[Unit 1]

1/18 Descartes

Aristotle: "psuche" broad soul/mind (digestion → rational judgment)

Descartes: includes all of consciousness in mind

Kim: Phenomenal consciousness (sensory qualities) + and intentions (propositional/representational attitudes) = mind

1/23 Ryle on Descartes' Myth

1. Casual Problems
    a. The Mystery Problem = Mind/Body casual interaction seems inexplicable
    b. The Redundancy Problem = Our body is already explained by physical explanations, the mind is then redundant
2. Other Minds Problems
    a. "you can't tell whether or not someone else has a mind"
    b. i.e. given dualism, a body may behave as if it has a soul, but it could not, therefore we should not accept dualism

Alternatives to dualism (20th century)

I. Psycho-neural Identity theory
    a. Minds do cause intentional behavior (Descartes was right that brains are "thinking things")
    b. These hidden mental events are physical and occur in the brain
II. Philosophical Behaviorism
    a. Minds are not contained within the brain; the mind is independent of the brain. (Minds can exist without brains)
    b. Minds are not things like bodies that cause intentional behavior
    c. To talk about minds = talk about behavior
    d. Stream of consciousness is unimportant with regards to behaviorist
III. Ryle (*broad* Behaviorist)
    a. A mind requires more than a stream of consciousness (Stream of consciousness is not what makes us more intelligent than lizards)

b. Category Mistake = dualists think minds and bodies belong to same category i.e. "things" or "substances"

1/25 Kim on Behaviorism

I. Wittgenstein beetle in a box
   a. Possible for everyone to have something different in their box
   b. The world beetle becomes meaningless
II. Kim on Behaviorism
   a. Explain mind based on publicly observable behavior
   b. The behavior of winces and groans helps us understand pain because we think of pain as the causes of these winces and groans (it's not necessary that pain cause these behaviors)

Timeline:

Aristotle (300s' BC)

Descartes (1640's)

Ryle (1949)

Smart (1950s)

1/27 Smart's Psychoneural Identity Theory (he's against it: Smart says perception is brain processes)

a. Basic View
   a. Concepts of sensations are not satisfactory explained by behaviorism
   b. Sensations are hidden as brain processes
   c. Difference in meaning between "brain talk" and "sense talk"
b. Meaning and Reference
   a. Two things can have different meanings but refer to the same entity
   b. We describe sense perception differently but refer to the same brain processes

i. So we don't say "x feels pain" is the same meaning as the brain processes (science), but simply refer to the same thing.

c. Occam's Razor = law of parsimony; choose the simplest hypothesis out of competing ones

d. Nomological danglers = it would require that the ultimate laws of nature to create complex events involving configurations of billions of particles

c. Ultimate law of nature = Smart doesn't believe that neuron firings could really be fundamental laws (like gravity, etc.)

d. Criticism of P1 distinct from P2 properties

1/30 "Mind as Brain" or Kim on Psychoneural Identity Theory

1. For every mental property M, there is a neural-physical property N, s/t M=N
2. Block and Stalnaker = there is no *reason* for identities, they simply exist
3. Psychoneural doesn't work because neural states are common and not exclusive to our one physical brain

2/1 Functionalism / Multiple Realizability

I. Mental properties resist reduction to the physical domain → Functionalism becomes more popular
   a. i.e. we can criticize psychonueral identity theory while also not going back to Descartes dualism

II. Multiply realizable = the very same mental features can be had equally by physically very diverse beings
   a. Eg: humans, cats, octopi, robots, aliens could all feel pain (or any mental state)?
   b. Therefore we cannot differentiate mental states from physical phenomena

III. Functionalism = mental states are determined by the function or role it plays (the same function may be performed by very diverse states)
   a. Mousetraps can be made in infinitely many physical ways, but all serve the very same *function*. This is the multiple realization of mousetraps in physically diverse entities.

IV. Causal Role Functionalism = mental states are apt to cause certain effects and to be the effect of certain causes (minds are causal roles)

V. Machine Functionalism = mental states are functional states of a computational machines (minds are computational machines)

2/3 Kim on Functionalism

I. Functionalism allows for mental states to cause behavior
II. Ramseification = replace specific mental states with general mental properties; this lets us describe pain in terms of functional role without circularity
    1. X is in pain == When there exist states: M1, M2, and M3 [T (M1, M2, M3) and x is in M2]
III. **Qualia Inversion** (the ways of looking and feeling) objection = Colors can be swapped; therefore different mental properties might play the same role for different people
    1. The implication is that we lose casual interaction between the mind and the function
    2. SIMPLIFICATION: input and outputs are the same, but the mental properties in-between could be different
IV. **Absent Qualia** = Feelings can be completely removed; therefore the same function is indistinguishable from something playing the same role but not having any of the feelings

Kripke on the Mind-Body Problem: the "Modal Argument"

I. Rigid designator = an expression is a rigid designator if it designates to the same object in every possible world in which object exists
    a. Rigid designators: Ben Franklin, Richard Nixon
    b. Non-rigid designators: The inventor of bifocals, the US president in 1970
II. Recipe: Explaining Away Strategy ⇔ It is possible X without Y and Y without X
    a. This proves that *feeling of pain* and *brain states* distinct properties
    b. Modal epistemology = Possibility/Necessity and How do we know?
III. Hill Response: there are other ways to explain things away without using the Explaining Away Strategy (therefore not if and only if)
IV. Two types of imagination:
    i. 1. Sympathetic – Put ourselves in a different position; 1st-person
    ii. 2. Perceptual – Things we imagine with our perception

[Unit 2] – Consciousness

What is Consciousness (Kim)

I. Preliminaries of Consciousness
    a. Consciousness is important because without it we don't think of ourselves as really human
    b. Consciousness is debated heavily over by philosophers (with diverse views)

c. Consciousness is also hard to explain with just science; we have to know what we are trying to explain before we can find it empirically!

II. Positive Account of Consciousness
   a. There are (1) conscious creatures and (2) conscious states; but we focus of (2) conscious states
      i. This is because (1) creature consciousness is dependent on (2) conscious states
   b. Block state: "phenomenal consciousness is experience" & "a state is made phenomenally conscious if there *is something it's like to be in that state*"
      i. Kim adds: Sensory paradigms; phenomenal consciousness (distinctive qualitative characters)
   c. Kim doesn't always say: "what it's like": There is something it's like to hold your breath or meet the president BUT these aren't conscious states
      i. Similarly, what it's like to feel pain is not always the same but depends on the occasion of the pain.
      ii. And, there's something it's like to believe BUT there is no special *quale* of this belief and thus is not a phenomenally conscious state.
   d. Thus Kim is not in agreement with the Block: "what it's like"

III. Siewert: there is more to what it's like to understand than is found merely in 'sensed or felt qualities"
   a. i.e.: what it is like to act without understanding is different than what it is like to act with understanding (phenomenally they seem to be the same, but we say they are not)

<u>Siewert on Consciousness</u>

I. Siewert motto: "minimally presumptuous without being useless"

II. Threefold Conception of Consciousness
   a. Subjective experience conception
   b. Subjective contrast conception
   c. Subjective knowledge conception
   d. Aim: unit these three appealing and intuitive ways of explaining phenomenal consciousness

III. Subjective experience conception
   a. Consciousness = experience
   b. Problem: we can have experience where there is no phenomenally
   c. Sea Slug: experience affects the strength of our synaptic connections but this isn't phenomenal. Thus experience cannot ≡ consciousness.
      i. [experience cannot ≡ consciousness] because we experience our experiences (hence its coincidence they are the same)
      ii. We lose phenomenal character if we just say experience = consciousness

IV. Subjective contrast conception
   a. Understanding consciousness by comparing it to its absence
   b. Blindsight = it is possible to both see relevant stimulus and still be blind
      i. Blindsight isn't phenomenal consciousness but it is still sensory perception?
      ii. We cannot see something that looks no way to us
   c. Subjective contrast: blindsight viewing is not consciousness, but viewing shapes we cannot make out are consciousness; defining more clearly what "looking" is
   d. Phenomena requires something looking somehow to you; subjective stuff is phenomenal

<u>What is it like to be a bat? Nagel challenges physicalism</u>

I. We can't explain the physical nature of mental phenomena
   a. If Physicalism is true, then all mental phenomena have an objective character.
II. Subjective vs. Objective as demonstrated by the Bat
   a. 1. Assume that there is something it's like to be a bat, for a bat.
   b. 2. We can *know* the facts about what it means to be a bat, but still not *feel* how it means to be a bat.
      i. E.g. we have to take up a point of a view that we cannot possibly take up
   c. Therefore objective facts cannot completely contain feels; therefore there are some things that are *only* in the realm of subjectiveness
III. Objective = facts that require nothing
IV. Subjective = facts that require a point a view

<u>The Knowledge Argument (Jackson; What Mary doesn't know argument)</u>

I. If she has all knowledge, she knows the experience of color. But she cannot understand this by deduction. Thus (1) is wrong?
   a. Distinction between "knowledge that" vs. "knowledge how"
   b. All these facts are physical but not deducible in this fashion (the response is)
II. Response to Mary Argument
   a. (1) No new knowledge = Mary doesn't gain any new knowledge that she couldn't learn through physicalism
   b. (2) Only new abilities = Mary gains new abilities with color, not new knowledge. Abilities are not deducible and do not violate physicalism
   c. (3) Only a new way of knowing the same old facts = Mary with color just gains a new way of knowing the same facts she already knew from the textbook

Phil 312: Notes

Levine – The Explanatory Gap

I. Can consciousness be scientifically explained?
   a. Neural Correlates of Consciousness (NCC)
      i. fMRI's, brain maps, etc. for consciousness?
      ii. Binocular rivalry: After staring at an image long enough, we switch images rather than superimpose them; this gives us neural correlates for what it's like to see green/red
II. Explanatory Gap = even if we find the NCC identities for everything we still don't understand everything about consciousness
III. Argument:
   a. (a) heat is molecular motion and water is H20
   b. (b) pain is c-fiber firing or (b') pain is to be in functional state F
   c. (a) is fully explanatory, (b) is not fully explanatory
      i. (a) gives a casual explanation for the phenomenon; we need not know any more
      ii. (b) something is left unexplained; why does someone in that physical state feel that way
   d. To me: this seems to go back to the question of explaining **why does c-fibers firing cause pain?**
      i. Is this even an intelligible question? Is there more to explain then the causal role? It seems so because this why question seems to make sense.
      ii. Can we push all questions to the unanswerable why question? Is it even a problem if we cannot answer the why question?

Kim and Physicalists vs. the Explanatory Gap

I. Supervenience: Physical state P is necessary for mental state M
II. Hard Problems of Consciousness
   a. How can neural mechanism N enable a system to preform task T? [easy problem]
   b. How can neural mechanism N enable a system to experience pain? [hard problem]
   c. Concept of what it's like *is not a functional role concept*; the second question is the hard question.
III. Psychonerual identities vs. the explanatory gap = if we have identities, we have no gap.
   a. The feeling of pain is necessarily explained by the identity. (To ask why is to ask a silly question)
   b. Issue with this: if everything can be explained at the physical level, then mental states have no casual effect on things
IV. Functionalism vs. the explanatory gap = to be in pain is to be in a state that is caused by tissue damage

Phil 312: Notes

The Epiphenomenalist Worry

I. Kim on the identity reduction of qualia
   a. Kim: only the casual argument for the psychonerual identity theory is any good
   b. Epiphenomenalism = physical things can cause both physical things and mental things, but mental things cannot cause anything
      i. [the mind doesn't cause anything to happen]
      ii. We must answer this question in order to go on with psychonerual identity theory

Kim on Mental Causation and Epiphenomenalist

I. Davidson's anomalism of the mental
   a. Mental domain requires rationality and coherence
      i. To have a mind requires rationality
   b. Physical domain does not require rationality and coherence
   c. Psychophysical laws will not be "strict, precise, explicit laws"

II. Principals
   a. Causal closure of the physical domain = all physical events have a wholly physical cause
   b. Exclusion Principle = no event has two or more distinct sufficient causes, unless it is a case of overdetermination
   c. Overdetermination = 2 bullets shot to kill a man, one does the job

III. The Exclusion Argument
   a. Suppose M is a cause of P
   b. Physical property P* is a sufficient cause of P
   c. M is over and above P (M is not P)
   d. There is not a case of genuine overdetermination (Like a firing squad)
   e. Thus we conclude either:
      i. M is not a cause of P and (a) is false
      ii. There is no mental to physical causation (epiphenomenalism)
   f. Thus we must accept serious physical in order to avoid epiphenomenalism

IV. Objection: by stating that neither P* or M could not occur in absence of each other, we avoid overdeterminism; thus we can be non-reductionist and have mental causation

Phil 312: Notes

[Unit 3]

Computers, Minds, and the Turing Test

I. Machine Functionalism
   a. It's our brain's computational ability, not biology, which truly makes it a mind.
II. Turing Test (Alan Turing) [Turing Machines are analog CPUs]
   a. Can machines think? Alan thinks it's too meaningless to ask the question but with further technology we can answer YES to this question without much objection.
      i. We will change what it means to say something thinks rather than machines will acquire our ability to think.
      ii. Part A: We would reinterpret the question.
      iii. Part B: Technological advancements would help clarify the issue.
   b. Turing Test = A computer and a person both submit written responses to questioning third party, and the third party cannot tell the difference. Thus a computer could think like a person.
   c. Too tough: there are people who can't write but still have a mind
   d. Too easy: there is no semantic requirement for the program, doesn't this matter?

Dennett's "True Believers" (Is Mind in the Eye of the Observer)

I. What is a belief and what makes something a "true believer"?
   a. True Believer = intentional system, or a system whose behavior is reliably and voluminously predictable via the intentional strategy
   b. Intentional strategy = treating the object whose behavior you want to predict as a rational agent with beliefs and desires and other mental states exhibiting intentionality
II. How to use the intentional strategy for object X
   a. Decide to treat X as a rational agent
   b. Attribute to X beliefs and desires X ought to have
      i. X ought to have a lot of true beliefs about its environment (given sufficient sensory exposure)
         1. We will get some false beliefs attributable against the background of largely true ones
         2. I.E. Believers get things right fairly often, and false beliefs are given against the background of true beliefs
      ii. X ought to want: survival, absence of pain, food, comfort, procreation, and entertainment
   c. Predict that X will act to get what it desires via its beliefs
III. What does the intentional strategy work on?

a. Humans, animals, computers, thermostats, plants, lightning

IV. Concern #1: Doesn't this make something a true believer only relative to an observer who is unable to predict its behavior in other ways?

V. Concern #2: It's too easy east to be a true believer if even thermostats have minds
   a. It's a difference of degree, but a big difference of degree

VI. Dennett on Searle
   a. They disagree over what it means to have beliefs or minds

Content Externalism: Are your beliefs in your head?

I. Mental content = *What* I believe, hope, or doubt; the content of mental states
   a. Content is "truth evaluable"; the content is true or false

II. Causal-correlational: Frogs can't differentiate between flies and schmies
   a. The perception only represents flies/schmies because of correlation (i.e. content of perceptions depends on environment, not actuality)

III. S holds mental content P ⇔ it's the case that P
   a. Can a belief ever really be wrong if I can forever add to P? (I see either a horse or a mule, or a robot, etc…); beliefs seem to always be true somehow

Mental Content & Kim

I. Is mind confined to the brain?

II. Putnam's Twin Earth

III. Burge's Social Externalism / arthritis

The Extended Mind

I. The Extended Mind View
   a. Extended Cognitive Process = some parts of the world outside a person's body are literally parts of their cognitive processes
   b. Extended Belief = "standing beliefs" can be constituted partly by features of one's environment
   c. Extended Self = the extended mind implies an extended self

II. Extended Mind vs. Extended Consciousness
   a. Cognition is impacted by external environment, but it is not necessary that pure consciousness be impacted by the external environment (dreams, brain manipulation, etc.)

b. Foundation Argument = consciousness depends only on what is going on in the brain [due to our ability to manipulate consciousness by manipulating only the brain]

III. Extended Mind vs. Content Externalism
   a. Content Externalism = H20 vs. XYZ, what I believe is different due to passive difference in the two environments
   b. Extended Mind = it's not just content of belief that depends on the external, the state of believing something [and other mental/cognitive processes] is external
      i. Content Externalism = true/false of belief are external
      ii. Extended Mind = literal beliefs are external

IV. Parity Principle = anything external that functions like a process as if it *were done in the head* means that it is part of our extended mind

The Extended Mind – Overextended?

I. Features that indicate Otto's notebook is part of his extended mind
   a. 1. Constant, 2. Readily accessible, 3. Automatically endorsed, 3. Endorsed in the past
   b. Limit's on introspection
   c. Proliferation of actions

Noe: Extended Consciousness

I. Theory: "The brain is not the locus of consciousness inside us because consciousness has no locus inside us."
   a. I.e. consciousness isn't something that happens inside us: it is something that we do, actively, in our dynamic interaction with the world around us."

II. Noe's account of the "the standard view"
   a. We really are our brains, and our bodies are at most robotic tools at our brains' disposal.

III. Disagreement occurs at:
   a. (I) The "Boundary of Consciousness" Question
      i. They think that the boundaries of processes of thought perception terminate at the boundary of the brain
   b. (II) The "Brain in a Vat Question" Question

IV. Noe on Brain imaging and Persistent Vegetative State (PVS)

a. "at present we are not even close to being able to use brain imaging to get a look inside the head to find out whether there is consciousness or not."
b. Noe questions how good functional imaging can look at consciousness

Noe: Extended Consciousness (Magic Realism)

I. Ferret argument
   a. Eyes can be rewired to what are normally the auditory areas of the ferret brain, and the ferrets develop the capacity to see using this auditory area of the brain
   b. Thus the brain is plastic
II. The Phantom Hand
   a. Sometimes when an amputee is touched on the face, she will report feeling as if she is touched on the now missing hand because the neighboring face area of the brain invades the hand cortex and gets entangled with it
   b. Thus the brain is not 1 to 1
III. Why is it that sometimes the source of the stimulation to the brain seems to matter to determining the character of the subject's experience (ferret), and sometimes it's the brain area stimulated which is decisive (hand)

Noe: Extended Consciousness, Pt. 2: Return to Magic Realism

I. Substrate: "The substrate of perceptual experience… encompasses not only neural activations but also their dynamic relation to distal objects… the perceived objects themselves."
II. Clark: "dreams and surgeons" argument shows that the brain alone is responsible for consciousness (but not cognition)
III. Surgeon argument:
   a. Some conscious experiences can be produced by direct brain stimulation
   b. Then all events in consciousness can be produced by direct brain stimulation
   c. Thus the brain alone makes us conscious, and all conscious events arise inside our brains