models related to therapeutic approaches, based on active listening and building rapport (St-Yves and Veyrat 2012). Choice of words, tone or rhythm play an important role in these circumstances. For example, negotiators should try to avoid the word "problem" and replace it with "difficulty", or "hostage" should be replaced with the victim's first or last name (St-Yves and Veyrat 2012). These strategies can help communication and resolution through dialogue. On the other hand, negotiations where the individual has a mental disorder bring an extra difficulty to negotiators, who need to understand how they communicate and how to communicate with them. If the individual seems to have the intention of committing suicide, this will be linked to a feeling of despair, and negotiators should try to create hope; if the individual expresses feelings of anger, negotiators should help by finding a safe way of breaking the cycle of suffering (Braten et al. 2016: 238).

From a psycholinguistic point of view, Oxburgh and Ost (2011) identify two verbal categories of empathic communication in their study with suspects of sexual offences. They name them *empathic opportunity continuers* and *empathy opportunity terminators*. The authors explain that a suspect, either consciously or unconsciously, may provide some information looking for the interviewer's response. If the interviewer responds with something, either a statement or a reaction, which resonates with the information received and facilitates that the suspect discloses more information, this would be an empathic opportunity continuer. If the interviewer, on the other hand, ignores the information or responds with an unrelated question or comment, the suspect may not feel supported and may not disclose important information, which would be known as an empathic opportunity terminator. This is illustrated in Table 95.1.

From a discourse analytical perspective, Pounds (2019) provides the leading available linguistic classification of rapport-building linguistic features and empathic communica-

Tab. 95.1: Exemplars of an empathic opportunity, continuer and terminator (Oxburgh and Ost 2011: 184).

Empathy type	Exemplar
Opportunity	<i>...I am finding this whole process extremely difficult to deal with...</i>
Continuer	<i>...That's okay, I completely understand how difficult it is, but please try and stay focussed...</i>
Terminator	<i>...I don't care how difficult this is for you, just answer the question...</i>

tion in police interviews, as a result of data analysis extracted from authentic police interviews conducted during 2012 and 2013 in the UK. The classification documents seven global rapport linguistic dimensions displayed in investigative interviews, with real case utterances used appropriately or inappropriately to build and enhance rapport during interviews with suspects. Among these dimensions, the value of acknowledging feelings, as well as solidarity and affiliation building, are the ones highlighted in medical consultation training manuals as strategies of empathic communication (for the extended classification also related to the dimensions of face and mitigation, cf. Pounds [2019]).

Acknowledging feelings in a police interview can be displayed or verbalized. An interviewee can display an emotion verbally or physically (crying, trembling, biting lips, not talking). The police investigator acknowledges that emotion by responding to the implied emotion. Some language examples to be used would be: *I can see that you are upset* (if the interviewee appears emotional or cries); *I appreciate this may be something that is difficult to talk about* (if the interviewee shows discomfort or stops talking).

Building solidarity or expressing acceptance can be displayed as positive regard or other forms of alignment, such as using humour. The police investigator will express positive comments in relation to the suspect, victim or witness, in regards to their interests or abilities, or will praise, for instance: *thank you for your account* (after a statement); *You are clearly more knowledgeable about computers than I am* (praising on unrelated matters), with the aim of making the interviewee feel at ease. They can also refer back to general non-crime related experience (*Yes, you don't like parties / Yes, you never travel by train*) or use humour in relation to peripheral interview aspects: *You thought you were getting away with using those coloured pens* (in this case the suspect is asked to draw as part of the interview). In addition, the interviewer will use inclusive words, such as *we* or *us*, when referring to the interviewee (*We are here to help, none of us are here to judge you*). Pounds (2019) also gives several examples of police's interviewers adopting the same register or some of the exact words used by the interviewee (i.e., *And you thought he is a "dodgy fucker"? / What was that "little voice" telling you?*), which allows the interviewer to reduce power asymmetry with the interviewee.

Pounds includes a global rapport management memory aid (Pounds 2019: 118–119) which illustrates rapport dimensions with linguistic examples to build and develop rapport, but also and equally important, examples of how police investigators may hinder the working relationship. Here, she exemplifies speculative and assumptive language, like *I imagine you felt anxious* or *Why were you so depressed?* (in an interaction where the suspect did not describe himself as depressed), or using a technical word, like asking the suspect

Do you know who made the “allegation”? (if the suspect does not understand the word *allegation*, this will be an obstacle for rapport). Speculation and assumption are likely to make the interviewee feel discomfort, hence challenging the outcomes of the interview.

In suspect interrogations under accusatorial systems, police interrogators operate with social influencing strategies in order to display contrasting emotions which generate compliance in suspects. These strategies are variants of the “good cop, bad cop” technique and allow a display of both positive and negative emotions in suspects, as human beings tend to trust people they find likeable (O’Keefe 1990). The “good cop, bad cop” technique in criminal investigations implies that the presence of an intimidating police officer gives the impression that a kind or friendly officer seems even warmer or friendlier (Kamisar 1980). When suspects are presented with both a threatening interrogator and a friendly one, they trigger compliance mechanisms in the belief that it is to their own benefit to comply with the good cop’s requests. These mechanisms are related to escaping from anxiety provoked by the bad cop; reciprocating a good cop’s kindness, who in contrast with the bad cop is perceived as likeable and kind; and the fact that compliance is in their best interest. As a result, suspects may feel compelled to confess in order to reciprocate the good cop’s kindness and release the psychological pressure created by the bad cop (Rafaeli and Sutton 1991).

However, it must be highlighted that anything and everything the investigator does during the interview can have an impact on the emotional state of the interviewee, which may act upon enhancing or hindering information, either consciously or unconsciously. This explains why some personal traits influence the police investigator’s success on rapport (St-Yves 2006: 96). The rationale behind this claim rests on the psychological concepts of transference and countertransference (Freud [1910] 1957). Transference refers to certain ideas or feelings from past experiences, either positive or negative, that we project or transfer to another person, even if it is the first time we have seen this other person. If the transference is positive, rapport is easier to establish and build, since the feelings the interviewer projects towards the interviewee are likeable. If the transfer is negative, rapport becomes more difficult since the feelings projected are related to aversion. On the other hand, countertransference refers to the interviewer’s positive or negative emotional response to the suspect, victim or witness, also based on the interviewer’s past experiences. This response can be internal and may not be perceived by the interviewee. This is the reason why, especially in the case of negative transference and countertransference, the investigator needs to be aware of their emotions, so that they can minimize any negative or hostile behaviour which obstructs rapport with the interviewee.

One last aspect that needs to be highlighted is the expression of emotions in cross-cultural legal interactions. Cultural differences and different communication norms play an important role in police interactions and the management of emotions (Abbe and Brandon 2014: 216). This refers to speakers of cultures whose norms related to communication may differ from those of police officers or the institution. When members of different cultures interact in police settings, they bring their cultural norms to the interaction, and this can have a tremendous impact on language use and behaviour. Cultural norms include turn-taking etiquette (Gumperz 1982) or different presumptions when interacting with an authority (Rosenquist and Megargee 1970), as in the case of police officers. Some cultures may feel threatened if the interviewer violates their proxemics and sits too close, or if the

interviewer maintains eye contact for an extended period, causing them anxiety or fear. In addition, it must be emphasized that “emotional expression [hence relationship building and rapport] is finely tuned to language specific structures” (Majid 2012: 432). This means that emotions may be displayed through different prosodic features, such as loudness, tone or tempo. For example, in some languages like Italian, the phonetic shift from s to sh (/ʃ/ in the International Phonetic Alphabet or IPA) is used as a resource to add intensity to a word, like in *stupido* (*ftupido*) (Ochs and Schieffelin 1989: 15); other languages, like English, do not have this prosodic feature and it would be challenging to transfer the emotional implication.

A review on cross-cultural deception detection undertaken by Taylor et al. (2014) shows eight communicative dynamics that lead to misunderstanding in cross-cultural interactions. These dynamics are described as follows:

- The expectation of small talk, which is not used by some cultures as a way of engaging, and the role of expectations in status and authority figures. In some cultures, this may lead to demonstrating deference by being silent in the interview.
- The expectation for dialogue within a story-telling framework. Some cultures do not follow a linear storyline when recounting and this may be perceived as rambling dialogue.
- The expression of empathy to build relationships, which may be seen as patronizing and lead to defensive attitudes from the suspect, victim or witness.
- Forcing tactics like the use of rational persuasion or ultimatums, hence evoking negative emotions in interactions; and the use of resistance on the part of suspects, which may not be related to feelings of guilt but rather may be concerned with the suspects’ fear of incriminating themselves or concern that the police officer will not recognize that they are innocent.
- Issues related to face, referring to the importance of having a positive image in the interaction. Face is defined here following Oetzel et al. as “individual’s claimed sense of positive image in the context of social interaction” (Oetzel et al. 2000: 398). Within some groups, this may be to the extent of interviewees willing to give false testimony in order to agree with the interviewer, appearing honorable or leaving the interaction gaining the interviewer’s respect.

When cultural norms differ from one speaker to another, there is an inclination for one or both speakers to find the other odd or uncooperative, or even incompetent or deceptive (O’Mahony et al. 2013: 303). Communication errors arising from cultural and language differences may trigger negative emotions in the interaction and hinder investigation procedures, leading to an obstruction in the justice system (Black and Mendenhall 1990).

Cross-cultural differences are even more prominent in interpreter-mediated police interviews when the police investigator and the interviewee cannot speak the other’s language and the interaction is mediated by an interpreter. The renditions of both the police officer and the interviewee are translated by the interpreter, who will also be in control of the turns, since both parties will respond to the interpreter’s turns and not to each other’s turns, like in a dyadic interaction (Hale 2007). Although little research has been conducted into interpreter-mediated police interviews (Dhami, Goodman-Delahunty, and Desai 2017;

Goodman-Delahunty and Howes 2019), it seems that rapport may be enhanced or hindered by the interpreter. The police officer may rely on the interpreter to establish rapport, since the interpreter will communicate with the interviewee in their own language (Abbe and Brandon 2013), acting as a mediator, which is highly contentious and risky in police interactions, where it is the police investigator who is trained in investigative tactics, so the interpreter acting as a mediator can lead to a flawed interview (Fowler, Vaughan, and Wheatcroft 2016). In addition, in confrontational interviews, it can be the interpreter who reacts to conflict by neutralizing, or toning down the original rendition, as a way of aiding communication (Taibi and El-Madkouri Maataoui 2016), which may trigger misunderstanding or even suspicion (for an overview on challenges related to interpreter-mediated police interviews, we recommend Filipović [2007] and Goodman-Delahunty et al. [2020]).

5 Conclusion and further research

This analysis has presented a characterization of police settings affected by contrasting legal systems, with specific attention to the concept of rapport in police interviews with suspects, victims and witnesses, and how rapport is built and maintained in order to assist with diverse emotional states. This includes anxiety, fear or anger which may otherwise interfere in the interviewee's other cognitive resources. Several tactics and techniques have been described related to verbal and non-verbal communication, especially the ones that have been proved to be used by numerous police officers in their daily practice. We know now that these strategies are not randomly selected, and police investigators are trained in verbal and non-verbal tactics. Some of the main linguistic classifications have been provided, as well as examples of how a police interviewer can influence the emotional state of a person being interviewed, either enhancing or hindering the expression of emotions and making the information gathering either more, or less, successful. Special attention needs to be paid to the specific characteristics of police settings, where emotions are constrained by the nature of the interaction, and the expression of feelings is challenging. In addition, little research has been undertaken from a cross-linguistic and cross-cultural perspective, where specific language and cultural features, both verbal and non-verbal, may have an effect on how emotions are displayed and how they can have an impact in the outcomes of a police interview. Further research should be conducted in relation to emotions in cross-cultural settings, where interactions are more complex and cultural norms have an impact on the development of the interactions and the success of legal interviews.

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95 Law, literature, and emotion

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- 5 Case in point: The law-literature-emotion constellation around 1900
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Abstract: Since the 19th century, modern law has been based on strategies of rationalizing acts of speech as well as on specific forms of communication. For the law to function as such, it is necessary to inhibit or regulate disturbances to this particular framework as, for instance, caused by emotions. From this circumstance ensues one of modern literature's engagements with the law, displaying an interest not only in emotion scenarios which take effect in the legal context but also in the related epistemological conditions. Literature refers to law and emotions in order to elaborate on epistemological, social, and cultural issues. The chapter stresses and discusses the fact that language plays a decisive role for all three components. In investigating law-literature-emotion relations, the following questions arise: What part does the legal concept play in literature in the context of emotion? What kind of language/vocabulary is used in legal discourses and practices? After an introduction into general problems, the relationship between law, emotion, and language is examined with regard to current positions. This chapter is followed by a discussion of the potential of literature in this constellation. In order to also reflect practical possibilities, the paper proposes a methodological model for analysis.

1 Introduction

The modern era from the 18th century and particularly from the 19th century onward sees a close relationship between law, emotion, and literature. Legal scenes and emotion scenarios play an important role and as textual components they are primarily negotiated in terms of language. However, law and emotion are not merely linguistic variables. They are composed of different media constituents, are complex in spatio-temporal terms, and depend on knowledge and discourses. More recent legal theories thus understand legal acts as determined by spaces, materials, knowledge, and media constellations (Knaller 2021: 131; Müller-Mall 2012; Vesting 2011; Vismann 2011, 2000; Lerch 2004; Ladeur 2015, 2012; Müller, Christensen, and Sokolowski 1997; Augsberg 2012, 2009; Seibert 1996, 2004). Dietrich Busse summarizes the complexity of linguistic legal acts with the observations that

the sovereignty of legal decisions and interpretations of the law cannot be delegated to the linguistic form of normative texts alone. Rather, it is the result of a socially bound interpretation and application of texts. Since this interpretation is tied to an epistemological concretization and contextualization realized by applicants and recipients, it is open to modifications and is as such interminable (Busse 2004: 17).

Current theories of emotion also base their definitions of emotion and feeling on several components and their respective material- and media-related constellations. Christiane Voss (2004), for instance, proposes an approach which, contrary to Martha Nussbaum (1990) and Peter Goldie (2000), does not assume that emotions *per se* are already semantically charged. In her understanding, they are an interaction of pre-verbal, physical experiences, and a narrative frame; this interaction needs to be gradually developed and takes form as constellations which concern temporary, particular circumstances that have been put into perspective (see also Schiewer 2014; Scherer, Schorr, and Johnstone 2001; von Scheve 2009; Koppenfels and Zumbusch 2016; Knaller and Rieger 2016a; Mellmann 2015, 2006; Anz 2006, 2007; Winko 2003). Therefore, issues of emotion, law, and literature must be based on a notion of language that does justice to the complexity of the subject and that discards rational models and the idea of language as a rational sign bearer or as a simple tool for coding and decoding (Lerch 2005a; Schwarz-Friesel 2013; Schiewer 2014). Such an approach to language is followed and/or seconded by advanced and critical theories of law. One could mention media-oriented approaches (Müller-Mall 2015; Vesting 2011; Vismann 2011, 2000; Lerch 2004) and those explicitly interested in linguistics (Ladeur 2015, 2012; Müller, Christensen, and Sokolowski 1997) as well as new hermeneutics (Fish 2004), semiotic approaches (Seibert 2004, 1996) and advanced models of philosophy of law (Menke 2015; Möllers 2015; Augsberg 2012, 2009). They open up the notion of law to legal dimensions and constellations that allow one to consider or even to stress emotions (Buckel, Christensen, and Fischer-Lescano 2006). By considering Derrida's notions of the force of law and its implicit violence coming to light in legal acts (Derrida 1990), Fischer-Lescano asks for a legal concept that does not ignore the emotional dimension, the non-linguistic within the force of law and the field of social forces, in which the legal subjects are always involved (Fischer-Lescano 2014; Menke 2018). Greta Olson, by compiling Deleuzian and newer affect theories, takes this approach as a signal for traditional literature and law studies to reconsider their idea of the importance of literature and language. Therefore, traditional law and literary studies strictly following narratological, linguistic and text-oriented approaches would be challenged by affect theories which stress non-narratological and non-linguistic strategies and perspectives on law (Olsen 2016).

Nevertheless, it must be noted that language plays a central role in literature as well as in law and for emotions. Essential juridical acts are based on oral and written texts. The indispensable normative element for modern legal systems – i.e., legal texts – is embedded in language and speech acts. Emotions, on the other hand, heavily depend upon terminological definitions and linguistic descriptions. It can even be said that emotions gained a place in pre-modern and modern forms of knowledge mostly through their terminological classifications (Aristotle would be an early example) (Knaller 2021: 133; Frevert et al. 2011). To summarize, it can be stated that emotions are linguistically determined, while at the same time the linguistic component has to be seen as part of multi-constituted complexes,

combining physical, psychological, discursive, spatio-temporal, cultural, and knowledge-related factors. Emotions are the results of social, cultural, and media-related structuring of individual perceptions, and biological/genetic dispositions. They are basic conditions for us to function as communicating, social, political, biological, psychological, and ethical beings. Emotions are thus always also about knowledge, rules, norms, and traditions as well as about individual memories and experiences.

Against this backdrop, the relationship between law, emotion, and literature can be described as follows: As a modern, functionally indispensable social system, modern law is based on strategies of rationalizing and standardizing speech acts, on how institutions are organized, and on specific communications and practices. Said relationship is situated in a field of tension between the systemic requirement for norms and single legal and non-legal actions and situations. Law is therefore a process driven and regulated from within (its own norms, rules, practices, and limits) and from the outside (other norms, rules, practices, and events). This concurrence of the law's mandatory normativity and the inevitably contingent processuality and consequences associated with single legal actions constitutes a highly productive aspect for modernist literature. It reflects the tensions between the necessity of a modern society grounded in generally approved norms on the one hand and the right of freedom for the individual on the other. Since the 18th century and particularly the 19th century, literature has been dealing with this area of conflict and the uncontrollable contingencies of modern reality and society. The recourse to legal discourses and legal motives makes it possible to demonstrate the cultural and social characteristics and antinomies of institutions, individuals, and practices. In this context, emotions are of particular importance for literature. They count among the essential, never entirely calculable constants of human action and communication and, at the same time, they are both a part and a determinant of social practices (Reckwitz 2016). Thus, by representing how emotions and feelings may penetrate and even constitute legal norms and contexts, literature can demonstrate the unavoidability of emotions as well as the fact that law is located in norms as well as in the lifeworld. However, issues of emotion not only relate to legal, social, political, and cultural conflicts and practices, but also describe an aesthetic problem area with which literature has always been concerned: emotions and feelings have been constants of literature (and the arts in general). They are used and become effective on levels of production, text formation, and reception.

2 Law and emotion

In the context of the law, emotions and feelings can encompass the following characteristics: They can have a normative and corrective value in the legal context, they determine judicial reasoning and judgment; they authorize legitimacy and convey legal experience (Landweer and Koppelberg 2016: 16; see also Section 6 below). They question the worth and utility – and thus also the justification – of normativity and value systems. Emotions thus operate at the level of legal doctrines, legal norms, institutions, procedures, and the public, as well as in the context of their own environmental systems, which include the arts (Ellerbrock and Kesper-Biermann 2015: 5; Shaw and Shaw 2014). However, unlike the

relationship between literature and emotion, that between the law and emotion is always conflictual. In contrast to literary studies, the engagement of jurisprudence with emotion is ambivalent; in law, it is still questioned whether emotion constitutes a relevant category. Three notable lines of research can be identified in this context: discussions about (i) the so-called ‘sense of justice’ or *Rechtsgefühl* (which was especially salient for the 19th century) and (ii) a jurisprudential and philosophical discussion of *law and emotion* (as of the 1990s). A third line would be (iii) the current discussion of law and emotion in German-language legal theory, philosophy, and sociology. As for the sense of justice, it can briefly be noted that in its context – and in opposition to the positivistic theory of law – a law of life is advocated; and that the questions of value and validity omitted from normative doctrines of concepts, the understanding of ethics and morals, and the participants’ perspective should be addressed (Jhering and Rusche 1965). The following subjects have thus become and remain central: the role of the judge; the tension between norm, law, and case as well as between society and the individual (Schnädelbach 2015; Kalivoda 2013: 291; Kraus 2012; Hänni 2011: 125; Müller-Mall 2015). Nowadays, a ‘sense of justice’ implies using intuition in decision making, a subjective sense of being just, and associating the law with empathy (Kraus 2012: 37–40; Kalivoda 2013: 291, 293). The sense of justice (*Rechtsgefühl*) is still tied to decision-making and to the practice of passing judgement. This can affect subsequent law-making insofar as the latter requires the translation of non-legal discourses (like morals, ethics, and religion) and their vocabularies (including those of emotions and feelings) into legal discourse/the law. However, the sense of justice is not an emotion, but a feeling for law (Köhler et al. 2017: 10). The term has remained ambivalent and was even more so when it originated. This is due to it having a philosophical and moral connotation, while also being strongly oriented towards the (at the time) new natural sciences. Here, Gustav Rümelin can be cited as an example. Like the pioneering legal scholar Friedrich Carl von Savigny, Rümelin invoked 19th-century models of instinct and emotion but perceived the latter not so much as an inner (moral) feeling than as physiological stimuli (Rümelin 1948; Schnädelbach 2017: 99–100). A historical perspective on these relationships reveals another facet of the 19th century: i.e., that in the sphere of psychology, biology, physiology, and medicine, the concept of emotion found its way into all matters of criminal law – also in a negative way which remained pertinent well into the 20th century. In answering the question of the origins of crime and the “criminal figure”, jurisprudence draws upon scientific models that recognize psychological determinants and social circumstances as relevant to human behavior. Scientific and criminological literature establishes typologies where women are, for instance, labeled as predestined criminals. The criminologists Cesare Lombroso and Erich Wulffen, as well as the psychiatrist Richard von Krafft-Ebing with his important book *Psychopathia Sexualis* (1886), are some of the most influential examples for authors whose writings – which fall back on millennia-old topoi – condemn women as affective, instinctual, and criminal beings.

Bandes (1999), Posner (2000), Maroney (2006) as well as Abrams and Keren (2010) can, among others, be cited as participants in the more recent *law-and-emotion movement*. Their taxonomy of jurisprudential research is extensive and differentiated in terms of emotions which relate to theory, action, effect, and doctrines. While in the year 2000 Eric A. Posner still considered the issue of emotion as neglected (Posner 2000: 1), six years later Terry

Maroney already talks about an “emerging field” (Maroney 2006: 136). Other than proposed by Posner, emotion no longer requires defending against rationality but is recognized as conditional for legal regulations. Maroney’s taxonomy of jurisprudential research is already extensive: In the context of legal emotions one can be interested in specific emotions and in how they are reflected in legal theories (*emotion-centered*); in effects/actions triggered by emotions (*emotional phenomenon approach*); furthermore, one can deliberate which theories of emotion and of the law are relevant (*emotion-theory approach*); while, conversely, one can also consider how legal doctrines may influence theories of emotion (*legal doctrine research*) or how theories of emotion appear in certain legal theories (*theory-of-law approach*); finally, one also analyzes the influence of emotions on legal actors (*legal actor approach*). In 2010, Abrams and Keren (2010) describe *law and emotion*’s third and current phase of research, i.e., that concepts of emotion not only affect the law but also influence models of emotion (Posner 2000: 30; Knaller 2015b: 124–126). This approach can be extended by reflecting on new questions developed by Hilge Landweer and Dirk Koppelberg, who particularly foreground questions of norms and values in addition to considering different phases of legal practice (Landweer and Koppelberg 2016). Sociologist Rainer Schützeichel, in turn, stresses the relationship between emotion, legal normativity, and social communication structures as well as process structures in society (Schützeichel 2016: 68). As a last example, new theories in the context of critical law theory and new criminology studies can be mentioned. As previously stated, Andreas Fischer-Lescano (2014) follows the idea of a concept of law by taking care of the emotional side represented and caused by the law and its applications. The law, in Fischer-Lescano’s critical theory, needs a culture of a feeling for its own violence and a self-understanding/self-reflection of its own aporias. In order to demonstrate the validity of this alternative force of law, which does not put into question the normative, Fischer-Lescano (2014: 176) reaches back to critical aesthetic theory and literature in the form of tragedy (Sophocles) and poetry (Heiner Müller) which would deconstruct with their performative power of language and visualization the violence within the logos of the law. His idea of an alternative force of the law is also taken up by the sociologist Susanne Krasmann and the criminologist Christine Hentschel (Hentschel and Krasmann 2017).

In dealing with the overall issue of law and emotion, one must assume that psycho-physical (or physio-neuro-cognitive) elements interact with formal, media-related, linguistic modes and regulated practices, which in turn trigger social actions and communication. It can thus be concluded that it is this very set of issues – with its implications of an experiential, cognitive, and interpretative process and of theoretical as well as practical implementation – that explains the epistemological and life-worldly, practical relevance of emotions in law and literature. Questions of emotion imply the necessity to take into account how the law and its practices are conditioned (Möllers 2015: 322) by a society’s general conditions, rules, values, and conventions (Vesting 2011).

3 Law and language

As stated above, more recent theories of law and language (Christensen and Lerch 2005; Lerch 2005b) assume a linguistic concept which abandons the notion of language as an

entirely rational system. At the same time, this approach allows an opening up towards matters of emotion. In the case of the law, this occurs through considering language as action (Fish 2004); the notions of the performative/performance and the network (Müller-Mall 2012; Vesting 2011); embedding language in different media constellations (Müller-Mall 2015; Vesting 2011; Vismann 2011, 2000; Lerch 2004); and because of the attention that is paid to the procedures and to psychological as well as physical events during a decision-making process (Messmer 2005). Thus, new concepts of language/linguistic concepts in law also trigger an intensified examination of the relationship between law and emotion (and language). Key concepts raising this constellation to a more concrete level are, e.g., conflict, argument/argumentation, action, disruption, and play. Kent D. Lerch (2005b: XXIV; also 2005c: 178) hence speaks of a game of evaluation and rules, rather than talking of communication or of deducing normative texts. Heinz Messmer (2005: 259) compares legal conflicts with conflicts in a relationship, thus revealing why law theory often keeps its distance from emotions. Busse (2004: 15), on the other hand, regards every law-related speech act as subject to a preceding conflict that can only be addressed within a structured framework of knowledge. Lastly, Christensen and Lerch (2005: 130) consider the conflict arising from different interpretations as constitutive of law. However, Stanley Fish (2004: 126) calls for a concept of the law based on a system of actions (or rather practices), demanding that law becomes empirical. Perceiving the law as a system of practices, in turn, follows theories of performative speech acts and performance in more recent legal theories (Müller-Mall 2012; Christensen and Lerch 2005: 80). The disruptive power of emotions during communication and decision making is considered by Christensen and Lerch (2005: 127, 131). They value emotions as creative and constructive factors in the process of law-making, which in their opinion always constitute a re-writing and re-ordering of the status quo.

These considerations on law and language, and on law and emotion, serve as a starting point for the following discussion of issues pertaining to the complex of law, literature, and emotion in the context of questions of language.

4 Law, literature, and emotion in the context of language

Generally, literature can address the relationships between law and language or law and emotion in an aesthetically productive way and at the same time present aesthetic concepts of emotion and emotion scenarios. This becomes apparent in key concepts of the legal discourse (such as law, rule, norm, etc.) and respective related terms (i.e., proof, evidence, certainty, dispute, justice, facts, truth, decision, case, confession, guilt/innocence, remorse, ruling, conscience, etc.), on which literary legal scenarios are based or with which they can be analyzed. These general – not only legally relevant – terms can be tied to concepts of emotion as well as to emotion scenarios. The fact that they rely on explanatory discourses makes many such legally determining terms and metaphors interesting for literature. This already becomes apparent from the term “justice”, which describes a condi-

tion imperative for the law to function. However, justice can never be fully defined or expressed in words without using language to explain one's reasoning. Drawing on Pascal and Montaigne, Derrida thus speaks of a mystical authority of the law (Derrida 1990: 936–937). This does not imply a transcendent dimension but means that, strictly speaking, there is no ultimate meta-level to legitimize justice, only legitimate fictions, rhetorical procedures, or performative speech acts that can relate to justice. Literature takes this circumstance into consideration and demonstrates how this authority can take effect and form. Thus, literature also reveals what remains unmentioned, unvoiced, banned from language: the speechlessness of those who do not understand the language of the law; the silent agreements; a ruling's or decision's unmentioned pre-texts; the covert aporias of all decision making; the silence of ignorance (Knaller 2016: 190–191). A literary strategy for dealing with the precarious status of language within law is the construction of emotional scenarios and the unfolding of their linguistic triggers and outcome. Language here does not possess a conclusive or rational power. It triggers emotions followed by new emotions. At no point are facts and linguistic signs in full congruence. The participants never find themselves on one common level of knowledge and understanding. Therefore, literary case narratives are often multi-perspectival, full of narrative gaps and unexpected turns by also pointing out the struggle of coming to a conclusion and a full story (cf. Knaller 2017a). Truth in these texts is a subjective, contingent entity. Another literary strategy is the montage and combination of factual as well as fictive texts (narration, letters, interviews, judgements, journal articles, psychological estimates, etc.) with commentaries of a narrator acting as a personally involved investigator. Literary case studies tend to be reflexive and narrating from a self-observing point of view (cf. Pethes 2016: 15; Brière 2009: 158). A famous example is Truman Capote's *In Cold Blood* (1966). One could also mention Alfred Döblin's *Die beiden Freundinnen und ihr Giftmord* (1924) and more recently Emmanuel Carrère's *L'Adversaire* (2000). What has just been stated is closely linked to the fact that the law cannot be analyzed as a whole; it needs to be broken down into the individual parts of its texts, into the phases in which it operates, into its interstices (Derrida 1990: 12). In the language of law, speech acts therefore always contain traces of citations, other texts, media and systems (Ladeur 2012: 287; Möllers 2015: 283). Literature also engages in the latter aspects, which was already discernible during the reform period from 1900 onward. Slowly, a language concept emerged (for which François Gény serves as a prominent French example) which makes it possible to understand that working with and on legal texts is a norm-engendering practice. In this context, linguistic as well as non-linguistic juridical processes are always embedded within a respective time structure, thus constituting themselves within a narrative framework in the broader sense (cf. Olson 2014). This holds true for the verdict, the decision, and the grounds for a judgement. A case constitutes itself through a reciprocal process of references (to the past), the present (of expressions, of stipulation), and future events – i.e., within an unstoppable process of actions. In terms of legal theory, the relationship between perpetrator (which parts of their biography can be told?), crime (evidence), and case (a linguistic, hermeneutic, and empirical process) appeals to literature. The ensuing confrontations combined with indispensable emotion scenarios, once again, strongly appeal to literature. This is because interrupting and concluding gives rise to manifold potentials for emotion: confrontations between judicial and non-judicial bodies – due

to language, the relationship between violence, power, enforcement, and weakness (due to status, gender, age, education, etc.). Finally, so as to generate objectivity, facticity, and impartiality, legal cases are always subject to intense scrutiny from the viewpoint of the evidence. However, evidence depends on media, perception patterns, perceptive possibilities, and knowledge formations (Campe 2004: 108; Jäger 2006; Kemmann 1996). In legal use, evidence resists being clearly defined (Tyradellis 2006: 147). At the same time, evidence is unique in the sense that it is only valid in a specific chain of evidence. Such chains of evidence are silhouetted against a backdrop of questions concerning (i) knowledge (where do judges – the ruling authority – procure their certainty within and beyond themselves?), (ii) linguistic and narrative logic (how do they determine accurate points of connection?), (iii) the adequate language, and (iv) the appropriate mode (which methods are used?). “Evidence” is therefore always part of the ever-precarious tension between norm, fact, and (narrated) case.

With a short look at the relationship between law, literature, and emotion during the long turn of the century in France and the German-speaking countries, the productivity of this constellation shall be demonstrated. The specific complex of law, literature, and emotions as it has been shaped since the 19th century can be considered as pivotal. All three components were grounded on new bases, creating innovative reciprocal relations and impulses. The modern legal system was strengthened by legal texts remaining decisive today as well as by a surge of academic interest in theories of law. Regarding literature, the 19th century and the first decades of the 20th century were relevant to the question of modern figurations and functions of aesthetic emotion. Media influence and the dissolution of media boundaries as well as the aesthetic element of provocation or shock augmented emotions in an unprecedented way. Emotions are no longer employed to regulate or guide moral concerns as they were in the 18th and early 19th centuries; rather, they have developed an intrinsic value due to their intensity. Another aspect is the formation of emotion models in various fields of knowledge, science, and culture during the 19th century. The second half of the century – and especially the so-called long turn of the century – is the time which supersedes 18th-century discourses of sensitivity in favor of a science-oriented notion of emotions applicable to or deducible from modern life and the modern subject (Knaller and Rieger 2016b: 12–13).

5 Case in point: The law-literature-emotion constellation around 1900

The second half of the 19th century saw a drastic differentiation of scientific and scholarly systems (most important that between the natural sciences and the humanities), the consolidation of more and most recent scientific disciplines (like sociology, physics, psychology and psychoanalysis, ethnology, etc.), and the accompanying self-legitimizing discourses in the humanities, e.g., in aesthetics, (life) philosophy, art history, literary history, history, etc. It should be noted that these differentiations provided new impulses for the arts and literature, and that paradigms and models of emotions and feelings play an essential part

in these contexts. They are based on the concept of a subject who acts within environments and is conceived as a psychophysically and socially conditioned being, as a human being in the world and in life. In this context emotions are “complex entities” that can be composed of self-perception, the perception of others, cognitive processes, general perceptions, physical sensations, and communicative performance (Winko 2003: 159). They are understood as basic conditions of cultural actions. Emotions are understood as cognitive, physical, and neurological entities that can be observed through empirical studies (like those of Wilhelm Wundt). These innovations are reflected in medicine and the natural sciences, in sociology, and in psychology. Together with social and political modernizations and with their cultural and economic consequences, these extensive and far-reaching scientific achievements laid the foundation for avant-gardist and modernist arts (Knaller and Rieger 2016b). With them, the notion of art and literature will change forever and lay the groundwork for new forms like multimedia art, photographic and filmic arts, experimental literature, and highly political forms beyond traditional painting and realist novels. Jensen and Morat (2008: 13) describe the period between 1880 and 1930 as a second threshold period of Modernism: due to political, economic, social, cultural, and media-related peculiarities which sprang up as modern social policy, modern consumer economy, the new media and the related commercialization of culture and the arts were on the rise (Pethes 2014). For European legal theories, however, the long turn of the century implicates a time of consolidating the modern legal discourse with its specific practices and guidelines, including pure legal doctrine, modern legal hermeneutics, as well as the development of legal rationalism and positivism. As in art and literature, here too, counter-discourses, dissolution, restructuring processes, etc., can already be observed (Jouanjan and Zoller 2015; Grossi 2008; Aragoneses 2002). In legal theory and science, this is reflected in new terminology such as the sense of justice, the lively discussions about natural law and positivism, the new hermeneutics, or the strengthening of legal sociology. Particular attention is paid to questions concerning form, language, and terminology, the role of the individual (person), as well as social and cultural conditions.

The relationship between law and literature thus enters a new phase during the period under scrutiny. After a period of relatively close convergence during the 18th century (especially in Germany), now – because of the law’s academic professionalization (Frommel 1991: 470–472; Schönert 1991: 37) – legal theories draw less directly on literature (Weiler 1998; Rückert 1986). However, literature itself starts to take interest in the law in a way that is modified as compared to that of the 18th and early 19th centuries (von Arnauld 2009: 47). Because of reform movements in criminal law, the development of criminology as a science, and due to a general interest in public trials which the new mass media reported on, authors, writers, and journalists started to partake in the discussions on legal relationships, legal reforms, and legal practices. Karl Kraus’s contribution to *Die Fackel* can be cited as an example, as can Blaise Cendrars’ concern with legal cases (e.g., in *L’Or* [1925] or André Gide’s *Souvenirs de la cour d’assises* [1913]) documenting how he participated in and documented court cases. Important achievements to be mentioned in this context include, e.g., the Civil Code (1900) or salient historical events such as the legal crises of the Weimar Republic (Schnädelbach 2015; Wilhelm 2010; Siemens 2005). Texts critical of the justice system appear in novels and magazines, and the role of perpetrator is productively

applied, as writers stylize themselves as perpetrators or let the latter have their say (Linder 1991: 565). This happens against the historical backdrop of the so-called Pitaval stories, which were popular in French and German-speaking countries and served as case studies for lawyers. However, the new texts could also transcend mere case studies and present themselves as critical, open, linguistically hybrid, and experimental “case histories” (Neumeyer 2006; Niehaus 2006a, 2006b; Pethes 2014; Knaller 2017b). It can be said that there was a radical change in the representation of crime starting around the second half of the 19th century, and that after 1900 paradigms of emotion became important. When it comes to where and how crime originates, writers apply concepts from jurisprudence, recognizing the relevance of psychological determinants and social circumstances. The relationship between power and language becomes a literary topic – e.g., in the short yet highly complex text of Anatole France’s *L’Affaire Crainquebille* (1901). In Expressionism, crime is finally no longer portrayed as deviation but as resulting from society and existential inevitability – being an outsider is stylized. This can be illustrated with the series *Die Außenseiter der Gesellschaft. Verbrechen der Gegenwart* (ed. by Rudolf Leonhard [1924/25], featuring texts, e.g., by Egon Erwin Kisch and Alfred Döblin) and also becomes apparent in the newly emerging French robber novels and novels about youth gangs. Besides a wide array of entertainment novels, Alain-Fournier’s *Le grand Meaulnes* (1913) may be quoted as a witty literary example. What must also be pointed out is the literary deconstruction of typologies which were corroborated in legal, scientific, and criminological literature and portrayed women as predestined criminals – an image against which literature can take a stand. Emancipatory and oppositional types of women, legal discrimination, and social hurdles are often put up for discussion in legal circumstances such as legal cases and associated emotional and psychological behavior and consequences. Alfred Döblin demonstrates this in his documentary-oriented sketch *Die beiden Freundinnen und ihr Giftmord* (1924). Novels addressing the legal discrimination of women regarding their professional and sexual choices also appear in the works of Irène Némirovsky (*Chaleur du sang* [2007]), Julien Green (*Adrienne Mesurat* [1927]), and François Mauriac (*Thérèse Desqueyroux* [1927]).

Literature around 1900 locates itself at these very interfaces and poetically transforms the associated areas of friction. In literary texts, this is often demonstrated through formally merging narratives, case records, legal texts, newspaper clippings, and scientific texts (e.g., in Blaise Cendrars or Alfred Döblin). Based on the common emotional questions in psychology and medicine (either topologizing or critical of prejudice), literature is interested in highly expressive models of emotion and emotion scenarios. This shows that emotions imply discursive as well as life-worldly practical relevance and epistemological as well as everyday knowledge.

6 Methodological suggestions

A short methodological outlook will conclude the theoretical and historical observations made in the paragraphs above. From a theoretical and methodological point of view, the concept of “paradigm scenarios” by the cognitive philosopher Ronald de Sousa has proved advantageous in investigating the relationship between literature and emotion (de Sousa 1987: 72; Knaller 2017b). Paradigm scenarios store, manage, and activate the vocabulary

and practices necessary for attributing emotions. They enable reactions, associations, and evaluations and make it possible to define the functions of emotions and feelings as well as to perceive and understand the latter. They also bring together what Andreas Reckwitz calls “affective habitus” (schemata) and “affective style” (perceptible patterns of behavior) (Reckwitz 2012: 255–256).

To properly observe the law-emotion-literature constellation, one needs to raise the question of which emotion scenarios may generally occur in law and how they are used in literature, or how literature can generate new ones, respectively (Knaller 2021: 139–141). According to Landweer, the following scenarios of how and where law and emotion may interact with one another can be identified:

- law, emotion, and the respective validity of norms (the question of the relation between norms and feelings, e.g., in matters of justice);
- emotions relevant to the law and feelings of justice (emotions that have a legal affinity and strongly relate to norms) (see also Schützeichel 2016: 69);
- emotions occurring when norms are applied (relating to decisions and verdicts);
- legally institutionalized emotions outside the framework of positive law (such as revenge);
- legally institutionalized emotions (e.g., religious feelings, offensiveness);
- emotions relevant to the law (statements that are coded rhetorically and in terms of media; socially, culturally, and politically determined constellations);
- emotions and law in historical perspective;
- the normative question of the role emotions should play in jurisdiction;
- the share of the arts and sciences (Landweer and Koppelberg 2016: 16).

The vocabulary relating to emotions used in legal discourse and practices is important for a closer analysis of literary emotion scenarios in the legal context. Literature observes these scenarios, their vocabulary, and their practices – legitimizing discourses and the resulting cultural, economic, political, powerful, knowledge-steering conditions as well as how those are dealt with. Finally, emotional patterns in general cannot be realized on one individual or specific level. Besides Simone Winko (2003), Christiane Voss (2004) outlines a respective approach in the field of literary theories of emotion, describing a concept of emotion as comprising intentional (representations), behavioral (actions), bodily perceptual, and hedonistic (individually determined subjective) components (Voss 2004: 185). Emotions are therefore temporally limited, perspectivized constellations that concern specific facts. Literature portrays these constellations, puts them up for negotiation and describes them via their discursive and poetological relations. Applying the above-mentioned terminology (such as law, rule, norm, etc.) and respective related terms (i.e., proof, evidence, certainty, dispute, justice, case, fact, truth, decision, confession, guilt/innocence, remorse, ruling, conscience, etc.) makes it possible to identify legal, scientific, discursive, and emotional paradigm scenarios and to classify them according to the interfaces and frictions revealed through the poetological and literary treatment. Vocabulary, codes, communication structures, situations, and practices can be described through applying the concept of paradigm scenarios.

The results can form the starting point for analyzing emotion and law scenarios as well as their constitutive practices and discourses. Of particular interest hereby are the linguis-

tic, genre-related, and conceptual particularities which occur when terminology and text formations are implicitly or explicitly transferred from legal to literary – i.e., from non-poetologically oriented to poetic – texts. This process of discursively and materially charged application might also lay bare the aesthetic potential and as such the non-rational part of the law and its practices.

In the context of law and literature, the questions of language and emotions provide new insights and impulses on several levels. On the one hand, an aesthetic approach in the sense of taking care of bodily, sensual, and emotional questions as well as taking into consideration the force of the wide range of literary strategies can display the psycho-physical, cognitive, and practical bases of human acting and being. With these notions of law, normative texts and legal acts are related to their practical procedures and life-worldly consequences. On the other hand, emotions play a constructive interface for theoretical, methodological, and practical confrontations and reciprocal impulses of law and literary studies (Faralli et al. 2016; Knaller 2015b). It allows analyzing historical-systematically current topics and ever controversial notions like justice, for instance. An example for a reciprocal influence is Ian McEwan's (2014) novel *The Children Act*, which is equally interesting for literary and legal scholars alike. This presupposes and at the same time lays bare an open idea of language as discussed above as well as a notion of law beyond strict objectivity and textual norms.

7 References

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XIX Religion, emotional language, and communication

Albrecht Greule

96 Foundations in theolinguistics

- 1 Religious language – speaking of God – linguistic theology
- 2 From linguistic theology to theolinguistics
- 3 Theolinguistic research
- 4 Religion and emotion
- 5 Theolects and emotion
- 6 The emotional potential of sacred texts and emotionalization
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Abstract: Starting from a definition of *religious language* and the distinction between linguistic theology and theolinguistics, the article's first main part (Section 3) provides an overview of the theolinguistic research that emerged in Europe in the 1970s. The second main part (Sections 4–6) briefly covers the relationship between religion and emotion before focusing on the topic of theolect and emotion in greater depth. It identifies the emotional potential of sacred texts and the emotionalizing effect of texts used in religious services.

1 Religious language – speaking of God – linguistic theology

Religious language is fundamentally determined by human beings' relationship to *Theos/God*. This relationship is expressed in communication by humans speaking *about* Theos/God, by humans speaking *to* Theos/God and by God hearing human beings and speaking to them himself.

Religion becomes manifest in the figures of speech of (founding) myths, of rites and of commandments. The language of religion(s) includes 'communicative primal scenes' [...]; God's words of punishment, the encounters in which God inspires or calls his prophets and apostles (as in the case of Mohammed, for example); narrated miracles, miraculous transubstantiations. [...] Religious languages [...] reflect experiences of the numinous, *feelings of elementary dependence*, the consciousness of guilt and sin, hopes [...]. (Gerber 2009: 13, emphasis mine)

It is first and foremost the Bible and particularly the Old Testament that constitute the broad textual foundation from which religious "figures of speech" are derived. "God speaking with his people (Israel, A.G.), usually through mediators such as Moses or prophets, and the people or their mediators speaking with and to God and making promises in response is the manner in which the Israelites' faith is affirmed and performed" (Gerber 2009: 14). According to the prophet Ezekiel, God reacts emotionally to being denied by human

beings, showing anger (Sedlmeier [2009: 227–228]; also cf. Wagner [2007: 499–502] on God's emotions in the Psalms). Albrecht Grözinger (2017) draws our attention to the way in which God is spoken of and about in the Bible, which is consistently metaphorical.

Edmund Arens (2009: 45–55) renders the link between religion and language more precise against a communication theology background, distinguishing between five dimensions of religious language: (i) The *subjects* of religious language are all those “who perform religious speech acts individually or collectively, privately or publicly, or who take part in religiously informed communication” (Arens 2009: 45); (ii) “in their speech acts, religious subjects give expression to a wide range of *content*. [...] The most important content of religious language includes statements on the divine, transcendental, ultimate and thus ‘real’ reality” (Arens 2009: 45, emphasis mine); (iii) “religious speech acts are performed in various *locations* and in various contexts and are shaped by these encountered or established contexts” (liturgical, teaching, base community location) (Arens 2009: 46, emphasis mine); (iv) religious speech acts make use of a large number of oral and written *texts*; (v) “religious speech acts have a certain *intent*, thus priestly acts, for example – unlike paraenetic speech acts – aim to preserve authoritative religious knowledge, uphold the cult, envision and secure God’s attention and care, and convey divine protection and blessing” (Arens 2009: 48–50, emphasis mine).

Philosophical and linguistic reflections on religion and language are found in Andreas Uwe Müller (2009), while Uwe Gerber (2009: 20–21) formulates desiderata of research in linguistic theology.

2 From linguistic theology to theolinguistics

Categorizing “human-God” communication within the linguistic variety model is an important step in providing this communication with a linguistic foundation (Greule 2014: 154–56). The model takes as its starting point the set of overlapping linguistic variants (varieties) that have developed over time – such as dialects, sociolects – through which an individual language can be defined. Linguistic variation is the result of the different communicative needs of a language community. The term *theolect*, derived analogously to *dialect* and *sociolect*, is used to categorize and classify linguistic utterances that have GOD as their content, recipient or sender within the order of linguistic varieties. This means, furthermore, that – like all linguistic communications – theolects are underpinned by a grammar that differs according to the individual language in question. Words (lexemes) are used to construct expressions, statements and texts according to the rules of this grammar. Lexemes that either refer to God or predicate God are theolexemes, such as the German theolexeme *weih-* ('sanct' [Greule 2012: 39–44]), or, if the name of God is concerned, theonyms, such as *Allah* (Greule 2013). Not only are theolectal communicative messages subject to the rules of the linguistic system, they are generated in specific communicative situations and thus also require analysis using the pragmalinguistic parameters: who speaks when, where, to whom, with what aim about God. Finally, the universality of theolects is postulated, meaning that theolects are not restricted to one or several individual languages, but that theolectal communication can exist in all languages and may have existed at any time. On speech acts and speech act analysis in biblical Hebrew, cf. Wagner (1997).

3 Theolinguistic research

Theolinguistics as a linguistic discipline became established in Europe during the 1970s. The Bonn-based Bible exegete Erhardt Gütgemanns (1935–2008) was the first to attempt to utilize general linguistic approaches in New Testament theology. In 1970, he founded *Linguistica Biblica*, hitherto the only journal for interdisciplinary exchange between theologians, semioticians, linguists and literary scholars (the journal existed until 1993). In the 1976 edition of *Linguistica Biblica*, Jean-Pierre van Noppen (1976: 1) suggested the term ‘theolinguistics’ (*Theolinguistik*) to denote the discipline dealing with the links between language and religion. In the last 40 years, numerous scholars from different countries have engaged in research on aspects of religious language. The collaboration between German and Polish theolinguists gave rise to a loose affiliation of theolinguists in the international theolinguistics working group, which since its foundation has held an annual conference as a platform for discussing questions concerning language and religion – without restrictions to any particular confession, religion or language. Since 2008, the working group Theolinguistik has published the series *Theolinguistica* (Vol. 8, 2016). The editors of the essay collection *Handbuch Sprache und Religion* see themselves as “linguists of religion” (Liebert 2017).

Hitherto, theolinguistic research has concentrated upon Christianity (Hoberg 2009: 11). Since the Reformation and the translation of the Bible into German by Martin Luther, the main focus of theolinguistic research has been the relationship of the three sacred languages (Hebrew, Greek, Latin) to the vernacular languages and the translatability of the sacrosanct texts into one of the modern vernaculars (cf. Sonderegger 2000: 1041–1047). In the time leading up to the Reformation, vernacular (Czech) translations of Latin hymns already found their way into church services in the form of church hymns. This field of research experienced a boost following the Second Vatican Council (1962–1965), when the Catholic Church allowed the vernacular languages to be used in the liturgy, granting them the status of sacred languages. Accordingly, the main focus of recent theolinguistic research has included:

1. The translation of canonical texts, especially the Bible, into the vernacular languages (Bauske 2013a, 2013b; Greule 2000; Hrdinová 2013; Pořízka and Schäfer 2013; Sonderegger 2000; Stolze 2009; Wiesinger 2007);
2. “Religious” lexis and phraseology (Gondek and Szczęk 2013; Kucharska-Dreiß and Umińska-Tytoń 2013; Tiefenbach 2007);
3. Homiletic/rhetoric (Kucharska-Dreiß 2017; Mödl 2012; Thiele 2008; Thiele 2009; Uhliř 2014);
4. Hymnology (language in vernacular hymns) (Greule 2011; Greule 2012: 151–230; Helin 2011; Tiefenbach 2007);
5. Comparative theolinguistics (Greule, Kucharska-Dreiß, and Makuchowska 2005; Helin 2011, 2013; Kiraga 2009; Mihoková 2013).

Furthermore, a concentration of theolinguistic research on the vernacular in the Christian church service, particularly Mass – using the designations liturgical or sacred language – can be observed. Here, we are concerned with the taxonomy of liturgical types of text

(Greule 2003; Simmler 2007), Mass as a ritual set of actions (Greule and Kiraga 2017), the performative shape of liturgical language (Plüss and Bieler 2009) and the textual grammar and textual pragmatics of prayer (Greule 2015; Marx and Damisch 2013). Hrdinová (2013) investigates the Czech language in the Orthodox liturgy.

4 Religion and emotion

John Corrigan (2008) provides an overview of research on the topic of “religion and emotion”. This volume distinguishes between four areas of research: religious traditions, religious life, emotional states and historical and theoretical perspectives. The essays’ authors describe the fields in Buddhism, Christianity, Judaism, Islam and other religions where emotions have played a role, and analyse how important components of religious life (ritual, music, gender, sexuality and material culture) express emotionality. Some essays are concerned with specific emotions, such as love or hatred, and analyse their place within different religious traditions and cultural settings. Other essays investigate the thinking of figures such as St. Augustine, Soren Kierkegaard, Jonathan Edwards, Emile Durkheim, and William James. The handbook lists as the most important topics of research on Christianity and emotion: “(1) the effects of reducing emotion to cognition, volition, or embodiment; (2) experiencing faith as constituted partly by emotion; and (3) love as the core Christian virtue, not to be considered as solely a willed act but as including emotion” (Tallon 2008: 112).

In recent years, the research centre “History of Emotions” at the Max Planck Institute for Human Development (Berlin) has focused upon the topic of “emotions and religion”. The centre studies how emotional practices are passed on, exchanged and perceived in religious contexts. Scholars have noted that in many historical contexts, religious rituals aim to produce a particular emotional experience, as part of which certain ways of feeling are seen as proof of the correct faith or of a connection with the divine. Religious feelings were often associated with – usually very intense – collective emotional experiences. Furthermore, religious authorities sought to cultivate a specific emotional conduct. Research has shown how certain emotions and practices related thereto were either reinforced or suppressed. Often changes in religion were conditioned by emotional changes; changes in one’s confession called for changed feelings, too.

5 Theolects and emotion

5.1 Definition

There is a striking gap in the research where the relation of emotions to religious language is concerned. The fact that only little is known about whether emotions occur in theolects and how they are expressed probably has to do with a general lack of security about how to define emotions in the field of emotion research. According to Schwarz-Friesel, we are “still a long way from a generally accepted definition or conceptualisation within the

framework of a theory” (Schwarz-Friesel 2013: 43). Writing outside the field of theolinguistic research, Monika Schwarz-Friesel (2013: 43) uses the three Christian virtues of *faith*, *hope* and *love* to develop a definition of emotion. Furthermore, she devotes an entire chapter of her book to the two primal human emotions arising from the experience of death, *grief* and *fear* (Schwarz-Friesel 2013: 247–288), which religions have had to deal with since time immemorial and that also find theolectal expression (see Section 6.2.5).

Andrea Bender’s (2009) reflections on the cultural comparison of emotions take us into a specific theolectal context: the Christian missionaries who came to Tonga, the group of Polynesian islands near Tahiti, in the early 19th century, tried to translate the concept of *holy wrath* into Tongan. While they had no trouble translating wrath or holiness, difficulties arose when attempting to combine *holy* and *wrath*, for wrath – as an angry emotion – is neither holy nor indeed acceptable in any way in Tonga. Andrea Bender uses this example and the Tongan word *'ofa*, which covers a wide range of emotional terms, to show the difficulties arising in the translation of Christian texts despite the assumption that there are universal basic emotions.

The concept of *emotion* developed by Schwarz-Friesel assumes that “emotions such as love, fear, joy, hatred and pity are as strongly engrained in the human organism as cognitive abilities. They influence and accompany human actions as intensely and as long-term as mental thought and decision-making processes. Defining human beings [...] is not possible without including their basic emotional dispositions and possible forms of experience” (Schwarz-Friesel 2013: 49). Thus, it is inconceivable that emotions do not play a role in the enactment of faith in religious services. For “emotions are multidimensional, internally represented and subjectively experienced categories of syndromes that are registered by the individual in relation to herself, both introspectively/mentally and physically, the experiential values of which are linked to a positive or negative evaluation. These categories can be realised in various expressions (that can be) perceived by others” (Schwarz-Friesel 2013: 55). Within the context of religious services, two of the three forms in which emotions can be realised (Schwarz-Friesel 2013: 57) can be seen clearly: (i) the non-verbal facial expressions and gestures both of those participating in the service and in particular of the person presiding over the service (the celebrant), who is distinguished through festive, non-everyday clothing, and (ii) verbal forms of representation (through lections, apostrophes, speeches, etc.). The third form of realization, physical states, is – depending on the culture – overshadowed by the first two. In the church service context in particular, emotional forms of expression are subject to certain “display rules”. In Europe, overly expressive emotional states among the congregation are unusual and may be sanctioned.

5.2 Religious speech acts and emotions in religious services

Four speech acts are of central importance for the Jewish and Christian faiths: *praying*, *annunciating*, *testifying* and *professing* (Arens 2009: 48–55). The relationship of these speech acts to emotions is as yet unresolved. (On singing, which is a further characteristic of Jewish and Christian services, as an expression of emotion, see 6.2.2). The celebrant introduces the speech act of praying, the prototypical form of speaking to God, with the

emotional (liturgical) invitation to prayer (“Let us pray!”), with a call to “come before” God to ask him for something. Praying aims to attract God’s attention to the personally or communally expressed requests in the hope of God’s help, blessing, protection and salvation. The human suffering, distress, worries and pleas articulated during prayer are also the expression of the praying individuals’ wide range of emotions, such as love, trust and fear. Praying is the only one of the four speech acts emphasized by the praying persons’ gestural forms of expression (including outside the religious service context). The other main religious speech acts are associated with emotions to varying degrees: “When testifying, one’s own person is used to share an experience or an insight gained with others from the perspective of being affected or involved. Testifying articulates experiences in which fundamental and life-changing dimensions of the ultimate reality have been revealed to those who have become believers” (Arens 2009: 49–50). Even though the definition of this speech act makes no mention of emotions, testifying nevertheless goes hand in hand with a wide range of feelings (that still require differentiation) both in the persons testifying (in Greek: *martyres*) and in those to whom the testimony is addressed. In professing (e.g., *Shema Israel*, *Credo*, *Schahāda*), cognition dominates emotion if the profession of faith involves not only the processing of information, but also processes in which stored information (knowledge about the respective faith) is reproduced publicly, communally and authoritatively (cf. Schwarz-Friesel 2013: 93–96). On the emotional potential of announcing (sermon), see 6.2.3.

Institutional religious speech acts that are regulated through ritual and by law and that only certain subjects are permitted to perform include (ritualized) speech acts and sequences of speech acts such as baptising, consecrating, celebrating religious services, announcing, teaching, commanding and forbidding (cf. Arens 2009: 45). The ritualization taking place within the context of religious services is in itself able to evoke emotions, such as the fear of not following parts of the rite or making a mistake in doing so; joy and satisfaction in the successful celebration following the end of the service. These emotions can be attributed functionally to the feelings through which human beings define their relationship with their fellow humans (cf. Schwarz-Friesel 2013: 67). The religious services themselves contain a series of emotionalizing rites and types of texts and speeches (on the celebration of Mass, cf. Greule [2012: 146]; Greule and Kiraga [2017]).

We can assume that – alongside communal praying – communal singing during services possesses high emotional potential. This goes not only for the singing of the (celebrating) congregation, but also for the singing of the prayer leader litanist and the schola that goes beyond the leading celebrant reading out and reciting texts. On the emotional potential of hymn texts, cf. Wagner (2007).

6 The emotional potential of sacred texts and emotionalization

6.1. Emotionalizing texts and religious services

The assumption that reading or hearing an emotionalizing text activates or constitutes a certain emotional attitude (cf. Schwarz-Friesel 2013: 85) applies in particular to the commu-

native situation of religious services. Religious services are characterized by a ritualized sequence of texts that are recited or sung to or by the congregation, some of which repetition has made familiar, some of which are unfamiliar. In their different linguistic shape and form, they are able to evoke different emotions. Emotional potential is something in the text, something anchored in its information structure; by contrast, emotionalization is a process (Schwarz-Friesel 2013: 214). Whether the attendees of the service are actually emotionalized by texts and which emotion is primarily activated depends not only on the author or speaker and his or her textual competence, but on the situation (in the service) in which the texts are expressed as well as the knowledge and interests of the attendees (cf. Schwarz-Friesel 2013: 216). When analysing the emotional potential of sacred texts, terms that denote emotions such as *love, fear, pain* need to be distinguished from words that express emotions. The latter convey emotional impressions and attitudes and are the expression of the language producer's emotive attitude, such as the liturgical call '*Thanks be to God!*' (*Deo gratias!*) (cf. Schwarz-Friesel 2013: 151–153).

6.2 The emotional potential of text types in religious services

6.2.1 Mass (the Eucharist or Holy Communion)

Mass (the Eucharist or Holy Communion) has been regarded as the most important Christian church service since early Christian times. Greule and Kiraga (2017) present Mass as a complex of ritual actions and examine the function of the texts used in the service; Kiraga (2016: 127–157) minutes a concrete Mass celebrated in a Roman Catholic congregation in Berlin in the German language. Greule (2012: 141–149) investigates the emotional potential of a concrete Mass formulary. Here, a distinction is drawn between the texts of the Proper (the Proprium) and the Ordinary (Ordinarium) of Mass. The biblical texts defined as the proper readings for the respective Sunday contain expressions that denote emotions (*disgrace, shame, joy, reviving the heart*) and phrases that express emotions (*Be not afraid!*). The prescribed prayer texts reveal a psychogram that counters the primal human emotions of fear and dread with the Gospel's message to not be afraid.

6.2.2 Hymns

The reformer Martin Luther encouraged believers' participation in church services through German songs (songs for Mass, hymns) that aimed to contribute to the restructuring of Mass (the celebration of the Eucharist). The hymn texts are compiled in the first *Wittenberg Hymnbook* (1524). According to the analyses of Andreas Wagner (2007: 495–502), the emotional imagery in the current German Protestant hymnal focuses upon the idea of the body as the “container” of emotion: the heart is seen as the most important feeling organ (*Ich danke dir von Herzensgrund* ‘I thank you from the depths of my heart’). Emotions are also associated with the soul (*Was trübst du dich, meine Seele* ‘Why are you troubled, my soul?’) and the closeness of emotion and faith is striking; like emotion and the soul, faith likewise

has its “seat” inside the body (Wagner 2007: 497–480). Nicholas Harkness has written about the significance of singing in the Christian church service in a non-European setting (in Somang Presbyterian Church, South Korea [Harkness 2014: 50–54]).

6.2.3 Sermons

As part of the Reformation’s redesigning of Mass, the sermon became a fixed part of the service. It is the form and the place in the church service in which annunciating, which includes both regulative and expressive elements, takes place, in which religious content is shared; annunciating aims to “convince people of the doctrine and practices of a faith community, or to confirm them in the religious convictions gained, to strengthen or change these convictions” (Arens 2009: 49). How strong the emotional potential of sermons can be is revealed in the titles of specialist literature such as *Mit Sprache bewegen* (‘Moving through language’). Erwin Albrecht (2012) lists and comments upon the verbal expressions he used to move his audience and make them listen up in a Lent sermon as part of an ecumenical service in Berlin Cathedral. Albrecht Grözinger (2013: 322–325) describes the linguistic form of a “sermon of feelings” as a language of “impression”. The language of the sermon should make use of the language of impression in which many biblical texts speak. It affords a discretion that makes it possible to speak about emotions in the first place. “This will be most successful if preachers explore their own emotional world as sensitively as possible” (Grözinger 2013: 324) without making it the norm for others. “In this way, the multiplicity of emotional worlds that encounter one another in a religious service can be portrayed” (Grözinger 2013: 324).

6.2.4 Confession/baptism

One important prerequisite for receiving the *sacrament of penance and reconciliation* in confession is repentance. In the preparatory texts for confession, repentance is described as: “In light of God’s mercy I am sorry for my failures that have harmed others and myself. Shame and dread of people’s judgement or the fear of other external consequences of sin alone do not make repentance complete. From repentance grow the desire and the determination to reorient my life towards God’s will and reconcile myself with my neighbour” (Gotteslob 2013: 683). However, the confessing person does not state explicitly that he or she is repenting. In contrast to confession, during baptism the *abrenuntiatio* (‘the rejection of evil’) is expressed through a ritualized question-response dialogue centred on the word *renounce* (cf. Greule 2012: 135–140).

6.2.5 Sacramentals (rites imitating sacraments)

In her observations on the emotions occurring when confronted with death, Monika Schwarz-Friesel (2013) elaborates on the conceptualization of *death as a form of existence*

as well as on the conceptual relation between death and God as “the basis of the religions of this world” (Schwarz-Friesel 2013: 263). The idea or belief that death is not the end but a transition into another form of existence provides human beings with emotional comfort. The expression of comfort “in the face of death” is at the forefront of death-related church rituals (prayers for the dying, wake, burial ceremony [cf. Gotteslob 2013: 722–730]): “Prayer provides comfort, strengthens trust and helps us to endure in faith the fear of death and of losing a person close to us” (Gotteslob 2013: 723). Besides in the prayers for the dying, comfort is also given verbal expression in texts evoking corresponding emotions such as the Psalms, readings from Scripture (especially the Passion of Christ), songs (with the topic of “death and consummation”) and litanies. However, the emotional potential of non-liturgical sepulchral texts (cf. Śniadecka 2011a, 2011b), which presumably is high, has not been subjected to systematic analysis to date.

7 Research desiderata

In order to investigate the hitherto little analysed relation between religion and emotion more precisely in theolinguistic terms on the basis of empirical data, the emotional potential of the various texts employed in religious practice (church services and similar) – whether formulated freely or preformulated – would need to be surveyed in detail. In line with a comparative theolinguistics, the verbalization of emotions in religious texts and speeches would need to be analysed for convergences and differences between other religions (all religions if possible) interlingually, as well as between as many languages as possible.

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Walter Van Herck

97 Emotions, discourse, and religion

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Abstract: After an initial look at the complexity of the research field at hand, this contribution takes the notion of “emotional regime” as an access point to the history of religious emotions in Western Christianity. For the period up to the Middle Ages (Rosenwein 2016) attention is given to the role of emotion in ritual, to the battle of monks against their demonic passions and to the ideal of humility in the Rule of Saint Benedict. Textual evidence in the mystical writings of Hadewych (13th century) and in the spiritual diary of the founder of the Jesuit order, Ignatius of Loyola, shows the growing importance of inner experience and reflection on one’s own feelings. In this way the historical dimension of the interplay between emotions, discourse, and religion comes to the fore.

1 Introduction: The complexity of the research field

This contribution connects three topics which haven’t been treated very often together. There is of course extensive literature on religion and emotion (Corrigan 2004, 2017; Järveläinen 2000; Watts 1996; Wynn 2005). Equally, it doesn’t take much of an effort to find research on emotion and language (Brown 1982; Kövecses 2007). Also, religion and language (Brubaker 2013; Tyrell 2002; White 2010) has provoked a stream of scholarly publications. The three topics taken together, however, have received less attention.

There is no doubt that the whole spectrum of emotions (Ortony, Glore, and Collins 1988: 15–25) – ranging from event-related (joy, suffering, sympathy, envy, hope, fear) over action-related (pride, guilt, admiration, indignation) to object-related (love, loathing) emotions – is present in religion and finds expression in a manifold of types of texts (sermon, sacred text, prayer, exhortation, letter, diary). As can be expected, the religious expression is often culturally specific. In different religions the emotional alertness is directed to different aspects of life in a variety of ways. Emotions bring saliency; they bring to the fore what would otherwise have been left unnoticed. Emotions motivate actions (to run in fear; to

retaliate in hate) and sometimes justify them. Religious discourse imbued with emotion aims at disciplining the attention of its adepts. In this line are other functions of emotions, like memorizing what is deemed important in a particular emotional regime of a culture. By sharing these emotions, partly through language, the identity of religious groups can be constructed and maintained. Emotions are often meant to be contagious. These intrinsic features of religious emotional discourse remind us that religion is also always present in the domain of power, authority, and justification, where it is used for good or for ill.

The relation between religion, language and emotion is therefore complex and multi-layered. Many academic disciplines are involved in the study of this triadic phenomenon. There are historical questions concerning the way in which religious emotions are articulated in different periods of history (Plamper 2015); anthropological questions about the connections between emotions, rituals, myths, and spirituality in different cultures; theological questions concerning religious views on the nature of emotions; and psychological questions about the nature of religious emotions. More disciplines – like literary studies, communication studies, sociology, or philosophy – could be listed.

This contribution will necessarily have to make choices about subject and approach. Concerning the different types of texts mentioned earlier, it seems that three types of discourse (cf. Rothenhöfer 2018: 489) are present: (i) emotional discourse in lived religion (*la religion vécue*); (ii) religious discourse about emotion; and (iii) the discourse of more theoretical approaches to religious emotion in philosophy, theology, and the humanities. Drawing a sharp line between these types of discourse can, however, prove difficult in concrete cases. Notwithstanding the vague boundaries, this contribution will focus on the first two types mentioned. The rather abstract philosophical discussion of passions and emotions in, for example, the work of Descartes or Spinoza is not what is of interest here. The emphasis here can be much more on the interaction between religion, discourse, and emotion.

The concept of emotion has been interpreted rather one-sidedly as purely personal and referring to an inner state. There is no point, of course, in denying this personal aspect of emotions. But, as Riis and Woodhead (2010) make clear, emotions are always about someone or something. In that sense “emotion” is a relational concept. In many cases our language about emotions is objectifying, as for example when describing a situation as pitiful or frightful. The emotional character of the situation is out there for everyone to see or feel. We most often “share” emotions since it is hard to be in the same situation and not to go through the same emotions. Emotions are tied up with language. Our linguistic communication always conveys information about how we emotionally relate to the situation in which we find ourselves, as does our body language. While talking we express emotional content, and we evoke emotions in others. Expressions and evocations go together in a dialectical way. Furthermore, the articulation of an emotion immediately changes the emotion itself. Some discourses are more intended to be expressive, as for example the intimate description of personal spiritual life in a diary, and some to be more evocative, as in a sermon by which a preacher tries to bring the audience to compunction.

This intersubjective, relational character of emotions can take different forms. Sharing the same feeling need not be an emotion infection. The emotional identification of a militant with their leader differs from compassionate fellow feeling. Beyond the intersubjective level there are also forms of collective emotional arousal. Durkheim’s (1998) account sug-

gests that it is the collective that produces the emotions (as opposed to some psychological accounts that see the individual as the source of emotion). Arlie Hochschild (1983) elaborates on “feeling rules”, the fact that we are expected to feel in a certain way according to implicit scripts. Part of our education is emotional education. Collective emotional arousal can induce group bonding. These collective emotional dynamics can, however, also make the individual vulnerable to manipulation and what is called “a managed heart”. The notion of “emotional regime”, developed in the next section, helps to understand how emotion and language are connected.

Davies’s (2011) study of the interplay between emotion, identity, and religion takes this social dimension of emotions seriously. Indeed, however much an emotion is personal, it still forms part of an emotional repertoire that is shared in a community or society. This social dimension in itself implies a historical dimension, as the emotional repertoire of cultural communities shifts over time (Schnell 2015; Stalfort 2013). This contribution intends to show with broad brush strokes the dynamics of Western religious emotional discourse over time. The focus will be mainly on Western Christian contexts. The term used in Christianity has been “passion” and its correlates. The term “emotion” only came in use in the 19th century and has clearly a more secular ring to it (Dixon 1999, 2003).

The next section offers an elucidation of the notion of “emotional regime” and what it can mean in relation to religion. The following sections diachronically trace one major shift in the religious-emotional culture of the Christian past, namely a growing importance of inner religious feelings, by presenting, analyzing, and comparing some key texts taken from different centuries.

2 Emotional regime and religion

Riis and Woodhead (2010) have made the concept of “emotional regime” central to their approach of religious emotion. The notion of “emotional regime” makes it possible to develop a more comprehensive view of emotion. Emotion isn’t a purely private, inner state, but involves interactions with other persons, with social groups, with the past, with symbolic objects. Riis and Woodhead (2010: 53) point to the fact that individuals are born into existing worlds of feeling much like they are born into a language.

It was first introduced by Reddy (2001), who applied the term on a political level to the “emotional setting” of the French Revolution. Under “emotion” Riis and Woodhead understand “a label for a range of coordinated psychophysical elements, in and through which we relate to other beings and symbols, and in terms of which they relate to us” (Riis and Woodhead 2010: 47). An “emotional regime” is a kind of emotional culture which contains emotional norms which are articulated through an entire socio-symbolic structure. In an emotional regime some emotions can be more dominant than others. Some contexts are for example dominated by fear, competition, joy, or fun. The notion of “emotional regime” has high relevance for religions, as religions have encompassing emotional programs and are mostly open to a variety of emotions. In the simplest programs all persons involved have the same feelings. In more complex settings people have different emotional experiences in different emotional roles. Subtle systems of rewards and sanctions for (in-)appropriate emotion-

al display offer an often implicit or tacit emotional training which helps to develop a kind of emotional proficiency in the participant. Lack of this emotional proficiency and the inability to tune in emotionally will mostly be immediately noticed by insiders. Obeying emotional conventions or standards within the context of an emotional regime doesn't necessarily imply conformism. Forms of emotional rebellion and creativity are part of emotional regimes. In the case of the "big emotions" for which there is little opportunity to train or prepare, expectations are sometimes communicated in narrative form. Emotional regimes are possible on different scales from macro-level regimes, as is the case in states where national symbolic institutions, memorial monuments, and the like produce specific emotional regimes, to the micro-level of circles of friends, nuclear families, and romantic courtship. These "emotional patterns transcend the individual and persist over time and across generations" (Riis and Woodhead 2010: 51). Historical studies of emotion presuppose this mediation between past and future.

This contribution will pay attention to the way in which the emotional regime in Western Christianity has shifted. A look at ritual is an obvious place to start, as ritual is ubiquitous to the pre-modern subject. The question will be to what extent ritual performances can be seen as expressions of emotions. It will turn out that emotions are not so much the source of ritual, but rather its effect. The solemnity of ritual is not the product of individual emotions, but it can produce emotions and impress the individual.

3 Ritual, expressivism and de-personalization

The role one assigns to emotions in ritual settings is dependent upon the appreciation given to ritual. In the historical development of most religions there are oscillations between appreciation and depreciation of ritual (Segal 1998), between theological approval or disapproval of ritual. David Hume (1985) observes these contrary tendencies in his essay "Of superstition and enthusiasm", in which superstition mainly refers to a ritualistic religion like Roman Catholicism and enthusiasm to a more expressivist type of religious experience as can be found in the Protestant tradition. Superstition is defined by Hume as consisting "in ceremonies, observances, mortifications, sacrifices, presents, or in any practice" (Hume 1985: 74), while its counterpart enthusiasm receives the following description: "raptures, transports, and surprising flights of fancy; and confidence and presumption still increasing" (Hume 1985: 74). The appreciation of ritual as seen in, for example, the Catholic tradition seems to entail a dismissal of emotions. Conversely, the approval of emotions as in enthusiasm entails the depreciation of ritual. Watts (1996: 81) alludes to two schools of thought concerning emotions in religion. One school sees strong emotion as the hallmark of a strong religious life, while the other puts more emphasis on the calming of the passions.

In this section I will first try to elaborate the reasons for seeing a tension between ritual and emotion (Van Herck 2015). Secondly, I will indicate that from a wider angle, ritual cannot be understood unless one brings emotions in the picture. Furthermore, in a wider definition of ritual the public display of religious emotions as is the case in enthusiasm, can also be termed "ritual", be it of a different type.

The anthropologists Humphrey and Laidlaw (1994) analyze the specificity of ritual action. According to them, Western people nowadays don't seem to understand the unique character of ritual action. The reason for this is their inclination to immediately take ritual to be a means to communicate or express specific beliefs and (emotional) meanings. "With this has come the triumph of the idea that this changeable ritual is, or should be, only a way of communicating or expressing the religious beliefs and moral ideas of the participants. So pervasive is this idea that ritual on its own, without subjective convictions, comes, for many, to seem mere mumbo-jumbo" (Humphrey and Laidlaw 1994: 8).

The idea that ritual is essentially communicative and expressive has almost become a dogma in anthropology according to them. There is an obvious reason why anthropologists get on this wrong track. As anthropologists they question people about their ritual practices and in this way they learn certain ideas. They then fallaciously think that the purpose of the ritual is to communicate or express these ideas. This cannot be the purpose of the ritual, however, since the people already know these ideas (Humphrey and Laidlaw 1994: 73). Humphrey and Laidlaw see a form of intellectualism cropping up: "[...] this attempt to interpret ritual as functioning to communicate what the anthropologist has learned or surmised, can lead to a contrived intellectualization of ritual" (Humphrey and Laidlaw 1994: 74). To the extent that what is communicated is more of an emotional nature, one can rightly complement the contention here above with an "emotionalization of ritual".

What they call "ritualization" is a particular, occasional modification of an intrinsic feature of all action, namely its intentionality (Humphrey and Laidlaw 1994: 73). The definition they give of "ritualization" is: "Action may be said to be ritualized when the actor has taken up what we shall call the 'ritual commitment', a particular stance with respect to his or her own action" (Humphrey and Laidlaw 1994: 88).

Humphrey and Laidlaw (1994) describe the transformation which normal human action undergoes when ritualized as a loss of the constitutive role of intentions (including our emotional valuation of things, people and events). What they mean is that although people have intentions and accord meanings to their ritual acts, these intentions are not constitutive of the ritual act. The identity of the act does not depend on the agent's intentions. Normal, daily actions have intentional meaning. When we grasp their point, we grasp the intention one has when performing these actions. A woman stretches her arm and moves it around. Is she waving to a friend? Is she doing some yoga exercise? Or is she trying to feel whether there is a draft in the room? (Humphrey and Laidlaw 1994: 94). What this person did in stretching her arm depends on her intentions. But in ritual, intentions have no such constitutive role; instead, the identity of the act is dependent on scripts and rules. This also means that corrections which could be made in normal action, like saying "that is not what I meant" are irrelevant in ritual (Humphrey and Laidlaw 1994: 98).

From this follow the other features of ritual. It has, secondly, the character of being stipulated. Not intentions, but rules are constitutive of ritual. One follows a given scenario and therefore the ritual act is there, like an object. "You have still done it, whatever you were dreaming of" (Humphrey and Laidlaw 1994: 5). For the same reason, the celebrant has no priority over an observer to say what she is doing, as is the case in normal action. Ritual acts are, so-to-speak, ready-made (Humphrey and Laidlaw 1994: 96). The third feature is elemental or archetypal. Ritual acts are like entities. "Celebrants' acts appear, even

to themselves, as ‘external’, as not of their own making” (Humphrey and Laidlaw 1994: 89). The fourth feature, ritual’s apprehensibility, concerns its openness for interpretation. Because it is “external”, ritual can be interpreted in a variety of ways. In daily actions the actor has a privileged position in determining what they did because their intentions are constitutive of the identity of the act. In ritual everyone can give an interpretation. If we post ourselves on the steps of a temple or a cathedral, asking all the “believers” coming out, what it was they did in there, we will be confronted with a variety of opinions and emotions: learned or childish, moral or spiritual, progressive or conservative, etc. Sometimes these interpretations are institutionalized: “the institutional imposition of meaning is a reaction religion can have to ritualization, not part of it” (Humphrey and Laidlaw 1994: 81). In sum, “[i]n adopting the ritual stance one accepts, that is, that in a very important sense, one will not be the author of one’s acts” (Humphrey and Laidlaw 1994: 97–98). This consequence of the ritual stance comes down to what could be called a form of “de-personalization”. More than any other acts, ritual acts are liable to deteriorate into a void copy, into empty, sanctimonious acts, a danger for which, in many religions, warnings are issued.

Because they are ontologically constituted beyond individual intentions, the participant feels to be part of something larger than life. As such rituals are a rest-break in the day-to-day sequence of intention/emotion-laden activity. Humphrey and Laidlaw write: “It is this gap – a potential freedom from the everyday and inexorable suffusion of action with personal intentions – that provides a space which may suggest a reason why people perform ritual” (Humphrey and Laidlaw 1994: 99). Rituals free me of myself, of my ever-present ego, of ever-present wishes, feelings, beliefs, and intentions. Emotions are therefore not the source of ritual (in this strict use of the term as rule-guided performative acts), but surely emotions can be the effect of ritual (or a by-product of ritual). Awe, devotion, joy, or a sense of atonement can fulfill the redeemed participant.

The gatherings of what Hume would have called enthusiasm have a different structure. Human invention, design, and creativity seem to have a larger role here: what is at stake is not the repetition of an ancient scenario, but the expression of religious emotions by participants who speak in their own personal voice. The “enthusiasts” confess, are inspired, or express the power which moral imperatives have over them. Here, the personal emotions do seem to be the source of the ritual (now taking “ritual” in a broader sense). In a “superstitious” ritual – just to continue Hume’s distinction – words and actions follow a pre-fixed order, only allowing a minimal personal input. It appeals in a de-personalized way.

However, both can elicit emotions like awe, the feeling of being lifted above oneself and feelings of inspiration, hope, calmness, and serenity. In the Christian liturgy this is what is meant by the words of the priest “*Sursum corda*” (‘Lift up your hearts’) and the people’s reply “*Habemus ad Dominum*” (‘We lift them up to the Lord’). Liturgical prayers show a proliferation of metaphorical discourse on the divine which emphasizes an attitude of submission (lord, shepherd, king, castle). Self-forgetfulness seems essential. Whether ritual functions as an unmoved monument that overarches the individual, or is fueled by the emotions of the participants, in both cases the outcome is that the participant feels part of something bigger than life. One is relieved and feels stronger. Awe and adoration can become invincible motivators.

The phenomenon of “ritual weeping” seems to be a case in point where a nuanced understanding is needed. Looking from a Western, 21st-century perspective, ritual weeping produces “false tears”, as opposed to the “real tears” of spontaneous weeping (Ebersole 2004: 187), but these tears aren’t less real. Durkheim (1998: 567) points out that mourning is a duty imposed by the group. It is not meant to be the expression of individual emotions. It is not as if an anterior emotion of grief would render the ritual act authentic. Modern Western views tend to misunderstand the “superstitious” form of ritual – modelling ritual mainly on the enthusiast, expressivist form. This results in the evaluation of a phenomenon such as ritual weeping as inauthentic because seemingly in many cases there are no emotions. Some scholars therefore criticize the expressivist tendency and argue that the direction needs to be reversed. An interior experience isn’t the origin of the symbolic or ritual act, but is its result. The question is not whether the symbols or ritual fit the inner experience, but the other way around (Moyaert 2007: 186). The symbols and rituals impress us and open the road to an interior experience. As Blaise Pascal (1976: 116) notes, we need to take holy water in order to find faith.

Ritual weeping is weeping together; it is a collective act. As such the notion of “ritual” could be expanded beyond the limits of formal liturgy to encompass also processions, pilgrimages, and public performances. Christian (2004: 35) points to an example of a procession in 1507 during the plague in Barcelona to the Chapel of St. Sebastian, the plague saint. People following the procession would weep and lament. Typically, these events were situated in the less regulated context of the streets and squares. They took on a more “enthusiastic” character, to speak in Humean terms. These public tears were signs of the spiritual condition of the weeper, of contrition or compassion sometimes provoked by images of the Passion. Christian (2004: 47) notes that the tendency in early modern times is towards a privatization of weeping as the notion of a community being responsible to God virtually disappears. This is the general tendency in the history of religious consciousness, namely the growing importance since the late Middle Ages of an individualist, expressivist emotionality. But first, in order to complement what the role of emotion in ritual has taught us about the pre-modern religious disposition, we turn to the meaning of passion and feelings in early monasticism.

4 Evagrius of Pontus and the battle against demons

The pre-modern way of dealing with emotion can be characterized as an objectification or reification. The emotion is out there as a force outside the individual subject. A good example of this can be found in Homer. Homer makes many references to the gods, whom he describes as intervening in some way or as taking “part in an action or event” (Dreyfus and Kelly 2011: 60–63). Helen ran off with Paris because she was under the spell of Aphrodite. Achilles is said to be sensitive to the moods which Ares brings. The Homeric Greeks seem very conscious of the fact that we have no complete control over our successes and failures. They recognize the importance of those actions which border on events like falling asleep or not, waking up or not, fitting in or not, being able to gather a crowd or not, being filled with desires, courage, wisdom, emotions, and moods. These aren’t the types of ac-

tions for which it helps to try harder. Instead, they are represented as gifts from the gods. The Homeric self is open to the world, allowing to be drawn out. The very idea of a private experience is bizarre in a Homeric context. Moods and emotions are public and shared. It is rare and difficult to hide one's feelings. In a sense, a god is such a public mood that attunes us to what matters in a situation (Dreyfus and Kelly 2011: 84). It can be noted on the side here that recent cognitive theories of religion explain the success of religious concepts as "gods", "witches", etc., by reference to universals in the human emotional repertoire (Dulin 2011: 224).

Something of this ancient reification of the emotions lingers on in the work of Evagrius Ponticus as he describes the battle of the hermits against demons or "demonic" passions. Two things are notable here. First, the word "battle" announces a rather negative approach towards the passions. Secondly, although this battle is an inner and personal battle, it should nevertheless be recognized that since these passions are out there, as objective forces, they are the same demons for all of us. In this sense, Evagrius's discussion is not about the very personal or singular.

Evagrius Ponticus (345–399) was known as the psychologist of the desert. Around 381 he was noted in Constantinople as a gifted dialectician in the discussion with various heresies. He fell in love with a woman who was married to a senior official. He fled the city on the basis of a dream in which he was shown all the dangers of his passion. He resided in Jerusalem for a time. From 383 he was in the Egyptian desert; he was in Nitria for two years and in the Desert of the Cells for 14 years. Various sayings of the desert fathers were devoted to him. He belonged to a small group of monks influenced by Origenes. Originally they were highly regarded and tolerated, but from 400 they became the object of persecution. However, Evagrius died earlier.

What is peculiar to this early monasticism is the identification of passions and sins as demons. The question should not be whether demons exist. More interesting is the question concerning the nature of the demons, i.e., the underlying psychic reality. In the mythological language of the monks, emotions and passions are described as demons. Demons are fallen angels who try to seduce humans into evil. According to Evagrius, there are three types of (intelligent) beings, to which each time a different power of the soul corresponds, namely (i) angels (Gr. *nous*, 'spirit'), (ii) demons (Gr. *thumos*, 'fierce emotion', 'anger', etc.), (iii) people (Gr. *epithumia*, 'lust'). The demon brings excitement and confusion to the angry part of the soul. Blind rage is a natural image of the demon.

Demons have an airy body. They move through the air, are faster than people and cold as ice. Essentially invisible, they can still mimic the color and shape of a body. They are active in fantasy and in dreams. Their usual means are bad thoughts (Gr. *logismoi*; of course, these are emotionally charged). Fighting with demons is fighting with one's own (especially affectively charged, never purely intellectual) thoughts.

The thoughts that angels give us give rise to questions about the origin of creation and therefore to the contemplation of God. Purely human thoughts merely depict objects. Demonic thoughts always approach things with passion and emotion. Furthermore, demons are cunning. They cannot look into the soul (like angels), but they make deductions from our outer behaviors. They can control a person in such a way that he becomes insane. At the hands of the demon, there can be a "loss of reality" because people come under the

spell of illusions and projections. It is important to become aware of this mechanism whereby we project our wishes and emotions onto others. Evagrius writes in *Praktikos*, § 48:

The demons strive against men of the world chiefly through their deeds, but in the case of monks for the most part by means of thoughts, since the desert deprives them of such affairs. Just as it is easier to sin by thought than by deed, so also is the war fought on the field of thought more severe than that which is conducted in the area of things and events. For the mind is easily moved indeed, and hard to control in the presence of sinful phantasies. (Evagrius 1972: 29)

When we see things in the light of our own desires and emotions, the demons act upon us. In particular, thoughts that involve excessive wrath or desire stem from the demons. Where do our thoughts come from? Good and beneficial ones come from the angels; harmful and infertile from the demons; other thoughts come from the person himself. Memory is a special form of thought that can have a fatal power (the monk remembers his worldly life). They make greed through dream images, hallucinations about meals and women, and make them anxious through images of wild animals. Demons – because they are such a powerful psychic reality – have a psychosomatic effect.

Demons search for the weaknesses of the monk. They patiently wait for the right moment to strike. Because they cannot see into the soul, they pay attention to our facial expressions, the way we walk. Everywhere they look for a sign of annoyance, anger, sadness, etc. The monk should therefore watch his behavior so as not to expose his inner self to the demons.

Demons know no measure. They encourage the monk to fast and pray incessantly, so that he becomes tired and weak, and he eventually gives up his way of life. Every excess, every fanaticism comes from demons. They have no sense of what is appropriate (no discretion). Demons seek conflict and dispute. Judgments about others, gossip, etc., make the monk blind to his own mistakes and shortcomings.

The monastic doctrine of the eight sins was grafted on these ideas about demons. Evagrius, Cassian, and John Climacus developed it. The eight vices are: (1) gluttony (Gr. *gastromargia*); (2) fornication (*porneia*); (3) greed (*philarguria*); (4) sadness (*lupē*); (5) wrath (*orgē*); (6) listlessness (*akēdia*); (7) vainglory (*kenodoxia*); and (8) pride (*hyperēphania*). For Evagrius, every vice represents a demon. So, there are different types of demons. The classification is related to the Platonic classification of the soul. The first three belong to the desiring part (*epithumia*: 1, 2, and 3), the next three to the irritable, emotional part (*thumos*: 4, 5, and 6) and the last two to the spiritual part (*nous*: 7 and 8). The first three concern drives that belong to human nature. They can only be controlled and integrated. If this fails, then the vices 4, 5, and 6, which typically arise from frustration, are provoked. So, these are not drives, but negative states of mind that are harder to master. The most difficult are the vices of the mind, 7 and 8.

A first way of defense is to allow the demon to enter and to quietly observe its work. This requires a kind of inner detachment. Instead of drifting along with the current emotions, they are watched with surprise and curiosity. If this detachment fails during the temptation itself because one is too clouded, then one must make a retrospective analysis. The result of this analysis can then be that one can “call the demon by name”, which removes the threat.

A second way of defense against the demons is the so-called “antirrhetic method”: a word from scripture is placed opposite the demon. One throws a few words at the demon. In this way one makes good use of wrath. After all, wrath drives away thoughts from the mind, both good and bad. So, one should not only see through the demonic activities with the mind (first defense), but also use their emotional powers against them (second defense). The monk sails against the demons; he mocks them, laughs at them. In this battle it is therefore possible to expel one demon with another. In this way, one can banish the demon of fornication with, for example, the demon of pride (who cannot bear shame).

In the strict sense, the antirrhetic method consists of casting a word of scripture against every demon. The word of God sees through the trick and holds the victory in itself. This is not a logical refutation. If the scripture is an inner truth for the monk, then it is inviolable. Thus, in his *Antirrhetikos* (6.24) the following is introduced against listlessness:

Against the [tempting-]thought that provokes us at the time of acedia to go to the brothers, ostensibly to be consoled by them: Ps 76:3f my soul refused to be comforted. I remembered God and rejoiced; I poured out my complaint and my soul fainted. (Evagrius Ponticus 2019)

Gregory the Great was responsible for the reduction of the eight demons to seven deadly sins. Gregory took pride from the list because pride is the root of all sins. He also allowed listlessness to coincide with sadness and filled the vacant place with envy (Lat. *invidia*).

When reviewing this type of treatise on the passions which evoke sin, it is clear that the metaphors which color this discourse confirm the overall negative approach to the passions which is present here. The passions are enemies (demons) which have to be fought and beaten. All means are allowed in this war, even the use of certain passions as weapons to triumph over other passions. The discourse portrays the monks who fight against evil thoughts as warriors who deserve the admiration of those who are engaged in easier battles, namely the fight against evil things. The monk therefore seems more likely to attain a heroic, i.e. saintly, status. Scripture itself is seen as a shield that protects the monk. The image of the demons spying on monks to find defects in their behavior has an extraordinary disciplining power.

But next to the negative approach of emotions, Western Christianity developed a different kind of discourse which emphasizes a positive approach in which emotions can be steps towards a loving union with God (Coulter and Yong 2016).

5 Benedict of Nursia as a synthesis of asceticism and ritualism

There is a clear tendency in Western spirituality to move away from external forms like rituals and to focus on more inner forms like reflection and contemplation. While the external forms are mostly rather collective in nature, the latter are more private and individualistic. In the following I will present three texts which can illustrate this development.

The pre-modern type of spirituality is ascetic and ritualistic. This type of religious experience is continued by Benedict of Nursia (480–547) and given expression in his *Rule for*

monks – a guiding rule that had definitive influence on the development of Western monasticism. The rule attempts to develop a whole lifestyle which must give form to spirituality. As such, a type of discourse is used which has legal or juridical connotations. In a rather minute way, the details of communal life are prescribed: when to rise, to sleep, to eat, to pray, to read, to listen, to exhort, to work, to confess, etc. The rule is a discourse that disciplines. By performing certain practices (like manual labor, fasting, waking, psalm singing, self-imposed silence, etc.) in a tight rhythm and on specific locations, the monk seeks to constitute a certain religious attitude or habit. The *Rule for monks* by Benedict shows us a simple and uncomplicated form of religious experience. In it, the world is neither embraced nor despised. The ascetic aspect consists in no more than fasting, waking, and accepting the pain that is part of life. Benedict writes in his prologue that he wants to open a “training school for the service of the Lord” in which he hopes not to impose anything that is too difficult or too heavy. His spirituality comprises the whole of human life: inner and outer. Prayer and contemplation are inner; liturgy, manual labor and charity are outer. Only one chapter of the rule (7) is “spiritual” in the modern sense of the word. It treats the sequential acquisition of the virtue of humility. The highest step, the stage where the monk has completely acquired this virtue, illustrates how much inner and outer are interwoven in his perspective (Van Herck 2008: 75–86):

The twelfth step of humility is that a monk always manifests humility in his bearing no less than in his heart, so that it is evident at the Work of God, in the oratory, the monastery or the garden, on a journey or in the field, or anywhere else. Whether he sits, walks or stands, his head must be bowed and his eyes cast down. [...] Now, therefore, after ascending all these steps of humility, the monk will quickly arrive at that perfect love of God which casts out fear. Through this love, all that he once performed with dread, he will now begin to observe without effort, as though naturally, from habit, no longer out of fear of hell, but out of love for Christ, good habit and delight in virtue. (Benedict of Nursia 1981: 201–203)

The first step on this ladder of humility consists in the *fear of God*. In the quotation given above which describes the last step (twelfth degree), fear has no part. There are clearly emotions at work here – fear, love, and the feeling of being small that suits humility – but none of these emotions are exalted. With Benedict we do not find any far-reaching purely interior quest, no affective form of mysticism, no visions, no ecstasies, and no self-mutilating penance. Verheyen ([1992] 2001: 23) remarks that the *Rule* barely mentions the value of personal religious experience. Indeed, it need not, for affectivity is here embedded in the total dynamics of religious life. Love of God is connected with something that, from a contemporary point of view of some, is outrageous: habit. Contemporary forms of spirituality often want to be (sometimes in a compulsive way) original, creative, and expressive. Spirituality must testify of personal growth and self-development. But to Benedict the highest level of being a monk is characterized by the habit itself to do what is good. The notion of habit means that a specific way of acting (emotions included) has become part of the self.

This ascetic lifestyle is congruent with ritual. Ritual, too, is an outer practice directed at the acquisition of an inner *habitus*. The ritual field forms a sacred microcosm in which, as described in the previous section, the normal attitude towards one's own actions is transformed in a way that reminds one of the freeing oneself for God in ascetical practice. For in a ritual, one acts without letting one's intentionality have a definitive influence on

the identity of the ritual action in question. The liberating force of ritual is not so much an evocation of emotions, but rather the opposite: in ritual one can do something meaningful and this meaning cannot be reduced to the will, the desires, or the intentions of the actor. The *ex opere operato* of ritual brings about a decentralization of the self. Or to put it differently: ritual can move and touch because it demonstrates in a telling way that the subject's emotions are irrelevant. It divests the subject of its emotions and directs attention to something higher and holier. The sought-after, spiritual goal can therefore be described as an attempt to make one great liturgy of life itself, to move through life like one moves through a ritual – that is to say, guided and directed by something larger than life.

6 Hadewijch, or the union of love

By the time of the 13th century, religious ideals had changed drastically. The following quotation is taken from the ninth letter of Hadewijch, a Flemish mystic woman. In the English translation from Middle Dutch:

May God make known to you, dear child, who he is, and how he deals with his servants, and especially with his handmaids – and may he submerge you in him! Where the abyss of his wisdom is, he will teach you what he is, and with what wondrous sweetness the loved one and the Beloved dwell one in the other, how they penetrate each other in such a way that neither of the two is distinguished from the other. But they abide in one another in fruition, mouth in mouth, heart in heart, body in body, and soul in soul, while one sweet divine Nature flows through them both, and they are both one thing through each other, but at the same time remain two different selves – yes, and remain so forever. (Hadewijch 1980: Letter 9)

In this letter, the love for God is modeled on erotic love. The terminology is more emotional (“sweet”) and sensitive (“enjoying one another, mouth in mouth”) than one will ever find in the Patristic age. The association with God is confidential and intimate. Hadewijch’s mysticism of love is conditioned by the thought (and feeling) of Bernardus of Clairvaux.

Bernard of Clairvaux once became involved in a controversy with the Benedictine tradition which, until then – and together with Augustine’s heritage – had dominated Europe’s spiritual culture. With the foundation of the abbey of Cluny in 910, the Benedictine ideal reached its point of culmination, but an aberration was lurking behind its success. Feudal power, excessive wealth and an exclusively liturgical life threatened to corrupt authentic monasticism. Reaction came about when Robert of Molesme founded Cîteaux in 1098 with the intention of bringing the purity of Benedict’s rule back to religious life. In its restoration of the rule Cîteaux also went beyond what the rule demanded. Increasing moments of complete silence were introduced, and mortification or castigation was practiced regularly.

According to the Flemish Bernard scholar Paul Verheyen (2001: 31), the meeting between Bernard and Guillaume of Saint-Thierry around the year 1128 in the hospital of Clairvaux was crucial for the birth of mysticism in its strict, more affective sense. De Paepe (1979: xix) situates the birth of nuptial mysticism around 1160. During their illness, Bernard and his friend spoke to each other about the *Song of songs*. This Biblical hymn of corporeal love is given a mystical interpretation. Its opening sentence, “O that you would kiss me

with the kisses of your mouth" (RSV), is interpreted as the words of the soul which wants to take Christ as its groom. The *Song of songs* had already been commented on by the church fathers, but in a more retired and less affectionate manner. Typically the sensible qualities of the experience of God are described in terms of sweetness ("dulcedo", "suavitatis"). Bernard refers many times to Ps. 33, 9 ("Savour how sweet the Lord is") and to Mt. 11, 30 ("For my yoke is sweet"). The effects are more than a side effect of a strong love for God. Lode Van Hecke (1990) quotes Bernard: "The goal of the monk is not to search for the earthly Jerusalem, but for the heavenly, and this not progressing by foot, but using the affects" (Van Hecke 1990: 51). The logic and language of love and amorousness is applied to the mystical subject. This is the birth of an emotional mysticism with the human soul as bride. It entails a complete transformation of the relation to Christ and the image of Christ. This relationship is stripped of its cosmic dimensions and changes into a more intimate relation. Christ is less an imperial Pantocrator and more a fellow traveler, a companion. It stimulated interest in the child in its crib, for the wounds of the crucified. Because Christ comes "closer", the devotion to Mary increases. The metaphors of the soul as the bride of Christ, of Christ as bridegroom or spouse, mobilize quite specific emotions within the religious domain. Religious feelings of infatuation, of love melancholy, of erotic union, of being separated from the loved one, etc., all derive their relevance from this discourse of bridal mysticism. Moreover, these metaphors engender new metaphors like the (mystical) kiss (*De oris osculo* by Willem Jordae [1967]), the preparations and dressing for the (mystical) wedding, and so on.

In the late Middle Ages, the discourse of spirituality becomes more independent from theological discourse, and within the discourse of spirituality this causes a growing sentimentalism. From the 12th century onwards the twin sisters of theology and spirituality begin a process of separation. Theology is given a prominent role in the rising universities. Non-academic spirituality is refused entrance – so to speak – and waits outside at the universities' gates. Theology enjoys the university context so much, however, that she hardly ever returned to her spiritual sister outside.

In pre-modern times thinking about faith was itself part of a religious practice. Patristic theology cannot be distinguished from patristic spirituality. The writings of the church fathers did not distinguish between the knowledge and practice of faith (Vandenbroucke 1950; Verdeyen 2004). Theology was itself an act of devotion and piety. Not without reason theology is called in this context a praying theology, a *theologia orans* (Louth 2000: 4–5). By entering the universities and schools, theological discourse is rendered more rational, scholarly, and academic. The separation from spirituality thus also affects a curtailment of the concept of theology. The reverse is also the case: philosophical and doctrinal reflections are ever less present in spiritual writings. Devoid of its cosmic-symbolical thread of life and torn away from its unity with a more intellectual theology, the concept of spirituality narrows down over the centuries to a purely interior, personal, unmediated, and emotional relation to God. The *locus* of this new type of spirituality is no longer to be found in, for example and eminently, Benedictine abbeys. It is to be found along smaller, somewhat more marginal paths: in the nascent mendicant orders (Franciscans and Dominicans), the Beguine movement, Modern Devotion and, later on, in the Reformation (Karant-Nunn 2010). It is no longer predominantly expressed in Latin but in the vernacular, and no longer

predominantly male but female. The lay population, as opposed to the clergy, have a growing share in it, as the upcoming reformation movement will prove.

The new discourse of female (bridal) mysticism helps to shape new forms of relations of power and authority. As Jantzen (1996: 157) has shown, a direct, emotional relation to God made it possible to bypass all the male, academic prerequisites for speaking with authority. In their visions (Fraeters 2012) and other forms of religious experience, women could develop a justifying discourse. Experiences of mystical union gave women a voice of authority within Christianity.

7 Ignatius of Loyola and affective self-reflection

Gradually, religious culture is transformed in an important way. The mystico-affective mode of experience shuns the exteriority essential to the ascetic-ritualist mode. Not the rhythm of praying and working, not ritual action, but inner desires and emotions are the object of mystical discipline. Not only is the purely negative act of guarding oneself against the power of the passions required, but also the more positive acts of making inner resolutions, remembering, imagining, and feeling. Because Bernard and Hadewijch shaped the relation to God on the model of nuptial love, the Loved One remained central to them. But in later authors, less attention is given to the object of love as they turn their focus inward to the investigation and development of one's own emotions. The late modern or postmodern idea that spirituality is mainly a matter of self-observance and self-realization announces itself.

The *Spiritual exercises* by Ignatius of Loyola (1491–1556) are a spiritual quest to find the will of God in one's personal life. The will of God can be found by paying attention to the stream of one's own emotions. Here again, the discourse disciplines the emotions and prepares the devout reader to “passionate loyalty to Jesus Christ, and willingness to sacrifice all in his service” (Riis and Woodhead 2010: 162). The following quotation is taken from his *Spiritual diary*. This text – consisting of two copy-books – was found in his writing table after his death. In the first part 200 mentions are made of the tears he weeps before, during, and after mass. In addition to this flood of tears, the reader is struck by the frequent use of the first-person singular characteristic of many 16th- and 17th-century authors.

Mass of the Holy Name of Jesus – After experiencing remarkable devotion and tears while I prayed, from preparing for mass and during mass very great devotion, also tears; only at times could I retain the power of speech; resolution fixed on poverty. After mass, devotion not without tears, while I considered the choices in the election for an hour and a half or more. When I came to offer what seemed to me most reasonable, and to which my will felt most impelled viz. that no fixed income should be allowed, I desired to make this offering to the Father through the mediation and prayers of the Mother and Son. Firstly I prayed her to assist me before the Son and Father. Next I implored the Son that together with the Mother He might help me before the Father. Then I felt within me that I approached, or was taken before, the Father, and with this movement my hair rose and I felt what seemed a very remarkable burning in every part of my body, followed by tears and the most intense devotion. Later, *when I read over what I had written and saw that it was well written, fresh devotion*, not without water in my eyes; and later still, when I remembered the graces received, a new experience of devotion. (Ignatius of Loyola 1996: 74, my italics)

Ignatius is preoccupied with his own plans, feelings, and thoughts. The genre of the diary is well-suited for this emotional exaltation. When he puts his feelings in writing, this effectively reinforces his inner life. The expression of the emotion provokes new emotions. Not only does he have these religious experiences, but he writes them down and then reads and rereads what he has written. This reading produces in itself new emotions: emotions about his emotions. It is a discourse of emotional self-enhancement. Furthermore, his descriptions have a sensual-physiological dimension: Ignatius is in tears, unable to speak, his hair stands upright on his head, and his body feels like it is being burned. As William James argued, we do not cry because we are sad, but we are sad because we cry. Rothenhöfer (2018: 499) rightly notes that many emotional states are typically expressed in bodily metaphors and metonymies.

8 Understanding this growing sentimentalism

In summary, this “new” spirituality can be characterized as follows: (i) the importance of the external and the material is reduced, which results *in extremis* in contempt for the world, the body; (ii) the importance of inner experience is increased in the form of more self-inquiry and extensive methods to work with one’s feelings, resolutions, images, memories, thoughts, and consciousness – ritual and symbols are reduced to vehicles of evocation or expression of these inner processes; (iii) intellectual reflection is put aside and makes room for more affective contents.

A spiritualized and emotional religious experience abates the more external methods of asceticism, ritual, and its way of life in favor of methods directed at the interiority. Modern types of spirituality have developed complex sequences of mental exercises which have to be repeated at set times in order to retain their effectiveness.

The tendencies that were established in the late Middle Ages and reinforced in modern times still influence the contemporary discourse on religious and spiritual matters. That Western religious experience is highly individualized is not a matter of debate. “Believing without belonging” is its sociological expression. Even those who count themselves among the members of a religious group are inclined to distance themselves personally from the official policy, hierarchy, and moral viewpoints of that group. Rituals and ceremonies are only deemed meaningful if a personal touch is added. Personal, spiritual growth is often mentioned as the criterion used to measure the value of collective, religious events and processes. No world view or religion seems to be exempt from this individualizing trend. In different Christian churches there are groups – such as charismatic groups or Pentecostalism – that stimulate a personal religiosity charged with emotion. Personal, public confessions, dramatic fits of crying, and exalted jubilations are common phenomena in those circles.

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XX Emotion and clinical settings

Renata F. I. Meuter and Xuefei Gao

98 Language and emotion in health communication

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Abstract: Communicating about one's physical and/or emotional health occurs in healthcare settings where, increasingly, the client or the practitioner (or possibly both) communicate in their non-preferred language. Here we examine research that focuses on the way in which clients and practitioners use language to communicate emotion and consider how multilingual speakers are affected in their ability to communicate about physical or mental health by the language they use. We also discuss how one's use of language to express emotion is responded to (or not) by the other in the healthcare communication context, including in therapeutic settings. In reviewing the extant literature, we highlight some of the methodologies used to reveal emotional language use in conversation and the methods currently available to determine whether such conversations meet the speakers' objectives.

1 Emotional language processing in bilinguals and multilinguals

Worldwide, there are growing numbers of individuals needing to access, and using, their local healthcare system who do not share their first language (L1) with their practitioners. At the same time, healthcare practitioners increasingly include migrants who do not speak the main language of their host country as their L1 (Hawthorne 2001). As a result, health conversations, irrespective of the setting in which they take place (e.g., general practitioner consult rooms, hospital general wards or emergency departments, mental health clinics), increasingly are language discordant. That is, either the patient or the practitioner (or both) speaks a language other than the language spoken by the broader community and, consequently, at least one of the speakers has no choice but to use a second language (L2) to communicate about health concerns.

Health communication, even under optimal conditions, is prone to miscommunication. Such miscommunication is far more likely when communicating in another language. Better outcomes are achieved when patients are able to communicate in their own language (e.g., Freeman et al. 2002). It is not surprising then, that higher rates of readmission have been observed where there were language differences (e.g., Karliner et al. 2010), as well as more adverse events (e.g., Divi et al. 2007) and longer hospital stays (John-Baptiste et al. 2004; Lee et al. 1998). Recent research highlights anxiety associated with using an L2 as accounting in part for the lower access rates to health services reported for migrants and refugees (Zhao et al. 2021). There is also the issue that practitioners may be aware of their communication shortcomings when using their non-native, non-dominant L2. They report feeling anxious about needing to communicate in a language they have not mastered enough to be confident that they communicate and interpret communication in a sufficiently nuanced way (e.g., Hall et al. 2004). To ensure good communication with their clients they use strategies, such as making fun of their own accent, but feedback from others (peers, clients) suggests that those strategies do not improve the clarity of their communication (e.g., Jain and Krieger 2011; McGrath, Henderson, and Holewa 2013).

Thus, in healthcare settings where there is language discordance, we are dealing not only with clients in a heightened state of emotion but also with individuals at their most vulnerable trying to communicate how they feel in a language not their own. This communication challenge is compounded by the fact that, increasingly, practitioners are concerned about their own ability to communicate in and understand the language (also not their own) in which they provide care. Of interest here is how these conversations evolve and, in particular, how the speakers are able to communicate their concerns. First, we review what is known about communication in healthcare, specifically in the therapeutic and medical settings, when practitioner and client do not share the same language.

2 Bilingual communication of emotion in health contexts

2.1 Therapeutic settings

When effective communication is compromised, such as when the therapist and client do not share the same language and/or culture, there can be adverse outcomes for clients (Gutfreund 1990; Marcos 1976). Good communication is core to the formation of a strong therapeutic bond (or therapeutic alliance) which, in turn, is believed to be the most important predictor of the success of therapy, independent of the type of therapy used (Flückiger et al. 2018).

Although one may assume that bilingual speakers would be more comfortable expressing their emotions in their native language (L1), the reality is more nuanced. For example, in a lab-based study Gutfreund (1999) found that Spanish-English bilinguals tended to express their anxiety and depression more often in Spanish (their L1); however, English-Spanish bilinguals used their L2 (Spanish) more often than English (their L1) to express

the same emotions. These findings are consistent with reported data of code-switching in therapy, believed to occur either to express oneself better by using L1 for highly emotive content or by using L2 when unsure of the L1 vocabulary, or to protect oneself and retreat to a safer space, psychologically further removed from an emotional event by using the L2 (e.g., Ayçiçegi and Harris 2004; Marcos and Urcuyo 1979; Santiago-Rivera et al. 2009). In a therapeutic setting, Javier (1989: 93) describes bilingual clients who responded emotionally in L1 but experienced “emotional detachment” when using their L2 to discuss the same experience. Consistent with the latter observation, a mood induction study of autobiographical memory found no systematic language-based difference between monolinguals and bilinguals when identifying adjectives consistent with positive emotions; however, bilinguals identified more negative emotions when using their L2 (Kheirzadeh and Hajiabed 2016).

Our memories are enmeshed with the language and culture in which they were formed (e.g., Aragno and Schlachet 1996; Marian and Neisser 2000; Schrauf 2000; Schrauf and Rubin 2001), and switching languages during therapy can help clients convey emotional states and access memories believed long lost (Santiago-Rivera and Altarriba 2002). For example, Marcos and Urcuyo (1979) reported better recall of childhood events experienced in the country of origin when clients used their native L1 (see also Larsen et al. 2002). Consistent herewith, the emotional intensity of autobiographical memories was amplified when recalled in the language also used during their original encoding (Marian and Kaushanskaya 2004). These findings suggest that therapists should be mindful that language can be a powerful tool for therapy, ensure that they are aware of their clients’ bilingualism and then flexibly encourage L1 and L2 usage according to the sub-goals of each session, especially when dealing with clients experiencing emotional adversities. However, the use of the client’s L1, even when switching between the client’s L1 and the L2 (when L2 is the primary language of the therapeutic practice), does not necessarily result in more emotion-speak. For example, Ramos-Sánchez (2007) reported that monolingual European American counselors produced the most emotional language use in their sessions, in contrast to their bilingual language-switching Mexican American counterparts. Also, many bilingual therapists, who willingly adopted their clients’ native language, reported feeling inadequate and were frustrated by their difficulties with translating medical terms into their native language, calling for the integration of bilingual therapeutic terminology in formal practitioner training and education (Johal 2017; Estrada, Brown, and Molloy 2018).

Despite the reported difficulties with using a client’s native language, therapists who shared the mother tongue with their client and used it in their practice reported feeling closer to their clients (Gulina et al. 2018). Switching between languages may be a valuable alternative that can provide a means of managing the medical terminology problems whilst – and this would be its primary objective – assisting with building a stronger therapeutic alliance, at least from the therapist’s perspective. For example, a qualitative study of language use practices revealed that Spanish-English bilingual therapists used language switching to promote a stronger therapeutic alliance with their Spanish-English speaking clients (Santiago-Rivera et al. 2009).

2.2 Medical settings

While supporting and/or improving a client's emotional health is often a key aim of therapeutic sessions, addressing a client's physical ill health and their health concerns (e.g., cancer treatment decision-making) often involves discussions and negotiations that are at least partially devoid of emotional expression (Siminoff and Step 2011). Language may, however, be vital in how its appropriate, patient-centred use can improve wellbeing. For example, Guerrero et al. (2013) examined the relationship between health practitioners' Spanish proficiency level and their Spanish-English clients' wait time and retention in treatment. The patients were undergoing substance abuse treatment. Higher Spanish proficiency was correlated with shorter wait times and higher retention rates. These data suggest that the ability to speak the clients' primary or preferred language creates a more responsive and supportive environment for them, hopefully resulting in better health outcomes.

The research discussed thus far suggests that language is (and can be) used to connect with or distance oneself from emotions (the client perspective) and to better connect with clients (the practitioner perspective). The foci were on language in an overarching sense rather than the content of the consultations, and on interplay of language and emotion. Elsewhere in this handbook (Ekberg) there is a detailed discussion of the use of Conversation Analysis to unpack what occurs in conversations, focusing on monolingual health conversations. Here we extend this discussion to include other qualitative, quantitative and mixed methods approaches to health conversations and outline those that can usefully be applied to understanding the use of language and the coding of emotion in bilingual and multilingual conversations.

3 Theoretical approaches

There are several theoretical approaches that can be taken to studying language-discordant communication, some of which are discussed elsewhere (e.g., Ekberg), although not explicitly with reference to bilingual and multilingual communication. Here we focus on two theoretical approaches aimed at understanding communication in healthcare settings and, in particular, the miscommunication that arises. In our review of the approaches and the relevant research, we will tease out the work that is relevant and/or applicable to the communication of emotions (including distress, anxiety, pain, etc.) and we will focus explicitly on how these approaches are useful to understanding language-discordant communication.

3.1 The psycholinguistic approach

This approach to language-discrepant health communication is expounded by Segalowitz and Kehayia (2011) and is based on the usage-based theory of L1 and L2 acquisition (Barlow and Kemmer 2000; Lieven and Tomasello 2008; Tomasello 2005). It is particularly relevant to situations where one of the speakers is less proficient in the language that is spoken.

According to usage-based theory, normal communication involves establishing joint attention on the one hand and reading intentions on the other. That is, by using certain semantic and syntactic features of the language that is used, speakers focus the other person's attention on the critical aspects of their message. The listener, in turn, tries to establish, by attending to the language used, what the speaker's intentions are (e.g., to provide or to request information, to persuade). Because L2 speakers may not have sufficient control over aspects of their L2 that are subtle (and sometimes not even that subtle, at least not to a monolingual speaker), they may experience particular difficulty in their ability to communicate their intentions (e.g., what aspects of language best serve them to express their distress or pain) and in their comprehension of intention of the message that they are given (e.g., is the doctor's comment a directive or merely a suggestion). These attention-focusing and intention-reading functions are fundamental to almost all communications. As discussed previously, where at least one speaker uses a weaker L2, communication problems are likely to arise, and this theoretical approach provides a framework for identifying which attention/intention functions of communication fail and which specific linguistic features are implicated in this breakdown.

To our knowledge there is a dearth of research of real-life health conversations that apply a usage-based approach to the analysis of health conversations. There are, however, a few experimental studies that have focused on the linguistic control that is implicated in one's ability to attend to key features in language. For example, Segalowitz and colleagues, using experimental task-switching paradigms constructed using relational stimuli such as adverbs denoting time (e.g., "now" versus "later") and causal conjunctions (Segalowitz and Frenkel-Fishman 2005) or switching between verticality (e.g., "above" versus "below") and proximity judgments ("near" versus "far"; Taube-Schiff and Segalowitz 2005) reported shift cost patterns consistent not only with the existence of a form of linguistic attention that targets the relational elements of language, but also with linguistic attentional control that is associated with L2 proficiency. Taube-Shift and Segalowitz (2005) reported greater switch costs (and thus poorer attentional control) when processing linguistic stimuli in their weaker L2. This suggests that the processing demands of linguistic attention are influenced by language experience. Importantly, when Duncan, Segalowitz, and Phillips (2016) used spatial prepositions presented in English to determine whether proficient English-French bilinguals (dominant in English) differed from monolingual English speakers in their ability to shift attention from one relational element (e.g., distance) to another (e.g., relative size), they found that proficient bilinguals out-performed monolinguals when processing their L1, evidence for a positive impact of knowing a second language (and knowing it well) on one's ability to attend to linguistic detail in one's L1.

How are the aforementioned experimental studies relevant to a discussion of language and emotion in conversational interactions? They suggest that proficiency impacts one's ability to attend to the meaning of linguistic markers and, specifically, that lower ability in L2 suggests poorer linguistic attentional ability. When a bilingual speaker is constrained to communicating in a weaker L2 about health concerns, not only are they more likely to have an understanding of key concepts that differs from that of their practitioner (e.g., pain; Mustajoki, Forsén, and Kauppila 2018), they are also less able to focus on critical linguistic markers and capture the associated implications in the practitioner's health message. Visu-

alisation techniques now available to look at how conversations evolve across time between patients and practitioners (e.g., Discursis et al. 2012a; Angus et al. 2012b) include the potential to code for emotive terms/expressions and track how well each interlocutor responds to the emotional content expressed by the other (see Section 4).

3.2 Communication Accommodation Theory

A qualitative approach that is especially well suited to the study of language-discordant and language-concordant communication in healthcare settings is Communication Accommodation Theory (CAT) (Gallois et al. 1995; Gallois, Ogay, and Giles 2005). A particular strength of CAT is that it addresses both intergroup and interpersonal communication. Amongst its basic propositions are the following: (i) speakers try to converge (or not) the manner in which they speak to accomplish important social goals (e.g., the need for social approval, identity); (ii) the need to communicate efficiently in part determines how much speakers converge; (iii) convergence is perceived as something positive; importantly however, (iv) divergence in how speakers speak to each other tends to be perceived negatively because it reflects a deliberate intent not to speak like the other. CAT characterises effective communication by identifying communication strategies that encompass behaviours individuals use to communicate. From the description of these strategies, it will be immediately evident how apposite they are for characterising communication behaviour in language-discordant contexts. The first of the CAT strategies is *approximation*, which is evident (for example) when individuals change their accent to sound more similar to, or to differentiate themselves from, the other (convergence and divergence) (see for example Bourhis, Sioufi, and Sachdev 2012). Approximation can be revealed also by the degree to which speakers repeat and follow up on ideas introduced by the other speaker (e.g., Watson et al. 2015). When speakers adjust their speech in accordance with how competent they perceive their speech partner to be, this is the strategy of *interpretability*. In a health context a medical professional would show good interpretability when adjusting/reducing the amount of medical jargon in their communication with a patient. *Discourse management* is the CAT strategy that captures the way in which communication is managed by each interlocutor. Effective discourse management is evident when speakers are mindful of the other and their understanding as the conversation unfolds. An example of discourse management is the use of backchannelling (e.g., using sounds of encouragement) which, when used appropriately, has the effect of encouraging the other to continue or expand their narrative. Of particular relevance in the context of discordant health communication is *interpersonal control*, the CAT strategy that encompasses the communication behaviour that a speaker uses either to encourage participation from the other (e.g., a nurse explicitly inviting the patient to ask for clarification) or constrain the other such that the possibility to contribute to the conversation is limited. Language barriers may function as constraints on interpersonal control. Language barriers may also serve to limit one's ability to express one's concerns and make it clear to the other (e.g., a health practitioner) that there is a need to be reassured. The appropriate recognition of this need in the other, as inferred from their communication, is called *emotional expression* (Watson and Gallois 2004).

As the description of the communication strategies hopefully convey, as a theoretical framework CAT is particularly well suited to the study of the dynamics of patient-practitioner communication, i.e., how this communication evolves across time, also because it recognises that communication is often impacted by group membership and is not confined only to the interpersonal aspect of communication. This is an important factor to keep in mind when considering health communication, and perhaps even more so for health communication across cultural and linguistic barriers where individuals may respond based on how they perceive themselves as belonging to a particular group (e.g., the group of patients as opposed to that consisting of doctors; Watson and Gallois 2007) as well as based on their cultural, ethnic, and linguistic affiliation (e.g., Wang, Rosenberg, and Lo 2008). Understanding the existence of the latter as a factor in communication is especially informative when at least one interlocutor uses an L2. Such situations may constitute a language barrier that makes it challenging for interlocutors to converge in their communication. The resulting poorer convergence may result in interlocutors perceiving each other as unaccommodating, resulting in a poorer working relationship (e.g., Segalowitz 1976). One possible focus could be to identify the specific impact of language discrepancy on accommodation and its consequences for patient-clinician communication.

To date, research using CAT and focusing on language-discordant communication is sparse and as yet there are no published studies focusing on the emotional component of such communication. However, the research in health communication using this approach is promising and highly applicable. For example, Watson et al. (2015) used CAT as the framework within which to consider open-disclosure conversations in hospital settings. These are conversations that occur because a patient was harmed in a procedure (an adverse event), and such conversations are necessarily fraught with difficulty and potentially highly emotive. Using a semi-experimental approach in the first phase of their study, participants watched eight unique video recordings of a medical practitioner in an open-disclosure conversation with either the affected patient or a relative of the patient. The video recordings were selected from role plays that occurred as part of a clinical training program, and categorised as effective or ineffective communication by the research team. Prior to each video participants reviewed a brief history of the patient, including details of the medical error. Following each video, they rated the communication on items that measured the CAT communication strategies used by both interlocutors. Effective conversations were rated significantly higher on interpretability, interpersonal control, and emotional expression. That is, in these conversations the practitioner was perceived as (i) providing clear information (and the patient or relative as having a good understanding of the information provided), (ii) allowing the patient/relative sufficient opportunity to ask questions, and (iii) showing empathy in a way that was appropriate to the situation and the patient/relative's distress. Current research in this area explores the use of CAT in language-concordant and language-discordant real-life hospital conversations, and suggests important differences in how monolingual and bilingual/bicultural practitioners manage their patient communication (e.g., Chang, Meuter, and Hocking 2018).

4 Analytical techniques

Conversation dynamics form one window on the way in which emotion is coded in health conversations, and how concerns are expressed by clients and responded to (or not) by the health practitioner. There are a number of qualitative approaches that can be used to analyse health conversations and below we identify a number of techniques that can usefully be applied to tease out emotion and emotional content from those conversations. In addition, we highlight how some of these approaches can be used to establish whether emotion language is identified and responded to appropriately by the listener.

Traditionally, conversation analysis (Shaikh, Knoblock, and Stiles 2001) in healthcare communication tends to focus on linguistic structures and their directly conveyed meanings based on psycholinguistic models. More recently, grounded in communication theories, coding schemes for medical consultation have been developed that can capture the dynamics of conversations that often involve multiple participants with shared, or sometimes conflicting, goals and motivations (e.g., Siminoff and Step 2011; Traino and Siminoff 2016). Often these schemes adopt process-based approaches (cf. Segalowitz et al. 2016) and capitalize on the connoted meanings and affective tones offered by speech beyond content-based analysis.

4.1 Coding schemes

The Siminoff Communication Content and Affect Program (SCCAP) (Siminoff and Step 2011; Traino and Siminoff 2016) is a coding scheme that is well suited to identifying and marking affective meaning in conversations. It focuses on (i) goal-directed communication among multiple stakeholders, and (ii) meaning as well as affect exchange among multiple communicators through analyses of both verbal and non-verbal behaviors (linguistic structure and tone). The SCCAP is, in part, based on the Roter Interaction Analysis System (RIAS; Roter and Larson 2001) and the observational scheme developed by Street et al. (2005). The vocal cues comprise confirmation, vocal immediacy, and affiliation. Confirmation occurs when one's self-definitions are perceived as "accepted, acknowledged or endorsed" by the other (Laing, Phillipson, and Lee 1966; Siminoff and Step 2011: 181) as signaled by, for example, apology, clarification, reassurance, and shared laughter (see also Sieburg 1985). By contrast, ambiguity, indifference, irrelevancies, and one-sided laughter would be perceived negatively and constitute disconfirmation. Immediacy occurs when one's communication reflects a degree of psychological closeness to the other (Anderson, Guerrero, and Jones 2006) and is often cued by "vocal warmth, interpersonal touch, reduced physical distance, using a conversant's name, or other person-centered references" (Siminoff and Step 2011: 182; Jones and Guerrero 2001). Finally, affiliation captures a sense of belonging in an ongoing conversational partnership. Positive affiliation can be signaled by eye contact, smiles, nods, close physical distance, and a sympathetic/encouraging tone of voice (Kiesler and Auerbach 2003). Furthermore, SCCAP coding considers the role of social influence: an often-neglected dimension in health communication, yet one that is important to consider in health conversation where medical persuasion may determine a patient's decision. All

three categories of relational communication, as well as social influence, have been linked to relational quality and communication effectiveness (Siminoff and Step 2011).

In general, there are two stages in this audio coding scheme. During the first stage, trained coders will code the content themes of consultations and communication style (influence, confirmation and disconfirmation) at the same time. Content themes consist of events such as “Introduction, Purpose Care Logistics, Disease, Treatment, Preferences and Values, Procedures, Medical History, Clinical Trials, Psychosocial, Emotional, Prognosis” (see also Siminoff and Step 2011: table 1). The unit of analysis by default is an utterance (the smallest unit conveying meaning), although this can be totally customisable depending on the specific purpose of research. During the second stage, immediacy and affiliation are obtained through independent observers’ ratings. The raters are required to rate on both immediacy and affiliation (“vocal expressiveness, speech rate, extemporaneous tone, vocal clarity, vocal encouragement, inclusive pronoun use” [Siminoff and Step 2011: 186]; positively valenced emotions and negatively valenced emotions) as representative nonverbal communicative behaviors (Siminoff and Step 2011).

Finally, Siminoff and Step (2011) validated SCCAP in two independent datasets. This two-stage coding scheme generated high interrater reliabilities in a tissue donation study, and greater requester affect was associated with consent to donation. In a separate early breast cancer consultation sample, consistent with previous literature (Frankel 2001), medical management (content themes) dominated the conversation and emotional topics (confirmation) were covered but mainly dominated by the oncologists. When combined with traditional conversation analysis (reviewed elsewhere in the handbook; see Ekberg), coding schemes that adopt a process-based emotional focus can be more revealing, particularly with respect to actual emotion that is demonstrated. For example, Beach and Dozier (2015), in a study of cancer patients, found that overall better emotional outcomes (i.e., fewer fears and uncertainties but greater hopes) were reported post-consultation; however, process-based analysis revealed that the interactions were often initiated by the patients but typically low in emotion. In turn, although the practitioners were typically highly responsive, their responses were even less emotional. These data suggest that both patients and practitioners were able to address the patients’ concerns without (or perhaps because of their lack of) explicit use of emotion language during the consultation, a finding that is somehow counterintuitive but rather revealing when doctors are dealing with newly diagnosed cancer patients.

4.2 Discursis

Discursis is a language visualisation tool, an innovative software package that generates a visual representation of both the conversational turn-taking events and the semantic overlap between turns (reflecting the degree to which the exchanges remain focused and on topic) (Angus et al. 2012a). The visual representation (the Discursis plot) can be quantified for statistical analysis of structure and overlap. These analyses can also reveal the degree and manner in which conversations differ across L1 and L2 interactions and are especially suited to analysing communication accommodation. For example, in Watson et al.’s (2015)

study of simulated open disclosure conversations, they used a two-pronged approach in which the recorded conversations that were rated for the presence of CAT strategies (such as approximation, interpersonal control, interpretability) were also analysed (in the form of transcripts) by using Discursis. Reassuringly, the Discursis plots revealed patterns that were consistent with the ratings obtained in the first phase of the study. Of importance to our discussion, the results from both approaches showed that those conversations that were rated as effective by the participants (and when using Discursis) were also the ones in which the practitioners (i) were observed to clarify their communications more to ensure that the patient would understand them (interpretability) and (ii) provided opportunities for the patient to provide input and seek clarification (interpersonal control).

5 Future directions and implications

5.1 Emotions, language, and the older patient

With an aging population and increased migration, the number of bilingual and multilingual older adults in the healthcare sectors is rapidly rising. Older adults tend to constitute the majority of patients suffering from chronic health conditions and disease among the general population (Chin et al. 2011; Maresova et al. 2019). At the same time, older adults, compared to their younger counterparts, are inclined to pay more attention to positive information in the external world and also have better recall for positive information (the “positivity bias”; Carstensen and Mikels 2005). The positivity bias may have an evolutionary root and has the advantage that, in the face of many facets of declines that are almost inevitably associated with aging, reconciling oneself with the world about what can, and most importantly, cannot be done to reshape it and still feeling good about it, might be the ultimate goal of fulfillment given the perceived time limit of human lifespan during senior years (Lang and Carstensen 2002).

Many interesting predictions can be made regarding emotional language processing among aging Culturally and Linguistically Diverse (CALD) populations in health contexts. For example, the well-established “emotional distancing” of L2 usage can manifest itself in many ways. Thus, older CALD adults may switch more often to L2 to convey (maybe implicitly) their negative feelings and predominantly use their L1 to express their positive ones. In some instances, L1 may well have been forgotten, as documented in a number of studies of L1 attrition (e.g., Köpke 2004; Mayr, Price and Mennen 2012). In either case, there would likely be a significant impact on emotional well-being when choosing not to, or no longer able to, communicate in the L1. The latter is also often the case in migrant communities when the language of origin is lost in the community, sometimes already with the first generation (Clyne 1991; Clyne et al. 2013). Practitioners should be mindful to ask about language preferences and the possible implications of the preferred choice for therapeutic outcomes. They should also be trained to identify types of code-switching in their consultations (something that is more likely to occur with patients with whom they share another language), because these can reveal important repressed traumas and/or unverbalized somatosensory feelings or pains.

5.2 Multimodal processing of emotional language and non-verbal cues

Emotion can also be expressed non-verbally and, while a full discussion is out of scope here, it is important to recognise that the ability to use and comprehend non-verbal cues (or not) can further impact on the ability of older individuals to make themselves understood. Basic research in multimodal language processing (Schubotz, Özyürek, and Holler 2019), combining both verbal and non-verbal information such as speech-gesture coregistering or gesticulation (Özyürek 2002), has suggested that when required to narrate short stories (half familiar to both interlocutors and half only familiar to the speaker) to age-matched addressees, both younger and older adults generated a similar number of gestures. However, it was only the younger group that demonstrated sensitivity to the common ground manipulation by gesturing more when the stories were considered unfamiliar to the addressees. The older adults failed to take into consideration the addressees' familiarity (or lack thereof) with the stories by gesturing as much in the "non-common ground condition" as in the "common ground condition". Interestingly, both frequency and rate of gesturing were unrelated to their cognitive profiles for both age groups, and it was speculated that older adults might have prioritized their social, emotional and/pragmatic goals during communication (e.g., really enjoying story-retelling with another real person), which explains the overall lack of age effect in co-speech gestures. Finally, another nuanced but nontrivial finding from this research is that older adults tended to gesture more when feedback was given during normal communication. Compared to lab research, Özyürek and colleagues' work has highlighted the importance of face-to-face communication and immediate feedback in everyday communication (medical and clinical settings included) in order to encourage effective gesture use. This could be particularly important for elderly adults or CALD populations (perhaps especially when they are elderly) when cognitive and/or linguistic constraints may hinder them from fully expressing their intended meanings and/or emotions. Once again, future practitioner training should incorporate interpersonal gesture perception and gesture generation in their formal medical communication curriculum, given language and gesture could be mutually complementary in order to give rise to optimal communication outcome.

The work on speech-gesture coregistering also poses new questions and challenges for emotion and language research. For example, how do we best code the emotional valence and intensity that are indicated by gestures alone versus those accompanied by speech? Does emotionality embedded in gestures inherently share the same quality and valence as that signaled in speech? What proactive measures should assistive technology and applications that are gesture-based (ehealth and tele-consultation programs in their various forms and versions; Chen 2013) take in order to make these a tool for, and not a barrier to, communication for vulnerable aging CALD groups? For example, interactive gesture regimens imposed by the apps are so demanding that the communicating partners have to compromise either their speech, their gesture, or both (Chen 2013).

5.3 Tool development and communication theory refinement

Communication theories such as CAT also have important implications for assessing the communication of emotions, whether embedded in speech or expressed using non-verbal

behaviors (gestures, facial expressions, eye gazes and body postures). For example, the emphasis of CAT on the bidirectional relationship between clients and practitioners suggests that subjective and objective measurement of emotional perception and relationship satisfaction should take into account both practitioners' and clients' perspectives. After all, like in any relationship, miscommunication (particularly of emotion) inevitably happens, and emotional distress and exhaustion have been strong predictors of professional burnout and/or turnover among health professionals. Their jobs require intense and constant interpersonal interactions and, either explicitly or implicitly, demand that they support the emotional wellbeing of their clients, sometimes (if not often) at the cost of that of their own (Dollard et al. 2003; Knudsen, Ducharme, and Roman 2008; Scanlan and Still 2019). Furthermore, capturing the bidirectionality of emotional communication at its various levels may require further tool development that captures conversations involving two or more parties more fully (Angus et al. 2012a, 2012b; Segalowitz et al. 2016), two prominent examples of the latter case being triads in couple therapy and bilingual client assisted by a more proficient L2 friend/relative (Jungner et al. 2019). Recent developments in computer vision and artificial intelligence, such as refined machine learning and deep learning algorithms, are capable of starting to understand simple affect and gesture expressions (Zeng et al. 2009; Pavlovic, Sharma, and Huang 1997), and potentially could be integrated with analytical tools such as Discursis. Reciprocally, both psychological and communicative theories would benefit greatly when attempting to interpret communication involving a triad: how do practitioners manage (i.e., direct and [un]synchronize) their respective divided attention and joint intention? How do interpreters faithfully maintain clients' expressed meanings and emotions in both verbal and gestural forms, to the best of their ability, so as to avoid practitioners' misperception and thus failed accommodation, and vice versa?

6 Conclusion

As emotional beings, we communicate our emotions every day, either to our employer/employee, our friends, child(ren) or partner and parents, seeking things as practical as advice and financial help, and as intangible as rapport, understanding and empathy. Unfortunately, as models of psycholinguistics and communication theories indicate, communication (of emotion) is never easy but rather is highly susceptible to interpersonal and intrapersonal variations. Language-discordant communication in the healthcare sector poses a unique challenge and opportunity to study and intervene on factors intrinsic and extrinsic to successful health communication. The theories, methods, settings and proposals reviewed herein hopefully will provide a framework within which researchers, practitioners, and policymakers can see the interconnections more clearly, identify gaps, and initiate cross-talks with one another. After all, finding the common ground is what is needed for a research area that is mostly problem-driven (in healthcare settings) yet traditionally under-studied (simulated lab experiments). Nevertheless science, and society as a whole, should prioritize allocation of resources to our most vulnerable, for example, a suffering CALD elder, in order to move science, society and, most importantly, humanity forward.

7 References

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99 Emotion, regulation and therapy

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Abstract: Emotion and emotion regulation occur in dynamic contexts that involve modulation based on the identification and perception of emotional experiences. Consequently, emotion processing and regulation are best understood as adaptive and variable across social contexts. However, in intervention science for emotion regulation, reliance on a fixed and trait-like characterization of emotion regulation (i.e., identifying deficits in an individual's skills instead of focusing on the ability to adjust skills based on characteristics of the context), is common. A focus on either contextual experiences or fixed characterization of emotion regulation can change treatment implementation and efficacy. In this chapter, our discussion of emotion experiences, expression, and emotion regulation considers the complex contexts in which emotion processes unfold. In particular, we note specific contexts that are influenced by cultural and developmental transactions, and we acknowledge the importance of social goals in emotion and emotion regulation. Social goals change based on objects/persons in socio-cultural context and vary based on stages of development, which underlines the importance of adaptability of emotion and emotion regulation. We conclude with a discussion of clinical prevention and intervention models – weighing their application of emotion science and theory in practice, with recommendations for future intervention development work.

1 Introduction

Theory about emotion has been prolific throughout the history of humankind and the science of psychology has made notable contributions. The experience, expression, and regulation of emotion represent core aspects of being human and are considered critical to social interactions and relationships. Emotion, and the related construct of emotion regulation, are generally understood to be dynamic, adaptive, and variable across contexts. How-

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ever, the scientific study of these phenomena has tended to rely on a trait-like characterization of emotion experiences, like emotion regulation. The focus is too often on identifying deficits in an individual's skills – generally ignoring the importance of considering context. In this chapter, we discuss the importance of context, culture, and developmental transactions in the process of emotional experiences, emotion expression, and emotion regulation with an emphasis on how emotion science has been used in intervention research and applied clinical settings.

We begin by defining emotion (i.e., experiences and expression) and emotion regulation. Aligned with the literature, we define emotion and its regulation as complex processes that occur in dynamic contexts (Campos, Frankel, and Camras 2004). We take this position because emotion regulation requires assessment of social goals and adaptation of those goals that are (a) dependent on who and what is present within the socio-cultural context and (b) shaped by developmental tasks across the lifespan. In short, we suggest that the ways in which emotions are expressed, experienced and regulated are driven by context-specific variables. The chapter concludes with a consideration of a few exemplar clinical interventions that address emotion regulation. We also make recommendations for future intervention development work that are based on our assessment of emotion and emotion regulation as adaptive and dynamic within context.

2 Defining emotion and emotion regulation

Working definitions of emotion have evolved from considerations of both the structure of emotion and the function of emotion as adaptive and motivational (Campos, Campos, and Barrett 1989; Campos, Frankel, and Camras 2004; Saarni 1999: 187). Early approaches focused on the biological bases of emotion, including the focus of Charles Darwin on the bio-evolutionary origins of emotion and the work of William James, whose thoughts on the matter may be summarized as, “I am afraid of the bear because I run from the bear” (James 1894: 518). These early approaches emphasize the close association between often intense physiological experiences and the “feeling” of an emotion.

Theorists following in a physiological and structural tradition have focused on several topics including (a) which emotions may be basic ones (and thus perhaps “hard-wired” into humans via evolution), (b) how emotions are displayed in the face and body, (c) how emotions are “experienced” in the brain, with particular emphasis on which brain areas may be involved in particular emotions, and (d) the universality (or not) of emotions across cultures. It is not accurate to say that biological and structural approaches to emotion differ radically from the more psychological approaches that follow. In fact, theorists on both sides often agree on the fundamentals. However, for the purposes of this overview, it is useful to note that there are some theories that emphasize the biology of emotion and others that emphasize what we may call the *psychology of emotion*.

The psychological theories of emotion, most of which can be described as *functionalist*, often emphasize the importance of appraisal in emotion. The emphasis on appraisal arose in the middle of the 20th century and was a reaction, like the cognitive revolution, to what was perceived as a lack of emphasis on the relevance of meaning to emotional experience,

particularly meaning in a social context. So, for example, Joseph Campos, a major figure among functionalists, offered a definition of emotions as “processes of establishing, maintaining, or disrupting the relations between the person and the internal or external environment” on matters important to the individual (Campos, Campos, and Barrett 1989). In other words, emotions motivate a person to adapt to the environment and to modify emotions or the environment to fit his or her goals/concerns (cf. Frijda 1986; Tamir 2016). Similarly, Arnold defined emotion thusly: “Emotion is the felt tendency toward an object judged suitable, or away from an object judged unsuitable, reinforced by specific bodily changes according to the type of emotion” (Arnold and Gasson 1954: 294). The early views provide a substantial foundation for recent developments of emotion as functional, which note the importance of emotion as flexible based on objects/persons within context (Campos et al. 2011; Hollenstein 2015).

The functionalist conceptualization is closely aligned with a psychoevolutionary view, which suggests that emotions have evolved to organize physiological systems (the biological and psychoevolutionary component) and to facilitate an adaptive response to important events (the functionalist component – see e.g., Darwin 1872; Ekman 1992; Gray 1990; Izard 1977). For example, Izard’s Differential Emotions Theory (Izard 1977, 2011) suggests that emotion is associated with a unique action tendency or behavioral response pattern. In this case, an action tendency and the associated emotion can effectively short-circuit more laborious cognitive processes (reason, problem-solving) to efficiently organize behavior in the face of danger (cf. Gray 1990).

Though many theorists take a functionalist view on emotion, their emphases often differ. For example, some functional theorists have emphasized relational aspects of emotion, such that the interpersonal meaning of events becomes central to defining and understanding emotions (e.g., Lazarus 2006; Lazarus and Folkman 1987). Similarly, social constructivist perspectives emphasize relational meaning, though these theories note the active role that the individual takes in ascribing emotional meaning to events, especially when considering the so-called self-referential emotions such as shame and embarrassment (e.g., Lewis 2000, 2011). In particular, Barrett’s *conceptual act model* of emotion emphasizes the role individuals play as the “architect” in building a knowledge base or conceptual system of emotions, constructed from relational meanings ascribed by previous sensory inputs and/or past experiences (Barrett 2017: 110–112; Fugate and Barrett 2014: 281).

In short, although theory on emotion has a long history and is often diverse, most current accounts of emotion focus on biological and evolutionary underpinnings of emotion – that is, that emotion serves a critical role in human survival. Furthermore, most accounts emphasize functional aspects of emotion, particularly with regard to the function(s) emotion serves in interpersonal relationships: emotion tells us what (and who) is important to us and motivates us to act in ways to maintain or disrupt our relations with people and objects.

Emotion and emotion regulation are often defined in the research literature as separate concepts. However, more recent work suggests that in lieu of thinking about emotion and emotion regulation as the classic causality dilemma of “which comes first”, we should consider that there exists a concerted effort of both emotion and emotion regulation to adapt to context-specific goals. A unified theory of emotion-related processes (i.e., emotion

expression, experience, and regulation) in dynamic context is better suited for investigating emotions in treatment and intervention implementation (Campos et al. 2011; Camras and Shuster 2013).

As Gross and Thompson (2006) note, the scientific study of emotion regulation stems from two different theoretical approaches: (a) the personality psychology approach, with roots in research on stress/coping, psychoanalytic study of psychological defenses, and functionalist emotion theory, and (b) the developmental psychology approach, again with roots in functionalist theory, yet highlighting the development of emotion regulation via multiple factors (e.g., temperament, socialization, etc.). These two approaches have at times operated in parallel, leading to some divergence in conceptualization of the construct of emotion regulation. Fortunately, work in the past decade has focused on clarifying the construct of emotion regulation. Although that process has not led to a definitive conceptualization, a common set of precepts has emerged.

First, although emotion regulation is viewed as a dialectical construct, involving both emotion as a behavior regulator and emotion as a regulated phenomenon, most research in emotion regulation emphasizes the latter. As an example, Thompson's (1994) definition is frequently referenced: "extrinsic and intrinsic processes responsible for monitoring, evaluating and modifying emotional reactions especially their intensive and temporal features, to accomplish one's goals" (Thompson 1994: 27–28). Furthermore, Thompson (1994) outlines several possible ways that emotion is regulated: (a) neurophysiological response (a brain-mediated somatic response like when, under stress, the body releases adrenaline to prepare us for fast action); (b) attentional processes (i.e., focusing attention on a particular stimulus, such as when one focuses on the finish line during a race to keep from experiencing exhaustion); (c) construals/attributions (i.e., "explaining" something that happens to oneself in a way to alter one's emotional reaction, such as attributing a team's lack of success in a game to bad luck in order to help keep spirits up); (d) access to coping resources (i.e., being able to talk with or interact with a trusted person); (e) exposure to environment (i.e., when one is in a particular place that has an impact on one's emotions, like a fun party that lightens one's spirits); and (f) responses/behavior (i.e., specific behaviors one engages in to change one's feelings, such as when one chooses to engage in a reliably enjoyable activity to lift one's spirits).

A second aspect of emotion regulation is related to the distinction between control and regulation. Most theorists view emotion regulation as going beyond control, instead referring to the "dynamic ordering and adjusting" (Cole et al. 1994: 83) of emotional behavior. Control, in contrast, is viewed as the restraint of emotional processes. Hence, most agree that emotion regulation involves more than merely stopping or reducing emotion. In fact, sometimes emotion regulation involves increasing emotional arousal or up-regulation (e.g., creating a positive and upbeat attitude in a car full of complaining children; cf. emotion cultivation [Fredrickson 1998]). Along these lines, emotion dysregulation is not necessarily only the lack of "control" over one's emotions, but instead regulation that is "operating in a dysfunctional manner" (Cole et al. 1994: 80).

A third aspect of emotion regulation involves environmental variables (e.g., family, friends, culture). For example, the transaction of child temperament and caregiver characteristics and behaviors (e.g., attachment, parenting style) in the development of emotion

regulation is of particular importance (e.g., Calkins 1994). From this perspective, emotion regulation develops in the context of the relationship(s) between the child and his/her parents/caregivers. In addition, the broader cultural context also influences the development of emotion regulation as particular cultural context is often critical when assessing the adaptiveness of particular emotion regulation efforts.

2.1 Implications for dynamic emotion processing

As noted, emotion and emotion regulation are often examined as trait-like characteristics, a perspective that can lead to identifying and remediating deficits in individuals, disregarding the contextual nature of emotion and emotion regulation. As we have also stated, we consider an understanding of context to be critical in assessing and describing emotion and emotion regulation (Thompson 2011). As such, viewing emotion and emotion regulation must always be understood in relation to the context in which they are occurring. For example, it is insufficient to view aggression as emotion dysregulation or maladaptive by definition; instead, one must consider the context in which the response occurred. Additionally, when relationship and social goals are being met, the continued use of specific emotion regulation strategies are likely to be maintained (Birk and Bonanno 2016; Gross 2015). Maintenance of emotion regulation is an important but understudied aspect compared to modification (Birk and Bonanno 2016). Emotion regulation involving both stability and change recalls the functionalist view that emotion is related to adaptation to context (Suveg, Southam-Gerow, and Goodman 2007). Before we shift to describing clinical and prevention interventions that focus on emotion regulation, we provide additional background on the relevance of context for understanding emotion and emotion regulation.

3 Context, culture, and developmental transactions

First, let us provide some clarity on what we mean by context. A brief definition of context is the specific and present situation in which a particular set of experiences are unfolding. There are several facets of context relevant to emotion regulation and these include: individual (e.g., temperamental characteristics), social (e.g., caregiver depression, domestic conflict, discrimination), cultural (e.g., culture-based attitudes and preferences about emotion), and systemic (e.g., school rules and social policies). These facets independently and collectively influence emotion regulation and its adaptiveness. Empirical research and clinical application examining emotion in socio-cultural context is necessary for understanding how emotion regulation influences downstream outcomes.

In the next few paragraphs, we address the aforementioned defining characteristics of emotion and emotion regulation by examining the empirical evidence that points to the role of context, culture, and transactional relationships in the development of emotion experiences, expression, and regulation (i.e., emotion-related processes). Thus far, we have made the point that emotion and emotion regulation are dynamic in nature and based on goals of the context. Specifically, goals relative to emotion-related processes differ across

context and culture and are shaped through transactions between the individual and others/objects in their environment (Kim and Sasaki 2012; Sameroff 2009: 10), and to examine them out of context does not adequately address the skills necessary to adapt to these specific socio-cultural goals.

4 Adaptability of emotion and emotion regulation: Context matters

Emotion (both experienced and expressed) is complex across different contexts and changes across time (Gross 2015). For example, we can examine emotion across different social contexts (e.g., emotions experienced in school versus emotions experienced at home), as well as within one specific event (e.g., emotions experienced at the beginning of a conversation versus those experienced at the end of a conversation). Further, particular strategies of emotion regulation that are helpful in one context may not be in another, and so context plays a large role in the sorting of emotion (i.e., organization and classification) – increasing the ability to differentiate between what is adaptive under certain circumstances (Campos et al. 2011). Proper assessment of context leads to more accurate emotion regulation and better outcomes, such that the absence of assessment of context or inaccuracy risks engaging in emotion regulation strategies that are maladaptive and depart from one's social goals. Gross (2015) suggests that while many would describe emotion regulation as the up-regulation of positive emotions (e.g., happiness, joy, excitement) and the down-regulation of negative emotions (e.g., sadness, fear, anger), there are particular situations in which the down-regulation of positive emotions and up-regulation of negative emotions are adaptive. For example, one may be happy and excited about a potential job position but understand that seeming too eager may decrease the chances of an offer.

5 Cultural influences and differences in social goals of emotion and emotion regulation

Emotion also occurs in contexts that are steeped with cultural expectations and group-specific goals (Kim and Sasaki 2012), including what Campos, Frankel, and Camras (2004) term as “social signals”. The shared signals and norms within groups promotes a culture that guides emotion and emotion regulation by coloring the ways in which emotions are identified, selected, and implemented (Diaz and Eisenberg 2015). These shared values of emotion are noted to serve the role of producing emotion in others, influencing the regulation between individuals within the group, and embedding individuals in their socio-cultural context (Campos, Frankel, and Camras 2004).

One example is the use of particular emotion regulation strategies across and within cultures. Within Western culture, emotion regulation strategies that aim to change one's interpretation of the experience (i.e., reappraising the emotion) are typically adaptive, un-

less the emotions being experienced are felt as high in intensity, in which case strategies that are distracting (i.e., looking away or attending to something else) are better suited (Birk and Bonanno 2016). By contrast, suppressing emotions is considered less adaptive and can have an impact on one's mental, social, and physical well-being (Gross and John 2003). However, in some cultural contexts suppression of emotion is adaptive. For example, empirical evidence suggests that individuals from Eastern Asia are more likely to use emotion regulation strategies of suppression, yet experience fewer costs than individuals from the United States (Butler, Lee, and Gross 2007; Kim and Sasaki 2012). Additionally, whereas the social and cognitive costs of emotion suppression are high for individuals in the United States (Gross and John 2003; Richards and Gross 1999), African-Americans living in the US often use suppression of emotions as a strategy for navigating contexts that include experiences of racial discrimination – specifically suppressing expression of anger (Johnson and Green 1991). Suppression as an emotion regulation strategy for African-Americans living in the US is therefore functional and adaptive in some short-term contexts, although it may come with long-term physical and mental health costs. These individual differences of emotion regulation strategy use across and within cultures highlights that effectiveness of emotion regulation strategies must be considered in light of context and cultural expectations.

Cultural differences in emotion regulation strategies implies that the “who” or “what” in an individual’s social context drives emotion-related processes. In addition, there appears to be some variation in emotional experiences between interacting with one’s own cultural group, and interacting outside of one’s cultural group – primarily an outcome of interracial group stress and coping (Ashby, Butz, and Tartakovsky 2008; Vrana and Rollock 2002). The variance in emotion and emotion regulation across cultures and contexts promotes the development of a wide range of strategies to store in one’s “regulatory repertoire” (Bonanno and Burton 2013) or regulation “tool-kit”. Context remains a key variable that individuals consider when determining what is appropriate and adaptive to reach social goals. Ideally, then, regulation “tool-kits” provide a wide range of tools that can be used flexibly and in response to the socio-cultural context.

6 Transactional development of emotion and emotion regulation

In light of examining context, developmental perspectives in the field of psychology and emotion science suggest that across the lifespan, developmental goals and social context change. Thus, the development of emotion regulation is shaped by these changes. Models of emotional development such as the affective social competence model (Camras and Halberstadt 2017; Halberstadt, Denham, and Dunsmore 2001) make particular note of developmental changes in early development. For example, young children are tasked with building relationships outside of the home with same-age peers, which allows for the opportunity to adjust emotion regulation strategies to meet their social goals. Emotion transactions between same-age peers often need adjustment (e.g., adjustment of emotion

regulation based on the type of play). As a result, emotion regulation is guided largely by what fits individual social goals and the responses of peers; that is, the direct, external consequences are large determinants of emotion regulation responses. However, into adolescence and young adulthood emotion regulation begins to rely more heavily on internal experiences, including internalized values and understandings of how emotions and relationships work. In general, across the developmental lifespan, emotion regulation repertoires increase not just in quantity and complexity but also in how well individuals are able to adjust their approach in response to changes in the context.

Emotion and emotion regulation are tied to social and mental health outcomes. Specifically, because emotions are a basic foundation of human experience, the context, culture, and developmental transactions in which they occur have implications for the treatment of mental health outcomes (Suveg, Southam-Gerow, and Goodman 2007). Acknowledgement of context in the development of emotion and emotion regulation patterns may help identify ways in which individuals may become “stuck” in patterns of regulation that do not adequately meet their goals. Treatment and intervention in the field of psychology is thus tasked with finding ways to grease the wheels and situate emotion and emotion regulation in the dynamic context of individual’s lives.

7 Approaches to treatment and application in clinical settings

Emotion has been involved in theory and practice since the beginnings of clinical science, but behavioral and then cognitive-behavioral therapy approaches have emphasized their own theoretical constructs, leading to an under-emphasis on emotion (Southam-Gerow and Kendall 2002). With more than two decades worth of work on integrating emotion into treatment approaches, there are some emerging models to consider. In this concluding section, we review ways in which intervention developers have integrated emotion into their models. Although our focus is largely on children and adolescents, we start with an adult-focused approach: the psychodynamic model developed by Greenberg and Safran called emotion-focused therapy (EFT [Greenberg 2004; Greenberg and Safran 1987]). In EFT, the therapist focuses on helping the client develop an understanding of the *meaning* of her emotional experiences, with some of those experiences being nonconscious. The meanings become organized into *emotion schemes* and they serve as a template for future emotion-related experiences. When the schemes develop from traumatic or problematic experiences, maladaptive behavior can result. The focus of EFT then becomes increasing a client’s awareness of the schemes, especially the maladaptive emotion schemes, through activation of those schemes during sessions. Once activated, the therapist works with the client to talk through the experiences and understand the historical basis for the schemes. The approach emphasizes insight-building related to the schemes, with a secondary focus on changing the schemes to be more adaptive to the client’s current context.

More recently, Barlow, Allen, and Choate (2004) outlined a unified treatment for emotional disorders for adults – an approach directly derived in part from emotion science and

theory. The unified approach applies three strategies tied to models of emotion regulation: (a) cognitive reappraisal; (b) prevention of emotional avoidance, and (c) changing what are called emotion action tendencies. Although the first of these sounds like a traditional cognitive-behavioral approach, there is an emphasis on what they call *antecedent* reappraisal; essentially, the therapist helps the client analyze potential triggers for negative affect, an approach that draws on work by emotion regulation scientists (e.g., Gross 1998; Gross and John 2003). The second strategy, emotional avoidance prevention, adapts behavioral exposure by permitting the therapist to expose the client to their emotional experiences. Finally, the last strategy, via emotion action tendency modification, the therapist helps the client to identify and engage in as many positive-affect inducing activities while avoiding activities that lead to negative affect.

These two approaches, EFT and the unified approach, represent similar efforts to use emotion theory and science in treatment development for adult psychopathology. In particular, EFT focuses on the identification of emotion experience within specific contexts, while unified treatment extends this approach by actively engaging the client in turning maladaptive regulation efforts into positive affective changes. However, because these treatments are best suited for adults, there remains a focus on individualized deficits and perceptions of emotions. Thus, we turn our focus of application to thinking about the emotion transactions that occur in larger social context. The remaining discussion addresses how intervention developers have used emotion science and theory for application with children, adolescents, and families. We briefly review three prevention approaches: (a) the PATHS program, (b) Izard's Emotions Course, (c) Denham and Burton's program and three treatment approaches (i) Suveg's Emotion-focused Cognitive Behavioral Therapy (CBT), (ii) Kovacs' Contextual Emotion Regulation Therapy, and (iii) Southam-Gerow's modular approach.

Prevention intervention is a promising area for applying emotion science. One of the first interventions to capitalize on this direction was called Promoting Alternative Thinking Strategies (PATHS). The PATHS program is a classroom-based approach designed to promote emotional competence in school-age children. The PATHS program involves explicit teaching of emotion-relevant skills based on emotion science. One example is the promotion of skills that develop vertical regulation – that is, helping children develop and use their higher-order processing skills to regulate their emotions and actions. The term vertical regulation is used because of the interaction of the developing frontal lobes with the limbic system. As an example, children are taught to use self-talk, a cognitive strategy, to help them manage strong emotions. The PATHS program also emphasizes horizontal communication (i.e., asymmetry of information processing in the two halves of the neocortex; Greenberg and Kusché 1994). For example, children learn word labels for emotional experiences depicted in drawings, theoretically improving cross-hemisphere communication and integration. Evidence supporting the PATHS program is quite promising (e.g., Greenberg 2004; Greenberg et al. 1995).

The PATHS program was a major inspiration for a program that Denham and Burton (1996) tested for at-risk preschoolers. This classroom-based, teacher-led program leveraged teacher-child relationships to develop children's emotion understanding, emotion regulation, and interpersonal problem-solving abilities. A final example of a prevention interven-

tion based on emotion theory and science is the Emotions Course developed by Izard et al. (2004) and designed for pre-school aged children attending Head Start programs in the United States. The Emotions Course uses a variety of modalities (e.g., puppets, stories) to teach and help children practice a variety of emotion-related skills, with a focus on building the children's knowledge about emotion, particularly related to how to handle challenging emotional experiences. The program spans more than twenty sessions and is delivered by teachers.

Turning next to treatment interventions, Suveg et al. (2006) adapted a cognitive-behavioral approach for children with anxiety disorders by infusing emotion-related content to facilitate child learning of emotion skills (e.g., Southam-Gerow and Kendall 2002; Suveg and Zeman 2004). The emotion-focused CBT (ECBT) involved an emotion-related content in each session. For example, each session started with a focus on a particular emotion, with an emphasis on improving emotion understanding through learning different signals for different emotional experiences. ECBT also includes a focus on emotion regulation skills for a broad spectrum of emotional experiences. For example, the treatment includes numerous emotionally provocative vignettes as a means for helping the client develop an understanding of how emotional situations occur, develop, and can be resolved through different regulation strategies. Evidence supported that the emotion-adapted CBT approach produced strong reductions in anxiety symptoms and increases in emotion skills.

Kovacs et al. (2006) also developed and tested an emotion-informed treatment called Contextual Emotion-Regulation Therapy (CERT) for primary school aged children with depression. Their developmentally informed program viewed depression as occurring in an interpersonal context; as a result, the treatment involved a caregiver throughout. The treatment begins with a framing of the child's depression in the context of stress and coping, with the aim being to help the family work together to use skills learned in treatment to help the child recover and to develop resilience skills for later challenges. The family are presented with skills across four emotion regulation domains: biological, behavioral, cognitive, and social. Different skills are introduced and rehearsed across these domains, individualized for each client. For example, one client may have an emphasis on behavioral regulation skills, such as engaging in pleasurable activities or exercising, another may receive a focus on cognitive regulation skills such as exploring, analyzing, and rehearsing helpful versus less-helpful self-talk, and a third client may receive a focus on social regulation skills, such as learning how to enlist the aid of others in regulating moods through joint activities or support. Data reported on the program were promising.

Finally, Southam-Gerow (2013) presented a set of treatment modules that target a variety of emotion-related skills. The modules were designed to plug into and complement other treatment programs rather than be delivered as a standalone treatment. Modules were arranged in a developmental fashion beginning with the skills of emotional awareness (e.g., recognition of signals of emotions in self and others) and emotional understanding (e.g., knowledge that multiple emotions may co-occur, understanding that feelings can be hidden). Later modules focus on more complex skills such as empathy and emotion regulation. The latter is explored across multiple modules. The first emphasizes the importance of prevention of emotion regulation, including a variety of self-care activities such as sleep hygiene, adequate nutrition, and physical exercise as means to reduce vulnerabil-

ty to emotional reactivity. Later modules focus on cognitive, behavioral, and social means of emotion regulation. There are specific modules for the regulation of four different emotions, including anger, worry, sadness, and fear. Exercises and games are used to illustrate the concepts and help the child rehearse new or developing skills.

8 Conclusions

In conclusion, in this chapter we have argued that emotion and emotion regulation are embedded in dynamic and complex contexts. Specifically, emotion and its regulation occur in contexts that include cultural and developmental shifts. It is not enough to only consider the physical people and objects in context that influence emotion and emotion regulation, but we must also consider the social signals of specific cultural groups, navigation of context in which cultural signals are not one's own, and developmental shifts that highlight processes of emotion that are most important in our social relationships with others during a particular life stage. These components of context impact how emotion-related processes are developed, maintained, and adjusted to best fit our needs.

As this chapter has a specific focus on application of emotion theory and science within clinical settings, we suggest that prevention and intervention efforts address the complexity of emotion and emotion regulation for best practices. Intervention methods at the adult level address individual-specific needs necessary for maintaining social relationships by focusing on internal experiences of emotions. However, it may be worthwhile to involve key objects/persons within social context to help clients explore emotions under real-time experiences. The EFT adult treatment method attempts to do this through conceptualization of an individual's experiences, but unified theory takes consideration for context a bit further through guided exposure to particular context.

The role of others is more apparent in prevention and intervention application for children, adolescents. Based on developmental properties of emotion, prevention interventions and treatments for children and adolescents specifically involve those most proximal – teachers, peers, and family. Work in prevention intervention for children is specific to working at stages of early development in classroom settings. This entry point for intervention is significant because children in early childhood are tasked with managing emotion processes (i.e., experiences and expressions) learned at home, and then transferring those processes through emotion regulation into a new setting with peers (peers that are also managing similar processes). The mentioned prevention interventions share a similar understanding that early difficulties in processes of emotion and emotion regulation may lead to later undesirable outcomes. Treatment models address the development of undesirable outcomes with a focus on adding more adaptive skills to child and adolescent emotion repertoires.

Treatment and intervention efforts that highlight emotion and emotion regulation in dynamic context are most effective in addressing emotion-related behaviors and mental health concerns. We find this to be important to the effectiveness of the prevention and treatment models outlined in this chapter's discussion. Specifically, newer models of treatment and intervention build on the foundation of initial models to include dynamic con-

text. The modular approach by Southam-Gerow (2013) is particularly promising – combining what is known to be effective in treatments with children and adolescents with the use of a developmental approach of “readiness” and building upon skills necessary to obtain desired emotion regulation outcomes. Addressing the meaning of emotions based on individuals’ experiences, inclusion of those who can aid in regulation (e.g., teachers, parents, and peers), and use of developmental ability appear to be among the most effective.

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100 Language and emotion in psychotherapeutic interaction

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Abstract: This chapter provides an overview of qualitative, language-based approaches to studying emotion in psychotherapeutic interaction. Particular attention is given to conversation analysis, which has made substantial contributions in this area. A hallmark of conversation analytic inquiry is fine-grained analysis of naturally occurring social interaction. Conversation analytic research investigating language and emotion in psychotherapy is underpinned by a broad conceptualisation of emotion as a socially situated stance. This approach has facilitated description of a range of practices for displaying emotion in psychotherapy. Clients can display emotional stances that are more or less explicit, for example, and therapists use a range of practices in attempts to engage clients in discussion about emotion. Conversation analytic research identifies two key challenges for therapists in this regard. First, therapists do not typically have direct access to clients' emotional experience, and must therefore find ways to display knowledge about experiences that are not their own. Second, therapists need to maintain collaborative working relationships with clients, and this objective can conflict with attempts to discuss emotional experience in ways that do not align with clients' perspectives. Therapists must find ways to manage these challenges in order to promote successful therapeutic outcomes. By highlighting the diverse ways in which emotional stances are displayed in psychotherapy, and the challenges associated with discussion of emotion, conversation analytic research provides key insights into ways language and emotion are central to the psychotherapeutic process.

1 Introduction

From its inception, psychotherapy has been known as 'the talking cure' (Freud and Breuer 1895). This interpersonal form of treatment involves trained therapists using psychological

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principles to engage clients in discussion about their mental disorders, problems, or complaints (Wampold and Imel 2015). There has also been longstanding recognition of the important role of emotion in the psychotherapeutic process (Burum and Goldfried 2007; Greenberg and Paivio 1997). This chapter considers research exploring the nature of ‘talk’ within the ‘talking cure’; in particular, how emotion is regularly displayed and discussed. The focus is on language-based approaches – namely, conversation analysis, discourse analysis, and narrative analysis – which provide novel perspectives on the roles of language and emotion in psychotherapy. Conversation analysts, in particular, have made substantial contributions to the study of emotion in psychotherapy. Focusing on the fine-grained detail of the routine methods people use to organise social interaction, conversation analysts have explored how emotion is displayed and constituted linguistically and interactionally through sequences of verbal and non-verbal actions. Accordingly, the principal focus of this chapter is on conversation analytic research that examines how emotion is shaped and made sense of by participants in psychotherapy.

2 Language in psychotherapeutic interaction

Most studies of language in psychotherapy contribute to what is known as psychotherapy process research, a broad field that comprises both quantitative and qualitative approaches (Gelo, Salcuni, and Colli 2012; Hardy and Llewelyn 2015). Quantitative process studies typically aim to connect what happens in psychotherapy with its outcomes, typically by coding the conduct of therapists and clients into categories suitable for statistical analysis (Gelo and Manzo 2015). Qualitative research offers an alternative approach that embraces and explores the diverse possibilities of therapeutic interaction, avoiding the sort of rigid classification that is often necessary in quantitative research.

Qualitative approaches to psychotherapy process research have been categorised into three broad areas (Gelo et al. 2012):

1. Exploration of participants’ experiences, typically using interview data;
2. Use of existing theories of psychotherapy to identify and interpret crucial moments within actual therapy sessions (e.g., threats to client-therapist rapport);
3. A focus on how language is used within actual psychotherapy sessions.

The latter type of qualitative research is the focus of the present chapter, due to its focus on language. Typically, one of three methodological approaches are involved in such studies: narrative analysis, discourse analysis, or conversation analysis. Each of the approaches are considered briefly here (see Georgaca and Avdi [2009], McLeod [2011] for detailed reviews).

Narrative analysis involves examining the role of stories (i.e., narratives) in people’s construction of their subjectivity and experience. In psychotherapy research, narrative analysis can be used to highlight the ways in which apparently ineffective client narratives might be transformed through the therapeutic process (cf. Avdi and Georgaca 2007b). In contrast to this specific focus on narrative, discourse and conversation analytic approaches are concerned with broader social uses of language that include, but are not limited to, narrative.

The term ‘discourse analysis’ encompasses a range of approaches across multiple social science disciplines (Avdi and Georgaca 2007a; Georgaca and Avdi 2009; McLeod 2011); however, a common link is a focus on the role of language in social life. This includes exploring ways speech and text produce versions of events that sustain particular social actions and institutional practices. Within family therapy, for instance, discourse analysts have considered the ways in which the action of blame is managed (e.g., O'Reilly 2014; Patrika and Tseliou 2016). At a broader level, the discursive perpetuation of social phenomena such as inequality have been examined. In couples therapy, for example, Sutherland and colleagues (2016) examined how gendered power was routinely reproduced through the use of discourses of maternal responsibility, heterosexual attraction, and women's sexual passivity.

Like discourse analysis, conversation analysis involves exploring the social aspects of language use. However, in contrast to the diversity of discourse analysis, conversation analysis is a relatively homogenous field with a well-defined approach. It involves a focus on the organisation of talk and other forms of conduct (e.g., gaze, gestures) in social interaction, examining how the local context of interaction helps specify the meaning of this conduct. Conversation analytic research has made substantial contributions – in particular over the past two decades – to understanding the use of language and emotion in psychotherapeutic interaction. The remainder of the chapter examines this conversation analytic research in more detail.

3 Conversation analysis and psychotherapy

Psychotherapy typically involves a series of social interactions between at least one client and one therapist. Conversation analysis methods can provide insights into these interactions that may not be possible with alternative approaches (Madill, Widdicombe, and Bar-kham 2001; Peräkylä et al. 2008). Several features of conversation analytic research differentiate it from alternative approaches to studying social interaction. First and foremost is a specific focus on *naturalistic* social interaction. Conversation analysis does not make use of contrived data, such as those collected in controlled laboratory settings, or generated through self-report methods such as interviews. The focus on naturalistic data maximises the ecological validity of research findings. Second, conversation analytic research is based on the assumption that social interaction exhibits an orderliness that extends to its minute details. Focusing on these details enables conversation analytic researchers to identify features that may be overlooked when other approaches are used. Third, rather than starting with theoretical propositions about the nature of social interaction, conversation analytic research uses an inductive approach to identify and explain the orderliness of social interaction. By theorising *with* data, conversation analysis can identify orderly aspects of social interaction that may not have been anticipated, *a priori*, through the use of theoretical speculation (Sacks 1984; Stivers and Sidnell 2013).

4 Conversation analysis and emotion

In conversation analysis, displays of emotion, through the use of langage and other forms of conduct, are referred to as *emotional stances*. This conceptualises emotion as flexible and dependent on the local social context of its production, rather than being an external manifestation of an individual's internal emotional state. By adopting a broad understanding of emotion as a socially situated stance, conversation analytic research has been able to identify the diverse ways emotion is routinely produced or accomplished in social interaction. These can include verbal expression, such as naming or referring to particular emotions. Emotional stance can also be displayed through non-verbal dimensions of vocal conduct, such as laughter, sighing, or the prosodic quality of verbal expressions. Furthermore, emotional stance can also be displayed through a diverse range of non-vocal, embodied conduct, including facial expressions, gaze, crying, gesture, and posture. This diverse assemblage of practices enable people to produce a range of emotional stances in interaction (Goodwin, Cekaite, and Goodwin 2012; Sorjonen and Peräkylä 2012). Given that the exploration of emotions by clients and therapists is a foundational component of the psychotherapeutic process (Burum and Goldfried 2007; Greenberg and Paivio 1997), conversation analytic insights into the display and organisation of emotional stance are important for understanding how psychotherapy works and the contributions that therapists and clients make to this process.

5 Emotion in psychotherapeutic interaction

The following review of conversation analytic research investigating language and emotion in psychotherapy is organised into three sections. First, the different practices that clients use to display emotional stance are reviewed. Second, the practices used by therapists to orient to emotion are considered. Third, the important aspects of interaction between clients and therapists – namely the ways clients and therapists manage knowledge within their interaction and the ways they manage their therapeutic relationship – are considered in relation to displays of emotion in psychotherapy.

5.1 Clients' displays of emotion

Most conversation analytic research has focused on emotional stances that are produced verbally (e.g., Hutchby 2005; Muntigl, Knight, and Angus 2014; Voutilainen 2012; Voutilainen, Peräkylä, and Ruusuvuori 2010b). For example, in the following fragment of interaction from a psychotherapy session, explicit references to emotion are made by both client (lines 4 and 5) and therapist (line 15). (See the appendix for transcription conventions.)

- (1) (Muntigl, Knight, and Watkins 2014: 42-43)
- 01 T: °so how's it been. °
02 (0.7)

03 C: mm? (.) °I:? I- (.) I.° I found. I:, (1.1) after
 04 the last session I was re:ally like frustrated
 05 an:, (0.4) disappointed and I didn't know what to do
 06 with it. (0.3)

07 T: ye:s?

08 C: a:nd, I sort of- (1.3) I felt like I'd, (1.4) touch
 09 on alotta things an then just walked away from
 10 the:m a:nd,

11 T: mm h[m:,]

12 C: [and] it didn't really have any shape and
 13 didn't really (.) do anything? an [didn't-]

14 T: [so you seem]

15 very dissatisfi:ed?

16 C: yea:h. (0.4) yeah

Here, the client can be seen to adopt a negative stance towards a previous therapy session. In addition to explicitly naming two negative emotions – frustration and disappointment – the client's emotional stance is conveyed through negative descriptions of the session (e.g., lines 8–13). In response, the therapist labels the client's emotional experience as 'very dissatisfied' (line 15), which the client subsequently confirms (line 16). It is through practices such as these that parties make emotion relevant for their interaction.

Clients' emotional stance can also be enacted through physical conduct, such as facial expressions, nods, or gestures (Muntigl, Chubak, and Angus 2017; Muntigl and Horvath 2014a; Muntigl, Knight, and Watkins 2014). For example, clients may convey sadness by glancing downwards (Muntigl and Horvath 2014a). Vocal conduct, such as prosody, can also be implicated (Fitzgerald and Leudar 2010; Muntigl et al. 2017; Muntigl and Horvath 2014a; Weiste and Peräkylä 2014). For example, clients may switch to a quieter or more unsteady voice with higher pitch (Muntigl et al. 2017), or may punctuate their speech with crying (Muntigl and Horvath 2014a).

Through their use of a range of verbal, vocal, and embodied practices, clients can display emotional stances that are more or less explicit. More inexplicit stances involve descriptions of subjective experiences that are potentially indicative of, but do not explicitly articulate, an emotional stance (Ekberg et al. 2013; Ekberg et al. 2016; Voutilainen et al. 2010b). Consider, for example, the following fragment of data from a study of online, text-based psychotherapy. The extract comes partway through a discussion of the client's prior involvement with illicit drugs (all typographical errors were made by the participants).

(2) (Ekberg et al. 2016: 317)

01 T: perhaps we should turn to looking at how you feel about
 02 yourself? Do you think you have forgiven yourself yet?
 03 C: yes i have forgiven myself, put it down to experience, but i
 04 still have nightmares about police busting into our
 05 house turning thee place upside down and being chucked in a
 06 cell .

07 T: sounds terrifying. When you say nightmares, you mean dreams
 08 that happen when you are asleep?
 09 C: yes
 10 T: And do you get flashbacks at all- waking experiences where
 11 you relive the awful things as if they were real again?

During this interaction, the client describes recurring nightmares but does not explicitly identify the emotional impact of these nightmares. Nevertheless, the client adopts a negative stance towards the content of these nightmares through aggressive descriptions such as “busting into our house” (lines 4–5) and “being chuckled in a cell” (lines 5–6). His descriptions provide a basis for the therapist to infer a negative emotional impact (line 7: “sounds terrifying”). Therapists use expressions such as “it sounds”, or “you look”, to link the knowledge they are claiming about the client to something that has been derived from the client’s spoken or embodied conduct (Ekberg et al. 2016; Muntigl and Horvath 2014a). Other ways that therapists have been noted to orient to clients’ displays of emotion are considered in the following section.

5.2 Therapists’ orientations to emotion

The conversation analytic research described above identifies some ways clients routinely display emotional stance in psychotherapy. Other conversation analytic research has focused on how therapists orient to emotion to progress particular therapeutic goals. When clients do not make their emotional stance explicit, therapists can use various practices in attempts to make these emotions more explicit. Fragment (2), considered in the previous section, where the therapist assesses the client’s described experience in emotional terms (“sounds terrifying”), is an example of this. Therapists often need clients to refocus their talk on the emotions associated with their experiences in order to achieve a therapeutic agenda of exploring and interpreting emotional experiences. They can do this, for instance, by asking questions such as “what do you feel?”, as in Fragment (2) above, which makes the discussion of emotion a conditionally relevant next action (see also Hutchby 2002, 2005, 2007; Muntigl, Knight, and Angus 2014; Muntigl and Zabala 2008; Sutherland, Peräkylä, and Elliott 2014; Weatherall and Gibson 2015).

In addition to using explicit questions about emotional experience, therapists can also orient to clients’ emotions through the use of formulations and interpretations. A formulation involves a therapist proposing a version of events or experiences that follows directly from the client’s own account, although usually with some kind of transformation of that account (Antaki 2008; Antaki, Barnes, and Leudar 2005; Davis 1986; Weiste and Peräkylä 2013). In contrast, an interpretation involves a therapist foregrounding their own perspective about a client’s talk, often connecting things that have been said over the course of therapy (Bercelli, Rossano, and Viaro 2008; Peräkylä 2004, 2005; Vehviläinen 2003). Formulations and interpretations have been found to be used by therapists to develop progressively particular understandings of emotional experience. By recognising a client’s emotional experience using a formulation of the client’s prior talk, and then providing an

interpretation that proposes a particular understanding of that emotional experience, therapists work towards achieving particular therapeutic goals (Muntigl and Horvath 2014b; Vehviläinen 2003; Voutilainen et al. 2010b). The following fragment of data, which has been translated from Finnish, comes part way through a discussion of a hypothetical situation in which the client's mother has berated her.

- (3) (Voutilainen et al. 2010b: 96)
- 01 C: or like that so that if it is face to face .hh so
 02 then (.) then I guess I could li:ke (.) #seize
 03 up so that#.
 04 (0.7)
 05 T: <Ts you wouldn't be able to "even look at° mother>
 06 (.) ↑mm[mm.
 07 C: [Y-YEA:H.
 08 (0.9)
 09 C: .hff So that she: (.) she like somehow (.) ↓just by
 10 ↓looking at me fWOULD .hh floor me so ↑thatf
 11 (0.5)
 12 T: (that's) Right (.) then she would be again tha:t
 13 mo:ther that you as a child were af [↑raid of.
 14 C: [Yea:h (.)
 15 yea-h.

In this fragment, the therapist first recognises the client's emotional reaction by claiming that her emotional experience would be so overwhelming that the client would not be able to look at her mother (line 5). Following the client's endorsement of this formulation (lines 7 and 9–10), the therapist then produces an interpretation, which links this particular emotion to the client's childhood experiences (lines 12–13). This interpretation is also endorsed by the client (lines 14–15). Through the use of formulations and interpretations, therapists can thus promote sustained discussion of emotion to progress particular therapeutic goals, such as understanding how past experiences influence present emotions.

Not all formulations used by therapists to focus on emotional experience align with clients' own stances. For example, therapists' formulations can sometimes challenge clients' emotional stances, suggesting alternative emotions (Weiste 2015; Weiste and Peräkylä 2014). Conversation analytic research finds that when formulations are used to support clients' emotional stances, these routinely match the prosody of a client's prior turn. In contrast, formulations that challenge clients' emotional stances are routinely produced with prosody that is disjunctive from the prosody of the client's prior turn. The following fragment of data has been translated from Finnish.

- (4) (Weiste and Peräkylä 2014: 694)
- 01 C: ...he was a human being of course I don't want to
 02 (0.3) so (0.7) he was not a saint (0.5) sometimes he
 03 had really stupid ideas, (0.4) that no no, (0.5)

04 I don't want to exalt him like you just .hh I mean
05 like (0.5) to exaggerate but (.) for me he was.
06 (0.4)
07 T: so that you are afraid of that exaltation.

Prior to and during this fragment, the client had been describing her grief following the death of a family member. At line 7, the therapist provides a formulation of the client's turn that challenges what the client has said by providing an alternative characterisation that highlights fear instead of grief. Weiste and Peräkylä (2014) explain how these types of responses were regularly produced using prosody that does not match that of the client's prior turn. This was achieved through practices such as discontinuity in intonation and rhythm, higher or louder volume, or more expansive pitch span than the client used in their prior turn.

Conversation analytic research has also identified other practices used by therapists to orient to emotion. As seen above, in Fragment (2), therapists can name an emotion, with expressions such as “sounds terrifying”, which makes explicit emotional experiences that may not have been foregrounded in clients’ own talk (Ekberg et al. 2016; Muntigl, Knight, and Angus 2014). Therapists can also ‘illustrate’ emotions by using elaborate or vivid language to convey the emotion that the client may have experienced (cf. Muntigl, Knight, and Angus 2014; Rae 2008; Zemel 2016). The following fragment of data provides an example. It comes midway through a discussion in which the client is telling her therapist about an occasion when her boyfriend told her not to get too intimate with him. At no point within her telling, however, does the client indicate her emotional response. Throughout this fragment, non-vocal conduct is transcribed in italics below the talk with which it occurs simultaneously.

(5) (Muntigl, Knight, and Angus 2014: 766)

01 C: u:(h)m, (4.2) I guess one of the things was like- (0.4)
02 when we were talking: once about (.) relationships,
03 friendships, .hh (0.8) um. (5.3) he just- (2.3) no.
04 >(h)↑how this was actually very interesting.< .hhh (0.3)
05 he goes (.) <well don't,> (0.4) don't fa:l:l:. (0.7) I don't
C: multiple nods →
06 want you to fall in love with me:. (0.3) °um, ° (0.3)
C: continues nodding.
07 we are just frie:nds.
C: fast shallow multiple nods

. ((8 lines omitted))
.
15 C: .hh and I'm just (0.3) hh (2.1) the:re and I'm thinki:ng,
16 <o(.)ka:y,>
17 (1.6)
18 C: and I couldn't really, I didn't really want to comment

19 on it bec(h)ause >I was just like< (0.5) u(hh) heh .hh (.)
C: shakes head. C: opens mouth, shakes head

20 what's [going on here.]
C: looks at T

21 T: [you're just stu:nned]

22 T: sorta like a slap in the face?

23 (0.3)

24 C: yea:h. °e- euh s-° (.) literally.
C: multiple nods
T: shallow nod

At line 21, the therapist first names the client's emotion, explicitly verbalising how she felt in response to her boyfriend's comment ("you're just stunned", line 21). At line 22, the therapist then uses an analogy to compare this emotional experience with the physical experience of being slapped in the face. Practices like this, which provide a more vivid and elaborate 'illustration' of a client's emotional experience, are a means by which therapists can claim to understand the emotional impact of a client's circumstances. Along with formulating and interpreting, this practice of illustration highlights the different ways discussions of emotion can be made relevant by therapists within interaction. These therapist practices for highlighting emotion support therapeutic agendas of facilitating exploring and understanding clients' emotional experiences.

5.3 Epistemics, affiliation, and emotion

A challenge routinely encountered by therapists when seeking to engage with clients' emotional experiences is that they do not have direct access to clients' subjective experience of emotion. Rather, the client has the greatest knowledge, or epistemic authority, over their own emotional experience (Labov and Fanshel 1977). Therapists must therefore find ways to adopt an epistemic position in regard to emotional experiences that are not their own (Heritage 2013). For example, as shown in line 7 of Fragment (2), a therapist can design an inference about the client's emotional experience, using expressions such as "sounds like" to indicate that their claim is based upon something the client has talked about or done in therapy. Practices such as the one observed in Fragment (2) provide a way for therapists to adopt the client's perspective, but without claiming authority over the client's emotional experience (Ekberg et al. 2016; Muntigl and Horvath 2014a; Voutilainen et al. 2010b). In contrast, instances where the therapist does not use practices such as "sounds like" to qualify their epistemic position, such as at line 21 of Fragment (5) ("you're just stunned"), claim a higher degree of certainty about the client's emotional experience. This highlights the detailed ways therapists design their claims about clients' emotional experience to adopt a specific epistemic position in relation to their claim.

In addition to managing epistemic considerations during discussion of emotional experiences, therapists also need to maintain collaborative working relationships with clients, as a foundation for successful psychotherapy (cf. Muntigl and Horvath 2016; Sutherland

and Couture 2007; Voutilainen and Peräkylä 2016). Conversation analytic research provides a novel perspective on collaboration within psychotherapy by studying the practices participants use to affiliate – or disaffiliate – with the actions of others (Lindström and Sorjonen 2013). Most research has focused on disaffiliation. Consider, for example, the following fragment of data, where a therapist's suggestion about hopefulness (line 11) is rejected by the client (lines 12–13). As in Fragment (5), non-vocal conduct is transcribed in italics below the talk with which it simultaneously occurs.

- (6) (Muntigl, Knight, and Watkins 2012: 19–20)
- 01 C: ...the only s(h)ing that I know is=that uh.
 02 (2.1)
 03 C: .hhh writing to him?
C: looks at T
 04 T: mm [hm,]
 05 C: [giv]es me (1.9) ((lip smack) uhm. (1.4)
 06 makes me feel better?
C: double nod, looks at T
 07 T: mm hm.
 08 (0.7)
 09 C: because
 10 (1.2)
 11 T: writing=ta him makes you feel more hopeful?
 12 C: hopeful. noh hop- I .hhh I do not have, .hh hopes.
 13 (0.9) for that, (2.0) relationship?
T: nod *T: shallow multiple nods*

Understanding affiliation and disaffiliation has important implications for the ways emotion is discussed in psychotherapy. For instance, clients do not always frame their emotions in ways that therapists are prepared to accept (Davis 1986; Ekberg et al. 2016; Muntigl, Knight, and Angus 2014; Rae 2008; Voutilainen et al. 2010b). Alternatively, some clients, especially children, may not support therapists' attempts to foreground emotional experience (Davis 1986; Friedlander et al. 2012; Hutchby 2002, 2007; Muntigl 2013; Voutilainen et al. 2010b). Conversation analytic research shows how therapists manage these types of potential disaffiliation. In instances where therapists' attempts to focus discussion on emotional experience fail, they have been shown to hold clients accountable (Friedlander et al. 2012; Muntigl 2013; Vehviläinen 2003). Consider the following fragment of data, translated from Finnish, in which the client is held accountable for the lack of negative affect in his description of his parents' divorce.

- (7) (Vehviläinen 2003: 587–588)
- 01 (2.5)
 02 T: when you described the:: (0.5) divorce you have
 03 described it- (0.8) >>as if it were somehow<< as an easy
 04 <incident>.

05 (1.0)
06 T: tha:t #er# (1.0) father just went away and, .hhhhh mother
07 just decided that it is time for father to leave.
08 (6.0)
09 T: and I'm wondering whether it- (2.5) is that easy.
10 (1.2)
11 T: divorces are seldom that °easy°. .hhhhh
12 and especially in a situation where there are (very) many<, .hhhhhh painful things that also bound >them<.
13
14 (3.6)
15 C: .hhhhhnfffff uhhhhmm yeshhmmm
16 (0.8)
17 C: mhhh

In other circumstances, parties may share a focus on emotion, but with the therapist and client adopting divergent positions (Davis 1986; Voutilainen and Peräkylä 2016; Voutilainen, Peräkylä, and Ruusuvuori 2010a, 2011; Weiste and Peräkylä 2014). How such divergences are managed, particularly over time, can thus be important for the therapeutic process and may even affect the therapeutic outcome.

Although most conversation analytic research focuses on relatively small sequences of action, examining a series of psychotherapy sessions involving the same therapist and client can highlight how discussions about emotion can change across the psychotherapeutic process. For example, a client may not initially, but then progressively, affiliate with a therapist's stance about the nature of their emotional experience (Voutilainen et al. 2011; Voutilainen, Rossano, and Peräkylä 2018; Weiste 2015). The following two fragments of data provide an illustration of this process. Across this therapeutic process, which lasted two years, the therapist repeatedly challenged the client's feeling of self-blame. One way she did this was by creating spaces in which the client might express negative emotions towards her mother. Throughout earlier sessions of therapy, however, such as in Fragment (8), the client did not affiliate with this stance. The following fragment of data is one such instance, and comes part way through a discussion in which the client has described her mother ignoring her success at work.

(8) (Voutilainen et al. 2011: 352)
01 T: ...she did not express like any kind of interest.
02 C: No,

. ((11 lines omitted))
. .
14 T: It's no wonder that you feel (.) rejected and .hhh (1.3)
15 like no one cares.
16 (4.0)
17 ?: .hff
18 (2.3)

19 T: I guess that does make one feel like that.
 20 (12.0)
 21 C: .hfhhh kryhh-kryhmm hmhhhhh Then it's that I have always
 22 like (0.3) but if I speak to Ville ((client's husband)) about
 23 those then he starts to .hh (0.4) rail at her or berate or
 24 (1.5) say bad things about her and then I defend her to death
 25 and .hfff (.) so that no one is like (0.5) allowed to say
 26 anything bad about her

In response to the client's report of her mother's lack of interest, the therapist validates a connection between negative feelings that the client had described earlier (data not shown) and her mother's behaviour (lines 14–15 and line 19). The client does not respond, however, by affiliating with this stance. Rather, she reverts to displaying the self-blame (lines 22–26) that is common throughout this period of therapy. Much later in the therapeutic process, however, the client tends to affiliate more strongly with the therapist's attempts to reject self-blame.

(9) (Voutilainen et al. 2011: 359–360)

01 T: ...so:[.hhh (.) the fault [is not yours.
 02 C: [Yea-ah. [Yeah.
 .
 . ((8 lines omitted))
 .
 11 T: =If she happens to be that kind of person.
 12 (.)
 13 C: Yeah:..
 14 (0.6)
 15 C: That's the way it is indeed heh heh (.) hhhhh &that's the way
 16 it is& I MEAN I have never (.) I can't .hhh e: (.) m-m I
 17 mean I don't (.) understand wh-(.) #mmmm# I mean if I tried
 18 to like find something within myself (.) like I don't know
 19 what that would be .hhh[hh I mean I nevertheless
 20 T: [Mmmm.
 21 C: see myself as a quite (0.9) quite decent daughter like
 22 [I mean I have not [thou- (.)
 23 T: [Mmmm. [Yeah.
 24 C: not (.) been in trouble ((continues))

On this occasion, the client accepts the therapist's rejection of self-blame as an appropriate response to her mother's behaviour. This reflects a new understanding that has been progressively developed across the therapeutic process: that the client cannot control her mother's behaviour and this is therefore not something for which she should blame herself. Fragments 8 and 9 illustrate how therapists and clients can progressively develop understandings of the clients' emotional experiences that both parties are prepared to accept.

Conversation analytic research that examines, in close detail, the longitudinal progression of displays and discussion about emotion is useful for understanding the precise ways change can occur across the psychotherapeutic process (cf. Madill 2015). If a therapist does not affiliate with a client's emotional stance, it can impact a psychotherapeutic interaction and potentially threaten the entire therapeutic relationship (Muntigl and Horvath 2014a; Voutilainen 2012; Voutilainen and Peräkylä 2016; Voutilainen et al. 2010a). However, it also seems that this risk must be balanced against the possibility that periods of disaffiliation may be crucial for therapeutic progress (Voutilainen and Peräkylä 2016; Voutilainen et al. 2010a, 2011). Managing this challenge can thus be an important part of discussion about emotion in psychotherapy.

6 Future research

The research reviewed here provides a solid foundation for future investigations of language and emotion in psychotherapy. In addition to further knowledge of verbal emotional stances, additional research is required to understand the range of non-verbal (e.g., crying, laughing, etc.) and non-vocal conduct (e.g., gestures, facial expressions) that can be implicated in displaying emotional stances. There is also scope for different types of comparative research (Sidnell 2009). First, the discussion of emotion could be compared across different psychotherapeutic approaches. Second, discussion of emotion could be compared across therapeutic relationships that have more or less successful outcomes. Third, comparative approaches could also seek to identify systematic differences between psychotherapeutic conversations and mundane social interactions. Fourth, further research could expand upon existing studies of the ways discussing emotion can change across the psychotherapeutic process. Comparative and longitudinal studies are likely to yield insights that may help longstanding attempts to understand how psychotherapy might alleviate mental distress (Wampold and Imel 2015). An ongoing challenge for both conversation analytic (Ruuusuori 2013; Sorjonen and Peräkylä 2012) and psychotherapeutic research (Burum and Goldfried 2007; Greenberg and Paivio 1997) is understanding emotion in ways that will help to define it more clearly. Additional research is also likely to afford opportunities to address this ongoing challenge.

7 Conclusions

Language-based approaches to studying psychotherapy, such as conversation analysis highlight how the therapeutic process is managed in and through social interactions between therapists and clients. The practices that shape these interactions routinely involve one of the key concerns of psychotherapy: emotion. The research reviewed in this chapter explores ways language and emotion intersect within psychotherapeutic interaction. It establishes how emotion can be made relevant through assemblages of verbal, vocal, and embodied conduct. This research also shows how therapists use a range of practices to

orient to emotion. Finally, it suggests that the ways emotion is discussed, especially when clients and therapists express divergent perspectives about the client's emotional experience, can be a crucial part of the therapeutic process. Such findings highlight the importance of focusing on the details of naturally occurring therapeutic encounters to better understanding the role of language and emotion within psychotherapy.

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8 Appendix: Transcription symbols

Example	Explanation
Wo[rd]	Square brackets mark speaker overlap. Left brackets indicate overlap onset and
[Wo]rd	right brackets indicate overlap offset.
Word=word	An equals sign indicates absence of discernible silence between two utterances.
Word (0.4) word	A number within parentheses refers to silence, which is measured to the nearest tenth of a second.
Word (.) word	A period within parentheses indicates a micropause of less than two-tenths of a second.
Word.	A period indicates falling intonation at the end of a unit of talk.
Word,	A comma indicates slightly rising intonation.
Word?	A question mark indicates highly rising intonation.
Word	Underlining indicates emphasis on the underlined sounds.
Wo:::rd	Colons indicate stretching of the immediately preceding sound, with multiple colons representing prolonged stretching.
W↑ord	An upward arrow marks a sharp increased pitch shift, which begins in the syllable following the arrow.
W↓ord	A downward arrow marks a sharp decreased pitch shift, which begins in the syllable following the arrow.
WORD	Upper case indicates talk produced at a louder volume than surrounding utterances by the same speaker.
°Word°	Words encased in degree signs indicate utterances produced at a lower volume than surrounding talk.
>Word<	Words encased with greater-than followed by less-than symbols indicate talk produced at a faster pace than surrounding talk.

(continued)

Example	Explanation
<Word>	Words encased with less-than followed by greater-than symbols indicate talk produced at a slower pace than surrounding talk.
Wor-	A hyphen indicates an abrupt termination in the pronunciation of the preceding sound.
£Word£	Pound signs encase utterances produced with smile voice.
#Word#	Number signs encase utterances produced with creaky voice.
.hhh	A period followed by the letter 'h' indicates audible inhalation, with more letters indicating longer inhalation.
(Word)	Words encased in single parentheses indicate an utterance that was unclear to the transcriptionist.
((Word))	Words encased in double parentheses indicate a transcriptionist's comment. Sometimes this is used to describe a participant's conduct (e.g., lip smacking).

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101 Embodied language in experiential therapy

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Abstract: Starting in infancy, robust bonds begin to form between experience and language, as humans begin, crudely at first, then with increasing subtlety and complexity, to symbolize their experiences of self, other and the world in words. A dynamic interplay of felt-experience and the expression of that experience, i.e., its representation, evolves over a lifetime. Yet trauma and emotional suffering disrupt and sometimes even break that bi-directional flow. In therapy, we witness distinct shifts in language as clients move through a variety of emotional states, and move from emotional suffering to healing. Accelerated Experiential Dynamic Psychotherapy (AEDP) is an experiential, emotion-focused mind/body therapeutic model that harnesses the power of safety and secure attachment in the therapeutic dyad in order to guide clients through waves of intense, feared and thus split-off emotional experiences. Accelerated Experimental Dynamic Psychotherapy uses experience-near, embodied language to stay true to the experiential essence of its methodology. As clients shift from traumatized, defended, anxious, or shame-soaked states to increasingly open, connected, full-bodied contact with a wide range of emotions, so too does their language evolve to reflect the transformations of emotional processing. In this chapter, we track vivid changes in language content, prosody, rhythm, attunement, metaphor, imagery, silence, and lyricism as clients move from dissociation, dysregulation and defenses, into deep, embodied contact with self, other, and emotion. Furthermore, we explore how AEDP psychotherapists utilize experience-near language to effect emotional state changes within the dyad. In this way, language is not only a mirror of, but also a vehicle for, healing transformation.

1 Introduction

Very often, when speaking of deep emotional experiences, reference is made to the limitations of language – “more than words can express”, “where language can’t go” – particu-

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larly when those experiences are profound, emotional, mystical and/or aesthetic. Based on our clinical experience with Accelerated Experiential Dynamic Psychotherapy (AEDP), a healing-oriented, relational, experiential, transformational therapy, we beg to differ: we will show that the capacity to express deep emotional states in language is not limited to poets, but actually becomes the province of all humans engaged in the process of transformative healing change.

Accelerated Experimental Dynamic Psychotherapy is an experiential mind/body treatment that seeks to entrain patients' positive neuroplastic potential (Hanson 2017; Hanson and Hanson 2018) to heal trauma and attachment trauma (Fosha 2000, 2017; Fosha et al. 2009; Gleiser 2013; Gleiser, Ford, and Fosha 2008; Lamagna and Gleiser 2007; Russell 2015). *Experientially* refers to an intensive focus on present-tense internal experience, especially affective experience as it arises in the body, encouraging clients' attention to it, and then proceeding to work with it. The goal of Accelerated Experimental Dynamic Psychotherapy is to help patients first access and then process difficult emotional and relational experiences that heretofore were feared to be unbearable. Through the in-depth processing, patients are helped to recover their sense of core self and experience increased resilience and renewed zest for life.

In working with patients to help heal trauma and transform their emotional suffering, Accelerated Experimental Dynamic Psychotherapy tracks and fosters an unfolding of transformational experience that goes through four states of emotional processing, each with its own characteristic phenomenology and linguistic markers. This four-state phenomenology (which is described in greater detail below) reveals an arc that organically links suffering with flourishing, negative emotion with positive emotion, and languishing with resilience (Fosha 2009b, 2017; Fosha, Thoma, and Yeung 2019).

In going through this process, language can function as a vehicle for either dissociation, i.e., separating the spoken word from body, emotion and experience, or for connecting body and mind in healing. The key is embodiment, i.e., the individual's access to somatically based emotional states and thus the rootedness of language in bodily-based emotional experience (Lakoff and Johnson 1980). As individuals move through progressive states of emotional processing, AEDP psychotherapists closely track the respectively distancing/disconnecting/obfuscating or expressive/integrative/connecting role that language plays. The therapeutic goal is to bypass defense-driven states where language is disconnected from body and emotional experience, in order to gain direct access to visceral, somatically rooted emotional experiences, which, when fully processed, usher in integrative states. As previously dissociated experiences are processed and integrated in this transformational process, increasingly, language and its role in the therapeutic process change: experience-near words and unique idiosyncratic language emerge from within the embodied experience to communicate to self and other. Furthermore, the putting into language of felt experience leads to new embodied experiences, which in turn lead to the emergence of more new language, and so on. The integration that results from zigzagging between (a) bodily based emotional experience and (b) its expression in experience-near, embodied language often leads to integrative states characterized by, at times, almost elegiac language – rich in imagery, vivid metaphors, rhythmic prosody and poetic expression – in which deep meaning and new truths are expressed. In Accelerated Experimental Dynamic Psychothera-

py, we track changes in language function, content, prosody, rhythm, metaphor, imagery, silence, and lyricism as clients move from (i) dissociation, dysregulation and defenses, into (ii) deep, embodied contact with emotional experience, and then, as that experience of emotion is thoroughly processed, to (iii) embodied integrative experiences of self, other, deep insight and personal truth.

In Part 2 of this chapter, we will review ideas from both psychology and neuroscience about the relationship between language and emotion. We briefly examine how language and emotion interact and are construed in six realms that affect our understanding of the role of language in emotion processing and transformation: (a) the role of emotion-specific language in emotion regulation; (b) the experience-near language of the experiential therapies; (c) the insula-mediated bodily based *felt sense* of emotional experience; (d) dyadic affect regulation in trauma; (e) trauma and language; and (f) the role of language in healing, i.e., putting positive neuroplasticity into clinical action. In Part 3, we introduce basic aspects of Accelerated Experimental Dynamic Psychotherapy. In Part 4, we describe the phenomenology specific to each of the four states of the transformational process, discuss the language features that characterize each of the four states and give clinical examples of each state to illustrate our deeply relational, experiential, transformational Accelerated Experimental Dynamic Psychotherapy therapy.

What both interests and excites us is that we are not *only* describing here how language *reflects* the mental state of the patient, expressing either pathology and the effects of trauma, or alternately, healing and the beneficial effects of therapy. We also want to show that *language itself*, much maligned language, actually plays a role in *facilitating integration* in the transformational process. Thus, language does not only capture the process of change, and its moment-to-moment fluctuations thereof; when language is embodied and stays experience-near, far from interfering or obfuscating, it actually plays an essential role in the transformational process.

2 Emotion, language and the brain in development, trauma and healing: A partial and highly selective overview

2.1 The role of emotion-specific language in emotion regulation

Each of the fields of emotion, language and change processes in therapy encompasses a massive literature, not to mention considerations of their complex neurobiological and phenomenological interplay. In lieu of comprehensive review of each disparate field, we will focus on a convergent overview of a model that posits an integrative framework for considering how emotion and language processes interact in the brain (see Brooks et al. [2017] for a more comprehensive summary) and how those interactions can be harnessed in the service of healing change in psychotherapy (Jonathan Baylin, pers. comm., 2018).

From the perspective of a psychological constructivist model of language and emotion, emotion words, such as “anger” or “surprise”, are not merely labels of emotional states,

but are actually constitutive elements of such states. When the brain perceives and registers environmental stimuli, it makes an initial neuroceptive assessment of relative safety or danger as a general, bottom-up feeling state (Porges 2011). Then a top-down process of category refinement, known as *conceptualization* stemming from semantic knowledge that is largely language-mediated, complements and enhances the initial feeling state (Lindquist and Barrett 2008). Translating this into what we know about the neurobiology of emotion, (a) an embodied, subcortically generated feeling state (Damasio 1999), together with (b) an insula-mediated felt sense (Craig 2002, 2005), is integrated with (c) a more cortically mediated process of semantic identification to create a more reliably felt and known emotional state. This self-recognized state then prepares the individual for adaptive action and execution. A recent meta-analysis of 386 neuroimaging studies (Brooks et al. 2017) found support for the authors' hypothesis that emotion-specific words, like anger and sadness, evoked distinct neural representations that tap into semantic processing regions of the brain, thus fostering more regulated experiences; in contrast, general affect words, like "pleasant" or "unpleasant", tend to activate the amygdala and parahippocampal gyrus, and are indicative of more ambiguous and potentially more dysregulated feeling states. There are important implications for emotional regulation here: once an activated affective state is named, the arousal valence decreases in a kind of *de facto* affective regulation process (Lieberman et al. 2011).

The meta-analysis of Brooks et al. (2017), as well as the work of Lieberman et al. (2011), Pennebaker (Pennebaker and Beall 1986; Hughes et al. 1994), and Wardecker (2016; Wardecker et al. 2017) all provide support for the idea that the integration of emotional experience with language can be an effective tool in regulating emotion (see also Dana and Porges [2018] for the importance of naming emotional states from the perspective of Polyvagal Theory). Using a technique developed by Pennebaker, Wardecker (2016; Wardecker et al. 2017) studied the written trauma narratives of survivors of child sexual abuse and found that those who spontaneously made use of specific emotion words, both positive and negative, had better psychological outcomes, especially when the abuse was more severe.

A similar finding comes from a now empirically validated understanding that mindfulness practice downregulates the amygdala: "The activation of the amygdala can be down-regulated through simply noting your own experience through mindfulness practice. Literally just naming anger, rage, or trauma increases processing in the prefrontal cortex, the executive system of the brain, and down-regulates activation of the amygdala" (Hanson 2017: 54).

As Accelerated Experimental Dynamic Psychotherapy clinicians, we further refine this suggestion by showing that language interacts with emotion in many ways, and that the regulation of emotion by language can have negative or positive effects, depending on the context: for instance, in the early stages of the transformational process, a focus on language and higher cognitive processes can be a vehicle for squashing emotional experience, as we see in the defense mechanisms of intellectualization, isolation of affect, and reaction formation (Freud 1977), as well in as the mechanism of dissociation (Lanius et al. 2010). However, language can also enhance the regulation of emotional experience in a positive adaptive way, and thus contribute to the adaptive functioning and well-being of the individual. In that latter case, language can be a tool for either down-regulating (i.e., calming)

emotional distress, or up-regulating (i.e., amplifying) adaptive, healing emotions. Furthermore, as we will explore in later sections of this chapter when we talk about the role of language in emotional processing in experiential therapy, *affective labeling* or finding a verbal *handle* for the felt sense of an experience (Gendlin 1981, 1996) can be used either by the patient to clarify and deepen a feeling state or an adaptive emotion, or by the therapist, as part the process of dyadic regulation, to bring a patient into deeper contact with healing emotion, or to regulate distressing, disorganizing affect states.

2.2 The experience-near language of experiential therapies: embodiment and the felt sense

As we said earlier, often, when speaking of deep emotional experiences, reference is made to the limitations of language to do justice to emotional, spiritual or aesthetic experience. We believe this to be an unfortunate result of ignoring the deep wisdom of the experiential therapies that have put into action, in a systematic and replicable fashion, what poets and artists do intuitively. The experiential methodology (Gendlin 1991, 1996; Greenberg 2002; Levine 2010; Cornell 2013) that psychotherapists harness to bring about transformational change needs experience-near and emotion-rich language (Lakoff and Johnson 1980). Through the judicious and intentional use of experience-near, evocative, image-based language rather than abstract, construct-based language, therapists help patients come into contact with their embodied, felt-experience where they have access to their emotions. This often entails the therapist's intentionally shifting their own expression from a logical, cognitive, explanatory language style to a more richly evocative, embodied one, employing much simpler language as well as enlivening and colorful metaphor and imagery.

Another shift involves manipulating prosody, the paraverbal aspects of language. By s-l-o-w-i-n-g down the flow of speech and introducing more rhythmic, meditative cadences and feelingful emotional textures, we activate the resonance circuits of the brain (Siegel 2010, 2017) and entrain the social engagement system of the autonomic nervous system (Dana and Porges 2018; Porges 2011). We thus initiate a shift, likely undergirded by the autonomic nervous system's social engagement system and mediated by mirror neurons (Iacoboni 2009) in the patient's brain into another brain state, one more conducive to the accessing and processing of deep bodily based emotion. The *felt sense* (Gendlin 1981, 1996) is an important construct here, central in Accelerated Experimental Dynamic Psychotherapy, as in all experiential therapies. A term coined by Gendlin (1996), here is how he describes it:

A felt sense is a wholistic, implicit body sense of a complex situation [...] A felt sense contains a maze of meanings, a whole textile of facets, a Persian rug of patterning – more than could be said or thought. Despite its intricacy, the whole felt sense has a focus, a single specific demand, direction or point. (Gendlin 1996: 58)

A felt sense is not a mental experience but a physical one. *Physical*. A bodily awareness of a situation or person or event. An internal aura that encompasses everything you feel and know about a given subject at a given time – encompasses it and communicates it to you all at once, rather than detail by detail. Think of it as a taste, if you like, or a great musical chord that makes you feel a powerful impact. (Gendlin 1981: 32)

And Sills (2001) on Gendlin:

This is the embodied realm of the felt sense. It is within this body space that access to the embodied meaning of our experience can be accessed. The focusing process will only work if you have a relationship to the feeling tones held within this body space. It is where the ‘all-about-ness’ or the ‘whole of something’ is held and experienced. To paraphrase the Buddha, when your awareness is held *within* your body space, you can be with the feeling tone *within* the feeling tone (i.e., not dissociated from it). (Sills 2001: 373)

2.3 Emotions, embodied experience and the insula-mediated felt sense

There is a burgeoning understanding in the last two decades of how the brain processes emotion, how trauma affects emotional processing, as well as how healing and trauma resolution happen and manifest in the brain (Fosha, Siegel, and Solomon 2009). In conversation with these emergent understandings, we subscribe to a view of emotion as subcortically generated and invariably involving the body (Damasio 1999, 2003; Panksepp 2009; Panksepp and Biven 2012). Emotional experience is indeed co-extensive with bodily-rooted experience. The insula (Craig 2002, 2005), master organ of interoception, plays a central role in integrating all brain aspects of emotion and delivering them and their fluctuations, moment-to-moment, in an integrated way, in what Craig (2009) called Global Emotional Moments. Embodied emotional experience can be understood as moments of felt sense of experience, fully knowing that that emotional experience and the felt sense of it fluctuate moment to moment.

2.4 Dyadic affect regulation

From infancy through adulthood, emotions are regulated in the context of dyadic attachment relationships, beginning with the caregiver-infant dyad (Bowlby 1988, 1991; Schore 2009; Tronick 2009). From the first days of life, repeated patterns of how emotions are responded to, handled and regulated, are being co-created in the caregiver-infant dyad: these become representational schemas of interactions which become internalized as the individual’s affect regulatory repertoire. Unless transformed by subsequent experiences, these schemas operate throughout an individual’s lifespan. They are both language- and emotion-mediated, as the patterns are laid down with verbal and nonverbal elements (i.e., a flash of anger or compassion on the caregiver’s face; a soft, supportive murmur; or critical, biting dig and the respective emotional states and self-representations each differentially evokes). This dynamic highlights the importance of doing deep experiential emotional processing work within a safe, supportive, affect-facilitating dyad where new, healthier, more secure templates for dyadic regulation can be co-created (Fosha 2013). The Adult Attachment Interview is an instrument where one can reliably know an individual’s attachment style by the rhetorical features of the language s/he uses to speak about emotionally laden events. The ground-breaking research of Mary Main, Peter Fonagy, and their colleagues into attachment and metacognition using the Adult Attachment Interview demon-

strates empirically what we know clinically (Fonagy et al. 1991, 1994; Main 1995, 1999): while insecurity of attachment is associated with compromised language styles (overly verbose, underproductive or disorganized), language and representations become increasingly coherent and cohesive with more secure attachment.

2.5 Trauma and language

The explosive growth in the field of neuroscience extends to how trauma impacts the brain (Frewen and Lanius 2015; Teicher and Samson 2016; van der Kolk 2015). In the brains of individuals who are depressed and/or traumatized, we see different and more disorganized or compromised patterns of activation. To name only a few: in post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), Broca's area is deactivated and language shuts down (Bremner 1999, 2006; Liberzon et al. 1999; Rauch et al. 1996; Shin et al. 1999; van der Kolk 2015); the corpus callosum is compromised (Teicher and Samson 2016) and thus the flow of information between the hemispheres is compromised; also, studies also found decreased volumes of the frontal cortex, including reduced anterior cingulate cortex, as well as stress-related decreases in the size of the hippocampus (Bremner 2006; Sherin and Nemeroff 2011; Shin, Rauch, and Pittman 2006), now being understood as playing a major role not only in memory but also in relating incoming words to stored semantic knowledge, necessary to understanding and generating sentence meaning (Sanders 2016). The compromised functioning of corpus callosum, frontal cortex, prefrontal cortex and hippocampus all contribute to decreased top-down regulation of the amygdala, and a lowered activation threshold for fear responses (Sherin and Nemeroff 2011); and thus decreased regulatory power for language. With more subcortical amygdala driven affect, language becomes constrained to briefer, less complex, sentences, replete with more fear-driven words: thus challenged, prosody is affected, semantic and declarative memory are affected, regulatory capacity is affected, embodiment is affected, as is the capacity to self-reflect and tell a coherent story of oneself (Brand et al. 2012). This partial and brief account hints at the complexity involved in an understanding of what is happening neurobiologically in our patients with trauma histories whose language is fragmented, disorganized, and incoherent – and disembodied.

2.6 Healing and language

We live in times where our understanding of healing, transformation, and positive neuroplasticity is also exponentially expanding (Doidge 2007, 2016; Hanson 2009, 2017; Hanson and Hanson 2018; Lazar et al. 2005; Spalding et al. 2013; Vestergaard-Paulsen et al. 2009). Not only do we know about how the brain processes emotion (Damasio 2003; Panksepp 2009), and how that functioning is compromised by trauma (Frewen and Lanius 2015; van der Kolk 2015), we also now know that neuroplasticity, and more to the point positive neuroplasticity, is a lifelong process which operates from the cradle to the grave. Processes by which trauma and emotional suffering heal invariably involve integration (Siegel 2010, 2017); more nuanced emotion-based language has a lot to do with the bidirectional commu-

nication between the insula, involved in the generation of the felt sense, and the anterior cingulate, involved in relational prosody (Jonathan Baylin, pers. comm., 2018). Whereas in trauma we have dys-regulation, dis-connection and dis-sociation, in healing we have regulation, integration and re-connection. Furthermore, Accelerated Experimental Dynamic Psychotherapy has also articulated a detailed phenomenology of the transformational process (Fosha 2017) that allows the systematic tracking of the process of change and healing.

In the following section, we sketch a brief overview of Accelerated Experimental Dynamic Psychotherapy in order to contextualize the four states of emotional processing and how language expression evolves and transforms across these states.

3 On Accelerated Experimental Dynamic Psychotherapy

Accelerated Experiential Dynamic Therapy is a healing-oriented, mind/body psychotherapy (Fosha 2000, 2013, 2017, 2009a, 2009b; Fosha et al. 2009; Gleiser, Ford, and Fosha 2008) that puts positive neuroplasticity into systematic action (Yeung and Fosha 2015). Accelerated Experimental Dynamic Psychotherapy aims to undo aloneness to transform emotional suffering (Fosha 2000) and set in motion resilience and transformational processes of flourishing (Fosha 2017; Russell 2015). We seek to build a case that *embodied language* is (i) an intentional tool AEDP psychotherapists employ to awaken and harness the power of positive neuroplasticity, (ii) a mirror reflecting the unfolding cascade of transformations as patients move through deep emotional processing, and (iii) a tool/vehicle for further integration and transformation. Accelerated Experimental Dynamic Psychotherapy, with its double helix of explicit attachment and emotional processing interventions, is an ideal lens through which to explore the beautifully nuanced relationship of emotion and language as they play out in a transformational experiential psychotherapy.

Unlike traditional models of therapy that are psychopathology-based, Accelerated Experimental Dynamic Psychotherapy roots itself in *transformance* (Fosha 2008), a construct fundamental to its optimistic, healing orientation. Transformance is the innate motivational drive toward healing, growth and self-repair present in all of us (Yeung and Fosha 2015); it constitutes positive neuroplasticity in therapeutic action. The transformance drive, which comes to the fore in conditions of safety, is marked, moment-to-moment, by positive affective/somatic markers. It is the motivational counterpart of resistance, which comes to the fore in conditions of threat and stress. Whereas resistance eventuates in disorganization, deterioration and languishing, transformance eventuates in resilience, expansiveness, complexity and flourishing. As we illustrate in the next section, the rhythm, prosody and content of language are vital elements of how we track the shift from resistance to transformance and track emergent glimmers of resilience and motivation.

Grounded firmly in affective neuroscience, attachment and intersubjectivity (Bowlby 1988; Lyons-Ruth 2006; Panksepp 2009), Accelerated Experimental Dynamic Psychotherapy seeks to heal trauma by championing the innate healing capacity of neuroplasticity in a safe, attached therapeutic relationship. Accelerated Experimental Dynamic Psychotherapy's transformational practices blossom because they are rooted in a positive, embodied, attachment-informed and intersubjectively engaged therapeutic relationship that seeks to

replicate “the sociobiology of kin-recognition, secure attachment, limbic resonance, mammalian caregiving, and early development” (Loizzo 2017: 188). The Accelerated Experimental Dynamic Psychotherapy psychotherapist strives to experientially engage the client from the get-go, so that, together, they can co-create a safe dyadic environment in which challenging emotional experiences – both negative and positive – can be accessed, experienced, and worked through.

A crucial element of Accelerated Experimental Dynamic Psychotherapy is *emotional processing*, which involves experiencing core affects like grief, pain, anger, and compassion for self, with the fundamental goal of helping the patient process emotion to completion, that is, to fully experience and master them (Fosha 2004, 2013). An equally crucial, and unique, element of Accelerated Experimental Dynamic Psychotherapy is *metatherapeutic processing*, which is the processing of transformational experience leading to further upward spirals of resilience and flourishing (Fosha 2017; Russell 2015). Through the moment-to-moment, in-depth processing of difficult emotional, relational and transformational experiences, patients are helped to recover their sense of core self and experience increased resilience and renewed zest for life.

4 The nimble dance of feelings and words: Emotional processing to completion, the meta-processing of transformational experience and shifts in self-expression

Because evolution has wired emotion and other affective processes of transformation into our brains, bodies and nervous systems, when an individual is properly supported, full experiential processing of each emotion has a positive conclusion: the release of the resilience and adaptive tendencies that are wired into the emotions (Damasio 2003; Darwin 1872; Frijda 1986). Trauma and insufficient support for dyadic affect-regulation interfere with that natural adaptive process, and we seek to redress the balance. The methodology of Accelerated Experimental Dynamic Psychotherapy has client and therapist emotionally engaged, moment to moment tracking fluctuations in affective experience, energy, somatic contact, and connection, thereby undoing the aloneness that necessitated banishing feared emotional experience to begin with. Within the field of safety co-constructed by the dyad, the focus of the work is on helping the client access, process and work through previously overwhelming emotional experiences, through a variety of experiential emotion-processing techniques (Fosha 2000, 2004, 2017), until there is a shift from a negative affective valence (“something doesn’t feel good”) to a positive affective valence (“something feels good”). The emergence of positive affect signals the release of resilience and other adaptive action tendencies which are the hallmark of successfully processed adaptive emotions (Fosha 2000, 2004; Russell and Fosha 2008).

Accelerated Experimental Dynamic Psychotherapy is relentlessly experiential in its technique. It uses experiential work with relational experience to co-create safety and

transform relational experience (Fosha 2009a; Lamagna 2011; Lipton and Fosha 2011; Pando-Mars 2011, 2016; Prenn 2011), and uses a four-state phenomenology of the transformational process which, moment-to-moment, guides the work (Fosha 2009a, 2009b, 2017). Accelerated Experimental Dynamic Psychotherapy's transformational phenomenology differentiates between (a) defense-dominated states, (b) states where there is embodied somatic access to adaptive affective change processes, and (c) states where transformational processes can take hold and evolve. In this section, we trace how language morphs, transforms and evolves as therapist-patient dyads move through the four states of emotional processing.

Language is a key transformative tool through which the experiential techniques are expressed and enacted – both verbal and paraverbal aspects of it. For after all, we promote experience but do so primarily through spoken communication. The AEDP psychotherapist can vary pace, tone, prosody to help people (i) down-regulate when agitated or dysregulated; (ii) up-regulate when dissociated or shut down; (iii) drop down further into embodied experience; (iv) feel affectively matched to enhance resonance and undo aloneness; and (v) mirror and amplify or reflect the unfolding transformation. Varying and making use of embodied language, evocative by virtue of being rich in imagery and metaphor, can similarly contribute to advancing the experiential work. Embodied, bottom-up, “right brain” language (short hand for language that’s simple, concrete, rich in images and far away from abstraction and intellectualization) helps with establishing resonances and in general accessing rich regulated states of embodied experience. Furthermore, language can also be a transformative tool for organizing experience. The research of Mary Main (1995, 1999) and Peter Fonagy (Fonagy et al. 1991) shows how having a cohesive and coherent autobiographical narrative is an essential aspect of secure attachment, which in turn is linked with resilience in the face of trauma (Fonagy et al. 1995). Other therapies, including narrative therapy (White and Epston 1990) and even prolonged exposure (Foa, Hembree, and Rothbaum 2007) construct (and, in the case of prolonged exposure, repetitively recite) cohesive autobiographical narratives of trauma and stressful events as an active therapeutic component.

Accelerated Experimental Dynamic Psychotherapy is characterized by detailed phenomenological descriptions of the four states that characterize the transformational process. This transformational phenomenology functions as both map and compass, helping therapists orient themselves as to where they are and guiding them as to where they need to go as they aim for maximal effectiveness.

The moment-to-moment guidance of clinical practice by the phenomenology of four states of the transformational process is foundational to Accelerated Experimental Dynamic Psychotherapy. The flow chart in Figure 102.1 identifies the phenomena that characterize each of the four states. We will describe and illustrate with clinical examples these four distinct states of the transformational process, with an emphasis on the linguistic features and properties – both verbal and paraverbal – of each state. What we wish to emphasize is that language is both a mirror for and a vehicle of transformation – a mirror for what is happening inside the patient, as well as a catalyst for further integration, transformation and healing. This latter both because of the organizing and binding aspects of language (Brooks et al. 2017) for the patients themselves, i.e., the transformative process that occurs internally when inchoate experience acquires shape and structure through language

The Phenomenology of the Four-State Transformational Process in AEDP




Fig. 102.1: Phenomenology of the transformational process.

(Gendlin 1996); and also, as a result of the therapist's use of language – both verbal/content and paraverbal aspects – to help shift the patient's state/experience toward more transformative states.

4.1 State 1: distress, stress, symptoms, disconnection and language as mask

Our chart begins with how our clients arrive, with emotional suffering and demoralization, along with transformance and hope side by side with trauma. State 1 is a place of stuckness, stress and distress, resulting from both the success (hyper-regulation) and failure (dysregulation) of defenses and from the inhibiting affects, such as anxiety, shame, that power them. Expressing the same phenomenon neurobiologically: in dissociation we witness the clinical sequelae of the cortical inhibition of limbic responsiveness (Lanius et al. 2010), whereas PTSD results from amygdala over-activation and decreased activation of medial prefrontal cortex, orbitofrontal cortex, and corpus callosum (Sherin and Nemeroff 2011; Teicher and Samson 2016). Side by side with the sequelae of trauma and defense-dominated functioning, we also see transformance phenomena, i.e., glimmers of resilience, health, motivation, genuine emotion, yearning to heal. The goal of State 1 work is to co-construct relational and emotional safety, privilege transformance manifestations, and minimize the impact of defenses and inhibiting affects so as to help our patients “drop down” into embodied, somatically based affect states, where they can be in contact with emotions that previously were too overwhelming to be dealt with alone. With aloneness undone through the co-created therapeutic relationship and active dyadic affect regulation, what could not be processed alone previously can begin to be dyadically processed in the here-and-now.

Patients' language expression in State 1 tends to reflect either the disconnection and/or disorientation of their emotional state. Manifestations can range from a paucity of expression and awkward, prolonged silences, to a “wall of words”, which, instead of conveying emotional content, serves to create a barrier to connection with their internal experience. Key tactical defenses – unconscious strategies meant to keep distress at bay – are often linguistic: vagueness, tangentiality, pressured speech, casual chatting, monotone voice, lack of prosody or affect while disclosing traumas. Furthermore, intellectualization, dry, barren, empty, repetitive husk-like narratives all serve to maintain distance from painful, avoided experiences. Language in State 1, instead of being a bridge to relational intimacy and connection with internal experience, functions as a mask, hiding the distress harbored beneath.

The following excerpts from actual therapy sessions illustrate language as mask and language as disconnection. (Hereinafter Patient and Therapist will be abbreviated as Pt. and Th.)

- (1) Example of State 1: vagueness, avoidance of relational contact
Th: Hi, welcome.
Pt: (long silence)

Th: How are you doing?

Pt: I had a long drive in the rain, I enjoyed that.
(a little later)

Th: Do you have an initial sense of me? [invitation to relational engagement]

Pt: (sigh)

Th: I notice you sigh. Do you have an initial sense?

Pt: Like a gut reaction?

Th: That's perfect.

Pt: I like the color of your shirt ... no, not really ... [invitation declined] my mind wonders, it is difficult to stay in the moment, my mind is wandering, I am daydreaming, thinking about what I am going to do later.

Th: Ok so if you notice anything else, lemme know [setting collaboration in motion].

Pt: (laughs) It's hard to do [resists collaboration gambit] ... In meditation ... Just letting your mind wander ... My mind is going to a shopping list.

(2) Example of State 1: overly concrete, disorganization

Th: So, what I would like to start with is just the kind of problems that are bringing you to seek help. And then we'll see where we go.

Pt: Anything? Now it's just anxiety ... And it is weird because for the past year I have been crying at everything. Like right now, I am just getting teary-eyed and I don't know why. I'm not really ... I'm just, things are just worn out but ...

Th: Do you have a sense ... if you focus on the tears, where the tears are coming from? [attempt at anxiety regulation by shifting patient to internal focus]

Pt: It is all right there, in my sinuses. My sinuses are bad anyway right now ... I've always had anxiety, since I can remember. Since I was 16, probably. I've had it. I've done a lot of control breathing and stress classes and stuff like that. To help relieve it. And it is working out a little bit. But I still ... [still in disconnected narrative mode, resisting connection to present experience]

Th: Some ... Some things are helping a bit. Yeah. So, you're still having to contend with a lot of kind of disrupting feelings.

Pt: Yeah, I guess. [pt gets disconnected, blanks out]

Th: No? Let me back up, and you tell it to me, as you feel it.

Pt: Ok, because when I get nervous and everything too it's like my brain goes out the window. And I can't really remember what someone said two seconds ago. [dissociation] And then it's like I lose IQ points. Because half the words you're saying to me ... sometimes, I can't remember what they mean.

Th: That's so hard ... [empathy]

Pt: It is hard to really register in my head what you're actually asking me. And that's what happens when I get nervous. And I have to ... if I'm in an argument, with my significant other or something, I have to ... It takes me a while to respond to him. Because I have to stop and think what he said, process it, then respond to it. By that time he tells me why I'm not saying anything. Or just, "don't talk if you" ... "Don't sit here if you're not going to talk to me."

Th: Right.

Pt: That's kind of weird. I don't like that.

As these transcripts illustrate, when patients are in State 1, therapists can feel cut off, as though watching a person struggle and suffer, just out of reach. When patients are in defensive states of aloneness and alienation, the AEDP psychotherapist seeks opportunities, small and subtle at first, to bind language to present-moment felt experience, for glimmers of transformance are just as much a part of State 1 as the defensiveness and the disorganization. Always on the look-out for, and privileging them when we detect them, AEDP psychotherapists are “transformance detectives”, who upon detecting the transformance glimmers, engage in a practice we call “notice and seize” (Frederick 2009). Often this means first slowing people down, to circumvent pressured speech, and distracted, superficial, disconnected language output, and beginning to draw their attention to emotional or somatic experiences as well as put words on those experiences. This may be as simple as just naming a felt emotion or experience, or as complex as focusing on an experience and describing the sensations vividly, including how they shift upon being noticed.

(3) State 1: example of the detection of transformance glimmers, and the transition from State 1 to State 2

Pt: Yeah, I'm kind of going to bring you from the ground up. Sometimes responsibilities, responsibilities come with suffering and then the kind of position I'm here right now from an African perception. I'm more or less the head of the family 'cuz I'm the only male of the family so which comes with responsibility.

Th: Tremendous responsibility. [empathy]

Pt: Yes, 'cuz it comes with ... and, you know, the responsibilities come with conflicts and conflict sometimes leads to a lot of stress, because I'm more or less carrying everybody's burden.

Th: So, just as we're starting, I am really just very struck by your openness with me, your directness and I also see that you've given this a lot of thought, so I really appreciate that. [transformance detection]

Pt: Yes. 'cuz it's been like in my family right now, I have two siblings and they are females. I'm the only male and from an African perspective we believe the male is the ... They believe the male in the house is responsible for both the success and the failures of a family ...

Th: That puts a lot of pressure on you. [empathy]

Pt: Yeah. I'm the first born. So you know I have uncles that are out here that [need help]. Everybody look upon me for support, assistance in every possible way. So I'm that kind of ...

Th: Sounds like a big ... heavy burden that you're carrying. [empathy]

Pt: Yes, 'cuz right now, you know, when the phone rings sometimes I'm tempted not to pick it up 'cuz most times it's, you know, somebody needs this, somebody needs that, can you do this, can you do that. Somebody needs that, can you do this, can you do that. And you know, when we first started, you know, thinking, you know, responsibility, looking at it in a positive way that you know is what kind of, you know, builds in mind. But I later found out, you know, there are just too many stresses that, you know, that comes with it. Yeah, I remember that I've been out here almost about 17 years.

- Th: Wow!
- Pt: Yeah. My siblings that came through me, I was able to put them through. You know, they have their doctorate degrees now. Yeah. Yeah, I've been helping. Them ...
- Th: I see. So you've been helping them, and they have their degrees.
- Pt: Yeah. Yes. I'm kind of just, you know ... Stagnant. Yeah. [transformation glimmer: emotionally evocative word]
- Th: Stagnant? [notice and seize]
- Pt: Yeah.
- Th: So, let me tell you one of the things that I like to pay attention to, all right. That you're describing this very difficult situation and we now got to this, you know, this sense of burden and now that it feels stagnant. [notice and seize]
- Pt: Yeah.
- Th: All right, and I just see that as you're telling me there's a heaviness. You know, what I want us to sort of look at is go from the big perspective more to your experience, and how you've been affected by this?
- Pt: Yes. Sometimes ... yeah.
- Th: So, I want to stay with stagnant.
- Pt: Yeah.
- Th: 'cuz that's a big word. [focus on big evocative word]
- Pt: Yes, it is. It is, because sometimes I look at it in this way that's, you know, that why do I just keep pleasing people around me? Yeah. I actively worked 12 years and I looked back and, you know, saw that there was nothing saved up.
- Th: So you're looking of what you've done taking care of other people.
- Pt: Yes.
- Th: And you're really starting to wonder what about yourself?
- Pt: Yes. And when I think about that ...
- Th: Yeah, go ahead. [encouraging]
- Pt: It hurts. [emotion word, gateway to State 2]

We seek to connect the language centers of the brain with the insula-mediated “felt-sense” (Craig 2002) and with right-brain and limbic mediated affective experiences (Schore 2009), to stimulate the greater activation of the corpus callosum and promote whole brain activation (Siegel 2010, 2017), thus beginning to knit together language and experience into a more embodied language. This represents the first state transformation: moving from defensive distress and dysregulation to connection with and beginning to access and express embodied emotional experience. As we saw in the last example, we move from quotidian language first to “stagnant” and then to the directness and vividness of “it hurts”.

4.2 State 2: core affective experiencing and the embodied language of emotional experience

State 2 is the state in which the emotional processing of adaptive affective experiences takes place. It involves accessing, experiencing, regulating, working through, and process-

ing to completion the patient's deep somatically based, wired-in core affective experiences. Core affective experiences include but are not limited to: *categorical emotions* of sadness, anger, fear, joy and disgust; *coordinated relational experiences*; *ego states and their associated emotions*; *attachment strivings*; *somatic "drop-down" states*; and *authentic self-states*. State 2 experiential work involves processing the negative affects associated with trauma and emotional suffering, and then gradually working them through until resilience and the adaptive action tendencies of the emotions are released. When a whole wave of emotional processing is completed, it is as if an alchemical change has taken place. The pain of suffering has been transformed into a positive experience. We see the release of *break-through affects*, i.e., experiences of relief, release and hope; and we also see the *adaptive action tendencies* wired into each emotion come online. The motivation to act on behalf of the self, which had been split off along with the core affects, can now come to the fore.

As patients move into and fully through State 2, remarkable shifts in language begin to emerge. Gone is the obfuscating quality: words become simpler, more direct, specific, embodied, connected to present-moment lived experience, thereby opening a pathway to deeper emotional experiencing. Language allows both patient and therapist to gaze out over and ultimately set foot within the rich landscape of core affective experiences, replete with healing potential, whether these core affective experiences be grief, anger, intimacy, or feeling helped, understood, or cared for. Therapists also use language as an amplifying tool to further deep emotion: i.e., if a patient says "hurt", the therapist might up the ante to "agony" if this feels resonant with the patient's experience. In State 2, language is the means to the end, the end being the deep and full experience of emotion. While language is more of a pathway in this state, the destination is coursing, empowering anger, waves of sobbing, the warmth of being understood by another. Words, like a clear pool, faithfully reflect the features of the emotional landscape. With a direct line to the limbic system, language can now be trusted.

Notice in the first example the therapist's explicitly encouraging the patient to put an incipient realization into words. Both of the next two examples also illustrate the taking of emotional processing to an adaptive completion, where a more complex and more integrated state emerges as a result of the processing of the formerly too-difficult-to-process emotion.

(4) State 2: example of processing deep affect, i.e., grief, leading to insight

Pt: And then I just think of what our relationship [hers with mom] is today and how it's me pursuing her, me trying to keep that relationship together because ...
(long pause, patient is crying deeply)

Th: Can you let me be with you as this deep pain comes up? [offer of relational support to undo aloneness]

Pt: She's alone (crying)

Th: Mmm hmm. [empathy, non-verbal accompaniment]

Pt: And I just realized that that's what I'm afraid of.

Th: Spell it out ... Just put into words what you just realized.

Pt: I continue to pursue her so that she's not alone.

Th: Mmm hmm.

- Pt: And I think that that's part of what keeps me in my marriage.
- Th: The fear ... the not wanting to end up like her.
- Pt: Yeah ... Yeah ... And I know that we're so different and chances are I wouldn't end up alone, but I just realized that's probably how it all connects.
- (5) State 2: example of processing intense different affects, i.e., anger and sadness, to their respective completions, followed by State 3, Metaprocessing and then, State 4, Core State
- Th: What came to mind when you said it reminds you of stuff with your brothers? I'd love to get an incident that sticks in your mind as, you know, one of those moments. [therapist asks for specific example to root the work in specificity]
- Pt: [tells an incident of being bullied by his older brother Rudy, who beat him up mercilessly when they were kids]
- Th: [instructions for portrayal: a tool to vividly evoke a past scene to heighten emotional connection to it, and create a new emotional experience]
- Th: Rudy ... OK ... What do you picture?
- Pt: Punching him in the face.
- Th: Let yourself viscerally just feel what your arms want to do...
- Pt: I feel really strong.
- Th: Um hm, and your legs want to do what? What does your whole body want to do ...
- Pt: I put all my power into the punch ... All it would take is one.
- Th: All it'd take is one. And then... [mirroring and encouraging]
- Pt: Yeah.
- Th: Okay so can we go just, go along for the ride and just play it out. What happens, what do you see?
- Pt: I see my fist hitting him in the face.
- Th: Your fist hits him in the face and then what happens to him?
- Pt: He goes down.
- Th: What does he look like?
- Pt: I don't know, I can't see him that well. Uh ... [soft defense]
- Th: First of all ...
- Pt: He looks ... he looks enraged and then I'm just waiting for him to get up ... Because if he gets up he will be sorry, very sorry.
- Th: Um hm, um hm, so what happens? We're tracking one thing, you know, this [smacks fist into her own palm] we want to sort of explore and enact until whatever this is about is satisfied ... whatever it takes.
- Pt: He's not going to get up. I think he realizes it's ... it's suicide to get up.
- Th: Um hm, because if he got up, then what?
- Pt: Then I'll hit him harder.
- Th: And harder and harder. Again, just feel what that fist wants to do; put your civilized man on the couch. Just let that go [smack smack] for a second. [intervention aimed at bypassing his tendency, in previous sessions, to censor himself]
- Pt: I'm ... I'm starting to feel sorry for him.
- Th: What's coming up?

- Pt: I just feel sorry for him, you know; I don't ... he hurt me and hurting him back is, it's you know, it's just endless rounds of violence, it's not good. It doesn't heal anything so ...
- Th: Okay, take your cortex, put it on the couch, just go with the feeling, stay with the feelings because there's some ... [intervention aimed at bypassing his tendency, in previous sessions, to intellectualize]
- Pt: Sadness.
- Th: there is sadness coming up.
- Pt: Yeah.
- Th: If you look at him on the floor, what does his face look like? Cuz you said, you know, if he gets up one more time, it's suicide. What do you see? It's now, you know there's still something in your fist, I think. [I'm] not a hundred percent sure we're done with that.
- Pt: Right, I'm aware my jaw is tight too.
- Th: Okay, so been this rising up of sadness; there's some grief there. It's also very deep ...
- Pt: Yeah, because I, because I hurt him. I mean, he hurt me, but ...
- Th: Um hm, from this place of grief, it's from the belly or from the heart, what do you say to him? What do you want to say? Or what do you want to do? [now that the anger has been processed, and it gave rise to another emotion, grief, this intervention is aimed at now also processing the grief]
- Pt: I wanna help him up.
- Th: Um huh. How would you do that?
- Pt: I held out my hand.
- Th: Um huh, does he take it?
- Pt: [crying]
- Th: Just let it come.
- Pt: He apologized.
- Th: He apologized. There's such depth of feeling in ...
- Pt: Yeah.
- Th: Where are these tears coming from ... ? Don't hold them back, it's okay.
- Pt: I'm not. But [now] I can completely forgive him ... Now I can completely forgive him for what he did.
- Th: What did he say to you?
- Pt: He said, "I'm sorry," and I think he gave me a hug.
- Th: So then, what's inside you when you said, "I can forgive him?" Because I still see so much emotion.
- Pt: Relief. I can let go. I mean, you know, I stopped having fantasies about beating the crap out of him a long time ago, but ... I didn't go through this kind of experience where, you know, I had the experience of, of him apologizing after getting revenge. (starts to tear up)
- Th: What inside is getting touched?
- Pt: Um, you know, it was a very moving experience I just went through, and, you know, so it's ... I don't know what specifically is being touched but I have an

awareness that, that is valuable and it's healing. [patient spontaneously starts to metaprocess the experience he is having; State 3]

Th: Do you see where these tears or what is inside wants to go next?

Pt: Yeah, yeah ... Just, I just felt, you know, tension go out of my body, it just feels like a real release.

It is with what happens next that Accelerated Experimental Dynamic Psychotherapy extends the scope of the experiential processing to go systematically beyond the other experiential approaches. Having processed core affective experiences to completion, Accelerated Experimental Dynamic Psychotherapy then goes on to experientially process the newly emergent transformational experiences, just as rigorously as the emotions that preceded them. Enter metatherapeutic processing, and the work of State 3.

4.3 State 3: the experience of transformation and the language of flux

Metatherapeutic processing refers to a therapeutic intervention that facilitates an explicit exploration of the *experience* of a particular piece of successful therapeutic work just completed. For instance, after the client successfully completes a round of experiential work in which he or she processes suppressed, often painful yet adaptive emotions, such as assertive anger and/or grief over loss, then metatherapeutic processing focuses on the experience of the resulting emotional change itself. Metaprocessing involves a process of going back and forth between experience and reflection, in what has been described by Iwakabe and Conceicao (2016) in their task analytic approach to metaprocessing, as “in a zigzag manner” (Iwakabe and Conceicao 2016: 238).

State 3, where the metatherapeutic processing of transformational experience takes place, is characterized by the emergence of the affects of innate healing, deep somatically based transformational *affects*, invariably positive affects associated with transformational experience. Accelerated Experimental Dynamic Psychotherapy is unique in having articulated the precise phenomenology of the positive, adaptive, and characteristically high arousal transformational affects, along with the upward spiral of further transformations that comes from metaprocessing them (Fosha 2009b; Fosha and Thoma 2019). Six *metatherapeutic processes*, each with its respective *transformational affects* have been identified to date: (i) the process of mastery evokes the *mastery affects*, the “I did it!” feelings of joy, pride, and confidence that emerge when fear and shame are undone; (ii) the process of *mourning-the-self*, accompanied by the transformational affect of emotional pain, involves painful but liberating grief and compassion for one’s self, and one’s losses; (iii) the process of *traversing the crisis of healing change* evokes the *tremulous affects*, fear/excitement, startle/surprise, curiosity/interest, even positive vulnerability, maintained with the support of the therapeutic relationship; (iv) the process of *the affirming recognition of the self and of its transformation* evokes the *healing affects*, gratitude and tenderness toward the other, as well as feeling moved, touched or emotional within oneself; (v) the process of *delighting in the emerging transformation* evokes the *enlivenment affects* (Iwakabe and Conceicao 2016)

of pleasure, exuberance, excitement, motivation, and exploratory zest; and finally, (vi) the process of *taking in the new understanding* evokes the *realization affects*, the “yes!” and “wow” of wonder, awe, amazement, associated with the grasping of the magnitude of transformational changes taking place.

State 3 is characterized by yet another evolution of language expression. Following the often turbulent emotions in State 2, State 3 ushers in a slower rhythm, where integration of the powerful emotional experiences can begin to take place. Speech can be halting, uncertain, tentative as patients strive to express a new sense of themselves, never before encountered. Newness is the central organizing construct here, and the gradual accommodation of the newness; one can almost hear the trail-blazing process of new neural channels being forged in the brain. Language feels fresh, emergent, and often invokes the wonder, awe and reverence of this new state of being. The first chords of a reverent quality can creep into language that is still emotion-laden and rich in right-brain imagery and metaphor. Yet State 3 can also be somewhat disorienting for patients, as old limitations fall away, and a new, truer sense of self begins to emerge. This is another moment where the attachment relationship is crucial, with the AEDP psychotherapist remaining explicitly present, normalizing the tremulous nature of transformation, reflecting the patient’s experience and keeping her connected to the cascade of transformational affects. The therapist’s task in this state is simple: support the patient in this exploration and keep the flow moving forward in a dance of experience and reflection.

- (6) State 3: example of narrative emerging as patient is processing her transformation, and how she feels different in the wake of processing her trauma (sexual abuse at age 10), as she discovers she no longer feels the shame and guilt she has carried, for years, like a badge of shame

Pt: Because you know when you (*sighs*) ... like when you have a thing that you’ve experienced ... a trauma ...

Th: For such a long time ...

Pt: Yeah, and you haven’t like been able to deal with it properly ... you kind of own this feeling, like ... and the feeling may be like “Oh, you know ... I’ve been deeply affected ...” And not that it hasn’t deeply affected me, but I think there’s this badge of hurt that I liked to carry ... even though I won’t say that.

Th: Right ...

Pt: I wouldn’t say that, but that’s the feeling that I felt for years ... And now it’s just different ... I don’t feel like I need to ... wear that badge of hurt ...

Th: Wow ...

Pt: Anymore ...

Th: Wow ...

Pt: If that makes sense ...

Th: It makes complete sense and what I want to ask you is ... and how does it make you feel about YOU? [initiate metaprocessing into patient’s experience of this big change-for-the-better]

Th: What’s the difference? ... How do you feel different?

Pt: Um ... I definitely feel ... I don’t feel the shame ... I think that’s it (chuckles) ... Yeah ... that’s the biggest thing that I feel when I think about that and I’m just

like ... I'm just like thinking through it now ... Like shame and guilt is no longer there ... I don't feel that feeling ... I don't feel that feeling ... normally I always feel that feeling ... the shame ... and now I don't have it (said with wonder, surprise)

Th: Right ...

Pt: More than anything ... Usually I kinda wanna hide under a rock type of thing because this has happened to me. It's just that now the feeling I get when I talk about is not the same at all.

Th: Right, it used to be in your body but now it is not there ...

Pt: It's not the same at all ... it's not there, like not at all ... it's weird ... it's just weird ... it's just different ... ["weird" is a marker of the newness, part tremulous affect, part realization affect] Like the shame and guilt are not there ... at all. It's good but it's just different ... Definitely ...

(7) State 3: example of transition into State 3 work

Pt: It's freeing, it's huge ...

Th: Stay with that, physically with that feeling inside.

Pt: It's really huge, it's just ...

Th: Just notice what it feels like and if you don't mind sharing it.

Pt: Yeah, it feels, I feel like it feels very light and ... [post-breakthrough affects, markers of the completion of the State 2 transformation]

Th: It feels very light?

Pt: Yeah, it feels like that huge weight I just had on myself was just totally removed, um ...

Th: Let yourself be with that, just be with that.

Pt: I think I feel stronger and more empowered. [mastery affects]

Th: That's a nice smile.

Pt: Yeah, I guess, it's really weird.

Th: Just stay with it.

Pt: I don't know, I feel more empowered by now.

Th: What do you notice?

Pt: Just a sense of lightness that ...

Th: What'd you feel here when ...

Pt: Just like, not like a hole but just (points to her chest, where she felt the weight)

Th: Right, that's where the hole was, so the weight is off ...

Pt: Is gone and I just feel like I can just, just that it was okay for me then to feel that pain but it, but ... it's hard to explain. [emergence; the felt sense of experience precedes the language to more precisely express it]

Th: Take your time ... take your time there's a ton going on. [dyadic affect regulation]

Pt: Yeah, that's true.

Th: You know, you're very used to feeling that weight, but now you feel something else. [explicitly articulates and focuses on the difference]

Pt: Yeah, I'm just feeling free of it.

Th: And what is free feel like, what does it feel like in your chest, what does it feel like in your eyes?

- Pt: It just feels like I'm weightless I guess; it feels like I can go out and save the world and like that I'm free of it. [mastery affects]
- (8) State 3: an example of the tremulous affects of State 3
- Th: Tell me a little bit more about the feeling ... just a pure feeling that I see in your face and in your eyes ...
- Pt: (shifts body position) It's almost like, you know, that ... I experience like kind of a wateriness in my lower kind of abdomen ... sort of the fear before you do something brand new. [tremulous affects]
- Th: Mm-hmm ...
- Pt: The uncertainty of stuff and not having a sense of control ... and I guess ... if I'm worrying about the same thing, then I have some control over what I'm worrying about ... instead of just recognizing that like ... I'm kind of afraid of everything ... there's parts of me ... it's completely understandable but I need to learn how to grow up out of so ... I need to work on these fears because they relate to my current life ... and my past trauma ...
- Th: Right ...
- Pt: And I feel like it gives me a key ... a thread that will help me unlock a lot of other ...
- Th: Totally ... so it's like ... yet another brand of fear that feels very different. I love the watery description right ... it's like different from all the flaring layers of ...
- Pt: But it's interesting ... it's not really fear ... it's just the unknown ...
- Th: Right, right ...
- Pt: It's like looking at the ocean and not being able to see what's beneath ...
- Th: It's like ...
- Pt: Or the far shore ...
- Th: Yes, yes ... it's a beautiful description of it ...
- Pt: And having hopes and dreams but not having any real knowing ...

As these excerpts show, metaprocessing oscillates between experience and reflection, between right brain and left brain, between insula and anterior cingulate, between the limbic system and prefrontal cortex. The steady oscillation between experience and reflection while metaprocessing the high arousal transformational affects of State 3 leads to recursive cycles of transformation, and culminates in State 4, Core State, characteristically a low arousal state of calm, clarity, and flow, as well as cohesiveness and coherence.

4.4 State 4: Core State and the language of truthtellers, storytellers, poets and saints

Core State is one of calm and neural integration and is characterized by the natural emergence of the same qualities of mind that mindfulness and contemplative practices seek to bring forth – well-being, compassion, self-compassion, wisdom, generosity, flow, clarity, joy, and alignment (Fosha and Yeung 2006). We see here the further cultivation of “exceptional mind/body traits like [...] spontaneous altruism” (Loizzo 2017: 188). Guided by the

truth sense (Fosha 2005), this smart vagus-supported, parasympathetically mediated, low arousal Core State is where the fruits of the transformational process are reaped and folded into self: this state is characterized by patients' expressions of "wellness, calm, and fulfillment" (Iwakabe and Conceicao 2016: 241). Core truths about the self-emerge: "this is me" revelations are a common feature of Core State. In State 4, the embodied new meanings, new truth and new sense of self that emerged through the healing process become integrated into a larger self (Fosha 2009a, 2009b). A new, coherent and cohesive autobiographical narrative, a correlate of resilience and secure attachment (Main 1999), naturally comes forth as well.

The language of Core State is as distinct from that of State 1 as any language can be. If in State 1, language serves to separate, wall-off, hide and protect, in Core State, language is alternately lyrical, limpid, transcendent, or else clear, coherent, direct and truthful. One of the most vivid felt sense examples of the experience and expression of Core State that I (Gleiser) have ever encountered was by a college student who had just completed a rage portrayal in which she imagined murdering her twin sister (who had always been the idealized darling of the family, while my patient was the devalued and projected "bad twin"). This young woman described the sensation of Core State as, "That feeling you get of diving into a clear, cool pool of water, and then the feeling of surfacing, when your head comes up out of the water again".

If the language of State 3 is slow because patients are searching for ways to express their new reality, in State 4 the slow rhythm is more a feature of smart vagus, parasympathetic mediation: a calm, open, expansive, at times seemingly meditative, state. Invariably, experiences that feel "right", "true" and "aligned" are part of the State 4 experience. And there is also a deep positive valuation of the self, a quality that is essential to healing, both specifically from trauma (Cook et al. 2005) and in general.

Here, we are in the realm of truthtellers, storytellers, poets and saints. Truthtellers because the narrative is infused with conviction and a felt sense, shared usually by patient and therapist, that the (subjective) truth is being told. Storytellers, specifically autobiographers, because the putting together of one's personal narrative in a way that is coherent and makes sense, is the hallmark of secure attachment (Main 1999). Poets, because the language is often stunningly vibrant, original, eloquent and somehow "just right" as a way of conveying the deepest truths about the patient's self and life. Saints, because there is often an elegiac quality of transcendence, a sense of accessing something bigger and beyond oneself: often patients invoke spiritual images or metaphors as a way of expressing the power of this state of mind.

(9) State 4: an example of Core State.

(This clinical example illustrating Core State is a continuation from the example used above, illustrating State 2 work with anger and then grief).

Pt: Yeah, yeah ... Just, I just felt, you know, tension go out of my body, it just feels like a real release.

Th: What do you notice, as the tension drains out, as there is a release?

Pt: Well, what I was thinking was that it feels easier to have compassion for ... for anyone right now because we all suffer, even the abusers. [State 4: deep compassion]

- Th: Even the abusers.
- Pt: You know, because if they were feeling real good, they wouldn't need to abuse somebody.
- Th: That's very powerful.
- Pt: Yeah, that feels really appropriate and kind, to him and to me. [State 4: kindness to self and other]
- Th: In what way kind to him and what way kind to you?
- Pt: Well I can stand up for myself, um, and still care about him at the same time and even if it's hard on him or uncomfortable, that it's still okay to do, like worth doing, because it'll either make our relationship a little better or, or not, but at the very least I will be fully me in the relationship. Since he's my brother, you know, that's important even though, even if I don't, you know, interact with him a lot. When we do, that's what I want to bring to the relationship. [State 4: the patient is spontaneously constructing a new autobiographical narrative]
- Th: Tell me about "fully me." ["this is me" is a frequent Core State phenomenon]
- Pt: It's standing up for me.
- Th: And what does that feel like inside?
- Pt: It feels, you know, it feels appropriate, it feels right, it feels like I'm being strong; makes me want to sit up straight [State 4: experience of alignment]
- Th: Yeah, just notice.
- Pt: Actually, that feels comfortable and strong at the same time [integrated state]

(10) State 4: Core State

- Th: Let yourself be ... Don't fight it.
- Pt: (nods, crying) I just need to love myself.
- Th: It's you letting yourself do what you need to do in the tears and in the compassion, just let it come. Something very profound is happening [affirmation of the patient and her work]
- Pt: I am enough [Core State: simple, declarative language]
- Th: You are enough.
- Pt: I've always searched for it, inner confidence not being able to find it and I guess maybe since I've really haven't loved myself ... I don't know ...
- Th: Let it come ...
(pause)
- Pt: I see myself as beautiful [Core State: simple, declarative language]
- Th: I see you as beautiful, but I want to hear from you inside what happens as you see yourself as beautiful?
- Pt: I guess I could, you could say, I'm seeing myself from God's eyes and who he's meant for me to be and I'm finally grasping that. [Core State: true self experience, spiritual experience] In a way and in just this small time ...
- Th: Just breathe ... and let it come up, that's all, as you look at yourself and see yourself.
- Pt: I can see such a strong woman when I gave birth to my daughter without any drugs and I was in such a calm place, so in tune with my body and with myself and [husband] was there holding my hand and helping me, I was so in tune

with me and in that place I felt such a calmness and peace and confidence that I could do it and just like looking at that person and she was beautiful, you know. I think the thing was you can't control what happens to yourself in that moment. And so just letting go and letting what was happening happen because it needed to, that was ... it was huge, and I felt so amazing after it and just letting go and letting what happens happen ... (makes birth giving motions with her arms) [Core State; deep positive valuation of the self; experience of calm and alignment: "in tune"]

(11) State 4: zigzagging, first Core State, then back to State 3.

- Pt: I just feel kind of peaceful right now, and just aware and we've just gone through a lot of stuff ... [Core State: feeling "peaceful"]
- Th: A lot. What is the peaceful feeling?
- Pt: Relaxed, at ease, just you know, like the muscles are all soft.
- Th: What's [in] your hands?
- Pt: Yeah, they're relaxed too. As you can see. So ... feels good.
- Th: I'm glad, we've done an enormous amount today, enormous. [validation]
- Pt: Yeah, yes.
- Th: Stay with whatever's happening.
- Pt: It's appreciation [healing affects]
- Th: Thank you. It's mutual. It's mutual; it feels very deep.
- Pt: Yeah. (tears up) [healing affects]
- Th: Can you just sort of let yourself sort of speak from wherever this originates, these tears?
- Pt: Appreciation. [healing affects]
- Th: Yeah. Yeah ...
- Pt: What comes to mind, it's like, wow, it's fucking amazing [realization affects]
- Th: Yeah. (big smile) It's fucking amazing.
- Pt: Pretty cool.
- Th: [laughing] It's is, very cool!
- Pt: Yeah, it is.

5 Conclusion

Embodiment holds the key to whether language disconnects, or mirrors and reveals deep experiences. We began with an intention to rehabilitate the reputation of language to serve extra-ordinary transformational states – like love, inspiration, reverence, or transformation itself as an experience. As we have shown throughout, key to this rehabilitation is the notion of embodiment. Embodied language, intimately linked with the felt sense, follows moment-to-moment fluctuations in emerging, transforming, ever-emergent emotional experience, capturing, evoking and creating that emergence. Not only does embodied language accurately, and satisfyingly, for both members of the dyad, capture subtle emergent inner experience and illuminate that experience for self and other; embodied language also

organizes experience and thus can be the catalyst for further transformational changes and their integration into self.

This holds valuable implications for clinicians. In this chapter, we have made of a case for Accelerated Experimental Dynamic Psychotherapy's being a prime example of an experiential therapy that harnesses the power of embodied and transformational language. However, clinicians from any therapeutic orientation can view language as a powerful vehicle of positive change and enhance their awareness of how they are utilizing language themselves in session, in terms of both content and prosody. Clinicians who remain in analytical, concrete or logical language are less likely to engage the integrative function of the whole brain, and less likely to invoke the rich, right-brained language that can access heretofore avoided healing emotions. Simply mirroring a patient's current state and current language is not enough; through careful choice of language and fishing out glimmers of emotion-tinged language in a patient's speech production can shift the dyad into new, more enlivened, more feelingful, more embodied states that lead to healing change for patients.

Rich research opportunities in this field abound. Neuroscience has begun to afford glimpses into how emotion and language function in the brain, but investigation has yet to probe deeply into how language neural networks may differ between the polar extremes of distress-based, defensive driven language and open, integrative, vivid language states. In short, the potential identification of different neural networks of a range of emotional-state driven language production could illuminate brain-based evidence of healing change, and perhaps even one of the mechanisms of such change. This would represent neuroscientific support for our theory of language as both mirror of healing change and catalyst for healing change.

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Abstract: Volumes of literature have been devoted to understanding how facial expressions of emotions are processed in autism. However, the nature of emotional processing outside the visual domain still remains unclear. Although emotional language incorporates a myriad of faculties, the current chapter highlights how individuals with autism process emotion words. Behavioral findings show that individuals are able to correctly identify basic emotion words. But neuroimaging data reveals that participants with autism fail to activate either motor or limbic systems in contrast to their typical counterparts. Furthermore, they also recruit language areas of both the hemispheres to a larger extent. These findings signify differential integration of language, motor and emotion networks in autism even in the face of equivalent behavioral competence. Although the issue of emotion language processing requires further investigation, these studies indicate that at least high-functioning individuals with autism can learn abstract emotional concepts in a rule-based manner that makes it difficult to decode emotions in the visual domain. Further, hypoactivity in the motor areas implies atypical motor embodiment of emotional concepts and aligns this domain of research with documented motor deficits and anomalous emotional processing in the visual domain as part of the autistic symptomatology.

1 Introduction

Difficulties in social interaction and communication forms a major part of autism spectrum disorder (ASD) (American Psychiatric Association 2013). Facial expressions of emotions play a key role in social communications and thus, it is not surprising that a multitude of studies provide evidence for impairments of facial emotional processing in ASD. The most commonly reported results are problems with recognition of emotions (Kuusikko et al. 2009), reading emotional expressions from the eye region (Peterson, Slaughter, and Brownell 2015) and distinguishing between different expressions (Eack, Mazefsky, and Minshew 2015).

People diagnosed with ASD have difficulties in processing faces generally. Therefore, studies conducted on facial emotional processing are not sufficient for drawing conclusions about the nature of emotional difficulties in autism. Problems with facial processing include both a lack of focus on the eye area and lack of spontaneous attention to faces (Harms, Martin, and Wallace 2010; Senju and Johnson 2009). As such, drawing conclusions about generic emotional impairments requires a focus on emotional language. Focusing on emotional language is also imperative from the standpoint of understanding the nature of emotional processing deficits in order to draw conclusions about the larger picture. This is because some theorists claim that emotional impairments are linked to social capacities (e.g., Schultz 2005) or Theory of Mind (ToM; Hillier and Allinson 2002), whereas others argue that problems with processing of emotions extend beyond the social domain (e.g., Gaigg 2012). Efforts should be focused on moving beyond assessments of only socially relevant affective behaviors in order to resolve these issues.

Consistently, the objective of the present chapter is to provide an overview of the literature that deals with how individuals with autism process written emotion words and discuss the implications of the findings. It is important to highlight that individuals with ASD also have problems with language (e.g., Khetrapal 2015). Keeping this as a backdrop, only those studies will be described that have compared typical individuals with high-functioning people on the spectrum who have no apparent language difficulties or delays. These comparisons will give a clearer picture about problems with emotional impairments, as part of the autistic symptomatology.

2 Processing of written emotional words

A basic task of emotional language processing is the identification of emotion words (e.g., *happy* and *sad*) or emotion-laden words (e.g., *death* and *birth*). Although researchers may not reach a consensus on how to describe emotion words, many will agree that these words entail both valence (neutral, negative and positive) and arousal (high, moderate or low) (see Altarriba and Bauer 2004). Processing of emotion words has been extensively studied for typical individuals and results show that words for emotions are prioritized for processing in contrast to neutral words. Consequently, people show a better memory (Kensinger and Corkin 2003) paired with faster identification times for emotion words (Vinson, Ponari, and Vigliocco 2014). A representative study conducted by Altarriba and Bauer (2004) constructed three different word lists containing either concrete (e.g., *building*), abstract (e.g., *height* and *advice*) or emotion words. The lists were presented to English-speaking participants who were unexpectedly later asked to recall as many words as possible. Participants recalled more words from the emotion lists than any other lists. This kind of prioritized processing that emotion words receive is labeled as the ‘emotion effect’. The effect is backed by higher physiological activation (Citron 2012). On the other hand, studies conducted with ASDs show that emotion words are processed differently. Deviant processing has been noted while assessing both attention and memory for emotion words – assessments that do not directly impinge upon social interactions.

2.1 Tasks for attention

People have limited attentional resources. As such, these resources should be utilized in an optimal manner. Consistent with the architecture of our attentional system, certain stimuli (e.g., emotional or threatening information) are prioritized for processing. An attentional blink (AB) task is deployed for assessing such attentional biases. In a typical demonstration, stimuli like words or pictures are presented one after the other at a single location (Raymond, Shapiro, and Arnell 1992). The rate of presentation is usually between 6 and 20 items per second. Participants are expected to identify two targets (T1 and T2). If T2 occurs between 180 and 500 milliseconds after T1, then participants are likely to identify T1 but miss T2. This is the ‘attentional blink’ wherein the second target is missed as our attentional resources are devoted to processing the first target. AB is stronger if T1 is emotional in nature. This is because there are not enough resources to focus on T2 in that case. On the other hand, if T2 is emotional and T1 is non-emotional, then AB is reduced or attenuated (Musch, Engel, and Schneider 2012). Corden, Chilvers, and Skuse (2008) presented negative and neutral words to individuals with autism as part of the AB paradigm. Participants were expected to identify T1 and T2 that were discriminated against distractor words by their color. T1 and T2 appeared in black whereas the distractor words appeared in different colors. The emotion words failed to modulate the attentional blink at short inter-target intervals (< 500 ms). A second similar study conducted by Gaigg and Bowler (2009a) deployed negative emotion words (e.g., ‘taboo’), neutral words and male proper names. Expectedly, emotion words failed to capture the attention of the ASD participants.

The modulation of attention by emotion words rests on extensive cortico-amygdala networks and the language processing areas (Gaigg 2012). Anomalies of these networks are hypothesized to be responsible for the behavioral findings in high-functioning autism (HFA). To the extent that quick and automatic detection of emotionally relevant stimuli is important for adaptive functioning, the failure of emotional information to modulate attentional processing in autism could have negative consequences for everyday functioning. People on the spectrum may fail to notice or detect unexpected, albeit emotionally relevant events with debilitating effects for memory, social evaluation and decision-making.

2.2 Tasks for memory

Two most popular findings in the memory literature is that emotional information is recognized and recalled better than neutral information (LaBar and Cabeza 2006) coupled with a slow forgetting rate (Yonelinas and Ritchey 2015), implying an enhanced encoding of emotional material. An early study comparing adults with autism and their typical counterparts showed that both groups of participants exhibited superior memory performance for emotion words in contrast to neutral words on a recognition test, immediately after studying a random sequence of these words (South et al. 2008). Other than that, the ASD participants took a significantly longer time to respond to the test items, indicating that there might be qualitative differences in how emotion modulates memory in autism.

On similar lines, Gaigg and Bowler (2008) presented adult ASDs and typical participants with a random sequence of emotional (taboo), semantically or categorically related

but neutral words (e.g., fruit names) and unrelated neutral words. They also did not find any group differences in memory for the words conveying emotions on an immediate free recall test of memory. However, the memory advantage for emotionally charged words declined after 1 hour and 1 day for the autism group again on a free recall test. On the other hand, the memory advantage increased for the typical group. Both the groups showed a memory disadvantage for semantically unrelated neutral words, suggesting that the memory advantage obtained by South and colleagues (2008) could be due to semantic relatedness between stimulus items rather than a pure effect of emotional information. The results also suggest that the quantitative enhancement of memory in autism could be attributed to the semantic aspects of the stimuli as opposed to the emotional aspects. The decline of memory advantage after 1 hour and 24 hours only for the autism group further corroborates this conclusion. In a nutshell, the comparable performance shown by ASDs could be due to ‘semantic modulation’ rather than an ‘emotional modulation’ of memory that fades with time.

Gaigg and Bowler (2009b) conducted a second study by deploying a memory illusion paradigm to tease apart the influences of emotions and semantics. On a memory illusion study, participants are presented with a sequence of orthographically associated words (e.g., *Book*, *Nook*, *Tape*, etc.) rather than semantically associated words (e.g., *bed*, *pillow*, *blanket*, etc.). Participants are also expected to recognize the presented words in a subsequent recognition test. Additional orthographically associated words or Target Lures, not included in the prior presented sequence, are included in the test. Half of these new words (e.g., *Hook*) are neutral in nature while the other half are emotion words (e.g., *Rape*). Typical individuals are unlikely to identify emotional Target Lures during the test phase, although their false identification of neutral Target Lures is more than the chance level (Pesta, Murphy, and Sanders 2001). The results imply that the emotional aspects rather than the semantic aspects of words attenuate illusory memories of Target Lures.

Presenting emotion and target words to adult ASDs and their healthy counterparts, Gaigg and Bowler (2009b) obtained findings from typical individuals that were closely aligned with the results shown by Pesta and colleagues. However, the susceptibility to illusory memories was comparable for both emotion and non-emotion words in the case of adults with autism. The results show that encoding of emotion words is not different from that of neutral words and individuals with autism do not retain emotionally significant words in a qualitatively distinct manner over time. The outcomes further suggest that the results obtained by Gaigg and Bowler (2008) could be attributed to semantic modulation rather than emotional modulation. Findings from the current and the previous studies collectively point towards the possibility that emotional processing impairments in autism are not purely restricted to the social domain. In this regard, findings from the assessments of memory complement the outcomes from the assessments of attention.

3 Neurobiology

Dominant findings in autism attribute the autistic symptomatology to abnormalities in the social brain network. The network – comprising the cerebellum, temporal cortical regions

(especially the fusiform gyrus and superior temporal sulcus), limbic areas (amygdala, hippocampus, insula, and cingulate cortex), the dorsal striatum (putamen and caudate), and parts of the frontal lobes (inferior, medial, middle, and superior frontal gyri) – is important for understanding our social surroundings (e.g., Cauda et al. 2011; Duerden et al. 2012; Nickl-Jockschat et al. 2012). Therefore, it comes as no surprise that abnormalities of the network are linked to social-emotional impairments in autism.

It is important to highlight that these same areas of the social brain are also involved in mediating other aspects of cognition. The medial prefrontal cortex is involved in ToM functioning (Gallagher and Frith 2003) and decision-making (Ridderinkhof et al. 2004). The fusiform gyrus supports face processing (Kanwisher 2000). Middle and superior temporal cortices help mediate language processing (Price 2010). Interactions between emotion and cognition are dependent upon the integrity of the striatal and limbic areas (Gaigg 2012). Additionally, the amygdala that gets activated in response to negative (Kensinger and Schacter 2006) and positive emotion words (Briesemeister et al. 2015) maintains reciprocal connections with cortical and sub-cortical regions. Through these extensive connections, the amygdala modulates cognitive processes ranging from perception, attention to memory and decision-making. Emotional modulation of attention and memory, as described in the previous sections, are the result of these reciprocal connections between the amygdala and other cortical/sub-cortical regions. The widespread connections between various parts of the social brain network has led to the proposal that aberrant connectivity between disparate brain regions is a central feature of the autistic symptomatology at the neurobiological level (Rippon et al. 2007).

Specifically, words conveying emotions activate the amygdala, medial/orbital frontal regions, cingulate cortex (Maratos et al. 2001) and the language areas. Additionally, emotion words also elicit activations in the motor system that reflect activations observed for processing action words, e.g., *write* or *wave* (Moseley et al. 2012). These overlapping activations suggest that the meaning of emotional words is mediated by partial reproduction or simulation of the same experiential or motor states that occur when a person encounters a target object in the real time/world (Barsalou 2008). For instance, describing a happy event partially reproduces a similar happy emotional state that a person would have felt while experiencing the described event, originally. In this manner, physical sensations or motor elements of emotional expressions (e.g., the bodily feeling of frowning) contribute towards higher order (emotional) processing. In a nutshell, the bridge between emotion words and experienced emotional states is ‘action’ itself (Wittgenstein 1953).

Consider words such as *fear*. These can’t be easily linked to an object like a concrete word (e.g., *Apple*) and, as such, acquire emotional connotations through repeated usage in action contexts (e.g., ‘crying’ and ‘screaming’). These action contexts then become critical for bridging the gap between word and meaning and thereby get incorporated in the network representing the meaning of emotion words (Moseley et al. 2012). Deploying a passive reading task and using an event-related functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI) that detects changes in hemodynamic response to events with a temporal resolution of about 100–150 milliseconds (Zani and Proverbio 2002), Moseley and colleagues (2012) produced evidence commensurate with this proposal. In their study, activations were observed in the motor regions for emotion words in the case of healthy participants. The activated

areas were mostly contained in the regions that were also active during the processing of words that stand for face-related and arm-related actions. In other words, activations for emotion words are closely patterned after activations underlying action words for those body parts (face and arms) through which emotions are expressed. These findings imply that the meaning of both action and emotion words are embodied in the motor system. A second study from the same group was conducted on adult HFAs, again deploying a passive reading task and using an event-related fMRI. The study participants were presented with action (e.g., 'grasp' and 'chew') and object words (e.g., *cheese* and *flute*) (Moseley et al. 2013). HFAs exhibited hypoactivity of the motor cortex in response to action words relative to a typical control group, implying disembodiment of action-related concepts (words serve as an anchor for accessing concepts). Both the groups revealed similar activation patterns in posterior temporal regions; areas that are usually activated by written words.

Study participants performed a second semantic decision task after 8 weeks of undergoing the scanning procedure wherein they had to indicate, through button presses, whether briefly presented words (exposure time: 150 milliseconds) were related to objects or action. Both the action and object words were taken from the previous fMRI experiment. In addition to the behavioral task, participants also completed the Autism Spectrum Quotient (ASQ) (see Ruzich et al. 2015). The questionnaire assesses social difficulties in autism and makes no allusion to motor impairments. HFAs were slower to judge action words in contrast to the object words, whereas their typical counterparts did not show the same behavioral contrast. There was no difference in accuracy between the two groups, although a significant correlation was obtained between the hypoactivity of the motor cortex, increased reaction times for action words and the ASQ scores. On the basis of these findings, it appears to be the case that action circuits are not completely broken, at least in HFAs. Consequently, HFAs might retrieve action-related knowledge in an unusual manner. Or perhaps, atypical simulation may underlie the process of action-related words.

Later, similar event-related fMRI studies were conducted with adult HFAs comparing passive processing of emotional words to abstract verbs (e.g., *heal* and *dwell*) and animal names (Moseley et al. 2015). Whole-brain analyses of activity provided evidence for reduced activity in bilateral motor areas (primary motor and premotor cortex) only for emotion words and not for abstract verbs and animal names. Reduced activations for emotion words were also observed in the limbic regions, reflecting the affective nature of these terms. Although the study did not collect behavioral indices of emotion word processing, the combined hypoactivity of the limbic and motor areas are indicative of atypical alterations of action links between emotional states and emotion words (or disembodiment of emotional concepts). Furthermore, the authors also obtained a correlation between the motor and limbic hypoactivity and autistic traits as assessed by the ASQ. These results are generally comparable to those obtained by Moseley and colleagues (2013), even though the present study did not find comparable hypo-activations for abstract verbs. Clearly, future studies are required to examine intricate relations between emotional impairments, language use and motor deficits.

It should be pointed out that as fMRI is associated with poor temporal resolution, it wasn't possible to discern whether observed hypo-activation in response to emotion words

is a result of pre-reflective (arousal-driven) processes in an early time window or late occurring post-reflective processes. These issues can be settled with the help of electrophysiological studies, which capture real-time perceptual and cognitive processes supporting emotion word recognition.

In the interim, it can be concluded that the meaning of both the action and the emotion words are embodied in the motor system. Because of this, motor problems in an early developmental period may lead to a wide range of downstream deficits in higher cognitive processing (e.g., ‘written language’, as described here). On parallel lines, motor abnormalities have actually been found to precede the emergence of social and communication impairments in autism (Bryson et al. 2007). And as cortical language areas and motor systems are closely entwined, atypical structural and functional connectivity between anterior frontal action systems and posterior language regions might be the neural basis for disembedding of action concepts (e.g., Pulvermüller and Fadiga 2010). When connected typically, this connectivity between frontal and posterior areas allows merging action information into the linguistic system (see Lai et al. 2012). The posterior language areas, comprising temporal cortices and inferior parietal areas, also have functional connections with the limbic regions, which may further serve as an additional link for mediating embodiment of emotional concepts (Weisholtz et al. 2015). In the light of these findings, it comes as no surprise that aberrant connectivity between these same brain regions have been found in toddlers with autism (Zhang et al. 2018), adolescents (Fletcher et al. 2010) and adults (Moseley et al. 2016) with HFA.

3.1 Electrophysiological studies

Electroencephalography (EEG) is a non-invasive electrophysiological method used for recording electrical activity of the brain by placing electrodes over the scalp. Averaged EEG responses are collectively termed as event-related potentials (ERPs) that are time-locked to stimulus events. EEG offers a good temporal resolution, i.e., approximately 1 millisecond. As such, using EEG is a good option for differentiating between early pre-reflective processing versus later occurring reflective processing; an issue that remained partially unanswered by event-related fMRI studies.

EEG studies planned for investigating the contrastive effects of emotional and neutral words have shown that effects of emotion are visible as early as 200 milliseconds (ms) after word onset in the form of an Early Posterior Negativity (EPN) component that peaks between 250 and 300 ms (e.g., Schacht and Sommer 2009). The EPN has a posterior distribution and is noted to be more pronounced over electrodes placed on the left side of the brain in studies that have used single words as stimuli (see Herbert, Junghöfer, and Kissler 2008). This component is observed in a variety of tasks such as silent reading (Kissler et al. 2007) and lexical decision (Palazova et al. 2011). According to Citron (2012), EPN indexes automatic and implicit processing of emotions or could be attributed to physiological arousal, hinting at simultaneous access for both a word’s emotional flavor and its visual form (Kissler, Assadollahi, and Herbert 2006). The early occurring EPN component is contrasted with a late occurring Late Positive Complex (LPC) component that peaks between 500 and 800 ms

with a centro-parietal scalp distribution (e.g., Citron 2012). It is explained to index enhanced attention, deeper stimulus processing (Herbert et al. 2006) or recollection of memories (e.g., Stróżak et al. 2016). As such, LPC might predict better memory performance at a later point in time (see Dolcos and Cabeza 2002).

Lartseva and colleagues (2014) presented pseudowords and high-frequency Dutch neutral and emotion words to HFA adults and typical individuals in a lexical decision task. The study participants were expected to answer whether a presented word is a true word or not by pressing two buttons corresponding to 'yes' and 'no'. Both the groups were faster to respond to the emotion words in contrast to neutral words, suggesting that an early processing of emotions from words is intact in autism. However, the EEG data revealed a different story. Significant EPN effect was not observed for any of the groups, but the LPC was absent in the case of HFAs despite a typical behavioral response. The results imply that HFAs process emotion words in a different manner, post-lexically (as LPC occurs after lexical access). Thus, the emotion word processing deficit appears at a later stage, whereas arousal-driven processes are intact. Early pre-reflective processes are behind the typical behavioral performance of the autism group. Perhaps, well-functioning adults may also develop an alternative processing strategy that results in an atypical EEG/ERP response (in this case, an absence of LPC). It may be possible that the motor and limbic hypoactivity, observed on the event-related fMRI studies, is the spatial loci of the post-reflective processes underlying emotion word processing. However, we need integrated or simultaneous EEG-fMRI studies with HFAs in order to settle issues like these.

4 Discussion

It is important to resolve the paradox between atypical performance observed on the AB and memory tasks and the comparable behavioral performance observed for the lexical decision task. As noted earlier, words for emotions are prioritized, mediated by dedicated neural circuits originating in the amygdala. The first step in this chain of events is increased autonomic physiological arousal in response to emotional stimuli (both words and pictures). Subcortical connections between the amygdala and various nuclei in the brain-stem mediate changes in arousal (LeDoux 2002). Arousal responses (e.g., skin conductance) to emotional pictures and words are relatively preserved in ASD (Gaigg and Bowler 2008). When emotional stimuli involve words, then lexical access is also prioritized (Citron et al. 2014), giving rise to automatic processing of emotion words. Automatic processing could be equated with better performance on lexical decision tasks, on a behavioral level, and early ERP components, i.e., EPN (Abbassi et al. 2015). Therefore, it seems plausible that automatic processing of emotion words is intact in adults with HFAs and a comparable performance observed by Lartseva and colleagues (2014) is in line with this proposal, even though they did not obtain an EPN. Clearly, future studies are needed on this front.

In addition to eliciting arousal, amygdala also plays a central role in directing or orienting attention towards emotional stimuli, which in turn is mediated by extensive connections that the amygdala maintains with the sensory cortices, memory-related regions (e.g.,

hippocampus), prefrontal cortex and language-processing areas (see Brosch et al. 2013; Gaigg 2012). Modulation of stimulus processing (such as those observed for the AB task; Zhang et al. 2014) and memory encoding made possible by attentional biases, in this manner, could be closely entwined with late occurring ERP components such as the LPC. Consistent with this proposal, a lack of LPC in the study by Lartseva and colleagues (2014) easily explains both atypical encoding and retention of emotion words, previously observed for individuals with autism on tasks of memory. The influence of limbic structures, in particular the aberrant modulation afforded by the amygdala, over hippocampal-based memory processes is further implicated to be behind the observed atypical performance (e.g., Gaigg and Bowler 2008). Future EEG and fMRI studies are clearly needed that employ a variety of behavioral tasks in order to tease apart automatic versus controlled processing of emotional words in ASD.

In summary, emotion word processing involves both pre-reflective (automatic or shallow processing) and post-reflective (deep) processing. The automatic processing may begin in the left hemisphere, consistent with left lateralization of EPN observed in prior studies using single words as stimuli (Herbert et al. 2008). During this stage, participants are able to make only semantic connections between words from a particular category (e.g., emotional category) without the involvement of embodied simulation. This proposal is in line with the ‘semantic modulation’ of emotionally charged words, which led to better recognition or recall immediately after presentation (South et al. 2008; Gaigg and Bowler, 2008). Beyond this stage, deeper processing is accompanied by simulation, enhanced attention and recollection of memories with more involvement of the right hemisphere (e.g., Abbassi et al. 2015). Evidence, cited so far, suggests that post-reflective (deep) processing may be unusual in HFA. The broader picture hinges upon the possibility that there might be differential integration of language, motor and emotion networks in autism even in the face of equivalent behavioral competence on a limited variety of tasks.

To reiterate, emotional concepts are subject to deviant processing due to lack of embodiment. In response to this peculiarity, adults with HFA adopt a compensatory mechanism by relying on semantics as a proxy for processing emotion words and language. For instance, emotional concepts are associated with words despite their abstract nature, which makes it easier to learn them. On the contrary, it is not feasible to assign any equivalent rules for learning facial emotional expressions (Sand 2015). As far as this compensatory strategy is sufficient for the task at hand, HFAs would not show any decrement in performance. As soon as a task requires the involvement of deeper levels of processing, deviances in performance will be apparent. Studies on memory for emotion words and other neuroimaging studies provide credence to this line of reasoning. Due to these peculiarities, HFAs become more familiar with word descriptions rather than facial expressions of emotions by the time they reach adulthood. Compensatory mechanisms may further lead to reorganization at the neural level. Anecdotal evidence has already shown that unlike healthy participants, adolescents and young adults with HFA show increased activation of fusiform gyrus in response to emotion words (Han et al. 2014), an area which is otherwise specialized for the processing of faces. Under these circumstances, neuroimaging becomes a valuable tool for examining neural substrates or brain activity in concert with behavioral responses for the purpose of understanding emotion word processing.

5 Conclusion and future directions

It might be premature to abandon the popular view that problems with reciprocal social competences are at the forefront of autistic symptomatology. Instead of treating emotional language impairments as key, it may be possible that emotional language deficits are the result of social deficits that negatively impact the development of both emotional competence and emotion understanding. That is why difficulties with emotional language should be examined with reference to emotional processing both within and outside the social domain. Even then problems with emotional language may not be easily apparent. This is because words conveying emotions could be used and learned outside the social context, e.g., people may know that a particular word stands for a specific emotion without having an understanding of the emotion itself (Lartseva, Dijkstra, and Buitelaar 2015). HFAs might be more adept in learning such abstract emotional concepts due to their well-developed language abilities paired with above-average cognitive abilities in contrast to those who are on the lower end of the autism spectrum. And widespread aberrations of interregional connectivity might be the neural signature of this peculiar learning style in HFA (Vissers, Cohen, and Geurts 2012). Thus, compensatory mechanisms also warrant further investigations.

In this regard, emotional language processing is viewed as a lynchpin between emotional impairments and social deficits. Therefore, emotional language impairments should receive more scientific and clinical attention. As we await more evidence, the social-emotional features associated with an autism diagnosis could be conceptualized within domain-general anomalies in how emotions interact with cognition. This view is commensurate with the neurobiological findings that parts of our social brain are involved with many other functions (e.g., face processing and memory) besides mediating social competences. This view is also consistent with atypical behavioral performance observed on tasks that do not directly tap into communication skills or social interaction (e.g., attention and memory).

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Abstract: The interrelation between emotion and language has been a long-standing focus of psychological as well as linguistic research. Clinical populations are particularly interesting since the connections between language and emotion are highlighted when either language competencies or affective behaviors are altered in the context of clinical disorders. The findings from three selected populations will demonstrate that linguistic and emotional competencies are strongly intertwined: language impairment makes children and adolescents vulnerable to difficulties in emotional processing and adjustment, and language markers related to affective disorders can be identified in patients' speech. As a final point, clinical implications for identification of the disorders, determination of a prognosis, and selection of an intervention are discussed.

1 Introduction

Emotions play an important role in human communication, and most daily-life interactions involve a variety of verbal and/or nonverbal manifestations of emotions. Language offers a wide range of prosodic, lexical, and grammatical means for the expression and verbalization of emotional states (see Kauschke 2019; Klann-Delius 2015). As Schwarz-Friesel (2015) points out, "language does not only communicate emotive meanings, but evokes emotive representations, helps to reflect or construct emotions, and enables us to focus on emotive conceptualizations" (Schwarz-Friesel 2015: 160). In this sense, language, cognition, and emotion strongly interact. The relation between language and emotion is all the more interesting when it comes to atypical conditions. If either language competencies or affective behavior are altered in the context of clinical disorders, the specific contributions of language and emotion to successful communication are highlighted. Thus, observation of clinical populations offers a glimpse into the associations and dissociations between these domains and their complex interplay. I will approach these issues from two complementary perspectives:

1. What are the socio-emotional consequences of language impairment?
2. How are the characteristics of affective disorders reflected in patients' speech and language?

In order to address these questions, three clinical groups were selected that represent different profiles of strengths and weaknesses in the domains of language and/or emotion. For children with Developmental Language Disorder (DLD), who are characterized by primary language deficits, it has been shown that their linguistic problems often lead to behavioral and emotional difficulties, and that DLD negatively affects their emotional well-being and quality of life. Furthermore, their language limitations may have effects on more basic processes of emotion perception and categorization. In people with Autism Spectrum Disorders (ASD), their difficulties with communication and social interaction are readily observable. Language abilities are often well-developed, in particular in people with high-functioning ASD, and verbal means to express emotions are usually available. However, those means may be used to a lesser extent, perhaps indicating less interest in communication about internal states. Finally, patients with depression suffer from an affective disorder characterized by decreased sensitivity to pleasurable events and a strong focus on one's own problems and distresses. The symptoms of this severe mood disorder are reflected in the patients' speech. In each of the three conditions selected, linguistic and/or emotional functioning are affected to varying extents. The profiles of DLD and depression show fundamentally different clinical characteristics: the language problem predominates in DLD with effects on emotional processing or behavior, whereas depression is primarily an affective disorder, with related effects on speech and language. In contrast, the problem in ASD is located in the area of communication, where language and emotion coincide. Empirical findings on the characteristics of the three populations will be presented and discussed in the following sections.

2 Language and emotion in Developmental Language Disorder

2.1 Definition and characteristics of DLD

In the ICD-11 (WHO 2018), the term DLD is used for children with persistent difficulties in the acquisition, understanding, production, or use of language outside the limits of normal variation. DLD is a subset within a broader category that covers a range of problems affecting speech, language, and communication. Children with DLD show deficits in language that are severe enough to interfere with daily life, and are not associated with a clear biomedical etiology – i.e. their language problems seem to be “unexplained” (Bishop 2014; Bishop et al. 2017). DLD is a common developmental disorder in children, with a prevalence of approximately 7% of the population (Leonard 2014). The heterogeneous symptoms of DLD are described along the main dimensions of language: phonology (speech sound disorders), grammar (impairments in the acquisition of morphology and syntax), lexicon (lexical-semantic or word finding difficulties), and/or pragmatics.

Children with unexplained language problems have traditionally been labelled as children with Specific Language Impairment (SLI). In this long-standing framework, the term “specific” implied that there were no other developmental problems beyond language. As

an example for a classical definition, Fletcher (1999) used the term SLI for “children for whose non-normal language acquisition there is no identifiable physical or psychological basis. These individuals have normal hearing, intelligence within normal limits, an apparently intact neurological substrate, and no behavioral or emotional disorder” (Fletcher 1999: 349). In other words, language deficits represented the children’s central, or even only, problem (Leonard 2003: 211). Thus, exclusionary criteria were applied in order to separate children with a known cause of their language problems from those that were unexplained. However, clear cases of selective language disorders tended to be the exception rather than the rule. Exclusionary criteria, which had been a key part of the diagnosis, were questioned and re-examined (Bishop 2014; Reilly, Bishop, and Tomblin 2014), and the traditional concept of SLI became the subject of considerable scrutiny and debate. Since the term “specific” was considered misleading, a new framework arose (Bishop et al. 2016, 2017) resulting in re-naming SLI as DLD. Even in the absence of biomedical conditions such as genetic syndromes, autism, hearing loss, or other conditions, it became clear that subtle impairments in cognitive, sensory-motor, or behavioral domains can and often do co-occur with DLD. These co-occurring problems explicitly include limitations of adaptive behavior and emotional disorders.

In the course of this debate over terminology and definition, the view of the role of emotion in childhood language disorders underwent a shift: whereas the SLI framework simply excluded pervasive developmental disorders such as autism from the diagnosis and thus assumed children’s socio-emotional competencies to be roughly appropriate, recent definitions stress the significant impact language disorder has on the social interactions and emotional well-being of children and adolescents.

2.2 Socio-emotional problems in DLD

It is widely accepted that children and adolescents with DLD are, overall, vulnerable to having difficulties with emotional adjustment and in peer relations (Conti-Ramsden et al. 2019). Problems in these areas have been labelled BESD (behavioral, emotional, and social difficulties [Lindsay and Dockrell 2012]) or SEB (social-emotional and behavioral [Levickis et al. 2018]) difficulties, and this term will be used in the following sections. Leonard (2014) summarizes empirical findings on SEB problems that often accompany language impairment: During pre- and elementary school years, children with DLD are less likely to be selected as friends and to be less accepted socially. These children interact less with peers in social activities and are more withdrawn and/or reticent than their classmates. At school age and during adolescence, the social and emotional problems of children with language impairment tend to increase. Studies have revealed poorer social competencies, poorer-quality friendships, less emotional engagement in close relationships, greater social stress, and problems with emotional regulation. Many individuals show higher rates of anxiety and/or depression, and lower self-esteem.

In a longitudinal study, Lindsay and Dockrell (2012) explored the prevalence and stability of behavioral difficulties and poor self-concepts in a sample of students between the ages of 8 and 17 with a history of language impairment. According to the *Strengths and*

Difficulties Questionnaire (SDQ), the participants had consistently higher levels of SEB problems compared to the normative sample. The highest level of discrepancy was found with peer problems, where differences between the participants and the normative sample increased between the ages of 10 and 16. Emotional symptoms decreased with age in the sample, but stayed above the norm. The proportion of students whose emotional problems reached the clinical range increased from 14 % at age 8 to 21 % at ages 12 and 16. Clinically significant peer problems rose from one-third of the sample between the ages of 8 and 12, to 54 % at age 16. Similar results were obtained for a sample of 8-year-old German children with DLD: 35 % of these children scored in the clinical range with regard to the overall SDQ score (Sarimski, Röttgers, and Hintermair 2015). In line with Lindsay and Dockrell (2012), hyperactivity was the most prominent SEB symptom in 8-year-olds. Approximately 15 % of the sample showed clinically significant emotional problems, and more than 25 % had clinically significant problems with peer relationships. When borderline scores were included, more than 50 % of the sample had a slight or substantial risk of clinically significant SEB problems. In a recent study, Eadie et al. (2018) examined parent-rated quality of life (QoL) in a large sample of 4- to 9-year-old children with and without DLD. Children with DLD not only had lower ratings of QoL than their typically developing (TD) peers, but they also showed declining QoL scores from ages 4 to 9. The authors conclude from their findings that co-occurring socio-emotional problems play an important role in contributing to the lower QoL experienced by children with DLD.

In light of the findings summarized above, there can be no doubt that language difficulties are often associated with SEB problems. The questions arise of how to explain this co-occurrence and how to model the (inter-)relations between linguistic competencies and SEB problems. Of course, it is plausible to regard socio-emotional problems as “collateral effects” (Leonard 2014). In this view, SEB difficulties are a consequence of limited language abilities: Due to their problems with understanding and/or producing language, these children have limited opportunities to successfully communicate with others, which in turn may affect their peer relations, their emotional regulation skills, and their social behaviors (Kauschke 2019; Rieffe and Wiefferink 2017). Deficits in language cause these children to struggle in social contexts, leading to emotional problems such as anxiety, withdrawal or low self-esteem (Leonard 2014), although these symptoms do not always reach the threshold of clinical significance. However, a unidirectional view may be too simplistic, and it is questionable whether variances in language abilities can sufficiently explain SEB problems. First, it is important to note that not all children with language disorders experience SEB difficulties and vice versa (Levickis et al. 2018). There is no clear association between the severity of language deficiencies and SEB problems. For example, Eadie et al. (2018) did not find differences in QoL between children with severe or mild to moderate language impairment. SEB problems do not always disappear when language abilities recover, and early language skills are not always a reliable predictor of subsequent SEB problems. It might be hypothesized that SEB symptoms may originally arise as a consequence of a child’s limitations in language and communication, but in the course of their development, verbal and nonverbal domains can follow different trajectories depending on various individual characteristics (e.g., gender, temperament, personality), and environmental influences (such as family support, educational and/or clinical intervention, and other issues).

It must be kept in mind that DLD as well as SEB skills are cover terms that encompass a range of different aspects. Which aspects of language are associated with which dimensions of SEB behavior is an unresolved issue. Levickis et al. (2018) stress that associations with language exist for some domains of SEB, but not for others. For example, they found that the overall association between the stability of the language disorder and SEB problems was strongest for hyperactivity and weaker for emotional problems. Conti-Ramsden et al. (2019) examined in detail whether trajectories of emotional problems and peer problems proceed in parallel in children and adolescents with a history of DLD. The results uncovered distinct patterns. In approximately half of the sample, the trajectories of emotional difficulties and peer relation problems did run in parallel, but there were also patterns in which emotional and peer problems diverged, such as in patterns involving (a) low levels of emotional problems together with gradually increasing peer problems, or (b) high levels of early emotional difficulties resolving into adolescence, together with relatively low peer problems. These results emphasize that the patterns and symptoms of SEB problems in children with DLD vary individually and change over time. Yet little attention has been paid to individual linguistic profiles and their potential association with SEB problems. Given that DLD is heterogeneous and symptoms can affect different domains of language to different extents, future research should investigate whether a certain profile or subtype of DLD (such as speech sound disorder, lexical problems, grammatical problems, or combinations of impaired areas) interferes most with successful communication and interaction and therefore has the strongest negative impact on socio-emotional development.

To summarize, DLD is often, but not necessarily always, accompanied by socio-emotional problems. Future research should further clarify the interrelations between these domains.

2.3 Processing and verbalization of emotions in DLD

In the studies conducted to date, co-existing SEB problems were predominantly identified by questionnaires given to parents or caregivers. Therefore, it is worth investigating whether and how children with DLD differ from TD peers when they are directly asked to process or verbalize emotions in experimental settings.

With respect to children's processing of emotional information during development, findings are ambiguous. Rieffe and Wiefferink (2017) found no difference between results from toddlers and preschoolers with and without language impairment on a nonverbal task for facial emotion recognition, but identified lower performance by the language-impaired group on an emotion recognition task that involved labelling of emotions. In contrast, there are findings that point to problems with emotion processing at a nonverbal level. Spackman et al. (2005) investigated emotion recognition in children with language impairments. In a task that required minimal reliance on language, participants were shown photographs of faces and asked to indicate which emotion was being expressed using response cards. Children with language impairments had significantly more difficulty identifying the emotions of surprise and disgust. Merkenschlager et al. (2012) presented silent video clips showing facial-gestural expressions of basic emotions. Children with and without DLD were

asked to choose a line drawing that matched the emotion presented and to express the emotional content of the scene by verbally describing or pantomiming it. Performance in emotion recognition by children with DLD lagged behind those of the TD children. Furthermore, age-dependent skill improvement in emotion recognition was lacking in the clinical group. Deficits in nonverbal emotion processing were also reported by Levy (2019) using a video-based emotion recognition task. Children with DLD not only performed significantly below the level of TD peers on the verbal part of the task (choosing an emotion word out of four alternatives that matched a facial expression displayed by an actor/actress in a short video), but also on the nonverbal part (identifying a video clip out of four alternatives that showed the same emotion as the emotion displayed in a target video).

This line of research was also pursued by our group. First, a series of multi-modal experiments investigated how TD children, adolescents, and adults categorized emotion words and emotional facial expressions (see Bahn et al. 2017; Kauschke et al. 2019; Vesker et al. 2018a, 2018b). The results demonstrated that participants improved with age on emotional categorization tasks. For both emotional words and facial expressions, children at age 6 performed better when categorizing positive compared to negative stimuli, an advantage that decreased with age. With reference to DLD, it was particularly interesting to contrast subjects' performance on verbal and nonverbal tasks. As a result of this language disorder, limitations on the processing of emotion words were expected. If DLD affects primarily or predominantly the language domain, the processing of emotional faces should be similar to TD children. However, if the processing of emotional information is affected more generally, emotional face recognition might also be impaired. In a subsequent experiment with primary school children with and without DLD (Bahn et al. 2021), we used parallelized verbal and nonverbal emotion-processing tasks (two decision and two categorization tasks). In the decision tasks, the participants had to differentiate between words and pseudowords (verbal task) or between human and animal faces (nonverbal control task). In the categorization tasks, they had to classify emotion words (verbal) or pictures showing emotional facial expressions (nonverbal) as positive or negative. Results indicated that TD children – as expected – performed better than DLD children on lexical decision and emotion word categorization tasks. No group differences were found for the face decision task, indicating that the lower performance of the children with DLD was not reducible to a generally lower processing level or to attentional deficits. Surprisingly, the children with DLD were also significantly less accurate on the nonverbal emotion-processing task (categorizing facial expressions as positive or negative), suggesting emotion-processing problems across modalities.

Further evidence for problems in emotion understanding comes from the processing of emotional tone: Children with language impairments show problems interpreting emotion conveyed by prosody. When presented with narrative passages that vocally express the emotions of happiness, anger, fear, or sadness, children with language impairments performed more poorly than their TD peers (Fujiki et al. 2008). Similar deficits in the recognition of vocal emotion cues have also been confirmed in recent studies (Griffiths et al. 2020; Löytölä et al. 2020).

Turning to the verbalization of emotional states, studies have consistently found that children with impaired language skills were less accurate at labeling isolated facial expres-

sions depicted in photographs (e.g., Delaunay-El Allam et al. 2011). Even when they were able to identify and label emotions from facial expressions, they still had difficulties linking these emotions to prototypical social situations (Rieffe and Wiefferink 2017) and integrating their emotion knowledge with event contexts (Ford and Milosky 2003). Spackman, Fujiki, and Brinton (2006) examined the ability of children with DLD to infer and describe emotions associated with specific social situations. Children with DLD made significantly more errors at inferring the correct emotion. In addition, they were less sophisticated in their descriptions of emotions than were TD children. Although they could talk about their emotional experiences in some instances, they did so in a vague way – e.g., by simply restating the emotion – or refused to perform the task. A closer look at narratives of children with DLD was taken by Brinton, Fujiki, and Asai (2019), who examined the ability of five children with DLD to describe mental states in stories and found that these children “seldom described the internal experience of characters; how characters understood events, how they reacted to specific situations, what they wanted or hoped for, or how they felt” (Brinton, Fujiki, and Asai 2019: 5). When directly prompted to do so, these children produced more references to emotions than during spontaneous story production, but their responses still revealed gaps in their understanding of characters’ emotional states.

In light of the problems children with DLD have with understanding emotions that were revealed by the reported findings, it should be questioned if deficits in structural language can fully explain the limitations observed in emotion processing. While it is possible that children with DLD simply lack the words and grammatical structures necessary to describe emotions and inner states with sufficient detail and sophistication, some authors (Brinton, Fujiki, and Asai 2019; Spackman, Fujiki, and Brinton 2006) doubt that such findings can be wholly attributed to language limitations and argue that the perception and understanding of emotions might be shallow and immature in children with DLD. If this proves to be true, difficulty determining emotions from events might “translate into confusion inferring what emotions peers experience in every-day situations, and this could continue to undermine social interaction” (Spackman, Fujiki, and Brinton 2006: 184).

To take this idea further, constructionist approaches (e.g., Lindquist, Satpute, and Gendron 2015; Lindquist 2017) argue for a very powerful supporting role of language in the perception and experiencing of emotions. According to this view, language does more than simply communicate emotions. Instead, it is an important ingredient for the creation and shaping of emotion concepts. Emotion words in particular are essential to transform vague sensations of pleasure and displeasure into a discrete and coherent emotion. Consequently, the presence or absence of emotion words will alter the categorization and conceptualization of emotions. In that sense, “disorders that impair language might have implications for emotion and social processing that are more far-reaching than typically assumed” (Lindquist 2017: 138). DLD might be a test case for this assumption, since it is widely acknowledged that restricted language abilities limit communicative opportunities, leading to SEB problems (as described in Section 2.2). However, the influence of language may go beyond this. Language impairment affects the acquisition of a differentiated repertoire of emotion words (following the general limitations in vocabulary size characteristic in children with DLD), and the related opportunity to learn about emotion concepts through language. This might have a negative impact on more basic processes of emotion perception,

processing, categorization, and understanding. The above-mentioned findings demonstrating the difficulties of children with DLD with nonverbal emotion-related tasks, and the longitudinal associations between poor language skills and later emotion recognition difficulties (Griffiths et al. 2020) can be seen as support of this hypothesis.

In order to disentangle the contributions of language and emotion processing to the profile of DLD, the children's individual language competencies in different linguistic domains should be considered in more detail and correlated with their performance on non-verbal emotion-processing tasks.

3 Language and emotion in Autism Spectrum Disorder

3.1 Definition and characteristics of ASD

ASD is a complex neurodevelopmental disorder characterized by marked and ongoing deficits in reciprocal social interaction and communication, and unusually restricted, repetitive behavior and interests (WHO 2018; Masi et al. 2017). ASD covers a spectrum from mild to severe symptoms with high inter- and intraindividual variability. In addition to the core symptoms mentioned above, language and cognition can be affected to different degrees. Individuals with ASD and co-occurring intellectual disabilities are categorized as "low-functioning". A large proportion of these individuals do not develop language, or acquire only a few words or signs at most, resulting in severe communication problems (Maljaars et al. 2012). Therefore, the link between language and emotion cannot be effectively studied in this population. In contrast, individuals with average or above-average intellectual development and good verbal abilities have been described as "high-functioning". High Functioning Autism (HFA) is particularly interesting here because it seems to provide a clear contrast to DLD: While cognitive abilities are in normal ranges in both conditions, the fundamental problem in DLD is language (even though it is often accompanied by SEB problems, as shown in the previous section); however, the main characteristics of HFA are limited socio-emotional reciprocity, lack of emotion understanding, and reduced interest in sharing emotions with others. Thus, at first glance, these two developmental disorders seem to represent dissociating profiles of strengths and weaknesses in the domains of language and emotion. However, Löytölä et al. (2020) found very similar delays in emotion recognition skills in children with both ASD and DLD.

Verbal abilities in HFA are mixed, with both preserved and impaired components (Landa and Goldberg 2005). Individuals with HFA show relative strengths in the domains of grammar, phonology, and vocabulary, while in the semantic domain, subtle impairments may arise when processing abstract, figurative, or ambiguous language. Individuals with HFA often fail to interpret the meaning of figurative expressions despite intact structural language skills (Vulchanova et al. 2015). In addition, they may invent novel words with idiosyncratic meaning or use odd or overly formal and precise words that give the impression of "pedantic speech". Pragmatic deficits are nearly universal in both high- and low-functioning subjects with ASD (Eigsti et al. 2010), including symptoms like inappropriate responses or conversational difficulties.

3.2 Processing and verbalization of emotions in ASD

A compromised ability to recognize, interpret, or express emotions is a characteristic feature of ASD. Nonverbal emotion processing is clearly impaired: for example, there is evidence that individuals with ASD have difficulty extracting emotional information from faces (Harms, Martin, and Wallace 2010), perceiving other's moods, and using nonverbal behaviors such as eye gaze and facial expressions. Given that formal language abilities are good or at least sufficient in individuals with HFA, but the motivation to communicate about internal states is diminished, Levy and Kauschke (2015) investigated whether children with HFA between the ages of 8 and 12 were able to produce emotion words adequately. Three tasks were performed:

1. Cued word generation: Participants were asked to name as many words as they knew that belonged to the categories "animals" or "emotions".
2. Word association: Participants were asked to produce as many words as possible that came to their minds when hearing the terms "joy", "fear", and "school".
3. Animated shapes task: Participants verbally described video scenes (Abell, Happé, and Frith 2000) depicting moving triangles. Words produced that referred to internal states in general and for emotions in particular were analyzed.

Results showed that there were no significant differences between the participants with the HFA group and an age-matched healthy control group. The HFA group generated and associated a similar number of words when presented with emotional cues and used a comparable proportion of words referring to internal states and emotions when describing the video scenes. It was evident that children with HFA had acquired age-appropriate emotion vocabularies, and they were willing to make use of them in these experimental settings.

Even though individuals with HFA seem to be well equipped with verbal devices to express emotions, this does not mean that they employ these means in unconstrained settings. A number of studies used oral narratives (mostly based on picture books) in order to analyze the production of words referring to internal states. When the overall use of internal state terms (which refer to intentions, desires, emotions, or cognitive states) is compared in HFA groups and control groups, results are mixed. According to a meta-analysis by Baixauli et al. (2016), the results from 15 selected studies on internal state language in high-functioning ASD were highly heterogeneous, but showed a medium effect in comparison to the control groups, suggesting that individuals with HFA tended to use fewer terms for internal states. A heterogeneous picture also emerges with regard to the use of emotion words (a subset of internal state terms): While some studies did not find group differences (e.g., Losh and Capps 2003; Rumpf et al. 2012), other studies showed that the proportion of emotion words used was lower than in TD children (e.g., Kauschke et al. 2016; Siller et al. 2014). From a quantitative viewpoint, limitations in the use of affective language in narratives may not always be evident, but more serious difficulties may arise in the expression of qualitative aspects, in particular with explanations of the causes and consequences of emotions. When asked directly how characters felt in certain situations or why they behaved in certain ways, participants with ASD produced fewer appropriate terms than controls (e.g., Tager-Flusberg and Sullivan 1995). Lartseva, Dijkstra, and Buitelaar (2015)

conclude from their review on emotional language that individuals with ASD have difficulty providing in-depth explanations. It must be kept in mind that storytelling does not necessarily involve the recognition and verbalization of emotions actually experienced by the speaker or the dialogue partner. It remains an open question of how individuals with ASD verbalize emotional states in everyday situations, and to what extent they might attempt to avoid these topics in natural discourse.

3.3 Comparison of internal state language in DLD and ASD

Since the boundaries between the two developmental disorders are not always clear-cut and similar symptoms can sometimes be found in children from either group, there has been substantial debate about the degree to which ASD and DLD overlap. Suggestions to define the disorders along one continuum (Bishop and Norbury 2002) have been replaced by approaches that consider the overlap as superficial and argue for distinct profiles (Taylor et al. 2014). Either way, children with DLD as well as those with ASD have been shown to have problems to adequately describe internal states experienced by story characters, perhaps due to different underlying problems related to the respective condition. To address this issue, two studies that directly compared these two populations with respect to their use of affective language in narratives will be discussed in this section. According to Norbury, Gemmell, and Paul (2014), narratives are a challenging setting for both populations: For individuals with ASD, storytelling “puts pressure on both their relatively (though not entirely) spared structural language skills, as well as their weak pragmatic abilities”; for children with DLD, “narratives are a context in which to observe the relatively (though not entirely) spared pragmatic and socio-cognitive skills, while highlighting the effects of their characteristic limitations in structural language” (Norbury et al. 2014: 487).

Norbury et al. (2014) investigated narratives from 75 English-speaking children and adolescents between the ages of 6 and 15 elicited by the use of a wordless picture book. The groups with ASD and DLD presented the most prototypical phenotypes: The participants with ASD did not show structural language deficits on standardized tests, and the participants with DLD had no social-pragmatic impairments. Despite these distinct profiles, results from both groups converged on rather similar problems in narrative skills. Participants with ASD and DLD performed poorer than TD children regarding quantitative indices such as story length, number of different words, or syntactic complexity. In addition, both clinical groups had difficulty organizing utterances into cohesive structures, their narratives lacked semantic richness, and they omitted important story elements. Regarding the use of internal state language in their stories, the DLD group turned out to use less differentiated affective vocabulary than either the TD group or the ASD group. The authors concluded that participants with ASD had sufficient vocabulary and social insight to recognize and label internal states, while children with DLD may have recognized those internal states in others but lacked the vocabulary to discuss thoughts or feelings.

In a study by Levy (2019), narratives of 69 German-speaking children between the ages of 8 and 12 were analyzed. As in the study by Norbury et al., performance on standardized language tests was age-appropriate in the ASD group and impaired in the DLD group, and

the high-functioning ASD group showed more signs of social-pragmatic problems than the DLD group. The participants were asked to re-tell the events shown in a video that depicted an emotion-laden story. In contrast to the results reported by Norbury et al., the ASD group did not differ from the control group regarding quantitative indices, macrostructure, coherence, and cohesion, while the DLD group, as expected, lagged behind the TD and ASD groups in all quantitative and qualitative variables used to measure narrative competence. A striking convergence with the results reported by Norbury et al. emerged with respect to the use of internal state language: Again, the DLD group used significantly fewer words for internal states than both the TD and the ASD groups, who did not differ significantly from each other. When lexical abilities (measured by a standardized expressive vocabulary test) were included as a covariate, only the difference between the DLD group and the control group remained significant. That is, even when controlled for vocabulary size, children with DLD still produced fewer words to describe internal states than the control group. Thus, it cannot be rejected that the inability to express story characters' internal states is more than just a byproduct of lacking the verbal means to do so. As argued in Section 2.3, emotion concepts per se may be altered in children with DLD because the formation of emotion categories has not been sufficiently supported by language.

The results of these two cross-disorder studies differ with respect to narrative competence in ASD, which turned out to be impaired in one study and age-appropriate in the other, but these differences might be attributed to the use of different elicitation techniques. However, a consistent finding in both studies was that participants with DLD clearly had more difficulties than their peers with ASD to verbally express the intentions, thoughts, and feelings of story characters. These findings indicate that individuals with high-functioning forms of ASD are willing and able to verbalize emotional content in narrative contexts, while the reasons for the sparse verbalizations of inner states in children with DLD must still be clarified.

4 Language and emotion in depression

4.1 Definition and characteristics of depression

Depressive disorders are characterized by a range of symptoms, such as depressed mood and loss or diminishment of interest, pleasure, enjoyment or energy, accompanied by other behavioral or neurovegetative symptoms (WHO 2018). A major symptom is anhedonia, which is decreased sensitivity to pleasurable events (Bevins and Besheer 2005). Patients with this condition often pay selective attention to negative stimuli, interpret stimuli more negatively than healthy people, or show attenuated processing of positive stimuli. Another core symptom of depression is self-rumination, which is a strong focus on one's own problems and distresses (Şimşek 2013).

Assuming that language reveals information about personality, research has pursued the issue of how characteristics of a disorder are reflected in patients' language processing and use. First, one robust finding is that patients with depression frequently use first-person singular pronouns. This "I-talk" seems to be reliably related to depression and indi-

cates self-focused attention. For example, Rude et al. (2004) showed that participants with depression produced the pronoun "I" more frequently than participants without depression. Tackman et al. (2019) also confirmed the correlation between I-talk and depression. However, they concluded from their findings that self-referential language using first-person singular pronouns may not be unique to depression, but rather linked to distress proneness or negative emotionality in general. I-talk can also be clinically relevant, as frequent first-person pronoun use was found to predict an unfavorable course of depression (Zimmermann et al. 2017). A second speech-related feature observed in patients with depression is the frequent use of absolutist words. Al-Mosaiwi and Johnstone (2018) revealed in an analysis of texts taken from internet forums that depression as well as other affective disorders (e.g., anxiety) are correlated with a higher use of words without nuances (like "always", "totally", "entire"), reflecting absolutist thinking. Third, dissociations between the use of literal and figurative language link depression to ASD, as well as to other psychiatric disorders such as schizophrenia. In these populations, it has been observed that abstract ideas conveyed by idiomatic or metaphoric expressions are often interpreted in concrete ways, which is clinically referred to as *concretism*. Barth and Küfferle (2001), who designed a proverb and metaphor interpretation test for use in German, found that concretistic interpretations in depression were not as pronounced as those expressed in schizophrenia, but difficulties in the processing of figurative language cannot be excluded. Nagels et al. (2016) and Kauschke et al. (2018), by using the same test, showed that patients with depression had more difficulty interpreting metaphors and proverbs than did healthy controls. In contrast, Bartczak and Bokus (2015) concluded from their rating study that subjects with depression did not have problems with metaphorical processing per se. Charteris-Black (2012) analyzed how patients with depression verbally expressed their attitudes towards the disorder in oral interviews and found that patients did use metaphors to refer to their feelings and their disorders. In the interviews, they described their experiences with depression by using such terms as "trapped", "weight and pressure", "darkness", or "emptiness". Thus, it is unclear whether concretism is as typical in patients with depression as it is in patients with schizophrenia or ASD.

At least two of the potential linguistic markers (I-talk and absolutist words) have been shown to be clearly associated with depression. Nevertheless, they should not be considered unique markers, as similar traits were found in several other clinical groups.

4.2 Verbalization of emotions in depression

Given that depression is a mood disorder, it is reasonable to assume that emotive language would be particularly affected. Indeed, a focus on negative emotional experiences that is characteristic for depression is frequently accompanied by a negativity bias in language processing and use. Schlipf et al. (2013) demonstrated attenuated evaluation of positive words in patients with depression. Using lexical decision tasks, it was found that patients with depression were especially slow in processing negative affective words (Stip et al. 1994) and exhibited less brain activation for happy words and more activation for sad words than did controls (Canli et al. 2004).

The naturalistic speech used by patients with depression is often characterized by an over-representation of negative content. Rude et al. (2004) found that participants with depression used more negative emotion words than participants without depression in written essays. Kauschke et al. (2018) investigated the verbalization of emotions and other internal states in elicited speech production. The participants, 44 patients with depression and 36 healthy controls, were asked to describe pictures showing emotive events. The descriptions were transcribed and coded for all literal and figurative references to internal states. Apart from the fact that the control group was more talkative than the clinical group (the healthy participants produced a significantly higher total number of words in order to describe the pictures), the proportion of words referring to internal states relative to all tokens and the proportion of emotion words relative to all internal state terms did not differ between the groups. However, patients with depression tended to express fewer positive emotions than the participants in the control group, confirming attenuated attention to positive content. A detailed analysis of metaphorical expressions did not reveal significant group differences. Although the clinical group performed significantly poorer on the proverb and metaphor interpretation test, the patients with depression did not produce fewer metaphors in their descriptions. When talking about internal states, both groups used more literal (nearly 80 %) than metaphorical (around 20 %) expressions. Taken together, these data support the concept of a negativity bias, but do not support a concretistic bias in speech production.

In current research, the use of big data approaches has become increasingly popular. Based on the examination of selected social media posts, such studies analyze how the relative frequency of specific kinds of words (such as absolutist words or emotion words) relates to mental health. Several studies indicate that the frequent expression of negative emotion words on social media can identify individuals experiencing symptoms of depression (Seabrook et al. 2018). For example, Eichstaedt et al. (2018) showed that frequent verbal references to typical negative symptoms in Facebook postings were predictive of the poster having a medical report of depression. The profile of depression-associated language markers appearing in the postings “was nuanced, covering emotional (sadness, depressed mood), interpersonal (hostility, loneliness), and cognitive (self-focus, rumination) processes” and somatic complaints (Eichstaedt et al. 2018: 11205).

5 Clinical implications

This overview of findings from the analyses of three clinical populations has demonstrated that linguistic and emotional competencies are strongly intertwined. Nevertheless, this interaction is multi-faceted and can take different forms. For individuals with DLD, it has been shown that language impairment leads to communication problems, which in turn make children and adolescents with this condition vulnerable to difficulties with emotional adjustment and social behavior. A unilateral relation seems to exist with respect to the verbalization of emotions: Since subjects lack appropriate vocabulary and the necessary structural linguistic means, internal states cannot be conveyed and exchanged adequately. However, recent research suggests that subtle problems with emotional processing may

exist over and above the mere consequences of limited communication abilities. Despite their clearly diminished abilities for the processing of emotions, individuals with high-functioning types of ASD, in turn, have at their disposal the vocabulary and the linguistic competency to talk about emotions but seem to be less inclined to express their inner feelings to others in everyday situations. In individuals with depression, language markers related to the typical symptoms of the affective disorder were identified in patients' speech. According to Şimşek (2013), a link between language use and depression is incontrovertible, but the processes by which language contributes to depression are less clear.

In order to determine clinical implications, profiles of the strengths and weaknesses in the domains of language and emotional competencies, and the potential directions of influence among these domains have to be considered.

5.1 Clinical implications for children with DLD

Given that the notable language problems of children with DLD frequently cause subsequent socio-emotional problems, a primary simple clinical implication is straightforward: structural language skills must be improved as much as possible by speech and language therapy. Improved general language skills would enable children with DLD to better participate in communicative situations with peers and adults, and thus reduce the negative consequences on social behavior, emotional well-being, and quality of life. A second, more specific implication concerns the difficulties of children with DLD in describing internal states with language. Expanding the children's vocabulary for describing emotional and other psychological or mental states should therefore be an essential component of lexical intervention. In addition to expanding the emotive lexicon, information on the use of other means of expressing emotions through language can be targeted in the intervention process, such as syntax (exclamative sentences), morphology (affixes or particles with affective connotations and functions), and prosody (emotional tone). Newly acquired words and structures used for the expression of emotions should then be consolidated into narrative contexts (by the comprehension and generation of stories), and finally transferred into spontaneous speech. The use of internal state language should be supported by caregivers. Rieffe and Wiefferink (2017) stress the importance of "emotion talk" in families for toddlers and preschool children with language problems. During book reading episodes, as an example, caregivers should invite their child to join in conversations about the story character's emotions, and to express their own thoughts and feelings about the story.

Some authors claim that nonverbal domains should additionally be targeted in the clinical treatment of children with DLD. Conti-Ramsden et al. (2019) stress that the diagnosis of children with DLD should include examination of much more than language skills. Strengths and difficulties in specific domains of emotional processing, emotion regulation, and social behavior need to be assessed carefully and on an individual basis. Assessment in these nonverbal domains helps to estimate the breadth of a child's difficulties and to identify individual areas of robustness or resilience. Socio-emotional aspects should also be incorporated into therapy. Spackman et al. (2006) suggest that interventions for children with DLD should include activities designed to enrich these children's emotion understand-

ing. Moreover, children with DLD accompanied by socio-emotional problems clearly need intensive support from their families. Therefore, whole-family approaches to intervention may be useful. Eadie et al. (2018) emphasize the role of family resources in improving affected children's overall well-being and quality of life. Lindsay and Dockrell (2012) state that adults, including parents and family members and those involved in teaching and training, have the potential to support adolescents with DLD and to enhance their resilience to behavioral and emotional difficulties.

Given that the trajectories of language and emotional competencies and the patterns of relative strengths and weaknesses are fluid and variable throughout development, it is necessary to monitor a child's profile of skills continuously in both domains in order to find an intervention strategy that can be tailored to the child's needs at the time of intervention. This is a challenging task that requires interdisciplinary work with a variety of professionals, such as language therapists and psychologists. Levickis et al. (2018) are concerned that DLD and socio-emotional problems are often viewed as separate entities, and thus diagnostic and intervention services may not always be coordinated. Apparently, there is a strong need for integrated, interdisciplinary approaches for children with DLD.

5.2 Clinical implications for individuals with ASD

While the classical approach for the treatment of DLD is speech and language therapy (although emotional competencies should not be neglected), intervention for individuals with ASD typically focuses on psychological treatment and cognitive-behavioral approaches. The comprehensive treatment program described in Thomeer et al. (2019), for example, comprises therapeutic activities targeting social skills, communication performance, face-emotion recognition skills, and interest expansion. Intervention may be complemented by activities designed to promote language skills. Thomeer et al. (2019) included training on the interpretation of nonliteral language in their program. Participants were exposed to a broad range of idioms and figurative language, and they had to decide whether a statement was meant to be interpreted literally or if it might have an alternative meaning. After the five-week treatment period, the children in treatment demonstrated significantly better understanding of nonliteral language compared to a control group. Lindquist et al. (2015) recommend techniques that train the labeling of one's own and others' emotions in order to compensate for the emotion-perception deficits observed in ASD.

Narratives are another language-related area relevant for individuals with ASD. Gillam et al. (2015) explored the effects of a narrative intervention program that emphasized the use of mental state and causal language. All five participating children achieved positive gains regarding overall story complexity, story grammar knowledge, perspective taking, and the use of mental verbs. Dodd et al. (2011) compared a traditional narrative-based intervention focusing on story grammar with a narrative approach that particularly focused on perspective taking. The latter program highlighted characters' emotions, cognitive states of mind, and perspective taking. Participants had to identify the emotions that the characters experienced throughout the story, as well as any influencing factors. Participants who received this kind of intervention demonstrated greater growth in their ability to retell a

story from the perspective of different characters and in their use of mental state verbs as compared to those who participated in the traditional program.

Through the use of narrative-based interventions, individuals with ASD learn to pay attention to characters' internal processes, to the causes that bring about emotions and other internal states, and to their consequences. These skills should be able to be transferred to natural situations. In individuals with ASD, it may be much more demanding to communicate their own emotions and to take interest in the internal states of conversation partners than to simply describe the internal states of fictitious story characters.

5.3 Clinical implications for patients with depression

Patients suffering from depression are commonly treated by antidepressant medications and/or cognitive-behavioral psychotherapy. The general aims of psychotherapy are to increase positive thinking, understand causes and triggers for depression, manage stress, change behavioral patterns or attitudes that contribute to symptoms, improve relationships, and find coping strategies. Language is not a primary target for patients with depression, but it plays a role in the identification and prognosis of the disorder, as well as for monitoring and promoting changes during therapy.

The characteristics of language use reported in the previous section are applied in order to identify people at risk for depression. It has been claimed that social media based screening methods, combined with the improvement of machine-learning algorithms, will be increasingly helpful with the identification and monitoring of social media users experiencing signs of depression (Eichstaedt et al. 2018; Seabrook et al. 2018). Linguistic markers such as I-talk or the frequent use of negative or absolutist words may point to specific symptoms or predict future depression status. Thus, “unobtrusive depression assessment through social media of consenting individuals may become feasible as a scalable complement to existing screening and monitoring procedures” (Eichstaedt et al. 2018: 11203). These large sample approaches offer the advantage of a naturalistic observational design, but also bear the risk of low experimental control (Al-Mossaiwi and Johnstone 2018).

Since psychotherapy is talk therapy, the speech and language used by the client and the counsellor play crucial roles in the intervention process. First, psychotherapy can help individuals label their emotional experiences more specifically, thereby increasing their emotion knowledge and emotion regulation (Lindquist, Satpute, and Gendron 2015). In addition, metaphors are considered as valuable markers of therapeutic change. Metaphorical expressions link abstract processes to concrete, perceptible experiences that make the underlying abstract concept more salient and accessible. Charteris-Black (2012) suggests that metaphorical expressions of trapped feelings can facilitate the recovery process. He recommends that therapists should encourage clients with depression to use diverse metaphors to convey the intensity of their emotions. Levitt et al. (2000) describe in detail how the focused use of metaphors during therapy (such as “unloading the burden”) can indicate therapeutic change, support recovery, and contribute to a positive outcome.

6 Conclusion

It must be kept in mind that the three clinical populations discussed in this chapter represent very heterogeneous conditions. In order to explore how types or severities of affective disorders alter patients' speech and language, which characteristics of language impairment are likely to impede socio-emotional competencies, and whether and how deficits in emotion representation may be rooted in language deficits, interindividual differences must be considered in future research. The inclusion of additional clinical populations should expand the knowledge base concerning these questions. Lindquist et al. (2014), for example, demonstrated altered emotion processing in patients with semantic dementia following atrophy in language-relevant areas of the left hemisphere. In addition, the use of neuroscientific methods, such as EEG or neuroimaging techniques, can shed light on the interaction of language and emotion at a neural level. Previous neuroimaging studies found links between schizophrenia and altered brain structures within typical emotion and language clusters (Nickl-Jockschat et al. 2011; Cavelti et al. 2018). However, studies on the interplay between emotion and language in clinical populations are still scarce, and further research is needed to support theories on underlying cognitive and neural mechanisms.

Taken together, elements of language serve as means by which personal experiences can achieve structure, coherence, and meaning. The ability to connect language and inner states makes it possible for individuals to make sense of their experiences. Consequently, an incongruity between language and inner states is detrimental to mental health and emotional well-being (Şimşek 2013), and the inability to verbally express personal experiences, or difficulties in representing internal states by language, can contribute to emotional problems. Therefore, enhancing the capacity and inclination to convey emotions through language seems to be fruitful and beneficial for a wide range of clinical populations – as well as in many non-clinical contexts.

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XXI Affective computing in human-machine interaction

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104 The use of language in affective computing for human-computer interaction

- 1 Introduction
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- 3 Examples of affect sensing and computational models of emotions
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Abstract: The field of Human-Computer Interaction has traditionally focused on the study, design, and implementation of techniques that facilitate an effective communication between a computational system and the user. In the last decades, the developments in this area have evolved from the design of useful and usable interfaces to the construction of complex interactive systems able to motivate and engage the user in the execution of a specific task. A relatively new field of research that has contributed to the advancement of human-computer interaction in this direction is known as affective computing. The term affective computing was coined in 1997 to refer to efforts dedicated to the construction of artificial systems able to recognise emotional states from the user and simulate emotions in advanced interactive systems such as embodied conversational agents and robots. A key component in the development of these systems is the use of natural language, as a source to identify human emotions, and as a medium to interact with the user. In this chapter we present a brief overview of the affective computing research area, emphasising how language is used for emotion recognition and emotional speech production. In the second part of the chapter, we describe our work in the recognition of emotions using paralinguistic information and the modelling of emotions for embodied conversational agents.

1 Introduction

The emergence of Human-Computer Interaction (HCI), as a discipline within computer sciences, can be seen to be very closely related to the development of personal computers in the later 1970s. As stated by Carroll (2001) in his brief intro to HCI, before the decade of the 1960s the focus of computing was on computation processes and few efforts were dedicated to present the results of these computations efficiently. This strategy started to change in the later years of the 1970s when some early ideas such as personal/desktop access to massive information (Bush 1945), graphical user interfaces (Sutherland 1963), and interaction with computers through direct pointing and windows (Engelbart and English 1968) were consolidated. At the beginning of the 1980s, when personal computers started

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to be accessible to the general public, which had no specialised knowledge of operating systems and software applications, it was evident that HCI efforts needed to be focused on the design of *easy* and *usable* interactive systems (Cockton 2001).

The study of methods and assessments centred on how to develop *ease-of-use* computer interfaces brought forth the term *usability*, which concentrated HCI's research endeavours during the 1990s (Diaper and Sanger 2006). Usability can be seen as a quality attribute assessing how easy and useful the software's user interfaces are (Issa and Isaias 2015). Four main factors have been identified as being of high impact on the usability of an interactive system: the user, the task, the technology and the context of use (Bruno and Al-Qaimari 2004). Thus, it is essential that interactive system designers consider the key characteristics of the targeted users' population, analyse the particularities of the task(s) that the users will perform with the system, recognise the potential and limitations of the technology, and understand the context where the system will be used. The study of these four factors, with the ultimate objective of improving how people interact with computers, has promoted the development of different research fields such as *User-Centred Design*, *Interaction Design* or *User Experience* (Ritter, Baxter, and Churchill 2014).

All these fields of research have contributed to the HCI area emphasising different aspects of the designing of interactive systems. While *User-Centred Design* is focused on "understanding the characteristics, capabilities, commonalities, and differences of the targeted users, *Interaction Design*" specialises in the designing of interactive products "to support people in their everyday and working lives" (Sharp, Rogers, and Preece 2002: 6). Complementarily, *User Experience* addresses the "user's emotions, beliefs, preferences, perceptions, physical and psychological responses, behaviours, and accomplishments that occur before, during, and after the interaction with the system" (Ritter, Baxter, and Churchill 2014: 44). The emergence of these fields has contributed to the shift in focus of HCI from the construction of *useful* and *usable* interfaces to the design of *enjoyable* and *engaging* interactive systems. This evolution of HCI's emphasis has occurred mainly due to the proliferation of new computer-based applications developed for personal and at-home use, contrasting with the traditional task-based work applications where HCI was initially concentrated (Blythe et al. 2004).

The construction of motivating and enjoyable applications involves not only the understanding of user's preferences and requirements but also a continuous perception of their emotions, reactions, and behaviour provoked by the system. This input can be used by the application to adapt its contents and style of interaction, with the objective of improving the user experience and maximising its utility. A relatively new field of research concerned with the design and creation of interactive systems that are able to sense, recognise, respond to, and influence user's emotions is *affective computing*. Rosalind Picard coined the term in her (1997) book, and argues that affective computing "expands HCI by including emotional communication together with appropriate means of handling affective information" (Picard 1999: 1). The construction of affectively competent interactive systems involves two main steps: the *sensing* of emotional states in the users, and the *generation* of affective reactions in the artificial systems. Applications of affect sensing can recognise different user emotions through the collection and analysis of signals and patterns obtained from facial expressions, linguistic and paralinguistic phenomena, textual data and

electrodermal activity, among some others. The generation – and communication to the user – of affective reactions in artificial systems is achieved through the development of computational architectures that simulate human-like emotion processes. These architectures are based on different cognitive, psychological and neurological perspectives of human emotions and are currently used as part of the internal mechanism in interactive social robots and embodied conversational agents.

One of the human communication abilities more studied in HCI and used in affective computing to sense and to convey affective information is language. The underlying research area of language-based interactive systems is *Natural Language Processing*, which explores methodologies and techniques for computers to understand and manipulate natural language – text or speech – to develop a naturalistic communication with the user. The generation of speech-based communication in artificial systems can facilitate straightforward interactions with a wide range of users, e.g., children and elderly people (Cucchiari and Van Hamme 2012). In affective computing, speech is one of the user's input data that can be analysed in linguistic and paralinguistic terms to identify emotional states. Complementarily, language is also of high importance when modelling emotions in artificial systems. The common way to convey a particular emotion from, e.g., an embodied conversational agent to the user is through the generation of particular verbal and non-verbal behaviour. Concerning verbal behaviour, a current open challenge is the production of expressive speech synthesis for the construction of realistic emotional virtual agents and robots.

In this chapter, we present an overview of the affective computing research area, emphasising how language is used for emotion recognition and emotional speech production. Particularly, Section 2 shows how different methodologies developed in the field of affective computing are currently integrated into the various modules of a spoken dialogue system. This integration allows the construction of interactive systems able to recognise different emotional states in the user (Section 2.1), emphasising two types of speech data: paralinguistic (Section 2.1.1) and linguistic (Section 2.1.2) information. Complementarily, we also present how interactive systems generate and communicate adequate emotional reactions at different moments during an interaction (Section 2.2). This affective communication is achieved through the implementation of a computational model of emotions (Section 2.2.1) able to emulate a specific emotional state, which is conveyed through emotional speech synthesis (Section 2.2.2).

In the second part of the chapter (Section 3), we describe in more detail some of our research in two main areas: (i) the recognition of emotions using paralinguistic information, and how this can be used to identify some mental health conditions in individuals (Section 3.1); and (ii) the modelling of affective processes for the construction of embodied conversational agents (Section 3.2) that can be used for learning (Section 3.2.1) and healthcare (Section 3.2.2) purposes. Finally, Section 4 presents some conclusions.

2 Affective computing and language

The affective computing research field is defined as “computing that relates to, arises from, or deliberately influences emotion and other affective phenomena” (Picard 1997: 3). Thus,

a primary objective is the study and development of technological systems and devices that can recognise, interpret, process and simulate human emotions. According to Sander and Scherer (2009), affective computing can be organised into four main areas:

1. Technologies used for sensing, recognising, modelling and predicting affective states.
2. Methods and techniques for the computers to respond adequately to the perceived affective information.
3. Computational mechanisms that model/simulate internal emotions or implement their regulatory and biasing functions.
4. Technology for displaying emotional information or mediating the expression or communication of emotions.

Each of these complementary areas has its own open challenges and involves knowledge not only from computer sciences but also from different disciplines such as psychology, cognitive science, sociology, linguistics, education, and neuroscience, among some others. For affect sensing, several efforts have been dedicated to the automatic recognition of user emotional states through the analysis of patterns collected from facial expressions (Cohn and De la Torre 2015), body postures (Bianchi-Berthouze and Kleinsmith 2015), speech features (Rao and Koolagudi 2013), text (Strapparava and Mihalcea 2015), physiological responses (Healey 2015), or more recently, using a multimodal approach (Castellano et al. 2015). Once the emotional state of a user is automatically detected, the next step during an interactive session is the generation of the adequate affective responses (according to the goals of the interactive system) and how to convey them.

The use of language in the affective interaction process – affect detection, generation of the emotional responses and the communication of them to the user – is directly related to the development of spoken dialogue systems. Spoken language is the most natural way of communication between humans, and it also provides an easy and quick way to interact with a computer application (Pittermann, Pittermann, and Minker 2010). The evolution of spoken dialogue systems has allowed its use in information retrieval (e.g., delivering bus or train schedules) through to problem-solving applications (e.g., offering technical support over the telephone). A spoken dialogue system is commonly composed of a pipeline of the following modules: (i) an automatic speech recognition module; (ii) a natural language understanding component; (iii) the dialogue manager system; (iv) a natural language generation module; and (v) a text-to-speech system (Schmitt and Minker 2013).

The addition of an emotional layer at different stages of the pipeline allows the construction of spoken dialogue systems able to recognise and convey affective information. Figure 104.1 presents the different components of a spoken dialogue system with the addition of affective models at the input and processing of the user's speech data, and at the generation and speech synthesis of artificial emotions. In particular, the recognition of user's emotional states can be done at the *speech recognition module* (using acoustic paralinguistic patterns) and at the *natural language understanding module* (through linguistic analysis). The identification of the user's emotional state can be used to update an – emotional – model of the user. The information of this user's model is, in turn, one of the inputs used by the *affective computational model* responsible for generating the emotional response during the interaction cycle. The communication of this affective information can




Fig. 104.1: Spoken dialogue system with components for recognition and generation of affective information.

be included in both the *language generation* and *text to speech modules*. The following subsection presents an overview of the most representative works and open challenges in the recognition and communication of emotions using language-based information.

2.1 Affect sensing from speech

2.1.1 Paralinguistic emotion recognition

The development of an emotional speech recogniser usually combines techniques of signal processing (Vetterli, Kovačević, and Goyal 2014) and machine learning (Mohri, Rostamizadeh, and Talwalkar 2012). Two main aspects are addressed in this research area: the first one is the development of techniques for the processing, analysis, and characterisation of the voice's signal. Secondly, the application of different pattern recognition techniques that model the properties of the information extracted from the voice's signal. Although significant progress has been achieved in this research area, there is still a long way to go to get robust speech emotion recognisers with good performance under realistic conditions. A factor that limits the performance of these systems in real contexts is the scarcity of databases containing audio of genuine and spontaneous emotions. Recurrently, researchers have worked with corpora of acted emotions representing, in most cases, prototypical and intense expressions that facilitate the search for acoustic correlation and the subsequent

automatic classification. This type of database is usually recorded in a controlled environment to avoid problems in the processing of the signal, including variation in the distance to the microphone, environmental noise or reverberation. As a consequence, the accuracy obtained by the developed models is not good enough when these models are transferred to real contexts (Steidl 2009). This lack of accuracy in contexts where there is little or no control is the main reason behind the recent construction of corpora in realistic environments such as podcast recordings (Lotfian and Busso 2017), children playing (Lyakso et al. 2015) or live TV shows (Lubis et al. 2014).

An additional challenge is the correct identification of a set of *acoustic features* for emotion recognition in spontaneous speech. Several works have focused on features related to the prosodic aspects, such as accent, intonation, and rhythm. However, it has been discovered that the closer we get to a realistic scenario, the less reliable is prosody as an indicator of the emotional state of the speaker (Batliner et al. 2003). Therefore, it is necessary to identify those features that complement the information provided by the prosodic aspect of speech such as voice quality, spectral and others. A third open challenge at the characterisation stage is how to find the ideal size of the speech segments that will be further analysed. The usual procedure is to divide the audio signal into small windows (around 25 milliseconds) where the signal is expected to be stationary and extract the acoustic features from each window (local features). However, for the capture of relevant paralinguistic information (such as emotions), it is necessary to analyse longer segments such as words or phrases by calculating statistics of all speech features extracted from an utterance (global features). Defining the size of the segments and the best way to capture the information has also been investigated. In Steidl (2009), three levels of segmentation have been tested: word, turn and chunk, but the identification of the best option remains an open research topic.

The selection and application of the *machine learning techniques* to train the classification or regression models for speech emotion recognition is also a fundamental step. There are two principal approaches at this stage. The *static processing* applies statistical functions on low-level descriptors in specific periods of time, preventing the overfitting in phonetic modelling. On the other hand, *dynamic processing* concerns how the acoustic features evolve over time taking into account the evolution of the emotional state of individuals. In static processing, the emotion recognition is performed through static machine learning methods such as Support Vector Machines, Decision Trees, and Feed-Forward Neural Networks. The classification is made at the elocution or turn level, and the analysed segments have different sizes. The features are obtained from the extraction of Low-Level Descriptors, e.g., intonation, energy, or spectral coefficients. Then statistical functions such as a mean, quantile standard deviation are applied to the features, which result in vectors of the same size for all the utterances (Vogt and André 2009; Lee et al. 2011). In dynamic processing, features such as tone, energy, Mel Frequency Cepstral Coefficients, and their derivatives are used in combination with dynamic machine learning methods such as Long Short-Term Memory Neural Networks, Hidden Markov Models (Pittermann and Pittermann 2007) or Gaussian Mixture Models.

2.1.1.1 Machine learning techniques for unlabelled data

One strategy to address the problem of scarcity of spontaneous, genuine and labelled emotional speech databases is the use of unsupervised (Hastie, Tibshirani, and Friedman 2009) and semi-supervised (Zhu and Goldberg 2009) machine learning techniques. In particular, the problem of unlabelled data can be addressed from two perspectives: by reusing knowledge and by minimising the number of samples required to train the classifiers. One way to reuse knowledge between different domains is through *transfer learning* (Pan and Yang 2010). For instance, in Zhang et al. (2011) an unsupervised adaptation of acoustic models for emotion recognition is described, and the results of adding unlabelled data in the training process are comparable with results obtained by training the classifiers with labelled data. Similarly, Deng, Zhang, and Schuller (2014) described a learning method for the transfer of features. In a first step, an exclusive model for the source and target data is trained using an unsupervised method to build two sub-spaces. Next, a neural network was used to discover the differences between the features of the target data in the source sub-space and the features in the target sub-space.

A strategy to minimise the number of samples required for the training of the classifiers is through *active learning* (Tong 2001). The objective of this technique is that the learning algorithm decides which data should be labelled. Active learning algorithms could obtain good classification accuracy of a sample, but they also include the possibility of asking the user whether a new classification is correct or not. Samples with less certainty are usually presented to human labellers for annotation. This strategy is applied in Zhang and Schuller (2012), where the authors describe how the problem of data scarcity is addressed using two strategies based on active learning. From the obtained results the authors conclude that the use of these strategies significantly reduces the amount of manually transcribed data necessary to obtain high accuracy in emotion recognition. A similar study is presented in Zhang et al. (2013), where it is suggested to exploit the reliability of the usual ambiguity in emotional labelling through an active learning approach based on the uncertainty of the label.

2.1.1.2 Use of deep learning

Deep learning (Skansi 2018) is another machine learning technique used in recent years to obtain better accuracy in speech emotion recognition (Fayek, Lech, and Cavedon 2017). Algorithms based on deep learning are usually applied for classification and features generation. In this approach, high-level abstractions are modelled in the data by using hierarchical feature architectures composed of multiple transformations of their representation. A relevant characteristic of deep learning is the unsupervised pre-training step of the learning algorithm (usually a neural network). At this stage, large amounts of unlabelled data can be used to build high-level features. Pre-training has the effect that the same neural network obtains better results than when initialised with random parameters, as it is traditionally done. Deep learning algorithms seek to exploit the unknown structure in the distribution of input data to discover good representations with abstract features at higher levels of representation learned from low-level features. This fact makes it easier to separate the most descriptive aspects of the data from each other (Schuller 2015).

The study presented in Stuhlsatz et al. (2011) describes the use of Deep Neural Networks to learn optimised discriminant features for speech emotion recognition. The authors

used a low dimensionality set of features applying a semi-supervised phase of initialisation and an unsupervised phase of neural network training. The results showed that the obtained discriminant features increased the performance of the obtained classifiers in comparison with models trained with support vector machines and a set of acoustic features of high dimensionality. Another study described in Huang and Narayanan (2017) developed a Recurrent Neural Network used for speech emotion recognition based on the log-Mel filterbank energies. Convolutional layers are responsible for the discriminative feature learning, and the authors proposed a convolutional attention mechanism to learn the utterance structure relevant to the task. Reported results indicate a 4.62% improvement in emotion recognition using the eINTERFACE'05 database (Martin et al. 2006). A review of other works that use deep learning techniques for speech emotion recognition achieving better accuracy levels compared with other machine learning techniques is presented in Latha and Priya (2016).

As a summary, the best results in emotion recognition from speech are currently achieved mainly by the use of semi-supervised and unsupervised machine learning techniques. These approaches include deep learning and transfer learning of compact data representations and automatic recognition tasks. A review of recent works also shows a trend towards a massive and autonomous multi-task learning requiring confidence estimation methods such as active learning.

2.1.2 Linguistic emotion recognition

While paralinguistic (i.e., implicit) information is usually measured by quantitative features describing variations in the way the words or phrases are pronounced, linguistic (i.e., explicit) information identifies the qualitative patterns that a speaker has articulated (Anagnostopoulos, Iliou, and Giannoukos 2015). The linguistic emotion recognition process is in charge of identifying specific words or phrases usually from texts (in spoken dialogue systems, this process is applied to the transcription of the user's utterances), which can be correlated to an emotional state. The existence of an updated dictionary of emotionally salient words is then highly important for the successful implementation of linguistics in emotion recognition. According to Danisman and Alpkocak (2008) three main approaches are commonly used for emotion recognition in texts and documents: *keyword-based approaches*, *lexical affinity* and *ontology-based approaches*.

Keyword-based approaches are based on a predetermined set of terms to classify the text into emotion categories. An example of this approach is the study described in Hu and Liu (2004), which uses a small set of given seed opinion words, finding their synonyms and antonyms in WordNet as predictors of the semantic orientation of adjectives. WordNet organises adjectives as bipolar clusters sharing the same orientation of their synonyms and opposite orientation of their antonyms. Thus, if the orientation of a synonym/antonym is known, then the orientation of the given adjective could be set correspondingly. Having enough seed adjectives with known orientations, then the orientations of all the adjective words can be obtained (Lee, Jeong, and Lee 2008). However, as stated in Shelke (2014), this approach has the limitations of ambiguity in keyword definitions or the inability to

process text without keywords. The lexical affinity approach (Valitutti, Strapparava, and Stock 2004) uses affinities of words as a feed for a machine-learning algorithm. The words have some probabilistic value representing the affinity for a particular emotion class. However, it requires a high-quality, large-scale training dataset for a better classification. Ontology-based approaches use semantic networks as linguistic resources for lexical representation of affective information using common-sense knowledge. An example of these resources is ConceptNet (Liu and Singh 2004), an integrated common-sense knowledge-base with a natural language processing toolkit called MontyLingua that supports textual reasoning tasks without additional statistical training.

A research field close to emotion recognition from texts that has arisen in recent years is known as *sentiment analysis* or opinion mining (Cambria et al. 2017). As defined in Liu (2017), sentiment analysis “is the computational study of people’s opinions, sentiments, evaluations, attitudes, moods, and emotions” (Liu 2017: 11). The high rise of sentiment analysis over the last decade can be explained in part by the extensive use of social networks where users generate millions of texts expressing different opinions, feelings and sentiments on several and different topics. A key difference between emotion recognition from texts and sentiment analysis is that while the former focuses on extracting a set of emotion classes, the latter is usually a binary classification task with outputs such as *positive* versus *negative* or *like* versus *dislike* (Cambria et al. 2017). The two research areas are closely related and even inter-dependent to the extent that some sentiment categorisation models, e.g., the Hourglass of Emotions (Cambria, Livingstone, and Hussain 2012), infer the polarity associated to a sentence directly from the emotions this conveys. The development of this research area has not only allowed the recognition of the polarity in sentences but also different sub-tasks have been defined such as aspect extraction (Poria, Cambria, and Gelbukh 2016), subjectivity detection (Chaturvedi, Cambria, and Vilares 2016), sarcasm detection (Poria et al. 2016), or personality recognition (Poria et al. 2013).

But focusing on the linguistic emotion recognition used in spoken dialogue systems, the best results are obtained from studies that combine linguistic and paralinguistic information. An example is the research described in Batliner et al. (2003), which suggests that apart from prosodic features in the speech signal, syntactic and behavioural hints like repetitions in a dialogue and part-of-speech features should be taken into consideration. Similarly, the work of Litman and Forbes-Riley (2004) studies the utility of speech and lexical features for predicting student emotions in computer-human tutoring dialogues. Emotion annotation was performed for negative, neutral, positive and mixed emotions. Prosodic features were extracted from the speech signal and lexical items (words) from recognised speech. Reported results indicate a 19 % to 36 % relative improvement in error reduction over a baseline of previous experiments.

2.2 Generation of emotional speech responses

Once the emotional state of a user is automatically detected, the next step during an interactive session is the generation of adequate – in terms of the interactive system’s goals – affective responses and the way to convey them. Different computational models have been

developed with the aim to simulate human-based processes for the generation of emotions in artificial systems. The following sub-sections present two research areas dedicated to the generation and communication of affective states: the development of *computational models of emotions* and *emotional speech synthesis*.

2.2.1 Computational models of emotions

Computational models of emotions have emerged trying to cover specific (and sometimes theoretically incompatible) emotional mechanisms with the objective to implement computational functions that imitate biological emotions (Sander and Scherer 2009). The differences in many of the existent computational models of emotions are a logical consequence of the different emotion theories where these models have their roots. In particular, the different psychological theories of emotion differ in their assumptions about which components are intrinsic to emotion (e.g., cognitive processes, physiological responses, motivational changes, motor expression, and subjective feeling), how they are integrated, and what the relationships are between them (Marsella, Gratch, and Petta 2010; Scherer 2010). Some of these theories of emotion are the following (Scherer 2010; Scherer and Peper 2001):

- *Adaptation theories* argue that the emotion system has an adaptive function that is primed by evolution to detect stimuli that are vitally significant for the organism's well-being.
- *Dimensional theories* differentiate emotions by their position in a two-dimensional space: (i) *valence* (pleasantness-unpleasantness) and (ii) *arousal* (or activation) varying on a continuum from active to passive.
- *Appraisal theories* argue that most emotions are elicited by cognitive (but not necessarily conscious or controlled) evaluations of situations and events, and that the patterning of the reactions in the different response is driven by the results of the evaluation (i.e., appraisal) process.
- *Motivational theories* are based on the relationship between emotional and motivational phenomena.
- *Circuit theories* assume that genetically coded neural circuits determine the differentiation and the number of fundamental emotions.
- *Basic emotion theories* claim that during the course of evolution a limited number of basic or fundamental emotions (typically between 7 and 14) have evolved and that each of these emotions has its own eliciting conditions and its own physiological, expressive, and behavioural reaction patterns.
- *Lexical theories* assume that semantic structure will point to the underlying organisation and determinants of the emotion domain.
- *Social constructivist theories* suggest that the meaning of emotion is mostly constituted by socio-culturally determined behaviour and value patterns.

The selection of a specific emotion theory as the basis of a computational model should highly depend on the specific components of the emotion phenomenon that the computational model tries to represent. For example, dimensional theories are frequently used as




Fig. 104.2: Some representative computational models of emotion, taken from (Marsella, Gratch, and Petta 2010).

good representational frameworks for systems that attempt to recognise human emotional behaviour. This choice is mainly due to the fact that a dimensional model translates emotion into a small number of continuous dimensions that can be mapped to continuous features of behaviour (Marsella, Gratch, and Petta 2010). Some existent computational models of emotion *combine* different theories to represent different components and phases of the emotion phenomenon. For example, as presented in Scherer (2010), the valence and arousal dimensions can be seen as the representation of a high-order factor space into which the discrete or basic emotions can be plotted. Moreover, a computational affective system can implement for example a dimensional model for the user's emotion recognition and an appraisal model for the generation of emotional behaviour during the interaction. Some of the existent computational models and the theories behind them are reviewed in (Marsella, Gratch, and Petta 2010). Figure 104.2 shows a summary of different computational models of emotions and their theoretical roots.

From the current existent theories of emotion, the one that predominates above the others in the efforts dedicated to implementing computational models of emotions is the *cognitive appraisal theory of emotions* (Lazarus 1991; Scherer, Schorr, and Johnstone 2001). The core concept of appraisal theories is that the events in a person's environment are constantly identified and evaluated by the individual. This cognitive evaluation (or appraisal) process leads to an emotional response (according to the event's relevance for the person), which in turn generates a specific behaviour to cope with the appraised events. The high success in choosing this theory as the theoretical background in several computa-

al models seems in part due to the emphasis and explanation of the connection between cognition and emotion, which help in the construction of artificial systems that simulate complex human-like behaviours. Moreover, appraisal theories of emotion appear to be the most comprehensive way to represent the complexity of the emotion process, covering the whole path from low-level appraisals of the eliciting event to high-level influence over behaviour (Scherer 2010).

Several computational architectures based on the appraisal theory of emotions have been developed since the early 1990s (Elliott 1992; Dias and Paiva 2005; Gebhard 2005; Marsella and Gratch 2009) most of them focused on the construction of (more) believable embodied conversational agents within virtual environments. As reflected in Marsella, Gratch, and Petta (2010), the development of embodied conversational agents based on appraisal theories has allowed the creation of real-time interactive characters that exhibit emotions in order to make them more compelling (Reilly 1996), more realistic (Mao and Gratch 2006), or more able to induce desirable social effects in the users (Paiva et al. 2005). During the interaction between the agent and the user, the generated agent's emotion can be used by the natural language generation component to add emotionally salient words in the construction of the dialogue's utterances used by the agent in the verbal responses to the user.

2.2.2 Emotional speech synthesis

After the affective computational model produces a specific emotion, the next step is how to convey that particular emotion to the user. In a spoken dialogue system, the text-to-speech component should be able to synthesise the voice with the different tones and intonations that can be associated with different emotions. Intelligibility in synthetic speech has improved considerably in recent years, to the point that speech synthesisers are widely accepted and used in several devices and applications (Crumpton and Bethel 2016). Nevertheless, the generation of artificial emotional voices in text-to-speech systems is not yet a common feature. The main reason for this is that current synthesisers still face the problem of generating understandable (for domain-independent systems) and natural-sounding speech (Burkhardt and Campbell 2015). Different challenges need to be addressed such as the lack of a comprehensive and utterly understandable model about the precise functioning of the human voice that describes acoustic, phonetic, morphological, syntactic, semantic and pragmatic phenomena. Additionally, a synthesiser has to decide properly how to pronounce strings of characters that represent different concepts such as numbers, abbreviations, acronyms, ordinal and roman numbers, amounts of money, etc. In some languages, there are also homographs, which are words that are written identically but their pronunciation changes according to the semantic value of the sentence in which it is found, which aggravates the problem.

There are currently two main approaches used to generate emotional speech: *data-based approaches* and *rule-based approaches*. Data-based approaches include *diphone synthesis* based on the concatenation of small units of recorded speech. This method became possible after the invention of the Pitch Synchronous Overlap and Add technique in the early 1990s, which allowed changing the pitch contour of a given segment of speech (Burk-

hardt and Campbell 2015). In diphone synthesis, only pitch and durational features can be modified, and the natural waveform shaping preserves the voice quality. A method to control the voice quality is the use of multiple diphone databases from the same speaker. Formant and diphone synthesis use handcrafted rules to modify the acoustics of the voice representing different emotions (Murray and Arnott 1993). On the other hand, rule-based approaches, also known as *formant synthesis*, generates the acoustic speech entirely through rules on the acoustic correlates of the various speech sounds. No human speech recordings are used and the resulting speech sounds unnatural compared to diphone synthesis, but a large number of parameters related to both voice source and vocal tract can be modified, allowing the modelling of emotional expressivity in speech (Schröder 2001).

More recently, statistical approaches combine the flexibility of formant synthesis with the naturalness of large databases. The use of Hidden Markov Models is currently the most successful method to produce not just an acoustic sequence for synthesis but also an indication of the prosody of the utterance. Shifting the parameters of the source speech signal with respect to a target emotional style enables the generation of different emotional styles. The work presented in Lorenzo-Trueba et al. (2015) describes a method for the automatic transplantation of a speaker's emotions into the voice of a different speaker by combining emotional and identity information into a single cascade transform capable of imbuing the desired emotion into the target speaker. Using this method, they tested *transplanting* four emotions: anger, happiness, sadness, and surprise. The synthesiser was tested with students who reported that they perceived the voice as natural-sounding and showed satisfaction with the dialogue system.

In Turk and Schröder (2010), the research is oriented to investigate voice conversion and modification techniques to reduce database collection and processing efforts while maintaining acceptable quality and naturalness in the generation of expressive synthetic voices. The authors extended the unit selection engine with voice quality transformation using Hidden Markov Models-based prediction or vocal tract copy re-synthesis. One reported result is determining a trade-off between identification of expressive style and naturalness. Another study by Wu, Yang, and Gan (2018) developed an emotional text-to-speech system based on Hidden Markov Models by using an emotional Mandarin speech corpus with speaker adaptation. The authors used a Mandarin-Tibetan cross-lingual approach to train a set of average acoustic models by speaker adaptive training. Then the authors trained a set of speaker-dependent acoustic models of target emotion, which were used to synthesise emotional Tibetan or Mandarin speech. A similar work is presented in Cassidy et al. (2016) where a text-to-speech system was also developed based on Hidden Markov Models but with a variant called Cluster Adaptive Training to achieve emotionally expressive synthesis. This technique uses multiple decision trees to capture speaker, or emotion, dependent information. Each cluster is initialised using the data of one emotion. Using this approach, it was possible to synthesise speech with an expression combining two of the originally recorded expressions.

Although good advances have been achieved, more studies considering the combination of rule-based approaches and statistical algorithms are necessary to face the current challenges in the generation of a coloured set of emotions, for domain-independent applications and also for producing more natural-sounding voices during speech synthesis.

3 Examples of affect sensing and computational models of emotions

3.1 Emotion recognition from acoustic paralinguistic information

3.1.1 Features selection from speech

As already introduced in Section 2.1.1, one of the main challenges in the automatic recognition of emotions from speech is the method to find the most relevant speech's acoustic features. In this sense, we have carried out a series of experiments to examine the importance of different groups of acoustic speech features in the estimation of emotion primitives. In one of our works (Pérez-Espinosa, Reyes-García, and Villaseñor-Pineda 2010), we applied features selection and dimensionality reduction techniques to find the features subsets that best estimate the emotional primitives *valence*, *activation* and *dominance*. We used the corpus VAM (Grimm, Kroschel, and Narayanan 2008) and extracted 252 acoustic features belonging to three types: prosodic, spectral and voice quality. We performed a feature selection and applied the dimensionality reduction technique through Principal Component Analysis. We found that for the case of the emotion's valence the most relevant feature groups were spectral, pitch contour, and voice quality. For activation, the most relevant feature groups were spectral, energy contour, pitch contour, and voice quality. Dominance shares the order of feature group importance with activation. Nevertheless, more information about the distribution of energy in different frequency ranges of the speech signal is still required.

In a similar work, we experimented with the selection of acoustic features using a bilingual approach (Pérez-Espinosa, Reyes-García, and Villaseñor-Pineda 2011a). We studied the importance of the acoustic features, dividing them into groups and evaluating them using two databases, one in English – IEMOCAP (Busso et al. 2008) – and one in German – VAM (Grimm, Kroschel, and Narayanan 2008). We analysed the multi-lingual importance of features and investigated if these features are relevant regardless of the language. We performed monolingual, bilingual and cross-lingual feature selection experiments. In the first cross-lingual experiment we used the acoustic features found using the IEMOCAP corpus to estimate the emotion primitives in the VAM corpus and vice versa. To evaluate the results of this set of features, we executed a 10-fold cross-validation, using only data from one corpus at a time. In the second experiment, we used the features found in a bilingual feature selection, i.e., merging IEMOCAP and VAM data. To evaluate the estimation performance of this set of features, we trained our classifiers using the instances of a language and tested those classifiers with the instances of the other language. Finally, in the third experiment, we used the features found in the bilingual selection. To evaluate this set of features, we performed a 10-fold cross validation using the data from only one language at a time. In the results of these experiments, we observed that the features selected for a particular language had an acceptable performance in the other language. The estimation was more accurate when we used chosen features for only one language. We also observed

that when we crossed the trained models to estimate emotion primitives, the estimation accuracy decreased, mainly for dominance and valence. We concluded that emotions in different languages could be estimated using a similar set of acoustic features. However, the patterns shown by these features are complicated to use from one language to another without any adaptation. We also concluded that it is possible to identify common emotional patterns in both languages using a feature set that works for both languages.

3.1.2 Speech corpora creation

During our research work in the automatic recognition of emotions from speech, we created two corpora of emotional speech. The first one is called EmoWisconsin (Pérez-Espinosa, Reyes-García, and Villaseñor-Pineda 2011b), which contains voices of children participating in an activity with a card-based game. The second one is called IESC-Child (Pérez-Espinosa et al. 2020), and it includes children's voices interacting with a robot. In both databases, we induced emotions through the application of positive and negative stimuli. For the creation of the EmoWisconsin corpus, we applied the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test (Grand and Berg 1948) with the objective of inducing different emotional states in the participants. Psychologists use this test to evaluate the abstract cognitive function of children. It consists of cards printed with geometric figures that vary according to colour, shape, and quantity. The participant, through trial and error, must deduce the classification principle that the facilitator is requesting. The test was applied by a group of psychologists who modified the original protocol to present the activity as a game, where children would become involved and express themselves verbally. Every child participated in two sessions: the first one includes the participation of an affable facilitator, and a sulking facilitator conducted the second one. During the session with the affable facilitator, it was expected that the child would experience positive emotional states such as serenity, security, motivation, and joy. On the other hand, during the sessions with the sulking facilitator, it was expected that the child feels a negative emotional state with emotions such as nervousness, insecurity, overwhelm and frustration. The experiment involved 28 children aged between 7 and 13 years and a total of 11.39 hours were recorded. Post-processing was done using two annotation schemes: the categorical and the continuous approaches.

For the creation of the IESC-Child corpus, we designed a Wizard of Oz scenario where children interacted with a couple of Lego robots by giving them instructions to accomplish a mission. We explained to the participants that they had to guide the robot by voice commands across a labyrinth, from the start to the finish point. Additionally, the child should instruct the robot to enter some intermediate stations to collect sweets. They also should avoid some obstacles so as not to lose the collected sweets. Both the stations and the obstacles were coloured to represent how many sweets the children can win or lose. We used two robots with the same appearance but a different personality. In the first robot, the *agreeable* personality was modelled and its behaviour included following all the instructions provided by the child and congratulating him/her when some sweets were collected. The other robot was modelled with the opposite, *disagreeable* personality, and sometimes

it did not follow the children commands, dropping some obstacles or ignoring some intermediate stations to collect the sweets. Also, the disagreeable robot blamed the child when losing some sweets. A total of 174 children between 6 and 11 years old participated in the experiment, obtaining 87 hours of audio and video recordings. Furthermore, subjective data were collected by administering a multiple-choice questionnaire to each participating child to gather information about preferences towards the robots and the emotions they experienced (Martínez-Miranda et al. 2018). The elocutions were labelled with discrete emotions as well as mental states and attitudes. With the construction of these speech databases, we aim to contribute the tools required to carry out new experiments on automatic emotion recognition from speech. Both databases are available, upon request, to the research community.

3.1.3 Assessment of health conditions from automatic emotion recognition

The automatic recognition of emotions from speech can also be used as a support tool for the recognition of some health conditions of individuals related to affective aspects. Two examples in which we have worked are the estimation of the level of depression (Pérez-Espinosa et al. 2014) and the classification of bipolar disorder (Maxhuni et al. 2016). In the first study, we designed a method for depression recognition using audio-visual information in the context of the AVEC'14 challenge (Valstar et al. 2014). The goal of this challenge was to develop methods that could automatically predict the value of a self-reported depression indicator. The proposed solution was to split clips into segments for feature extraction. Next, audio-visual features were extracted from the segments. Mono-modal predictive models were trained, and two prediction strategies were considered. Firstly, we used the direct prediction of the best model, and secondly, we trained a meta-classifier on top of the predictions of all of the models. We evaluated the proposed methodology using the training and development data provided by the organisers of the challenge, and showed that our best result is competitive with the baseline method. The main features of our proposal were that (i) we used emotion primitives for building depression recognition models; (ii) we extracted visual information from voice and silence segments separately; (iii) we consolidated features and used a meta-model for fusion. Our experimental study revealed that using emotion primitives as attributes for depression recognition is a promising approach. The meta-classifier based fusion scheme proved to be very helpful for depression recognition. In particular, the meta-classifier surpassed mono-modal models trained on consolidated features.

For the classification of episodes of bipolar disorder, we analysed audio, accelerometer and self-assessment data from five patients. The data were obtained over 12 weeks during individuals' real-life activities. We evaluated the performance of several classifiers, different sets of features and the role of the questionnaires for classifying bipolar disorder episodes. In particular, we found that it is possible to classify with high confidence the course of mood episodes or relapse in bipolar patients. We combined speech features and emotion features with motor activities during a phone conversation, providing richer context infor-

mation. We tested different sets of features: using only accelerometer features, only audio features, and combining accelerometer with different audio features. When using only accelerometer features, we obtained results over 80 % on average, with the frequency domain features performing slightly better. The audio features achieved a similar performance, when both types, emotional and spectral, were considered together or when tested in isolation. The best results were obtained when the spectral and emotional features from audio were combined with the frequency domain features from the accelerometers. The information collected from the frequency domain features of the accelerometers lead to higher classification accuracy than the information extracted from audio. The results obtained from these two studies show that emotional patterns obtained from speech can be used as features to build models able to estimate or classify some affective disorders.

3.2 Emotional embodied conversational agents

Embodied conversational agents or virtual agents are advanced computational interactive interfaces that implement a combination of dialogue interaction and a set of body movements and facial expressions to simulate face-to-face conversations. The main goal of these interfaces is to engage the users in the continuous and long-term use of a background application. The first applications of this technology were developed for teaching/training purposes and the game industry acting as non-player characters. One of the domains where the use of virtual agents has grown in recent years is in eHealth applications. In the following subsections, we exemplify the use of computational models of emotions as the internal mechanism to generate affective reactions and personality traits in virtual agents by summarising our work in two approaches. The first one is a serious game developed to teach collaboration dynamics at the inter-personal level, and the second one is an interactive application to support the remote monitoring and treatment of people with major depression and suicidal behaviours.

3.2.1 The intermediary (un-)collaborative agent

Effective collaboration dynamics are fundamental to learning, knowledge exchange, and development/innovation processes in a wide variety of contexts. The correct identification of relevant factors that facilitate or hinder collaboration at different (e.g., organisational, team and inter-personal) levels is fundamental to developing and applying collaboration competencies. One method to teach these collaboration dynamics is through a serious game, where different realistic scenarios can be simulated in a controlled and safe environment. The work described in Martínez-Miranda et al. (2008) was developed in the context of a European research project aimed at providing learning experiences regarding the dynamics of collaboration at the inter-personal level. This game focused on factors that determine both motivation and capability to collaborate at the individual level, their manifestations in inter-personal conversational exchanges, and the possibilities to influence them

through one-on-one interactions. Players faced a scenario where mission accomplishment requires them to collaborate successfully with a simulated peer: the intermediary agent. The underlying mission that, collaboratively, the players and the intermediary agent need to achieve is the implementation of different strategies for change management in a big company. The players need to interact with the intermediary agent through the selection of different utterances in the user interface asking to implement some initiatives such as organise face-to-face meetings with different managers, organise events and workshops, send specific information via e-mail to the managers, etc. Depending on how the interaction progresses, the intermediary agent implements the requested initiatives or does not, producing positive or negative consequences for the achievement of the mission.

The behaviour of the intermediary agent is produced via branching dialogues, building on the modelled concepts of *trust*, *trust change tendency*, and *responsibility* for initiative choice. A personality profile shapes the agent's overall pattern of behaviour and informs its *emotional reactions* to events produced during the game. The theoretical foundation of the dynamics of collaboration is the trust building cycle model (Vangen and Huxham 2003). The basic assumptions about trust adopted in the game were: trust increases collaborativeness; (un)successful initiatives increase (decrease) trust; consistently poor performance decreases trust; a small wins strategy thus is more likely to be successful in building trust; openness increases trust; social (as opposed to mission-oriented) interaction can increase trust, if pursued in appropriate contexts.

Conceptually, the player-agent interaction develops over *conversation cycles*, defined in terms of initiatives issued in sequence in the underlying mission. A conversation cycle is structured into the following stages:

- *Introduction.* This stage includes an initial greeting (e.g., by the intermediary agent: "Hello! I am Julie. I will be working with you in this mission."), or some statement confirming that the previous cycle (analysis of the results of the initiative most recently issued) is concluded.
- *Asking for a suggestion.* This optional stage is started when players select an utterance asking the agent for initiatives to implement next. Depending on its current level of collaborativeness, the intermediary agent can make some proposal, resist providing a suggestion or suggest an initiative that would have a negative result for the mission. Figure 104.3 presents examples of how an agreeable (left window) and disagreeable (right window) intermediary agent makes suggestions to the player.
- *Proposing an initiative.* The players propose the initiative to implement: this need not match any suggestions by the intermediary agent. Again, the agent can accept or resist issuing the initiative in the underlying simulation. Such resistance allows instantiating specific sources of collaboration breakdowns (e.g., unavailability of the agent: "I need to go out now, please issue your request again later on"; lack of commitment: "Sorry, I have some other urgent work to finish first!"; or inter-cultural differences: "I cannot do that, local holidays are coming and I have no time for any request.").
- *Implementing an initiative.* In the cases where the intermediary agent decides to implement an initiative, this can occur in full compliance with the player's request, can comply only partially (with some or all parameters changed), or can even be an altogether different initiative.




Fig. 104.3: Dialogue responses from the *agreeable* (left) and *disagreeable* (right) intermediary agent (Martínez-Miranda et al. 2008).

- *Coping with results.* After an initiative has been implemented, the intermediary agent reports (with varying degree of detail) feedback obtained about the effect achieved. Players can react with utterances reflecting their evaluation of the result (e.g., assigning credit/blame: “Come on! How could this happen? That is really bad!”); they may ask for more information, at which the agent may disclose information initially kept back; or issue utterances related to purely social themes (“Say, have you seen the latest news on TV?”).

The modelling of different personalities, *agreeable* and *disagreeable*, was implemented through a set of utterances representing the high impact of trait agreeableness on collaborative topics such as cooperation and social harmony. Agreeableness also relates to bipolar facets such as empathy, friendliness, and helpfulness – of relevance in the social relationship of intermediary agent and the player, enabling scenarios with an unfriendly but highly collaborative, or a friendly but limitedly collaborative agent. The reactions of the agent to salient internal and external events were modelled as emotional appraisals. Resulting action tendencies were mapped to behaviour parameters for expressive animation, allowing to model longer-term *mood* with superimposed immediate but shorter valenced reactions in a principled fashion.

As can be noted, the utterances (both those selected by the user in the user interface and those generated in the intermediary agent) used during the agent-user interaction cycles play an important role in how the relationship evolves, as well as in how the two different personalities in the agent are modelled. Thus, the use of specific dialogues to represent and communicate the internal state (e.g., emotions, moods, personalities) of a synthetic character is essential to conveying to the user different styles of interaction. In our experiment described in Section 3.1.2 (Martínez-Miranda et al. 2018), this was evident when the two robots with the same physical appearance, but using different utterances to represent two antagonistic types of personality (*agreeable* vs. *disagreeable*), interacted with

children. One of the objectives of the study was to identify whether the participants noted the differences in the behaviour (dialogues and actions) displayed by the robot. The participants were stratified according to their age in groups of 6–7, 8–9 and 10–11 years old to assess relevant differences between the different groups. After the analysis of children's self-reported information, the obtained results indicated that most of the children noted the differences in the style of interaction between the two robots, though a statistically relevant percentage of children in the 6–7 years old group reported that they did not note the difference between the two robots.

3.2.2 A computational model of therapeutic empathy

One of the emotion-related characteristics more studied when developing embodied conversational agents is how the underlying computational model of emotion produces empathic reactions to create better interactive experiences. Empathic virtual agents have been developed to achieve better cooperation and complete longer interactive sessions in different domains. Within the clinical domain, a relevant area where the use of empathic virtual agents can be beneficial is in the treatment of mental health disorders (Hudlicka et al. 2008). Empathy is considered a fundamental aspect of promoting therapeutic change when providing counselling and psychotherapeutic interventions (Rogers 1967). The modelling of empathic responses in embodied conversational agents as virtual assistants to support the treatment of mental health disorders faces some challenges that need to be carefully addressed. For example, in the treatment of major depression, the virtual agent should not display "pure emotional" empathic behaviours by adopting the same – typically negative – mood of the patient. The disadvantage is that these behaviours can be interpreted as sympathetic expressions of condolence that may imply a sense of unintended agreement with the patient's (negative) views (Clark 2007). What is most beneficial from a clinical perspective is not to produce "only" natural empathic reactions as response to the patient's input, but to generate therapeutic empathy responses in the agent.

The work described in Martínez-Miranda, Bresó, and García-Gómez (2014a, 2014b) presents a computational model of *therapeutic empathy* for the construction of virtual agents to support the remote treatment of people with major depression. The proposed model is based on the concept of therapeutic empathy defined in Thwaites and Bennett-Levy (2007), which distinguishes it from *natural empathy* (experienced by people in everyday situations) by the "addition of the cognitive perspective-taking component to the emotional one; the cognitive component helps the therapist to conceptualise the client's distress in cognitive terms" (Thwaites and Bennett-Levy 2007: 594). In other words, a therapist should "assume both the role of an emotional involvement in an interview with a patient and an emotional detachment that allows for a more objective appraisal" (Clark 2007: 102). The proposed emotional model aims to produce in an embodied conversational agent the required *emotional detachment* or *emotional distance* at specific stages of the interaction with patients with major depression.

The theoretical basis of the proposed model lies in J. J. Gross' process model of emotion regulation (Gross 2001). In particular, two strategies of emotion regulation were modelled:

(i) *cognitive change* and (ii) *response modulation*. The cognitive change strategy is triggered when the patient is reporting a bad situation (e.g., low mood level), which in a first step would also produce (empathically) a negative emotion in the virtual agent. Once triggered, the cognitive change strategy seeks for additional information that can change (positively) the significance of the detected situation (e.g., finding a positive tendency in the mood level regarding the reported values in past days), allowing a more objective appraisal. Complementarily, the response modulation strategy is used to down-regulate those negative emotion-expressive behaviours in the agent produced when the cognitive change strategy has not succeeded (i.e., there is no information that changes the negative situation meaning). The suppression of negative expressive behaviour helps the virtual agent in not conveying a sense of condolence that would be counterproductive due to the patient's condition.

The negative but regulated emotions produced in the embodied conversational agent by an *un-desired* situation are used to select the most appropriate *verbal feedback* to the user as the response to those specific events. For example, imagine that during a session, one of the agent's activities is the assessment of the patient's current depression level using a standardised questionnaire. If the score obtained indicates that the depression level is quite high, the virtual agent can appraise this event as highly undesirable for the patient's condition, generating a strong negative emotion. Using the cognitive change strategy of emotion regulation, the agent can change the meaning of this situation using an alternative view. In the example, the virtual agent consults the depression level scores obtained during previous sessions and checks whether the current result shows a positive tendency in the patient's condition compared with the previous results. If this positive tendency exists, the original event is reappraised as "not much undesirable" to the patient (though the current score is still not optimal). This reappraisal can change the emotional state or the emotion's intensity in the agent, which is reflected in the feedback provided to the patient: "Ok, it seems that your current condition is not very good, but in general terms, you are making good progress in the last days". This is different from the feedback that the virtual agent would provide if the response is based only on the negative meaning of the current situation (e.g., "Ok, it seems that you have had some difficult days, but please continue with the treatment").

In Martínez-Miranda and Alvarado (2017), we modelled different strategies of emotion regulation, considering how the selection and execution of these different strategies are applied according to the individual differences identified in John and Gross (2007). These differences in how the emotions are regulated will produce different styles of interaction in the embodied conversational agents. This computational model has been integrated into a virtual agent (deployed in a mobile app) aimed to maintain interactive sessions with people detected with suicidal behaviours. The use of embodied conversational agents in this situation would be beneficial to (i) collect specific information helping in the assessment of the user's condition during a particular period (e.g., asking about the user's emotional state such as in Figure 104.4); (ii) detect alert signals and establish direct contact with a family member or healthcare services; and (iii) provide immediate therapeutic-based information, helping to prevent the occurrence of a user's risk situation (Martínez-Miranda 2017; Martínez-Miranda et al. 2019).




Fig. 104.4: Mobile application with an embodied conversational agent aimed to support people detected with suicidal behaviour (Martínez-Miranda et al. 2019).

4 Conclusions

In this chapter, we have presented a brief overview of how the research efforts in affective computing and spoken-based systems are used in Human-Computer Interaction for the construction of emotional interactive systems. Although good advances have been achieved in both the automatic recognition of emotions and the modelling of affective states in artificial systems, there are still important challenges to be addressed. For example, in the use of paralinguistic information for emotion recognition the main problems include the recognition of natural emotions in naturalistic environments. In naturalistic scenarios, emotions are not always generated in a prototypical way but are generated as a mixture of emotions with greater or lesser intensity. Some authors (Larsen and McGraw 2011) have shown that in certain situations people can experience more than one emotion at a time. That is, there may be more than one emotion perceived in the same utterance either one after the other or even simultaneously. This type of phenomena, i.e., the mixture and intensity of emotions, represents a fundamental challenge for automatic paralinguistic emotion recognition.

Moreover, the emotional expressions of people, to a large extent, depend on their idiosyncrasies, culture, and environment (Picard 2003). Most of the current research work has focused on monolingual emotion classification, avoiding the cultural differences among speakers. Even in the same language, there are different speech traits according to the speaker's region of origin, which means that trained models for speakers of a region are not as accurate when used with speakers from a different region. Some authors have investigated the problem of paralinguistic emotion recognition in more than one language (Pérez-Espinosa, Reyes-García, and Villaseñor-Pineda 2011a; Brester, Semenkin, and Sidorov 2016).

An additional challenge in the automatic emotion recognition from speech is the identification of the adequate speech features to distinguish between different emotions (El Ayadi, Kamel, and Karray 2011). Currently, there are low-level acoustic descriptors for speech that are very well tested in other similar tasks such as speaker recognition. However, in the case of emotion recognition, there is not the same clarity about which particular characteristics are the most appropriate. The acoustic variability introduced by the existence of different sentences, speakers, speaking styles, and speaking rates represents an important obstacle because these properties affect most of the common extracted speech prosodic features such as pitch and energy contours (Banse and Scherer 1996).

The automatic recognition of emotions using linguistic information also has limitations and challenges. When using keyword-based approaches to classify a text into different emotional categories, the main barriers are (i) the ambiguity of the keyword definitions; (ii) the processing of texts without the presence of the defined keywords; and (iii) the difficulty in creating an affective lexicon mainly due to the evidence that only a mean of 4 % of the words used in texts have some emotional value (Pennebaker, Francis, and Booth 2001). The use of artificial intelligence techniques, and more specifically machine learning algorithms, are commonly applied to overcome these advantages. Nevertheless, the development of the algorithms to categorise the text into emotion classes presents the same problems of the machine learning algorithms used with paralinguistic information: it requires large corpora of labelled data for the training of the classifiers, which may not always be feasible. A proposed solution is the combination of both keyword and machine learning-based approaches. Higher accuracy can be obtained in the automatic recognition of emotions from training the classifiers and adding knowledge-rich linguistic information from existent dictionaries and thesauri (Binali, Wu, and Potdar 2010). Moreover, the challenge of automatic detection of emotions using linguistic information increases when sentences contain a negative implied emotion with a positive surface emotion, i.e., sarcastic sentences. The automatic detection of sarcasm and irony is a new research sub-field of sentiment analysis presenting different challenges. A review of this field and some obtained results can be seen, e.g., in Hernández-Farías, Patti, and Rosso (2016) and Joshi, Bhattacharyya, and Carman (2017).

The synthesis of affective behaviours, e.g., for embodied conversational agents or social robots is usually based on a computational model of emotions as presented in Section 2.2.1. These existent computational models are based on diverse theoretical roots that are focused on different aspects of the affective processes. Thus, essential for the construction of affective systems is the correct selection of a particular model according to the objectives of the required application. A disadvantage from the existence of several and different computational models of emotion is the difficulty in evaluating their functionality regardless of the application's domain as well as the execution of comparative analyses between different models (Broekens, Bosse, and Marsella 2013). A proposed solution is to standardise the development process of these models by breaking up the existing emotion theories into their component assumptions and reformulating these assumptions in a common conceptual framework defined through a formal language (Reisenzein et al. 2013).

The conveying of the affective states produced by the internal computational model of emotions during the interaction with the user needs to be carefully addressed, taking into

account also the objectives of the application. The particular emotion and its associated intensity are the basis to produce the corresponding verbal and non-verbal behaviour in embodied speech-based interactive systems. The displaying of facial expressions and a set of body movements during the interaction is essential due to the evidence about the influence of non-verbal communication on how the users perceive the relationship with these systems (Strassmann et al. 2016).

Nevertheless, even in the cases when embodied conversational agents or social robots display a good non-verbal behaviour, this should be complemented with a synthetic voice able to reproduce different tones and intonations associated with the corresponding emotion. Although important advances have been achieved, there are still open challenges in the generation of understandable, domain-independent and natural-sounding text-to-speech systems. One of these challenges is the discrepancy between natural but inflexible vs. artificial-sounding but flexible synthesis approaches (Burkhardt and Campbell 2015). Similarly to the automatic emotion recognition problem, the development of good affective speech synthesisers can be obtained with a hybrid solution: the combination of rule-based physical modelling systems and statistical algorithms based on large datasets.

In the second part of this chapter, we summarised a set of specific studies developed to contribute in two areas: (i) the automatic recognition of emotions using paralinguistic information, and (ii) the construction of computational models to generate adequate (according to the context of the application) emotional responses for embodied conversational agents. Both the automatic recognition of emotions and the generation of artificial emotional reactions can be useful for the development of interactive systems within the health context. A future line of research for the improvement of interactive systems able to automatically recognise affective states from the users is the implementation of multimodal interfaces. Data collection, fusion and analysis from different inputs (e.g., facial, voice, audio-visual and physiological signals) need to be done in naturalistic environments and in real time. Advances in machine learning methods demonstrate that these applications are achievable (Mukeshimana et al. 2017). On the other hand, the challenge of establishing long-term relationships between artificial companions and human users involves not only the generation of coherent and believable emotional reactions but also the adjustment of the behaviour of the artificial system based on previous interactions, as well as the adaptation of social interactions to users of different gender, personality and cultural background (Vinciarelli et al. 2015). The development of artificial systems with all these abilities will facilitate their effective adoption and usage not only in the health context but also in a large set of applications.

5 References

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105 Emotions in affective human-computer interaction

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Abstract: Emotions play a critical role in motivation and influence cognitive processing, both the fundamental processes (attention, perception, memory) and higher-level processes (learning, decision-making, planning). Emotions also play a crucial role in social interactions, mediating attachment, communicating behavioral intent, and facilitating the development of the empathic loop and interpersonal trust, and are also intricately linked with language. Linguistic stimuli can trigger powerful emotional states and emotions influence both the content and prosody of utterances, as well as the interpretation of linguistic stimuli. As computer systems proliferate into most aspects of our lives, it is increasingly important to consider the effects and roles of emotions in human-computer interaction (HCI). This is especially important in contexts where computers and computerized agents are transitioning from tools to collaborators, assistants and coaches. This chapter provides an overview of the cross-disciplinary area of Affective Computing (AC), and outlines how AC enables the development of affective HCI. The chapter then elaborates in greater detail the area of computational affective modeling, and argues that deeper models of emotion generation and emotion effects are necessary to support more complex human-machine interaction, both non-verbal and verbal. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the promises and challenges in affective HCI.

1 Introduction

Until very recently, combining emotions and computers would have been considered impossible, undesirable, or, more likely, both. Throughout history, emotions have been considered unreliable and undesirable, and an anathema to reason. In spite of brief periods when emotions were accepted and even glorified, such as the romanticism of the 19th century, emotions remain to many somewhat suspect. They are often associated with lack of reason and rationality, predictability and control.

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Yet emotions are also quintessentially human, mediating motivation, creativity, and adaptive behavior in general. Emotions influence both the fundamental processes mediating cognition (attention, perception, memory encoding and recall) and higher-level cognitive processing (problem-solving, learning, decision-making, planning) (Ekman and Davidson 1994; Frijda 1994; LeDoux 1996, 2000; Mineka, Rafaeli, and Yovel 2003; Robinson, Watkins, and Harmon-Jones 2013). Emotions also play a crucial role in social interactions, from mediating attachment processes to communicating behavioral intent and facilitating the development of the empathic loop and interpersonal trust. Affective processing is also closely linked with natural language processing. Emotions influence both the content and prosody of linguistic utterances in language generation, and emotions influence the linguistic interpretive processes, inducing a variety of biasing effects. In addition, linguistic stimuli play a critical role in emotion generation via cognitive appraisal. Recent neuroscience research also demonstrates that emotions are essential for what is generally considered “rational” processing (Bechara, Damasio, and Damasio 2000; Damasio 1994; LeDoux 2014).

As computer systems proliferate into most aspects of our lives, it is increasingly important to consider the effects and roles of emotions in human-computer interaction (HCI). Many systems cannot function effectively with human users unless the human’s emotions are recognized and taken into account. This is particularly important in life-critical situations where computers provide decision-support functionalities in operational contexts characterized by time pressure and information overload, and the consequent high levels of stress (e.g., medical settings, flight operations, space operation, power plants). It is especially the case in situations where computers and computerized agents are transitioning from tools to collaborators, assistants, coaches, and even companions, with the associated requirements for affective realism and socially intelligent interaction, both non-verbal and verbal. Recognition of, and adaptation to, human emotions are therefore essential components of effective human-computer interaction.

Much as the ability to manipulate symbolic knowledge has led to dramatic enhancements in computer functionalities (e.g., artificial intelligence systems capable of playing chess at world champion levels, expert systems able to diagnose diseases, natural language processing enabling the development of systems such as Watson), so can the ability to model, recognize and “express” emotions dramatically enhance human-computer interaction.

This chapter discusses how the cross-disciplinary area of Affective Computing (AC) enables the development of affective HCI: ranging from machine recognition of emotions and generation of emotion-like expressions in agents and robots, to computational modeling of emotions in agent architectures, affective computing aims to facilitate more natural, affect-aware and affect-adaptive interaction between humans and machines. Following an overview of Affective Computing, the chapter discusses computational affective modeling in more detail, focusing on a particular model of affective biases on cognition and decision-making. The role and importance of these deeper models of emotion in affect-adaptive human-computer interaction is then discussed, in both non-verbal and verbal interactions. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the promises and challenges in the emerging area of affect-adaptive HCI (Hudlicka 2003).

2 Overview of affective computing and affective human-computer interaction

The discipline of affective computing began to emerge in the 1990s and was established when Rosalind Picard (1997) of the MIT Media Lab coined the term *affective computing*, in her eponymous book. Picard defined affective computing as “computing that relates to, arises from, or deliberately influences emotions” (Picard 1997: 3). Since then, the cross-disciplinary area of affective computing has grown and blossomed. Today, affective computing represents a highly active area of research and practice across its four core areas: emotion sensing and recognition by machines, computational models of emotion and cognitive-affective agent and robot architectures, emotion expression by synthetic agents and robots, and affective user modeling. Figure 105.1 illustrates these four core areas of affective computing, within the broader context of human-computer interaction. All four of these areas are directly relevant to affective HCI, as outlined below.




Fig. 105.1: Four core areas of affective computing within the broader context of human-computer interaction.

2.1 Emotion recognition

Recognition of human emotions enables computer systems, including social agents and robots, to adapt to the user's emotional state. For example, if a student using an intelligent tutoring system becomes frustrated or anxious, the system can adapt both the content and the mode of delivery, to reduce the student's frustration or anxiety level. In interactions

with virtual intelligent agents or social robots, emotion recognition is particularly important. This enables these synthetic entities to be more affectively and socially realistic, and supports more effective, and even enjoyable interaction (Castellano et al. 2008; Dautenhahn 2007; Hudlicka et al. 2009; Ortony 2003; Paiva 2001; Paiva, Sobral, and Aylett 2005); e.g., social robots can help children on the autism spectrum recognize others' emotions and manage their own (e.g., Dautenhahn and Werry 2004).

There has been significant progress in the recognition of the basic human emotions (typically: joy, sadness, fear, anger, disgust, surprise) over the past two decades, with rates of accuracy reaching those of human observers (90 percent and higher) (Zeng et al. 2009). These high rates of recognition have been achieved through progress in identifying useful features in the data (e.g., the Facial Action Coding System [Ekman and Friesen 1978] for facial recognition, which has become the de facto standard in facial emotion recognition), improvements in the classification algorithms, use of multiple channels as sources of data (e.g., facial expressions + voice prosody), as well as the use of task data (e.g., taking into consideration the level of success within the task, to help disambiguate the recognition results). Many challenges remain however, most notably: (i) the recognition of more complex social emotions (e.g., guilt, pride, shame, embarrassment), which often involve more subtle expressions, are typically highly idiosyncratic in both their triggers and manifestations, and may necessitate collecting data over a longer time interval; (ii) and the recognition of naturalistic emotions, that is, emotions expressed in the course of normal, daily social interactions, or interactions with ubiquitous technologies. These emotions are typically more subtle and expressed via fleeting expressions. The data collection is also more challenging in naturalistic contexts, where many dynamic variables exist, such as subject movement, ambient lighting and ambient noise.

2.2 Emotion expression

The increasing use of embodied agents in human-computer interaction facilitates, and often demands, that these agents produce expressive behavior that is interpreted as a particular emotion by the human users. This applies both to virtual characters, displayed on a screen, and to physical robots that share the user's physical space. Examples of agents include intelligent affective characters used in tutoring systems, virtual behavior coaches, and non-playing game characters. Examples of robots include social robots used to teach children on the autism spectrum emotional intelligence skills and various robotic agents used, for example, as companions for the elderly (Bickmore et al. 2005; Vardoulakis et al. 2012). Note that we are not suggesting that these computer systems actually "feel" anything resembling human emotions. Rather, they are able to configure their particular embodiment in a manner that is interpretable as a particular human emotion, in order to enhance some aspect of the user-machine interaction.

The particular channels available for expressing emotions are a function of the agent's or robot's embodiment. Agents can take on a variety of embodiments, ranging from a head, to upper torso, to full-body. The number of expressive channels increases as the complexity of the embodiment increases; e.g., from face only, to face plus upper torso with arms which

adds partial posture and gestures, to a full-body, which adds full-body posture and body movement channels. In addition to these non-verbal channels, speech is often also included.

The more channels are available to express emotions, the more realistic that expression will be. However, the expression of emotion across multiple channels also poses significant challenges, due to the coordination required among the expressive channels. In other words, whichever expression is displayed on the face must also be manifested by the head position and movement, by gestures, speech (both content and prosody), body posture, body movement and any specific behavioral choices. This is particularly challenging when affective dynamics are taken into consideration; that is, the onset and decay of the emotion expression over time. Emotion researchers have developed markup languages (e.g., EmotionML; Schröder et al. 2011) to facilitate this coordination among distinct channels, as well as to achieve device independence. The establishment of stable feature sets and semantic primitives (e.g., again, the Facial Action Coding System mentioned above) also contributes to progress in this area. (For a discussion of the importance of channel-specific semantic primitives, in both emotion recognition and emotion expression, see Hudlicka 2005).

2.3 Affective user modeling

Models of users capture user-specific information to support user-adapted interaction. This can be static information (e.g., demographic information, user skill level, etc.) as well as dynamic information (current score in a game or results of a test in a tutoring system). This information enables the system to deliver information, and adapt its processing, to match the user's preferences. This is particularly important in learning and training environments, decision-support systems, and gaming.

Affective user models augment traditional user models with information about the user's affective profile, both static (e.g., the user's stable affective traits) and dynamic (e.g., the user's current affective state). Affective user models also contain information about typical patterns in emotion generation (which stimuli in the current HCI context trigger which emotions for this particular user), and emotion effects (what are the typical effects of particular emotions on this user's behavior, in the current context) (Hudlicka and McNeese 2002).

Affective user models can be integrated in a variety of systems and user interfaces, both anthropomorphic and non-anthropomorphic, where they facilitate both the dynamic recognition of user emotions in real-time and the generation of affect-adaptive system behavior; e.g., reduce game complexity if user becomes frustrated, increase it if the user becomes bored. The majority of existing affective user models do not attempt to construct actual models of the hypothesized affective processing within the user. In other words, affective user modeling typically does not involve emotion modeling of the user's emotions. Rather, these models collect the affective user profile information in some static structures or in some type of probabilistic representations capturing the observed dynamic patterns regarding the user's affective behavior (e.g., Bayesian belief nets).

2.4 Emotion modeling

Emotion modeling aims to model both the generation of emotions and their effects on both the internal cognitive processing, and on their visible manifestations, in the case of embodied agents and robots. This last core area of affective computing will be discussed in more detail in Section 3.

2.5 Affect-adaptive human-computer interaction

From machine recognition of emotions and generation of emotion-like expressions in agents and robots, through the dynamic construction and representation of a user's affective profile, to computational modeling of emotions in agent architectures, affective computing aims to facilitate more natural, affect-aware and affect-adaptive interaction between humans and machines. In the case of agents and robots, these capabilities facilitate more affectively and socially realistic interactions. This in turn helps make these interactions not only more effective but ultimately also more satisfying, and even enjoyable.

These affect-adaptive and affectively realistic interactions enable a greater degree of engagement across a wide variety of contexts, including intelligent tutoring systems, decision-support systems and gaming. In cases where the virtual agents or robots aim to be the human users' coaches or even companions, some research aims to establish the "affective loop" – an empathic (or rather a virtually empathic) connection between the user and the synthetic entity.

To support these types of increasingly complex affective interactions, virtual agents and robots need to model some aspects of affective processing within their architectures. These models are necessary to support both non-verbal affective interaction (generating and displaying an affectively congruent emotion in an agent interacting with a human user) and verbal interaction (accurately interpreting a human user's utterance within the current affective and relational context, and producing an appropriate verbal response). The remainder of this chapter discusses the nature of these underlying models in more detail. Section 3 discusses models of emotion generation and focuses on models of emotion effects on cognition. Section 4 briefly introduces the important role that deeper models play in mediating natural language understanding and generation.

3 Computational models of affective processing and their importance for affect-adaptive HCI

Models of affective processing relevant for affective HCI are typically symbolic models, often embedded within cognitive-affective agent architectures that control the behavior of the associated virtual character or robot. The affective processing represented in these models can usefully be divided into two categories of processes (Hudlicka 2012): those modeling emotion generation (currently most frequently via cognitive appraisal), and those

modeling the emotion effects on behavior and expression (in the case of models controlling the behavior of agents and robots) and, less frequently, on the internal cognitive processing. Both are discussed below, with emphasis on models of emotion effects on cognitive processing.

3.1 Modeling emotion generation

Emotion generation in biological agents is an evolving, dynamic process that occurs across multiple modalities (e.g., cognitive, physiological/somatic), with complex feedback and interactions among them. While all modalities are involved, our understanding of these phenomena is best within the cognitive modality, and existing models of emotion generation typically implement cognitive appraisal (Hudlicka 2008a). This is of course also a logical choice for models embedded in cognitive-affective architectures that control the behavior of agents or robots interacting with human users. (Emotion models aiming to implement affective user modeling, however, should take the other modalities into account, but given the complexity of the neurophysiological substrate mediating affective processing, modeling of these phenomena is in its infancy.) The discussion below is therefore limited to models of cognitive appraisal, recognizing that the current emphasis on the cognitive modality may well be an example of “looking for the key under the lamp because there is light there”.

All cognitive appraisal theorists focus on the role of cognition in generating the subjective emotional experience, by mediating the interpretations required for the evaluative judgments of the current emotion-triggering stimuli that eventually result in the felt emotion. The most influential appraisal theories in computational modeling are those that are cast in “computation-friendly” terms. The first of these was a theory proposed by Ortony, Clore, and Collins (1988), now referred to as the OCC model, which remains the most frequently implemented model of appraisal. More recently, appraisal models proposed by Scherer (2001b), and Smith and colleagues (Smith and Kirby 2001), have become the basis for computational models of appraisal (Scherer 2001a).

Regardless of the particular details of the hypothesized appraisal process, cognitive appraisal theories emphasize the role of domain-independent evaluation criteria (often referred to as appraisal variables or appraisal dimensions), which capture the results of the assessment of the agent’s current situation, with respect to its goals and beliefs. For example, Scherer’s appraisal theory identifies the following variables (Scherer 2001b): novelty, valence, goal relevance and goal congruence, responsible agent, coping potential, and norms. Similar variables are also identified in the OCC theory, but structured somewhat differently within the OCC emotion taxonomy. Thus a situation where an agent encounters a growling dog and experiences fear, would first result in instantiating the appraisal variables of novelty (“high”, since the dog just appeared), valence (“negative”, since dog represents potential danger), goal congruence (“low”, since agent wishes to be physically safe), and coping (“low”, since agent does not know how to handle an aggressive dog), which would then correspond to the emotion of fear.

From a computational perspective, emotion generation via cognitive appraisal can thus be viewed as consisting of two steps, each implementing a specific mapping. The first step

maps the emotion-triggering stimuli onto the set of domain-independent appraisal variables. The second step maps this set of instantiated variables onto the resulting emotion. If we conceptualize the set of possible emotions as an n -dimensional space defined by the appraisal variables, we can view the instantiated set of appraisal variables as a vector defining a point or a region within this n -dimensional space. This point or region then corresponds to the generated emotion.

The triggering stimuli can be external cues (e.g., behavior of another agent, an event that just occurred in the external world) or internal cues generated from recalling a particular situation or event, or imagining a situation occurring in the future. It is important to note that the first step requires complex inferencing involving the agent's current goals, beliefs about self and the world, and the emotion-triggering stimuli. In all but extremely simple worlds this inferencing requires significant knowledge, reasoning under uncertainty, and possibly meta-level control strategies to address potentially competing or conflicting goals that the agent may have.

In addition to these mappings, emotion generation must also address the affective dynamics; that is, the determination of the intensity of the derived emotion, as well as any changes in this intensity during the onset and decay of the emotional state. Most existing models of appraisal use relatively simple formulae for calculating emotion intensity, typically focusing on desirability and likelihood; e.g., [desirability * (change in) likelihood] (Reilly 2006). A number of complexities are typically not addressed. For example, Reilly (2006) points out the need for representing asymmetry of success versus failure; in other words, for different types of individuals (and different goals), success may be less (or more) important than failure; e.g., extraversion is associated with reward-seeking whereas neuroticism is associated with punishment-avoidance. Modeling of these phenomena requires distinct variables for success (desirability of an event, situation or world state) versus failure (undesirability of the same). Related to the intensity calculation is the calculation of the emotion onset and decay rates, which brings up the issue regarding the extent to which emotions represent self-sustaining processes that must "run their course". Reilly summarized current approaches to decay calculation as being linear, logarithmic, exponential, or any of a number of possible functions that monotonically decrease with time (Reilly 2006).

Unfortunately for modelers, emotion dynamics are not well understood, and the data for precise calculations of intensities and onset and decay rates are not readily available. Existing empirical studies provide limited and often context-specific data. Emotion dynamics modeling thus represents one of the primary challenges in affective modeling.

3.2 Modeling emotion effects

Once an emotion is generated, its effects on the agent's behavior need to be modeled. In most affective virtual characters and robots, this involves mapping the emotion onto its visible manifestations, both in terms of the expressive channels available in the agent's embodiment and linguistic capabilities, if any (e.g., face, hand gestures, speech prosody and content), and in terms of the specific behavior. For example, a robot whose cognitive appraisal model generated fear may try and move away from the fear-inducing stimulus

while displaying a fearful expression on its face and demonstrating fear with its gestures (e.g., protective body position and hand gestures). Less frequently, the effects of emotions on the agent's cognitive processes are also modeled, and yet these of course play a critical role in determining the observed behavior. The remainder of this section therefore focuses on models of the effects of emotions on cognition.

Emotions exert profound influences on cognition in biological agents. This is evident across a range of high-level cognitive processing, including learning, planning and decision-making. (It is also evident in the understanding and generation of natural language, as discussed in Section 4 below.) All of the processes mediating decision-making, and ultimately action selection, are affected by emotion: attention, perception, situation assessment, goal-management, decision-making, planning and execution monitoring.

Emotion effects, and the associated affective decision biases and heuristics, can be adaptive or maladaptive, depending on their type, magnitude and context. Consider the bias to preferentially process threatening stimuli, associated with anxiety and fear. This can be highly adaptive in situations where survival depends on rapid detection of danger and appropriate reaction (e.g., avoid a predator; avoid an approaching car that has swerved into your lane). The same bias can be maladaptive if neutral stimuli are judged to be threatening (e.g., prey is misjudged to be a predator and the animal starves; a passing car is assumed to be on a collision course and causes you to swerve into a ditch).

A range of emotion and mood effects and biases has been identified: positive emotions induce a global focus and the use of heuristics, whereas negative emotions induce a more local focus and analytical thinking; anxiety reduces attentional and working memory capacities available for the task at hand, biases attention towards the detection of threatening stimuli, biases interpretive processes towards higher threat assessments, and induces a self-bias; mood induces mood-congruent biases in recall (e.g., MacLeod and Matthews 2012; Mineka, Rafaeli, and Yovel 2003).

3.3 Modeling emotion effects in terms of architecture parameters

Emotions thus influence all aspects of cognition and exert effects across all stages of processing within particular cognitive tasks, such as learning, planning or decision-making. Other transient states also influence cognitive processing, such as fatigue. In addition, personality traits as well as individual differences in training, skill level, and prior experiences influence both the structure of, and processing within, the cognitive apparatus. To capture the effects of these states and traits on cognitive processing, Hudlicka developed a parameterized approach to modeling the effects of multiple, interacting individual differences on (aspects of) high-level cognitive processing: the MAMID methodology and architecture (Methodology for Analysis and Modeling of Individual Differences; Hudlicka 1998, 2003, 2007). A high-level schematic of the MAMID architecture is shown in Figure 105.2.

The core feature of MAMID is the ability to represent the combined effects of multiple, interacting states and traits terms of a set of parameters that influence the processing of data within the individual architecture modules. What distinguishes MAMID from the majority of existing cognitive-affective architectures is this focus on modeling the effects of




Fig. 105.2: MAMID cognitive architecture: modules and mental constructs.

emotions (and other states and traits) on cognitive processing. Whereas most existing architectures focus on emotion generation via cognitive appraisal, and the subsequent direct mapping of the generated emotions onto behavior and expression, MAMID aims to represent the interaction of emotion and cognition within the processes that mediate the selection of particular behavior. This capability makes it possible to represent a variety of affective and personality agent profiles, and their effects on the simulated agent's behavior, thereby supporting the creation of a wide variety of agent types, with distinct "personalities" and differences in affective reactivity.

The MAMID symbolic architecture consists of modules that aim to correspond to the distinct stages involved in recognition-primed decision-making, where incoming cues are mapped onto the selected action. MAMID thus implements a sequential see-think/feel-do processing sequence, consisting of the following modules: *Sensory Pre-processing* (translates incoming data into task-relevant cues); *Attention* (filters incoming cues and selects a subset for processing); *Situation Assessment* (integrates individual cues into an overall situation assessment); *Expectation Generation* (projects current situation onto possible future states); *Affect Appraiser* (derives a valence and four of the basic emotions from external and internal elicitors); *Goal Management* (identifies high-priority goals); and *Behavior Selection* (selects the best actions for goal achievement). Long-term memory (LTM) associated with some of the modules is represented by belief nets, which mediate the mapping of the incoming data onto the module's output (e.g., Situation Assessment module maps cues onto situations). Figure 105.3 illustrates the parameter-based modeling approach.

The cues, actions and other intervening structures involved in this mapping process are termed mental constructs, and include also situations, expectations and goals. Mental constructs are characterized by their attributes (e.g., familiarity, novelty, salience, threat level) which influence their processing; that is, their rank and the consequent likelihood of being processed by the associated module within a given execution cycle (e.g., cue will be attended, situation derived, goal or action selected). These attributes thus provide the means through which the parameters exert their influence on processing, and thereby model the affective biases on the decision-making process.

MAMID models both emotion generation and emotion effects, but emphasizes the latter. Emotion generation is modeled within a dedicated Affect Appraiser module, which




Fig. 105.3: Parameter-based state and trait modeling methodology.

integrates external data (cues), internal interpretations (situations, expectation) and desires and priorities (goals), with stable and transient individual characteristics (traits and emotional states), and generates an emotional state, in terms of one of the four basic emotions (fear/anxiety, anger, sadness, joy). Emotion intensities are determined from several contributing factors, including a *trait bias factor* – reflecting a tendency towards a particular emotion, as a function of the agent's trait profile (e.g., high neuroticism/low extraversion individuals are predisposed toward negative emotions), and *individual factor*, which represents a weighted sum of the emotion intensities derived from the emotion-specific belief nets, reflecting the idiosyncratic contributions of specific elicitors. The Affect Appraiser module incorporates elements from several appraisal theories: *domain-independent appraisal variables*, *multiple-levels* of resolution, and *multiple stages* (Leventhal and Scherer 1987; Smith and Kirby 2001).

The effects of emotions (as well as traits and non-affective states) are modeled by mapping a particular configuration of emotion intensities and trait values onto a set of parameter values, which then control processing within the architecture modules, as well as the data flow among the modules; e.g., decrease/increase the modules' capacity and speed, introduce a bias for particular types of constructs, such as high-threat or self-related constructs. (Refer to Figures 105.2–105.4.)

The functions implementing these mappings are constructed on the basis of the available empirical data. For example, the anxiety-linked bias to preferentially attend to threatening cues, and interpret situations as threatening, is modeled in MAMID by ranking high-threat cues and situations more highly, thereby making their processing by the Attention and Situation Assessment modules more likely. Currently, the parameter-calculating functions consist of weighted linear combinations of the factors that influence each parameter. For example, working memory capacity reflects a normalized weighted sum of emotion intensities, trait values, baseline capacity, and skill level.

3.4 Example: modeling the effects of anxiety on decision-making

Two of the biases that have been extensively studied are the *attentional* and the *interpretive* threat bias associated with fear and anxiety. This bias focuses attention on high-threat cues, which are therefore processed preferentially, resulting in the neglect of non-threatening cues. The interpretive processes (represented by the Situation Assessment and Expectation Generation modules) are also biased to favor high-threat interpretations (MacLeod and Mathews 2012). Thus, ambiguous cues can be mapped onto an interpretation of danger; e.g., a child playing in the water, waving his hands and shouting can be interpreted as drowning. Both of these mechanisms can be explicitly modeled in MAMID, via parametric manipulations of its processes and structures.

Anxiety-induced threat bias is modeled by first calculating the threat level of each cue, situation and expectation (the mental constructs), from factors that include state and trait anxiety factors, and individual history (prior experience with a specific type of situation that has caused anxiety before). The threat level is then used as a weighted factor in the function calculating the overall construct rank, which determines the likelihood of its processing, within a given execution cycle. In states of high-anxiety, high-threat constructs have a higher ranking, and are thus processed preferentially. In other words, high-threat cues are given preference over low-threat cues and high-threat interpretations are therefore preferentially derived over low-threat interpretations in situation assessment. Figure 105.4 illustrates this process in MAMID.




Fig. 105.4: Modeling anxiety-induced threat biases in attention and interpretation within MAMID.

3.5 Using models of emotion to enhance affective HCI

Emotion models are developed for both research and applied purposes. The former aim to elucidate the mechanisms that mediate particular affective processes in biological agents, while the latter aim to enhance the believability or effectiveness of computer systems, in-

cluding the behavior and appearances of virtual agents and social robots. Applied models are typically less constrained, since they do not aim to represent the actual processes that mediate affective processing in biological agents, but rather aim to produce the specific required outcomes; e.g., enhance agent's affective realism.

Consider two examples below where a social robot and a virtual affective character need to generate an emotion to ensure affect-adaptive interaction with its human partner. In the case of a social robotic companion: if its human partner displays a positive emotion, the robot's emotion generation model will also generate a positive emotion, to help ensure affect-adaptive interaction. In the case of a virtual character acting as a tutor in an intelligent, affect-adaptive tutoring context: if its human partner displays frustration or displeasure, the virtual character's emotion generation model would derive concern and empathy. In both cases it is possible to use either black-box models, which directly map the incoming stimuli onto the desired emotions. Alternatively, deeper process-models can be used, which derive the emotions using the cognitive appraisal processes outlined above, and via the intervening appraisal variables. Although not all applied affective HCI contexts require process models, these models are generally more robust than black-box models, and are the preferred option in all but the simplest affective HCI contexts.

Deeper models are particularly relevant for modeling the effects of emotions on cognitive processing, which in turn determines the types of behavioral choices made by the associated agent. In addition, research models of affective biases can help elucidate the mechanisms that mediate these biases in humans, and other animals. Such models have the potential to provide a basis for the development of improved decision-support systems, which could help counteract these biases, for example, under conditions of high stress. Better understanding of these mechanisms would also have applications in behavioral health, and could support better approaches to the diagnosis and treatment of mental health disorders (Hudlicka 2008b, 2017).

Applied models of affective biases can enhance the effectiveness of virtual characters and robots, by enabling them to both exhibit more realistic (believable) behavior, and to better “understand” the behavior of their human interaction partners; in effect, to begin to implement the theory of mind types of computations that humans perform automatically during social interactions. These models can also be used to generate more realistic behavior in non-playing game characters, by displaying both adaptive and maladaptive biases associated with distinct “emotional” states the characters may be “experiencing”. Such affectively complex game characters contribute not only to more engaging games developed solely for entertainment purposes, but have the potential to significantly advance the area of serious games used for psychotherapy, where customized social environments can be constructed to facilitate the development of social and emotional skills that are often the focus of psychotherapy.

4 Language and emotion

For intelligent agents to behave with the multifaceted sophistication of people, they must achieve a comparable level of linguistic dexterity. This remains one of the hardest problems

of AI because fundamental natural language understanding and natural language generation involve far more than manipulating transcribed words on a page. Real language is full of ambiguity, ellipsis, vagueness, and implicatures. Speakers can boldly or discreetly convey a large variety of nuances that interlocutors can correctly or incorrectly interpret. The success of the communication depends on a large variety of features outside of language per se – including, but not limited to, the communicators' physical, mental, and emotional states.

Consider the following examples, which illustrate that utterances can have a basic, "linguistic" meaning as well as various types of contextually determined implications.

1. An employee is late to work because he was stuck in traffic for three hours. His coworker says, "I'm glad you could finally make it!" The direct meaning of this is that the coworker is happy to see his colleague. However, an indirect meaning is also available: this could be a snarky criticism for being late. The addressee's actual interpretation will depend upon his mood (e.g., how angry he is after all that traffic), the coworker's intonation, and the overall nature of their relationship – is the speaker a friend or a foe?
2. A patient presents to a doctor with severe abdominal pain. While taking the history, the doctor asks, "Have you been traveling lately?" To answer the direct meaning of this question, the patient could exhaustively list all recent travel events, including an overnight at his mom's house just across state lines. However, this would miss the point: the doctor is actually asking about travel events relevant to abdominal pain, such as trips to exotic places with potentially questionable water supplies. Whether the patient responds to the direct meaning or the intended one depends on his current physical state (how much pain he is experiencing), how that is affecting his cognitive state (whether he can think straight or not), his general cognitive abilities (whether his theory of mind is sufficient to infer the speaker's goals), his level of confidence (whether he is afraid of the consequences of misinterpreting the question), and so on.
3. A master chef says to his apprentice "Now the salt", and the apprentice hands him the salt shaker, only to be yelled at: "Don't give it to me, put it in the soup!" The latter exclamation not only provides an action-based clarification, it also has emotional effects on all but the most cool-headed of apprentices: after all, this is much different than calmly saying – or saying with a wink and a grin – "Actually, I meant put it in the soup".

The best way to operationalize this kind of deep natural language processing is to model all aspects of intelligent agents – their knowledge, perception, cognition, emotions, and actions – using the same, ontologically grounded metalanguage, which permits the cross-pollination of feature values. In such an environment, natural language understanding and natural language generation involve translating between strings of language and the agent's metalanguage of thought. Unambiguous, fully specified meaning representations are what the machine reasoning community has been expecting of the natural language processing community for decades, but the latter has not delivered. Instead, mainstream natural language processing has focused on tasks and approaches that circumvent the need to compute meaning. The one that most centrally involves the language of emotions has come to be known

as “sentiment analysis”; however, since neither its goals nor its outputs inform the advancement of cognitively modeled intelligent agent systems, we will not mention it further here.

REQUEST-INFO-1

AGENT	HUMAN-1	<i>; the speaker</i>
THEME	ANXIETY-ATTRIBUTE.RANGE	
BENEFICIARY	HUMAN-2	<i>; the interlocutor</i>
textstring	how	
lex-sense	how-adv4	

ANXIETY-ATTRIBUTE-1

DOMAIN	HUMAN-2	<i>; elided but reconstructed during natural language understanding</i>
TIME	<i>find-anchor-time</i>	
textstring	anxiety	
lex-sense	nervousness-adj1	

Fig. 105.5: The ontologically grounded meaning representation for “How’s the anxiety today?” and any of its paraphrases.

To give just a taste of what deep natural language understanding and natural language generation involves and what it offers, let us consider how language-endowed intelligent agents modeled within the OntoAgent cognitive architecture (McShane and Nirenburg 2021) analyze the question “How’s the anxiety today?”, which could, for example, be a natural part of an application devoted to clinical psychology.

The meaning representation in Figure 105.5, simplified for reasons of space, uses frame-based structures whose components are numbered instances of ontological concepts. Those concepts are described, using property-value pairs, in the agent’s language-independent ontology; this means that the agent has more information to support its reasoning about each concept than is provided in the input. Each frame is headed by a concept instance and described by the property values attested in the input. The properties “text-string” and “lex-sense” are metadata that serve as a trace of system functioning: e.g., ANXIETY-ATTRIBUTE-1 is generated by analyzing the text string “anxiety” using the lexical sense “nervousness-n1”, for which “anxiety” is listed as a synonym. The domain of this attribute is filled by HUMAN-2, which reconstructs the elided reference to the interlocutor. Its range – some value on the abstract scale {0,1} – is what is being queried. The REQUEST-INFO-1 frame is generated by a sense of the adverb *how* that is selected out of the many senses of this adverb because this sense expects the construction “How [be] [word(s) indicating an ontological PROPERTY]?” in the input.

Automating this analysis process requires a specialized computational lexicon that includes a large number of constructions, a high-quality, property-rich ontology, and a sophisticated analysis system; in short, no small amount of preparatory work is necessary before any such system is deployed. However, that work yields numerous benefits. First, it ensures that paraphrases of an utterance – e.g., “So, what’s up with the anxiety?”, “Tell me how the nerves are doing”, “How are the nerves today?”, etc. – will result in the same meaning representation. Second, it results in a structure that is well-suited to machine

reasoning since it seamlessly integrates into the agent's dynamically populated memory. So, when asked "How's the anxiety today?", all the agent has to do is search its memory to determine its current value for ANXIETY-ATTRIBUTE. Third, the process of natural language understanding is organized in stages, so that the agent first computes purely linguistic interpretations and then decides, using a large inventory of knowledge bases and feature values available in the context, whether some deeper meaning is intended. If it is, that meaning is explicitly expressed in the meaning representation. For example, if the traffic-harried employee decides that his colleague is criticizing him, then the meaning representation will be enhanced by the property value "PURPOSE CRITICIZE".

We demonstrated how this style of natural language understanding supports realistic agent functioning in the Maryland Virtual Patient application prototype, which sought to provide clinicians in training with practice in diagnosing and treating patients by means of interactive clinical simulations. The virtual patients at the core of this system integrated cognitive simulations with physiological ones. The physiological simulations generated values of features, such as pain and fear, that the agent interpreted into ontologically grounded memories through the process of interoception. Those memories, in turn, informed the agent's reasoning about action. We further advanced the modeling of the multi-directional effects of language, physiology and emotion on the example of a clinical case of gastroesophageal reflux disease (McShane et al. 2013). In addition, we described how OntoAgent-style modeling could support the automatic detection of cognitive biases in a clinical setting – something that requires the full integration of language processing, mental model ascription, and reasoning. All of this is detailed in McShane and Nirenburg (2021).

5 Summary and conclusions

5.1 Summary

This chapter introduced the cross-disciplinary field of Affective Computing, and its four core constituent areas, and their relevance to developing affect-adaptive human-computer interaction. Following a brief overview of emotion recognition, emotion expression and affective user modeling, and their relevance to affective HCI, the chapter focused on the fourth core area of Affective Computing: computational modeling of affective processes. Models of emotion generation via cognitive appraisal, and models of emotion effects on cognition, were discussed in detail, and an example of a cognitive-affective architecture that focuses on models of affective biases was then described, the MAMID architecture, along with a scenario illustrating how anxiety-induced biases on cognitive processing would be modeled.

A case was made for the benefits of deeper models of emotions in architectures controlling the behavior of virtual affective characters and social robots, and the role of these models in enabling affectively and socially realistic behavior in virtual agents and social robots. The necessity for deeper knowledge models in natural language understanding and generation was then briefly discussed.

5.2 Promises and challenges in affective HCI

The past decade has witnessed tremendous progress in affective HCI, particularly in the recognition of some human emotions by machines and the expression of synthetic emotions by virtual affective agents and social robots. Above we have already discussed the wide range of applications of these new technologies, including systems that can adapt to the user's affective state, and the creation of virtual agents that can serve as coaches, trainers and companions. There is increasing interest in incorporating affective HCI into the rapidly growing area of behavioral health technologies: mobile apps, serious games, and virtual and augmented reality systems that address a variety of mental health problems and provide support for behavior change (e.g., Hudlicka 2016, 2017). Progress in affective user modeling and computational emotion models has not been as rapid, since these two areas of affective computing face more significant conceptual, methodological and technical challenges (e.g., Hudlicka 2014, 2015). However, as the need for more sophisticated, and socially and affectively realistic, virtual agents and robots increases, there will be increasing need for more complex underlying models of both the human user (thereby stimulating advances in affective user modeling) and the emotional models and cognitive-affective architectures controlling the behavior of the agents and robots (thereby stimulating advances in computational models of emotion).

While affective HCI and affective computing technologies promise to enhance human-machine interaction, some degree of caution is required regarding the ethical issues that arise as computers begin to play increasingly important roles in our lives, not only as tools, but as autonomous and pervasive entities. Privacy is of course the most obvious concern, and as computers' abilities to recognize our emotions during a variety of daily interactions improve, it is essential that these issues be explored and addressed, to avoid creating various types of Orwellian scenarios.

But privacy issues represent only the beginning of the complex set of ethical issues that will need to be addressed as virtual agents and social robots begin to populate our social space and interact with humans as independent entities. Perhaps the most critical issue is the emergence of artificial relationships between human users and virtual agents and social robots. Researchers are just beginning to explore the ramifications of such relationships, and collaborations among computer scientists, psychologists and social scientists, and ethicists will be essential to formulate guidelines for the development and use of these new machine capabilities, and to ensure that we proceed in a manner that benefits both individuals and humanity as a whole.

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Abstract: Human conversational partners usually not only focus on what is being said, but also try to interpret and respond to affective cues that have been conveyed in a dialogue. Several research projects started to simulate emotional behaviors through computer-based dialogue systems in order to enable more human-like styles of communication when humans communicate with machines. Especially in areas where machines can take on the role of assistants, consultants or even companions, the emulation of human affective behaviors might be desirable and necessary. This chapter provides a survey of dialogue systems that simulate certain aspects of human affective behaviors, focusing on the modeling, analysis and synthesis of affective behaviors. It discusses the following research questions: How can affective behaviors be modeled within a machine? To what extent is a machine capable of detecting human affective cues from facial expressions, gestures and speech? What possibilities does a dialogue system have to express affective behaviors as well? How do humans respond to a dialogue system that simulates certain aspects of affective behaviors? In addition to presenting affective computing technologies, we also provide representative examples of affective dialogue systems and discuss to what extent it is possible and desirable to simulate empathic behaviors by a machine.

1 Introduction

Interpersonal communication is inherently emotional. Human conversational partners usually try to interpret – consciously or unconsciously – the speaker's or listener's affective cues and respond to them accordingly. The willingness and ability to empathize with the attitudes and emotions of other people is not only important in interpersonal communication, but should also be considered in the development of socially interactive agents.

With the objective to contribute to more natural and intuitive ways of communicating with machines, an increasing number of research projects started to investigate how to

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simulate emotional behaviors using computer models. On the one hand, robust techniques are being researched that recognize emotional states from multisensory input, such as facial expressions, gestures and speech. On the other hand, mechanisms are under development that generate and display emotional states of virtual agents or robots, for example, by deformations of synthetic skin. The behavior of these artificial agents does not follow a given script, rather it develops spontaneously based on operationalized emotional models that are informed by theories from the cognitive and social sciences or learned from multimodal recordings of human behaviors.

This paper discusses the current state of the art in affective dialogue systems that dynamically tailor their conversational behaviors to the affective state of an interlocutor. First and foremost, this task involves the perception of the human emotional state, for example on the basis of social signals that can be recorded, for instance, with the aid of video or audio data. Subsequently, an adequate response should be shown in which the agent itself expresses signs of empathy. In addition to the specific use of emotions, the agent needs to show understanding of the user's concerns. That is, the agent must evaluate situations from the perspective of a user to understand their emotions.

2 Why do we need affective dialogue systems?

At first glance, the idea of simulating empathic behavior through computer models appears outlandish. So far, computers have been primarily considered technical devices, which serve above all to support people in conducting routine-like work and therefore should show a pure purposeful behavior with a consistent and reliable performance that can be evaluated using objective measures. Despite news on machines showing quasi-intellectual behaviors, such as winning a World Chess Championship (Campbell, Hoane, and Hsu 2001), the view of a computer as a working device that follows pure rational criteria is still prevalent.

Nevertheless, the number of technical systems with anthropomorphic features that can be found in the user's daily environment is increasing. Examples include voice-based information systems, robots that provide household services or robots that take care of people in need. Often such systems are not just employed as tools, but can take on the role of assistants, consultants or even companions. In order to ensure acceptance by their users, the emulation of behaviors that are oriented towards interpersonal communication between humans seems reasonable and necessary.

There is evidence from a number of empirical studies that the simulation of affective behaviors may indeed lead to an improvement of the dialogue between a human and a machine. An analysis of user interactions with a dialogue system conducted by Martinovsky and Traum (2003) demonstrates that many breakdowns in man-machine communication could be avoided if the machine was able to recognize the emotional state of the user and respond to it more sensitively. Experiments by Prendinger and Ishizuka (2005) have shown that an empathic computer agent can indeed contribute to a more positive perception of the interaction. Work by Aist et al. (2002) indicates that the empathic behavior of a tutoring system may positively enhance the performance of the human learner.

In recent years, considerable efforts have been made to improve the expressive behaviors of artificial interactive agents that encounter human users in the role of animated virtual agents, as anthropomorphic robots or as digitally enhanced everyday objects. Experience has shown, however, that impressive animations in conjunction with a realistic appearance are not enough to create sustainable affective bonds with the human user. Artificial interaction partners with anthropomorphic behaviors initially benefit from the novelty effect. However, they tend to lose their appeal to the user after a short time. The desire to establish long-term relationships between machines and human users is one of the driving factors to simulating empathic behaviors in machines (Leite et al. 2013).

3 Modelling empathic behaviors

When simulating aspects of emotional behaviors, the question arises of how to represent emotional states within a computer system and according to which scheme should changes in emotional states take place. To describe emotional states, computer scientists typically rely on predefined categories to represent emotions, such as the basic emotions defined by the emotion psychologist Ekman (1999): happiness, sadness, surprise, anger, fear and disgust. Also widespread is the representation of emotions by a coordinate system which allows us to locate emotions within an n -dimensional space. Usually, numerical scales related to pleasure, arousal and dominance are employed to describe specific emotional states (Mehrabian 1995). For example, anger is characterized by high unpleasantness and high arousal. The dominance dimension is used to describe how much a person has a situation under control. It enables the distinction between anger and fear, both of which are emotions that are characterized by high unpleasantness and high arousal.

Appraisal-based approaches describe emotions as valued reactions to emotion-eliciting stimuli. For example, one might assume that users are in a negative emotional state if a computer-based assistive dialogue system is repeatedly not able to solve their problem. In their book *The Cognitive Structure of Emotions*, Ortony, Clore, and Collins (1988) describe detailed rules to explain the elicitation of 20 common emotions. On the basis of their model, several computer programs were developed that simulate emotional processes. Appraisal-based emotion models may be combined with classical planning approaches from the area of Artificial Intelligence in which agents determine an appropriate sequence of actions to achieve certain goals. On the one hand, emotional states may result from an assessment of a situation, for instance, when risks are detected that may compromise the conduction of a plan. For example, a number of approaches determines how realistic the goal achievement is and how important it is to the agent (Marsella and Gratch 2000). Vice versa, emotional states may influence the realization of plans since they determine how many resources will be employed to achieve goals or to avert threats. Furthermore, appraisal mechanisms may elicit certain action tendencies, such as the tendency to hide from view or to attack (Frijda 1987).

4 Automated analysis of affective signals in a dialogue system

Previous dialogue systems focused on a pure semantic analysis of multimodal input. A number of empirical studies revealed, however, that a pure semantic analysis does not always suffice. Rather, a machine should also be sensitive towards communicative signals that are communicated by a human user in a more unconscious manner.

Automatic sensing of emotional signals in real-time systems usually follows a machine learning approach and relies on an extensive set of labeled multimodal data. Typically, such data are recorded in separate sessions during which users are asked to show certain actions or interact with a system that has been manipulated to induce the desired behavior. Afterward, the collected data is manually labeled by human annotators with the assumed user emotions. Thus, a huge amount of labeled data is collected for which classifiers are trained and tested.

Recent research has concentrated on a large variety of modalities to determine affective user states including facial expressions (Martínez et al. 2019), gestures and postures (Kleinsmith and Bianchi-Berthouze 2013), speech (Vogt, André, and Wagner 2008), and physiological measurements (Kim and André 2008).

In a dialogue system, language is an obvious communication channel to explore. Emotions may be determined from the semantic meaning of utterances as well as the acoustic properties of speech, such as energy, pitch or spectral content. In the last 15 years, a significant effort has been made to find an optimal set of the most important acoustic features for emotional speech recognition. Nowadays, open source tools, such as EmoVoice (Vogt, André, and Bee 2008) or OpenSMILE (Eyben et al. 2013), extract thousands of acoustic parameters. An attempt for a more compact, yet generic, feature set is the Geneva Minimalistic Acoustic Parameter Set (GeMAPS) described in Eyben et al. (2016). Most recently, Wagner et al. (2018) investigated the benefit of handcrafted acoustic features compared to automatically learned representations and came to the conclusion that feature engineering can still help improve the robustness of end-to-end systems that automatically infer features from simple spectral representations or even learn directly from raw waveforms. A related problem is the recognition of affect bursts, such as laughs, moans and sighs, which may provide hints to specific emotions in a dialogue (Wagner, Lingenfelser, and André 2013). When analyzing such signals, the conversational context has to be taken into account. For example, a laugh is not always an indicator of a positive emotion, but may also allude to negative emotions, such as embarrassment. As a first step to deal with this challenge, Gebhard et al. (2018) combine a framework for detecting multimodal social cues with a cognitive model of emotions.

Furthermore, lexical features in spoken utterances may be exploited as another source for determining the emotional content of an utterance (Osherenko and André 2007). Usually, dictionaries of affect, such as WordNet-Affect (Strapparava and Valitutti 2004), are employed to determine the affective information contained in a word. However, to obtain acceptable recognition rates, the linguistic context has to be taken into account. Negations represent a particular challenge. They may reverse the polarity of affect conveyed by an utterance as in “I’m not happy”, but they may also serve as amplifier of affect as in “Never

have I been so happy". The examples show that the definition of hand-crafted rules for sentiment analysis may be extremely time-consuming. Recently, deep learning models are garnering interest as a promising approach to automatically learn linguistic representations for sentiment analysis (Zhang, Wang, and Liu 2018).

An obvious approach to improve the robustness of the classifiers is the integration of data from multiple channels, mostly by exploiting audio-visual combinations; see, for example, Wöllmer et al. (2013) or Lingenfelser et al. (2018). Different fusion architectures have been proposed in the literature that may be distinguished by the level at which information from multiple modalities is integrated; see D'Mello, Bosch, and Chen (2019) for an overview. Results suggest that integrated information from audio and video leads to improved classification reliability compared to information from a single modality. However, the gain is lower for spontaneous affective behaviors than for acted affective behaviors (D'Mello and Kory 2012).

5 Synthesis of affective behaviors in dialogue systems

The desire to make human-technology interaction more intuitive and more natural led to the development of synthetic agents that employ language, gestures, facial expressions and posture in order to communicate with a human user. To be perceived as lifelike individuals, such agents should be equipped with the ability to portray emotions in a believable manner. To this end, a number of challenging synthesis tasks have to be solved, including the generation of facial expressions and body poses that reflect a particular emotional state as well as the production of emotionally colored language and speech.

A straightforward approach to create artificial creatures with a believable emotional behavior is to produce different animations for each envisioned situation and to play them on demand. This approach is, however, not feasible for practical reasons and comes with high development costs. Therefore, it comes as no big surprise that sophisticated techniques for portraying emotional behaviors have been developed in various areas of computer science including speech synthesis, computer graphics and animation as well as robotics.

Approaches to the automated generation of facial expressions are usually based on the Facial Action Coding system (FACS; Ekman, Friesen, and Hager 2002). The overall goal of FACS is to provide a coding system for human facial expressions by means of so-called action units that refer to the relaxation or contraction of muscles, such as cheek raiser or nose wrinkle. To show affective behaviors in the face of a virtual agent or a physical robot, muscle movements are simulated that correspond to the action units of a particular facial expression. Compared to virtual characters, the expressive power of physical robots is still limited. However, mechanisms are under development that generate and display emotional states of robots, for example, by deformations of synthetic skin. Studies by Augsburg University demonstrate that at least a subset of the muscle groups referred to in FACS may be simulated in such a way that emotions, such as pleasure or surprise (see Figure 106.1), may be reliably recognized by human users.

In addition, a number of studies have been conducted to explore the expressive power of body poses and gestures for virtual agents and physical robots. As an example we refer




Fig. 106.1: The humanoid robot Alice showing pleasure (left) and surprise (right) (source: Augsburg University).

to Häring, Bee, and André (2011), who investigated to what extent the basic emotions by Ekman (1999) may be conveyed by body poses and gestures of the robots provided by Aldebaran Robotics. To generate expressive movements, the authors followed perception studies by Coulson (2004), who investigated which emotions human observers ascribe to static body poses of computer-generated mannequin figures.

Furthermore, attempts have been made to realize linguistic variations that convey not only the semantics of an utterance, but also psychological qualities, such as the speaker's personality and emotions. An example of such an approach has been presented by Mairesse and Walker (2010) with the Personage generator. Personage is based on an extended set of modules from the standard Natural Language Generation architecture, with modules for content planning, sentence planning, and surface realization. In contrast with many generators, Personage provides many parameters to support pragmatic transformations that affect human perceptions of the speakers' personality traits and emotions.

A particular challenge is the fine-grained synchronization of multimodal behaviors to express emotional state. For example, the body gestures, facial displays, and lip movements of an agent have to be tightly synchronized with the phonemes of a spoken utterance. Even small failures in the synchronization may make the agent appear unnatural and negatively influence how the agent is perceived by a human observer. To synchronize multimodal behaviors, a variety of scheduling approaches have been developed that automatically compose animation sequences following time constraints, such as the PPP system (André, Rist, and Müller 1998) or the BEAT system (Cassell, Vilhjálmsson, and Bickmore 2001). More recent approaches, such as the SmartBody (Thiébaux et al. 2008) or MARC system (Courgeon et al. 2011), assemble synchronized animations and speech based on performance descriptions in BML (Behavior Markup Language [Kopp et al. 2006]). This XML language includes specific tags for controlling the temporal relations between modalities. For example, BML allows us to specify that a particular behavior should start only when another one has finished. Since the specification of hand-crafted rules for creating multimodal virtual character behavior is very time-consuming, attempts are being made to augment speech with synchronized gestures (Ravenet et al. 2018).

6 Building empathic dialogue systems

Various attempts have been made to implement empathic behaviors in computer-based dialogue systems. Behaviors of different complexity have been examined, including processes that simply mirror a human's emotion state in the artificial agent, but also processes that require a deeper understanding of the causes and reasons for it.

Ideomotoric empathy is based on the imitation of the emotional cues of a dialogue partner. Such an imitation is possible without understanding the emotional states of a dialogue partner. For example, if the user is distressed because he was not able to solve a task in a tutoring system, an artificial agent would simply imitate the user's facial expression without knowing why the user is distressed.

A simple form of ideomotoric empathy has been realized by Augsburg University using a humanoid robot called Xeno developed by Hanson Robotics (see Figure 106.2). Xeno takes on the role of an empathetic listener who analyzes the acoustics of speech as well as the user's facial expression to infer information on the user's emotional state. As a reaction, Alice mirrors the recognized emotion in her face. This behavior may be considered as a simple form of empathy. The semantic content of the user's utterances is not taken into account for this application.

Reactive empathy is a reaction of an agent to the user's emotion. In this case, the emotion shown by the agent may differ from the emotion of the interlocutor. For example, seeing a person in despair might elicit sympathy in the observer, but not necessarily despair in the observer as well.

Deliberative empathy requires the agent to put himself in the place of the user in order to decide on an appropriate emotional reaction. For example, a teacher might feel despera-



Fig. 106.2: A robot mirroring the user's emotions (source: Augsburg University).

tion about a student's performance, but nevertheless try to convey optimism in order to encourage a student.

To simulate empathic behaviors, rule-based and empirical approaches have been proposed in the literature. While analytic approaches follow theories from the cognitive sciences, empirical approaches learn empathic behaviors from recordings of human-human interactions or from live interactions with human interlocutors.

Boukricha et al. (2013) present a computer model to implement reactive empathy following a rule-based approach. Their model considers that an agent's response to the emotional state of others depends on the relationship to them. Their approach is illustrated by a scenario in which empathic behaviors for the agent Emma are automatically generated as a reaction to conversations between the agent Max and the agent Lisa. For example, Emma would get irritated based on her current mood and her relationship to Max if Lisa should offend Max.

Martínez-Miranda, Bresó, and García-Gómez (2014) developed a virtual agent that supports the treatment of people suffering from major depressive disorder by conducting daily sessions with them. Using a rule-based approach, they implement various emotion-regulation processes that serve to modulate negative emotions induced in the virtual agent. This way, some form of deliberative empathy is implemented that is supposed to be beneficial from a therapeutic point of view. For example, the agent should not express anger about a patient quitting a session, but instead convey a sense of understanding that encourages the patient to continue.

McQuiggan and Lester (2007) followed an empirical approach and collected data of empathic interactions between two agents in a virtual environment that were controlled by human trainers. One trainer had to accomplish specific tasks while the other trainer had to observe the behavior and to select appropriate empathic behaviors. Based on these recordings, a computer model for empathic behaviors was created using methods from machine learning (Naïve Bayes and decision trees). The model was tested by having human users interact with virtual agents whose empathic behaviors were based on the learned model. The study revealed that the human users found the empathic behaviors of the virtual agents appropriate.

While McQuiggan and Lester (2007) learned empathic behaviors from previously recorded computer-mediated interactions between humans, Leite (2013) presents an approach to adjust empathic strategies of a robotic cat during the interaction with a child based on Reinforcement Learning (RL). The approach makes use of a reward function that takes into account how the emotional state of a user changes after the application of an empathic strategy. As time progresses, the system learns which strategies have proven promising. Using a sophisticated selection mechanism, the system ensures that successful strategies are selected with greater probability while enabling flexible adaptation to a new situation. For example, a child might require more help when the degree of difficulty of the chess game increases. That is, the robot is able to adjust if necessary. An evaluation showed that the robot managed to keep children interested over a longer period of time. The authors ascribe the successful findings to the empathic behavior of the robot.

Ritschel, Baur, and André (2017) present an RL approach that adapts the linguistic style of a robot based on subliminal feedback provided by a human user: affective signals. RL

is used for real-time learning about the optimal robot personality and adapting to the desired profile over time instead of asking the user explicitly, sticking to a fixed personality or relying on mirroring the (opposite) user profile. The reward signal required for RL comes directly from the user's level of engagement, which is estimated based on multimodal affective cues. The system's ability to adapt its dialogue style was evaluated using simulation results and an interactive prototype.

7 Examples of empathic dialogue systems

Various attempts have been made to simulate empathic behaviors in computer-based dialogue systems. In this section, we present a variety of examples focusing on systems that are based on an embodiment of the dialogue system by an audio-visual character or a physical robot.

SEMAINE (Schröder et al. 2012) focused on the implementation of empathic listening behavior. Listening is a component of any dialogue, and to make your counterpart feel understood and cared for, you need the capabilities of an empathic listener that appears attentive and sensitive towards the emotional state of others. Within the SEMAINE project, a variety of virtual characters with different personality profiles was created. These characters were able to engage in a conversation with a person and to recognize and respond to a human user's non-verbal behaviors in real-time. The main objective of SEMAINE was to sustain a natural conversational dialogue by concentrating on the non-verbal capabilities of a sensitive artificial listener without having to deal with the challenges of speech recognition and language understanding. To this end, the computer had to be able to perceive the user's verbal and non-verbal behaviors and signal awareness of them by producing appropriate listener behaviors, but without requiring deep natural language understanding abilities.

Cavazza et al. (2010) integrated the EmoVoice system by (Vogt, André, and Bee 2008) mentioned earlier into a natural language dialogue system in order to improve the robustness of a speech recognizer by fusing emotional states recognized from the acoustics of speech with sentiments extracted from the transcript of speech. For example, when the users employ words to express their emotional state that are not included in the dictionary, the system would still be able to recognize their emotions from the acoustics of speech. Furthermore, the EmoVoice system is used to generate an immediate empathic response when the user stops speaking.

Morency et al. (2015) present a virtual agent that engages in a dialogue with a patient to assess multimodal behaviors related to stress and post-traumatic stress disorder. The automatically analyzed cues by the patient are employed not only for diagnostic purposes, but also for controlling the dialogue between the agent and the patient. For example, when the patient pauses a lot in the conversation, the agent tries to encourage her to continue speaking.

Gebhard et al. (2019) implement a virtual agent called EmmA running on the users' mobile phone and helping them cope with stress at work. The agent analyzes the users' psychological state based on behavioral data obtained from mobile sensors and a simula-



Fig. 106.3: A pupil interacting with a virtual character to prepare for a job interview (source: Augsburg University).

tion of emotion regulation strategies (Gebhard et al. 2018) in order to select appropriate verbal intervention strategies if the stress level is at a critical stage.

Damian et al. (2015) developed a game-like environment for job interview training. Job interviews are usually accompanied by negative emotions, such as stress and nervousness. Role play with a virtual character as shown in Figure 106.3 enables trainees to test conversational strategies in a safe environment and to learn how to cope with negative emotions. During the conversation with the virtual agent, the verbal and non-verbal signals of the trainee are recorded and analyzed to assess the trainee's multimodal behaviors and to regulate the flow of the dialogue. For example, if the trainee stops speaking, the agent might ask the trainee to give more details or start a new topic. An evaluation in a German school revealed a positive effect of training sessions with the game-like environment compared to traditional job interview training using written materials.

KRISTINA (Wanner et al. 2017) is a human-like socially competent and communicative agent (see Figure 106.4). It runs on mobile communication devices and provides a service to migrants with language and cultural barriers in the host country.

The KRISTINA agent is able to interpret the user's multimodal input and has access to knowledge related to the topic of the conversation to come up with an appropriate response. To this end, KRISTINA's multimodal knowledge representation framework includes ontologies that represent relevant healthcare information from the web to support the dialogue with the human user. A sample dialogue conducted with KRISTINA is shown below:



Fig. 106.4: A senior interacting with the KRISTINA healthcare agent (source: Augsburg University).

- K: You look downhearted today. What is wrong?
- U: I feel sad. Because of my eyes, I even can't read the newspaper anymore.
- K: Shall I read the newspaper aloud for you?
- U: Yes, this would be great!
- K: You certainly can still read the headings of the articles. Just tell me which one I shall read.

8 Human reactions to empathic agents

Studies by Reeves and Nass (1996) indicate that people show social and affective behavior patterns towards computers that can also be found in human-human communication. Therefore, it is very likely that social and affective bonds may also be established between humans and machines. To this end, highly realistic behaviors are not necessarily required. The phenomenon of Tamagotchi has shown that people may get bound emotionally even to very simple artificial creatures. The impact might be even greater if artificial creatures convey emotional behaviors that appear like genuine feelings.

Positive effects of an emotional relationship between humans and robots could be observed in a number of studies. Robots have the potential to mitigate loneliness for elderly people, stimulate social interactions with other people and thus contribute to a better quality of life (Sharkey and Sharkey 2010). However, the idea to get emotionally bound to a machine also raises uneasiness. There is the question of whether such a relationship may have the same quality as a relationship between humans. Not for nothing the highly controversial book *Love and Sex with Robots* by David Levy (2007) has inspired numerous debates on this topic.

Progress in the automatic recognition, modeling and synthesis of emotions fosters the development of artificial creatures that are able to convey the illusion of empathic companions. However, it is questionable to talk about true empathy in this case. If I tell a friend about my sorrows, I expect sincere empathy and would be disappointed if it should turn out that the empathy of my friend was faked. One might argue that most people are aware of the fact that they are just interacting with a machine and thus do not expect genuine feelings. However, what about people suffering from dementia who are not able to distinguish between human and artificial beings?

Since an emotional dialogue system is able to record and store all conversational behaviors by a human, questions regarding the protection of privacy inevitably arise. Should a doctor get access to the conversations between a patient and a care-taking robot? Only in very rare cases, a human dialogue partner would be able to recall the exact wording of a conversation. For an artificial dialogue partner, a perfect memory is easy to realize, but not necessarily desirable.

9 Conclusions

In this paper, we provided a survey of approaches that aim to simulate affective behavior in dialogue between a human and a machine. We have demonstrated how techniques for the recognition, modeling and synthesis of emotions are employed in state-of-the-art dialogue systems. While machines cannot feel real empathy, there are a number of application fields including the diagnosis and therapy of psychological disorders, social coaching and robotic companions where it makes sense to reproduce affective behaviors in a machine. We have presented various examples of dialogue systems that make use of virtual agents as interlocutors to illustrate the use of affective computing technologies.

Due to the complex nature of human affect, modeling, analysis and synthesis of human affective behavior are far from being solved problems. Affective dialogue systems that show an appropriate behavior in unexpected situations remain a daunting challenge. Current technology is often not flexible enough to adapt to new situations. Existing databases for training components that analyze and interpret human affective signals are only suited for specific speaker groups, languages, and environmental factors, such as background noise. Furthermore, affective states might be elicited at runtime that system developers did not anticipate. Advances in the area of deep learning have also fostered the development of more robust affective dialogue systems. However, there is still a lack of true understanding of the user's situation, requiring a profound analysis of the elicitors of affective states. Since affective dialogue systems are typically employed in situations where sensitive data are shared with a machine, protecting and respecting the user's privacy is a major concern. In this context, it is important to note that the realization of affective dialogue systems does not only involve the solution of technical limitations, but also has to go beyond disciplinary boundaries to encompass ethical, legal and social implications of their employment.

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**XXII Methodical and practical consequences
for education, native language education,
foreign language education and second language
education**

María Del Carmen Fonseca Mora

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Abstract: Language is the most omnipresent and powerful cultural artifact that we humans possess to mediate our knowledge of the world, our connection to the other(s), and our own thought and self-regulation. As Halliday (1975) stated, the main two essential functions of language are to interact with others (social interaction) and to interact with ourselves (thinking). In recent years, there has been an urgent need in European society for educational involvement in processes that develop pluricultural and plurilingual competences for collaborative dialogue to enhance the acceptance of otherness and avoid inequalities between social groups (Coste and Cavinalli 2015). Emotions have a filter effect (Mora 2013) and therefore the affective issues that surround this educational approach need to be explored, as innovative approaches are often rejected due to insufficient knowledge of what they involve and due to fear of change. In order to offer some answers, this chapter analyzes studies on how affective factors and emotions influence language acquisition and learning and proposes methodological principles and practical tasks that can be applied to language education and that may ensure the learning of values, attitudes, skills, knowledge and critical thinking needed in a plurilingual and pluricultural society. Based on the fact that cognition and emotion are intertwined factors, I describe the main research findings of the different trends in emotion and language research. I review some existing differences between first and second language acquisition from an affective perspective. I also discuss motivation and language anxiety, which foster or hinder learners' willingness to communicate as two poles that are almost entirely independent of each other but not opposite ends of a single continuum. This chapter also includes some insights on mediation which, considered as a paradigm shift in the foreign language classroom and through the different out-of-class language learning possibilities (Piccardo 2014, 2018), can provide an environment where learners maximize their emotional intelligence, their plurilingual and intercultural communicative skills. Finally, I delve into studies of emotions in learning a foreign language and round off this chapter with methodological recommendations for language education.

1 Research on emotion in language education: An introduction

Research on emotion in language education has been published under different categories that range from educational linguistics (Arnold and Fonseca 2011; Khajavy, MacIntyre, and Barabadi 2017) to affective neuroscience, neuroeducation or educational neuroscience (Schumann 1997; Mora 2013, 2016), positive psychology in language acquisition (MacIntyre, Gregersen, and Mercer 2016) or pragmatics (Dewaele 2016). Thus, research on emotion in language education can be considered a multidisciplinary field that is developing out of work in applied linguistics, psychology, education, sociology and neurosciences. The cognitive perspective of applied linguistics studies provides information on crucial issues such as language aptitude, the age factor, the content to teach and how to structure it in formal teaching, and on effective learning and communication strategies for language learning; but considering the socio-affective dimension contributes significantly to understanding what influences language learning in such a way that it surpasses the individual cognitive capacity of a learner. In this review of research on emotion in language education, contributions that refer to individual affective factors and emotions are considered as affective phenomena that either facilitate or hinder the teaching and learning of languages.

Affective factors and emotions are two complementary concepts present in the applied linguistics literature but without there being a general consensus on the definitions of both terms. In this chapter, by affective factors I mean non-linguistic variables that, according to Gardner and MacIntyre, are “those emotionally relevant characteristics of the individual that influence how she/he will respond to any situation” (Gardner and MacIntyre 1993: 1). Following Scherer’s definition (2005: 700–703), emotions (fear, joy, excitement, pride, etc.) are short, intense responses elicited by internal (memories or images) or external (events or behaviors) stimulus events that are relevant to the person; and, therefore, they produce synchronized response patterns, change rapidly and have a strong effect on behavior.

Complementary to Descartes’ rationalist vision of the human being, the 21st century affective language research defines the socio-emotional basis of human interaction and communication as the way we construct our social world. The Spanish neuroscientist Francisco Mora (2013) has provided useful information in the field of neuroeducation about how the brain works in the learning process and how emotion is essential for the development of curiosity, attention, memory and learning in general. He also explains how humans have always been influenced by emotion but that now neurobiology has shown how emotions are an integral part of cognitive processes (Mora 2016: 37).

Schumann’s (1999: 29) neurobiological contribution to language acquisition describes the neural mechanism for stimulus appraisal based on positive and negative evaluations of the second language learning situation. He contrasted psychologists’ perspective of the different appraisal dimensions with second language acquisition researchers’ analysis of motivation questionnaires and observed that the following appraisal dimensions were found in both research areas: novelty and familiarity, pleasantness, goal or need significance, coping potential and self and social image. A reduced emotional response to foreign language processing as opposed to native language processing has also been stated (Ivaz, Costa, and Dunabeitia 2016). These authors affirm that this is probably due to the emotion-

ally neutral academic environment versus the emotionally charged family environment in the contact with the native language.

Another tendency in applied linguistics studies is that of researching the affective factors that Arnold and Brown (1999) classified into individual factors such as beliefs, attitudes, motivation, identity, self-esteem, learning styles, anxiety, among others, and relational factors such as empathy, intercultural processes and ways of transaction (cooperative, autonomous or hierarchical modalities). Highly relevant is the construct of willingness to communicate, which according to MacIntyre (2007) “may be seen as both an individual difference factor facilitating L2 acquisition [...] and as a nonlinguistic outcome of the language learning process” (MacIntyre 2007: 564).

Furthermore, emotion in language research acknowledges that humans are emotional beings whose concepts relating to emotion depend on their language and culture (Dewaele 2016; Wilson 2013; Lemke 2013). Studies from discourse analysis identify how emotions are conveyed in different languages. One of the difficulties in this type of research is the existence of subjective emotional experiences, that is to say, “the inherent variability in emotional responses between people in similar contexts” (Dewaele 2016: 463).

Finally, research related to emotion in language education concentrates on the study of behaviors based on emotions. Humans are emotional beings with the capacity to justify or hide the emotions that are behind their actions (Maturana and Varela 1997). A great many behaviors can be explained by the fact that any stimulus is firstly evaluated by our amygdala, an almond-shaped set of neurons located deep in the brain’s medial temporal lobe which is in charge of emotions and emotional behavior. This is of special relevance for teaching, where the main role of the teacher, according to Mora (2013), is that of awakening students’ curiosity so that they get interested in studying the topic proposed. MacIntyre, Gregersen, and Mercer (2016: 1) go one step further. They explain humans’ capacity of agency in affecting other people positively or negatively through their actions. This agency becomes central for language teaching, learning and communication, and is highly connected to the concept of mediation. Agency means that all of those involved in the teaching and learning process – teachers, students, parents and school staff – can affect one another.

In conclusion, research on emotion related to language education is of great interest, probably in search of what Gross (1992) affirmed more than two decades ago:

Insights into the ways in which our brains function have generated tremendous excitement in scientific and educational circles over the past decade. It is now apparent that learning can be enlivened and strengthened by activating more of the brain’s potential. We can accelerate and enrich our learning, by engaging the senses, emotions, imagination. (Gross 1992: 139)

In fact, Fredrickson (2000), in her broaden-and-build theory, affirms that positive emotions (joy, interest, contentment, pride and love) can undo or reduce negative ones and that “positive emotions seem instead to spark changes primarily in cognitive activity” (Fredrickson 2000: 264).

But Stevick (1999), one of the well-known mainstream authors in affective language learning studies, warns us that affect and its impact on memory is not a philosopher’s stone that denies the existence of cognitive and biological variables. He argues, however,

that it is important to understand the role of affect in learning, “that is, in the process of changing a learner’s inner resources so that they will become more useful” (Stevick 1999: 55). In addition, focusing on the pedagogical implications of considering the affective dimension, Arnold and Fonseca-Mora (2004) acknowledge teacher’s capacity to “organize a variety of contexts that offer learners a variety of ways to engage meaning and strengthen memory pathways” (Arnold and Fonseca-Mora 2004: 119). And these varieties of contexts may ensure the accomplishment not only of linguistic but also vital aims. At the same time as they learn a foreign language, students can “acquire the knowledge, values and capacity to be responsible citizens in modern, diverse, democratic societies” (Council of Europe 2018: 5). An educational institution is not an isolated cell, it exists to train members of a society (Fonseca-Mora 2001) and “education plays an essential role in building the future and reflects the type of world we want to prepare for the generations to come” (Council of Europe 2018: 7).

2 Some differences between first and second language acquisition in terms of affect

A review of the first stages in first language (L1) acquisition from an affective perspective illustrates the importance of beliefs. Parents believe that their children will become good speakers, that their children will progress and, therefore, parents make their interactions meaningful. Parents, guided by this deep, unconscious belief, act as facilitators and mediators: intuitively, they use a simplified code which helps children to understand and comprehend language. This form of speech, known as *motherese*, *parental talk* or *caretaker talk*, is characterized by the use of short sentences and an increased number of pauses, the use of vocabulary and situations close to the child’s experience and the abundance of non-verbal gestures (Fernald 1985). All this is accompanied by melodic contours with affective and communicative value (Papoušek, Papoušek, and Symmes 1991). Parents repeat words and utterances and know that the process of acquiring a language takes time. Each performance of the child, whether verbal or non-verbal, receives a smile, a hug, or a supportive comment. When parents consider all the necessary elements so that learning becomes a personal achievement, they help to raise their child’s self-confidence.

While humans normally succeed in L1 acquisition, this is unfortunately not always the case for second language acquisition (SLA) and less for foreign language acquisition (FLA) for a number of reasons such as: age, time of exposure to the target language, lack of real-life communication needs, context, among many others. FLA contexts, students learning English as a foreign language in a Spanish school for example, is different from SLA contexts where learners have the opportunity to use the second language within the speech community. In general, time of exposure and possibilities of interacting in the target language ensured by living in a country where the language is spoken are facilitating factors of the language acquisition process, although in both contexts the learner’s willingness to communicate can be a significant factor.

However, Schumann’s (1975) critical review of different affective factors related to the problem of age contributes significantly to the better understanding of this fact. He analy-

zes the case of adults adjusting to a new culture, the influence of their attitudes and motivation. There are many different positive or negative emotions felt by adults during their period of acculturation. Schumann (1975) reviews the scientific contributions in this field, which report the negative effects the rejection of the native language community or the pressure exerted by the expatriate community may have on the second language learner. Second language learners may feel language shock, culture shock, culture stress or shame regarding their low language proficiency. While integrative motivation, the interest in belonging to the new culture may help them, anxiety derived from the disorientation encountered upon entering a new culture where they feel deprived of the sense of belonging, and depression have also been reported. According to Schumann (1975), "culture stress often centers around questions of identity" and therefore, the learner "may feel he has no supportive membership group and at the same time be unable to perceive the local citizens as a reference group" (Schumann 1975: 212). The case is different for learners who are motivated by an instrumental orientation, those who believe that mastering the target language will help them to succeed in their professional environment. This self-oriented reason can make some learners feel not so focused on adjusting to a new culture.

Although age and context (among other features) show clear differences in first and second language acquisition, both share socio-emotional variables that noticeably influence the language acquisition process.

3 Affective factors and emotions in the plurilingual classroom: A true story

Mobility has affected our classrooms. At university, for instance, our audience has become plurilingual. The Erasmus programme joins students from different countries in the same classroom, offering a unique chance of developing learners' plurilingual and pluricultural skills. Lynn's case, a 19-year-old Chinese student who came to the University of Huelva at the beginning of the academic year to learn Spanish and English, may help to exemplify how good language learners actively develop their linguistic resources to produce and receive messages, negotiate meaning through interaction and co-construct meaning as a social agent (Council of Europe 2017).

Lynn was an unusually talented language learner with a high verbal memory. Stevick's principle of "Success (in language learning) depends less on materials, techniques and linguistic analyses and more on what goes on inside and between the people in the classroom" (Stevick 1980: 4) is very relevant here. Lynn's *inside*, his clear, meaningful purpose, his personality, motivation, self-discipline, autonomy, learning style and self-confidence, and his capacity of *between*, that of integrating and interacting with other students and with his teachers, were crucial affective variables that influenced his language learning progress.

He had a clear goal, a highly self-oriented reason: knowing these two languages would help him to get that job as international salesman at his uncle's enterprise in his hometown in China. But he had only one academic year to achieve this. Though he seemed fairly

fluent in Spanish, even with some communication problems, he had no idea of English. But his desire to learn these languages was really strong. Therefore, his first decision was to live in a shared flat with Spanish university students. His outgoing personality, his always smiling face, helped him to interact well with all of them, to make new friends at the university and to interact with students and their parties where he sang and danced to Spanish and English songs. He also joined some social networks where he actively posted and answered in Spanish posts from the many friends he had made. As far as English was concerned, he decided to enroll in *Inglés I* and *Inglés II*, in both semesters of the first year of the English Studies degree. In class, he identified the best English speakers, sat next to them, and followed all instructions and every type of recommendation for learning given by the English teacher. He participated in the different collaborative tasks the teacher had designed for them. His peers acted as mediators, they invited him to participate and to explain his thoughts and intervened supportively to focus his attention on aspects of the task by asking targeted questions and inviting him to suggest ideas. He spent several hours per day reading in English, learning vocabulary, writing his class tasks and he started watching all the recommended movies and musical video clips with subtitles. As he noticed his English teacher's interest in helping him to achieve his language goals, he asked her if he could attend other subjects taught by her and she allowed him to take *Language acquisition*, which was taught in the third year. There, he connected with other many Erasmus students enrolled in this subject and tried to interact with them inside and outside the classroom. Everyone knew Lynn, his sense of humor and his ability to create positive emotions around him, which made him very popular among teachers and students. His teachers constantly praised him for his effort. His excellent final grades at the end of the academic year were evidence of his self-discipline, his strong desire and willingness to communicate in both languages, his integrative but also instrumental motivation, his vision of the speaker he wanted to be.

Lynn's case is unusual, and as teachers we do not often have students with these extraordinary characteristics in our classrooms, but his success can be explained not only in terms of cognitive abilities but also through the consideration of the affective factors mentioned above. The understanding of what happened inside Lynn and in the way he interacted with others supports the thesis that cognition cannot be understood without taking emotion into consideration.

4 Affective factors in language learning

Krashen's (1982) affective filter hypothesis helped to show that second language acquisition was influenced by students' openness in a conscious or unconscious way to learning. Currently, an impressive growing body of research has acknowledged the relevance of the affective phenomena in language learning (Arnold 1999; Rubio 2007; Dörnyei and Ushioda 2009; Arnold and Fonseca 2011; Horwitz 2016; Oxford 2016; Jiménez Raya, Martos, and Tassinari 2017). At the base of Krashen's metaphoric socio-affective filter are factors related mainly to beliefs, to the predisposition towards the new language and culture, to communication needs, to the environment and to interpersonal relationships. As mentioned above,

Arnold and Brown (1999) classified affective factors into internal (anxiety, motivation, self-esteem, beliefs, attitudes, autonomy, identity, personality traits, etc.) and relational (empathy, culture shock, acculturation, and modalities of transactions, etc.). A detailed analysis of all affective factors is beyond the scope of this chapter. For this reason, this section includes firstly a reflection on some differences between first, second and foreign language acquisition in terms of affect. Then, I present a general overview of the main affective factors that are linked to the two essential agents in any formal learning process, the teacher and the students, and the interactive space created inside and outside the classroom.

4.1 Teacher's beliefs, teacher roles and teacher talk in the FL classroom

Teachers are, without any doubt, a key element for successful foreign language learning. Their role as leaders of the group gives them a special power. For this reason, I will examine their beliefs and expectations, their role in the classroom and their discourse from an affective perspective. Teachers' core beliefs and expectations about the different elements that affect the language teaching-learning process can be grouped in different categories (Richards and Lockhart 1994; Williams and Burden 1997). A list of the most representative ones includes the following:

- Beliefs about the foreign language: its importance and the need to know it, the more difficult aspects to be learnt; the skills needed and the dialect that has to be taught.
- Beliefs about learning: the appropriate strategies for learning a language, the type of tasks that should be done.
- Beliefs about students: students' desirable prior knowledge, the responsibilities students need to take in order to improve their learning. Meighan and Meighan's study (1990) reveals that teachers often metaphorically describe their students as receptacles, as raw material, as customers, as individual or democratic browsers, as opponents or as partners. Each of the different visions of students represents a determined teacher performance.
- Beliefs about teachers' role: the changes necessary in their profession, the type of training required and their responsibilities in the classroom.

These different types of beliefs predict teacher performance in the classroom and therefore influence students' actions.

4.1.1 Teachers in their roles of facilitators and mediators

Underhill (1999) classifies teachers according to their basic roles as Lecturer, Teacher and Facilitator. Teachers as Lecturers master the content of their subject. Teachers in their "teacher" role have knowledge of the subject and are "familiar with a number of methods and procedures to teach them" (Underhill 1999: 143), while the Facilitator is defined as a teacher who knows "subject, methods and internal processes" (Underhill 1999: 144) that

“generate a psychological climate that is conducive to high quality learning” (Underhill 1999: 147). This role of facilitator relates to the role of mediator, which has been explained by Feuerstein’s theory of mediation (Feuerstein and Feuerstein 1991). This theory states that adults, parents, or teachers offer Mediated Learning Experiences since they prepare the content and select those stimuli that help their learners to achieve success. Mediated Learning Experiences were originally developed by the Israeli psychologist Feuerstein, who worked with traumatized youths after the Holocaust. Tan (2003) explains how Feuerstein focussed directly on the learner: “When others were modifying materials for those with learning disabilities, Feuerstein chose to invest his energies in modifying those learners directly” (Tan 2003: 54). Williams and Burden (1997: 77) apply Feuerstein’s mediation theory to the language classroom where language teachers need to act according to the following three main basic parameters of mediation to ensure a high-quality learning atmosphere:

- Meaning: the teacher needs to awaken students’ awareness of the importance of the task for learning so that they can value it in a personal and in a wider cultural context.
- Purpose and transcendence: the teacher needs to ensure students’ understanding that the learning experience has greater relevance for them beyond the immediate time and place.
- Shared intention: teachers need to ensure that students have clear instructions for carrying out a task; that they clearly know what the teacher is asking for. This requires alertness and awareness to the others’ responses.

Broadly speaking, teachers when acting as facilitators and mediators increase students’ willingness to participate in the language classroom and favor students’ autonomy through the teaching of meaningful techniques and strategies that promote reflection on the learning process, creativity and agency (Jiménez Raya, Martos-Ramos, and Tassinari 2017). Teachers’ discourse and nonverbal behavior as well as the type of tasks planned for the students have great influence on achieving these goals.

4.1.2 Affect in teacher talk

Teacher talk is characterized by frequent voice inflections and repetitions intended to organize and control the teaching learning process. The nature of this speech influences significantly students’ willingness to participate in the language class and thus in the assimilation of the content taught (Arnold and Fonseca 2007). Ellis’s study (1998) on teacher confirmation illustrates verbal and non-verbal affective aspects that play an important role in shaping learners’ self-concept and their academic success. Among the different teacher behavior patterns encountered, the undergraduate students participating in Ellis’s study appreciated especially when the teacher asked open-ended questions, gave positive feedback, acknowledged students’ participation even when their answer was not the most appropriate one, knew students’ names, connected the content of their subject to real-life situations, smiled and established eye contact during the lesson, checked on students’ understanding and, in general, evidenced interest in students and in their learning and therefore elicited positive emotions in the classroom.

4.2 Students' language-learning predisposition: beliefs, identity, motivation and anxiety

Individual factors in language learning have been defined as “traits that can be recognised across people” (Ehrman and Dörnyei 1998: 35), for instance, characteristics that exist in everyone but that may vary from student to student. Some of these individual factors belong to the affective domain and explain to a certain extent why language learning is different from learning other subjects. In Williams's (1994) words:

This is mainly because of the social nature of such a venture. Language, after all, belongs to a person's whole social being: it is part of one's identity, and is used to convey this identity to other people. The learning of a foreign language involves far more than simply learning skills, or a system of rules, or a grammar; it involves an alteration in self-image, the adoption of new social and cultural behaviors and ways of being, and therefore has a significant impact on the social nature of the learner. (Williams 1994: 77)

In order to reflect on the affective components of language learning, we will briefly discuss students' beliefs that relate to their motivation, anxiety, and identity, as these beliefs connect with emotions, and emotions result in consequent actions.

As mentioned before, beliefs are in many cases of an unconscious nature until they become explicit; nevertheless, they guide teachers' and students' actions. Ellis (1994) classifies the studies concerning second language students' beliefs in three different categories: beliefs about the importance of having a linguistic aptitude, beliefs about the nature of language learning, and beliefs about the strategies that are most appropriate for a good learner. Dörnyei (2001) affirms that “incorrect beliefs can become real barriers to the mastery of an L2” (Dörnyei 2001: 67) and recommends organizing a debate at the beginning of any course to help students to identify these beliefs and to correct them if necessary. Aragao (2011: 306) analyzed students' beliefs about their oral competence, their classmates and their teacher, and reported that these beliefs resulted in their feelings of embarrassment, shyness and class inhibition, affecting students' behavior in the classroom. Fonseca, Ávila, and Segador (2015) compared the academic success of 454 students enrolled in a pilot musical programme combining secondary education and musical studies to that of students in the same school following the standard secondary education syllabus. Their findings showed that students enrolled in musical training programme felt more capable in reading in a foreign language. Students believed that music training empowered their reading ability and it was shown that this resulted in their being more willing, more motivated to keep studying the foreign language.

The relevance of motivation in the process of learning a second language is undeniable. According to Crookes and Schmidt (1991) a student is motivated “if he or she becomes productively engaged in learning tasks, and sustains that engagement, without the need for continual encouragement or direction” (Crookes and Schmidt 1991: 480). There have been many attempts to explain the difficult and complex concept of motivation (Gardner 1985; Deci and Ryan 1985; Schumann 1999; Dörnyei 2001; Csizer and Dörnyei 2005; among others). The first influential research on motivation was carried out in Canada by Gardner and Lambert (1972), who analyzed the motivation of French and English speakers to learn

the language of the other community. The central hypothesis was that success in learning a second language depended fundamentally on students' attitudes towards the language and the community that speaks it. Social identification and ethnolinguistic identity have always been implicit in this integrative concept (Ushioda and Dörnyei 2009). Gardner and Lambert (1972) also described the existence of an instrumental orientation where learners' goals are those of achieving personal or professional benefits. This division of integrative and instrumental motivation is more useful when considering the adult second language process; however, it seems to be of less use when describing a secondary education student's motivation in the foreign language classroom.

From the point of view of the classroom, the distinction between extrinsic and intrinsic motivation under the umbrella of the self-determination theory is an interesting approach (Deci and Ryan 1985). Intrinsic motivation is related to students' self-interest. It can also be associated with the use of personal strategies to satisfy greater communication autonomy. Extrinsic motivation, on the other part, usually relates to grades, to students' goal of passing a subject, instead of studying for the pleasure of acquiring knowledge and skills. Self-determination theory considers the role of social context and social relationships. In fact, contextual conditions such as physiological growth, integrity and general well-being (Decy and Ryan 2010) as well as the satisfaction of three basic psychological needs – the need for competence, the need for autonomy and and the need for relatedness – are established as required conditions that explain learners' motivation (Decy and Ryan 2008).

From a neurobiological perspective, Schumann (1997, 1999) explains motivation in relation to the human appraisal system that evaluates first any stimulus according to its emotional relevance and then gives it a particular meaning. Based on Scherer's model (1984), stimuli that are positively rated enter one of the following categories: novel but somehow familiar, attractive because it adapts to goals or specific needs, cognitively manageable, respectful with social cultural norms, and pleasurable (Schumann 1999: 50–51). Language learning is a long process that requires not only initial positive appraisal but sustained motivation.

One of the most relevant theories of motivation in language acquisition is offered by Dörnyei (2005), where beliefs, identity and self-images become the basic concepts on which the *L2 Motivational Self System* is constructed. The three basic components that make up this motivational system are identification with attributes that an ideal speaker has (the ideal self); the desire to acquire specific qualities to be able to respond to obligations or responsibilities or avoid negative results (the ought-to self); and the image and vision of the speaker the learner wants to become (the future self). This vision of future would provide self-guides, possible autonomous actions to enhance language learning success. Other basic considerations explicit in this model connect with Norton's concept of identity: "identity is always constituted in relational terms; the individual never stands apart from the social world, but is always an integral and constitutive part of it" (Norton 2016: 2). World globalization, multilingual families and language multi-competence still need more research to fully understand second language learning motivation and how it affects learners' multi-identities.

If motivation has been considered one of the most positive affective factors in language learning, foreign language anxiety has been described as the factor that most hinders lan-

guage acquisition. Research describes how linguistic anxiety arises in specific situations of fear and effort to learn another language and/or to communicate with it, but that it can disappear once learners know how to handle the communication circumstances (Horwitz and Young 1991; Sparks and Ganschow 1993; MacIntyre and Gardner 1994; MacIntyre 2002; Rubio 2004; Horwitz 2010; Dewaele et al. 2018). Linguistic anxiety has been attributed to having a low proficiency level (Sparks and Ganschow 1993), and MacIntyre and Gardner (1994) affirm that anxiety produces cognitive interference and therefore affects language learners' achievement and communicative capacity. Interesting enough, Horwitz (2010), after reviewing the findings of 44 research studies on foreign language anxiety, concludes that language teaching can alleviate foreign language anxiety. Dewaele et al. (2018), after analyzing the variables that affect foreign language enjoyment and foreign language anxiety of 189 British high school students, recommend teachers to focus on enjoyment and to "light the students' fire by being more engaging and creating interest in the FL" (Deawele et al. 2018: 694).

4.3 The place of mediation in the interactive space: socio-emotional interactions

Due to the number of variables that affect language learning and their changeability, multiple causations need to be considered from a dynamic complexity perspective (Griffiths 2015). The affective factors mentioned can change through interaction and the emotions that this interaction provokes. The dynamic relationship between students and teacher or that among students of the same group is often forgotten, as Ehrman and Dörnyei (1998) explained,

the learning process often is considerably hindered by a lack of understanding of how dysfunctional classroom interactions between teachers and students and among the students can divert energy and attention away from the learning task. On the other hand, any cognitive and affective learning can be substantially enhanced by adroit use of interpersonal and group dynamics. (Ehrman and Dörnyei 1998: 2)

In the case of the foreign language classroom, a relaxed classroom atmosphere, good rapport between students and teacher, a "cohesive learner group with appropriate group norms" (Dörnyei 2001: 31) have been considered as the basis of a motivating language class.

Brown explains how many students feel not interested in learning a foreign language by itself, that they do not "want to learn English, they would like to have learned English" (Brown 2002: 167) and cites Feuerstein's theory of Structural Cognitive Modifiability to affirm that:

Those who do not possess such predispositions, in our case towards the particular area labelled "learning a foreign language", will display an incapacity to become modified. As a result, they will have difficulty in benefiting from the experience to which they are exposed no matter how many times the experience is renewed. In order for them to benefit from exposure to the foreign language, these learners need an approach from the teacher that takes him beyond his usual outlay because, unlike other individuals, his learners are not fitted out psychologically to benefit from either formal (for exam-

ple, grammar and vocabulary exercises) or informal (for example, fluency exercises) opportunities to improve language proficiency. (Brown 2002: 167)

Brown (2002) proposes Feuerstein's mediated learning experiences as an approach that may awaken students' curiosity and predisposition towards language learning. This idea connects with the basis of the socio-cultural theory, where learning a language goes beyond the learning of words to name isolated objects or actions to have a socialization effect (Lantolf, Thorne, and Poehner 2015). In mediated learning experiences, learners are considered social agents who co-construct meaning while mobilizing their general and plurilingual and pluricultural competences. In this sense, the Council of Europe (2017) also recommends an action-oriented approach as it defines learners as

members of society who have tasks (not exclusively language-related) to accomplish in a given set of circumstances, in a specific environment and within a particular field of action. While acts of speech occur within language activities, these activities form part of a wider social context, which alone is able to give them their full meaning. We speak of "tasks" in so far as the actions are performed by one or more individuals strategically using their own specific competences to achieve a given result. (Council of Europe 2017: 9)

This vision of language education broadens the interactive space as online interaction becomes a language learning tool that works beyond the classroom walls (Nunan and Richards 2015).

Piccardo (2014) reminds us of the relevance of learners' social as well as mental contexts. In fact, the mental context "filters and interprets the external context or situation" (Piccardo 2014: 18). Students' cognitive, social and affective abilities will be affected by this mental filter as the interactive space is constantly evaluated by its participants. Some people handle social interactions more fluently than others (McBrien, Wild, and Bachorowski 2018). Affective factors such as empathy, respect, tolerance, leadership and cooperation capacities become crucial as they need to be developed appropriately to achieve successful language learning through mediation, where the main focus is to use language in real-life situations to collaborate with others to co-construct meanings. According to the Council of Europe (2017: 102–103), mediation implies that

one is less concerned with one's own needs, ideas or expression than with those of the party or parties for whom one is mediating.

One needs to have a well-oriented emotional intelligence [...] empathy for the viewpoints and emotional states of other participants in the communicative situation. [...] a social and cultural process of creating conditions for communication and cooperation, facing, and hopefully, defusing only delicate situations and tensions that may arise. Particularly with regard to cross-linguistic mediation, [...] this inevitably also involves social and cultural competence as well as plurilingual competence. (Council of Europe 2017: 102–103)

According to McBrien, Wild, and Bachorowski (2018), these learners' individual factors in handling social interactions are related to the concepts of emotional and social intelligences, but also to empathy and interpersonal sensitivity. The different experiments that helped them to validate their Socio-Emotional Expertise (SEE) scale, that is to say, the analysis of the high-quality socio-emotional interactions, also pointed to adaptability and expressivity as two relevant factors to be considered.

Peer-mediated learning, based on the Vykotskian constructs of mediation and scaffolding but also on Long's Interaction hypothesis (1981), has been analysed to observe if action-oriented approaches improve language, literacy, and academic learning for culturally and linguistically diverse students (Cole 2014). Cole's meta-analysis (2014) concluded that “[m]ain effects analyses indicate that on average, peer-mediated learning approaches improved literacy outcomes by nearly half a standard deviation (.486, SE = .121, $p < .001$) when compared with teacher-centered or individualistic instruction” (Cole 2014: 374).

5 Researching emotions in language education

There is much to be done yet to develop research on language learning and emotions. Emotions have been defined as “contextual, relational [...] and not innate, not internal psychological states, not universal, and not measurable” (Benesch 2016: 2). Therefore, due to the nature of emotions, research in this field implies intrinsic difficulties. A non-exhaustive review of the main research procedures used in this field may show a general vision of the most salient advances.

Language anxiety, mainly measured through scales, is the most frequently studied negative emotion as mentioned above (Horwitz and Young 1991; MacIntyre and Gardner 1994; Sparks and Ganschow 1993; Rubio 2004). The study of the relation between multilingualism and affect is becoming more and more relevant. Based on the premise that different languages are from different cultures and therefore that emotions could be language-/culture-dependent, Dewaele and Pavlenko (2002) created the Bilingualism and Emotion Questionnaire, which they used with more than 1,500 multilinguals to analyze their language preferences to express different types of feelings such as love or anger. The main conclusion derived from the studies related to this questionnaire is that mother tongue (or dominant L1 in bilinguals) is the preferred language to express emotions. In addition, cultural competence acquired in stays abroad and culture distance among languages spoken, and not only proficiency levels, seem also to have an effect on the foreign language speakers' ability to communicate emotions appropriately and on their difficulties in identifying emotions and judging their intensity (Dewaele 2011).

Discourse analysis to identify emotions has also been a research procedure with significant contributions. Foreign language learning is considered a difficult activity, often associated with many different types of emotions that fluctuate between feeling ashamed, due to the lack of competence in communicating mature ideas in an insufficient linguistic vehicle, or on the contrary, feeling enjoyment because speaking in another language provides “another soul” (Wilson 2013), another way of experiencing the world and therefore of solving problems and interacting with others. Discourse analysis provides evidence of a cultural frame switching effect in bilinguals as regards emotional experiences, depending on the main characteristics of the language used and its role in the speaker's life (Dewaele 2016; Wilson 2013). Dewaele (2016) affirms that “the learning of multiple languages, and the resulting multi-competence, affects not just phonology, morphology, syntax, lexical choices, but also pragmatics, where the communication of emotion is situated” and that “the fact of learning to recognise and express emotions in different languages affects how these

emotions are recognised and expressed in the multilingual's various languages" (Dewaele 2016: 463).

Bamberg proposes narratives (short stories research) as a good tool to analyse identity and its evolution. He states that these small stories allow "for the study of how people as agentive actors position themselves – and in doing so become positioned" (Bamberg 2010: 13). Kramsch (2009) studies through *language memoirs* and learners' testimonies what is involved in becoming a multilingual speaker. One of the different aspects she analyses is desire, which she considers a core element of language learning. She sees desire as being the "urge to escape from a state of tedious conformity with one's present environment to a state of plenitude and enhanced power" (Kramsch 2009: 14). Or as "a deep desire not to challenge the language of their environment but to find in the foreign words a confirmation of the meaning they express in their mother tongue" (Kramsch 2009: 15).

Gregersen and MacIntyre (2012: 193), motivated by the Positive Psychology movement and their theoretical revision of how imagination impacts language learning, affirm that "positive emotion facilitates the building of resources because positive emotion tends to broaden a person's perspective, opening the individual to absorb the language. In contrast, negative emotion produces the opposite tendency, a narrowing of focus and a restriction of the range of potential language input" (MacIntyre and Gregersen 2012: 193).

Of a different nature, Kaufmann and Vosburg's study (1997), which dealt with their negative mood induced experiment, presented the power of negative emotions as a stimulus to improve a non-ideal situation or to activate persistence until it becomes ideal. As regards this changing behavior of feeling and, therefore, meaning, Lemke (2013) affirms "[w]e can identify strongly with something at the same time we hate it or fear it. The excluded middle of Reason's logic does not apply in the domain of feelings and feeling-based evaluations, in part because we can feel in many different ways about the same thing" (Lemke 2013: 64). De Costa's proposal on how to study emotions may be a solution to this apparent controversy. De Costa (2015) emphasizes the changeable nature of emotions and refers to the perspective of applied linguists who define emotions as embodied actions that can be researched in SLA through scalar approaches to language learning and teaching. In his qualitative research study, he gathered data from directly observing Daniella, a scholarship student from Vietnam, from video- and audio-recording her interviews and from her written work, the subject syllabus, and her progress reports. He analyzed the evolution of her desire and her anxiety about becoming a scholar. To identify the elements of her emotional development, De Costa divided the data obtained into three timescales: before, during and after the 2008 school year. The study started with Daniella's positive emotions and concludes reporting Daniella's increase of anxiety due to pressures and her finally detaching herself from the initially desired scholar identity.

Conscious of this controversy between the effect of positive and negative emotions in FL learning, Dewaele and MacIntyre (2014) studied the relationship between enjoyment and classroom anxiety with a questionnaire administered to 1,742 FL learners of 90 different nationalities. Their results show that learners reporting higher levels of enjoyment experienced less classroom anxiety and that in general, advanced learners felt more enjoyment than anxiety. They also evidenced trends depending on regional areas. For instance, in their sample population, North Americans obtained higher results in enjoyment, while Asian students felt more classroom anxiety.

In a more recent study, Macintyre and Vincze (2017) used an emotion scale to research ten positive emotions (joy, gratitude, serenity, interest, hope, pride, amusement, inspiration, awe, and love) and nine negative emotions (anger, contempt, disgust, embarrassment, guilt, hate, sadness, feeling scared, and being stressed). These emotions were correlated with core variables from the integrative motive, the social-contextual model, and the L2 motivation self system. Results show that both positive and negative emotions are correlated with SLA motivation processes in the context of South Tyrol where Italian speakers have a lot of contact with German. Their data suggest a significant role for positive emotion, although their overall conclusion is that a variety of emotions are implicated in the L2 motivation processes.

As a general summary of research on emotion in language education, it can be affirmed that emotions play a significant role in the learning of languages because the social, personal and relational contexts of those involved are relevant in this process. Researching emotions in language learning is an important challenge where scales, questionnaires, direct observation, interviews, narratives, discourse analysis or induced mood experiments have been the most used tools for understanding the problems of learning and teaching languages and offering useful solutions.

6 Methodological and practical consequences for language education

A chapter on emotions in language education cannot end without some proposals for the language classroom. Language learning is a long process that requires repetition and practice and requires the support of sustained motivation. In this sense, what pedagogical practices does research in emotion and language education suggest?

A first pedagogical conclusion derives from the findings of affective neurosciences: boredom does not promote language learning; on the contrary, students' curiosity needs to be fed so that they become actively engaged. According to Schumann (1997), "emotional reactions influence the attention and effort devoted to learning" (Schumann 1997: 8). Students pay attention to what awakens their curiosity (Mora 2013). But, curiosity in the language classroom needs to be connected to students' active engagement, to meaningful interactions, to oral and written language production. Obviously, as Chastain (1988) mentioned, "experiences that have positive results tend to be repeated and those with negative outcomes avoided. Those that are associated with success are approached with confidence and those associated with failure or displeasure are approached with reluctance and distaste" (Chastain (1988: 167), but how to get adolescents' attention in a highly technological environment that seems to indicate that everything is immediately available without effort?

The appraisal dimensions discussed (Schumann 1999) add clear indicators to understand how language learners evaluate different teaching proposals: students are motivated by something new but at the same time familiar that has meaning for them. They may be more willing to participate if they understand the goal of a task, when learning is connect-

ed to real-life situations, and when instructions are carefully given so that they will feel they will be able to do the task that is proposed. In a multicultural classroom, special care needs to be taken with learners' social and cultural norms so that they feel their self and social images are respected.

A second educational suggestion from our theoretical review is that "one size does not fit all" in current multicultural classrooms. The variability of emotions and of affective factors which at the same time are culture-language dependent, indicates the impossibility of considering the notion of linear causality of any language education strategy and that multiple causations need to be considered (Griffiths 2015). This implies that foreign language teachers have to include in their lesson plans a variety of tasks that can adapt to different learning styles, to alternative ways that help, on the one hand, to avoid boredom, but that also enable students to know their abilities instead of being discouraged by their limitations. These alternative forms may include interactive experiences with the arts (painting, music, literature, films, etc.), and in general, exercises with challenges that activate a positive image of themselves (Fonseca-Mora 2002; Foncubierta and Gant 2016) but that are also connected to action-oriented, learner-centered methodologies where learners collaborate, where peer-mediated learning improves students' literacy outcomes (Cole 2014).

Smith's (1999) BASICS model illustrates how teachers may create a willing language learning community. The acronym BASICS includes six components: belonging, aspirations, safety, identity, challenge and success. The sense of belonging can be enhanced through group dynamics that help to create a cohesive learner group. Although learners' self reflection on their personal aspirations is recommendable, effective cooperation can derive from pursuing a common goal as, for instance, while cooperating to accomplish a mediated language learning experience.

Mediation in foreign language learning may give learners the opportunity of being more aware of the others' needs, of making decisions together, of collaborating and sharing ideas and of agreeing on how best to complete a task. In fact, Arnold and Brown (1999) postulate that, "[a]s we teach the language, we can also educate learners to live more satisfying lives and to be responsible members of society" (Arnold and Brown 1999: 2). Learners' feeling that their personal views and experiences are useful in dealing with real-life problems in a secure classroom environment may influence their beliefs regarding their possibilities for becoming successful. But mobile phones and tablets can also promote communication beyond the walls of the classroom and may connect formal and informal learning. Technological tools, if used in connection with learning goals, can lead to optimal motivation and engagement in language learning while satisfying real-life communication.

Another pedagogical suggestion relates to teacher discourse. Students who feel acknowledged, recognized and not rejected or humiliated are more willing to participate actively in the foreign language classroom and also outside it. Students' beliefs on how language learning happens need to be explored. Students need "to discover" that having meaningful interactions is the best way of learning a language. This will help them, for example, to consider how social networks can give them more options for written interaction with people from different countries or how watching movies or singing modern English songs in their free time could improve their pronunciation as well as help with the memorization of lexical chunks that would better their speaking fluency. As mentioned by

the Council of Europe in the CEFRCV (2017), high quality learning also depends on students' awareness of the importance of their tasks and of the relevance of the learning experience beyond the immediate time and place. This student awareness depends on the learning experiences that the teacher provides.

Furthermore, another pedagogical suggestion in this chapter is related to language teaching in order to reduce foreign language anxiety. Horwitz, Horwitz, and Cope (1986) affirm that anxiety can be a factor behind disruptive behavior. When learners feel afraid of communicating in a foreign language, when they feel insecure or ashamed of their poor performance, they often do not recognize these emotions in front of their peers, but prefer to exhibit lack of interest or aggressive behavior. Specific resources, such as musical activities, humor, gamified tasks, and tasks that demand collaboration and creativity to solve real-life problems are usually evaluated as useful for producing positive emotions in the language classroom and therefore reducing negative ones, such as anxiety. Teachers can also reduce anxiety when planning scaffolded instruction, by giving positive feedback, by acknowledging that errors are needed for progress to happen, by personalizing their teaching.

Our last reflection is related to the role of language learning in education. Language is a symbolic tool connected to our experiences and to our vision of the world. Language, culture and thought cannot be separated. Therefore, learning a language means learning other ways of expressing oneself, of understanding other types of cultural references, of knowing how to interact with others. This implies dealing with ambiguity with flexible minds. The constant focus on "understanding the other" and on how to become "understandable" to others can be measured through the mediation descriptors that the Council of Europe (2017) proposes. Making students aware of their mediation capacities in plurilingual classes could become an interesting way of educating them in becoming more aware of their socio-emotional competences, of becoming active social agents of a more inclusive society.

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- 1 Introduction
- 2 The ESLE model
- 3 The stages of ESLE
- 4 Concluding remarks
- 5 References

Abstract: Underscoring the role of emotions and sensory psychology in language studies, this chapter intends to introduce emo-sensory language education (ESLE) as a different perspective to learning and teaching a second/foreign language. Inspired by emotioncy (emotion + frequency of senses) literature, ESLE deals with recognizing and managing sense-related emotions in a second/foreign language learning classroom. In fact, ESLE rests on the assumption that the language itself along with the classroom setting is mingled with sensory emotions that can affect learners' cognition. Being cognizant of the interplay between emotions and senses and its effect on cognitive abilities can empower teachers to facilitate the process of second/foreign language learning. Knowledge of this kind can help teachers regulate and manage sense-induced emotions to the extent that learners find language learning vibrant and enjoyable. To shed more light on the idea, the six aspects of the ESLE model, i.e., multisensory education, embodied education, learning styles, sensory intelligence, emotioncy, and emo-sensory intelligence are illustrated and their implications in the language classroom are provided. Subsequently, three stages, namely emo-sensory awareness, emo-sensory preferences, and emo-sensory management are proposed for the implementation of the ESLE model in the classroom, leading language teachers to induce emo-sensory practices into their pedagogy.

1 Introduction

Human beings have many aspects, including emotions. There is no universally accepted definition of emotion. However, it can be said that in essence, "emotions are basic psychological systems regulating an individual's adaptation to personal and environmental demands" (Glaser-Zikuda, Stuchlikova, and Janik 2013: 8). These states of feeling that influence our behavior are of different types: anger, fear, sadness, disgust, surprise, anticipation, trust, and joy (Plutchik 1980). To use these emotions more efficiently to guide our behavior, we need to know how to monitor and manage them. It was Bar-On (1988)

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who first introduced the term *emotional quotient* (EQ) as a counterpart to *intelligence quotient* (IQ) to underscore the role of emotions in success in life. Following the same trend, Salovey and Mayer (1990) put forth the first formulation of the concept they referred to as *emotional intelligence* (EI), whose popularity is very much indebted to Daniel Goleman's (1995, 1998) popular book on EI. In fact, EI reflects "the capacity for recognizing our own feelings and those of others, for motivating ourselves, and for managing emotions well in ourselves and in our relationships" (Goleman 1998: 317).

Over the past three decades, research on the prominent role of emotion has scattered around different fields of study including education. "Emotions are at the heart of teaching" (Hargreaves 1998: 835). In fact, a classroom is an emotional place which can arouse many types of emotions in learners, manipulating their motivation, social relations, self-concept, self-regulation, and personality development (Dweck 1986; Götz et al. 2003; Pekrun 2014). Moreover, emotions are crucial contributors to students' academic achievements (Lewis, Haviland-Jones, and Barrett 2008; Valiente, Swanson, and Eisenberg 2012). They can affect cognitive processes like memory and perception (Parkinson et al. 1996). According to neurophysiological theories, positive feelings or positive emotions systematically enhance a broad range of cognitive processes (Isen 2008). Positive emotions trigger neurochemical mechanisms including the release of dopamine into brain regions which enhance working memory, long-term memory, and controlled attention (Isen and Schmidt 2007).

The undeniable traces of emotions have been extended to the realm of language education as well. Emotions may entail hope for success, excitement to learn, anxiety about encountering or producing a new language, fear of failure, pride in accomplishments, and many more. In effect, it could be asserted that foreign language learning is an emotionally driven task (Dörnyei 2005; Imai 2010; López 2011; MacIntyre, MacKinnon, and Clément 2009). Seminal works such as Gardner and Lambert's (1972) discussion of attitudes and motivation in second language learning and Dörnyei's (1994) account of motivation in the foreign language classroom have paved the way for many studies on the role of affective factors in language education. Different aspects of emotion, such as enjoyment and pride (Goetz et al. 2008), anxiety (Horwitz, Horwitz, and Cope 1986), and fear (Ellis 2008), have been indicated to influence the language learner, all of them "regulating the motivational energy foreign language learners display in the classroom" (López and Cardenas 2014: 299). Among the different types of emotion, negative ones, especially anxiety, are perhaps the most studied in second language acquisition (MacIntyre and Gregersen 2012). In a study done by Pishghadam, Zabetipour, and Aminzadeh (2016), it was demonstrated that EFL (English as a Foreign Language) learners experience anger mostly over the listening skill; enjoyment and pride over speaking; shame over listening and speaking; hope, boredom, and hopelessness over writing and listening; and anxiety over all four language skills. Language learners' emotions may be brought about by various factors, including the teacher (see Martinez Aguado 2018), the social status of the language being learned, and learners' attitudes towards the language (Aragao 2011). Among these, of foremost importance seems to be the teacher. In fact, learners' emotions in the foreign language classroom have been compared to those of wild horses, which can be harnessed in the hands of a good teacher (Dewaele 2015). For example, foreign language teachers can appeal to students' emotions by using puzzles, singing and humor (Caruso 2015). It has also been shown that foreign language learners' enjoyment in the classroom is strongly related to the teacher (Dewaele et al. 2017).




Fig. 108.1: Dimensions of the ESLE model.

Apart from the emotional aspect, humans are sensory beings. Senses are the information channels which connect us to the physical and social environment. As put by Baicchi, Digonnet, and Sanford (2018), our presence in the world is dependent on our senses, since they function as a connection between the world and our body. The world is constantly offering us sounds to hear, textures to feel, scents to smell, and a myriad of things to see or taste. Senses can trigger emotions, and conversely, emotions can enforce senses. In fact, senses and emotions are forever married (Heller 2002). Although each concept has received due attention separately, one can rarely find research on the combination of senses and emotions and the effect it can have on learning. Perhaps the most well-known proposition made in this regard has been by Lozanov, who introduced *Desuggestopedia* in language teaching (see Larsen-Freeman and Anderson 2011). The method relies on the principle of desuggesting limitations and psychological barriers on learning, which results in learners using their full mental capacities. Learners' senses are implicitly used through music, arts, and drama to arouse emotions, which act as a gateway to better learning and cognition.

The emerging interest in the coalescence of senses and emotions has recently inspired Pishghadam, Adamson, and Shayesteh (2013) to cast a new look at sense-induced emotions and broach the concept of *sensory emotions* (technically called *emotioncy*). To foreground sensory emotions in language education, *Emo-Sensory Language Education* (ESLE) is proposed in this chapter based on the assumption that teachers should be aware of sense-induced emotions in class, striving to monitor and manage them effectively enough so that learning can be facilitated. ESLE covers six main components, including learning styles, emotioncy, sensory intelligence, embodied cognition, emo-sensory intelligence, and multisensory education. Figure 108.1 gives a schematic representation of the model.

The present chapter elucidates each of the aforementioned concepts and then relates each to the ESLE model. After covering the theoretical underpinning of the model, the chapter continues with its practical aspects by offering three stages to implement it.

2 The ESLE model

2.1 Learning styles

The concept of learning style is a product of general psychology (Ellis 2008). A standard definition for learning styles is “cognitive, affective, and physiological traits that are relatively stable indications of how learners perceive, interact with, and respond to the learning environment” (Keefe 1979: 4). It is basically “a general predisposition, voluntary or not, toward processing information in a particular way” (Skehan 1991: 288). Learning styles mediate between emotion and cognition, as seen in Ehrman and Leaver’s (2003) classification of learning styles in second language acquisition, entailing the following nine styles: field-independence versus field-dependence, random versus sequential, global versus particular, inductive versus deductive, synthetic versus analytic, analogue versus digital, concrete versus abstract, leveling versus sharpening, and impulsive versus reflective.

Another dimension of learning style, which pertains more to the formal classroom setting, is the preference that learners have for visual, auditory, kinesthetic, and/or tactile input (Reid 1987). According to Reid (1995), one major category of learning styles relevant to the field of foreign language learning is sensory/perceptual styles. This category has to do with the physical environment in which we learn and involves using our senses in order to perceive data, which is what is highlighted in ESLE. These sensory learning styles or sensory preferences categorize learners into the following: visual learners who prefer reading, using pictures, images, and spatial understanding; auditory learners who prefer listening, and using sound and music; and kinesthetic and tactile learners who prefer using their body, hands, and sense of touch. Learning styles are not exclusive, meaning that learners may use, for example, both visual and auditory input; however, they often have a preference for one (Dörnyei 2005). Here is a brief overview of the four preference types (Dörnyei 2005):

- *Visual learners:* These learners absorb information most efficiently through the visual channel. They prefer reading tasks and tend to make certain information more visually salient by using colors. However, visual learners are not necessarily interested in the printed written material. In effect, they tend to be engaged by both verbal and non-verbal presentations of information. Therefore, they also like pictures, graphs, charts, films, and videos.
- *Auditory learners:* This type prefers auditory input such as lectures, voices, and audiotapes. They also like to engage in discussions and group work. They have a preference for written passages to be read out, and often recite out loud what they want to remember. They prefer to have oral practice without their books.
- *Kinesthetic and tactile learners:* These two style preferences are related to each other, although not identical. The kinesthetic style learns most effectively through complete body experience and movement, while the tactile style prefers a hands-on learning approach. Kinesthetic learners require frequent breaks and cannot rest motionless for a long time. They often walk around when trying to memorize something. Tactile learners enjoy working with objects, and making posters, collages, and other types of building models. They like creating artwork or conducting lab experiments.

Learning styles theory holds the belief that individual students are successful in learning with different learning styles. Since styles are consistent and enduring tendencies or preferences within an individual (Brown 2014), it stands to reason to say that each language learner comes to class with his/her particular learning style. Other than learners' own preferences, sometimes one sensory modality may have better results than others in the learning outcome. For example, since the 1960s, it has been known that the immediate recall and recognition of verbal materials is better via the auditory modality compared to the visual modality. Also, according to cognitive load theory (Sweller, van Merriënboer, and Paas 1998) and Mayer's theory of multimedia learning (Moreno and Mayer 1999), using audio instead of visual texts will decrease working memory load and improve learning.

It is important that the learner's learning style match with the teaching style presented in the classroom. For example, if a learner who enjoys making something for a class project (tactile style) mostly encounters textbooks to read (visual style), s/he will not be able to learn efficiently, for there is a mismatch between teaching and learning styles. This is where the language teacher must be prepared beforehand. It should be kept in mind that if teachers do not attend to students' learning styles, they may be emotionally affected, leading to failure in their class performance. One way to deal with this issue is to distribute Reid's Perceptual Learning Style Preference Questionnaire (Reid 1995) at the onset of the class program and find out about each learner's sensory preferences in the classroom. The teacher then should try to design activities that integrate the learners' learning styles. Apparently, learners with more than one sensory preference have more chance of success than those with only one because they can process information in more than one way presented (Kinsella 1995).

2.2 Emotioncy


Refuting Chomsky's (1966) theory of *universal grammar* (UG), Greenspan (1992) shifted his focus to the association between language and emotion, claiming that symbols, language, and intelligence are not deeply rooted in genetics; instead, they evolve out of the emotional responses gained by means of the child's interaction with the environment and caregivers.

Inspired by a number of different theories including Greenspan's developmental individual-difference relationship-based (DIR) model of first language acquisition, Pishghadam, Adamson, and Shayesteh (2013) introduced an emotion-based perspective into the second/foreign language learning domain. Based on this perspective, each entity carries a degree of emotion for individuals, which is referred to as emotioncy (emotion + frequency). Individuals' emotioncy depends on whether they have heard about, seen, touched, or experienced that entity and also the level of frequency of exposure to such concepts. An individual can have higher emotioncy for some specific words in a language since he has directly experienced those entities. Yet, his emotioncy for the words for which he has no emotional experience may be low or even close to zero. Table 108.1 recapitulates the different kinds of emotioncy in a hierarchical order.

Based on the emotioncy kinds, emotioncy types can range from *Avolvement* (Null emotioncy), to *Exvolvement* (Auditory, Visual, and Kinesthetic emotioncies) and *Involvement*

Table 108.1: Emotioncy kinds (Pishghadam, Jajarmi, and Shayesteh 2016: 14)

Kind	Experience
Null emotioncy	When an individual has not heard about, seen, or experienced an object or a concept.
Auditory emotioncy	When an individual has merely heard about a word/concept.
Visual emotioncy	When an individual has both heard about and seen the item.
Kinesthetic emotioncy	When an individual has heard about, seen, and touched the real object.
Inner emotioncy	When an individual has directly experienced the word/concept.
Arch emotioncy	When an individual has deeply done research to get additional information.

**Fig. 108.2:** Emotioncy kinds and types (Pishghadam 2016a).

(Inner and Arch emotioncies). This division signifies that a special type of emotion can be generated based on the information that each individual receives through their different senses. Figure 108.2 illustrates the six-level matrix of emotioncy including its kinds and types.

In the psycholinguistic literature, there is a distinction between “emotion” words, and “emotion-laden” words. Emotion words straightforwardly express particular affective states (e.g., *happy*, *angry*), whereas emotion-laden words (e.g., *death*, *wedding*) can arouse people’s emotions without explicitly revealing the affective states (Pavlenko 2008). In general, emotion-laden words are processed faster and more efficiently than non-affective ones (Ababssi et al. 2011). There is also evidence that word class affects the timing and characteristics of affective word processing (Herbert, Junghofer, and Kissler 2008; Schacht and Sommer 2009). Adjectives that describe characteristics, states, and traits may have a more




Fig. 108.3: Educational emotioncy pyramid (Pishghadam 2016a).

direct connection with emotions than verbs describing actions or events, or nouns that designate concrete objects (Pavlenko 2008). In addition, studies have revealed that emotion and emotion-laden words appear to be more memorable than neutral words (e.g., Al-tarriba and Bauer 2004; Rubin and Friendly 1986; Saarela et al. 2016; Talmi and Moscovitch 2004).

In acquiring one's first language (L1), the word (lexicon) and its world (emotion) are learned simultaneously. In other words, the word gains additional meaning through its emotional context and experience (Greenspan 2001). Just as there has always been a flow between the L1 and the second language (L2) in terms of lexicon and grammatical rules, emotions may similarly move between the source and target languages under the title of *inter-emotionality*. When the flow is from learners' L1 to their L2, they already own the relevant emotion and only need to know the word in the L2; however, when the flow is from learners' L2 to L1, they need to acquire both the word and the induced emotion. Thereby, language learners learn the words that they have already emotionally connected to in their L1 faster and more easily. Yet, if the word does not exist in the learner's L1 (null emotioncy) or has a different emotional context associated with it, it is more difficult to attain in the L2. For example, a language teacher who wants to teach the word 'Halloween' to a child with Persian as his L1, has to emotionally familiarize the child with the concept of Halloween, since the child is not acquainted with the word in his own culture. Thereby, both the emotion and the word need to be acquired by the child.

Emotioncy has set the foundation for several complementary views, such as *sensory relativism*, which posits that sense-induced emotions can relativize cognition. The *educational emotioncy pyramid* was accordingly designed to enable individuals to develop to their full potentials through sensory-based education (Figure 108.3).

To elaborate, the moment students enter the class, they are not often aware of the course content (null emotioncy). Based on the pyramid, traditionally the greatest amount

of information is conveyed through auditory inputs as the teachers initiate to lecture on different issues. Feeling the need to engage the students' sense of vision requires the teachers to flavor their talks with graphs, pictures, and PowerPoints. Incorporating the sense of touch could significantly improve the process of learning as well. During the inner emotioncy stage, all the senses come into play to directly experience a piece of reality. In the final level (i.e., arch emotioncy), the students master multiple layers of the previously learned concepts by delving into and doing research on them.

To date, the newly developed concept of emotioncy has been investigated in a number of theoretical and empirical studies. It has been acknowledged as an index of word saliency resulting in improved comprehension and retention (Pishghadam and Shayesteh 2016), surpassing cognitive abilities in vocabulary learning success. Moreover, emotioncy has lately been marked as a critical means of freeing up working memory and cutting back on cognitive load (Pishghadam 2016a). It has further been employed as a benchmark for sorting out culture teaching strategies (Pishghadam, Rahmani, and Shayesteh 2017) which is especially significant in the foreign language classroom. In the field of testing, emotioncy is considered a potential source of test bias, an extraneous factor affecting assessment (Pishghadam, Baghaei, and Seyednozadi 2016) and a measure for estimating the complexity of texts (Pishghadam and Abbasnejad 2016). In psychology, Pishghadam (2016b) identified emotioncy as an indicator of learners' willingness to communicate (WTC). Research has demonstrated that those who are more willing to engage in conversation with others are more effective language learners (MacIntyre et al. 1998).

2.3 Sensory intelligence

Along with cognitive and emotional responses, sensory reflections enable people to have a better map of their body and the world (Dunn 2000). Neurologically speaking, this may happen through *sensory integration*, when the brain receives and processes the information from one's body or environment and makes it possible to apply it in our everyday life (Ayres 1972). Sensory experiences are in fact unique, constantly mediated by culture. The vocabularies we use to put our experiences into words reflect the work of our sensory systems to identify certain perspectives of an entity. While 'bright' indicates visual input, 'scratchy' reflects touch input. Yet, the right amount of sensory information that each individual needs to function best in response to sensory inputs is different from that of others, though not everyone is aware of their sensory needs. People show different responses towards the sensory inputs around them which have been labeled as *sensory intelligence* (SI), working to help them understand how to modify their senses or the environment to have a better feeling of themselves (Lombard 2007). As a result, they respond differently to situations or environments due to their sensory content. In fact, there are four basic ways people react to sensory inputs: *seekers* who cannot get enough of different sensory inputs, *bystanders* who need more sensory information to stay activated, *avoiders* who demand order and routine, and *sensors* who are quite sensitive to what is going on around them. Simply put, individuals with low sensory thresholds avoid sensory stimulation and prefer calm, well-structured, and predictable environments. On the other hand, those with high sensory

thresholds are significantly influenced by sensory information via the environment (Dunn 2000). To illuminate, Lombard (2007) offered her *sensory tree* to give a clearer picture of the sensory intelligent relationships. While *sensation avoiders* are like the anchoring roots of the tree, *sensation seekers* resemble its leaves, receiving whatever the nature sends to them. Those with *typical thresholds* (neither high nor low) are likened to the trunk of the tree holding the parts together and the *sensory sensitives* are associated with the surface roots of the tree not stretching deep into the soil.

Overall, our sensory intelligence has a high impact on our day-to-day living. It affects our productivity levels and professional relationships, as well as the way we learn (Lombard 2007). Not only IQ and EQ, but also their collaboration with *sensory quotient* (SQ), may open up possibilities to guide learning outcomes. Knowing sensory patterns of learners can assist teachers in optimizing their learning environments and getting their needs met. While some may seek for multi-sensory stimulations, others may have a low sensory threshold. Thus, providing a balanced environment can lead to a rise in the learners' confidence and overall success. In addition to our senses, emotions provide a complementary outlook towards learning to one's benefit. The idea will be further elaborated on in the following section.

2.4 Emo-sensory intelligence

Emotion is the manifestation of the internal states and is intrinsically connected to physical and sensory feelings (Lazarus 1999). Although the way senses and emotions coalesce is rather unsettled (Thomson, Crocker, and Marketo 2010), it is believed that this connection functions in two directions. All objects are identified with their emotional qualities perceived through our sensory modalities. In turn, the emotional responses arising from our sensory experiences activate the sensory cortices (Vuilleumier 2005).

Different ideas have thus far been set forth with a recent emphasis on the way the senses generate emotions. A few studies (e.g., Pishghadam, Jajarmi, and Shayesteh 2016) have investigated the way sensory inputs can emotionally relativize cognition. In fact, sensory experiences can bring about different emotions in people that change the way they perceive the world. Being able to attend to these sensory emotions may give the person extra potential to harmonize one's life. Accordingly, we postulate that not everyone is aware of his sense-induced emotions, coined as emotioncy. The sheer ability to "recognize, label, monitor, and manage sense-induced emotions to guide one's behavior" (Pishghadam and Shayesteh 2017: 24) is called *emo-sensory intelligence* (ESQ). Having its roots in both emotional and sensory intelligences, ESQ revolves around the emotional interpretation of the senses while sharing common features with emotional differentiation, emotional clarity, and EI. In a relevant study on color-emotion associations, Pishghadam and Shayesteh (2017) reported that participants had positive, negative, or no emotion for colors. The variation among individuals was mainly the result of evolution and culture, as well as personal experiences. To explicate, they came up with a three-set model of emo-sensory expression consolidating sense (S), emotion (E), and language (L) (the ability to verbalize one's inner feelings). The intersection of the components (i.e., SE, SL, and EL) delineates the degree to which the individuals are able to express their emotions (see Figure 108.4).




Fig. 108.4: The three-set model of emo-sensory expression (Pishghadam and Shayesteh 2017: 22).

To their view, SEL, as a manifestation of ESQ, characterizes the ideal state in which individuals “sense an entity and recognize the type of emotion evoked by that, label it, and try to manage it to guide behavior” (Pishghadam and Shayesteh 2017: 23).

There are various modifiable mediating factors which may directly or indirectly influence ESQ. Perhaps one’s *(emo)sensory capital* (Pishghadam, Shakeebaee, and Shayesteh 2018) can affect his/her emo-sensory intelligence to a great extent, meaning that due to their cultural, economic, and social backgrounds individuals may hold different emotioncy levels for different entities. This could gain more prominence in educational domains, hypothesizing that learners with more *(emo)sensory capital* show higher emo-sensory intelligence. In other words, *(emo)sensory capital* is believed to be a prerequisite to emo-sensory intelligence. This may apply to language classes as well. Each learner comes to class with a certain degree of emotioncy towards an object or a concept, depending on his/her social class, religious beliefs, cultural understanding, and family/educational background. In order to illustrate this matter more, we can take the example of a learner who has been raised in a religious family. If a religious figure happens to be the content of the language material being presented in class, that learner may relate to the topic more than a learner who has been raised in a context indifferent or ignorant of religious issues.

By and large, in order to boost emo-sensory capital and eventually ESQ in learners in general and language learners in particular, we need to set the scene by giving more weight to senses. Multisensory education could serve as a noteworthy step towards fulfilling this goal.

2.5 Multisensory education

Studies of learning have generally placed a premium on a single sensory modality. However, our experiences in the world result from complex multisensory interactions (Shams and Seitz 2008). In fact, the human brain has evolved and developed in a way to operate and learn in multisensory environments (Driver and Noesselt 2008). From a neurological point of view, different sensory information proceeds to different brain regions. To have effective instruction, all parts of the brain including cortical regions of the cerebral cortex

(i.e., the frontal, parietal, temporal, and occipital lobes) and subcortical structures should come into play (Zull 2011).

The “modality effect” is one of the first and most influential theories to promote the use of more than one sensory modality in education, claiming that instructional material that is presented in a dual format (audio/visual) is superior to a visual-only presentation. In effect, the modality used to present information may be critical to working memory load and our ability to transfer information to long-term memory. When working memory is divided into auditory and visual components, there is more available capacity to deal with information (Leahy and Sweller 2011). The redundant and/or complementary information from different modalities can improve recognition memory compared to just one modality (Amedi et al. 2005). The reason is that multi-sensory stimuli are presented in two codes and thus encoded twice, whereas uni-sensory stimuli is presented in one code and encoded only once (see Mastroberardino et al. 2008).

Multisensory education uses different senses (i.e., visual, auditory, kinesthetic, tactile, etc.) to accelerate learning. In multisensory education, different sensory types come hand in hand to create the maximum amount of sensory exposure. This method of education, which is also known as VAKT (visual-auditory-kinesthetic-tactile), rests on the premise that students learn best when information is presented in different sensory types (Mercer and Mercer 1993). A multisensory approach integrates sensory activities and does not distinguish a specific learning style for a specific learner. Ideally, all four learning styles should be addressed equally (Murphy 1997).

Educators have always believed that multisensory education enhances learning (see Shams and Seitz 2008). An apparent advantage of multisensory education is that it is more efficient at an individual level. It further includes learners with different learning styles and engages them all. People generally remember 10% of what they read, 20% of what they hear, 30% of what they see, and 50% of what they see and hear (Treischler 1967). Thus, the more sensory exposure involved, the more efficient the learning could be.

The multisensory learning movement was launched nearly at the beginning of the 20th century by Montessori (1912; as cited in Shams and Seitz 2008), based on which the teaching material is taught by a mixture of visual, auditory, tactile, and kinesthetic approaches. Since then, some educational programs have been designed according to this movement. The Wilson Elementary School is one example in this respect which has adopted a multisensory learning approach. After finding out about their students’ learning styles through distributing the Learning Styles Inventory, the teachers worked to create a learning environment sensitive to the learning styles identified. They designed learning activities which integrated the preferred learning styles of the students. The staff even “redesigned every classroom to respond to individual students’ needs for sound, light, seating, and mobility” (Stone 1992: 35). In addition, teachers played soft background music, provided low light and informal seating, and even permitted juice and raw vegetables in their classrooms. All these resulted in a dramatic increase in not only the students’ test scores, but also their attitudes towards learning (Stone 1992).

Gradually, the Multisensory Structural Language Education (MSLE) method came into being, using visual, auditory, tactile-kinesthetic, and articulatory modalities for language teaching (see Birsh 1999). For instance, to teach spelling by the multisensory approach,

students say the word, write the word, check the word, trace the word, write the word from memory and check, and then repeat the entire process (Graham and Freeman 1986). The method was also adapted to foreign language instruction. Accordingly, it includes teaching phonology and syntax step-by-step, following the logical order of the language, presenting small amounts of material at one time, and achieving mastery through repetition. Of course, all these are accomplished through simultaneous visual, auditory, and tactile/kinesthetic presentations (Sparks et al. 1992).

With the advent of technology into the classroom, multisensory education has become easier. In fact, a growing research area in multimedia educational techniques is strongly in line with research on multisensory facilitation (Shams and Seitz 2008). Multimodal processing reduces cognitive load because information from different modalities can be more easily chunked into short-term memory and used to build long-term representations (Bagui 1998). For example, animations that are co-presented with narrations facilitate learning of facts and concepts (Harp and Mayer 1998).

Overall, each language learner is a unique individual with his/her own abilities, strengths, and weaknesses. Part of the differences among language learners have been attributed to their having different learning styles. By adopting an eclectic approach, multisensory education takes into account all types of sensory learning styles in the mode of instruction and thus enhances learning conditions.

2.6 Embodied cognition

An embodied framework for cognition is a further perspective which amalgamates sensory and motor interactions. In recent years, embodied cognition has become a popular concept among scholars. According to embodied cognition, the mind and body are deeply connected. In other words, the mind influences the body and the body influences the mind. The basic tenets of embodied cognition are: “(1) cognitive processes are influenced by the body, (2) cognition exists in the service of action, (3) cognition is situated in the environment, and (4) cognition may occur without internal representations” (Goldinger et al. 2016: 959). To this, we can add other principles proposed by Wilson (2002), i.e., (5) cognition functions under the pressures of real-time interaction with the environment; (6) we convey cognitive work to the environment: due to the restrictions on our information-processing abilities including attention and working memory, we make use of the environment to cut back on the cognitive workload; (7) off-line cognition body-operated. Even when decoupled from the environment, the activity of the mind is grounded in mechanisms that evolved for interaction with the environment – that is, mechanisms of sensory processing and motor control.

This influence of the motor system (body) on cognition (mind) has been found in many cognitive domains. In memory tasks, for example, autobiographic memories are recalled faster when the participant is currently in the same body position as when the memory was created. A case in point is when lying back in a chair, it is easier to remember a visit to the dentist’s office than in another position (see de Nooijer and Willems 2016). The same influence can be found in language processing. For example, when hearing action words

(e.g., *to kick, to throw, to write*), the brain's motor and premotor areas are activated, which are the same areas that are operating when actually performing the action (Hauk, Johnsrude, and Pulvermüller 2004). Likewise, research has shown that action words that involve arm or leg movements (e.g., *write, kick*) can be recognized faster after the arm or leg activation (Pulvermüller et al. 2005). The coordination of body and mind is important for education since it facilitates student experiences of deep engagement and interest, which is also labeled under the term *flow* (Csikszentmihalyi 1988). When experiencing flow, an individual would be engrossed in the activity so that they lose self-awareness or self-consciousness; and finally, there would be a sense of oneness with the activity. From a different perspective, metaphors, as a common approach to embodied cognition, serve educational purposes. They are held to be so pervasive in everyday communication that they can mold our understanding of the world (Lakoff and Johnson 1999). Teachers generally use metaphors to facilitate learning or delve into the minds of the learners. Of different types of metaphors which can be of help to teachers, the sensory ones seem to be of great significance. Sensory metaphors refer to the metaphors which have sensory references in our brain and are rooted in our sensory experiences. Akpinar and Berger (2015) have shown that people use the phrase 'cold person' more often than that of 'unfriendly friend', because against the latter which is more abstract, the former has a sensory nature and more associative cues, and hence more memorable and culturally successful. Thus, it is our hypothesis that teaching sensory metaphors can facilitate and expedite the process of language learning.

There is also a bridge between the theories of embodied cognition and language education. As an instance, in the Desuggestopedia method of second/foreign language teaching, which was indicated earlier, embodied cognition manifests itself well. First of all, a calm state is reached through listening to classical music in the classroom. The musical background helps to induce a relaxed attitude, referred to as concert pseudo-passiveness by Lozanov (see Richards and Rodgers 2014). This state is optimal for learning, since all tensions and anxieties are removed, and concentration is very much increased. When reading a dialogue, the teacher with a musical accompaniment matches her voice to the rhythm and intonation of the music. In effect, the auditory sense helps to overcome psychological barriers in learners and reach the subconscious. Once there is a unity between the conscious and subconscious mind, learning is enhanced. Apart from music, dramatization and pantomime are employed in this method. When adopting these techniques, the motor system influences the mind, and together they create an optimal situation for learning the language used. Moreover, since cognition is situated in the environment, the bright and cheerful environment of the classroom in this method facilitates learning (Larsen-Freeman and Anderson 2011).

3 The stages of ESLE

The six dimensions of ESLE highlighted earlier presented an overview of how different emo-sensory abilities can play a role in the enhancement of second/foreign language education. In addition to the six dimensions, this chapter proposes three stages for ESLE which can lead to appropriate learning/teaching practices (Figure 108.5).




Fig. 108.5: The stages of ESLE.

Emo-sensory awareness (ESA) explains how attentive teachers, material/curriculum designers, administrators, and policy makers are about the interplay between emotions and senses in language education. Of course, if we want to have ESLE reflected in our classroom practices, we need to be first aware of the concept of sense-induced emotions and how they can be implemented in teaching practices. Designing instruments to assess the awareness of those involved would be a great step in this respect. The instruments can be either oral (interview protocols) or written (questionnaires), including the six dimensions of ESLE in their content. They can even assess individuals' own emo-sensory intelligence/(emo)sensory capital about related concepts in the field they are teaching to see how competent they are. It stands to reason that a teacher whose emo-sensory intelligence or capital towards the concepts presented in class is not high enough, would not be able to incorporate sense-induced emotions while teaching either. Similarly, a material designer with low emo-sensory intelligence or capital cannot design the content that would engage learners' emo-sensory experiences.

A further stage in implementing emo-sensory language learning/teaching practices is taking *emo-sensory preferences* (ESP) into account. Knowing about learners' ESP is a crucial step in being a successful emo-sensory language teacher. These preferences may include the teacher's accent, the class decoration, lighting, and seating arrangement, etc. As previously mentioned, it is very important that teachers identify their students' ESP before beginning instruction. Whether it is done by questionnaires or simple interviews, knowing about learners' ESP puts teachers a great step forward in successful instruction. According to Carbo, "as educators, we need to learn a wide variety of instructional techniques, adapting them to individual students' strengths" (Carbo 1996: 13). This makes learners relaxed, receptive, and more open to learning. The important point is that although we generally talk about learning styles, teaching styles also exist. Teaching styles may be influenced by teachers' own ESP, or they may simply be due to teachers' being more comfortable with a particular style. Therefore, teachers should also be aware of their ESP, for it may influence their teaching practices.

The ultimate practical aspect of the ESLE model is *emo-sensory management* (ESM). In other words, in order to benefit from the great advantages ESLE has to offer, teachers need to tailor their practices to the needs and preferences of the learners. They are supposed to care about the accent the learners prefer to hear, the visual aids they are interested in, the games they tend to play, and the tasks they are more comfortable with doing. This of course happens once teachers and learners are aware of the importance of emo-sensory abilities

and the great potential these have for learning enhancement. One paradigm which can aid ESM is the Non-Native English-Speaking Teachers (NNEST) movement. This poststructuralist approach, which is against the privilege of native speakers, seeks to reduce the marginalization of non-native speakers and omit the factors that dichotomize individuals into native or non-native speaker (Selvi 2014). The movement is not just at the level of teachers, but also pertains to administrators, academics, policy makers, and other professionals who may not necessarily teach courses themselves, but are somehow involved in the field (see Aneja 2016).

Although the proposed practices seem to be time-consuming and challenging indeed, teachers are recommended to dedicate additional time to the instructional preparation and pay extra attention to the emotional aspect of teaching due to the lasting impact they may have on their learners' learning experiences. The current practices of language teachers seem to be far removed from ESM, however.

4 Concluding remarks

By taking into account the interwoven relationship between emotion and senses, this chapter set out to introduce ESLE as a novel model in second/foreign language education. Based on ESLE, six components, namely learning styles, emotioncy, sensory intelligence, emo-sensory intelligence, multisensory education, and embodied cognition, are essential in creating an animated and efficient classroom experience. Emotioncy is defined as a hierarchy, ranging from avolvement (null emotions) to exvolvement (auditory, visual, and kinesthetic) and finally to involvement (inner and arch), to emphasize the emotions evoked by the senses. ESLE calls for considering students' visual, auditory, kinesthetic, or tactile learning styles, moving learners from avolvement to involvement, catering for their sensory thresholds, using and boosting their emo-sensory intelligence, creating a multi-sensory learning environment, and making harmony between their body and mind. Implementation of the model includes three stages, i.e., emo-sensory awareness, identifying emo-sensory preferences, and emo-sensory management. Recognizing and nurturing emo-sensory abilities of learners can change learning trajectories in mastering a second/foreign language.

Considering its novelty and firm theoretical basis, ESLE is a prelude to initiating other studies. Investigations need to be done on the effect of the model on second/foreign language education, especially foreign language education since it takes place in the classroom setting. These may include the influence of ESLE on learning each of the language skills, the characteristics of teachers who are able to efficiently implement the model, the type of class management required and the challenges which may exist in carrying it out. ESLE is an unchartered territory awaiting further research.

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109 Civic emotion, loyalty and linguistic belonging

- 1 Speaking patriotism: National loyalty and language use
- 2 Civic emotion: Duties of feeling
- 3 Civic thought: Duties of remembering and belief
- 4 Linguistic nationalism: Duties of speech
- 5 Legislating language: The “English Only” movement in US politics
- 6 Directions for future research
- 7 References

Abstract: In an increasingly globalized world, one of the most pressing questions faced by modern nation states concerns the incorporation of new immigrants. Immigration has become a political flashpoint in most developed countries and receiving nations have debated how new members should be first “vetted” to ensure their loyalty and then integrated to assume the rights and duties of citizenship. Most states have focused on encouraging, even attempting to mandate, linguistic assimilation, but many have also turned their attention to cultivating more subtle and intimate forms of belonging as well. This chapter will explore the small but growing body of scholarly research on “civic emotion”: a form of emotional labor in which good citizenship requires the cultivation of certain feelings toward the nation. In most countries, proper civic emotion involves the production and performance of national pride or patriotic love, but some states may also require members to feel more negative emotions, ranging from shame and grief over shared national traumas to the hatred of particular enemy groups. Finally, this chapter will look at linkages between linguistic nationalism and normative civic emotion, by exploring ways in which immigrants’ choices to speak either the native or host-country language are interpreted as expressions of deeper national loyalties.

1 Speaking patriotism: National loyalty and language use

In the spring of 1920, the United States was still less than two years out of what was then known as the “Great War” or, sometimes (grandly, but entirely incorrectly) the “War to End All Wars”, though this conflict has since come to be known simply as World War I. The fighting had ended, but resentments toward, and mistrust of, America’s former enemies had not – a fact that served to make life difficult for the approximately seven million German migrants, and their children, who had settled in the US over the preceding century

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(Krawatzek and Sasse 2016). At the beginning of the war, anti-German hostility had often taken the form of mob violence, but prejudice soon hardened into policy. By the end of 1919, 37 US States had passed laws restricting the public use of foreign languages in general, or German in particular. Iowa's "Babel Proclamation" went the farthest, banning the use of any language other than English in schools, during religious meetings, in conversations on trains, and even over the telephone (Gavrilos 2010). It was in the midst of this, in May of 1920, that a Nebraska school teacher named Robert Meyer violated his own state's "English Only" law by allowing a 10-year-old German-speaking student to read a Bible story out loud, in his native language, in front of a classroom full of witnesses. Meyer was tried for his crime, convicted, and fined, but his case would become the basis for a legal challenge that would eventually make its way to the US Supreme Court (Pusey 2017; De Valle 2003).

What does it mean to be a good citizen? This is a question that all states and national groups eventually grapple with, and their answers (as confused and contested as they usually are) will exert significant power in shaping everything from educational policies to immigration law. For those who wished to restrict the speech rights of people like Robert Meyer, and millions of other German-Americans, being a good citizen and speaking the same language as members of the linguistic majority were inseparable. As the Nebraska State Supreme Court noted when they upheld Meyer's conviction:

To allow the children of foreigners [...] to be taught from earliest childhood the language of the country of their parents was to rear them *so that they must always think in that language, and, as a consequence, naturally inculcate in them ideas and sentiments foreign to the best interests of this country*. The statute, therefore was intended not only to require that the education of all children be conducted in English, but that, *until they had grown into that language and it had become a part of them*, they should not in schools be taught any other language. (cited in De Valle 2003: 36, emphasis mine).

The wording of the opinion is striking and helps to illustrate why struggles over citizenship so often crystallize around quotidian, seemingly trivial, issues like one's choice of language in public or even private settings. Advocates of today's English-only laws (and their myriad national variations worldwide) often justify them by citing the desirability of speeding host-country language fluency, or even claiming that national security is threatened by unconstrained foreign speech (why not speak a language we can understand too, unless you have something to hide?). However, the justification put forward by the Nebraska Supreme Court expresses deeper anxieties about the nature of belongingness, and its relationship to communication, thought, and feeling. To speak in an alien language was to *think* in one, and if one is thinking in an alien language, then the very content of those thoughts must also be alien, hostile, and un-American. Patriotic sentiments, the court reasoned, could not be formed from foreign words, and, while the study of other languages could be acceptable under certain circumstances, it needed to wait until late enough in a child's development that they had first "grown into (English) and it had become a part of them" – only then could the tentative introduction of alternate ways of speaking, and thus thinking or feeling, be considered safe.

Ultimately, the US Supreme Court disagreed. In the 1923 decision, *Meyer v. Nebraska* it overturned Meyer's sentence and ruled that laws such as Nebraska's represented an unconstitutional restriction of the rights of both teachers and of parents to determine the course

of their children's educations (Pusey 2017). However, this was neither the first nor the last attempt by policy makers in the US, or elsewhere, to link national loyalty with language use.

2 Civic emotion: Duties of feeling

The emotional content of citizenship (or national membership) is itself a fascinating and growing field of study. Although citizenship is a status that both grants rights and demands certain obligations in return, early literatures on citizenship focused more on elucidating, and debating, the rights side of the equation. Discussions of citizenship as a set of stated or implied duties, either to the state or the national group as a whole, were more truncated, but tended to focus on measurable, "macro-level" behaviors such as supporting the state financially, or participating in the work of politics or national defense (Lister 1997). Explorations into what I call "micro-citizenship", citizenship obligations that focus on the citizen's emotional or intellectual orientation toward the nation/state, how she *thinks* and *feels* about her country, have been less common (Brown 2014). However, as Meyer's story suggests, this invisible, intensely personal, aspect of belonging is often considered to be of fundamental importance by national elites.

The idea that citizens are expected to *feel* a certain way toward the state is variously referred to as either "civic emotion" (Yekelchyk 2006; Brown 2014) or "affective citizenship" (Fortier 2016). The emotional content of citizenship is often most strongly associated with patriotism: generally understood to describe a simple kind of love or loyalty toward the nation. Normative civic emotion can, and often does, include elements of patriotic love: nationalists argue that love for the father/motherland is the ultimate duty of all members, while conservatives and reformers struggle over the question of whether love for the *patrie* is best expressed through obedience to the state or "patriotic dissent" (see Beauchamps 2016). However, civic emotion can also be more complicated than love, requiring other kinds of feelings from members as well. In this, the experience and performance of normative emotional states as an obligation of citizenship has significant similarities with Arlie Hochschild's (1983) concept of "emotional labor", the process by which workers are expected to manage their feelings and manufacture the appropriate affect (ranging from warm friendliness for flight attendants to authoritative threat for bill collectors) in the service of organizational goals.

For example, states may require shows of collective grief for departed leaders, such as the mass expressions of mourning, both organized and spontaneous, that followed the deaths of North Korea's Kim Il-Sung in 1994 and his son, Kim Jong-Il, in 2011 (Xu 2013). Political elites may seek to build a sense of felt "civic cohesion" among members in order to counter threats posed by extremist movements (Fortier 2010), or they may do the opposite, calling upon members to practice their "duty to hate" through displays of animosity toward state enemies (Yekelchyk 2006). The emotional orientation of new members toward states is of particular interest. In Western European states, mandatory integration courses and exams emphasize that migrants must develop the proper "affective orientation" toward the host country, which combines a desire for communal belongingness with an apprecia-

tion of values like pluralistic tolerance and economic self-sufficiency (Merolli 2016). My own work on modern-day Germany looked in depth at how new immigrants are taught the importance of a unique form of “broken” national feeling, a patriotic “anti-patriotism”, that combines a defiant rejection of national chauvinism with a sorrowful remembrance of the crimes of the Nazi era (Brown 2014).

3 Civic thought: Duties of remembering and belief

Closely related to civic emotion, so closely they are often difficult to separate, is the idea of “civic thought”: knowledges, beliefs, and ideologies that accompany preferred emotional states. The best studied form of civic thought is likely collective memory (Halbwachs and Coser 1992; Isurin 2017), narratives about the group’s past that build hagiographies of “founding fathers” or other national heroes (see Schwartz [1991] and Brunk [2008] for discussions of this process as it relates to the mythologization of the United States’ George Washington and Mexico’s Emiliano Zapata, respectively) and highlight key national victories or, just as importantly, galvanizing defeats (see, for example, Ben-Yehuda’s [1996] exploration of the recovery and mythologization of the Masada mass-suicide in the creation of modern Israeli collective memory). These shared “memories”, myths and forms of knowledge thus become carriers of normative ideologies that accompany preferred emotional states. Depending on the country, these can range from a belief in the superiority of democracy and free-market Capitalism, or control by a centralized party, or the leadership of a government which has been hand-picked by God.

4 Linguistic nationalism: Duties of speech

That linguistic nationalism would come to function as a stand-in, or marker, of normative civic emotion and civic thought is understandable. Thoughts and feelings cannot be heard except as they are spoken (or written), and language is not just the carrier of meaning, according to the linguistic relativist, but the form that gives it shape. Struggles over linguistic nationalism, like struggles over other markers of belonging, tend to be most acute in times of crises or national transition. The partition of India and Pakistan following the end of British Colonial occupation, for example, saw nation-building projects aimed at producing Hindi and Urdu as two distinct languages derived from a single common dialect – followed by outbreaks of genocidal violence in both fledgling states toward members of the new religious and linguistic minorities (Aneesh 2010). A similar process of splitting a largely shared tongue into a multiplicity of new national languages and dialects, differentiated by the adoption of distinct alphabets, orthographies, and rules of grammar, likewise marked the dissolution and division of the former Yugoslavia into new nation-states (see Greenberg 2000).

Migration is another transition that tends to set the stage for conflict over language use and belonging. The first attempts to enforce linguistic conformity in the United States

and Canada were not an outgrowth of the immigration of non-English speakers into the North American territories, but rather a result of the incursion of white settlers into lands occupied by indigenous populations. Initially, these conflicts were marked by violence, but by the end of the 19th century North American Indian populations had been brutally subdued, dispossessed of their land, and crowded onto impoverished Indian reservations. White elites debated what to do next, with some arguing that they should all be exterminated rather than warehoused and supported. Ultimately the “humane” solution of saving the Indians by “killing all that was Indian in (them)” gained favor, leading generations of Native children to be forcibly removed from their families and enrolled in boarding schools where they were required to take “Christian” names, dress and conduct themselves as whites, and were subjected to violent physical punishment for speaking any language other than English (Woolford 2015: 94). The result of this has been the gradual extinction of indigenous language fluency in North America (Woolford 2015). Generations of repressive policies toward indigenous language use in Australia have created similar results (see McKay 2011).

In the modern era, linguistic nationalism is generally a feature of struggles over the incorporation of foreign-born populations. European countries which had primarily been immigration-sending states before World War II have had to significantly change laws and policies governing citizenship, denizenship, and naturalization in light of the need to recruit foreign laborers, resettle refugees, and manage the family reunification claims of both. This has presented not just policy and legal challenges, but, for many, a certain kind of national identity crisis as well. As practices such the imposition of racial bars or quotas on immigration fell out of favor (but did not completely disappear) in settler societies like the United States, Canada and Australia, and countries like Germany, which had formerly linked citizenship with bloodline, reformed their laws to allow non-German ethnics to naturalize, these societies all had to re-think what it means to “belong”. Many have simply replaced racial and ethnic restrictions with new forms of gatekeeping, insisting on cultural or linguistic assimilation in lieu of racial homogeneity (Brown 2014; Goodman 2014).

5 Legislating language: The “English Only” movement in US politics

Some countries like Germany, the Netherlands, France, and Britain have supported linguistic assimilation through rollouts of obligatory “integration classes” aimed at helping new members achieve fluency, a move that, research suggests, is motivated by both pragmatic concerns (labor market participation and educational attainment are usually tied to host-country language ability) and fears about social Balkanization or threats to native-born cultural hegemony (Kymlicka 2012; Goodman 2014). In the US, the tendency has been to enforce English use in a more piecemeal fashion (and, in contrast to countries like Germany, where integration initiatives are government-funded, without necessarily providing the accompanying social support to facilitate it). More than 30 states have passed initiatives, mostly since 1980, declaring English to be their “official” state language (the US has no

official language), while a smaller number of states, and many localities, schools, and workplaces have adopted, or are attempting to adopt, more restrictive “English-only” policies, which mandate that English be the only language spoken in the course of official governmental or organizational activities (Liu et al 2014).

Analysis has shown that the popularity of these kinds of policies tends to correlate not only with the size of foreign-born populations, but also with the amount of attention given to immigration-related topics in national news coverage (Liu et al 2014). This finding is striking, because it suggests that “immigrant threat” and accompanying moves to enforce linguistic assimilation may not be driven by an actual increase in the number of immigrants, or any first-hand encounters with them at all, but simply by the intellectual salience of immigration as an issue, or media framings of it as a social problem (Liu et al 2014). Most “English official” legislation is merely symbolic, including no significant changes to state policy or practice, whereas the harsher and more far-reaching “English only” laws are often stymied by the impracticalities of enforcement. California’s Proposition 63, a successful 1986 ballot initiative which became the model for similar legislation across the US, specifically enjoined the legislature from taking any action that “diminish(ed) or ignor(ed)” the role of English as the state’s language and empowered residents to sue state or local agencies they felt were in violation of the law (Crawford 1987). Critics argued (and many proponents agreed) that the language of the initiative was broad enough to forbid everything from bilingual education in schools to the provision of translators for court appearances or 911 emergency-service calls. Ultimately, though, this restrictive interpretation survived neither court challenge nor the realities of governing in one of the most diverse states in the country, and, from an institutional perspective at least, the law had little impact (Crawford 1987).

Experiences of foreign-born and multilingual individuals in communities that have passed English-only, or even the more moderate “English-official” initiatives, however, suggest that the lived impacts of these attempts to legislate language use are very different. One common outgrowth of the introduction of such laws, regardless of whether they even ultimately pass, is an increase in “linguistic vigilantism”, attempts by individual citizens to police the foreign-language speech of others (Bender 1997). In some cases, such as that of a Colorado school bus driver who informed students that the state’s new language initiative made it “illegal for them to speak Spanish on the bus”, this may be driven by a misinterpretation of what these laws actually mean – their very vague, largely symbolic language serving only to encourage individual people and institutions to craft their own interpretations and engage in their own ad-hoc “enforcement” efforts (Bender 1997).

Other cases suggest more targeted attempts to enforce a vision of citizenship in which English-language use, unmarred by code-switching or even detectible non-standard accents, again functions as a barometer of belongingness, patriotic loyalty, and “whiteness” itself (see Zentella 2003). These range from the case of a restaurant in my own Pennsylvania hometown that posted “This is America, Speak English When Ordering” signs behind the cash register, to the students in my classes who complain of having private conversations interrupted – in shops, in restaurants, or on the sidewalk – by strangers who lean in and hiss “We speak English in this country” or even “You should be deported”.

Regrettably, rather than showing evidence of an increasingly tolerant attitude toward cultural, religious, racial, and linguistic diversity (and an embrace of more pluralistic forms

of citizenship) many receiving states are shifting toward a new kind of hyper-nativism. This is apparent in everything from the ostensible success of the UK's "Brexit" movement and political gains by far-right parties in Western Europe, to the election, in 2016, of Donald Trump to the Presidency of the United States. Racially divisive and nativist appeals have been a constant feature of American political discourse up through the modern era, but, at least since the Civil Rights gains of the 1960s, most of these took the form of so-called "dog-whistle" appeals: ostensibly race-neutral but heavily coded speech which mobilized claims about "inner city crime" or "urban welfare queens" to disparage blacks, or framed immigrants (but only certain kinds) as a threat to public order, American jobs, and native-born cultural and linguistic dominance (Brown 2016). Claims that immigrants would only be accepted if they "came legally" and "learned English" were common in these appeals (Brown 2016), but Donald Trump's campaign brought with it a disturbing shift back to an older kind of political language, a rhetoric reminiscent of the Jim Crow Era for its embrace of open hostility toward minorities – a shift from "dog-whistle" bigotry back to the "bull-horn" racism of decades past.

Because of this, in Trump's discourse, one heard little of the polite, coded gatekeeping that distinguished between "good immigrants" who came legally, assimilated, and learned English and the bad ones who did not. Instead, Trump promised (and attempted) to ban Muslim migration and most refugee admissions, to significantly curtail professional and labor migration, and to stop unauthorized immigration by building a giant wall at the southern border. He also called for an end to "chain migration" (immigration law which gives preference to spouses and family members of current citizens or visa-holders) and the "diversity lottery" system, which allows a limited number of visas from countries with historically low migration flows to the United States (a program which has historically benefitted Africa; Kopan 2018). Trump's viewpoint on immigration recalled, with open nostalgia, a time when US immigration law embraced racial quotas, framing Mexican migrants as murderers and rapists, and bemoaning the fact that the country accepts too many people from poor and undeveloped countries and too few from places like "Norway" (Kopan 2018; Schewe 2017). That there was less emphasis on "managing" linguistic or cultural diversity in Trumpian immigration rhetoric, may not be surprising, since his promises to "Make America Great Again" evoked a country without much in the way of either.

6 Directions for future research

The isolationist turn in Western politics does suggest certain directions for future research. Regardless of the resurgence of nativist populism, immigration receiving states are becoming more, rather than less, diverse: a demographic shift driven as much by fertility patterns as new migration. Caucasian whites are projected to lose their majority status in the United States by 2045 (Frey 2018), while Muslims will come to represent more than one in ten Europeans in the same time period (Pew Research Center 2017). What we are witnessing now may just be a predictable, and short-lived, backlash by aging majority groups threatened by the loss of cultural, racial, and linguistic hegemony. If so, today's minority popula-

tions could use this opportunity to resist assimilatory pressures and help their adoptive nations forge more inclusive notions of citizenship.

Or they may follow a different path. Though Robert Meyer and his German contemporaries would spend the early decades of the 20th century as the targets of xenophobia, they, along with other migrants of the same and earlier eras, eventually assimilated themselves into the exclusionary category of American “whiteness”, a transformation that brought with it both the loss of sending-country language fluency and, in many cases, the adoption of their own forms of nativist intolerance (Roediger 2005). Which route today’s receiving nations will take, and the shape that emerging notions of belongingness will take, remains to be seen.

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