1. Chapter 1
   1. SECTION ONE: Identity and Responsibility
      1. Address my own identity
         1. My right and responsibility to speak as a cis het straight white male
         2. How does the positionality of the speaker affect their capacity to speak to a text
      2. Reading and Authority
         1. What constitutes ones “authority” to speak on a text or the text’s authority over oneself
            1. Gadamer, hermeneutics, etc
            2. Nor only are the grounds of reading weighed down by the historical existence of Dasien, as in Gadamer and Heidegger,but a thoroughgoing otherness
      3. Positionality/Perspectivism/Standpoint
         1. The Feminist Standpoint: Developing the Ground for a Specifically Feminist Historical Materialism by Nancy Hartsock
            1. Check whether Hartsock cites Nietzsche or Foucault
            2. Pretty sure this is class-analysis/Marxist standpoint
            3. See metaphorics of “perspectivism” below
   2. SECTION TWO: Identity qua identity
      1. The problem of self Identity
         1. Question of self-identity through time – Locke, Kant, a classic philosophical riddle
         2. Find my paper from Dmitri’s Locke class. Check in CPR for Kant – maybe already wrote about it?
      2. Hegelian
         1. Phenomenology of Spirit (B)(IV)(A) True Nature of Self-Certainty: Independence and dependence of self-consciousness
         2. Identity as violence – internal and external violence
         3. Hegel: identity isn’t something that you are born with. It is a complex process of violence
      3. Another tradition: Heraclitus
         1. Becoming shatters identity but not in the Niezschean way
      4. Levinasian interpretation
         1. Identity of the speaker is always already a response and a responsibility
         2. Starts with Cratylus, not Heraclitus
            1. Cratylus contra Heraclitus[[1]](#footnote-2) the resistance to every integration expressed by the image of the river, in which, according to Heraclitus, one does not bathe twice, and according to Cratylus, not even once.
            2. Becoming/Temporality shatters identity but precisely in a non-violent way
         3. Similar to Nagarjuna rather than any Western thinker
            1. Non-Western

Derrida Greeks blah blah blah

Also Jay Garfield has written against only-Western philosophy

* + - * 1. Nagarjuana/Levinas

But the Other also disrupts my being/existence/becoming in such a way towards a groundelessness, and imposibile identity held only for the moment of reaction

<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/M%C5%ABlamadhyamakak%C4%81rik%C4%81>

Find old paper on Naguarjuna

Talk to John Clark, <http://cas.loyno.edu/philosophy/bios/john-p-clark#:~:text=His%20interests%20include%20dialectical%20thought,of%20humanity%20and%20the%20Earth.>

Read Jay Garfield maybe? <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jay_L._Garfield>

Dependant co-arising (Pratītyasamutpāda)  
<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Prat%C4%ABtyasamutp%C4%81da#:~:text=is%20called%20death.%22-,Causal%20chain,give%20rise%20to%20other%20conditions.>

All things are empty of self-being  
Emptiness/svabhava

<https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/nagarjuna/#EmptSvab>

* + - * 1. Flow of Breath paper:

During whatever moment and within whatever situation we find ourselves, we are always breathing. Beneath our consciousness, automatically, autonomically, air flows in and out of our bodies. Rarely are we aware of this fundamental part of our existence, yet we could not survive without it. What does the mundane fact of breathing mean? What could we learn by contemplating it? The everyday process of breathing has an ethical profundity. During the timespan of a breath, our egos are disrupted and we are opened to that which is other than ourselves. This can already be appreciated with a straightforward observation: 63 percent of my body is oxygen. Oxygen is not something that I merely use; it is something that I am; something that constitutes my substance. The oxygen that enters into me through my breathing becomes me, transforming from a part of the atmosphere into the person who I am. Not only was it once part of the ambient, this oxygen that is me in the present was other beings in the past, and will be others in the future. Through my breath, oth- erness invades and constitutes my very self. The fact that all conditions rely on each other displays another, deeper truth of Buddhism. Even more vigorously than Levinas, many schools of Buddhism stress that all things are empty of own-being (svabhava). As mentioned above, early Buddhism opposed the Vedic notion that there is a supreme Self (Atman) behind all phenomenon. In response, various Buddhist traditions developed not only the idea of nonselfhood (annata) but also of emptiness (sunnata).19 All phenomena exist only by virtue of their conditioned relationships with each other, and they are therefore empty of any substantial nature. The ground for any sort of becoming whatsoever relies on the fact that all things are at bottom empty. Only because all dhammas are empty of any self-subsistent nature can there be any dependent co-origination, the dynamic transformation of one phenomenon into another. By becoming aware of the annata and sunnata of all dhammas, and of the absence of one's own self-nature, the practitioner learns to transcend personal selfishness. The practitioner begins to under- stand that there is no separate, self-subsistent entity named I, and that the world cannot be reduced to a relationship with my own self, to being mine. In a passage strikingly similar to Levinas's account of the self 's "living from" the elements, Buddhadasa Bhikkhu explains, "Throughout our lives we have been thieves. We have been stealing things that exist naturally" in and belonging to nature -- namely, the conditions (sa?khara). We have plundered them and taken them to be our selves and our possessions." 20 The Buddhist practice of mindful breathing is thus an ethical practice aimed at dispossessing the self of these stolen goods. Through the mindful observation of the arising and passing of phenomena, I resist the temptation to reduce everything to my own perspective, to think that I am the person who is breathing and that the sensations feelings and thoughts that arise belong to me, that they are mine. I must be able to acknowledge thes real presence of these states existing in a place called me, identifying myself as those experiences, while also not claiming that a separated self has ownership of them. By releasing from such attachment to one's own self, one starts toward liberation from suffering. Beyond one's own liberation from suffering, this detachment has a wider ethical purpose. Just as uncontrolled emotions can wreak havoc, so can unregulated selfishness. By overcoming this egoism, one can impact society in a meaningful way. Santikaro Bhikkhu explains that, by allowing us to understand and detach ourselves from the need to find ourselves in everything, anapanasati helps us to let go of the selfishness that is destroying our lives and our worlds."21 So much conflict and violence is born out of selfishness; detachment from self- hood ultimately intends to bring about peace. 13

For this reason, anapanasati meditation is often practiced alongside loving-kindness (metta) meditation, in a prayer for the wellbeing of all breathing beings (sabbe pana): Whatsoever breathing beings there are  trembling, firm, or any other. . . . / those who are seen, and those who are unseen, those who live far away, those who are near, those who are born, and those who still seek birth  may all beings in their hearts be happy! . . . In the same way as a mother would protect her child, her only child, with her life, so toward all beings [the practitioner] should develop the measureless thought. Towards the whole wide world he should develop the measureless thought of lovingkindness, above, below, and across, without barriers, hate, or enemy.

IV. Conclusion By opening up the meditations by Levinas on la respiration and by Buddhism on mindful breathing to each other, we have taken note of similarities in how they consider this everyday activity. For both Levinas and Buddhism, a focus on breathing demonstrates deeper truths about the temporality of dynamic becoming. Time empties all entities of their self-identity, detaching them from their selves. It renders all selfhood radically open to an invasion by what is other than self. Through the course of time, otherness becomes transformed into an empty, vanishing point of selfhood. When one focuses on breathing and becomes aware of its deeper significance, one can thus effect an ethical transformation, a change that turns the self inside out and opens it to the other. Beyond observing these important similarities between Levinas and Buddhism, what else can this extended meditation on breathing teach us? What other responsibilities does it engender? Now that we understand that we are connected to each other through our breathing, what responsibilities do we take on for each other's breathing and for the air that we share with each other? At the very least, this meditation on breathing should help us to apply both Buddhism and Levinas to environmental ethics. Thich Nhat Hanh explains that the Buddhist insight into the interrelatedness of all things already makes it the oldest tradition of deep ecology.23

In Otherwise than Being, Levinas similarly indicates that, even before 20 any confrontation with the other, the self already becomes ethically responsible through its submergence in the elemental milieu. In his book, Terror from the Air, Peter Sloterdijk explains that the twentieth century witnessed the invention of gas warfare, a technique that turned people's everyday practice of breathing against them, by turning their means to life into a "breathing-unto-death." 24 Not only has this constituted a way of attacking others, it is also part of the violence that we are committing against ourselves. Toward the end of his book, Sloterdijk quotes a solemn speech by Elias Canetti: "To nothing is man so open as to air. . . . Air is the last common property. It belongs to all people collectively. It is not doled out in advance. Even the poorest may partake of it. And this last thing which has belonged to all of us collectively shall poison all of us collectively."25 Can we avoid this terrifying fate? The air that surrounds us constitutes the substance of our selves and of infinite others; taking care of our atmosphere enacts our responsibility both toward nature and toward humanity. Reflecting on breathing through Levinas and Buddhism can therefore remind us that taking care of the environment is one of the most profound ways in which we can take responsibility for the other. We can thus learn to hearken to the "Prayer to Future Beings" invoked by environmental activist and Buddhist teacher Joanna Macy:

You live inside us, beings of the future. In the spiral ribbons of our cells, you are here. In our rage for the burning forests, the poisoned fields, the oil-drowned seals, you are here. You beat in our hearts through late-night meetings. You accom- pany us to clear-cuts and toxic dumps and the halls of the lawmakers. It is you who drive our dogged labors to save what is left. O you who will walk this Earth when we are gone, stir us awake. Behold through our eyes the beauty of this world. Let us feel your breath in our lungs, your cry in our throat. Let us see you in the poor, the homeless, the sick. Haunt us with your hunger, hound us with your claims, that we may honour the life that links us. You have as yet no faces we can see, no names we can say. But we need only hold you in our mind, and you teach us patience. You attune us to measures of time where healing can happen, where soil and souls 13 can mend. You reveal courage within us we had not suspected, love we 20 had not owned. O you who come after, help us remember: we are your ancestors. Fill us with gladness for the work that must be done.26

* + - 1. Totality and Infinity
         1. Totality and Infinity is like “I is an Other” (Rimbaud): how the evanescent momentary self already disappates into the infinity of the other
         2. Levinas Identity is a momentary state in the dynamic of self and other.
         3. Always something that is responsive, so not entirely appropriate to say that one “has” an identity.
         4. Identity is absolutely not possession, but rather dispossession.
         5. A mode of responding to the other
      2. Tangents
         1. Yeah. What is identity anyways?
         2. Names and titles: Critique of Academia

same with titles. professional titles. professors “endowed chair of so and so and such and such”

Academia = anxious careerism

Professional Managerial Class

professionalization of thought

respectability politics: degrees, PhD, dissertation, etc

* + - * 1. Indigeneity

This is a bad term : indi (within) + gen (born)

i really hate the ideas of "property" and "ownership" altogether. this whole nonsense about "original occupants" comes from a horrible argument in english common law/john locke. i doubt very much that the indigenous inhabitants considered themselves "owner" of a land or that this land was their "property", or even that they constituted a singular "people" with a single name

Esto es ya más que suficiente para una revolución social de carácter económico y antiautoritario; pero hay más. En México viven unos cuatro millones de indios, que hasta hace veinte o veinticinco años vivían en comunidades, poseyendo en común las tierras, las aguas y los bosques. El apoyo mutuo era la regla en esas comunidades, en las que la Autoridad sólo era sentida cuando el agente de la recaudación de rentas hacía su aparición periódica o cuando los rurales llegaban en busca de varones para hacerlos ingresar por la fuerza al Ejército. En estas comunidades no había jueces, ni alcaldes, ni carceleros, ni ninguna polilla de esa clase. Todos tenían derecho a la tierra, al agua para los regadíos, al bosque para la leña y a la madera para construir los jacales. Los arados andaban de mano en mano, así como las yuntas de bueyes. Cada familia labraba la extensión de terreno que calculaba ser suficiente para producir lo necesario, y el trabajo de escarda y de levantar las cosechas se hacía en común, reuniéndose toda la comunidad, hoy, para levantar la cosecha de Pedro, mañana para levantar la de Juan y así sucesivamente. Para fabricar un jacal, ponían manos a la obra todos los miembros de la comunidad.

Same in Lacan, who I have not read but there is plenty of secondary literature

* + - 1. Tangents – probably belongs below on arche chapter?
      2. SECTION THREE: Violence and Metaphorics
         1. Why is a metaphorical reading interesting or important?

“Metaphors We Live By”, George Lakoff

Use “Metaphors we live by” to demonstrate the existential/phenomenological nature of metaphors

Zed must know about an interesting philosophical commentary or I can just stick with the cogsci. I know it from undergrad.

Maybe I can try to say something about Austin and speech acts. “words do things” I don’t know this stuff. Ask Zed.

Derrida, John Llewelyn, Simon Critchley on Levinas and Metaphors

 Borges is correct: "Perhaps universal history is but the history of several metaphors." Light is only one example of these "several" fundamental "metaphors," but what an example! Who will ever dominate it, who will ever pronounce its meaning without first being pronounced by it? -- Jacques Derrida on Emmanuel Levinas

See “Viewing Power”, <https://www.waste.org/~roadrunner/writing/thesis.htm>

* + - * 1. Army of Metaphors: Against Heraclitus

“Truth is a mobile army of metaphors, metonyms, anthropomorphisms, in short, a sum of human relations which were poetically and rhetorically heightened, transferred, and adorned, and after long use seem solid, canonical, and binding to a nation. Truths are illusions about which it has been forgotten that they are illusions.” Nietzsche

Definition is already metaphorical

Army” discourse as militarism

Nancy Hartsock: the barracks community. The all pervasiveness of military thought and language

Before we consider the importance of the feminist critique, let us begin by asking what are the aims and aspirations of anarchism. Anarchism is sometimes defined simply as the refusal of the state. However, anarchism must strive towards a much more profound goal than this. The long history of authoritarian domination has penetrated our ways of thinking and acting so deeply that an anarchist critique must re-evaluate the very roots of political philosophy, of the thinking that considers communality in terms of political association. The feminist scholar Nancy Hartsock argues that Western political thinking has been shaped by the way that the Greek polis (city-state) emerged out of what she terms the ‘barracks community’ (Hartsock, 1982, p. 283). Within this military encampment, the paradigmatic virtues were defined as courage, heroism, glory and the striving for immortality; human relationships were conceived as being fundamentally antagonistic and competitive, as struggles for power and domination. Hartsock claims that war and the masculine role of the warrior-hero have been central to our conception of politics ever since: for example, the warrior’s dominance on the physical battlefield has been transformed into the citizen’s dominance on the battlefield of rhetoric and into the businessman’s dominance on the field of commerce (Hartsock, 1982, pp. 285–6).

Critique of Heraclitus

Levinas quotes

We do not need obscure fragments of Heraclitus to prove that being reveals itself as war to philosophical thought, that war does not only affect it as the most patent fact, but as the very patency, or the truth, of the real. In war reality rends the words and images that dissimulate it, to obtrude in its nudity and in its harshness. Harsh reality (this sounds like a pleonasm!), harsh object-lesson, at the very moment of its figura¬tion when the drapings of illusion burn war is produced as the pure experience of pure being. The ontological event that takes form in this black light is a casting into movement of beings hitherto anchored in their identity, a mobilization of absolutes, by an objective order from which there is no escape. The trial by force is the test of the real. But violence does not consist so much in injuring and annihilating persons as in interrupting their continuity, making them play roles in which they no longer recognize themselves, making them betray not only commitments but their own substance, making them carry out actions that will destroy every possibility for action. Not only modern war but every war em¬ploys arms that turn against those who wield them. It establishes an or¬der from which no one can keep his distance; nothing henceforth is ex¬terior. War does not manifest exteriority and the other as other; it destroys the identity of the same.

The psychism will be specified as sensibility, the element of enjoyment, as egoism. In the egoism of enjoyment dawns the ego, source of the will. It is the psychism and not matter that provides a principle of individua¬tion. The particularity of the rode n does not prevent the singular beings from being integrated into a whole, from existing in function of the totality, in which this singularity vanishes. Individuals belong¬ing to the extension of a concept are one through this concept; concepts, in their turn, are one in their hierarchy; their multiplicity forms a whole. If the individuals of the extension of the concept owe their individuality to an accidental or an essential attribute, this attribute nowise opposes the unity latent in their multiplicity. This unity will be actualized in the knowing of an impersonal reason, which integrates the particularities of the individuals in becoming their idea or in totaliz¬ing them by history. The absolute interval of separation cannot be obtained by distinguishing the terms of the multiplicity by some qualita¬tive specification that would be ultimate, as in Leibniz’s Monadology, where a difference, without which one monad would remain indistin¬guishable from an “other,” is inherent in the terms. As qualities the differences still refer to the community of a genus. The monads, echos of the divine substance, form a totality within its thought. The plurality required for conversation results from the interiority with which each term is “endowed,” the psychism, its egoist and sensible self-reference. Sensibility constitutes the very egoism of the I, which is sentient and not something sensed. Man as measure of all things, that is, measured by nothing, comparing all things but incomparable, is affirmed in the sensing of sensation. Sensation breaks up every system; Hegel places at the origin of his dialectic the sensed, and not the unity of sensing and sensed in sensation. It is not by chance that in the Theaetetus\* Protagoras’s and Heraclitus’s theses are brought together, as though the singularity of the sentient would be required for Parmedidean being to be able to be pulverized into becoming and to unfold otherwise than as an objective flux of things. A multiplicity of sentients would be the very mode in which a becoming is possible—a becoming in which thought would not simply find again, now in movement, a being subject to a universal law, producing unity. Only in this way does becoming acquire the value of an idea radically opposed to the idea of being, does it designate the resistance to every integration expressed by the image of the river, in which, according to Heraclitus, one does not bathe twice, and according to Cratylus, not even once. A notion of becoming destructive of Parmenidean monism is acquired only through the singu¬larity of sensation.

Heraclitus : violence is fundamental to matter, to dynamis

Critique of temporality as Becoming, going back to Heraclitus

Temporality as polemos, a clash of opposites

Early Empiricism

Neizsche/Deleuze/Foucault/Heidegger

I wrote a paper for Critchley on Heidegger’s macho bullshit. Hope I still have it. Can probably reconstruct form “Introduction to Metaphysics”

Look at Bergson in Levinas and Deleuze

Copula is copulation:

the entire ontological lexicon of being, temporality, etc – occurs through the human intimacy and not as reactions to anonlymous forces

Materialism of empiricism –

Hobbes starts with this dynamic violence and winds up in war.

Locke too

Deleuze

Empiricism and Subjectivity

Maybe the Bergson book?

Nietzsche essay in The New Nietzsche

War Machine

* 1. SECTION: POLEMOS and Heraclitus -- Relation to past thought
     1. End of critique
     2. Hartsock “Barracks Myth Hartsock, N. (1982) ‘The barracks community in western political thought: prolegomena to a feminist critique of war and politics’, Women’s Studies International Forum, 5:3/4.
        1. ”Before we consider the importance of the feminist critique, let us begin by asking what are the aims and aspirations of anarchism. Anarchism is sometimes defined simply as the refusal of the state. However, anarchism must strive towards a much more profound goal than this. The long history of authoritarian domination has penetrated our ways of thinking and acting so deeply that an anarchist critique must re-evaluate the very roots of political philosophy, of the thinking that considers communality in terms of political association. The feminist scholar Nancy Hartsock argues that Western political thinking has been shaped by the way that the Greek polis (city-state) emerged out of what she terms the ‘barracks community’ (Hartsock, 1982, p. 283). Within this military encampment, the paradigmatic virtues were defined as courage, heroism, glory and the striving for immortality; human relationships were conceived as being fundamentally antagonistic and competitive, as struggles for power and domination. Hartsock claims that war and the masculine role of the warrior-hero have been central to our conception of politics ever since: for example, the warrior’s dominance on the physical battlefield has been transformed into the citizen’s dominance on the battlefield of rhetoric and into the businessman’s dominance on the field of commerce (Hartsock, 1982, pp. 285–6).
     3. Heraclitus/Heidegger/POLEMOS as originary opening of being or whatever nonsense
        1. I wrote about this for Simon. Do I still have the paper?
     4. Thought as constituted as an agora, a field of struggle to be right as a macho paradigm
        1. AGORA, Greek history, military transition to political<https://classics.stanford.edu/publications/origins-democracy-ancient-greece>
        2. Arendt
     5. We will encounter our disagreements with others in different manner than critique
        1. For example above we recognized a question and held it open without answering it
        2. Unanswerability (Levinas) . not exactly “unanswerable” but more it’s always an infinite conversation without terminus or conclusion.
        3. Maybe explore the idea of “responsibility” as “responding” to someone else in a conversation, and what it means when one is unable to respond
        4. also Buddhist notions of remaining within the problem rather than trying to answer it.
           1. Pema Chodron on “shenpa” for example
     6. Derrida/Levinas on infinite conversation –
        1. EL has a practically Talmudic description of community of discourse in T&I. Find it
        2. That philosophy died yesterday, since Hegel or Marx, Nietzsche, Or Heidegger-and philosophy should still wander toward the meaning of its death-or that it has always lived knowing itself to be dying (as is silently confessed in the shadow of the very discourse which declared philosophia perennis); that philosophy died one day, within history, or that it has always fed on its own agony, on the violent way it opens history by opposing itself to nonphilosophy, which is its past and its concern, its death and wellspring; that beyond the death, or dying nature, of phil-osophy, perhaps even because of it, thought still has a future, or even, as is said today, is still entirely to come because of what philosophy has held in store; or, more strangely still, that the future itself has a futureall these are unanswerable questions. By right of birth, and for one time at least, these are problems put to philosophy as problems philosophy cannot resolve.
        3. It may even be that these questions are not philosophical, are not philosophy's questions. Nevertheless, these should be the only questions today capable of founding the community, within the world, of those who are still called philosophers; and called such in remembrance, at very least, of the fact that these questions must be examined unrelentingly, despite the diaspora of institutes and languages, despite the publications and techniques that follow on each other, procreating and accumulating by themselves, like capital or poverty. A community of the question, therefore, within that fragile moment when the question is not yet determined enough for the hypocrisy of an answer to have already initiated itself beneath the mask of the question, and not yet determined enough for its voice to have been already and fraudulently articulated within the very syntax of the question. A community of decision, of initiative, of absolute initiality, but also a threatened community, in which the question has not yet found the language it has decided to seek, is not yet sure of its own possibility within the community. A community of the question about the possibility of the question. This is very little-almost nothing-but within it, today, is sheltered and encapsulated an unbreachable dignity and duty of decision. An unbreathable responsibility. Why unbreachable? Because the injunction is announced: the question must be maintained. As a question. The liberty of the question (double genitive)' must be stated and protected. A founded dwelling, a realized tradition of the question remaining a question. If this commandment has an ethical meaning, it is not in that it belongs to the domain of the ethical, but in that it ultimately authorizes every ethical law in general. There is no stated law, no commandment, that is not addressed to a freedom of speech. There is therefore neither law nor commandment which does not confirm and enclose-that is, does not dissimulate by presupposing itthe possibility of the question. Thus, the question is always enclosed; it never appears immediately as such, but only through the hermetism of a proposition in which the answer has already begun to determine the question. The purity of the question can only be indicated or recalled through the difference of a hermeneutical effort.
     7. “Respect for the Diversity of Tactics”
        1. Intellectual discourse is too often conceived as a fight -- Can my Hegel beat up your Heidegger; can my Russell beat up your Hegel; etc.
        2. The aim being to assert the superiority of my tradition of thinking over yours
        3. We are capable as thinkers and actors to accept a diversity of tactics; to explore one’s own avenue of subversion while respecting or at least attending to another avenue.
        4. one of the best traits of Hegel is his generosity in thinking; his belief that there must be an element of Truth in every thought for it to exist
        5. Explore alternatives to Hegel
           1. Explore Levinas, conversation, inheritance of thought
           2. Maybe also Nagarjuna’s critique of “svabha” self-existent entities
           3. would be cool to get madhyahamika / Nagarjuna in here too  [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/M%C5%ABlamadhyamakak%C4%81rik%C4%81](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mūlamadhyamakakārikā)

Neither from itself nor from another. Nor from both. Nor without a cause, Does anything whatever, anywhere arise.[[8]](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mūlamadhyamakakārikā#cite_note-FOOTNOTEGarfield19953-8)

If intrinsic nature (svahbha) does not exist, of what will there be alteration? If intrinsic nature does exist, of what will there be alteration?

Although (the term) "[self](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Atman_(Buddhism))" is caused to be known (of, about), and although (a doctrine or teaching of) "[no self](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anatta)" is taught. No "self" or any "nonself" whatsoever has been taught by the [Buddhas](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Buddhahood)

This is probably a footnote

* + - * 1. The already-Othering of the Same
        2. Maybe somewhere in Derrida too.
    1. Passage in Levinas Totality and Infinity about community of inherited conversation
    2. No political change through emotional violence
       1. White fragility and white tears -- shaming people for their weakness, vulnerability, neediness
       2. Ressentiment Nietzsche (Aragorn, post@)
       3. “Are we fooled by morality” --Levinas
       4. Nietzsche Moral thought is violence. it is actually a will to power
  1. Metaphorics of Maternity
     1. “Maternity and "materiality" -- look at John Drabinski “Sensibility” book. First chapter
  2. Heraclitus and Temporality
     1. “Continuous Creation” not “genealogy”
     2. Contra Deleuze/Heidegger/Nietzsche
     3. Levinas’s statement on Heraclitus “can not even step into a river once”
     4. “I is an other”
     5. the fissure of time is a continuous creation of Other into Self
     6. continuous creation -- a gendered generation, like biblical idea, maybe Spinoza too?
     7. Fundamental break up of matter vs. continuous creation
     8. Meditation as deferral of response
     9. Meditation as deferral of response
     10. Derrida deferral
     11. Futurity not as anticipation e.g. Heidegger
     12. Reminder to revisit the question
     13. Juggalo outreach
         1. Start out with Heraclitus and temporality futurity and responsibility
         2. Itu
         3. Anarche and mother originary responsibility before time
         4. Phenomenal existential experience
         5. Admit ignorance and experiment. What does this word mean
         6. Levinas admits response. For mistakes. Magonista Kropotkin
     14. Also Derrida Deferral
     15. Futurity not as Heideggerian anticipation,
     16. As a reminder to revisit the question, an admission that I do not have either the first principle nor the final answer
     17. futurity as responsibility,
     18. Meditation as the deferral of one’s response to an impulse --- impulse encountered in sensibility, where we first encounter the other
     19. Hans Jonas: Heidegger is a Gnostic. Relevant here?
     20. Continuous Creation vs. Genealogy
         1. Viewing Power<https://www.waste.org/~roadrunner/writing/ViewingPower/TotalityAndInfinity.htm>
         2. Levinas’ analysis of light and his opposition to Heidegger can be understood through a comparison of the Jewish and the Christian accounts of creation. Following Nietzsche, Heidegger explicitly critiques Christianity as a popularization of the Platonic reduction of the logos (logoV.) Heidegger contends that the logos originally referred to Dasein as the gathering-place for the strife (polemoV) of Being. Christianity obscures this notion of logos-as-gathering by interpreting Christ as the logos. Following the Alexandrian-Jewish[[1]](https://www.waste.org/~roadrunner/writing/ViewingPower/TotalityAndInfinity.htm#_ftn1) philosopher Philo, the Gospel of John describes Jesus as the phenomenon which mediates man’s relationship with the divine. Furthermore, John 1:9 explains Christ as the source of divine light as it is revealed to men, “That was the true Light, which lights every man that comes into the world.” Therefore, this book collapses the concept of the logos as light with the notion of a publicly accessible Word which subsists outside of man’s existence. Against this, Heidegger forwards an almost Gnostic idea[[2]](https://www.waste.org/~roadrunner/writing/ViewingPower/TotalityAndInfinity.htm#_ftn2) that each Dasein, as an individual, can potentially exist as its own true light, lighting itself as it comes into the world. In contrast to both John’s and Heidegger’s accounts of revelation, the Book of Genesis introduces God’s first act of creation in the following manner: “And God said, ‘Let there be light’ and there was light.” Contrary to the implicit claims of both John and Philo, this verse does not merely imply that revelation occurs through a substantive word, through the nominal. Rather, it describes the light of phenomena as preceded by and issuing forth from God’s exercise of speech.[[3]](https://www.waste.org/~roadrunner/writing/ViewingPower/TotalityAndInfinity.htm#_ftn3)
         3. Levinas describes the light of truth and of representation as something which becomes manifested between speaking interlocutors. In his book Totality and Infinity, he carefully describes the phenomenological transformations of this discussion. Levinas describes me as I posit myself in a “Now,” in a present moment in which I speak to the Other, am heard by her, and receive a reply from him.[[4]](https://www.waste.org/~roadrunner/writing/ViewingPower/TotalityAndInfinity.htm#_ftn4) As with Heidegger, Levinas employs the resources of Husserl’s phenomenology to follow the course of this discussion. Although Levinas, like Heidegger, opposes Husserl’s model of intentionality for implicitly positing a spectatorial subject which merely looks at an object, he finds metaphysical notions within Husserl which subvert the apparent ontological interpretations. He claims that Husserl’s major insight was that “notions under the direct gaze of thought that defines them are nevertheless, unbeknown to this naive thought revealed to be implanted in horizons unsuspected by this thought ... The break-up of the formal structure of thought (the noema of a noesis) into events which this structure dissimulates, but which sustain it and restore its concrete significance, constitutes a deduction — necessary and yet non-analytical.”[[5]](https://www.waste.org/~roadrunner/writing/ViewingPower/TotalityAndInfinity.htm#_ftn5) Levinas demonstrates that the intentional relationship which separates consciousness from its objects is not foundational, but rather is itself produced through certain genealogical developments of the relationship between the Other and me.
         4. Levinas claims, “The difference between the Other and me do not depend upon different properties. ... They are due to the I-Other conjunction, to the inevitable orientation of being “starting from oneself” towards “the Other.” The priority of this orientation over the terms that are placed in it (and which can not arise without this orientation) summarizes the theses of the present work.”[[6]](https://www.waste.org/~roadrunner/writing/ViewingPower/TotalityAndInfinity.htm#_ftn6) Levinas description of Being is as radically perspectival as Nietzsche’s.[[7]](https://www.waste.org/~roadrunner/writing/ViewingPower/TotalityAndInfinity.htm#_ftn7) However, whereas Nietzsche describes the experiences of a subject whose being and whose perspectives are determined by its will to power, Levinas describes my experiences in having my being and my perspectives be determined by my ethical position as the interlocutor of the Other. Derrida’s analysis of the structure of Levinas’ writing illuminates his intricate perspectivism. “In Totality and Infinity the thematic development is neither purely descriptive nor purely deductive. It proceeds with the infinite insistence of waves on a beach: return and repetition, always, of the same wave against the same shore, in which however, as each return recapitulates itself, it also infinitely renews and enriches itself.”[[8]](https://www.waste.org/~roadrunner/writing/ViewingPower/TotalityAndInfinity.htm#_ftn8) As Heidegger might say, Levinas’ writing repeatedly presents the same “factical situation,” yet, each time, it thematizes this situation from a new perspective. By varying perspectives, Levinas does not merely give the reader a “better view” of the same event. Rather, these different perspectives constitute each situation as a new and different ontological, phenomenological, and metaphysical event. These perspectives are produced as and through my intercourse with the Other. The evolution and transformation of our discussion produces intentional relationships which connect us and which orient me metaphysically. I speak to the Other who responds to me. As will be shown in this paper, each event within this complex intercourse reveals its own intentional horizons.
         5. To fully understand Levinas’ conception of vision and power, one must trace how these capacities evolve and transform throughout each stage of my ethical development. Against Heidegger’s description of Dasein as a dynamic temporalization, Levinas analyzes the time of discourse as a series of discrete, separated moments in which I am born, die and am reborn. In Time and the Other, he describes the birth of an individuated ego as his power to posit his identity, thereby escaping from the there is, an impersonal and eternal realm of undifferentiated existence. Totality and Infinity no longer refers to this event of separation as a power, but rather as the capacity to resist totalization. Levinas states, “The separation of the Same is produced in the form of an inner life, as psychism ... It is already a way of being, resistance to this totality. ... The dimension of the psychism opens under the force of the resistance a being opposes to its totalization.”[[9]](https://www.waste.org/~roadrunner/writing/ViewingPower/TotalityAndInfinity.htm#_ftn9) In direct opposition to Heidegger’s assertion that Dasein’s power develops from its futural appropriation of its heritage, Levinas explains that my capacity to resist the weight of the past in a present moment constitutes my force of resistance. Previous to this moment of separation, this separation in and as a moment, I had effectively perished when my works and my statements were alienated from myself by the impersonal institutions and public interpretations which subsumed them. I break with the domination of the totality by shedding my former manifestation and founding myself in a new moment in which I have an opportunity to make a new statement. Not only does this psychism separate me temporally, it also separates me ontologically. Against Heidegger who sees Dasein’s Being as always embedded within the impersonal dominance of Being, Levinas reappropriates the Cartesian distinction between an internal mental sphere and an external reality. According to Levinas, I resist being absorbed by the tyranny of Being by establishing the limit of my identity and creating an interior psychical realm which can not be violated by any external force or person.
     21. ADDRESS THE QUESTION OF GENDER HERE : continuous transformation of masculine/feminine in process of continuous creation<http://www.waste.org/~roadrunner/writing/Levinas/LevinasPerverter_20_1.htm>
         1. Throughout his work, most evidently in Totality and Infinity, Levinas employs motifs of kinship to describe my connection with alterity. When he describes the world as being "familiar to us" (TI 33), Levinas implies that experience is constituted as family members. Through each perspective of the ethical "relationship" (TI 39) opened at each instant of the ethical genealogy, the Other figures as a different relative: the father of futural fecundity (TI 274-277), the wife of the economic home (TI 154-156), the brother of political fraternity (TI 278-280), the sister soul of incestuous Eros (TI 254), and so on. The prevalence of these gendered family tropes has led many commentators to criticize Levinas for having a sexist and heteronormative bias. Over half a century ago in the foundational work of modern French feminism, The Second Sex, Simone de Beauvoir accused Levinas's figuration of woman as Other to be "an assertion of masculine privilege” (xvi n3). More recently, this protest has been expressed more angrily, with a recent article claiming that Levinas’s work articulates a “demonization of femininity and erasure of maternity” (Walsh 97).
         2. For anyone who admires the work of Levinas, such anger is alarming. Rather than reacting against this feminist standpoint, however, it is precisely our responsibility as Levinas scholars to be awakened by this alarm and to respond sincerely to this anger. As Andrea Juno and V. Vale explain, “[Women’s] anger can spark and re-invigorate; it can bring hope and energy back into our lives and mobilize politically against the status quo” (5). Only by rendering Levinas vulnerable, by exposing him to feminist critique, can we begin to answer for the problems in his thought and perhaps even to use these problems to develop new insights into gender and sexuality.
         3. On the one hand, the feminist objection to Levinas’s language seems to be exactly correct. Without a doubt, Levinas uses gendered motifs throughout his philosophy, deploying familial structures inherited from both the Judaic and the Greek legacies of patriarchy.[[1]](https://www.waste.org/~roadrunner/writing/Levinas/LevinasPerverter_20_1.htm#_edn1) At all moments of our reading, this should indeed trouble us. We should always refrain from masquerading his gendered language by replacing masculine pronouns with feminine ones, neutral ones, or even the hermaphroditic “he or she”; perhaps we should cease altogether to use “it” in our translations. We must keep in mind that Levinas articulates Humanisme de l’autre Homme, “Humanism of the Other Man,” and not, as a recent translation would have it, “Humanism of the Other.” On the other hand, only to claim that Levinas “privileges” the masculine over the feminine overlooks the more essential question: what does “privileging” mean and should we necessarily privilege the privileged over the secondary?
         4. Derrida astutely poses this methodological problem, “We will attempt to ask several questions. If they succeed in approaching the heart of this explication, they will be nothing less than objections but rather the questions put to us by Levinas” (WD 84). Perhaps the words that have caused so much controversy in Levinas’s work are the very terms that he himself opens up for discussion? Perhaps Levinas’s usage of filial tropes is not merely one of the “problems” in his view of politics (Critchley 174) but rather a problematic which must be deepened?
         5. More than any other thinker in the history of Western philosophy, Levinas stands accused in the very body of his texts, texts that “call for the critique exercised by another philosopher” (OTB 20), texts radically open to critical readings, texts that constantly require justification. Exactly because he employs binary gendered concepts, we can use Levinas’s texts to protest for justice not just in his work but in philosophy and in Western culture itself. Levinas has inherited sexist language and patriarchal logic from a long tradition of canonical Western thought--most of which has been written by white males[[2]](https://www.waste.org/~roadrunner/writing/Levinas/LevinasPerverter_20_1.htm#_edn2)--that has typically figured subjectivity as virility and citizenship as fraternity. Whereas many sensible, egalitarian thinkers try to masquerade this legacy by using gender-neutral language, Levinas deliberately foregrounds the problematic of gender. Therefore, perhaps a careful and critical reading of his texts can begin to think through the history of thought as masculine and to respond to the anger of our sisters.
         6. SECTION THREE AND HALF Perspectivism
         7. Here speak about perspectivism from a Levinasian POV, as distinct from our common perspectivism (Levinas/Nietzsche)
         8. See Levinas, Perverter  
            <http://www.waste.org/~roadrunner/writing/Levinas/LevinasPerverter_20_1.htm>
         9. Nietzsche: “There is only a perspective seeing, only a perspective “knowing.””[[4](https://www.waste.org/~roadrunner/writing/ViewingPower/DescartesAndNietzsche.htm#_ftn42)
         10. Levinas claims, “The difference between the Other and me do not depend upon different properties. ... They are due to the I-Other conjunction, to the inevitable orientation of being “starting from oneself” towards “the Other.” The priority of this orientation over the terms that are placed in it (and which can not arise without this orientation) summarizes the theses of the present work.”[[6](https://www.waste.org/~roadrunner/writing/ViewingPower/TotalityAndInfinity.htm#_ftn6)

Now that we have proposed an immanent hermeneutical strategy, we are bold enough to ask the broader interpretive question:  what are Levinas’s books about?  What storyline runs through his work? When we pay close attention to the etymological and the semantic networks immanent to his sentences, we notice that the same motifs crop up again and again under new transformations.[[9]](https://www.waste.org/~roadrunner/writing/Levinas/LevinasPerverter_20_1.htm" \l "_edn9" \o ")  Derrida gives us an insight into how metaphors develop through Levinas’s work: “*Totality and Infinity* … proceeds with the infinite insistence of waves on a beach:  return and repetition, always, of the same wave against the same shore, in which, however, as each return recapitulates itself, it also infinitely renews and enriches itself” (*WD* 312, n7). That is, Levinas’s writing, both across the span of his works and within a single text, can be understood as a process of reiterative rewriting.  Despite the fact that *Totality and Infinity* is broken up into a certain number of sections, chapters and subsections; and that *Otherwise than Being* was published 12 years after *Totality and Infinity*; and that Levinas’s religious work must be distinguished from his philosophical writings, I would argue that Levinas discusses one and only one thing again and again: I confront you; or, put dialogically, I converse with the Other; you say some thing to me and I listen, and then I say some thing to you and you listen.

What animates Levinas’s corpus is that each new analysis gives us a new perspective on this singular situation.  I would in fact argue that the notion of “perspectivism” is as important for understanding Levinas’s work as it is for Nietzsche’s.[[10]](https://www.waste.org/~roadrunner/writing/Levinas/LevinasPerverter_20_1.htm" \l "_edn10" \o ")   Although the dialogical relation of speech surmounts the theoretical stance of vision, Levinas still retains the notion of perspective, explaining that “ethics itself is an optics” (*TI* 23).  He does not abandon visuality, but instead warps it, perverts it.[[11]](https://www.waste.org/~roadrunner/writing/Levinas/LevinasPerverter_20_1.htm" \l "_edn11" \o ")  “The differences between the Other and me … are due to the I-Other conjuncture, to the inevitable *orientation* of being ‘starting from oneself’ towards ‘the Other.’  The priority of this orientation over the terms that are placed in it (and which cannot arise without this orientation) summarizes the theses of the present work” (*TI* 215).[[12]](https://www.waste.org/~roadrunner/writing/Levinas/LevinasPerverter_20_1.htm" \l "_edn12" \o ")

Once we understand the way that Levinas’s perspectives bend, we can begin to reflect upon the metaphorical networks that illuminate his work.  Most frequently, Levinas indicates the double-sidedness of a phenomenological event by reversing a perspective.  For example, to claim only that the Other is situated in an elevated state as the “Most High” is to miss the full dynamic mobilization of this metaphor.  The “height” of the other is the hyperbolic correlate and the perspectival reversal of the “the upsurge of the self (*le surgisment de soi*) … One becomes a subject of being … [by] an exaltation, an ‘above being’” (*TI* 119, *TeI*123).  Keeping in mind that the French root “*sur*” means “over,” we can then understand why Levinas insists that we experience history as a “SURvivor” (*TI* 57), why infinity “SURpasses itself” (*TI* 103), and why fecund temporality is a “reSURrection” (*TI* 56).  Through a different perspectival reversal, this height of separation can also be expressed as “an abyss within enjoyment itself” (*TI* 141), which becomes articulated as my “hypostasis” (*TO* 54-55) and the Other’s “destitution” (*TI* 78).

Now that we have a preliminary understanding of Levinas’s particular usage of tropes, we can better investigate why he seems so attached to what Derrida calls “the family schema” (*PF* viii). Already a doubling reversal is expressed through this trope: the “familiar” already hyperbolically inverts the Other’s existence as an alien, as “not resting on any prior kinship” (*TI* 34).  For Levinas, the notion of “family” connotes the way an individuated, separated multiplicity of entities are already related to each other, through social temporalities and moral obligations that preexist the political order.  Contrasting his analysis with a philosophical tradition stretching from Plato to Hegel, he asserts “the family does not only result from a rational arrangement of animality; it does not simply mark a step towards the anonymous universality of the State.  It identifies itself outside of the State, even if the State reserves a framework for it” (*TI*306).

Filiality does not emerge simply as a social construction, but rather constitutes a responsibility for other human beings independently of unifying structures such as Hegelian Spirit or Heideggerean Being.  Writing from within the phenomenological tradition, Levinas most pointedly questions the reductive universalization of Husserl’s *genus* (*TI* 194-96), a term derived from the Indo-European GEN, signifying “birth.”[[13]](https://www.waste.org/~roadrunner/writing/Levinas/LevinasPerverter_20_1.htm" \l "_edn13" \o ")  For Levinas, the generative family demonstrates that, rather than merely issuing from an origin, existence is a continuous creation: “the discontinuity of Cartesian time, which requires a continuous creation, indicates the very dispersion and plurality of created being” (*TI* 58).[[14]](https://www.waste.org/~roadrunner/writing/Levinas/LevinasPerverter_20_1.htm" \l "_edn14" \o ")

There is a sense in which *Totality and Infinity* may be read as if were the first Book of Moses, Genesis or בְּרֵאשִׁית,[[15]](https://www.waste.org/~roadrunner/writing/Levinas/LevinasPerverter_20_1.htm" \l "_edn15" \o ") the story of the engendering of generations.  It tells a story of life stage development, from birth through mature home ownership, through old age, through sex and death, to rebirth.  Levinas employs the terminology of birth repeatedly to describe a variety of interconnected phenomenological events such as the “latent birth” of the subject (*OTB* 139), the “birth of love” in Eros (*TI* 277), and the “birth of thought, consciousness, justice, and philosophy … of a meaning” through the third party (*OTB* 128).

In the life-stage narrative of *Totality and Infinity*, the event of birth is explored through the opening section on enjoyment, “the very production of a being that is born, that breaks the tranquil eternity of its seminal or uterine existence to enclose itself in a person” (*TI*147).[[16]](https://www.waste.org/~roadrunner/writing/Levinas/LevinasPerverter_20_1.htm" \l "_edn16" \o ")  The motifs Levinas employs in this original section are connected to other metaphorical networks throughout his work.  In addition to being a member of the biblical triad of destitution along with the stranger and the widow (*TI* 77), the “orphan” describes a particular aspect of this production of being, “an orphan by birth” (*OTB* 105).  This orphan event occurs because the child is born separated, after the erotic death of the mother and the father, “having absolved oneself from relations” (*TI* 195), separated from all relatives, constantly menaced by neediness.  One reversal of this concept--this conception--of the orphan is the concept of the work, which Levinas describes as “always in a certain sense an *abortive*action” (*TI* 228, my italics), a doubling of birth and death.

As mentioned above, this continuous GENesis must be understood as a creative enGENdering, and thus gender informs all phenomenological matters.  As with the family, gender is essential for overcoming a unifying totality.  Levinas asserts, “The difference between the sexes is a formal structure, but one that carves up reality in another sense and conditions the very possibility of reality as multiple, against the unity of being proclaimed by Parmenides” (*TO* 44).  For Levinas, gender is essential for breaking with “the neuter (the sole gender formal logic knows)” (*TI* 256), and with the neutral, Heideggerean Being that Blanchot criticizes (*TI* 298).  Unlike German and English which do have neuter cases, the French language gives all proper nouns a masculine or feminine gender.  For example, “*le sujet*” is masculine in French, just as human subjectivity and political citizenship have traditionally been figured as masculine by male philosophers.

* + - 1. SECTION FOUR: “It’s all Relative” (METAPHORICS OF FAMILIARITY):
         1. Critique of Levinas. Critchley, “Five Problems of Levinas”. Maybe his new book too.
         2. Levinas as mystical heteronormativity, nuclear family, heteroaexul inteecourse and breeding
         3. Levinas, Perverter

Throughout his work, most evidently in Totality and Infinity, Levinas employs motifs of kinship to describe my connection with alterity.   When he describes the world as being "familiar to us" (TI 33), Levinas implies that experience is constituted as family members.  Through each perspective of the ethical "relationship" (TI 39) opened at each instant of the ethical genealogy, the Other figures as a different relative: the father of futural fecundity (TI 274-277), the wife of the economic home (TI 154-156), the brother of political fraternity (TI 278-280), the sister soul of incestuous Eros (TI 254), and so on.   The prevalence of these gendered family tropes has led many commentators to criticize Levinas for having a sexist and heteronormative bias.  Over half a century ago in the foundational work of modern French feminism, The Second Sex, Simone de Beauvoir accused Levinas's figuration of woman as Other to be "an assertion of masculine privilege” (xvi n3).  More recently, this protest has been expressed more angrily, with a recent article claiming that Levinas’s work articulates a “demonization of femininity and erasure of maternity” (Walsh 97).

On the one hand, the feminist objection to Levinas’s language seems to be exactly correct. Without a doubt, Levinas uses gendered motifs throughout his philosophy, deploying familial structures inherited from both the Judaic and the Greek legacies of patriarchy.[[1]](https://www.waste.org/~roadrunner/writing/Levinas/LevinasPerverter_20_1.htm#_edn1)  At all moments of our reading, this should indeed trouble us.  We should always refrain from masquerading his gendered language by replacing masculine pronouns with feminine ones, neutral ones, or even the hermaphroditic “he or she”; perhaps we should cease altogether to use “it” in our translations. We must keep in mind that Levinas articulates Humanisme de l’autre Homme, “Humanism of the Other Man,” and not, as a recent translation would have it, “Humanism of the Other.”  On the other hand, only to claim that Levinas “privileges” the masculine over the feminine overlooks the more essential question: what does “privileging” mean and should we necessarily privilege the privileged over the secondary?

Alongside the violence of critical protest yet against the violence of rhetorical orthodoxy, we can still embrace the subversive potential of violent speech by interpreting Levinas blasphemously.[[6]](https://www.waste.org/~roadrunner/writing/Levinas/LevinasPerverter_20_1.htm#_edn6)  In contrast to Cohen’s hierarchical and orthodox moralism, our subversive and radical reading will attempt to reveal the immanent roots, the poetic dimension within Levinas’s hyperbolic, transcendental prose.[[7]](https://www.waste.org/~roadrunner/writing/Levinas/LevinasPerverter_20_1.htm#_edn7)  Such a reading will show that, although Levinas deliberately uses filial tropes throughout his work, this would only constitute a "problem" if it were read in a hermeneutically "straight" manner.  Beneath the apparent hetero-normative veneer of Levinas's prose lurk traces of queerness.  The ethical relationship is directed not simply from masculine Self to feminine Other, but is everywhere perverted.

See Levinas, Perverter: <https://www.waste.org/~roadrunner/writing/Levinas/LevinasPerverter_20_1.htm>

* 1. SECTION FIVE: Re-ligion (Community of Those Who have nothing in common)
     1. Mention Critchley and Cornel West on “religion”
     2. Communities of Queers and Freaks
     3. Black and Black and Red Mothers
        1. Sasah Luci
        2. Black Motherhood
           1. Alexis Pauline Gumbs
           2. bell hooks
           3. Deva New School
        3. Indgenous Motherhood
           1. possibly Maria Llopis' 'Maternidades Subversivas'
           2. Talk to Avi Rojas about being a doula
     4. Radical Faeries
        1. I used to consider myself a queer at various times,
           1. and was welcomed by great folks like The Murrmonster, Nedula, Liz, Rhani and Danny and Morty into the queer family, and myself
           2. Became a waitress with the 60s acid-head drag queens “The Cockettes”
           3. I became a waitress with the cockettes free meal
           4. 
           5. Weird how I am a dead ringer for my dead mother. Kind of like Norman Bates but also kind of different.  
              
        2. That said, I no longer call myself “queer”
           1. because I don’t understand the political commitments of claiming that label
           2. for the sake of simplicity, an attempt to create an identity that covers over all the internal and external variance
           3. I am a basically straight cishet white male
           4. I am according to some standards an effeminate male, perhaps even a “male hysteric”. At this point I am almost fifty so I no longer care about any criticism of my masculinity. Like it or lump it
           5. Besides this, “masculitity” is kind of a pain in the ass

Sure I have been called a “faggot” – even suffered a concussion after being smacked down the pavement for looking like one

But every masculine-defined body has gone through this form of abuse as enforced masculinity

How much is our culture inundated by various forms of male self-hatred.

Talk sympathetically about incels: men who aren’t masculine enough

* + - 1. Radical Faerie Commune in Tennesee:

Fales Library at NYU

“Go to Tennessee and find out for yourself” --Tobaron Waxman

* + 1. Juggalos
       1. Critchley on Clowns in “Infinite Converstaion”
       2. My own being-a-clown
          1. I myself have been possessed by the spirit of many tricksters
          2. [https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Trickster](https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Trickster?fbclid=IwAR3iFwZSMgjs6bXi1x9Y_xhMmnyG0WCK38-6OW74UeNfiP5IrCO-ZfCm3R8)
          3. I have been incarnated as:

Looney Toones Roadrunner (also Bugs Bunny and Daffy Duck, each with their own insanity)

Romantic hermaphrodite Krazykat (footnote to paper on Krazykat’s indeterminate gender)

Sun Wu Kong (description of Monkey King)

Hanuman eating the sun because he thought it was a big mango

I am a Puerto Rican colonial. This is my position in its history: my father was a chemistry professor at La Universidad Interamericana de San German and my mother, along with other expats and native Puerto Ricans, founded a school, named, appropriately enough “The School”

We had a mango tree in the backyard and used to play tic-tac-toe in the mangoes when we sliced them open

In Oaxaca, 2005, after working with indigenous communities and writing about their struggles (link to Barbarous Oaxaca article), I found myself staying with someone on the coast. One day I walked down the street and all the mangoes had fallen and I ate so many

Can probably link this to chapter about Eating, Consumption,OIKONOMOS

* + - 1. The Juggalo Sangha (spiritual community)
         1. Question of cultural appropriation.

Out of admiration shown by the MAD FAYGO LOVE shown by Violent J and Shaggy 2 Dope and all the juggalos and juggalettes

FUCK YOUR REBEL FLAG  
<https://consequenceofsound.net/2020/06/insane-clown-posse-selling-fuck-your-rebel-flag-t-shirt/>

March in DC  
<https://www.npr.org/2017/09/15/550724673/who-are-the-juggalos-and-why-are-they-marching-in-washington-d-c?fbclid=IwAR3TpAV-uQDXxKDtuy42gEVSwknAvTQh3baH5ohyhFdWIk75XXgFsq6fC1g>

Care and Love during COVID  
<https://twitter.com/icp/status/1253103845644828675?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5Etweetembed%7Ctwterm%5E1253103845644828675%7Ctwgr%5E&ref_url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.rollingstone.com%2Fmusic%2Fmusic-news%2F2020-gathering-of-the-juggalos-canceled-covid-19-988696%2F>

i am getting a juggalo shirt. i am going to commit to the juggalo lifestyle. i don't just want to appropriate their culture. so i have to start wearing face paint

i am going to become a member of the Juggalo FAM. i am understanding it as a spiritual conversion, like joining their sangha. i must learn to walk in the way of the juggalo

* + - 1. PROBLEMS (I): The “intentional family”
         1. This is what is wrong with the idea of the “intentional family”
         2. The family is pre-intentional, pre-voluntary, previous to society and politics
         3. Against voluntarism in anarchism generally
         4. <https://thegavoice.com/community/features/radical-faeries-and-unintended-family/>
         5. Religare as a connection that is pre-social and pre-political
         6. example:

brother fighting with step-father after mother’s death and myself fighting with brothers

* + - * 1. because family is presiely a bond that is not voluntary, relations we are obligated to whether or not we like them, whether or not they love us or we love them, whether or not they have traumatized them or they have traumatized us.
        2. almost every interesting story from the bible or greek tragedy or vedic liteatrue the ancient bible and greek tragedies are meditations on these sorts of religions
      1. Family is also the site of abuse
         1. <https://fireweedcollective.org/our-history/?fbclid=IwAR3slt9MDrgKTMNWusCHsND8Eiqye5Lg9XSgCrWdnWrtw2Np1e7KDLoJj3Y>  
            Past leadership included many white cisgender men that didn’t fully understand how deeply mental health struggles are interlocked with many forms of oppression. The result was an oppressive organizational culture that harmed people of color, women and femmes, LGBTQIA+ and other marginalized folks. White cis men, particularly those affiliated with The Icarus Project’s New York City chapter, were the folks most often named in these grievances, that also included unwanted sexual advances and systematic abuse of power. We attempted to develop internal accountability processes, however, white folks that sat firmly by people accused of causing harm disrupted and derailed the process and the women, femmes, and/or people of color spearheading these efforts experienced intense backlash and retaliation. It became clear that in order to stop and heal these harms, we had to transition away from white cis men leadership. The first step was to end the relationship with local groups as we were not able to guarantee the safety of these spaces.

END OF OUTLINE

* + 1. Not in the empiricist sense

##### Random

### Deferral of response

#### This a good and valid question and one that should remain open

#### Deferral and conversational responsibility

#### Did Critchley write about this in “Ethics of Deconstruction?

### HERE BRING OUT “IDENTITY IS A RESPONSE” “EXISTENCE IS A CONVERSATION, AND THE COPULA OF COPULATION, CONTINOUS FISSURE OF THE”

### FIRST INTERLOCUTOR HAS TO BE SIMON

#### Maybe introduce “conversation as a motif throughout the work

### Metaphorics of “responsibility” as responding in a conversation

#### Make the phenomenological example clear before abstraction

##### The temporality and ethics of texting

Urgent phone call you are viscerally summoned by the rigning of your phone or the chiming of a text message

##### Why haven’t they written back yet?

##### How am I supposed to reply?

##### Periodicity of checking to see if they wrote back -- Heraclitus

#### Maybe continue this below in discussion of Metaphorics

#### Derrida/Levinas on infinite conversation

##### T&I

##### W&D

### Whatever language allowed one person to talk to another about salmon

### In Levinas:

#### Mystical heteronormatvity?

##### With all the stuff on father, son, mother, daughter, etc, sounds like mystical heteronormative family

##### Reads like a mystical heterosexuality

#### Why?

#### “It’s all relative’ (on religion)

##### Re-ligare: Yoked to each other

### Response

#### Community of those who have nothing in common Levinas

#### Queer and Freak families

##### Faeries, Juggalos and Radical Faeries

#### Radical Mothers

## SECTION TWO: Metaphorics

#### Why is a metaphorical analysis important of interesting

### Metaphorics of militarism

### Metaphorics of familiarity



1. Marx
   1. Genesis of Matter is death of Other (Marx)
   2. Vampirism in Marx
2. IDENTITY
3. Levinas Perverter’s reading of gender and my understanding of my own positionality. namely the Self and Other transition between different states of masculinity/femininity in their interaction
   1. Start out with gender and Critchley.
      1. “Can never view oneself from the outside and the asymmetry of ethical space” = Levinasian perspectivism (see Viewing Power)
      2. Also why the idea of intellectual property ownership of ideas is ridiculous we are in a conversation
4. Methodological questions
5. Start with Critchley/gender/temporality
6. Then with critique/polemos == how do we enter into discussion into people we do not agree with
7. contrast this with Cohen on Derrida https://www.waste.org/~roadrunner/writing/Levinas/LevinasPerverter\_20\_1.htm
   * 1. Elevations and Subversion
     2. As distressing as it can be when anger is directed against a thinker one admires, it seems even worse when someone defends his thought with hostility and even employs it as a weapon of attack. As writers who have taken responsibility for the thought of Emmanuel Levinas, we have already committed to responding to the protest that his writings have engendered. For this reason, it seems inappropriate for Richard A. Cohen to dismiss the feminist analysis of Tina Chanter’s “Antigone’s Dilemma” with so much brutality and condescension in his first book Elevations, characterizing her thoughtful and temperate article as “a hatchet job. Levinas is once more made to play the tired role of the male fall guy … So why even bother with Levinas, one wonders, that sophisticated intellectual male chauvinist pig?” (EHG 196) It is hard for me to understand how a scholar of Levinas--a philosopher of politeness if nothing else--could be so rude and patronizing to one of our sisters. However, Cohen dismisses Levinas’s critical questioners--feminist and otherwise--as “attackers” (EHG 195) none of whom is given the individuated respect for separated Otherness, but who are instead defined collectively as enemies who “demonstrate loyalty to a party or school.” (EHG 196)
     3. Elevations opens upon an ominous note. Cohen recounts, “I remember distinctly to this day the impression Levinas made on me. 'This is true', I thought, in contrast to all the philosophers and philosophies which are fascinating or provocative” (EHG xi). Although anyone who has read Levinas can certainly appreciate Cohen’s “naïve” (EHG xi) sense of wonder, Cohen makes the dangerous move of proclaiming Levinas’s thought to be “true,” momentarily overlooking Levinas’s crucial “elevation” of the Good over the True. Practically canonizing Levinas as a saint or prophet, such an orthodox interpretation verges on dogmatism. We can already hear in Cohen’s contempt for thinkers who are merely “fascinating or provocative” an effort to reduce the ethical height of Levinas’s phenomenological ethics to a belligerent morality of ressentiment.
     4. Although Cohen is an astute phenomenologist, he makes the mistake of placing the normative over the phenomenological without fully appreciating how Levinas’s phenomenology is already ethics. Cohen states that “the central claim in Levinas is that the face of the other is manifested in and manifests a moral height” (EHG 183). Nevertheless, he reduces Levinas’s thought to a set of moral platitudes: “It is quite simple: it is better to be good than anything else. It is better to help others than to help ourselves” (EEP 11). Contrary to Cohen’s interpretation, however, Levinas does not issue prescriptive commands, but instead demonstrates how the prescriptive is already embedded in the existential. Levinas’s project is closely akin to Husserl’s quest to determine the eidetic essences that structure experience (Ideas 7-8), and even more similar to Heidegger’s demonstration that our “everydayness” actually reflects a more fundamental ontology (BT 380-82). That is, Levinas demonstrates how all of our experiences, even the most “commonplace” (TI 53), are already bent eccentrically by our moral orientation towards the Other, already penetrated from the rear by obligation. For example, Levinas does not simply argue that “violence is bad,” but rather demonstrates that, thanks to the ethical relationship, our wills and our bodies are always exposed to violence (TI 229) yet this violence is always postponed (TI 236).
     5. Cohen equates Levinas’s motif of height with a “moral force” that justifies hierarchical judgments of “better” and “worse” (EEP 140). Without properly articulating what the terms “good” and “evil” mean in Levinas’s writing, Cohen expresses this contrast with astonishing violence, arguing that Levinas’s “battle cry would be ‘Against evil, for the good!’” (EEP 104) Such a polemical cry could not possibly come from Levinas, but rather from Nietzsche’s man of ressentiment. According to Nietzsche, ressentiment arises from two inversions: (a) horizontally, ressentiment, the “sanctification of revenge under the name of justice” (52), looks outwards for an enemy rather than looking inwards for virtue; (b) vertically, ressentiment expresses the hatred of lowly people for the high born, and their jealous effort to revalue moral height. This attitude of ressentiment is most apparent in Cohen’s description of Levinas as “teaching morality to the intellectual elite who … think themselves too intelligent, too sophisticated, too cultured for ordinary morality” (EEP 1)
     6. To avoid confusing Levinas’s moral height with ressentiment, we must oppose the hierarchical logic of dogmatic orthodoxy by becoming subverters, overturning thought from below. [3] Judaism has always been a religion for subversion, for radical ruptures of thought that express both supreme disobedience and supreme piety. As Susan Handelman claims, Judaism contains within it a “heretic hermeneutic [that] can be part of tradition while simultaneously rebelling against it” (201). Our first patriarch, Abraham, became such an iconoclast when he smashed the idols revered and sold by his own father.[4] Similarly, modern Judaism stands in the shadow of Sabbatai Sevi, the 17th century apostate Messiah who consummated the Jewish Law by violating it.[5]
   1. Critique and Polemos
      1. critique is itself a military posture
      2. a different type of relationship
      3. Discursive vs. Conversational -- look around in Levinas
8. Political Economy
   1. OIKOS and economy
      1. OIKOS/Polis
      2. Fulfillment of human needs vs. Control of Household
   2. Self and Property <http://www.waste.org/~roadrunner/writing/Levinas/SelfAndProperty_FinalEssay_WEB.htm>
      1. The question of consumption is more fundamental than the question of production. Political economy is a question of human needs, not the right of labor
      2. Needs > Work.
      3. All eating is eating-of-the-Other
      4. Objectivity itself is the corpse of the Other
      5. Explore eating / orality
      6. Everything we inject has a source …
      7. Explore breathing
         1. The Flow of the Breath: Levinas Mouth-to-Mouth with Buddhism" (Ch 13, 2014)<https://www.dupress.duq.edu/products/levinas-and-asian-thought>
         2. The Flow of the Breath: Levinas Mouth-to-Mouth with Buddhism (about consumption and orality, environmental concerns of consumption)
9. Servility and the Service economy
   1. The exploitation of care labor
      1. Dalla Costa & James
      2. Silvia Federici
      3. Nancy Folbre “The Invisible Heart” -- I wrote a paper for Nancy Fraser about this. Let me see if I can dig it up.
10. Viewing Power <https://www.waste.org/~roadrunner/writing/ViewingPower/Conclusion.htm>
    1. Conclusion
    2. In this conclusion, I would like to take up Robert Gibbs’ challenge to consider possible relationships between Marx and Levinas though a rereading of this thesis.[[1]](https://www.waste.org/~roadrunner/writing/ViewingPower/Conclusion.htm#_ftn1) The trajectory from Descartes to Levinas charts a profound transformation in man’s consumer relationship to a developing commodity economy. Descartes writes at a period which marks the beginning not only of modern thought, but also of bourgeois capitalism. Descartes’ description of himself figures him as almost the paradigmatic bourgeois consumer. Descartes sits down at his desk, calm and clear-headed, relaxing in the complacency of his home, to write his Meditations on First Philosophy. From this space of comfort, Descartes looks out at a threatening world filled with possible uncertainty and insecurity. In response, he attempts to preserve this security by domesticating exteriority. Descartes masters the external world by positing it as a set of objects which offer themselves to him for his contemplation. He does not figure his consciousness as a tabula rasa, reacting to new, unexpected sense-data. Rather, Descartes sets a table for himself with morsels which offer themselves for his consumption and domination.
    3. Nietzsche’s and Heidegger’s works express their distrust and disdain of this consumerist position. Both of them warn that Descartes’ spectatorial paradigm constitutes a cowardly retreat from life and its contingencies. Heidegger explains that mass culture submerges and loses Dasein by transforming its authentic possibilities into exchangeable and consumable commodities. Nietzsche contends that society effeminizes the individual, making him unable to assert his sovereign will-to-power. Both of them overcome their anxiety over modern economic circumstances by developing an anxiety over an underlying abyss. They assert that, by confronting the limits of one’s own existence, one can find one’s will to take risks, no matter what outcome fate may destine. In response to the flaccidity and passivity of modern selfhood, Nietzsche and Heidegger affirm the importance of creative, heroic individuals, of tragic artists and poetic builders. By doing so, both of them try to oppose the dominant consumerist subjectivity with a productive subjectivity. Nietzsche’s argues that the self should assert its will to power by producing new perspectives and creating new poetic visions. By developing a concept of possibility which can not be reduced to actuality, Heidegger establishes a process of perpetual production which can not be reduced simply to the commodities it produces. Furthermore, Heidegger’s Dasein confronts its world as entity which it can manipulate to promote its own possibilities like the solitary capitalist entrepreneur who exploits reality in the name of free enterprise.[[2]](https://www.waste.org/~roadrunner/writing/ViewingPower/Conclusion.htm#_ftn2)
    4. Before discussing how Levinas’ works relate to consumer capitalism, I would like to meditate on what his work describes. Although Levinas is an ethical thinker, we must be precise about what this term means for him. Levinas is not a thinker of morals or virtues. He does not — at least, not explicitly — prescribe any specific behaviors or attitudes. Furthermore, he does not furnish us with the equivalent of a Kantian imperatives; he does not give us ground rules for moral laws. Instead, I would argue that Levinas’ project in Totality and Infinity is quite similar to Heidegger’s project of constructing a ontological phenomenology in Being and Time. Although the terminology often seems cryptic and the sentences often become dizzying, Levinas intends to describe the exact structures of our everyday empirical existence.
    5. Levinas’ philosophy attempts to radically reorient my conception of my life. Rather than letting me think of myself as an independent, autonomous entity, Levinas wrenches the center of my life outside of myself. Levinas teaches me just how radically I, at every moment of my life, am radically exposed to the wills of other people. The Other always maintains the capacity to shock me in both delightful and horrifying ways. My openness to the Other explains why I can not shut out another person’s suffering, even if I choose to ignore it. Conversely, this exposure also enables another person to invade my privacy in order to harm me. By orienting me towards ethics, Levinas does not necessarily make me act “better” in the conventional sense. Rather, he demonstrates how my interactions with others — and even my relationship with myself as one who transubstantiates into an Other over time — will always disrupt my self-assertive will. The Other confronts me as a person whose actions I can’t fully predict and whose statements I can’t completely control, yet whose commitments and words directly affect me. Furthermore, the Other seizes my destiny away from myself because he always takes over my projects and my works at the very moment that I project and produce them. Therefore, Levinas demonstrates that, in this post modern age of The Rapture, control will always slip out of our grasp and our will always be violated by others.
    6. Like Marx, Levinas’ works meditate on the irreducible materiality of the human condition and on the need for economic justice. Totality and Infinity always brings the reader back to a contemplation of the incarnate nature of existence, showing how our transformations from one moment to another are always resurrections of the flesh. Furthermore, this book always makes me contemplate how my discourse, my commerce, with others always occurs through the economic relationships I establish with them and with myself. In his discussions of enjoyment, Levinas consistently praises Marx for recognizing the fundamental sincerity of man’s material desires. Describing life as alimentation, as eating, Levinas’ analysis of enjoyment grounds my existence in my consumerism. Rather than viewing the world as possibilities I can seize, I ground my existence on my sensual enjoyment of the objects I consume. Levinas cites Theophile Gautier’s assertion, “I am one of those people for whom the external world exists.”[[3]](https://www.waste.org/~roadrunner/writing/ViewingPower/Conclusion.htm#_ftn3) He does not figure my life as a heroic one, but rather describes me as more of a dandy, as effeminate, indulging myself in the element.
    7. Levinas’ ideas can be applied to think through concrete phenomena which we encounter in our contemporary consumerist economy. For example, Levinas explains that the Other retains his transcendence through his infinite capacity to clarify the image he presents. Although he may manifest a particular facade at one moment, the Other can always present a completely different one in a new moment. The infinity of temporality allows the Other to create himself anew in a form which I never could have anticipated. This description, I would argue, can give us a phenomenology of Madonna, the post-modern person par excellance. Doesn’t Madonna’s constitute her “identity” precisely on her infinite capacity to recreate herself from one album to another, from the Boy Toy of Borderline, to the seductress of Like a Virgin, to the sophisticated vamp of Vogue? Similarly, Levinas explains that one establishes oneself in the moment by positing oneself as a concrete work. By manifesting oneself in the public world, one creates oneself as a consumable object. Again, doesn’t Madonna’s “power” derive precisely from her infinite ability to exploit herself, her infinite capacity to control her own commodification?
    8. More importantly, Levinas’ analysis can also lend itself to a new critique of the consumerist economy. The anarchist Raoul Vaneigem, in his Revolution of Everyday Life critiques consumerism in, as the title suggests, a Heideggerian manner. He argues that modern society forces us into a survival mentality in which we merely consume goods rather exploring and exerting our creative wills.[[4]](https://www.waste.org/~roadrunner/writing/ViewingPower/Conclusion.htm#_ftn4) Conversely, Levinas can help us to develop an an-archism of the other man. For Levinas, survival connotes a literal “living over,” an existence which lives off of those who have been slaughtered by history. Levinas explains that the self’s enjoyment derives through its concretization and incorporation of the elemental as objects for its bodily consumption. Furthermore, Levinas explains that this elemental enjoyment is produced from the materiality of the works it has inherited from the past, from the human suffering and death which has congealed itself in the production of a work. Levinas updates Marx’s analysis of capitalism as vampirism, Marx’s descriptions of the machinery of production sucking the life out of the bodies it consumes in production. He draws our attention to the fact that, in an era where all dresses are made from the blood of children and all overcoats are made from human hair, the everyday of consumption implicates the consumer in profound violence.
    9. Perhaps we can use Levinas to develop a phenomenology of social protest. The Other presents me with a being who “burns without being consumed,” whose humanity can not be fully absorbed by a consumer economy, yet whose epiphany also teaches me the possibility of a holocaust. Levinas figures me as someone who is profoundly aware of human suffering, even if I choose to ignore this degradation. Furthermore, in his later works, he repeatedly explains that the material needs of the Other are my own spiritual needs. The Other calls me away from my complacent comfort, demanding that I work to promote social and economic justice. Levinas describes ways in which I can confront systems of oppression. He explains that my freedom does not derive from my ability to exert my will, but rather from an awareness that anonymous powers always threaten to crush my freedom. Although outside powers can indeed control me and objectify me, I always maintain the infinite capacity to speak to the Other. Like Abraham who argues desperately against God’s destruction of Sodom and Gomorra, I retain the infinite ability and duty to bear witness to the suffering of myself and the Other and to speak out against the concrete facts which oppress us.
    10. [[1]](https://www.waste.org/~roadrunner/writing/ViewingPower/Conclusion.htm#_ftnref1) Robert Gibbs, Correlations in Rosenzweig and Levinas. [Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992.]
    11. [[2]](https://www.waste.org/~roadrunner/writing/ViewingPower/Conclusion.htm#_ftnref2) Heidegger’s later work criticizes this exploitation of the world through his analysis of Enframing [Gestell.] See his piece “The Question Concerning Technology” in The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays. [Translated by William Lovitt. New York: Harper and Row, 1977.]
    12. [[3]](https://www.waste.org/~roadrunner/writing/ViewingPower/Conclusion.htm#_ftnref3) Existents and Existence p. 37
    13. [[4]](https://www.waste.org/~roadrunner/writing/ViewingPower/Conclusion.htm#_ftnref4) Raoul Vaneigem, The Revolution of Everyday Life, p. 159- 163. [London: Left Bank Books and Rebel Press, 1993]
11. Self and Property <https://www.waste.org/~roadrunner/writing/Levinas/SelfAndProperty_FinalEssay_WEB.htm>
    1. The work of Emmanuel Levinas attempts to rethink the position of the individual self, reconsidering the way it is structured as a responsibility to the other person. Such an inquiry into selfhood necessarily raises the question of what is subsumed within the personal sphere, the suum. In his first magnum opus, Totality and Infinity, Levinas expresses this idea with a phrase borrowed from both Hegel and Sartre, writing that individual is ‘for-itself.’ “The subject is ‘for itself.’ It represents itself and knows itself as long as it is. But in knowing or representing itself, it possesses itself, dominates itself, extends its identity to what of itself comes to refute its identity” (87). Selfhood, Levinas explains, is not a stable identity but a process of self-identification, of appropriating the diversity of otherness and integrating it back into a unitary selfhood. Within Totality and Infinity, he delineates the steps by which this procedure occurs. Before the self involves itself in productive self-creation, he explains, its experience begins through consumption.
    2. Levinas explains that the ego is first produced as something that enjoys existence. The ego is neither a particular instance of a universal category nor something that partakes of elemental forces or codes, but rather something that lives a contented life, living from its contents, fulfilling itself by filling itself. Levinas describes this initial relationship to the world using the metaphorical language of eating, stating “Nourishment … is the transmutation of the other into the same, which is in the essence of enjoyment: an energy that is other, recognized as other … becomes, in enjoyment, my own energy, my strength, me. All enjoyment is in this sense alimentation” (111). This description of the dynamic emergence of selfhood contrasts dramatically with the analyses of Hegel and Locke. For Hegel, particularity first develops through the exercise of freedom, by the way one expresses oneself through the externalization of one’s will in property. Although Locke begins with self-preservation and the biblical dispensation for enjoyment, it is productive labor that turns the world into one’s own. In contrast, Levinas explains that the self initially relates to the other through a process of incorporation and not externalization, through consumption and not production. By emphasizing consumption, Levinas seems to be drawing attention the way in which one begins one’s existence -- not as an agent asserting its sovereign will and projecting its spirit onto things but rather as someone vulnerable who needs to be sustained by the world in order to survive.
    3. More than a reaction to either Locke or Hegel, Levinas’s emphasis on consumption seems to be a response to the way that Heidegger initially situates Dasein (human being). According to Heidegger, Dasein finds itself already thrown into a situation that surpasses it (174:135). Although this state of thrownness indicates certain susceptibility within its constitution, Dasein overcomes this passivity by recognizing how it is already engaged in the world. Dasein is already involved in a variety of productive relationships; it is related to things through relationships of utility that beckon to its hand. Once Dasein recognizes its engaged existence through the possessive relationships of mine-ness (Jemeinenigkeit) and authenticity / own-ness (Eigenlich), it can actively grasp things as they refer to it as ready-to-hand (Vorhanden), concerning itself by “producing, manipulating, and the like” (88) . According to Levinas, one first relates to the world through the mouth that eats rather than the hand that uses: man’s initial relationship is consuming the elemental rather than acting within Being. He remarks, “The consumption of foods is the food of life” (114). Therefore, he criticizes Heidegger's analysis for its overemphasis on productivity at the expense of consumption, remarking, "[Heidegger's model of the] world as a set of implements ... bears witness to a particular organization of labor in which foods take on the signification of fuel in the economic machinery. ... Dasein in Heidegger is never hungry" (134).
    4. Levinas describes several phenomenological transformations that respond to this dynamic of hunger. Part of this process entails the development of an economy in which personal property can exist. In itself, pure enjoyment does not engender any property ownership. Levinas employs the notion of the “elemental” to explain why this is so. Whereas Hegel finds a lack of will, a res nullis, within the natural world, Levinas describes it as permeated by anonymous elemental forces. Qualities without substances content sensible enjoyment. For example, Levinas states that one enjoys the “blue of the sky” (141). Here, he seems to be claiming that affectivity responds to the adjectival blue rather than a nominal thing such as the ideal of blueness, or the particular object described by blue, the sky. Affect responds to intensities, not to objects. Thus, Levinas states that these elements are “coming always without my being able to possess the source” (141). That is, within sensibility, one does not find concrete things which could be seized as property. Furthermore, Levinas explains enjoyment as a passive process, in which one is affected, undergoing waves of sensation. Levinas thus claims that ownership is ambiguous within this realm, writing “to possess by enjoying is also to be possessed” (158). In order for private property to emerge, the relationship of enjoyment must be transformed into a new configuration, a phenomenon which Levinas calls the Home.
    5. Levinas's notion of the Home seems to be an adaptation of Heidegger's description of how the individual relates to the world. In Being and Time, Heidegger argues that the self is not separated from things as a subject is from an object, but is already engaged in the world. According to Heidegger, the reason why Dasein is always already in a productive, manipulative relationship with the world is because it is always already “dwelling alongside” the world (54:80ff). Levinas's discussion of the "Home" seems to indicate his ironic critique of this idea. For Levinas, the Home is precisely the event that terminates engagement, separating the individual from the immediacy of his enjoyment. “Man abides in the world as having come to it from a private domain, from being at home with himself, in which at each moment that he retires” (152). Emerging from the welcome granted to him by an other person's hospitality, the home establishes a private being, walled off from the anonymity of sensible elements.
    6. By situating oneself inside the private realm of one’s domicile, one can relate the outside world back to oneself, laying claim to things within it as one’s property. This home enables labor and possession by creating a breach between the self and the elements in which it had been absorbed. Through this distance, one can exercise the power of a laboring hand which exercises labor and identifies property. Overcoming the transience of sensual affect, the hand draws from the element concrete things, objects that endure through time. In many ways, Levinas’s description of how property is acquired echoes Hegel’s notion that possession negates the independence of the thing (§59): “labor in its possessive grasp suspends the independence of the element… as property the thing is an existent that has lost its being” (158). For Levinas as for Hegel, possession entails the absolute domination of the property by the owner.
    7. According to Levinas, my encounter with the other person prevents the spread of this domination. This transcendental experience of confronting another person is not akin either to sensual enjoyment or to masterful possession. The other person is an exterior entity, someone that cannot be absorbed into my internal sphere or made into part of my identity. However, this encounter is not experienced as a negative limit but rather as a something that is overly positive. The other person, according to Levinas, is not something that eludes the grasp of possession but someone who overwhelms it. In this experience, he claims, “the I, nonetheless, contains in itself what it can neither contain nor receive solely by virtue of its own identity” (27). Envisioning the other person’s visage, one’s mind is confronted with a paradoxical experience of containing more than its capacity, something that could not have come from consciousness itself and that consciousness can not integrate into the self’s own identity. When the other person expresses herself, she produces an image or a work that can be appropriated, yet simultaneously she also expresses a transcendence that cannot be dominated. However she presents herself, she both preserves her own privacy and maintains the ability to respond in unforeseeable ways. According to Levinas, the other person transcends not just the self’s power, but its power for power (198). The only way that one could attempt to exercise absolute power over another person, to appropriate them as property, would be to murder them. However, murder would grant one possession of only a corpse, not the person herself.
    8. The encounter with the other person alters the self’s intimate relationship to the world it possesses and allows for the emergence of a common sphere. Complementing the phenomenology of the Home, Levinas describes another process that conditions ownership, the genesis of the general. He explains that, because the other person halts the self’s effort to appropriate, it both throws property into question and conditions it. “Possession itself refers to more profound metaphysical relations: a thing does not resist acquisition. Other possessors – those whom one cannot possess – contest and therefore can sanction possession itself” (162). The presence of other persons challenges my immediate enjoyment of goods, and removes me from my solitary experience of them. Paradoxically, however, this same interaction also allows for the establishment of property. In order for appropriation to occur, a subject must be counterposed against a field of objects. According to Levinas, one achieves this separation by presenting oneself and one’s goods to the outside gaze of the visage, to the other person’s vision. “In order that I be able to see things in themselves, that is, represent them to myself, refuse both enjoyment and possession, I must know how to give what I possess” (171). According to Levinas, I become aware of the general sphere once I generously offer my world to the other person.
    9. With this analysis, Levinas’s account of the commons differs dramatically from Locke and Hegel. Although Locke believes that the world was given to man in common, only the negative duty to avoid injuring others remains after creation. Since the right to existence and the right to property are individuated, generality can only emerge from a consent reached between separated persons pursuing their own ends. On the other hand, Hegel understands the universal order of the state as that which already conditions the substantial objectification of the particular person. In contrast, Levinas asserts that I move from my own solitary enjoyment to the common world through communicating with the other person and entering into commerce with him. Levinas’s analysis of the commons seems to be preferable than that of Locke, who treats the commons either as a something natural that should be privatized or as the epiphenomenal outcome of aggregated interests. The contrast between Hegel and Levinas, the question of whether we move from the general to the interpersonal or the interpersonal to the general, is much more subtle. Here it seems worth noting, though, that within The Philosophy of Right, Hegel only seems to consider the logical categories of particularity and universality. He has no comparable term for alterity, no way to discuss the unique phenomenon of the other person, as he did in the Phenomenology of Spirit.
    10. For Levinas, the realm of generality is populated not by property or by objects, but by works. Labor not only incorporates things into my existence, it also produces a thing exterior to myself, a work, a thing that attests to the absence of the worker. Levinas uses this notion of the work to argue against Locke and Hegel's assertion that labor creates property. “The product of labor is not an inalienable possession, and it can be usurped by the Other. Works have a destiny independent of the I, are integrated into an ensemble of works: they can be exchanged, that is, be maintained in the anonymity of money” (176). Whereas Hegel explained how property expresses the self by the way it embodies the human will, Levinas insists that the work expresses the will as something from which the will has removed itself. Production for Levinas does not expand the personal sphere, but rather creates something external to it, something that can be expropriated and manipulated by other wills. For Levinas, my labor not only secures what belongs to me, but also situates those expressions of myself in a general economy where they can be appropriated by anyone. Therefore, the very act of self-assertion and self-manifestation is already a primary exposure and self-alienation. “The other can dispossess me of my work, take it or buy it, and thus direct my very behavior; I am exposed to instigation. The work is destined to this alien Sinngebung [meaning-giving] from the moment of its origin in me” (227).
    11. Levinas describes the reverse process in a manner that further complicates the idea of ownership. Just as our absence is signaled in the ways that we express ourselves in our works, we also appropriate absences through our acquisitions. The other person, Levinas explains, is symbolized through the way that he has expressed himself in his works. Thus, I can acquire a certain kind of access to him through the way the person has expressed himself, but, Levinas explains, “we penetrate into this interior world as by burglary” (177). Levinas’s metaphor of burglary seems particularly striking in this discussion of property. As mentioned before, the primary threat against which Locke’s treatise defends is that of robbery: because the primary right of individuals is to promote their own self-interest, any infraction upon this privilege legitimates severe retribution. In contrast, Levinas’s describes how property is already theft: property is already situated in a public realm, and thus already subject to the economic dynamics of dispossession. More strikingly, Levinas’s example reconstrues the notion of thievery and the way it affects the personal sphere. For Levinas, the thief does not represent someone who takes property away from the sphere of selfhood, the suum, but rather someone who penetrates into it.
    12. Levinas further explores the susceptibility of the personal sphere in his second major book, Otherwise than Being. Otherwise than Being reworks the conceptual architecture of Totality and Infinity, focusing more closely on how the personal sphere develops from its responsibility to other persons. According to Levinas, the Western idea of selfhood is based on the idea that the self can possess itself through an act of identification. “In self-consciousness we identify ourselves across the multiplicity of temporal phases. It is as though subjective life in the form of consciousness consisted in being itself losing itself and finding itself again so as to possess itself by showing itself, proposing itself as a theme, exposing itself in truth” (99). In this statement, Levinas seems to be locating the problem of self-consciousness in what he refers to in an early essay as Heraclitus’s problem of the “illusory present” (“Reflections,” 65). Given that everything changes through the dynamic flux of time, how could one ever posit a stable identity for a thing such as the self? If one is always changing, isn’t the self already dispersed in otherness? Levinas claims that philosophy has consistently tried to resolve these problems by developing ways that one can integrate this diversity. It has proposed various themes through which one can grasp phenomena, allowing one to convert the external other into internal property and thereby establish self-possession.
    13. Levinas challenges the authority of these thematic organizing principles by demonstrating that before consciousness can appropriate the ex-ternal, the self is already ex-posed, already open to otherness. From the very beginning, the suum is already directed by its responsibility to other people. Otherwise than Being explains this prior exposure by clarifying one of the most puzzling aspects of Totality and Infinity: how is the “other” related to the “Other.” Totality and Infinity had presented two stages of the self’s development. First, the self emerges by integrating the “other” into the same, creating the identity of the self. Secondly, the self relates to the human “Other” as a transcendental entity that can not be appropriated. In Otherwise than Being, Levinas looks more carefully at the first stage of this process, explaining how sensible enjoyment and consumption is already ethical. Within sensibility, the self does not yet exist as a self-sufficient entity. As in Totality and Infinity, Levinas explains that consumption is the process by which the self achieves its identity. “The taste is the way a sensible subject becomes a volume, or the irreducible event in which the spatial phenomenon of biting becomes the identification called me, which becomes me through the life that lives from its very life” (73). Levinas argues that within this eating there is already a hunger that drives it. Whereas consciousness is driven to fulfill itself with contents, there is an underlying emptiness that perpetually troubles this fullness. According to Levinas, this emptiness indicates the presence of the other person’s absence. “The relationship with the other puts me into question, empties of myself and empties me without end, showing me ever new resources. I didn’t know I was so rich, but I no longer have the right to keep anything for myself” (“Meaning”, 94). One’s responsibility towards the other splits me open, preventing me from isolating myself as a self-sufficient, self-possessed identity. Levinas describes this process as an inversion and reversal of consumption: eating not only creates identity by internalizing the outside; it is also a “gnawing away at this very identity – identity gnawing away at itself – in a remorse” (OTB, 114).
    14. According to Levinas, the phenomenology of sensibility indicates an underlying vulnerability and exposedness to other persons. In contrast to Totality and Infinity’s claim that the self could be characterized as “for itself,” Levinas describes it in Otherwise than Being as a “for-the-other.” The very movement of incorporating otherness is also equivalent to being haunted by others already within oneself. The self is already committed to others before it is concerned with itself: it is exposed, posited in an external space filled with the wills of others. In Totality and Infinity, Levinas explained that the sphere of generality was comprised by works that testified to the absent wills of other people. This would suggest that, when we consume what the world offers, we are appropriating the remnants of others, incorporating their works and their actions as our own. We are thus claimed by others from the inside; we are created as entities who are already responsible for the legacy that other persons have left behind. Levinas explains “There is a paradox in responsibility, in that I am obliged without this obligation having begun in me, as though an order slipped into my consciousness like a thief, smuggled itself in me” (13). As in Totality and Infinity, Levinas’s reference to the thief refers not to the act of taking away an external object, but of penetrating into the interior. In Otherwise than Being, Levinas pushes this metaphor even further, to assert that consumption animates one’s own identity from the inside as a responsibility towards others.
    15. With this understanding of the world, Levinas helps us to reconsider and perhaps to overcome the prominence that the notion of private property has assumed in this moment of history. Levinas does so by reconsidering the notions of self, world, and other upon which are founded the ideology of possessive individualism and the institution of ownership, as well as the theories of both Hegel and Locke. In both of these writers, (1) the self is understood as an agent who exercises his labor to extend his sphere of selfhood; and (2) the world is understood as an empty vessel awaiting animation by the human will. Locke and Hegel do differ significantly with regard to their views on other people. Locke practically ignores social duties, whereas Hegel shows how universal social concerns always limit individual actions. Nevertheless, even Hegel argues that the particularity of each individual’s capacities and resources counterbalance the general right to social welfare, thereby sanctioning inequities in property ownership and modes of subsistence. In contrast, Levinas does not understand the world as merely an empty field awaiting human agency. For Levinas, the world is already occupied, haunted by the efforts of past generations of workers. The self begins its existence not as a productive laborer but as a consumer already enjoying the environment that others have created. Whereas Levinas’s viewpoint seems to be a vast improvement over both Locke and Hegel’s, he still shares a blind spot with the two of them. All three writers seem excessively humanist: for all of them, what matters the most in the world is the presence of human wills, either the self’s or the other person’s or society’s. The natural world itself exerts no significant claim on its own behalf. For this reason, we still need to consider what sorts of new ethical thinking will be adequate to respond to the environmental challenges confronting our planet today.
    16. Conclusion
    17. By analyzing the primary encounter between self and world as one of consumption rather than production, Levinas becomes interesting for modern political-economic thought. He dislodges the central category of property ownership, conceiving selfhood as an absolute generosity. “The subjectivity of a man of flesh and blood … is a being torn up from oneself for another in the giving to other of the bread from one’s mouth” (142). Although Levinas’s hyperbolic language is rhetorically radical, it is not entirely clear the extent to which it can be read as being politically radical. Despite Levinas’s occasional references to Marx and his philosophical usage of the term “anarchy,” he still seems to support politically the “pathos of liberalism” (TI, 120). Nevertheless, this paper will conclude by trying to push Levinas’s thought in a more revolutionary direction. This will be done by analyzing how this essay’s themes of property, production, and consumption are discussed by the Peter Kropotkin in his seminal declaration of anarchocommunism, The Conquest of Bread.
    18. Kropotkin criticizes the idea of property ownership because, like Levinas, he understands the world to be constituted by the works of other people. Thus, Kropotkin argues that no individual can lay claim to any particular object because the value of each thing depends on the efforts of an incalculable number of others. “And even to-day; the value of each dwelling, factory, and warehouse, which has been created by the accumulated labor of the millions of workers, now dead and buried, is only maintained by the very presence and labor of legions of the men who now inhabit that special corner of the globe” (6). According to Kropotkin, property claims are impossible because one’s existence already depends upon an infinite debt to others. The world within which one acts is already constituted by the historical deeds of past workers; one’s actions only become significant because they occur within a contemporary environment where other people currently labor.
    19. Given that everyone’s personal effort depends radically upon the efforts of others, Kropotkin further argues that ownership claims cannot be based on labor. Here, his claim is quite different from the critique of private property leveled by Karl Marx. In Although Marx’s early “humanist” writings are quite concerned with social needs (Heller, 40), his later critique of capitalism focuses more intensely on the inequity of social production, on an analysis of how the capitalist extracts surplus value from the laborer. In Capital, Marx roots the source of social value in human labor. In the first chapter, he claims that the total labor power of society can be divided into discrete units of average labor expended in a given hour (129), further distinguishing between simple and skilled labor. Kropotkin objects that Marxists and other collectivists place too much emphasis on determining the appropriate value of various kinds of labor. Thus, he argues:
    20. It is utterly impossible to draw a distinction between the work of each of these men. To measure the work by its results leads us to an absurdity; to divide the total work and to measure its fractions by the number of hours spent on the work also leads us to absurdity. One thing remains: to put needs above works, and first of all to recognize the right to live, and later on the right to well-being for all those who took their share in production. (231)
    21. Rather than focusing on labor, ownership, and production, Kropotkin asserts that people should organize themselves in such a way as to satisfy the human needs of consumption.
    22. Kropotkin criticizes the tradition of political economy from Adam Smith to Marx for consistently commencing their analyses with production rather than consumption. He defends his own decision to reverse the order by explaining
    23. Perhaps you will say [putting production before consumption] is logical. Before satisfying needs you must create the wherewithal to satisfy them. But before producing anything, must you not feel the need of it? Is it not necessity that first drove man to hunt, to raise cattle, to cultivate land, to make implements, and later on to invent machinery? Is it not the study of needs that should govern production? It would therefore be quite as logical to begin by considering needs and afterwards to discuss the means of production in order to satisfy these needs (238).
    24. Our capacity to produce, he claims, is sufficient to produce well-being for all, enough housing, clothing, luxury items, and food. The thing that prevents people from meeting their needs is the exploitation practiced within the contemporary system of private ownership, a system that reduces the majority of people to the barest subsistence. Instead of allowing this economic system to legitimate itself with the alibi that it practices efficient production, Kropotkin argues that we must begin by considering consumption. Society, he declares could only hope to meet the needs of all if it returns to the most fundamental question, the question of bread. “We have the temerity to declare that all have a right to bread, that there is enough bread for all, and that with this watchword of Bread for All the revolution will triumph” (69).
12. Against Militarism
    1. Carl Schmidt friend-enemy distinction
    2. The logic of militarism prevails not only within mainstream conceptions of politics, but also within various strands of radical thinking, from Marx’s belief that class struggle is the engine of history to Badiou’s celebration of the militant as a model for political subjectivity. Most alarming is the way that such militarism runs throughout the writings of the French Tiqqun group. Within these texts, we find the standard masculinist warnings against the way one is ‘castrated’ (Tiqqun, 2010b, p. 18) by mass society, as well as a hostile denunciation of the figure of the ‘Young Girl’, who represents for them the shallow bitch who succumbs to the idiocy of consumer culture. Worse yet are the recurrent calls to violence. Not only does it cite Clastres’s proclamation that ‘war is the truth of relations between communities’ (Tiqqun, 2010a, p. 22), but the text Introduction to Civil War also tells us, ‘Only the timid atom of imperial society thinks of “violence” as a radical and unique evil. ... For us, ultimately, violence is what has been taken from us, and today we need to take it back’ (Tiqqun, 2010a, p. 10). We are similarly informed that hostility is a primordial relationship and that the ‘hostis is a nothing that demands to be annihilate’ (2010a, p. 12).
13. Contra Deleuze/Nietzsche/Heidegger influences in anarchism
    1. “War Machine” Deleuze / Guattari
    2. Nietzsche & post-anarchism
    3. Critique of the “immanence of power relations” <http://www.waste.org/~roadrunner/writing/thesis.htm>
    4. Nietzhean heritage of Anarchism, especially the Deleuzian stuff
    5. Maybe some of it is very good. I have never read much Bifo or Negri
    6. Explore Heraclitus
    7. Tiqqun
    8. whatever post-Tiqqun stuff there is. I don’t know the literature. Endnotes? Commune.
14. Situationism and Levinas
    1. Levinas: For the Kids
    2. <https://www.waste.org/~roadrunner/writing/Levinas/Levinas_FTK_Paper_WEB.htm>
    3. “The state of nausea that precedes vomiting, and from which vomiting will deliver us, encloses us on all sides. we are revolted from the inside; our depths smother beneath ourselves; even our hearts are sick -- Emmanuel Levinas, 1935, “
    4. “ People who talk about revolution and class struggle without referring explicitly to everyday life, without understanding what is subversive about love and what is positive in the refusal of constraints, such people have a corpse in their mouth. -- Raoul Vaneigem, 1967 “
    5. Also read “De L’evasion” (1935) in comparison to Crimethinc “Evasion”
15. Anarchism as a practice of caring for the other
    1. Mutual aid as care
    2. I remember what [Kropotkin] did in Geneva in the winter of 1879 to help a group of Italian refugees in dire straits, among them myself; I remember the small attentions, I would call maternal, which he bestowed on me when one night in London having been the victim of an accident I went and knocked on his door; I recall the innumerable kind actions towards all sorts of people. (Malatesta, 1965, p. 258)
    3. metta sutta
       1. “just like a mother cares for its child …”
16. Past Work
    1. Viewing Power: (Descartes, Nietzsche, Heidegger, Levinas, implicitly Foucault. Ethical relations are more fundamental than power relations. Looks at perspectivism, starting with Cartesian cogito, through Nietzsche’s radicalization. finally Levinas as exterior-perspectivism)   
       <http://www.waste.org/~roadrunner/writing/thesis.htm>
    2. Self and Property (Locke, Hegel, Levinas: Consumption is more primordial than Production) <http://www.waste.org/~roadrunner/writing/Levinas/SelfAndProperty_FinalEssay_WEB.htm>
    3. Levinas: FOR THE KIDS!!! (Levinas and Situationism/Vaneigem) <http://www.waste.org/~roadrunner/writing/Levinas/Levinas_FTK_Paper_WEB.htm>
    4. Levinas, Perverter (A very weird paper. Lots of wacky stuff. Look in here for Heraclitus, perspectivism, critique of Simon Critchley)
       1. Since the inauguration of modern French feminism in Simone DeBeauvoir’s The Second Sex, Emmanuel Levinas has been criticized for the way his thought employs gendered, familial tropes. In response, this paper argues that, although this does constitute a very real and urgent problematic in Levinas’s thought, it only becomes a problem when his writing is read in a hermeneutically "straight" manner. Beneath the apparent hetero-normative veneer of Levinas's prose lurk traces of queerness. By closely tracing the motifs that Levinas correlates with gender, this paper will illustrate how, at each instant in the ethical relationship, the Self is always transforming between masculine- and feminine-gendered performances for a feminine- or masculine-gendered Other. Rather than embodying a conservative and essentialist view of sexuality, Levinas articulates an existential performative perversity.
    5. <http://www.waste.org/~roadrunner/writing/Levinas/LevinasPerverter_20_1.htm>
    6. Anarchism of the Other Person (Levinas and Anarchism)
17. <https://www.waste.org/~roadrunner/writing/Levinas/AnarchismOtherPerson_WEB.htm>
    * 1. Throughout his writing, the French philosopher Emmanuel Levinas uses the term anarchy to critique different modes of temporal, thematic, and political ordering. After an exploration of the Greek meanings of anarcian, this paper discusses the way that Levinas uses anarchy to point towards an ethical responsibility that arises before the political time of history. This interruption of time also disrupts the self's ownership of personal private property. The political ramifications of Levinas' distinction between autarchy, the selfish assertion of absolute ownership, and anarchy is illuminated by comparison with the works of various anarchists. Lastly, Levinas' development of the notion of anarchy is historically situated among the actual anarchist events unfolding around him.
    1. Undoing patriarchy, subverting politics: anarchism as a practice of care
18. <https://theanarchistlibrary.org/library/mitchell-cowen-verter-undoing-patriarchy-subverting-politics-anarchism-as-a-practice-of-care>
19. The Flow of the Breath: Levinas Mouth-to-Mouth with Buddhism (about consumption and orality, environmental concerns of consumption)
20. Bibliography
    1. How much new stuff to read?
    2. AGORA, Greek history, military transition to political<https://classics.stanford.edu/publications/origins-democracy-ancient-greece>
    3. Arendt on polis
    4. Silvia Federici
    5. Dalla Costa and James
    6. Nancy Folbre
    7. <https://www.amazon.com/Black-Hunter-Forms-Thought-Society/dp/0801859514> Pierre vidal naquet, ancient Greece
    8. I think the gateway drug for anthropology is probably Barry Strauss and Josh Ober
    9. Sasha Luci, feminist mom stuff
    10. bell hooks, stuff about “home”
    11. black mothering
21. DEVA WOODLY TALK
22. current moment
23. scholar of social movements
24. public discourse
25. Rebecca solnits stuff
26. safety and care in a very personal manner. I am a mother …
27. pandemic and movement
28. black feminist principles
29. radical and pragmatic
30. radical political imagination
31. practical steps
32. politics of care
33. acknowledgement of trauma, healing, interdependence, unapologetic blackness, abolitionist, restorative justice
34. one of the main ways care is enacted is healing justice
35. mode of analysis that oppression causes harm more than ….
36. requires personal and political action towards care
37. causes us harm and is part of what we take into account
38. essential part of being a part of healing
39. eradicate causes of harm
40. impossible to resolve trauma and heal while only focus on internal processes
41. structural analysis at its center
42. personal care not that stuff
43. (maybe take down Foucault here)
44. not individual responsibility to heal themselves
45. social ills require social action
46. black feminist practice always in context
47. care not only an ethics but also a politics
48. activity of governance basic need and responsibility to provide care for human life
49. deep affinity with voluminous
50. JOAN TRONTO
51. caring democracy
52. “care for citizens and care for democracy itself”
53. claim because they matter
54. no alternative
55. no abstraction
56. people simply matter
57. PRIORITY OF NEEDS!!!!
58. to matter -- to exist as mass at rest
59. EXACTLY!!!!
60. materiality (form/matter Aristotle, Levinas)
61. entitles you to care
62. reason for distress, etc ….
63. not dependent on properties or rights etc
64. no justification is necessary
65. “No justification” -- foundation of the Ethical
66. provision of what is necessary for upkeep ….
67. provide for needs
68. politics of care
69. hurting
70. full personhood
71. material deprivation
72. it matters if we are hurting
73. experience of politics
74. values feelings as embodiment what actually exists
75. acknowledges devalued values in masculinity
76. REVALUATION OF VALUES
77. “interdependence” -- this is where we are talking about the Other, work on breathing
78. unapologetic blackness vs. respectability politics
79. center marginalized
80. celebration of black joy
81. affirmation of black joy
82. (LOOK AT BARBARA EHRENREICH’s book on joy?”
83. accountability/interdependence
84. CLEARLY LEVINVAS AND RESPONSIBLITY
85. abolitionist
86. ASK SOL IF HE HAS ANY GOOD WORK
87. origin of movement
88. Lorde “institutional dehumanization” systems of oppression
89. racial capitalism
90. Cedric Robinson
91. capitalism racialized
92. new dimension of the way lived experience is intertwined
93. anti black racism is virulent
94. heart of logic
95. some are disqualified from universal (?)
96. rights
97. puts lived experience as its center
98. country has pit directly care for life against the interests of the trump authoritarian capitalism
99. profits > care
100. understand resonance of politics of care
101. which movement for black lives has been talking about from its inception
102. observable fact of black lives
103. people should not suffer for ugh i forgot
104. also the case that the people of black lives with the movement
105. do people have what they need to live and thrive
106. from this point of view the purpose of governance
107. OIKONOMOS
108. people matter they do not need to suffer
109. participating in the responsibility
110. one of the folks that i interviewed nikita Mitchell (MITCHELL!)
111. enact politics of care this way
112. a lot of the way
113. we are doing something magical and new
114. not just policy change but also
115. repairing new community as basis of our power
116. tending to emotions of people involved because we have to practice now who we want to be in future
117. TEMPORALITY LEVINAS
118. NEW WORLD IN THE SHELL OF THE OLD
119. movement and greater polity are in the midst of that struggle
120. key to the way of finding that way is by talking and thinking about interdependence (LEVINAS, NAGARJUNA)
121. creating material and social conditions in which people will not hurt each other
122. pragmatic. practical. not utopian
123. fighting for allocation of resources
124. caring for people
125. preventing as many from being locked up as possible
126. policing is no good (MARIANNE KABA, RUTH WILSON GILMORE)
127. policing and jail do not do what they pretend
128. MAGON QUOTE HERE “we did not need jailers”
129. change how people think about crime
130. cause harm because already are victims of crime
131. incorporates how we feel and how we are embodied
132. how we are in the world
133. from here to there
134. ANARCHIST ETHICS
135. QandA
136. insurrection and joy
137. develop practices to take care of themselves and each other (avoid burn out in protest)
138. being grounded and centered healing justice
139. HEALKING JUSTICE
140. social movement
141. institutions become self serving
142. demand of the people
143. lost this part about Weber it was smart though
144. disability studies
145. the idea of care from the idea to fix marginalized bodies
146. CARE in LEAH LATCHI “Care Work”
147. care at the center of our politics
148. people in all their different varieties can live and thrive
149. black feminist frameworks
150. we have no prisons or police
151. from punishment to care
152. diminish presence in accordance with the lack of need
153. PRISON FUNCTION OF STATE
154. SOCIAL FUNCTION OF STATE
155. CARE AS ANARCHISM
156. what kind of social institutions
157. what do you mean? I follow the work of abolitionists MARRIANE KABA GILMORE etc
158. really basic. don’t spend your money on cps. why on punishment
159. HUMAN NEEDS
160. I don’t want to put my money on jail
161. moved past that point I don’t want to say
162. I can’t imagine it yet
163. NEW SOCIETY IN SHELL OF OLD
164. what does it mean that “can’t imagine yet”
165. FUTURITY
166. Q:
167. violence
168. black men violence towards black women
169. “leave out the laundry”
170. WHAAAAAAT? IS THIS THE SAME AS LEAVE THE PROBLEM IN THE OPEN?
171. patriarchy intersectionality
172. compound oppressions
173. depending on one’s category
174. not only racism but also the way that racism is gendered
175. sexism and misogyny
176. directed a lot of different violences
177. more interested in systems rather than attitudes
178. BEAUITUFL GENIUS
179. attached to capitalism
180. men have a lot of work to do on masculinity
181. (here the dynamics of healing -- not beating up people)
182. Q: radical and pragmatic
183. imagining new possibilities
184. simultaneous
185. community control autonomous zones
186. state for the provision of care?
187. ideological diversity within the movement
188. DIVERSITY OF TACTICS
189. localities have issues, what methods they are going to take etc
190. community control is important but also it does not negate state responsibility
191. there still is a state
192. community comes
193. different localities, care at the center
194. lived experience at the center
195. not ideology
196. Q: how does movement for black lives be translated transnationally
197. internationalism
198. always an interest to be both local and transnational
199. care is always the answer
200. move from that moment
201. Q: Deborah
202. compare and contrast human rights discourse with politics of care
203. rights is not enough
204. HEGEL PHILOSPHY OF RIGHT
205. not about rights
206. not from ABSTRACT to PARTICULAR
207. she already knows her Hegel
208. doesn’t consider right qua right
209. systematically and demonstrably unable to be housed
210. same life span
211. not starting from abstract principles
212. CAPABILITIES APPROACH
213. it has some affinities
214. Nussbaum
215. politics of care unlocked from a rights framework
216. not a JURIDICAL problem
217. what people are able to do
218. capabilities gives you a back end
219. what are people capable of? what should they give
220. THE PRIORITY OF HUMAN NEEDS
221. capitalism?
222. no.
223. capitalism is focused on profit
224. TALK ABOUT RESOURCE EXTACTION SOMEWHERE -- WHEN WE ARE TALKING ABOUT OBJECTIVITY AND DEATH, POLITICAL ECONOMY
225. what do we choose? reopening economy or life and health
226. Random Notes to Self
     1. Juggalos as “Community Who Have Nothing in Common” (Lingis). Read their stuff.
     2. Kropotkin -- opposition to Darwinism and Social Darwinism
        1. Social Darwinism as a program of the right
     3. Trans stuff
        1. Not sure what Identity is
        2. Identity as violence
        3. Hegel
        4. Levinas

Nagarjuna: let’s get a close etymology of dependant-co-arising and svahbha

* + - * 1. Contra Deleuze/desirants

Sexuality itself is about “need” as much as “desire

Priority of “need” over desire

1. [Mitchell Verter](https://www.facebook.com/mangoo.spangoo?comment_id=Y29tbWVudDoxMDE1NzI2Njg5MDc4Nzc5MV8xMDE1NzI2NjkwODYxNzc5MQ%3D%3D) I can't even tell you how much I despise this idea. All of my politics and writing are focused on human vulnerability and trauma. Criticizing someone because they are "fragile" or because they shed "tears" is the most bullying kind of politics around. It is an adaptation of macho sadism to left politics and it is completely grotesque. It is an active encouragement of emotional abuse as a political strategy.
2. <https://newrepublic.com/article/156032/diversity-training-isnt-enough-pamela-newkirk-robin-diangelo-books-reviews?fbclid=IwAR3TtcnHNH0FkToY5GlrI4mn5No5gZ8SimbhqM56K5lVX-ZSwPJGR68V1K0>
3. freaks

<https://fireweedcollective.org/our-history/?fbclid=IwAR3slt9MDrgKTMNWusCHsND8Eiqye5Lg9XSgCrWdnWrtw2Np1e7KDLoJj3Y>

1. Sensation breaks up every system; Hegel places at the origin of his dialectic the sensed, and not the unity of sensing and sensed in sensation. It is not by chance that in the Theaetetus\* Protagoras’s and Heraclitus’s theses are brought together, as though the singularity of the sentient would be required for Parmedidean being to be able to be pulverized into becoming and to unfold otherwise than as an objective flux of things. A multiplicity of sentients would be the very mode in which a becoming is possible—a becoming in which thought would not simply find again, now in movement, a being subject to a universal law, producing unity. Only in this way does becoming acquire the value of an idea radically opposed to the idea of being, does it designate the resistance to every integration expressed by the image of the river, in which, according to Heraclitus, one does not bathe twice, and according to Cratylus, not even once. A notion of becoming destructive of Parmenidean monism is acquired only through the singu­larity of sensation. [↑](#footnote-ref-2)