

1 Monitoring and Projecting Global Hunger: Are We On  
2 Track?

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15 **Abstract**

16 Using microdata from 75 countries collected by FAO through the Gallup World Poll for  
17 the Voices of the Hungry project, we modeled levels of food security at the subnational  
18 level from 2010 to 2030 to create the World Hunger Clock ([worldhunger.io](http://worldhunger.io)). This is the  
19 first global picture of food security at a subnational level based on the Food Insecurity  
20 Experience Scale, the indicator for the Sustainable Development Goal of “Zero Hunger” that  
21 is most indicative of the individual’s lived experience of food insecurity and hunger. We find  
22 significant heterogeneity in food security around the world, ranging from less than 4% of the  
23 population being at least moderately food insecure in some high-income countries to parts  
24 of the developing world where over half the population is severely food insecure. Examining  
25 global temporal trends and accounting for the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic, we find  
26 that rates of severe food insecurity are declining steadily yet slowly, with larger observed and  
27 forecasted gains in lower and lower-middle income countries, resulting in global decreases in  
28 the total number of severely food insecure people. However, the total number of moderately  
29 food insecure people has been increasing and, after recovering from the shock of the COVID-  
30 19 pandemic, we predict it will continue to increase through the end of the 2020s. Overall,  
31 we conclude that global gains have been incremental, and current trends in development and  
32 demographic change will still leave a large share of the world’s population still experiencing  
33 hunger by 2030.

34 **1 Main**

35 Food security is a critical component of human flourishing and its importance as a global policy  
36 objective is reflected in the second Sustainable Development Goal (SDG 2), “Zero Hunger.” One  
37 of the indicators to track progress on the first target of this goal, to ensure access by everyone  
38 to safe, nutritious and sufficient food (SDG2.1), is the prevalence of moderate and severe food  
39 insecurity in the population based on the Food Insecurity Experience Scale, or FIES. The FIES  
40 was developed by FAO in 2013 as a global extension of pioneering work started in the US in the  
41 1990’s to develop a metric of food insecurity based on data gathered by interviewing the people  
42 who experience hunger and conditions that produce hunger. Other indicators of food insecurity,

43 such as FAO's more commonly used estimate of undernourishment, are based on macro models  
44 of the mean and distribution of calories available per capita in a population, developed on the  
45 basis of infrequent and heterogeneous data on food production and consumption. These do not  
46 directly capture the actual lived exposure of individuals to food shortages.

47 Currently, the data used to generate the estimates that are reported at the UN SDG indicators  
48 database come primarily from the 75 countries where surveys have been commissioned, vetted,  
49 and released by FAO. To compile global and regional aggregates, the current practice at FAO  
50 is to use the prevalence rate for the countries that do have FIES data as the regional rate.  
51 Moreover, since the FIES is a relatively new metric, a sufficiently long time series to assess  
52 time trends with a reasonable degree of precision is still lacking. Thus, to fill these spatial and  
53 temporal data gaps and understand whether SDG 2 is being met, modeled estimates of food  
54 insecurity outcomes are thus required.

55 This paper contributes to shifting the research frontier by filling these two gaps in terms  
56 of spatial coverage and forecasts by developing a machine learning model of FIES-based food  
57 insecurity rates based on covariates that are available for territories where actual survey data  
58 are not available. This model is then employed to obtain forecasts to 2030 and assess likely  
59 future trends in food insecurity. We take advantage of individual-level characteristics collected  
60 in FAO's FIES surveys to push the analysis beyond the country level to a sub-national level. To  
61 our knowledge, this is the first effort to model FIES-based food insecurity at that scale.

62 Food security has traditionally been difficult to measure, and this has arguably led to an  
63 incomplete or possibly inaccurate assessment of global hunger. Metrics of macro-health, such  
64 as anthropometric measures and mortality rates are correlated broadly with food insecurity and  
65 have been used for many years to monitor human well-being [1, 2]. However, these metrics are  
66 affected by other determinants of health such as the occurrence of infectious diseases, and are  
67 not meaningful at the scale of individuals or households [3]. Other proxies for food security, such  
68 as food availability estimated from crop yields [4], are also inadequate because they only make  
69 rough estimates of how accessible food is to the general population, and can elide populations  
70 that are food insecure due to poor access, even when aggregate food availability is high [5].  
71 Moreover, these metrics are very sensitive to incorrect estimates of crop yields and food reserves  
72 at a national scale. Thus, global estimates of hunger and food insecurity based on these metrics  
73 carry forward similar flaws.

74 As researchers began to focus on food insecurity at the individual and household level, mi-  
75 crodata from household surveys collecting information on household finances and consumption  
76 became a basis to compute a common proxy for food security [6]. However, these efforts were  
77 criticized for being onerous, insufficiently comparable, as well as for ignoring subjective and ex-  
78 periential aspects of food security [7]. This led to the emergence of several indicators designed  
79 to be rapidly deployable, and based on the lived experience of food security [8]. These metrics  
80 include the Household Food Security Survey Module (HFSSM) [9], originally developed for use  
81 in the US; the Latin American and Caribbean Food Security Scale (ELCSA); and the Household  
82 Food Insecurity and Access Scale (HFIAS) [10].

83 Drawing on the insights derived in designing and implementing these novel food security  
84 metrics, the FIES was developed by the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) of the United  
85 Nations (UN) [11] and is now recognized as a rapidly deployable and cross-culturally valid tool  
86 for understanding individual and household-level food insecurity [12, 13]. The FIES is based on  
87 a survey of eight behaviors indicative of food insecurity and hunger over the previous year, such  
88 as skipping meals or worrying about having enough to eat. Processing the responses given to the  
89 FIES questions through the Rasch model, each individual in the survey is assigned a score that  
90 allows them to be ranked on a scale of food insecurity severity. Once the severity measures are  
91 calibrated against a common reference (the global FIES reference scale) [14] and individuals are  
92 ranked in this fashion, conventional thresholds for "moderate" and "severe" food insecurity are  
93 set and the prevalence of such food insecurity conditions can be computed. Thresholds are set  
94 in such a way that a moderately food insecure respondent is one who likely has compromised on  
95 food quality and variety as a result of lack of resources, has been unsure about their ability to  
96 obtain food and has skipped meals or run out of food occasionally. A severely food insecure one is  
97 likely to have run out of food and has gone an entire day without eating at times during the year.

98 The percentage of people estimated to be over the threshold set for moderate food insecurity  
99 includes people that are also over the threshold for severe food insecurity and represents the  
100 SDG indicator 2.1.2.

101 Since 2014, FAO contracted the Gallup World Poll to administer the FIES survey module in  
102 as many countries as possible around the world and uses this data to estimate the prevalence  
103 of food insecurity at region and global levels. For a number of those countries for which it has  
104 been authorized to release the national-level estimates, FAO also reports the percentage of the  
105 national population that is estimated to be over the thresholds for moderate and severe food  
106 insecurity and publicly releases the microdata.

107 Drawing on individual-level data from these publicly available microdatasets from 75 coun-  
108 tries, we use machine learning methods to model food insecurity based on covariates and estimate  
109 levels of food insecurity globally, at the subnational level. The model is then used to forecast  
110 food insecurity to the year 2030 under a reasonable scenario on the possible evolution of the  
111 covariates.

## 112 **2 Results**

### 113 **2.1 Food Insecurity over Time**

114 Globally, in the year 2020, we estimate that 820 million people are above the threshold for severe  
115 food insecurity, and 2.5 billion people are above the threshold for moderate food insecurity (See  
116 Fig. 1). These numbers are higher than the estimates in the 2020 FAO State of Food Insecurity  
117 (SOFI) report, which reports about 746 million severely food insecure people and 2 billion people  
118 experiencing at least moderate food insecurity in 2019 [15].

119 Under realistic scenario assumptions, we find divergent trends in the number of moderate and  
120 severely food insecure people around the world, with the number of people at least moderately  
121 food insecure increasing and the number of people severely food insecure declining. However, for  
122 both indicators, these changes are very slight: in 2030, the number of moderately food insecure  
123 people will have increased by 2.2% since 2010, and the number of severely food insecure people  
124 will have decreased by 7.0%. The increases in moderate food insecurity have been in lower and  
125 lower-middle income countries, while the decreases in severe food insecurity are entirely from  
126 lower income countries. For both the moderate and severe food insecurity thresholds, COVID-19  
127 has had a clearly discernible impact, particularly in middle-income countries.




Figure 1: Number of people over the thresholds for moderate and severe food insecurity, by World Bank income groups as of 2020. Panel (A) shows the number of food insecure people with region totals stacked, to show global trends and totals over time. Panel (B) shows regional totals compared against each other over time.

128 Examining the rate of food insecurity in a population, rather than the total number of food  
 129 insecure people (See Fig. 2), we find clear improvements in all except high income countries.  
 130 Countries that are currently upper-middle income, like China and Brazil, saw large gains in  
 131 improving food insecurity rates throughout the 2010s, and will continue to see somewhat diminished  
 132 gains in improving food security throughout the 2020s. Lower and lower-middle income  
 133 countries, on the other hand, saw more modest gains in the 2010s but are forecasted to see  
 134 greater gains in reducing the rate of food insecurity in the 2020s. In spite of this progress in  
 135 the bottom three income quartiles, in high-income countries, the rates of people in moderate  
 136 and severe food insecurity have been flat and are expected even to increase slightly. Overall, the  
 137 world has made steady but slow progress on reducing the rate of food insecurity.




Figure 2: Percentage of the population over the threshold for moderate and severe food insecurity, by World Bank income groups as of 2020.

## 138 2.2 Food Insecurity Across Space

139 We find substantial heterogeneity in the global distribution of severe food insecurity across  
 140 countries and subnational regions (See Fig. 3). For the year 2020, mainland sub-Saharan  
 141 Africa is the continent with the highest rates of severe food insecurity, with 20% of people over  
 142 the corresponding threshold in at least one subnational area in every country except Gabon,  
 143 Djibouti and Equatorial Guinea. Outside of Africa, serious pockets of severe food insecurity  
 144 also occur in Venezuela, Syria, Papua New Guinea, Yemen, and Afghanistan. In many large  
 145 middle-income countries, severe food insecurity is also quite prevalent, with rates between 10%  
 146 and 15% in northern Brazil, many central Asian and middle-eastern countries, as well as India  
 147 and Indonesia.

148 The experience of at least moderate food insecurity is quite common in many parts of the  
 149 world. In 2020, much of Africa, south and southeast Asia, and parts of Latin America had over  
 150 50% of the population living with moderate food insecurity. Even in highly developed economies,  
 151 such as the United States and parts of eastern and southern Europe, over 10% of the population  
 152 is above the threshold for moderate food insecurity.




Figure 3: Spatial distribution of moderate and severe food insecurity for the years 2010, 2020, and 2030.

153 **2.3 Important Predictors of Food Insecurity**

154 Overall, our model was able to predict food insecurity with high accuracy in the countries  
155 for which training data was available ( $R^2 = 0.950$  and  $R^2 = 0.940$  for moderate and severe  
156 food insecurity, respectively), and excluding entire countries from the training data to evaluate  
157 out-of-country model error still showed overall good results ( $R^2 = 0.792$  and  $R^2 = 0.746$  for  
158 moderate and severe food insecurity, respectively). The relative importance of different variables  
159 as predictors of food insecurity can be assessed by examining the loss in forecast accuracy  
160 resulting from the exclusion of particular covariates.

161 For severe food insecurity, the most important variable for predicting food security levels is the  
162 Poverty Headcount Index (See Fig. 4), followed by the rate of stunting and the Gini coefficient.  
163 For predicting the rate of people with at least moderate food insecurity, GDP per capita is the  
164 most important, followed closely by the Poverty Headcount Index. The country's Gini coefficient  
165 is also important, more so for predicting the rate of severe food insecurity compared to moderate  
166 food insecurity. Across both outcomes, economic variables were the most relevant predictors.




Figure 4: Importance of each variable in predicting the percent of a population over thresholds for moderate and severe food insecurity. This is determined by the increase in the error when the variable is permuted before fitting the model.

167 The results of this analysis can be further explored in more detail on the World Hunger Clock  
168 ([worldhunger.io](http://worldhunger.io)), including statistics for each subnational administrative area.

169 **3 Discussion**

170 This paper presents the first global estimates of the experience of food insecurity at a subnational  
171 level, with forecasts until the year 2030. We find that, while food insecurity has been increasing  
172 and has likely worsened in 2020 due to the economic downturn associated with the COVID-19  
173 pandemic, our models predict that the percent of people who experience food insecurity globally  
174 will decrease throughout the 2020s, largely because of economic growth in developing countries.  
175 Nevertheless, lower and lower-middle income countries are expected to see overall increases in  
176 the number of moderately food insecure people.

177 Our analysis of the relative importance of different predictors for future food insecurity  
178 dynamics shows that economic conditions are the largest driver of global variation in rates of  
179 food insecurity. For both moderate and severe food insecurity, the Poverty Headcount Index,  
180 the Gini coefficient, and GDP per capita appear as highly relevant predictors of the rate of food

181 insecurity. The rate of stunting, an indicator of both sanitary conditions and chronic, long-term  
182 under-nutrition is also an important predictor of food insecurity. However, other indicators  
183 of nutrition and sanitary conditions, such as the rates of wasting and malaria mortality are  
184 less important as explanatory factors of changes in food insecurity. Geographic and climate  
185 factors, such as the percentage of urban population, topographic ruggedness and mean annual  
186 temperature or precipitation do not appear to be robust predictors of food insecurity at a global  
187 scale.

188 While economic conditions, and especially GDP per capita, are important predictors of food  
189 insecurity at a global scale, there is an upper limit to the extent to which increasing economic  
190 development alone can improve food security outcomes. High income countries have seen little  
191 improvement in food insecurity outcomes over twenty years, and upper-middle income countries  
192 are expected to see diminishing gains as they continue to develop economically throughout the  
193 2020s. Among the high-income countries in our dataset, those with the lowest rates of moderate  
194 and severe food insecurity also had lower inequality and poverty. This suggests that our model's  
195 forecasted marginal increases in food insecurity in high income countries is due to trends of  
196 increasing income inequality, and that economic development alone cannot ensure that everyone  
197 is well-fed.

198 Our results anticipating increases in the number of people over the threshold for moderate  
199 food insecurity concur with the FAO's predictions of increased rates of undernourishment, the  
200 other indicator for the SDG 2 target of ending hunger [15, Part 1, Page 11]. However, severe  
201 food insecurity may be a more apt indicator to compare with undernourishment, as the global  
202 totals are more similar [15]. In this case, our predictions diverge: the FAO estimates a 24%  
203 increase, from 687 to 841 million undernourished people, from 2019 to 2030, whereas we predict  
204 a 2.6% decrease, from 787 to 767 million severely food insecure people over the same period.

205 These discrepancies are in part due to our differing modeling approaches. While the SOFI  
206 report extrapolated recent trends in undernourishment and stunting, we modeled food insecurity  
207 based on interactions between projections in factors like GDP per capita, population, and  
208 the prevalence of stunting. Additionally, our diverging predictions for different hunger indicators  
209 are not necessarily mutually exclusive: it is theoretically possible for undernourishment to  
210 increase while severe food insecurity, as measured by the FIES, decreases. The discrepancies  
211 between our projections and those of the FAO illustrate both the complexity of hunger as a  
212 social phenomenon, as well as the challenges in predicting future socioeconomic developments,  
213 where different modeling approaches may yield different forecasts.

214 When making predictions in countries where we do not have primary data, we assume that  
215 the relationships among variables like poverty, stunting, inequality, and food insecurity are the  
216 same across all locations. We test the accuracy of these cases by using leave-one-out cross  
217 validation at the country level, and we find good accuracy, with our models making estimates  
218 that are only off by 4-7 percentage points on average when applied to countries outside of the  
219 training set.

220 Additionally, when making predictions into the future, we assume that the long-term patterns  
221 of demographic change, urbanization, and development will maintain their trajectories for the  
222 next decade. At a global scale, this is almost certainly the case: it is highly unlikely that rates of  
223 fertility or economic growth will shift suddenly and globally. Nevertheless, at more local scales,  
224 sudden crises can lead to severe and unforeseeable increases in food insecurity, as crises in the  
225 previous decade in Yemen, Syria and Venezuela have shown.

226 While we find that rates of food insecurity are expected to decrease overall by 2030, our model,  
227 which relies on middle-of-the-road assumptions, still expects the number of people experiencing  
228 moderate food insecurity to increase and the number of people experiencing severe food insecurity  
229 to fall only slightly between 2010 and 2030. This still leaves billions of people eating less than  
230 they should and three-quarters of a billion people going entire days without eating a decade  
231 from now, falling far short of the SDG 2 goal of ending hunger. Moreover, decreases in food  
232 insecurity as measured by the FIES do not necessarily mean there will be improvements in other  
233 significant challenges such as poor dietary quality, micronutrient deficiencies, sustainable diets,  
234 or obesity. Thus, while expected trends in correlates of food security give cause for optimism,  
235 there is still significant work to be done at the political level in pursuit of SDG 2.

236 **4 Methods**

237 **4.1 Disaggregation**

238 The data on the FIES collected by Gallup on behalf of FAO also records many individual-  
239 level attributes from the respondents, including age, gender, wealth quintile, and whether they  
240 live in an urban or rural area. Using national data on these variables, a standard weighting  
241 scheme is created for each individual, based on the ratio of population probabilities to sample  
242 probabilities of an individual with those characteristics being selected [16]. We use a similar  
243 methodology and calculate post-stratification weights at a subnational level. We use year-specific  
244 subnational estimates of population shares by gender, age, urbanization, and, where available,  
245 wealth, and create a separate set of weights for each subnational area across all individuals. For  
246 age and gender, we used gridded data from WorldPop [17]; for urbanization, we used spatially  
247 explicit estimates published by Jones and O'Neill [18]; and for wealth we used data on household  
248 wealth quintiles from Demographic and Health Surveys [19]. This methodology rests on the mild  
249 assumption that, within a given country, two individuals of the same age, gender, urbanization  
250 level and wealth quintile will have a similar food security status.

251 **4.2 Covariates**

252 We model subnational rates of moderate and severe food insecurity as a function of several  
253 covariates related to human development, nutrition, health, infrastructure, income levels and  
254 distribution, and the environment (See Table 1). We employ covariates for which projections  
255 are available up to year 2030 and, in most cases, also have subnational spatial resolution. For  
256 projections based on the Shared Socioeconomic Pathways (SSP) framework [20], we use the  
257 middle-of-the-road pathway, SSP2, and for climatological variables, we use forecasts based on  
258 the Representative Concentration Pathway (RCP) 6.0 [21].

259 Many of the variables require the harmonization of subnational historical data with projections  
260 at the national level. These include mean years of schooling, GDP per capita, as well  
261 as population. We use observed trajectories in the historical distribution of variables among  
262 subnational areas within a country to predict the future distribution of GDP, population, and  
263 schooling among subnational areas and disaggregate national-level future projections.

264 For health variables that have historically shown long-term trends and represent a rate of  
265 occurrence in a population, including stunting, wasting, and malaria mortality rate, we estimate  
266 the Annualized Rate of Change (AROC) for each subnational area to model these and to obtain  
267 predictions for variables up to 2030. We calculate the rate of change between each pair of years  
268 in the dataset, and then use the mean rate of change over the period for which data are available,  
269 giving greater weight to more recent years, and applying that mean rate of change to estimate  
270 future levels. This method is used to obtain forecasts of the rates of stunting and wasting up to  
271 the year 2030.

272 For the climatic variables, temperature and precipitation, we combine historical observations  
273 with an ensemble of four bias-corrected simulations of the future climate from the Inter-Sectoral  
274 Impact Model Intercomparison Project (ISIMIP) [22].

275 Finally, we adjust several variables to account for the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic.  
276 These include June 2020 GDP predictions from the World Bank [23], August 2020 estimates of  
277 impacts on anthropometry from *The Lancet* [24], as well as the Poverty Headcount Index [25].

Name	Source	Scale
Urban Percentage	[18]	Subnational
Stunting	[26]	Subnational
Wasting	[26]	Subnational
Mean Years of Schooling	[27, 28]	Subnational
GDP Per Capita	[27, 29]	Subnational
Gini Coefficient	[30]	National
Poverty Headcount Index	[25]	National
Water Scarcity	[31]	Subnational
Mean Annual Precipitation	[22, 32]	Subnational
Topographic Ruggedness	[33, 34]	Subnational
Mean Temperature	[22, 32]	Subnational
Malaria ( <i>P. falciparum</i> ) Mortality Rate	[35]	Subnational

Table 1: Covariates Included in the Analysis

### 278 4.3 Modeling

279 We fit two models for all subnational areas globally from 2010 to 2030: one for the percent of  
 280 the population over the threshold for moderate food insecurity, and one for the percent of the  
 281 population over the threshold for severe food insecurity. We use random forest regressions, which  
 282 perform well in the presence of non-linearities and interaction effects among predictor variables  
 283 [36]. A random forest regression involves generating a large number of decision trees, each using  
 284 different sub-samples of the data, and then aggregating the predictions of the decision trees. By  
 285 taking an ensemble of decision tree models, random forests introduce more variance and balance  
 286 out the bias that is common to methods based on single decision trees [37]. Given the bounded  
 287 nature of our variables of interest, the random forest regression are applied to the logically  
 288 transformed rates. We create our models using the `randomForestSRC` package in R [38].

289 To get the best possible model performance, it is necessary to tune the hyperparamters,  
 290 which control the process in which the random forest algorithm is run. These include the  
 291 average number of observations in a leaf node, the number of variables randomly selected as  
 292 candidates for splitting a node, and the maximum depth of each tree. We use the combination  
 293 of hyperparameters that perform best under leave-one-out validation based on  $R^2$ .

294 When performing cross validation, it is typical to select observations at random. However,  
 295 in our training data we have multiple highly similar observations from each country across years  
 296 and subnational areas, and we extend our model predictions to countries that were not found  
 297 at all in our training data. Thus, we perform a type of leave-one-out cross validation, where we  
 298 leave out all of the data from one country for each iteration. Thus, the model error after cross  
 299 validation gives us a sense of how the model is performing in countries where FIES data was not  
 300 collected. By this validation metric, we find that our models perform well, with an  $R^2$  of 0.792  
 301 and mean average error (MAE) of 0.071 for moderate food insecurity and an  $R^2$  of 0.746 and a  
 302 MAE of 0.041 for severe food insecurity. After fitting models on the entire dataset, we observe  
 303 a within-sample  $R^2$  of 0.950 and an MAE of 0.034 for moderate food insecurity and an  $R^2$  of  
 304 0.945 and a MAE of 0.018 for severe food insecurity.

305 After fitting the models, we examine the importance of the individual covariates in explaining  
 306 rates of moderate and severe food insecurity. We use a common method of permutating  
 307 each individual variable and re-running the regressions, and then determining the difference in  
 308 MAE between the regression [39, 40]. This metric can provide some interpretability to model  
 309 predictions.

310 The Supplementary Materials provide a detailed description of the data processing for the  
 311 covariates, as well as implementation and validation of the random forest models.

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316 **6 Author Contributions**

317 MC, BM, and HK conceptualized the analysis; CC, JCC, and HK provided methodological  
318 oversight; MC, BM, and JCL processed the data; MC and BM ran the models and conducted  
319 model validation; All authors contributed to writing and reviewing the manuscript.

320 **7 Competing Interests**

321 We have no competing interests to disclose.

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