

Real Time Detection of MAC Layer DoS Attacks in IEEE 802.11 Wireless Networks

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L2 DoS Attacks

MAC DoS Attacks



Misbehavior attack

SAA

CAA

Misdirection

RTS flooding

Selfish attacks

RTS dropping

Shorter DIFS, SIFS

NAV manipulation

Back-off manipulation



Change Point Detection

- Collect time series data
 - $\{x_1, x_2, x_3, \dots, x_t, \dots\}$
- Detect change point (μ), where the time series follows different distributions before and after the change
- Pre and post change density functions are
 - $f(\cdot)$ and $g(\cdot)$ respectively
- Hypotheses
 - $\mathcal{H}_0 = \{x_1, x_2, x_3, \dots, x_n\} \sim f$
 - $\mathcal{H}_1 = \{x_1, x_2, x_3, \dots, x_\mu\} \sim f$
 $\{x_{\mu+1}, x_{\mu+2}, x_{\mu+3}, \dots, x_n\} \sim g$



Change Point Detection

- CUSUM family algorithms
 - Parametric
 - Cumulative sum of log likelihood ratio
 - $W_n = \{W_{n-1} + \log(g/f)\}^+$, for all $n > 0$, $x^+ = \max(0, x)$
 - Use preset threshold for decision
 - Non parametric
 - Removed the need for density functions
 - $W_n = \{W_{n-1} + x_n - c\}^+$, for all $n > 0$
 - x_n is a non parametric score, a special heuristic function
- Similarly, R-SPRT



Central Limit Theorem

- New sequential change point detection
 - Let m is the window size, $0 \leq t \leq n-2m$
 - $Y_1(t) = \sum_{i=t+1}^{t+m} x_i$ and $Y_2(t) = \sum_{i=t+m+1}^{t+2m} x_i$
 - $D(t) = |Y_1(t) - Y_2(t)|$
- Compare $D(t)$ with threshold (D_{th})
- What makes it so Special?
- Let $\phi(.)$ be the CDF for standard normal distribution, defined as below:
 - $\phi(z) = P(a \leq z)$




Computing Threshold

- Then, $1 - \Phi(z)$ is the probability of $P(a > z)$
- For desired false alarm rate (ϵ), the cut-off value of z can be calculated as:
 - $1 - \Phi(z) = \epsilon$
- Borrow the solution z from the above, and scale it to find the threshold as below:
 - $D_{th} = z\sqrt{2m\sigma}$
- Detection Latency:
 - Report change time: $\eta = t+m$
 - Latency: $\eta - \mu$







Attack Simulation





- Back-off manipulation attacks
 - DIFS, SIFS, slot time
- RTS flooding attack
- UDP echo client application
- Different inter packet departure rates











- Normal nodes
- Sink node
- Attacker













Throughput Curves



Detection Accuracy

Algorithms	Scenarios	Detected	False Alarms	Latency(s)
CLT*	1	Yes	2	2.988
CLT*	1	Yes	8	7.223
CLT*	2	Yes	0	0.029
CLT*	2	Yes	1	0.818
NP-CUSUM	1	Yes	>50	-
NP-CUSUM	2	No	-	-

The higher latencies are corresponding to higher E-to-E delays



Why so?



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Takeaways

- Time series based attack detection
- A new sequential change point detection based on CLT
- Non parametric, Dynamic threshold
- Two types of 802.11 attacks
- NS-3 802.11 stack hack to create attackers



THANKS!



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Questions

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